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中國菁英政治中的女性流動

Promotion under the Glass Ceiling?

Female Elite Mobility in Chinese Politics, 1997-2017

Student: Marta Cruz Liñeira

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中華民國 105 年 9 月
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Dedication

To my father

Abstract

This thesis is an analysis of mobility in Chinese elite politics from a gender perspective and provides information on the women who break the so-called "glass ceiling" within the Chinese political system. It aims specifically to identify the prevailing characteristics or attributes of female elite cadres to find possible links, if any, between these characteristics and their mobility rates, within the context of increasing institutionalization of Chinese politics.

Key words: gender, Chinese elite, mobility, attributes, institutionalization, Chinese politics.

本文從中國精英政治的性別角度提出女性幹部遷調分析，並提供如何突破有關中國的政治體制內的女性精英幹部被稱為"玻璃天花板"的資訊。本文意旨在專業鑑別女性幹部的特質或屬性，來找其可能的連結，如果有這些特質的話，如何在中國政治逐步制度化的範圍內，分析出這些特質和女性幹部的遷調速率之關係。

關鍵詞：性別，中國的精英階層，流動性，屬性，制度化，中國政治。

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INTRODUCTION

1.1 Research question and its importance

Mao Zedong´s oft-repeated adage that "women hold up half of the sky" is still in use today by some government officials in China (Wallis, 2006). However, a closer look at the reality of China's political structures proves different.

Women still engage in political life in lower numbers than men. According to the National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council (NWCCW), in 2007, there were 15 million females in the cadre and personnel system in China, making up 38% of the total (Xinhua, 2016). The phrase "cadres and personnel system" was first used in a political report of the Central Committee (CC) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) for its 13th National Congress. It's a combination of two terms: the cadre system and the personnel system, more commonly referred to as the "cadres". The term "cadres" refers to personnel in Party and government organs, enterprises and service units who assume leadership, management or technologically specialized posts through predetermined procedures (Wang, 1994).

The gender gap in the CPC starts at the grass roots level (from the number of affiliates to the CPC) to eventually reflect in the upper echelons (the peak of the CPC´s hierarchy), where the disparity is more obvious. In 2011, the number of women affiliates to the CPC was 19.25 million out of a total 82.602 million members which constitutes 23,3% of the total members (China Today, 2016). However, according to Yu and Liu (2010) the proportion of female delegates in the four main political institutions -- National People´s Congress (NPC), Chinese People´s Consultative Conference (CPCC), Central Committee

of Communist Party of China (CCCPC) and, Politburo (PB)-- from 1954 to 2002 "(..) does not even reach the amount to one fourth of the total, not to say half".

Gender inequality in Chinese politics is an undeniable fact. This, then, begs the question: Is there a reason behind the symbolic presence of women in the decision-making circle? A selection bias? Is there a "glass ceiling" in Chinese politics?

The term "glass ceiling" was used for first time in 1984 by Gay Bryant in his book *The Working Woman Report: Succeeding in Business in the 80's*. In sociology and gender studies, the "glass ceiling" refers to the limiting career advancement of women within organizations. It is a psychological ceiling that makes it difficult for women to be promoted. In consonance with Cotter, Hermsen, Ovadia and Vanneman (2001) there are four characteristics that concur to the existence of a "glass ceiling": " (…) a gender difference that is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee, a gender difference that is greater at higher levels of an outcome than at lower levels of an outcome, a gender inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels, not merely the proportions of each gender currently at those higher levels and, a gender inequality that increase over the course of a career".

Despite the fact that there is obvious discrimination against women and a gender gap within Chinese politics, the focus of this study is not to investigate gender imbalances, but merely to increase existing knowledge on women who have broken the "glass ceiling" and have reached top leadership positions within the party-state.

The main research question therefore is: Do the attributes of female elites influence their mobility within the CPC? Linked to this question, the secondary research focus will look at the profiles of the women who are promoted, whether these promotions are strategic or random, and whether these women share certain attributes that make them more successful than others? In addition, it will research the speed of upward mobility for

individual women, the patterns of mobility, and how the "glass ceiling" is affecting their political careers?

Thus far the study of elites has focused on the analysis of family backgrounds, career backgrounds and values (Hoffmann-Lange, 2006). In the case of Chinese political elite, extensive literature provides insights on the standard profile of elite members in terms of political connections, career histories, and official statements regarding ideology and Party role. However, due to the small number of female elite members, the majority of studies focus on men (Chow, Zhang, & Wang, 2004).

This leaves a gap in the information available for the profiling of female elite members. In order to further understanding on female elite mobility, it is important to understand how these women are breaking the "glass ceiling". This thesis, therefore, could be useful in closing the leadership gap and fostering greater gender equality within the CPC.

The importance of the research question also links to the concept of "political opportunity structure". According to Rootes (1999) "political opportunity structure" can be defined as "the constraints and opportunities configured by the institutional arrangements and the prevailing patterns of political power which are the inescapable contexts of political action". MacAdam (2004) defines it as "a multi-dimensional concept that allows the researcher to analyze some of the reasons for a social movement's success or failure". And, it includes four elements: "(…) the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system, the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that undergird a policy, the presence or absence of elite allies, the state's capacity and propensity for repression".

Even though the term "political opportunity structure" has only been used in the analysis of social movements, considering feminism, as both a political and a social movement that seeks to achieve gender equality in society, then it is possible to infer that "political opportunity structure" as the inescapable circumstances surrounding a political

landscape, a sort of window of opportunity, in this case the institutionalization of the Chinese political elite may be influencing a more favorable political opportunity structure for women's interest.

Afshar (1996) underlines that the character of women's self-representation and the "political opportunity structure" do not exist independently of each other. As Randall (1998) states "woman can seize opportunities presented, but their intervention will simultaneously be constrained and even shaped by the character of these political openings".

Evidence accredit that the greater women representation is; the better represented their interests are (Sapiro, 1981)(Markham, 2013). Markham does not clearly define what he means by the term "women's interest," but for the purpose of the research, women's interest can be defined as overcoming of the gap between men and women in any sphere of the society.

So, the political opportunity structure not only could decrease the political participation gap between genders, it could also set a more pro-feminist political agenda, by appointing ¨femocrats¨[1] to power political positions that will promote policies related to women's issues (Randall, 1998). As party-state the CPC has already made big strides in the so-called "state-sponsored feminism". Howell (1998) claims that "for ideological and political reasons socialist states (referring to Soviet Union and China) have placed issues of women's oppression and exploitation firmly on the official agenda". This can be seen for example, in the Chinese case through the foundation and development of the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF) (Howell, 2003). The party-state support is significant because the opportunities and the period in which these opportunities emerge have led to the advancement of women in the party and in the society (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).

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[1] Feminists who achieve positions of influence within the government or in the bureaucracy as known as "femocrats". Scandinavian countries present the majority of the cases.

1.2 Literature review

1.2.1 Studies on Chinese elite politics

The study of Chinese political elite has often been defined by researchers and specialists in the field as extremely difficult, even daunting, a hard task or simply as a challenge. (Goldstein, 1994; Zheng S. , 2005). The iron discipline of the CPC, its official narrative and a general mistrust among its members generate an opaque and inaccessible environment for foreign researchers in Chinese politics. It is quite complicated even to glimpse how the elite operates in its decision-making process or the power struggles within the Party. Such opacity of Chinese politics and its elite is more commonly known as a "black box".

Teiwes (2015), in his review of the developments and mistakes in this field of research made by Western scholars in the past, argues that it "has been possible to penetrate the "black box" to varying degrees in different periods as new sources have become available, although the results have been always limited".

Since the 1970´s there has been a sharp increase of elite studies, mainly around four themes: factionalism, generational politics, technocracy and political institutionalization (Kou & Zang, 2014).These four themes look to explain Chinese elite politics through a certain model, using concepts as basic tools for the analysis of Chinese elite politics.

The first model, the factional model, considers power struggles and the role of factions in Chinese politics. For Nathan (1973) factions are "clientelistic", in other words they are formed through favor exchange while Tang Tsou (1995) includes other ties such as family, colleagues, etc. …and prefers the term "informal groups". The second model, the generational school or generational analysis states that there is common viewpoint that defines members of the elite. Similar background and experiences formed a common viewpoint among elite members. Generational school

defines "generation" not as biological age but the year a cadre joined the CPC (Yahuda, 1979). The technocratic model deals with elite replacement after the economic reform when a new generation of better educated and younger officials was recruited and promoted (Li & White, 1988), while the political institutionalization model focuses on the set rules and norms for elite recruitment and decision-making that followed the Hu Jin-tao period (Zang, 2005; Bo, 2007).

1.2.2 Chinese political elite and mobility

There were fundamental changes to China's political elite structure in the era of economic reform. The need to bring about economic changes and the lack of leaders to oversee these changes led to a massive elite renewal. The revolutionary cadres, traditionally recruited from poor peasants with a low level of education, were replaced by bureaucratic technocrats with a high level of education (Lee, 1991). It can be inferred then, that once the requirements for new leaders changed, so did the mobility patterns.

Walder (1995) establishes two paths for political elite mobility, (…) "one path requires both educational and political credentials and leads to administrative posts with high prestige, considerable authority and clear material privileges; the second path requires educational but not political credentials, and leads to professional positions with high occupational prestige but little authority and fewer material privileges". These two roads to power lead to two very different destinations for political elites; the administrator and the professional (Zang, 2004). On the other hand, Kou (2011) remarks how members of the elite educated abroad aren't eligible to work in certain fields within the party-state due to the fact that they are deemed ideologically tainted and not trustworthy.

Bo (2007) in his analysis of Chinese elites, combines the arguments of both Walder in his study and asseverates that despite the importance of educational credentials, the dominant profile of political elites is not technocratic, but provincial leadership. He argues that local government-party management experience and economic criteria have become key factors in elite mobility. In other words, a provincial leader is valued by the economic performance of his region (GDP), and his ability to implement and enforce policies during his term (Landry, 2008). The new branch in China's elite politics is the provincial leaders whose number among the elite has increased substantially, representing more than half of the total membership in the Sixteenth Central Committee of the CPC.

Another part of the debate in the study of Chinese elites concerns the causes of upward mobility. In opposing to the use of GDP as a key factor, other authors argue that provincial revenue collection, educational qualifications and factional ties play a more important role in elite ranking (Shih, Christopher, & Liu, 2012).

Other author argue that loyalty and ideological backgrounds still play a major role in the promotion of elites, highlighting the political screening these cadres are subjected to before becoming party elites (Bian, Shu, & Logan, 2001) and, the importance of the Party-patronage in individual career mobility (Li & Walder, 2001).

The vast majority of the subjects on those studies are men. The applicability of these studies on the subject of female mobility is doubtful. Most of the research only briefly refers to female elite members due to the small number of women in the elite. The conclusions in this regard are more anecdotal than robust.

1.2.3 Female Chinese political elite and mobility

According to Hershatter (2004) interest in research focused specifically on women's issues in China has emerged in the past two decades. And, as Chow, Zhang and Wang (2004) state "entering the new millennium in China, women's studies and the sociology of women/gender, though still in their early formation, have undergone a shift from applied, policy-oriented fields for solving women's problems to more theoretically relevant and empirically grounded fields incorporating a gender perspective".

However, female mobility in Chinese elite politics has not been widely studied yet. The largest part of the studies about mobility and China's elite politics has not been addressed from a gender perspective but rather a general overview. The main topics in this regard are: Women's political participation, studies focused on barriers of entry, and female leadership (Li & Zhang, 1994). Those focused on women's political participation in particular, are centered singularly on comparing female leaders with their international counterparts, rather than on mobility.

Women's political participation in China has fluctuated since the founding of the CPC. Communist ideology under Mao promised women's emancipation and the constitution of China endorsed gender equality (Guo & Zheng, 2008). Social transformation and state socialism under CPC have raised women´s overall status in China (Davin, 1976). The spectacular economic development of China in the recent thirty years has consolidated the role of women in society.

Nonetheless, the social differences between genders didn't cease, as reflected in the analysis of political elites (Su, 2006). One reason of this could be, as Gilmartin (1993) claims, that the CPC was formed as an eminently patriarchal party, dominated by men. The struggle for the emancipation of women remained as a sub-discourse of communist and nationalist ideology. Marxist ideology itself focuses on men as subjects under the capitalist

system, and seeks the emancipation of women in their proletarian condition, not as a woman.

According to Rosen (1995) women's political participation in the echelons of power peaked during the Cultural Revolution due to the chaotic "momentum" the Chinese politics was experiencing in which women were appointed as elites for reasons of personal loyalty (Yu & Liu, 2010). By the 1980s, the number of women in elite positions declined dramatically and only began to increase slightly again with the institutionalization of the party-state in the Deng Xiaoping era. This incremental process of institutionalization did not only affect the processes of leadership decision making but the dynamics of leadership competition, changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political order (Miller, 2008). In this new scenario power struggles between factions or informal groups are limited, and the former discretionary in promoting charges has been reduced, giving more importance to meritocracy than personal loyalty (Nathan, 2003). And, as it has been stated early, new profiles of Chinese elite politics are defined by a higher educational level and seniority in party membership (Zang, 1998).

And yet, the number of women in political management or decision making positions is still low (Zeng, 2014). Women as public leaders at the top level (organs or institutions with high power and authority capacity in the party –state) are under-represented (*Table* 1.1). The highest percentage of women is at lower level position, drastically decreasing upward, to a top without female representation.

Table 1.1 Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013)

Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013)		
CPC institutions	Proportion of women	Proportion of men
Politburo Standing Committee	0%	100%
Politburo	2,7%	97,3%
Central Committee	5,2%	94,8%
State Council	6,3%	93,7%
Chinese People´s Consultative Conference	15,3%	95,7%
National People´s Congress	21,4%	89,6%

Source: data derived from (Sissokho, 2014) and my own elaboration.

At the same time, the aforementioned economic development increases the access to higher education for women, bringing them to new required profiles and, the implementation of affirmative action addresses this progress (Guo & Zhao, 2009).

Regarding to CPC and female cadres, many studies are centered on barriers of entry. Authors look into the causes and reasons for the traditional and persistent low political participation of women. To become part of the core of leaders it is obviously necessary to be a member of the CPC. For example, the rate of membership to the CPC is lower among women; they represent less than a quarter of the total members of the CPC (China Today, 2016).

Among the causes, it must be remarked that Chinese society has been historically a patriarchal society, Chinese culture and philosophy distinguish between a public sphere

dominated by men and a private sphere dedicated to women (nú zhǔ nèi, nán zhǔ wài). Many traditional Chinese expressions represent men as superior being. Religion, especially the current revival of Confucianism, plays a role too. Another factor is the culture of social relationships and networking (guānxì) in which Chinese politics is viewed as an old boy's club where male patronage is key to promotion.

Unequal access to education, particularly in rural areas, the post-Mao era economic reform and its consequences that enlarged the gender gap in education, lack of family support, inability to reconcile family life and work, economic dependence and susceptibility to sexual harassment are cited as potential causes (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).

More women seem to reach higher levels of power in private companies than in state-own companies, state administrations or political positions. (Goodman, 2004). In the public sphere, they usually are relegated to nominal positions of authority and are responsible for like health, welfare, education, women and children issues (Pittinski & Zhu, 2005). Then, there is gender division labor or discrimination at work; women are prescribed feminine roles of household into the public domain.

Some papers argue that Chinese elite focus on economic growth have caused the abandonment of the prior China's state feminism. Though, this is arguable; since the economic reform, the party-state has implemented numerous affirmative actions and training female cadre policies (Guo & Zheng, 2008), the number don't hide the truth, the disproportionality men-women in CCP institutions is wide (Yu & Liu, 2010).

Studies about female leadership in China describe the political reality of these women. They are mainly dedicated to do women's work (fù nù gōngzuò), namely, they are usually in charge of agencies or organizations related to children or women issues (Rosen, 1995). Other authors, such as Zeng (2014) argues that China has developed many regulations and affirmative actions to raise the number of women in political positions, but

Guo & Zhao (2009) declare that ambiguity in regulating affirmative action makes it an inefficient tool. Su (2006) adds to this argument by stating that women in power structures are doubly discriminated against; they are being used to fill a quota on basis of their gender and belonging to minority groups, such as ethnic minorities, intellectuals and members of Democratic league. These women also face greater chances to abandon their careers because the "three rites of passage" -- falling in love, getting married and having children (Jie, Bijun , & Mow, 2004).

1.2.4 A comparative study: female elite mobility in other countries

To find comparative studies on female political elite mobility carries an inevitable difficulty; defining the Chinese regime and finding a similar one. The first intent would be the pursuit of studies on female mobility in post-communist countries (former Soviet Union members), nevertheless, it would not be an appropriate comparison. Former Soviet Union countries liberalized their economic and political systems and, although their democratic essence is questionable (Freedom House reports, 2014) due to its drift toward an authoritarian presidentialism, are still being considered democracies. For this reason, the essays and research on women and politics in post-communist European countries are focused mainly on the analysis of parliaments and the proportion of female political leaders in them, the effects of the electoral system on female political participation and, factors influencing their presence (Montgomery & Matland, 2003) (Wolchik, 1989).

The most suitable comparison would be one party-state countries like Cuba, Singapore or Vietnam. Cuba, a one party-state communist country, has undergone a timid economic liberalization in the past years: promoting foreign investment, developing new projects and allowing the opening of small business. Studies on female political mobility in Cuba are wider and more reachable than in other countries (like Vietnam).

Alvarez, director of the Center of Women studies in Cuba, in her essay *Mujer y Poder en Cuba* (1998) summarizes the main studies existing on female elite and political power in Cuba. According to her, research in Cuba about women's access to leadership positions can be classified into those that inquire about women's barriers to access to decision-making in different spheres of economic, political and social, and those studying particularly about the female representation in People's Power bodies.

Both research fields point out that to reach decision- making positions in the Party-state, the women's barriers of entry differ from men's barriers. Particularly, women face society discrimination and have more difficulties to access to education. Once, they get the political power positions, they have a higher rate of abandonment (their career) because economic crises and instabilities affect their careers more (Stephen, 2013).

Despite the existence of numerous affirmative actions, there is still a low promotion of female cadres to senior positions, generally due to a common belief that women cannot handle a private life and a demanding public job at the same time (Diaz & Caram, 1996). If the position to which they aspire, requires direct votes (some bodies of People's Power are selected), it is still less likely to be selected or promoted. The level of demands that are imposed on women to be selected is so high that the chosen ones are well above the average of the male counterpart capabilities. To hold the same rank level, they usually have a higher educational background than their male counterparts (Alvarez, 1998).

1.3 Main argument

In summary, the object of this research is female elite cadres and personnel system of the CPC. The main purpose is to assess the possible relationship between characteristics or attributes of female elite and their mobility rates, within the context of increasing institutionalization of Chinese elite politics.

This research is both descriptive and explicative. It attempts to identify the prevailing characteristics or attributes among the female elites and aims to find links between these characteristics and the types of mobility in the CPC.

The research takes into account the institutionalization of Chinese politics and the importance of the political connections in Chinese context. So, it also provides secondary information on affirmative action, and cadres and personnel system management policies, and addresses the survival of political connections or informal politics.

1.4 Research design

1.4.1 Case selection

Definition of "elite"

The object of study of this research was the female elite in Chinese politics. To identify the study sample, first it was necessary to define the term "elite" and second, to identify the political elite in China through a specific method.

Elite studies have been a rich area of research since early past century. Their origin began with classical theories mainly promoted by Pareto, Mosca and Michels. And it continued in the middle of 20th century with the further development of two different study perspectives; unitarian tradition and pluralist tradition.

Classical elite theories remark that "elite" is comparable to a real class; the ruling or dominant class. Its structure constitutes its strength and enables its members to stay in power. There are many links that bind together the members of ruling elite. Links ensure a sufficient unity of thought and a characteristic cohesion of a class group. Equipped with powerful economic means, elite is further ensured by unity, political power and cultural influence on the disorganized majority (Putnam, 1976).

Pareto (1991) was the first one to define the term "elite". According to him:

"there are two layers of the population, the lower layer or the non-select class and, the upper stratum, the select class or elite is divided, in turn, into two, the select class of government and non-government elite class".

Mosca (2004) preferred the term "ruling class" and described as:

"minority of influential people in the management of public affairs, to which most people give them, of willingly or unwillingly, the leadership".

On the other hand, Michels (2009) focused his studies on what he called "oligarchy". He stated that:

"the organization is what gives rise to the domination of the elected over the electors, of the leaders over the constituents, of the delegates over delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy".

Since then, many authors, based on the idea of the essential role of elites in society, have developed variations on the same elementary concept. Although, there is no single notion of the term "elite", all the definitions highlight the existence of a minority in a context of superiority over a majority.

Thomas Dye (1976, p. 12)defines elite members as those who hold:

"the formal authority to direct manage, and guide programs, policies, and activities of the major corporate, governmental, legal, educational, civic and cultural institutions in the nation".

Although, he refers to the American elite members, his definition has been used in the development of the present research to address the Chinese political elite.

Identifying the elite in Chinese politics

Following the definition of the term "elite", identifying elite in the Chinese case is next step. Generally speaking, there are three predominant methods in order to identify elite: reputational analysis, decision-making analysis, and positional analysis. The first one, reputational analysis gives importance to the informal relations and connections among the individual actors in power. Its method is based on querying informants on who are the power holders in a specific organization or process. The second one, decisional analysis is focused on decision-making process to find out who influences a specific activity; who are the actors involved. The third and last method, positional analysis is widely used, is the

identification of power positions within formal political institutions to understand power relations among elite. Those who hold power positions are assumed to be the elite (Putnam, 1976).

For purposes of this study, positional analysis was chosen to identify the political elite in the People´s Republic of China (PRC), dismissing the other two approaches for several reasons. In the case of reputational analysis, the development of the method requires researcher to know insiders with a clear knowledge of the organization or the political processes. They will be considered the informants. Nevertheless, access to top leaders is extremely difficult in socialist states.

Decisional analysis isn´t suitable for the Chinese political system because the decision-making process occurs behind closed doors. It isn´t possible to know who has taken a specific decision or who has successfully passed certain policy.

In addition, positional analysis is the most appropriate method to develop the present research given that in the Chinese political system status empowers the person; political position defines power limitations of the person who hold that position. Because of that, it´s so important to study political formal institutions and the organizational composition of them.

In accordance with Hoffman-Lange (2006, pág. 4), "identifying an elite sample by using the positional method requires prior research into the organizational and positional structure of the national political system before a list of elite positions." Therefore, for purposes of this research some particularities of the Chinese political system must be considered before identifying the elite sample.

PRC is a socialist republic lead by a single party, Communist Party of China (CPC). PRC´s 1982 constitution referenced the CPC leadership of the nation without detailing the legal basis for the CPC power. CPC has been in command in China since 1949. Although Chinese political institutions have evolved during this time, CPC still is the power source

of the various institutions of the state. As the *figure* 1.1 shows (see Appendix A), CPC dominates the leading political institutions in China and, hence, it dominates the Chinese political system as a whole. Within PRC, power state is exercised by CPC, Central People´s government and their provincial and local representation. General Secretary of CPC holds ultimate power over the state and the government. He is the Premier; the head of the state and the government.

Based on the domain of the Party over state institutions, and without going into elaborate details on the Chinese political system, it can be extrapolated that China's political elite is CPC´s elite. So, the tem "elite" in Chinese politics would mean the ruling elite; the CPC highest political positions members.

In using the positional method, the difficulty arises from stating what organ within the party-state holds the power. Often the real function of these organs within the CPC is far from its nominal function (Lawerence & Martin, 2013). Then, what are the organs that represented the highest authority in the ruling party? As *figure* 1.2 shows (see Appendix A), there are three CPC top leadership bodies: the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC), the Politburo (PB) and the Central Committee (CC) in descending order.

The study sample was the group of women members of CC[2]. The reasons to choose this organ are several: it has a real function (not only nominal function), it plays an important role by choosing the elite of the CPC, the most powerful group with an important

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[2] CC is a political body. It is one of the highest authority within the party, but doesn't exercise its authority as a legislative body would do. It contains the leading figures, and it's considered the place where debate on decision-making takes places (Dreyer 2000). It 205 full members and 171 alternate members. Members are elected from the elite of Party officials with a Party standing of minimum five years by the National Congress (NC) of CPC for a tenure of five years. When NC isn´t in session, CC leads the work of the Party and its external relations. (Sullivan, 2012). Under its supervision are: the General Affairs Office, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, The International Liaison Department, the United Front Work Department and the

number of women among its members[3] and, the PSBC and PB members must be CC members first.

If the aim of this study was to only measure the political participation of women in the Chinese elite, the analysis of the National People's Congress (NPC) would have been chosen for this purpose. This body is considered the legislative body and therefore has been compared with parliaments in Western political systems.

However, because of the uniqueness of the Chinese system, NPC study has no relevance in this case. The goal was not to study women political participation or women visibility on politics, analyzing an organ with nominal power, but studying the path of women who have reached the real exercise of power (understood as decision-making capacity); the effective representation; a real calculus on equality.

The research analyzed female members, full and alternate members included, of four CC: 15th CC, 16th CC, 17th CC and 18th CC, what meant a time line from 1997 to 2017[4]. The total number of women members of these four CC was 125, but due to many of them had been members of several CC, the final number narrowed down to 73 women (see Appendix A).

Policy Research Office (China.org.cn, 2015). It meets in Plenary sessions convened by PB, at least once a year. (Li C. , 2012). PBSC an PB members are selected from its ranks members.

[3] There aren´t women among the seven PBSC members and only 2 among the twenty-five PB members.

[4] 15th CC tenure was from 1997 to 2002 and so on, 16th CC from 2002 to 2007, 17th CC from 2007 to 2012 and, 18th CC from 2012 to 2017.

1.4.2 Data sources

The data was retrieved from two databases available online: Chinese Political Elites Database (Chinese Political Elites Database, 2016) and China Vitae (China Vitae, 2016). Both are resources of biographical information on Chinese leaders in the party-state. And they were the search tools used to facilitate this depth research, along with a wide bibliography and others online resources.

Both sources have been used to cross-examine the information. Even though both database gathered similar information on political elite member in China, they aren´t exactly the same.

Chinese Political Elites Database (NCCU top university program led by DP. Kou) collected information including names (Chinese and Roman alphabet), age, place of birth, nationality, birth and dead time, education backgrounds, work experience. Its coverage comprises four thousand biographical data cases, and it is limited temporarily to cases after 1966.

China Vitae gathered similar type of information and also, includes travels and appearances of the members of the elite in great detail. Chinese Political Elites Database is more completed on number of cases, and China vitae has more details in the particular cases.

Both of them have been used to complete the information. In case of discrepancy between the information resulting from the two databases, the information provided by Chinese Political Elites Database has been chosen to use over the one generated by China Vitae.

Missing cases and missing values

As it has been explained earlier, the object of study, the number of women on four committees, were 122. Given the fact that many of them participate in several committees the number was narrowed down to 73 women.

Of the initial 73 women in the sample, 7 were discarded. Four of them due to a general lack of information (Qian Chuanxiu, Wang Ruzhen, Cao Shumin, Song Liping), one due to the inability to authentication her (Wulan), and the remaining two cases because there was no information about the date of joined the CPC (Hu Xiaolian, Jiang Xiaojuang) making impossible to calculated their mobility rate. These seven cases were the only missing cases.

In the collection of information, it was observed missing values, however, these missing values were not crucial to the calculations of the study so that the subjects were not discarded of the sample. The final number of cases is 66 (see Appendix B).

1.4.3 Research method

A two phases study

The research is methodologically quantitative; it is based on statistical analysis. Even though quantitative in nature, there is also a qualitative approach to other variables such as the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics and political connections.

One purpose of statistical analysis is to take a large quantity of data on a category of persons or objects and summarize this information in a few exact mathematical figures, tables or graphs. Descriptive statistics explains how many observations were recorded and how often it occurred in the data or category of observations.

A second purpose of statistical analysis is to draw mathematical conclusions by relating the characteristics of a group of people or objects. This type of analysis is called statistical inferential and is calculated to show cause-effect relationships, so as to test scientific hypotheses and theories.

In the development of the present research, statistical analysis with both purposes (descriptive and inferential) was used. The first phase of the study was a univariate descriptive analysis and the second phase a bivariate inferential analysis.

A descriptive statistical analysis (univariate)

In the first phase descriptive statistical analysis of each variable (univariate) was done. In it, a general overview of the dependent variable, a comparison by CC and several main features related to the independent variables, was reported.

In addition, in the case of the dependent variable (mobility rate), the K-Means algorithm was used. It is a cluster analysis, a variety of multivariate analysis of interdependence, which aims to classify a group of individuals or objects (in this case female elite members) in a small number of groups or clusters in which each object belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean (D´Ancona, 2001).

The optimal number of clusters leading to the greatest separation (minimal intra-cluster variance) isn´t known, it must be computed from the data. After comparing the outcomes of several runs with an increasing number of clusters, it was decided to classify female cadre into two types (low mobility and high mobility) depending on their individual mobility rate. These groups are mutually exclusive; internally, as homogeneous as possible and, defined by the K-Means algorithm, based on the following formula:

Figure 1.3 The K-means algorithm

$$\text{objective function} \leftarrow J = \sum_{j=1}^{k} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left\| x_i^{(j)} - c_j \right\|^2$$

Source: (K-Means Clustering, 2015).

To make the classification, the program called Matrix Laboratory (MATLAB) has been used. The resulting classification of a female elite in two types of mobility is represented in this study in a graph automatically generated by MATLAB.

MATLAB is a software tool that allows mathematical programming in a high level programming language itself (language M). It is widely used by the community of scientists and engineers. It has numerous functions, the most basic are focused on matrix manipulation, data representation and implementation of algorithms.

An inferential statistical analysis (bivariate)

The second part of the data analysis is to contrast the hypothesis above mentioned through test of independence. The function of the test of independence is to contrast hypothesis in non-linear distribution samples. It is used for categorical variables where it is not possible to apply the classical methods of statistical inference, such as linear regression. It is a contingency table of disjoint sets. It measures the relationship between

two variables of one same sample or population and their significance (if they are independent or not).

1.4.4 Research limitations

The main limitation of this research was the impossibility of including the political connections or informal politics and evaluating them with regards to mobility. As mentioned earlier, the present research aims to evaluate the potential relationship between attributes of female elite and their mobility rates, within a context of institutionalization of Chinese elite politics. Although, there has been an institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, reflected in the set of rules and norms for recruitment, promotion and exit and retirement of cadres and decision-making process, the importance that political connections or informal politics still play in Chinese politics cannot be ignored.

Several studies prove that in Chinese politics there exists an interaction between informal networks and the Party´s institutionalization. As Kou (2014) states in China, "informal politics are imbedded in institutional context". The research acknowledges this phenomenon, nevertheless, the failure to gather the necessary information in this regard, and the lack of validity of the said information, and the inability to delimit the effect and scope of political connections made it necessary to exclude it from the analysis. The present study addresses the existence of political connections as a confounding variable and defines it, but does not include them in the analysis.

Other limitations of this research are: The scarce literature available in English on Chinese elite political mobility from a gender perspective, the difficulty of gathering the data, since one of the databases is in Chinese (Chinese Political Elite Database), and the opacity of Chinese politics.

1.5 Structure of the thesis

The first chapter of this research includes introductory information on China and women political participation, a detailed explanation of the research question and a justification of its selection, a profuse literature review in relation to the Chinese political elite, major standard profiles of elite members and mobility, a look to political elite from a gender perspective and comparative information. The introductory chapter also includes a summary of the main argument of the thesis and the research design –case selection, data sources, research method and research limitations--.

The second chapter explains the main argument of the thesis starting from the main hypothesis to the various variables and their operationalization into indicators.

The third chapter addresses the institutional context in Chinese politics, giving extensive information on cadre management system, affirmative action and so on. It also defines the role of political connections or informal politics in the given context.

The fourth chapter contains a descriptive analysis of the attributes and mobility of female elites in Chinese politics. The analysis of these variables is exemplified through numerous graphics which represent general overviews as well as trends over time.

The fifth chapter includes an inferential analysis of the relationship between attributes of female elites in Chinese politics and types of mobility. It tests the various hypothesis using test of independence.

The sixth and last chapter states the main findings of the research, argues specific types of discrimination that female cadres suffer during their career and proposes measures for its correction.

MAIN ARGUMENT

2.1 From hypothesis to definition of variables

The present study starts from the central hypothesis that attributes or characteristics of an elite group (in this case a female elite group), as well as the organizational structure (in which these women develop their careers) and political connections are affecting their political mobility.

The hypothesis is based on the literature review on elites and mobility specifically by China scholar Xiaowei Zang in his book *Elite Dualism and Leadership Selection in China*. Zang (2004) identifies mobility rate as "the speed with which individuals (cadre) climb the political hierarchy, which to some degree is a measure of the skills and qualities most highly valued by the top party leadership". He also claims that "mobility rate is the outcome of the joint work of human capital and organizational characteristics...difference in promotion speeds reflects both structural and individual characteristics. (…) Personal attributes are certainly important, but they operate within the confines of the opportunity structure".

From his statements, it can be deduced that attributes influence promotion opportunities (understood as status attainment) and mobility (speed of promotion), organizational structure (institutionalization of Chinese elite politics) shape the structure opportunity (setting age limits for promotions, demanding a minimum educational level…) and, political connections make the path to the top easier.

It is assumed that the three variables (attributes of female elite, institutionalization of Chinese elite politics and political connections) influence the dependent variable (mobility rate). The difference among the three variables is the degree of influence and measurement.

Attributes of female elite are specific, observable, measurable and directly related to mobility rate. Institutionalization and political connections are embedded in Chinese politics. Meanwhile, institutionalization can be measured and at the same time provide a time frame, but political connections can only be defined conceptually. One of the hurdles faced in doing this research was lack of access to the necessary information to study and to operationalize political connections into an indicator.

Hence, this research aims to study only the relationship between attributes of female elite and mobility. Others variables that may affect mobility are considered extraneous such as institutionalization and political connections.

Extraneous variables are not rare and "can affect the measurement of study variables and the relationship among these" (Laerd Dissertation, 2016). An extraneous variable is by definition any variable other than the independent variable that may influence a change in the dependent variable and that the researcher was not intentionally studying in the research. An extraneous variable can be classified as a control variable, when the researcher controls the variable, but doesn´t intend to examine it, and as a confounding variable, when the variable that is recognized before the study or during the study cannot be controlled by the researcher.

In order not to jeopardize the internal validity of the study, a clear differentiation between variables was made.

Table 2.2 Variables according to their function in the research

Variables according to their function in the research

Dependent variable	Mobility rate
Independent variable	Attributes of female elite
Control variable	Institutionalization of Chinese elite politics
Cofounding variable	Political connections

Source: my own elaboration.

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2.2 Variables and their operationalization

Dependent variable

The dependent variable of the study was the mobility of female elite. To operationalize the dependent variable in an indicator (mobility rate) Zang´s definition of mobility rate (or speed of promotion) in state socialism (2004) has been used:

- The rate of mobility = $(\frac{1}{age+CCP\ seniority}$ at the first CC of CPC to which the person joined)

-

Zang uses Kenneth Farmer´s definition of mobility rate in the Soviet Union (Zang, Elite dualism and leadership selection in China, 2004): "the length of the "wait" between an individual´s first acceptance of a party or government position and his or her first election to the Central Committee of Communist party" and, improve it by adding an extra factor, biological age. Zang´s indicator was chosen because it brings together two concepts: promotion, defined as status attainment (cadre reach the elite by being elected to CC of CPC) and, mobility, determined as the speed of promotion (the difference of years since she joined the CPC until she was first elected to the CC of CPC).

It should be noted that age is calculated as her biological age at the year she was elected for first time to CC of CPC. Seniority reflects the numbers of year since she first joined the CPC until she was elected for first time to CC of CPC. It is worth to mentioned because some women among the sample group have been members of several CC. For this reason, and despite the fact the main focus of the research includes four CC (15th ,16th ,17th and 18th), a new group was added in order to make the analysis more accurate. So, the data will show the mobility rate of five groups:

- Previous CC of CPC (before 1997)
- 15th CC of CPC (1997-2002)

- 16th CC of CPC (2002-2007)
- 17th CC of CPC (2007-2012)
- 18th CC of CPC (2012-2017)

Independent variable

The independent variable of the research was the attributes of female elite. Although it was not one variable, but a several ones (one for each main characteristic of female elite in Chinese politics) under a generic term. The so-called attributes of female elite include information regarding to demographic characteristics, educational backgrounds and, career backgrounds. To operationalization of this variable, an extensive model was applied to the biographical data on women members of the four CC.

Table 2.3 Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics

Attributes of female elite in Chinese Politics		
Demographic characteristics	Educational backgrounds	Career backgrounds
Nationality	Educational level	Government work
Province	Major	Party work
	Party school	Expert work
		Firm work
		Ideology
		PLA/police/law
		Mass organizations work

Source: my own elaboration.

Demographic characteristics

Nationality

China is a country of many nationalities, a total of 56 different ethnic groups have been officially identified. Han ethnicity (汉族) is the largest group in the country, constituting approximately the 92% of the population. Due to the high number of nationalities, the research only considered whether the women were Han or non-Han. Those who were non-Han were not classified into their specific minority groups.

1. Hypothesis

It has been observed that there is a high number of females belonging to minority nationalities (non-Han) among the political elite in China. As an example, in the 18th CC of CPC, there is a total number of 33 women, eight belonging to minority nationalities, (24.2%), while of the total number of the 356 men, only 21 belong to minority nationalities, (5.9%). This may confirm the statement made by Su (2006) that women are used to fill two quotas at once (quotas addressed to women and quotas addressed to minorities).

Keeping in mind that non-Han women are used to fill two quotas at once, while Han women can´t, the first hypothesis suggests that non-Han women would have a higher promotion opportunity and, therefore a higher mobility rate (the fast runners) than Han women.

1. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between nationality and mobility rate.
   Non-Han women have a higher mobility rate than Han women.

Province

In Chinese culture, there is a difference between ancestral home (祖籍) and birth place(出生地). Ancestral home refers to the geographic area where the family of someone is from, while birth place indicates the geographic area where someone was born. These two are not always coincident. The research used the ancestral home instead of the birth

place, and to indicate the province it used a PRC´s administrative divisions map that includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities, 2 special administrative regions and 1 claimed province[5].

2. Hypothesis

In his book *Chinese Provincial Leaders: Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949*, Bo (2002) declares that political mobility of a cadre is determined by his locality´s financial contribution to the central budget. The richer a province is; the greater chances of mobility the cadre has. According to this, members of CC are more likely to be from the major provinces in the East region. Where the richest municipalities are, and there are a greater prosperity, land area and a higher population density (Shih, Christopher, & Liu, 2012).

2. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ancestral home (province) and mobility rate. Women from East provinces have a higher mobility rate than women from others provinces.

Educational backgrounds
Educational level

Educational level describes the higher level of education achieved by the cadre, including high school, 3-year college, bachelor or 4-year college, master program (MA) and a doctorate (PhD).

3. Hypothesis

Since late 70´s, educational credentials have become a prerequisite of entry and promotion (Wang, 1994). The "four changes" cadre policy set up four criteria regarding cadre recruitment and promotion: revolutionary stand, youth, education, and specialization (gémìng huà niánqīng huà zhīshì huà zhuānyè huà) (Zhou, 2010). Educational level is a

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[5] The mentioned map reflects PRC´s administrative divisions according to CCP´s vision of PRC.

key factor for the political career of elite members.

3. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between educational level and mobility rate. Women with a higher educational level have a higher mobility rate than women with a lower educational level

Major

Major refers to academic discipline pursued by a college student or the field that a student decides to specialize in. 文科 and 理工科 are two terminologies used to distinguish between the major in social sciences and humanities and the major in natural science and engineering. It should be mentioned that women with a lower educational level do not have a major.

4. Hypothesis

Even though, Bo (2007) in his portrayal of the members of 16th CC minimizes the number of graduates in natural science and engineering among the elite, others authors (Li & White, 1988) (Lee, 1991) argue that the common profile in Chinese political elite is the technocrat and, technocrats by definition (Bo, 2007) met the academic requisite of having a degree in natural science and engineering.

4. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between major and mobility rate. Women with a major in natural science and engineering have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.

Party school

The Party School of the CC of the CPC so called Central Party School is located in Beijing, and it is the highest education institution of the CPC, which only trains officials for the CPC (Shambaugh, 2008).

5. Hypothesis

An exploratory analysis of the biographical data showed that women that received a degree in social science and humanities or a training from the Party School, they had already developed their career in some degree, namely, they had already joined the work force and the CPC. They may be considered more "red" than "expert". Based on the above mentioned literature (Li & White, 1988) (Li C. , 2001) (Lee, 1991), the research proposes that women with no Party school experiences (with a profile closer to an expert or technocrat) would have a higher mobility rate.

5. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between Party school experiences and mobility rate. Women with no-Party school experiences have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.

Career backgrounds

The research is focused on the variety of career experiences instead of the main careers, using the seven functional clusters with which Zang (2004) classified the career histories of Chinese leaders. Their career experiences are determined based by the length and significance (status, rank) of their work experiences. Each cadre has more than one career.

Department of Propaganda and United Front Work Department (UFWD) are included in the variable labeled as ideology work. UFWD consist of eight minor political parties and the All- China Federation of Industry and Commerce, nonetheless, it has been reported as a tool of CPC to control and to ideologize non CPC cadres (Pieke, 2009). Mass organization work includes Communist Youth League (CYL), ACWF, trade unions, sports related organizations and various mass organizations.

6. Hypothesis

For the purpose of the research, each one of them was used as a variable and a hypothesis was stated in order to find out if a determined career experiences (or the conjunction of any of them) play a role in mobility patterns (high or low mobility).

6.1 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between party work and mobility rate. Women with Party work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.2 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between government work and mobility rate.

6.3 Women with government work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between industrial bureau/finance work and mobility rate. Women with industrial bureau/finance work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between expert work and mobility rate. Women with expert work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.5 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ideology and propaganda work and mobility rate. Women with ideology or propaganda work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.6 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between PLA/police work/law work and mobility rate. Women with PLA/police work/law work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

6.7 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between mass organizations work and mobility rate. Women with mass organizations work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Extraneous variables

Control and confounding variables

The control variable of this research is the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy. The operationalization of this variable was made through the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality.

The term "institutionalization" in Chinese elite politics has been defined by Kou and Zang (2014) as "the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision-making". The accepted mechanisms shape a new organizational structure, affecting the odds of political mobility of elite members.

The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics is a gradual process, beginning in 1980, with Deng Xiaoping's speech on "Reform of the Party and State leadership" and still unfinished. It isn't clear for the author if the process will continue its consolidation, and will delve into new rules. It has been set from 1980 to the present, but a shorter period of time was chosen to analyze (1997-2017)[6]. This is because institutionalism as the measures taken for the promotion of female officials have been implemented gradually, the outcome of these can't be immediate. In order to observer the results of it, the research analyzed a shorter period of time. Referring to institutionalization, the "four changes" cadre policy, and any norm derived of this policy, and the affirmative action (specific for female cadre), regulatory framework and legislation are included.

The cofounding variable is the connections. As it was mentioned early, despite the actual process of institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, it cannot be dismissed the role of connections or informal politics. Nonetheless, to pursue a delimited object of research, the study did not step into the theoretical debate informal politics versus factionalism, but it tried to cover all possibilities, taking into account the importance of personal connections with the only intention of offering a broader picture of the CPC reality.

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[6] Time period from 1997 to 2017 comprises four CC: 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th.

INSTITUTIONALIZATION AND CONNECTIONS IN CHINESE ELITE POLITICS

3.1 Institutionalization context in Chinese elite politics

The institutionalization of Chinese elite politics, referring to CPC cadre policy, is the control variable of the research. It affects mobility by setting requirements to political power access and promotion. To operationalize the variable, it is necessary to set the theoretical description of it, and the delimitation of its temporality.

Following the definition of institutionalization proposed by Kou and Zang (2014) the author understand the term "institutionalization" in elite politics as the creation and persistence of a set of widely accepted mechanisms regulating leader exit entry and decision making. Namely, the set of written rules and unwritten norms that affect both the processes of leadership decision making and the dynamics of leadership competition, changing the criteria and the processes to promote leaders to the top political order (Miller, 2008) and thereby, creating a new "political opportunity structure".

The "Four Modernizations of socialism" (of economy, agriculture, development of science and technology, and national defense) was advertised by Premier Zhou Enlai in 1964. Despite of this, it wasn't until 1978, after the dead of Mao Zedong and the Gang of Four, when Deng Xiaoping boosted the economic openness (Chow G. , 2004). An economic reform of this magnitude (the shift of a planned economy to a market) needed new qualified political and bureaucratic elite with the knowledge and capacity to implement it and to be willing to do it.

As it has already been highlighted in the literature review, Li (2001) claims before the economic reform (1949-1978) CPC cadres were recruited and promoted "based on seniority in joining the Party and the Revolution, such as taking part in the Long March and the Anti-Japanese War; ideological commitment to Marxism and Mao Zedong though; political loyalty and activism in the class struggle, and; class background from a proletarian family". The profile of those cadres was not accurate for the new task. CPC needed develop a system to attract a younger and with technical skills cadre to renew the elite.

The political structure would be adapted to the requirements of the economic reform (Dickson, 2010). In August 1980, Deng Xiaoping gave a speech on "Reform of the Party and State leadership". He stated that the priority should be the economic reform, but in order to do it and keep the power the CPC should also initiated a political reform (zhī huā).

A major step of the political reform and therefore, in the political institutionalization of Chinese elite was the implementation of the "four changes" cadre policy. The idea was proposed by Deng Xiaoping, when he pointed out that cadres were not in a favorable condition to help realize the Four Modernization of socialism. The "four changes" refers to making cadres more revolutionary, younger, more knowledgeable and more specialized. And to ensure the elite renewal, Chinese authorities developed a system of cadre retirement. During 1982 organ reforms, it was implemented for the first time on a nation-wide basis. Up to this day, this cadre policy remains a guiding policy for cadre work. (Lisheng 1994).

The political institutionalization implied three big consequences on Chinese politics and one outcome. The consequences were: first, position means power (no power without position); second, institutional loyalty became more important than personal loyalty; and, third, political existence have also institutionalized, due to mandatory retirement age system (Bo, 2007). The natural outcome of this was a more stable regime

with power balancing and more predictable future scenarios. The CPC achieved to maintain its monopoly of the power and ensure its future.

In spite of the beginning of the institutionalization of Chinese elite politics was in 1980 with Deng Xiaoping´s speech on "Reform of the Party and State leadership", the research analyzes female mobility in a shorter period of time, from 1997 to 2017. The reason is that even though the beginning of the political institutionalization was in 1980, the implementation of cadre policies, especially those related to female cadres happened later on.

Main cadre system policies

Cadre policies affects the mobility of cadre by setting requirements of entry, promotion and exit. Those requirements are based mostly in age and level of studies.

Since 90´s, several regulations concerned to the selection and appointment of leading cadres have been issued:

- ¨Interim Regulations on Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres¨ (1995).
- ¨Development Program Concerning the Establishment of a National Party and State Leadership for 1998-2003¨ (issued in 1998).
- ¨Program to Deepen the Cadre Personnel System¨ (2000).
- ¨Regulations on the Selection and Appointment of Party and Government Leading Cadres (issued in 2002 to replace 1995´s regulations).

Among the set of requirements to promote and to exit, it must be noted a peculiar phenomenon, the cadre retirement system establishes different ages regarding to the gender of the cadre. Women are obliged to retire to earlier ages than men. Although, the ages

established depend on the job position on the Party-state, for female cadres the age requirement to retire is usually five years earlier than for male cadres. Namely, if the age limit for promote or retirement for a man is at 60 years old, for a woman is usually at 55 years old.

Legal frame

Back to the women and their chances on Chinese elite sphere, it should be mentioned first the legal frame and other regulations that women are subjected. Hershatter (2004) asserts that China has legislated gender equality, and recite the laws guaranteeing gender equality:

-        "Marriage Law, 1950, women and men are guaranteed virtually the same legal rights with respect to marriage.

-        Law of Succession ,1985, men and women are equal in their right to inheritance

-        Compulsory Education Law, 1986, all children aged six years and over must attend school to receive compulsory education through grade nine regardless of their sex, nationality, and race.

-        General Rules on Civil Law,1986, women enjoy the same civil rights as men

-        Law on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Women, 1992, women's rights are equal to men's in political, economic, cultural, and social life, and with regards to property and employment".

The political inclusion of women has benefited from gender-related institutions, policies and laws. Since 90's, the Chinese party-state has sponsored affirmative actions and joined to several conventions and bill referring women's rights. In 1979, China signed the

Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW), also known as international bill of rights for women. CEDAW is a legally binding "gender norm to build national institutions both formal and informal to guarantee gender equality in all spheres without reservation" promoted by United Nations (UN).

In 1995, China hosted the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing. The reason of hosting was that after the Tiananmen incident and, the almost collapse of CPC, the party-state needed regain the trust and clean its image. Hosting this kind of event would give the impression of a modern China.

Its success is debatable; only two foreign leaders attended, majority of attendance were people already working on women's issues. But it had a tangible impact on the highlighted the importance of making policy and research this gender by scholars and, moreover the authorities relaxed the measures that regulated the formation of advocacy groups, so eighteen new advocacy groups were formed (Zheng W. , 1996).

As well in this period of time (90's to nowadays) a favorable legislation and divers policies have been developed like the amendments of the 1992 women's rights law, it codified women's rights including freedom of speech, the right to vote and seek public office, compulsory education through grade nine (the same as for boys) and equal rights for women and men to contract farmland and housing and to obtain employment (Zuckerman, Blikberg, & Cao, 2000) and the National policy on women development in 1995.

Affirmative action

Affirmative action is defined in a broad sense as an active effort (through legislation or policies) to improve the opportunities for members of minority groups or women. It is designed to increase the number of people from historically underrepresented groups

within businesses, institutions and other areas of society. It is a means to countering historical discrimination against a particular group. In the field of study in question, affirmative action is understood as policies carry on by the CPC within the government and the party to increase the number of women in the public sphere.

To accelerate women political participation, the party-state has promoted the selection/training female cadres (2005), has created an action plan so called quotas (2000-2009), has implemented the 30% critical benchmark (temporal affirmative solution) and has incremented gradually the proportion of women in the National People's Congress. According to Guo and Zheng (2008), other important measures taken are:

- "Program for Women Development in China (1995-2000) (2001-2010)
- Measures and actions for implementation of gender policies
- Specific rules spelt out in various documents relating to personnel appointments by the central Organization Department (COD) of Chinese Communist Party (CCP), such the Program on Deepening the Reform of Cadre and Personnel System from 2001 to 2010, which supplement particular needs for women in different areas".

Despite the efforts, as it has been mentioned in the literature's review in the past 30 years, after dropping drastically (during 80's), the number of female leaders tends towards stabilization, for example the statistical range of female leaders in the CPC Central Committee (15th to 18th) is between 7.3% and 10%. This stability or stagnation, as the numbers are still low in comparison with men, could be the verification of ineffectiveness of affirmative action to break the glass ceiling.

Table 3.1 Average (%) of female in the CPC (15th to 18th) Central Committee

15th Central Committee	7,3%
16th Central Committee	7,6%
17th Central Committee	10%
18th Central Committee	8,7%

Source: data derived from Chinavitae.com, statistics of my won elaboration.

CPC has stated numerous times its willingness to promote gender issues, nevertheless the effectiveness of its policies are doubtful. Why does the party-state have this ambiguous behavior?

Regarding to the promotion of affirmative action and pro-female cadre policies, the reason behind could be Party's persistent attempts to include every group or movement within. Generally speaking, state organizations along with radical civil organizations make the change. CPC does not tolerate the existence of movements or organizations that can challenge its dominance. As part of its survival strategy, and in its effort for legitimacy, it embraces these demands (Dickson, 2010). CPC becomes a unifying element, representative of all interest of groups historically disadvantaged (women, student labor unions…). It does not leave room for the development of the civil society. As example of this, the use that Communist movements (in Soviet countries and in China) have made of women, requesting their support and efforts in times of need and crisis, then again relegated them to family life (Wolchik, 1989) (Gilbert, 1973). In addition, to search for further legitimation through representation of a large group like women and the intent to stand as a country at the forefront could be other feasible reasons.

3.2 Connections and its importance on Chinese elite politics

Political connections or informal politics: a definition

Elite networks studies refer to an approach within the field of study of the elite. They focus on documenting relationships of members of the elite together. There are two streams, which are based on the similarities to say that there is a ruling elite, and those who rely on the difference to highlight the existence of groups and rivalries, according to the latter, the elite would be plural.

In studies of the elite in China, there is also a stream focused on the so-called political connections or informal politics. Tang Tsou (1995) defines Chinese informal politics as "politics in which personal relationships with others or a set of such relationships constitute an end in itself". Lowell Dittmer (1995) reaffirms the importance of relationships in its conceptualization of informal politics, and states "that formal and informal politics are interrelated and interact on each other". Lucian W. Pye (1995) defends that "the 'informal' is very nearly the sum total of Chinese politics".

All the same, Andrew J. Nathan and Kellee Tsai (1995) insist on proposing a factionalism model to explain the Chinese political reality. Andrew Nathan (1995) believes that these mentioned groups are factions, ties based on clientelism non-limited to two people relation, are founded on exchange. There are three possible structures: simple factions, complex, and simple factions with support structures. Zhiyue Bo (2007) defends that the factional group is a more accurate definition, because these various groups are based on corporate ties established through shared experiences, and that they played a limited role. He also claims that they can be more useful as methodological tool.

Despite this research is centered on the relation between attributes of female elite and political mobility, the author can't dismiss the value of connections or the so-called

informal politics in Chinese elite. The personal relationship among the leaders, their connections (guānxì) still play a role in Chinese elite politics that can't be disregard nor family ties (princelings or tàizǐ), the prior membership to Chinese Communist Young League (CCYL) also known as tuán pài, the Qīnghuá clique or the Shanghai Gang can be neglected.

The literature's review on women on power in the world also reveals that women on top political positions in societies with large sexist features usually get there through family connections (Markham, 2013), the so- called "political dynasties". It can be argued whether this may apply to women leaders in China. Since "the reform era", only three women have reached a high level rank of power in the CPC as members of the Politburo: Wu Yi (2003-2008), Sun Chunlan (2012-) and Liu Yandong (2007-). Although, it is known that Liu Yandong's father was a figure of the Party and that Sun Chunlan enjoyed Hu Jintao's protection, cannot be stated as the key factor or only factor to their rise and promotion within the elite.

Moreover, political connections isn´t an exclusive factor to women on the Chinese elite. The fact that they have political connections in itself does not explain their mobility, but it rather proves that connections still have value in Chinese politics

Nevertheless, the inability to measure the political connections or directly relate to mobility made me define it as a cofounding variable. That is, it is assumed that political connections may affect mobility but the research cannot show how or to what extent, therefore political connections or informal politics are not included in the statistical analysis of the research.

ATTRIBUTES AND MOBILITY OF FEMALE ELITE IN CHINESE POLITICS

4.1 A descriptive statistical: a univariate analysis

4.1.1 Some features on attributes of female elite in Chinese politics

Demographics characteristics

As the literature review showed the proportion of national minorities is higher among female cadres than male cadres. The *graph* 4.1 reflects what is the total percentage of non-Han among female cadres at the different CC of CPC, and how it has fluctuated over time. The proportion of non-Han cadres among CC female elite is high, a 17%. A remarkable percentage taking into account that there are only a 6,7% of non-Han cadres among the total cadres of the CPC.

Graph 4.1 Nationality of female cadres by percentage and CC

Source: my own elaboration

The following *figure* 5.1 represented shows the percentage of women born in the different administrative divisions of PRC. The figure represents their ancestral home. And, as it is visible in the figure, the majority of women are from Jiangsu, Shandong, Zhejiang, Hebei, Henan. They make up the 56% of the sample. Both Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang are provinces located in the East of China. Meanwhile Hebei and Henan are bordering provinces to the above mentioned, located respectively in the North and South- Central areas of China.

Figure 4.1 Percentage of women born in administrative divisions[7] of the PRC

% of women born
0 %
1,5 %
3%
4,5%
10,6%
12,1%

Source: my own elaboration

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[7] Map includes 22 provinces, 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities, 2 special administrative regions and 1 claimed province.

Educational backgrounds

A high percentage of female cadres, 29,44%, hold a Master´s degree, following by a 23, 35% that studied a Bachelor degree. The percentage of women with a PhD or with a low level of education (like 3 year-college education) are a minority. The graph 4.3 shows how the number of female cadres with higher educational level has increased over time.

Table 4.2 Educational level of female cadres by total percentage

Source: my own elaboration

Graph 4.3 Educational level of female cadres by percentage and CC

Source: my own elaboration

The *graph* 4.4 and the *graph* 4.5 exhibit that the majority of female cadres at CC hold a major in social sciences and humanities, and that the percentage has increased over time to the detriment of major in natural science and engineering.

Graph 4.4 Total percentage of major studies among female cadres at CC

Source: my own elaboration

Graph 4.5 Percentage of female cadres with a major by CC

Source: my own elaboration

The *graph* 4.6 indicates that one half of the female members have received training or studies from the Party school, also, display the oscillation of percentage among the CC.

Graph 4.6 Party school studies by percentage and CC

Party school studies

Source: my own elaboration

Career Backgrounds

The next and last graph, the 4.7, evidences the main career histories of female cadres at the CC level by percentage. The graph takes into account the existence of a determined career experience as the non-existence of it. Among the different career histories is remarkable that majority of women do not have PLA/police or law work experiences, neither firm/finance and industrial bureau work experiences. Meanwhile, mass organization, government and party work experiences are the most common career histories among all the CC.

Graph 4.7 Career backgrounds of female cadres by percentage and CC

4.1.2 Mobility rate: an overview

As the below box plots shows, from 66 observed cases, without any missing case, the arithmetic mean of mobility rate is 0,013 with standard deviation of 0,002; maximum value is 0,018 and minimum is 0,009.

Graph 4.8 A general overview of mobility rate

The following graph shows the dispersion of cases. That is, what values are the most repeated or what are the frequencies.

Graph 4.9 Dispersion graph of the mobility rate

Source: my own elaboration

Mobility rate by CC of the CCP: a comparison

Graph 4.10 Mobility rate by CC of CPC

Source: my own elaboration

The analysis of mobility rate by CC[8] shows that mobility rate among female elite is decreasing overtime. To have a better understanding of the phenomenon, the components of the indicator; mobility rate; seniority and age, have been analyzed.

To observe the arithmetic mean of mobility rate, age and seniority by CC, it is noticeable that mobility rate is in a downward trend because age. The key factor is age. Seniority has not shown great variations along CC. Mobility rate is decreasing because women are getting access later to CC. They are older than they used to be. Several graphs display this tendency (see *graphs* 4.11 and 4.12 at Appendix C).

Table 4.1 Relation of mobility rate, age and seniority by CC

CC	Mobility rate	Age	Seniority
Previous	0,01417819	46,5	26,2
1997	0,01355724	48,9	27,0
2002	0,01317718	50,9	25,7
2007	0,01243556	52,3	29,1
2012	0,01213975	53,0	29,7
Total	0,01308676	50,4	27,5

Source: my own elaboration

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[8] Previous, 1997, 2002, 2007 and 2012 correspond to previous, 15th ,16th, 17th and 18th CC.

Applying the K-means algorithm: low mobility vs. high mobility rate

The procedure performed consisted of running the K-Means algorithm using an ever increasing number of groups, until they determined the classification of female cadres that offered the best results in terms of increased uniformity within each group.

The outcome[9] were two clusters or groups, low mobility and high mobility. Low mobility is composed by 41 female cadres compose and, high mobility group by 25. Approximately one third of female cadres had a high mobility rate versus two thirds with a low mobility rate.

Graph 4.13 Low mobility rate versus high mobility rate

Female cadres of the low mobility cluster have a mobility rate close or under the arithmetic mean for mobility rate, that is 0,013. Female cadres of the high mobility cluster have a mobility rate above the arithmetic mean for mobility rate, that is superior to 0,013.

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[9] As regard to the graph, it must be note that each point on the graph represents the most observed values between cases, it does not represent the total number of frequencies.

4.1.3 Relevant cases

Shen Yueyue, with a 0,179, has the highest mobility rate among all the female elite members analized. Her biographical data shows that she is from Zhejiang province as the 12, 1 % of her female colleagues, holds a master's degree in economic management and has also studied in the Party School. As other member of elite, she was part of the Youth League. During her political career, she has held several positions, including Head of the Organization Department of Zhejiang Provincial CPC Committee, vice minister of the Ministry of Personnel and First Deputy Head of the Organization Department of the 17th CPC CC. Since 2013 she is Chairman of the All-China Women's Federation.

In contrast, Peng Peiyun, with a 0,0092, holds the lowest mobility rate in the study sample. She graduated from Qinghua University and she worked most part of her career at Party leadership positions in diverse Chinese universities. Her most relevant job has been as vice minister of the Ministry of Education and posts related to women's and disabilities issues.

There have never been any female members in the PSC and currently only two women are members of the Politburo: Sun Chunlan and Liu Yandong. Sun Chunlan has a high mobility rate (0,014), meanwhile Liu Yandong has a low mobility rate (0,012). Although their mobility rates differ, there are some similarities in their career histories: both and have graduate studies in economics and social sciences, have been part and held positions in the Youth League, have been head of CPC Central Committee United Front Department and have work experiences in mass organizations such as ACWF and trade union. The remarkable difference is that while Sun Chunlan began her career at provincial level, she was one of the few women to hold an office as Party secretary of a province, Liu Yandong climbed the steps of the Party-state through different positions in the Youth League.

TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ATTRIBUTES OF CHINESE FEMALE ELITE AND TYPES OF MOBILITY

5.1 An inferential statistical analysis (bivariate)

5.1.1 Test of Independence

Two variables are related if their attributes vary together, for graduation of this relationship, the statistical of contingency has been used. When purpose of the study is the search for causal relationships, the percentages are estimated only in the direction of the independent variable. This variable is often placed on the columns, and the dependent variable in the ranks; but in this case the high number of attributes of the independent variable discourages its location in the columns, the percentages are horizontal and comparisons are vertical

Albeit illustrative, reading percentage is insufficient. An accurate statistical supplement to graduate the association between the variables and their significance is necessary. In this case, a test of independence has been used to measure the relationship between variables, namely, to test the hypothesis.

1. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between nationality and mobility rate.
    Non-Han women have a higher mobility rate than Han women.

Table 5.1 Relation of mobility and nationality

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Han	85,366	80,000	83,333
Non Han	14,634	20,000	16,667
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.2 Test of independence (nationality and mobility)

Chi-square (Observed value)	0,322
Chi-square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,570
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

    Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 57.04%

2. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between birthplace (province) and mobility rate. Women from East provinces have a higher mobility rate than women from others provinc

Table 5.3 Relation of mobility and province

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Hunan	4,878	8,000	6,061
Shandong	14,634	8,000	12,121
Liaoning	7,317	0,000	4,545
Hebei	12,195	8,000	10,606
Zhejiang	14,634	8,000	12,121
Chongqing	4,878	4,000	4,545
Jilin	2,439	4,000	3,030
Sichuan	2,439	0,000	1,515
Jiangsu	14,634	4,000	10,606
Hainan	4,878	0,000	3,030
Heilongjiang	2,439	0,000	1,515
Beijing	4,878	0,000	3,030
Gansu	2,439	0,000	1,515
Fujian	2,439	4,000	3,030
Shaanxi	2,439	0,000	1,515
Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	2,439	0,000	1,515
Taiwan	0,000	8,000	3,030
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	0,000	4,000	1,515
Shanxi	0,000	4,000	1,515
Jiangxi	0,000	4,000	1,515
Guizhou	0,000	4,000	1,515
Tianjin	0,000	8,000	3,030
Hubei	0,000	4,000	1,515
Yunan	0,000	4,000	1,515
Henan	0,000	8,000	3,030
Anhui	0,000	4,000	1,515
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.4 Test of independence (province and mobility)

Chi-square (Observed value)	32,204
Chi-square (Critical value)	37,652
GL	25
value-p	0,152
Alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 canʹt be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 15,22%

3. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between educational level and mobility rate. Women with a higher educational level have a higher mobility rate than women with a lower educational level.

Table 5.5 Relation of mobility and level of education

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
High school	0,000	4,000	1,515
3 years-degree	9,756	20,000	13,636
BA	51,220	32,000	43,939
MA	34,146	36,000	34,848
PhD	4,878	8,000	6,061
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.6 Test of independence (educational level and mobility)

Chi-square (Observed value)	4,406
Chi-square (Critical value)	9,488
GL	4
value-p	0,354
Alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 35,39%

4. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between major and mobility rate. Women with a major in natural science and engineering have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.

Table 5.7 Relation of mobility and major

Major	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Social sciences and humanities	41,463	52,000	45,455
Natural science and engineering	43, 902	40,000	42,424
No college education	0,000	4,000	1,515
Missing values	14,634	4,000	10,606
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.8 Test of independence (major and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	3,731
Chi-square (Critical value)	7,815
GL	3
value-p	0,292
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can ́t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 29,20%

5. Hypothesis: There is a relationship between Party school experiences and mobility rate. Women with no-Party school experiences have a higher mobility rate than women with a major in social sciences and humanities.

Table 5.9 Relation of mobility and Party school studies

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non party school studies	56,098	40,000	50,000
Party school studies	43,902	60,000	50,000
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.10 Test of independence (Party school studies and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	1,610
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,205
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 20,45%

6.1 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between party work and mobility rate. Women with Party work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.11 Relation of mobility and party work experience

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non Party work	36,585	40,000	37,879
Party work	63,415	60,000	62,121
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.12 Test of independence (Party work and mobility)

Chi-square (Observed value)	0,322
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,570
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 57,04%

6.2 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between government work and mobility rate. Women with government work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.13 Relation of mobility and government work experience

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
No government work	34,146	36,000	34,848
Government work	65,854	64,000	65,152
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

63

Table 5.14 Test of independence (Government work and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	0,024
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,878
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 87,82%

6.3 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between industrial bureau/finance work and mobility rate. Women with industrial bureau/finance work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.15 Relation of mobility and firm/finance/ industrial bureau experience

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non firm/finance/industrial bureau	78,049	60,000	71,212
Firm/finance/industrial bureau	21,951	40,000	28,788
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.16 Test of independence (Firm/ finance/ industrial bureau and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	2,468
Chi-square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,116
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 11,62%

6.4 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between expert work and mobility rate. Women with expert work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.17 Relation of mobility and expert work experiences

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non Expert work-0	85,366	88,000	86,364
Expert work-1	14,634	12,000	13,636
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.18 Test of independence (Expert work and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	0,092
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,762
Alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 73,23%

6.5 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between ideology and propaganda work and mobility rate. Women with ideology or propaganda work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.19 Relation of mobility and ideology work experiences

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non ideology work	78,049	84,000	80,303
Ideology work	21,951	16,000	19,697
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.20 Test of independence (Ideology and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	0,348
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,555
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 55,54%

6.6 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between PLA/police work/law work and mobility rate. Women with PLA/police work/law work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.21 Relation of mobility and PLA/police/law work experience

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non PLA/police/law	92,683	92,000	92,424
PLA/police/law	7,317	8,000	7,576
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.22 Test of independence (PLA/ police/ law and mobility)

Chi-cuadrado (Observed value)	0,010
Chi-cuadrado (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
valor-p	0,919
Alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 91,90%

6.7 Hypothesis: There is a relationship between mass organizations work and mobility rate. Women with mass organizations work experiences have a higher mobility rate than women without.

Table 5.23 Relation of mobility and mass organization work experience

	Low Mobility	High Mobility	Total
Non Mass organization	46,341	36,000	42,424
Mass organization	53,659	64,000	57,576
Total	100	100	100

Source: my own elaboration

Table 5.24 Test of independence (Mass organization and mobility)

Chi -square (Observed value)	0,680
Chi -square (Critical value)	3,841
GL	1
value-p	0,410
alfa	0,05

Source: my own elaboration

Interpretation of the test:

- H0: rows and columns of the table are independent.
- Ha: there is dependence between rows and columns of the table.
- Since the calculated p-value is greater than the significance level alpha = 0.05, null hypothesis H0 can´t be rejected.
- The risk of rejecting the null hypothesis H0 when it is true is 40,96%

5.1.2 Other statistical methods of data analysis

For the purpose of testing the relationship between attributes of Chinese female elite, as a whole, and types of mobility several statistical methods could be used, such a multivariate regression analysis. However, since the data gathering has been coded as a binary system, the most suitable statistical method is the logistic regression analysis or so-called logit model. It is a multivariate method for dichotomous outcome variables.

The findings of the research using the logit model were similar to those presented above with the test of independence, the absence of a significant relationship among the variables. The research only included the results of the test of independence to avoid reiteration of information, and choose the tests of independence because they provide the same information by variable and secondary information such as the contingency tables.

CONCLUSIONS

6.1 Answering the research question and secondary information

The research started from the hypothesis that attributes or characteristics of an elite (in this case a female elite group), as well as the organizational structure (in which these women develop their career) and political connections affect their political mobility. This central hypothesis rose from an exploratory analysis, based on the literature review and on a univariate descriptive analysis. And, the research continued to search for a causal relationship; an explanatory analysis of types of political mobility in terms of attributes of female elite.

The research did not find evidences that support the main hypothesis. Attributes of female elite do not influence or have a causal relationship to mobility type. The several tests of independence conducted show that there is no relationship between the type of mobility (low and high) and the attributes of female elite (the various variables examined) along the period of institutionalization of Chinese politics. The research has only got descriptive answers, as the common factors among them (see Table 6.1 at Appendix C). Regard to the key factors to their promotion mentioned, the study demonstrates that the characteristics among women with low and high mobility are similar, therefore there is no a key factor to their mobility.

As far as other objectives or secondary information that the study included, several information must be noticed. First at all, the proportion of female in the Chinese political elite from 1997 to 2017 tends towards stabilization in a number close or inferior to 10% of the total members, as *Table* 3.1 (reproduced in next page again) shows.

Table 3.1 Average (%) of female in the CPC (15th to 18th) Central Committee

15th Central Committee	7,3%
16th Central Committee	7,6%
17th Central Committee	10%
18th Central Committee	8,7%

Source: data derived from Chinavitae.com, statistics of my won elaboration.

The most common attributes among female elite or the standard profile is a Han woman from an East region province or bordering province, with a Master´s degree, a major in social sciences and humanities, with party school studies or not (the percentage is 50%-50%), with work experiences mainly in mass organizations, party and government bodies.

Regarding to the mobility rate of female elite, this can be classified into two types: low mobility, under the 0,013 rate and, high mobility above the 0,013 rate. The low mobility type is more common among the female elite members, two thirds of women at CC have a low mobility rate

Nevertheless, it showed that the main characteristics of female mobility pattern is age. The study indicates that the mobility rate over time is decreasing, because women are being promoted when they are older than they used to be. Women promoted in the last CC needed more time (years) to get to the same status position than the early CC female members.

6.2 A Double Glass Ceiling?

The exploratory analysis of data and literature available shows the presence of four characteristics that concur to the existence of a "glass ceiling" in Chinese politics.

The first one, a gender difference that is not explained by other job-relevant characteristics of the employee has been proven by the collection of educational background information on female elite displayed in the four chapter of this research. After analyzing the data gathered, findings prove that female elite members fulfill the requisites of entry in the Party-state; a la large proportion of the female cadres have a high level of education and they engage in the Party at a young age. So, the gender difference cannot be explained in terms of job-relevant characteristics of the employee.

The three remaining characteristics: a gender difference that is greater at higher levels than lower levels of the organization, a gender inequality in the chances of advancement into higher levels and a gender inequality that increase over the course of a career, are proven to be true as it is shown above (*Table* 1.1) in the analysis of member in CPC institutions from 1977 to 2013. Female cadres are underrepresented in high level power positions, this underrepresentation is greater at higher levels than lower levels of the CPC's organization chart and the gender inequality increases over the course of a career. An example of how gender inequality increases over the course of a career is the retirement system that penalized women. Female cadres must retire at an earlier age than male cadres. The current retirement system shortens the career period of female cadres and implies that over the end of their career they will have less chances to promote or to get up in echelons of the Party-state.

Table 1.1 Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013)

Average (%) female-male in CPC institutions (1977-2013)		
CPC institutions	Proportion of women	Proportion of men
Politburo Standing	0%	100%
Politburo	2,7%	97,3%
Central Committee	5,2%	94,8%
State Council	6,3%	93,7%
Chinese People´s	15,3%	95,7%
National People´s	21,4%	89,6%

Source: data derived from (Sissokho, 2014) and my own elaboration.

The present study confirms the existence of a "glass ceiling" in Chinese politics and identifies other potential discrimination that women face. The examination of their career histories indicates that women are not eligible to hard power position spheres. They develop their career mainly working in mass organizations as the CYL, ACWF, trade unions and sports related organization. They are almost nonexistent in People´s Liberation Army (PLA), police and the justice system. The profile of expert or dedicated to economic matters is also minority among them.

So, I propose the idea of a double glass ceiling as metaphor of the double discrimination female cadres suffer at CPC. They are not only less likely to promote but also, less likely to work in power capacity areas.

I have also noticed that women are getting elected to CC in an older age than they used to be. Given that one of the requirements of the political institutionalization is age,

the possibilities of these women to achieve higher positions in the CPC (PSC and PB) are lower.

According to Marie C. Wilson´s statement (2007) about the pipeline theory of women´s ascendancy in her book *Closing the leadership gap*, the most effective solution to break the glass ceiling is "to insert enough women at all levels and their promotion to higher ranks will be statistically inevitable".

Currently the number of women in low ranks is too small to increase their statistics chances to promote. This is due to a several reasons: first, the number of women affiliated to the CPC make up only the 23, 3% of total members, and second, the affirmative actions developed by the party-state have been inadequate, as the quotas. Regulations related female quotas often advised to have a minimum number of women in the government or CPC bodies. Cadres in charge of appointments often take these regulations literally and only select the minimum number of women required.

A solution has to address both issues: getting a higher number of women affiliated to the CPC, and evaluate the effectiveness of the affirmative actions. To create parity in the party base in all areas, understood as all bodies within the party-state and all spheres of power, is the key to break the "double glass ceiling".

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   +number&type=

Appendix A

Figure 1.1 China's Leading Political Institutions

Source: (Lawerence & Martin, 2013)

Figure 1.2 Organization chart of the Party-state and its main organs of power

Source: (The Economist, 2014)

Appendix B

*Table* 1.2 Name list of female members of CC (1997-2017)

Definitive list of study sample (66 women)

Chen Zhili	Shi Yuzhen	Wang Xia	Chen Zuoning
Gu Xiulian	Song Xiuyan	Wu qidi	Lei Chunmei
Hao Jianxiu	Sun Chunlan	Yin Yicui	Ulagan
Lin Liyun	Uyunqimg	Deng Nan	Liu Hui
Mo Wenxiu*	Wu Aiying	Li Bin	Zhao Aiming
Peng Peiyun*	Xie Qihua	Li Haifeng	Shen Suli
Wu Yi*	Yue Xicui	Yang Yanyin	Xing Yuanmin
Zhu Lilan	Tong Xiaoping	Li Yumei	Zhao Shi
Huang Zhang Zao (Qizao)	Chen Ximing	Hu Zejun	Xia Jie
Chen Yujie	Du Xuefang	Chen Yiqin	Ge Huijun
Han Guizhi	Huang Liman	Dao Linyin	Lu Xiwen
Huang Qingyi	Jiang Wenlan	Zhang Daili	Huang Lixin
Jin Yinhuan	Lin Mingyue	Zhang Lianzhen	Liang Liming
Liu Yandong	Shi Lianxi	Li Kang	Ma Wen
Qiao Chuanxiu	Shu Xiaoqin	Zhang Xuan	Fu Guihua
Qin Yuqin	Song Airong	Fu Yuelan	
Shen Yueyue	Tie Ning	Xian Hui	

Source: data derived from China Vitae (2016) and my own elaboration.

Appendix C

Graph 4 The mean of seniority by CC

SENORITY

26.2   27.0   25.7   29.1   29.7   27.5

Previous   1997   2002   2007   2012   Total

Source: my own elaboration

Graph 4 The mean of age by CC

AGE

46.5   48.9   50.9   52.3   53.0

55.0
50.0
45.0
40.0

Previous   1997   2002   2007   2012

Source: my own elaboration

Table 6.1 Independent variables and their frequencies.

Variable	Category	Frequency	%
Ethnicity	Non Han	11	16,667
	Han	55	83,333
Educational level	High school	1	1,515
	3 year-degree	9	13,636
	BA	29	43,939
	MA	23	34,848
	PhD	4	6,061
Party school studies	Non Party school studies	33	50,000
	Party school studies	33	50,000
Major	No major	1	1,515
	Social sciences and humanities	30	45,455
	Natural sciences and engineering	28	42,424
	Missing values	7	10,606
Goverment work	Non government work	23	34,848
	Government work	43	65,152
Party work	Non Party work	25	37,879
	Party Work	41	62,121
Expert work	Non expert work	57	86,364
	Expert work	9	13,636
Firm/finance/industrial bureau	Non firm/ finance/ industrial bureau	47	71,212
	Firm/finance/industrial bureau	19	28,788
Ideology work	Non ideology	53	80,303
	Ideology	13	19,697
PLA/police/law	Non PLA/police/law	61	92,424
	PLA/police/law	5	7,576
Mass organization	Non mass organization	28	42,424
	Mass organization	38	57,576

Source: my own elaboration