

**Who Likes Globalization?
Attitudes towards International Markets, Migration,
and Marriage in Four East Asian Countries***
**誰主張全球化？
東亞地區民衆對於跨國貿易、移民及婚姻的態度**

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中文摘要

全球化對不同國家和民衆的影響不同。本文從社會階層化的角度檢視階級和社會經濟地位與全球化態度間的關連性。利用2008年東亞社會調查（EASS）的資料，作者發現，中國、日本、韓國和台灣民衆對於經濟和社會面向的全球化態度迥異。東亞國家是全球貿易投資自由化的受益者，民衆支持經濟全球化。但是在社會全球化方面，教育程度愈高者對於外籍配偶的增加持反對的態度。本文也討論了為何東亞國家民衆經濟態度開放、但社會態度保守。

關鍵詞：全球化態度、階層化、階級、外籍配偶、移工、東亞社會調查

I. Introduction

Globalization has brought increasing flows of trade, people, culture, and information across national borders. As the movements and arguments against globalization continue unabated (Ray, 2007: 158), the impacts of globalization are advancing at both national and individual levels (Brady et al., 2007; Guillén, 2001). Globalization affects individuals as consumers, workers, residents, or migrants, in advanced as well as in developing countries. We are well informed about the objective effects of globalization, including the debates about its development, economic consequences, erosion of state sovereignty, and/or general welfare of the populace (e.g., Held, 2003[2000]). And even though Hirst and Thompson (1999) criticized the earlier literature for exaggerating the extent of globalization in the contemporary era, Guillén (2001) documents the boom of international financial and trade relations among affluent countries in the last two decades of the 20th century.

One of the criticisms about globalization is the unequal distribution of economic gains among countries in different positions in the hierarchy of world economy (Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 135-136). The trajectory seems to follow the path of dependent development and multinational corporations and upper class in their core economies gain more from globalized trade and investments than economically less developed countries (Duckett and Miller, 2006). As to the effects of globalization within countries, researchers note that individuals with higher economic and social status tend to support increasing openness of borders for foreign investments and foreign labor. They are the group who generally benefit from cheaper services and imported products. In contrast, those situated in the lower strata do not have resources in terms of knowledge, skills, and capital to utilize the advantages of economic and social openness due to globalization. For them job opportunities and wages are constantly threatened by cheaper imported products and foreign workers. Based on the findings of previous researcher, this paper uses the stratification perspective to study people's attitudes toward globalization at the individual and the country level.

And the region of interest is East Asia.

East Asia in particular has advanced rapidly in integration with the world economy. Eyraud and Lee (2008: xxii) noted that East Asia “provides probably the most fertile ground for examining the benefits and disadvantages of globalization”. Being one of the most economically dynamic regions in the world, East Asia manifests a compressed version of the world economic hierarchy. One of the most advanced economies in the world, Japan exceeds all other countries in East Asia in both national wealth and individual income. South Korea (“Korea” hereafter in this article) and Taiwan are in semi-peripheral positions in the 1970s but steadily developed since then (Amsden, 2001). Developing rapidly since the late 1980s and now replacing Japan as the second largest economy in the world (Dawson and Dean, 2011), although China is classified as a peripheral country in terms of per capita income. All the four East Asian economies have benefited from international trade and investments at different stages in history.

East Asia has been involved in social globalization too. Countries in the region have been historically homogeneous in culture and ethnicity, with the exception of significant minorities in China. The numbers of culturally-distinct indigenous peoples within these countries are too few to form a major ethnicity. But recently, East Asia countries have been compelled to revise their immigration policies and began to receive a large number of economic and marital migrants, mainly due to demographic changes and the rising living standards and the shortage of manual labor. Changes of immigration policies include revisions of regulations about citizenship of foreign spouses, the extension of length of legal stay for migrant workers, and the increasing quota for the number of international migrants. These changes affect and reflect the public’s attitudes toward assimilation of foreign culture and foreigners from the economically less developed countries into their homelands.

It seems that no studies have systematically examined public attitudes toward various dimensions of globalization and provide theoretical explanations to the results. The paper first examines public opinions on globalization at the aggregate

level among China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. It then continues to inquire which populations with what demographic characteristics are more favorably disposed towards globalization than others in East Asia. The focus of analysis is on the impact of individual and family characteristics, socio-economic status, and foreign contacts and experiences. I utilize the data of the East Asian Social Survey conducted in 2008 for the analysis. EASS consists of nation-wide, representative surveys of the four East Asian societies (more details later) listed above.

In the next section, I will review previous studies and propose hypotheses for relationships of variables used in the analyses. I then discuss the data in detail and present statistical findings. The last part of the paper discusses the implications of the main findings.

II. Literature Review

A. Differences of attitudes among East Asian countries

Regardless of questions asked or countries studied, past research generally has found that people take a positive view of globalization (Edwards, 2006; Mayda and Rodrik, 2005). Researchers used a perspective of positions in the world economic hierarchy to explain variations among countries. For instance, based on a survey of forty-seven countries between 1995 and 1997, Mayda and Rodrik (2005) found that China scored lower in pro-trade attitudes than Korea, Taiwan and Japan. Machida (2011) reported similar findings. He attributed it to the different positions of countries in the world system because core countries seem to benefit more from free trade and foreign investment than the less developed countries.

But other studies show to the contrary that position in the world system, i.e. core, semi-periphery, or periphery, may not determine people's attitudes toward globalization. Benefitting from world economic openness or not seems to be the more important determining factor. Duckett and Miller (2006) studied attitudes toward

an open economy and cultural imports in the Czech Republic, Korea, Ukraine, and Vietnam. They compared the distributions of answers to various opinion questions and found that most respondents had positive evaluation of international mobility of goods and culture in these four countries. However, among these four, respondents in Vietnam and Korea showed even higher support for globalization. Their economy benefited from openness to the world economy and people there thus are more likely support liberalization of trade and capital mobility.

Along with Taiwan, Korea has since the Cold War era relied on the dynamics of the global economy to become an important world economic force (Strange, 1996). Export-led development lifted Taiwan and Korea to the status of semi-peripheral country (Amsden, 2001). Like China also a socialist country, Vietnam has actively invited foreign investment following the former's developing trajectory in the last few decades. As a late late-development country, China learned from late-developed countries, such as the former Asian Four Tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan), how to take advantage of economic dependence through active state assistance and regulations.

The perspective of material interests may also explain the attitudes toward international migration. People's movements across borders for jobs or new lives constitute the social aspect of globalization. More than one hundred million instances of migration occurred in 2010 (ILO, 2010). Economic migration has increased 20% within ten years, from 86,000,000 in 2000 to 103,000,000 cases in 2010. Many more works have studied attitudes toward immigration than to economic globalization (for a most recent example, Mewes and Mau, 2013). From individual point of view, the threat of job opportunities taken by cheaper foreign migrants is real and direct, while the impacts of economic openness are indirect and not easy to notice. Analyzing the ISSP (International Social Survey Program) data for cross-national comparisons, Mayda (2008) found that respondents in the surveyed countries are

clearly more pro-trade than pro-immigration.¹ As to differences among countries, an international survey showed that Japan has a more restrictive immigration policy than other economically advanced European societies (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Even though the percentages of foreign workers in the total labor force are still low (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005: 9), migrant workers are visible in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan now. Inglehart and Baker (2000) found that people in East Asia still adhere to certain traditional family values under Confucian influences, even while economically industrializing. The insistence on ethnic homogeneity and nationalism still prevail in these Oriental societies and be represented in their restrictive immigration policies (Castles and Miller, 2009; Tsai, 2011). Social and demographic changes have pushed East Asian countries to reluctantly adopt a more open policy, in order to allow more foreign migrants to work than before, e.g. in menial jobs and in care for the elderly, and to accept international marriages mainly for the benefits of men living in rural areas.

There exist some differences of migration policies and results among East Asia countries, however. Taiwan has been more open in accepting foreign female spouses than Japan and Korea, judging by the numbers (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005). To date, there are more than four hundred thousand so-called “foreign brides” in the country (Lan, 2006). Korea has received forty-three thousand female spouses from other countries, mostly from China (Lee et al., 2006). China for the most part supplies brides in the international marriage market. As their support of economic openness I expect that Chinese might be more tolerant of foreign brides than people in other East Asian countries too.

B. Differences of attitudes at an individual level: Self-interest or openness?

Countries are becoming even more stratified in income and wealth due to increasing global competition in jobs and deskilling of the working class. Global-

¹ Mayda (2008) does not show which year of ISSP data was used in her analyses.

ization brings increasing competition in production efficiency and cost reduction. As the innovations of technology, transport, and communications have diminished the constraints of geographic distance, factories can be relocated easily from one country to another, and services can be subcontracted to take advantage of lower-paid workers (Hoogvelt, 2001: 135). Among all workers, the lower ranked labor, or that hired as contingent workers, is more vulnerable to be replaced by workers in outsourcing countries or by migrant workers (Davis-Blake and Broschak, 2009). As Coates (2000) points out, with capital and human resources becoming more mobile, globalization has doubled the size of the proletariat. Even though countries in East Asia seem to be among the winners in globalization, not all people benefit from economic prosperity (Kalleberg and Hewison, 2013). The polarization among owners and managers of big business, highly-skilled workers, and the common working class seem to deteriorate. The percentages of workers in precarious positions, such as the dispatched or the temporary, increased sharply especially in Japan and Korea (Kubo, 2008; Lee and Yoo, 2008).

Empirically, according to the results from previous studies (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hoffman, 2010; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), differences in economic interests and job opportunities contribute to differences of attitudes among respondents. People support globalization when it benefits their personal fortunes or improves life chances. They oppose it if foreign workers tend to replace them in their jobs or depress the average wages. Thus, manual workers and lower-level service workers are less likely to support globalization, especially in regards to the importation of foreign workers. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) report a tendency for low-skilled workers to oppose labor immigration in the U.S. In contrast, skilled laborers in rich countries are more likely to welcome globalization because they already receive higher benefits and are in a better bargaining position (Rudra, 2005).

In addition to economic interests, individuals' evaluations of globalization vary according to their personal knowledge, overseas experience, and local social contacts. While low skill levels and class positions in the occupational structure

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elicit negative attitudes toward globalization, educational background might mediate these effects. According to Hoffman (2010), highly educated people in general favor neo-liberalism and support free trade. They are likely to support immigration-friendly policies; people with more advanced educational degrees are inclined to accept liberalism and multiculturalism (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Mau et al. (2008) studied the German case and found education to have a positive effect on the acceptance of globalization. They interpret the results as due to the experience of multicultural contacts, and thence belief in universal equal rights for foreigners. But in analyzing a cross-national data set Davidson et al. (2009) find that elites (whom they define as capitalists and cosmopolitans) in developed countries do not always support social globalization. Thus the attitudes toward global openness seem to vary depending on the countries studied and the aspects of globalization involved. This paper does not have a specific hypothesis about the effects of education on people's attitudes toward economic and social globalization.

This paper includes cosmopolitan experiences as another factor affecting people's views of globalization; this factor has rarely been included in previous studies. Globalization is not just an abstract term or a force that matters only at the macro level. Individuals directly experience globalization by travelling or doing business overseas, watching news from international channels such as Al Jazeera, BBC, or CNN or other sources, communicating with friends of different nationalities, and/or exploring cultural products and activities from other countries. Overseas experiences, having contacts with foreigners living in other countries or with migrants at home seems to reduce social distance among people with different cultures and ethnicities (Bhagwati, 2004). Many East Asians have had first-hand experience because of travelling or contacts. Chang and Chen (2013) see the popularity of overseas sex-related consumption by East Asians as both a result and a symbol of globalization. Meeting migrant workers and female spouses from Southeast Asia or East Asia (especially China) have become common experiences in Taiwan and some other East Asian countries. Many male Southeast Asian workers can be seen laboring on

construction sites or in underground tunnels and their female counterparts help care for the elderly or the sick in the host countries. I expect that travel experiences and foreign contacts would help to increase people's acceptance of multiculturalism including international migrants from various nationalities. It is assumed that knowing and contacting with people from different cultures directly would improve mutual understandings and acceptance of the increase of the number of migrant workers and brides.

Other socio-demographic factors are also important variables in affecting people's attitudes toward globalization. These include gender, age, and the level of urbanization of residence. Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) found that men tend to be more conservative than women in their attitudes toward globalization. They also find that people living in rural areas tend to be more conservative on immigration than those living in cities.² Age has effects on people's attitudes as well. Based on the analysis of a Japanese survey, Sasaki (2004) finds that, in general, older people are more likely to support the policy of putting limits on importation of foreign products than are the younger generation. According to her study, while the majority of respondents wish the number of immigrants to stay the same, the older cohorts are more likely to prefer a decrease. Following the findings in previous research, this paper hypothesizes that respondents living in urban areas, women, and the younger generations would more likely support globalization. However, as competitors in the marriage market, fewer women than men may support the migration of foreign brides.

² Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) also reviewed the effects of political inclination on attitudes toward migration. Since the differences between left or right political parties hardly exist in East Asia, this paper does not discuss this factor.

III. Data Source and Variables

A. Data source

This paper uses the East Asian Social Survey (hereafter EASS) of 2008 to analyze people's attitudes toward globalization in Eastern Asia.³ EASS is a collaborative project of four national surveys: CGSS (Chinese General Social Survey), JGSS (Japan), KGSS (Korea), and TSCS (Taiwan Social Change Survey). It started in 2006 and has been conducted every two years since then. The same nationwide representative stratified random sampling method and questionnaire was used by all four national surveys. The theme of the 2008 EASS survey was Culture and Globalization, which incorporates questions on cross-cultural activities, attitudes toward globalization, travel experience, and social networks. Thus this survey provides comprehensive indicators for the study of globalization (see below). In comparison to, for example, Mayda and Rodrik (2005), I thus use a more recently-collected survey data to test public opinions. The original sample size in 2008 was 3,010 in China, 2,160 in Japan, 1,508 in Korea, and 2,067 in Taiwan.

B. Dependent variables

In the 2008 EASS survey, there are three sets of questions directly referring to globalization. The first set of questions asks the respondents about their attitudes toward globalization in respect to: 1) limiting the import of foreign products to protect domestic economy; 2) pursuing national interests, even if it leads to conflicts with other nations; 3) whether exposure to foreign films, music and books damages local culture. I use these three survey questions to represent attitudes supporting "protectionism" (i.e., opposing globalization). A seven-point scale is used for the answers in the questionnaire: strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor dis-

³ The website link to the East Asian Social Survey is <http://www.eassda.org/modules/doc/index.php?doc=intro>.

agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, and strongly disagree. It is inferred that people who agree with these statements to various degrees would more likely endorse protectionism of local business, national interests, and endogenous cultural products.

EASS also asks the respondents to evaluate the impact of cross-border flows of people, goods, and capital in various dimensions. The dimensions include economy, job opportunities, and environment. These three questions are used to represent people's support for or opposition to economic globalization in general. The answer options are also on a seven-point scale, ranging from very good to very bad.

The concepts of protectionism and evaluations of globalization each contain three questions. I used factor analyses to assess the possibility of decreasing the number of variables for the sake of parsimony (The results are presented in Appendix 1). The three questions of protectionism all load on the same factor, and each loading score is above 0.64. To make the composite, I combine the answers to the three questions. Thus values of the new composite - Protectionism - range from 3 (choosing "strongly agree" for all three items) to 21 (choosing "strongly disagree" for all three items). Higher values represent opposition to protectionism. The results of factor analysis are similar for the evaluation of globalization. All factor loadings are above 0.75. Values of the composite — Evaluation of Globalization — also range from 3 (choosing "very bad" for all three items) to 21 (choosing "very good" for all three items). Higher values represent positive evaluation of the impact of globalization.

In EASS, respondents are asked if they support increasing the number of foreign workers and brides respectively in their own countries (These are also questions adopted by the 2005 International Social Survey Program). There are five answer options for both questions: decrease greatly, decrease some, stay the same, increase some, and increase greatly. In Taiwan's case, the question of increasing the number of foreign spouses consists of three categories depending on their original nationalities: Southeast Asia, China, and other countries. To make the Taiwan surveys comparable with surveys of other countries in EASS, I combine the answers

for all the three nationalities together into a composite. Thus, if respondents wish to decrease the entry of foreign spouses of the three origins, the value of the composite is 3. The value is 15 if respondents agree to increase the number regardless of nationality. Other combinations vary in between these two values. Then to make the results comparable among countries, I use five categories for the coding in all four countries: the value of 3 to 1 (representing decreasing greatly), 4 to 6 as 2 (moderately decreasing), 7 to 9 as 3 (stay the same), 10 to 12 as 4 (moderately increasing), and 13 to 15 as 5 (increasing greatly).

C. Independent variables

Based on the literature review, I classify independent variables into three categories. One group includes socio-demographic variables: age, gender, marital status, and self-assessed degree of urbanization of the residence. These are used as control variables in the analysis. I hypothesize that older people, women, married people, and those living in less urbanized areas are more likely to support protectionism and be more cautious about the outcomes of globalization, and less likely to approve increasing the number of foreign workers or permanent migrants into their own countries. People with these characteristics are assumed to be more reserved about foreign influences and contacts.

The second group of variables represents socio-economic status. These include education level and language capital, class and occupational hierarchy, and income. I expect that more highly educated people or those who speak English more fluently will welcome increasing cross-border flows and contacts, and be more open to a free market, foreign influences, and international migration. People with higher income should feel less threatened by opening the market, as increasing foreign workers will be to their benefit due to availability of cheaper services. Thus, the rich are expected to oppose protectionism, give positive evaluations of globalization, and support increasing the number of migrant workers.

Everyone is likely to have a view about globalization, regardless of their em-

ployment status. Many respondents are devoted to bearing children and being full-time homemakers. Some are temporarily out of a job, retired, or unable to work due to various reasons. In order to better assess how class and occupational structure affects people's views about globalization, I constructed a variable representing employment status, occupational, and class positions. People out of the formal labor market are treated as one group in the analysis. Those in formal labor markets are classified by class and occupation: capitalists (hiring employees or not) and the employed. The last category is further divided into two groups: higher level non-manual workers and other employees. The former group includes white collar workers on a higher level, who are mainly professionals, managers, administrators, and legislators. Following on the previous literature, I expect that white collar workers will more likely oppose protectionism, positively evaluate the impact of globalization, and more likely endorse increasing foreign labor or brides than their counterparts with lower prestige or authority and those not in formal labor markets. The former possesses more human capital and social capital and are more competitive in world markets. The importing of foreign workers and women provides cheap labor in production and service sectors and does not constitute threats to their jobs. Thus the white-collar class is more likely to support globalization than those in positions of lower skill and prestige. However, I expect that employers will favor globalization more than the higher white-collar group, because they benefit from the option of using cheap labor.

The third block of variables in the analysis represents the concept of personal contacts. Specifically, these include the discussing international issues with others (measured by seven scales: never, about once a year, several times a year, about once a month, about once a week, several times a week, almost every day), experiences of travelling abroad, and having foreign friends. Both the latter two variables include three measures: never, once or one person, two or more. Being interested in or concerned about world-wide events, travelling in various places in the world, and having foreign contacts should increase respondents' support for globalization and

confidence in its impact, and lead to greater tolerance of immigrants.

IV. Findings

A. Descriptive statistics

I list the frequency distributions of the eight measures of the attitudes toward globalization in three figures. The histograms of Figure 1 show the results of attitudes toward protectionism among the four societies. To make the interpretation easier, I combine “strongly agree”, “agree”, and “somewhat agree” into one category: agree, “strongly disagree”, “disagree”, and “somewhat disagree” into one category: disagree. When asked about limiting imports to protect the domestic economy, the percentage of respondents agreeing with the statement is larger than those disagreeing in all East Asian samples. The highest percentage appears in China, followed by Taiwan and Korea. Respondents in all four societies in general show strong orientation towards protecting national interests in conflicts with other nations. However those in China and Taiwan respond even more strongly: 84% and 78% respectively agree with the statement. In general these findings are as expected that Chinese are the most supportive of globalization in the region as their country has been benefited from trade and investments liberation by providing cheaper labor force and other incentives for international business.

The last item listed in Figure 1 concerns the local influences of foreign culture. Taiwanese show the strongest positive attitudes toward the import of foreign culture, among all four states. Seventy-six percent of respondents disagree that increased exposure to foreign films, music, and books will damage native culture in Taiwan, far greater than 41% for China, 39% for Korea, and 33% for Japan.⁴

⁴ Checking into the frequency distribution of EASS 2008, I find that in comparison to people in other societies Taiwanese had the highest percentage of watching Korean TV dramas, Chinese movies, and Japanese animations. Japanese seldom watched Chinese movies or Korean TV dramas, while Chinese did not watch Japanese animation very often either. Taiwanese have the highest acceptance of TV programs or movies made by other societies in East Asia.




Figure 1. Attitudes toward Protectionism in Four East Asian Countries, 2008

Source: 2008 East Asian Social Survey - Culture and Globalization.

Note: Numbers in the parentheses are sample size by societies.

Figure 1 shows that Japanese have the highest percentage of saying “neither agree nor disagree” for all three measures of attitudes. The Japanese pattern of showing no strong attitudes toward either extreme of the scale is also found in another paper studying attitudes of these East Asian samples using the same year’s EASS survey (Chen and Chang, 2011).

The EASS survey also asks about people’s orientations to globalization through their assessment of the impact of international trade and investments. The results in Figure 2 show that all four societies gave positive evaluations to the impact of globalization on their economies. Since East Asian economies have enjoyed trade surpluses in internationally open economies, it is not surprising to see that the respondents react positively to globalization. Chinese and Taiwanese respondents are more likely to agree that globalization will bring more jobs and improve the environment, while Koreans and Japanese are more pessimistic about these. Koreans are especially conscious of the damage of globalization on the environment. As above, Japanese have the largest percentage showing a neutral attitude toward these questions or saying “cannot choose”.

The last section queries attitudes toward international migration. Figure 3 shows that Taiwan and Korea seem to belong to one group. As these two countries already have allowed in many foreign brides and guest workers, their people seem to wish the numbers of migrants to decrease. The majority of Japanese choose “staying the same” for both questions. It is noticeable that 44% of Chinese support an increase in foreign workers and 40% support more foreign brides moving into China. These numbers are higher than those of any other East Asian countries. As many Chinese became migrants in other East Asian countries, through marriage or work, they are more likely to accept the increase in numbers of foreigners than respondents than migrants-receiving countries such as Taiwan or Korea.





Figure 2. Attitudes toward Impacts of Globalization in Four East Asian Countries, 2008

Source & Note: see Figure 1.



■ Figure 3. Attitudes toward International Migration in Four East Asian Countries, 2008

Source & Note: see Figure 1.

B. Results of using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR)

I list the descriptive statistics of independent variables used in the analyses in Table 1. It is the basic information about the samples for each surveyed country. Generally speaking, the average age of Japanese respondents are older than Koreans, Taiwanese, and Chinese. Koreans and Taiwanese are more likely to live in cities than Japanese and Chinese. The majority of respondents have senior high or lower degree of education in China, while educational achievements of respondents are higher in the other three countries in the survey. There is a clear pattern of proletarianization of labor force in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The high percentages of respondents in the class of petty bourgeoisie in China might be due to the large size of population in the farm. Taiwanese have more experiences of travelling overseas and more likely to have friends with foreign nationalities than those in the other three countries.

■ Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Respondents' Characteristics in Four East Asian Societies

	Unit: % (persons)				
Respondents' Characteristics	China	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	χ^2 -value
Gender	(3,010)	(2,160)	(1,508)	(2,067)	6.9 +
Male	48	46	46	50	
Female	52	54	54	50	
Age	(3,010)	(2,160)	(1,506)	(2,067)	
Mean (S.D.)	43 (14)	52 (17)	45 (16)	45 (17)	
Marital status	(3,009)	(2,160)	(1,506)	(2,067)	415.3 ***
Single	11	16	22	28	
Married or cohabiting	84	71	66	62	
Divorced, Separated or widowed	5	13	13	10	
Self-assessed community scale [†]	(2,990)	(2,155)	(1,504)	(2,062)	1.7e+3 ***

Respondents' Characteristics	China	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	χ^2 -value
Farm in the country (=1)	0	5	1	.4	
Country village (=2)	35	32	13	20	
Town or small city (=3)	47	44	31	27	
Suburbs of big city (=4)	2	15	25	25	
Big city (=5)	16	5	30	28	
Education level [†]	(3,005)	(2,139)	(1,503)	(2,067)	1.7e+3 ***
No formal qualification (=1)	9	0	6	8	
Elementary school (=2)	24	2	10	15	
Junior high school (=3)	29	15	8	13	
Senior high school (=4)	23	48	40	30	
Junior college (=5)	9	13	9	13	
University (=6)	6	22	23	16	
Graduate school (=7)	.3	2	4	4	
Fluency in chatting with English speakers [†]	(3,010)	(2,151)	(1,506)	(2,065)	604.5 ***
Very poor (=1)	71	68	44	48	
Poor (=2)	21	20	38	28	
Fair (=3)	6	10	14	16	
Good (=4)	1	1	3	6	
Very good (=5)	1	.2	1	1	
Class structure	(2,957)	(2,151)	(1,507)	(2,066)	943.7 ***
Jobless, homemakers, students, etc.	35	37	41	35	
Wage employee: higher non-manual	8	6	4	9	
Wage employee: lower non-manual	12	26	24	22	
Wage employee: skilled manual	4	5	5	5	
Wage employee: unskilled manual	6	12	9	9	
Petty bourgeoisie	34	8	13	13	
Employer	2	6	4	7	
Monthly household income ^{†††}	(2,850)	(1,511)	(1,468)	(1,877)	

Respondents' Characteristics	China	Japan	Korea	Taiwan	χ^2 -value
Mean (unit: US\$)	374	5,335	2,882	2,495	
Frequency of talking about international issues [†]	(3,010)	(2,138)	(1,506)	(2,061)	389.3 ***
Never (=1)	36	25	25	26	
About once a year (=2)	5	8	6	4	
Several times a year (=3)	15	25	18	15	
About once a month (=4)	13	17	20	14	
About once a week (=5)	12	13	16	16	
Several times a week (=6)	12	9	11	18	
Almost everyday (=7)	5	2	3	7	
Has the respondent ever been to China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Europe or North America for tourism? ^{†, ††}	(3,010)	(2,148)	(1,502)	(2,067)	2.4e+3 ***
Has never been to these places (=0)	97	50	52	36	
Has been to one of these places (=1)	2	21	21	22	
Has been to two or more of these places (=2)	1	28	27	42	
Does the respondent have any acquaintances in China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Southeast Asia, Europe or North America? ^{†, ††}	(3,010)	(2,140)	(1,485)	(2,066)	1.2e+3 ***
Has no acquaintances in these places (=0)	94	72	68	54	
Has acquaintances in one of these places (=1)	4	17	18	21	
Has acquaintances in two or more of these places (=2)	2	11	14	25	

+ $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Source: see Figure 1.

[†] Being treated as a numerical variable in analyses.

^{††} Excluding respondents' own country.

^{†††} Been converted to US dollars at the exchange rate of the end of 2008.

Table 2 shows the results of regression analyses on the four variables measuring globalization; this was carried out by pooling the data of the four East Asian countries. For each dimension of globalization, the first column lists societal differences by using ordinary least squares regression (OLS) and the second column lists results of using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). I briefly explain the decision of using SUR in the next paragraph.

I speculate that the attitudes toward globalization are related to one another and one attitude may affect the answer of next question. I run a correlation analysis (Appendix 2) and find that three measures of globalization have significant correlations with one another, and the variable named Against Protectionism has weak relations with the other three. I thus include the other three measures of attitudes towards globalization in the equation when analyzing the remaining variable. For example, I include the attitudes towards the assessments of the impacts of globalization, and the attitudes toward the size of foreign brides and foreign workers when analyzing the equation of the variable of Against Protectionism. However, by including other attitude variables in the analysis would create the problem of endogeneity since these attitude variables are also affected by other independent variables in the same equation. Using OLS would result in biased estimates of regression coefficients. I thus use SUR in the multivariate analyses (Fiebig, 2001).⁵

The results of the first column for each dimension of globalization test only cross-national differences. Compared to Chinese (the reference group), respondents in the other three societies are more likely to oppose protectionism, but to view globalization more negatively, and are more likely to support a reduction in the number of migrants. Koreans and Japanese are in particular much less likely to assess globalization positively than do Chinese. The results show the coexistence of economic nationalism and the acceptance of globalization in China. Respondents in other East

⁵ I also analyze the same equations using OLS. Since the coefficients and significant level of many variables differ from using SUR, I present the results of SUR in the paper.

Table 2. Public Attitudes toward Globalization in East Asia, 2008: Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Results

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (S.E.)								
	Against Protectionism		Positive Evaluation of Globalization		Workers Increase		Immigration		
	OLS	SUR (1)	OLS	SUR (2)	OLS	SUR (3)	OLS	SUR (4)	
Country (China=0)									
Japan	1.96 (.09)***	2.27 (.36)***	-2.51 (.10)***	-2.18 (.38)***	-.34 (.03)***	.12 (.10)	-.32 (.03)***	-.12 (.09)	
Korea	1.21 (.10)***	1.37 (.22)***	-2.82 (.10)***	-2.51 (.23)***	-.61 (.03)***	-.04 (.06)	-.51 (.03)***	-.03 (.06)	
Taiwan	1.92 (.09)***	2.06 (.35)***	-1.11 (.09)***	-.57 (.38)	-.83 (.03)***	-.21 (.10)*	-.67 (.03)***	-.04 (.09)	
Socio-Demographic Backgrounds									
Male		-.13 (.07) ⁺		.28 (.08)***		-.06 (.02)**		.07 (.02)***	
Age		-.09 (.02)***		.01 (.02)		.3e-3 (.00)		-.01 (.00)	
Age2		.1e-2 (.00)***		-.1e-3 (.00)		-.1e-4 (.00)		.5e-4 (.00)	
Single		.04 (.13)		.5e-2 (.13)		.11 (.03)**		-.10 (.03)**	
Degree of urbanization		-.04 (.04)		.15 (.04)***		.01 (.01)		-.02 (.01)*	
Socio-Economic Status									
Educational levels		.22 (.04)***		.04 (.04)		.02 (.01)		-.01 (.01) ⁺	
Fluency in speaking English		.24 (.05)***		.11 (.05) ⁺		.04 (.01)**		-.03 (.01)*	
Class/occupational structure (Upper non-manual=0)									
Other wage employee		-.42 (.15)**		.39 (.16)*		-.06 (.04)		.03 (.04)	
Employer or petty bourgeoisie		-.67 (.16)***		.69 (.17)***		.04 (.04)		-.07 (.04) ⁺	
Jobless, homemakers, students, etc.		-.53 (.15)***		.32 (.16)*		.01 (.04)		-.04 (.04)	
Monthly household income (natural log)		.03 (.04)		.04 (.04)		.02 (.01) ⁺		-.02 (.01)	
Foreign Experiences and Contacts									
Concerning global issues		.02 (.02)		.04 (.02) ⁺		.01 (.01)		-.01 (.01)	
Overseas travelling experiences		.05 (.05)		.14 (.06)*		.06 (.01)***		-.05 (.01)**	
Having foreign acquaintances		.25 (.06)***		.04 (.06)		.03 (.02) ⁺		-.01 (.02)	
Public Attitudes toward Globalization									
Against protectionism				.10 (.01)***		.04 (.00)***		-.01 (.00)***	
Positive evaluation of globalization		.09 (.01)***		.85 (.05)***		.05 (.00)***		.3e-2 (.00)	
Immigration: workers increase		.50 (.04)***		.05 (.05)		.87 (.01)***		.77 (.01)***	
Immigration: brides increase		-.17 (.05)***		9.71 (.63)***		-.120 (.16)***		1.25 (.15)***	
Constant	9.75 (.06)***	9.01 (.59)***	15.40 (.06)***	9.71 (.63)***	3.20 (.02)***	3.18 (.02)***	8.554	7.058	
Sample size	8,680	7,058	8,224	7,058	8,605	7,058	8,554	7,058	
RR-Adjusted R ² / SUR- R ² (%)	7.67	18.51	11.49	17.63	10.10	35.33	8.15	30.48	

⁺ $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Source: see Figure 1.

Asian countries object to protectionism but have more doubts concerning the gains of globalization than do the Chinese. As China has benefitted from economic liberalization globally in the recent decades, Chinese support for globalization is shown in the attitude survey.

Adding personal variables rarely changes the significance of country differences in attitudes toward economic globalization based on the results listed in the second column. However, differences among countries on dimensions of social globalization became insignificant after adding personal characteristics. Thus Chinese, for instance, are not necessarily more favorable of increasing migrants than those in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Differences of individual characteristics among (and within) Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Taiwanese are more important in explaining people's attitudes toward international migration than their nationalities.

As to the effects of individual socio-demographic characteristics, men are more likely than women to support protectionism, to be optimistic about the impact of globalization, and to support more foreign brides entering their countries. And they are less likely to agree to import more foreign workers than are women. Older people tend to agree with protecting national interests when the latter are in conflict with globalization. As I expect, younger generations are more open to new activities, goods, and opportunities brought by globalization. Single people are willing to accept more foreign workers but not foreign spouses than are married people. The effects remain significant even after controlling for age and gender. The married appreciate more of opening borders for marital migrants than the single persons probably they or families and/or relatives benefitted from international marriage. Living in urban areas leads to more positive views towards the impact of globalization but negative views towards the entry of more foreign brides. As in Taiwan or Japan, most of foreign brides married to men living in rural areas. Thus as I expected, rural respondents are more likely to support the increase of the quota of foreign spouses into their countries. These results generally support the interests-oriented explanations that this paper proposed earlier.

Also as expected, educational achievement has a positive effect on accepting economic globalization. However, higher educational background leads to negative views on international marriages. Respondents who can speak fluent English (another measure of educational backgrounds) have stronger support for the three dimensions of globalization, but not for foreign brides either. The influence of class mainly appears in attitudes toward the first two measures of globalization. Upper white-collar workers do not support protectionism comparing to respondents in other class positions. However, they are also more likely to have negative views towards the effects of globalization. They may not like globalization but view the trend as inevitable. The capital class is more likely to object the increase of foreign brides than the professionals or other upper white collar workers in the region. The rich are more welcome of the increase of foreign workers than the less fortunate. In general the class interests only partly explain variations of attitudes toward globalization in the region as a whole.

Having foreign contacts and overseas travel experience has positive effects on supporting globalization or viewing it positively, as well as importing more migrant workers. These results are what I expect. However, similar to what I find for other variables discussed earlier, having overseas travel experience results in opposition to more foreign brides. It is different from the hypothesis that I stated earlier. Having travelled abroad, learning international news, or acquainting foreigners do not make people more acceptable of migrants from the economically less developed countries. I shall discuss more about the implications of these findings in the last part of the paper.

The last four variables shown in SUR1 to SUR4 are four dependent variables used when analyzing SUR. Most of these dimensions of globalization have positive relations with one another. However the opposite relationship appears between the increase of foreign brides and against protectionism. That is, respondents who support protectionism for national interests tend to support more international marriages. This could be seen as consistent for the reactions of the working-class people

in most of the countries studied (e.g., Mayda, 2008), that they see their economic interests threatened by globalization, but are also the group that gains more wives through marriage migration.

Using the values of adjusted R-square to represent the fitness of the analytical models, Table 2 shows that the final models can explain over or close to 18% of variances for all measurements of globalization, and even higher in the measures of migration. Country differences appear strong in the analyses of the general views about globalization and evaluations of globalization. Individual differences significantly increase the variance explained by the models in the case of migrant labor and spouses. Thus personal backgrounds and social positions have more explanatory power in the public attitudes than do the country differences.

Results in Table 2 show the determination of attitudes toward globalization for all East Asian respondents together in the EASS survey. Personal variables and socio-economic factors matter in the analyses for all four dimensions of globalization. The author has conducted subsequent analyses to examine how micro-level factors function differently among the four countries. Again I use SUR to avoid the possibility of obtaining biased coefficients.

Results in Table 3 show that in general personal ascribed characteristics and socio-economic attainments are more important in determining the attitudes towards globalization than foreign experience and contacts.⁶ Regarding the attitudes towards “against protectionism”, the more educated and those speaking fluent English are more likely to be against protectionism in all East Asian countries. We might speculate that those educated and speaking English are more likely to benefit from employment related to international trade. Taiwanese seem to be more heterogeneous in more personal factors than are respondents in other countries. Respondents

⁶ Similarly to the practices when pooling the data of four countries together, I try OLS for each of the four measures of globalization for the four countries. The coefficients and significance level again are different from using SUR. I list the results of using SUR in Table 3.

Table 3. Public Attitudes toward Globalization in Four East Asian Countries, 2008: Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (S.E.)							
	Against Protectionism				Positive Evaluation of Globalization			
	China (C1)	Japan (J1)	Korea (K1)	Taiwan (T1)	China (C2)	Japan (J2)	Korea (K2)	Taiwan (T2)
Socio-Demographic Backgrounds								
Male	-07 (.12)	-18 (.14)	-24 (.18)	-08 (.15)	.27 (.12) *	.47 (.17) **	.25 (.15)	.21 (.18)
Age	-10 (.03) ***	2e-2 (.03)	-04 (.04)	-15 (.03) ***	-02 (.03)	-07 (.04) *	-01 (.03)	.07 (.04) *
Age2	1e-2 (.00) **	-2e-3 (.00)	4e-3 (.00)	1e-2 (.00) **	1e-3 (.00)	1e-2 (.00) *	2e-3 (.00)	-1e-2 (.00) *
Single	-.49 (.24) *	-.02 (.23)	.82 (.31) **	-.33 (.23)	-.51 (.23) *	.33 (.28)	-.02 (.27)	.18 (.29)
Degree of urbanization	-.17 (.07) *	.04 (.08)	.07 (.08)	-.03 (.07)	-.03 (.06)	.17 (.09) *	.23 (.07) **	.27 (.09) **
Socio-Economic Status								
Educational levels	.15 (.06) *	.30 (.08) ***	.19 (.08) *	.17 (.07) *	-.06 (.06)	.04 (.09)	.10 (.07)	.08 (.09)
Fluency in speaking English	.25 (.10) *	.10 (.10)	.25 (.12) *	.16 (.09) *	.03 (.09)	.13 (.12)	-.06 (.11)	.17 (.11)
Class/occupational structure (Upper non-manual=0)								
Other wage employee	-.26 (.25)	.13 (.29)	-.41 (.41)	-.66 (.27) *	.53 (.23) *	-.03 (.35)	.02 (.36)	.68 (.33) *
Employer or petty bourgeoisie	-.53 (.26) *	-.48 (.32)	-.26 (.44)	-1.00 (.29) **	.76 (.24) **	.54 (.39)	.15 (.38)	.57 (.37)
Jobless, homemakers, students, etc.	-.27 (.25)	-.17 (.31)	-.61 (.42)	-.49 (.29) *	.70 (.23) **	-.22 (.38)	.06 (.37)	.41 (.36)
Monthly household income (natural log)	.04 (.06)	-.01 (.10)	.14 (.10)	.25 (.10) *	.11 (.05) *	.23 (.13) +	.21 (.09) *	-.03 (.13)
Foreign Experiences and Contacts								
Concerning global issues	3e-2 (.03)	.01 (.04)	.08 (.05) *	.01 (.04)	.01 (.03)	.07 (.05)	-.01 (.04)	.15 (.05) **
Overseas travelling experiences	.21 (.26)	-.05 (.08)	.07 (.11)	.02 (.09)	.28 (.24)	.15 (.10)	-.04 (.10)	.11 (.12)
Having foreign acquaintances	.26 (.19)	.29 (.10) **	.16 (.13)	.20 (.09) *	-.20 (.18)	-.23 (.12) *	-.04 (.11)	-.04 (.11)
Public Attitudes toward Globalization								
Against protectionism								
Positive evaluation of globalization	-.23 (.02) ***	.19 (.02) ***	4e-2 (.03)	.27 (.02) ***	-.20 (.02) ***	.28 (.03) ***	3e-2 (.02)	.42 (.03) ***
Immigration: workers increase	.49 (.07) ***	.08 (.12)	.68 (.10) ***	.46 (.08) ***	.83 (.07) ***	1.17 (.13) ***	.71 (.09) ***	.43 (.10) ***
Immigration: brides increase	-.12 (.07)	.23 (.12) *	-.48 (.10) ***	-.02 (.10)	-.09 (.07)	.13 (.14)	-.17 (.09) *	.61 (.12) ***
Constant	14.53 (.98) ***	7.10 (.98) ***	8.76 (1.3) ***	10.03 (.96) ***	14.18 (.91) ***	5.50 (1.2) ***	8.82 (1.1) ***	2.36 (1.2) *
Sample size	2,685	1,289	1,370	1,714	2,685	1,289	1,370	1,714
R ² (%)	5.62	12.03	8.56	24.89	3.41	16.66	4.41	16.03

Independent Variables	Regression Coefficients (S.E.)							
	Immigration: Workers Increase				Immigration: Brides Increase			
	China (C3)	Japan (J3)	Korea (K3)	Taiwan (T3)	China (C4)	Japan (J4)	Korea (K4)	Taiwan (T4)
Socio-Demographic Backgrounds								
Male	-05 (.03)	-3e-2 (.03)	-07 (.05)	-10 (.04)*	.03 (.03)	.2e-2 (.03)	.06 (.05)	.18 (.04)***
Age	.01 (.01)+	.01 (.01)	-01 (.01)	-02 (.01)	-01 (.01)+	-01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-1e-2 (.01)
Age2	-1e-3 (.00)	-1e-3 (.00)	.1e-3 (.00)	.2e-3 (.00)*	.1e-3 (.00)	.1e-3 (.00)	-1e-3 (.00)	-2e-4 (.00)
Single	.14 (.06)*	.02 (.06)	.02 (.08)	.16 (.07)*	-11 (.06)+	-03 (.05)	-02 (.08)	-08 (.06)
Degree of urbanization	.2e-2 (.02)	.04 (.02)+	-01 (.02)	.05 (.02)*	.3e-2 (.02)	-05 (.02)*	-4e-2 (.02)	-04 (.02)*
Socio-Economic Status								
Educational levels	.2e-2 (.02)	-01 (.02)	.04 (.02)*	.05 (.02)*	.01 (.02)	-1e-2 (.02)	-05 (.02)*	-03 (.02)+
Fluency in speaking English	.1e-2 (.03)	.10 (.02)***	.07 (.03)*	.03 (.03)	.01 (.03)	-10 (.02)***	-06 (.03)*	.02 (.02)
Class/occupational structure (Upper non-manual=0)								
Other wage employee	-01 (.07)	-06 (.07)	.03 (.11)	-14 (.08)+	-03 (.07)	.05 (.07)	-02 (.11)	.03 (.06)
Employer or petty bourgeoisie	.07 (.07)	-11 (.08)	.09 (.11)	.01 (.09)	-10 (.07)	.09 (.08)	-07 (.12)	-07 (.07)
Jobless, homemakers, students, etc.	.03 (.07)	-02 (.08)	-10 (.11)	-03 (.09)	-09 (.06)	.04 (.07)	-08 (.11)	-05 (.07)
Monthly household income (natural log)	.02 (.02)	.06 (.03)*	-03 (.03)	.09 (.03)***	-01 (.01)	-07 (.02)**	.02 (.03)	-06 (.02)*
Foreign Experiences and Contacts								
Concerning global issues	.01 (.01)	-01 (.01)	-2e-4 (.01)	.02 (.01)*	-2e-2 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-1e-2 (.01)	-04 (.01)***
Overseas travelling experiences	.06 (.07)	.01 (.02)	.04 (.03)	.08 (.03)**	-07 (.07)	-01 (.02)	-01 (.03)	-05 (.02)*
Having foreign acquaintances	.09 (.05)+	.03 (.02)	-02 (.03)	.03 (.03)	-04 (.05)	-01 (.02)	.03 (.03)	.3e-3 (.02)
Public Attitudes toward Globalization								
Against protectionism	.03 (.01)***	.5e-2 (.01)	.05 (.01)***	.04 (.01)***	-01 (.01)	.01 (.01)+	-03 (.01)***	-1e-2 (.01)
Positive evaluation of globalization	.07 (.01)***	.05 (.01)***	.06 (.01)***	.02 (.01)***	-01 (.01)	.5e-2 (.01)	-02 (.01)+	.02 (.00)***
Immigration: workers increase	.85 (.01)***	.93 (.02)***	.84 (.02)***	.85 (.03)***	.82 (.01)***	.87 (.02)***	.88 (.02)***	.54 (.02)***
Immigration: brides increase	-1.39 (.27)***	-.93 (.24)***	-.74 (.33)*	-1.17 (.30)***	1.20 (.26)***	.69 (.23)**	.84 (.33)*	1.49 (.24)***
Constant	2.685	1.289	1.370	1.714	2.685	1.289	1.370	1.714
Sample size	25.25	49.18	29.60	28.50	24.77	45.84	27.00	19.24
R ² (%)								

+ $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Source: see Figure 1.

who are younger, with better educational background and language capital, working in upper white-collar jobs, richer, and having foreign friends tend to support globalization and object to protectionism in Taiwan.

As to their evaluation of the impact of globalization, socio-demographic factors appear to be more important in Japan, while personal resources are more important in China. Men, the younger generation, and those living in urban areas tend to have more positive views about the outcomes of globalization than do women, older people, and those living in less urbanized places. Class and occupational status is a significant factor in determining Chinese attitudes on this dimension. The upper white-collar employees are less likely to judge globalization favorably than other paid workers, capitalists, and the jobless in China. Again, the overall effects of having contacts and travelling experiences overseas are limited in the region.

The analysis of international migration also indicates the importance of individual characteristics. As to attitudes towards more imports of guest workers, women, the never married, those living in urban areas, the more educated, the upper-white collar workers (comparing to other wage employees), the richer, and those having global knowledge and travelling experience tend to support international migration in Taiwan. The results of comparing upper white-collar workers with ordinary working class people in Taiwan are similar to what Wilkes et al. (2008) found in Canada. For other countries only two or three variables have significant impact in predicting the attitudes. For instance, except for education and language capital, no other variables have significant effects in Korea. Koreans with better educational capital welcome economic migrants but not marital migrants to their country.

People who support increase in foreign workers seem to have opposite views concerning increased entry of foreign spouses into the country. Men are more likely to support the increase of foreign spouses into Taiwan than are women. Those living in rural areas, the less educated, the economically worse-off, and those with fewer foreign acquaintances and travel experiences abroad also are more likely to welcome more migrants to the island through international marriages. This seems

to reflect the stereotype that most men marrying foreigners tend to be in less advantaged positions in social and economic dimensions. They cannot find local women to marry them and have to find brides from other parts of Asia.⁷

V. Conclusions

Globalization is an abstract concept. People assess its impacts depending on their own family backgrounds, learning in school, social experiences, and intellectual and personal contacts. Globalization has multiple aspects, but previous research has mostly focused on economic aspects (Meyer, 2007). The results of analyses generally support the stratification perspective to explain people's attitudes toward globalization both at country and individual levels. However, findings in the paper also show that East Asians' attitudes toward economic and social globalization is different, which is rarely discussed in previous literature.

Specifically the paper shows that material interests can importantly explain the variations of the attitudes toward globalization among the four East Asian countries and the respondents. Benefiting from global trade and investment openness, Korea and Taiwan experienced the increase of per capita income and national wealth since the 1980s. China's powerful and growing economic strength accumulated decades later has also challenged the arguments of dependency theory, that dependency on core country markets and investments delays and harms development. The perspective of the advantages of late industrialization seems to better explain the economic achievements of East Asian countries and how people in these countries have experienced the benefits too.

However, heterogeneity in attitudes toward globalization also exists among countries. Contrary to what Mayda and Rodrik (2005) and Machida (2011) find, this paper shows that Chinese have the highest support for economic globalization,

⁷ The author also checked the results of the main independent variables using ordinary regression analyses, which results are not much different from those using SUR.

compared with Japan and other East Asian countries. The different findings between the current paper and previous ones may be due to that fact that China's economic strength was not as impressive in the 1990s as in the 2008, when the survey was conducted. Nowadays, Chinese are also more likely to hold positive evaluation of globalization (economy, job opportunities, and even environment) and support increasing the number of migrants than are respondents in the other three countries. However, once national interests are seen to be negatively affected, people turn to support protectionism more in China than in other East Asian countries. I interpret this result to show the anxiety of being a late comer in economic development. As the most recent successful late-developed economy, China still relies heavily on cheap labor and state support to attract foreign investment. Products made in China have experienced strong price competition from other Asian countries such as India and those in Southeast Asia. Chinese thus might feel economic insecurity and opt for protectionism when national interests are affected. In contrast, respondents in Japan, the country which was industrialized even before World War II and has relied on capital- and knowledge-intensive production, are the least protectionist among those in all four studied East Asian countries.

The findings about the effects of individual factors on the attitudes toward globalization are mostly consistent with those found in earlier comparative studies, such as Davidson et al. (2009), Mews and Mau (2013), and Scheve and Slaughter (2001). Individual interests can explain most of the effects of class, socio-economic, and socio-demographic variables on the attitudes. Compared to women, men tend to support protectionism, have positive assessments of globalization, and veto increasing migrant workers. However they are more likely than women to support migration of foreign brides. The gender interests here are obvious; men are also much more likely to have experience with sex tourism. Residents living in rural areas are against globalization but support increasing the number of foreign brides. This is understandable in that in Taiwan and elsewhere young women eschew farm labor and migrate to urban areas, and men in rural areas have looked to less developed

countries such as Vietnam for brides. Overall, people at the lower end of the stratification system are more likely to resist economic globalization even though they give positive evaluation to the impact of globalization. This paper thus shows that people in East Asia have almost totally divergent attitudes regarding migrant workers versus foreign brides, and that people's acceptance of or objection to migrants depends highly on whether the migration would directly threaten jobs or provide marital opportunities. In Taiwan, wage employees in particular significantly support increasing the number of foreign brides, but object to increasing migrant workers. Previous studies (e.g., O'Rourke and Sinnott, 2006) treated all types of migrants as one group in their analysis, which might have mixed opposite attitudes and thus the results as this paper demonstrated. The current study shows that, in addition to the differentiation between social and economic globalization, there is heterogeneity with the attitudes toward social globalization. According to the statistical results, we need to differentiate between permanent residents and temporary guest workers in studying people's attitudes towards migration. Demographic and socio-economic factors have almost opposite effects on people's attitudes toward economic and marital migration.

We may explain this in the double context of class and gender in these economically mature societies. Increasing the number of migrant workers fulfills the economic and social needs (especially providing caretakers for the aging population) in East Asia, needs that the middle classes are able to pay for (Taiwan has about 160,000 guest workers caring for the elderly and the disabled in 2008). However most foreign women married to local East Asian men (predominantly working class and rural) have limited school education and mostly come from poor families in their home countries in Southeast Asia, mostly Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. The marriage usually involves a certain amount of payment to the bride's families and the agent, so-called "marriage commodification" (Wang and Chang, 2002). Their culture, habits, and living standards are distinct from those of the newly-developed East Asian societies and generally are perceived as being not as civi-

lized as Western societies. Therefore the results of the survey in an individual level can be seen as both class and cultural phenomena. The cultural integration through marriages seems to face resistance mainly from the more educated people.

Unlike what earlier studies found (e.g., Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Duckett and Miller, 2006; Mau et al., 2008) and this paper's hypothesis, I find that the highly educated (and those speaking fluent English) do not support all dimensions of globalization. To the contrary, they are more likely to oppose economic protectionism while also opposing increasing the number of marital migrants. The findings are even more prominent in Korea and Taiwan. Respondents with higher education tend to support increasing the number of migrant workers but decreasing that of foreign brides into the country in these two countries. For East Asian societies the immigration of massive numbers of foreigners started only in the last two decades. The experience of living with people of different ethnicities is rather new for East Asians, compared to Europeans who had such experiences for much longer history (Sassen, 2000). People in East Asia learned the word "multiculturalism" before they had any actual experience of encountering different cultures, customs, and languages. Furthermore the school education and the higher degree have stronger instrumental functions than knowledge conveying and pursuing. Even the East Asian government and the universities are more concerned with world-ranking of their university programs than the quality of teaching and research quality (Deem et al., 2008). The school curriculums may lack of teaching about multiculturalism. For parents and students obtaining more advanced education mainly aims for better opportunities in job markets in East Asia. East Asians are economically open but socially conservative.

The paper also finds that having foreign contacts or overseas travel experiences makes respondents more accepting of economic globalization and guest workers, but not marital migration. The results are especially strong in Taiwan's case. National context may play a role here. Among these four East Asian countries Taiwan has been more receptive of foreign workers, as judged by the absolute number and

the percentage of migrants (Yamanaka and Piper, 2005). In other words, our results show that having contacts with migrants in Taiwan or having overseas travelling experiences do not necessarily make people more acceptable of migrants from the economically less developed areas. Analyzing a data set with more detailed classifications of nationalities, Chang and Chang (2013) found that Taiwanese seem to be more acceptable of migrants from the Western countries or Japan than those from China or Southeast Asia. Or the unexpected results might be due to the measurements used in the survey. We may need more information about the context of foreign contacts to make the measurements more valid, e.g. to include in the analysis places of contact, whether family members or neighbors, channels of knowing each other, and hierarchical relations (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2008[2000]).

Approaching a summation, we may note first that Stiglitz (2007: 582-583) praised Korea, China, Taiwan, and Japan, the four countries studied in the paper, for successfully gaining the benefits of globalization “without a substantial increase in inequality. ... governments in the region took active steps to ensure that the rising tide of growth did lift most boats.” Whether these countries succeeded in creating trickle-down economic benefits for the ordinary people remains an empirical question to be tested. But the differences between countries in current development affect the relations between their peoples, it seems. Findings in this paper show that people in countries with more economic power tend to resist social integration with people from less developed countries. And people with better socio-economic resources are more skeptical about the acceptance of migrants from poorer countries (and their culture) into their homelands than are the less privileged classes. The social integration of people with different positions at individual and national socio-economic levels proves to be harder in the global era than international economic cooperation.

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Appendix 1. The Results of Principal Component Analyses of Attitudes toward Globalization

Variables / Factor	Against Protectionism	Variables / Factor	Positive Evaluation of Globalization
(a)Limit import of foreign products	.81	(d)Mobility of goods, people, capital, etc. is good or bad to our economy?	.83
(b)Follow national interests even if causing conflicts with other nations	.65	(e)Mobility of goods, people, capital, etc. is good or bad to our job opportunities?	.86
(c)Increased exposure to foreign culture is damaging our own culture	.67	(f)Mobility of goods, people, capital, etc. is good or bad to our environment?	.75
Proportion of variance explained (%)	.51	Proportion of variance explained (%)	.67
Sample size	8,680	Sample size	8,224
χ^2	1,934.96***	χ^2	6,215.67***

+ $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Source: see Figure 1.

Appendix 2. Pearson's Correlation Coefficients between Attitudes toward Globalization in Four East Asian Countries

Attitudes toward Globalization	Against Protectionism	Positive Evaluation of Globalization	Immigration: Workers Increase	Immigration: Brides Increase
East Asia				
Against Protectionism	1.000			

Attitudes toward Globalization	Against Protectionism	Positive Evaluation of Globalization	Immigration: Workers Increase	Immigration: Brides Increase
Positive Evaluation of Globalization	.043 ***	1.000		
Immigration: Workers Increase	.090 ***	.267 ***	1.000	
Immigration: Brides Increase	.020	.208 ***	.606 ***	1.000
China				
Against Protectionism	1.000			
Positive Evaluation of Globalization	-.097 ***	1.000		
Immigration: Workers Increase	.080 ***	.171 ***	1.000	
Immigration: Brides Increase	.053 **	.115 ***	.570 ***	1.000
Japan				
Against Protectionism	1.000			
Positive Evaluation of Globalization	.215 ***	1.000		
Immigration: Workers Increase	.196 ***	.350 ***	1.000	
Immigration: Brides Increase	.166 ***	.287 ***	.703 ***	1.000
Korea				
Against Protectionism	1.000			

Attitudes toward Globalization	Against Protectionism	Positive Evaluation of Globalization	Immigration: Workers Increase	Immigration: Brides Increase
Positive Evaluation of Globalization	.054 *	1.000		
Immigration: Workers Increase	.130 ***	.166 ***	1.000	
Immigration: Brides Increase	-.005	.082 **	.568 ***	1.000
Taiwan				
Against Protectionism	1.000			
Positive Evaluation of Globalization	.322 ***	1.000		
Immigration: Workers Increase	.313 ***	.273 ***	1.000	
Immigration: Brides Increase	.193 ***	.213 ***	.467 ***	1.000

+ $p < .1$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$. Source: see Figure 1.

Who Likes Globalization?

Attitudes towards International Markets, Migration, and Marriage in Four East Asian Countries

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Abstract

People and countries have been affected differently by globalization. Mainly based on a stratification perspective, this paper examines if differences in class and socio-economic status may explain variations of attitudes toward globalization at both country and individual levels. Using the East Asian Social Survey conducted in 2008, the paper examines public opinions toward globalization in China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The author finds that people have opposite reactions between economic and social globalization. East Asian countries have benefitted from trade and investment liberalization and the people have positive attitudes toward economic globalization. At the individual level, class and socio-economic factors affect the attitudes toward international marriage and foreign workers controlling for foreign contacts and travelling experiences. The working class is against increasing the number of migrant workers and people with higher educational credentials do not support any more foreign spouses. I discuss why East Asians seem to be economically open but socially conservative in the last part of the paper.

Keywords: Attitudes toward Globalization, Stratification, Class, Foreign Brides, Migrant Workers, East Asian Social Surve