

# Institutional Aspect of Democratic Consolidation: A Taiwan Experience\*

JAUSHIEH JOSEPH WU

*By procedural definitions of democracy, Taiwan appears to have become a democratic country since its much-publicized first direct presidential election in 1996. But the issue of whether Taiwan has consolidated or will consolidate its democracy remains a matter of debate. Unlike many other newly-democratized countries, Taiwan's main concern over its democratic consolidation lies not so much in its military's attitude toward the possibility of an opposition party coming to power, but in the ability of the political system, a semi-presidential system established in the summer of 1997, to survive future party competition.*

**Keywords:** democratization; democratic consolidation; semi-presidential system; Kuomintang; Democratic Progressive Party; the New Party; National Development Conference

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Democracy and democratization have been among the most important subjects in the studies of political development since World War II.

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**Dr. Jaushieh Joseph Wu**, Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, is author of *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995).

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After wrangling between dependency and modernization theories in the 1960s and 1970s, a new and visible international trend of political change since the mid-1970s has provided a new momentum and a greater case for studying political development. During this period, a group of more than sixty countries previously ruled by authoritarian regimes in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia have given way, in one fashion or another, to democratic elections, beginning from the April 1974 coup in Portugal.<sup>1</sup> In fact, changes have been so phenomenal that the trend is now popularly characterized as a "wave" of democratization, following Samuel P. Huntington's depiction of the global movement.

After endless searches for the causes of transition and the collapse of authoritarian regimes, and the conditions for establishing democratic governments, the focus of democratization studies has shifted slightly to the consolidation of the newly-established democracies. In lieu of the numerous cases of reversals in the first and second waves of democratization, the issue of how new democracies survive the transitional period and consolidate their democratic political systems is just as important as the transition process itself, if not more so. In this regard, previous studies have provided us with illuminating insights and yielded significant findings on the subject,<sup>2</sup> but as they have centered mainly on Latin American and South European countries, they may not be sufficient for students to fully understand all possible transition processes and their aftermath. More case studies, particularly of new democracies built upon non-European cultural configurations, will definitely be very important in testing existing generalizations about democratic consolidation.

Among the countries riding on the third wave of democratization, Taiwan's experience is quite unique and interesting in many ways. First, Taiwan's transition period lasted for about a decade, beginning from its

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<sup>1</sup>Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 3.

<sup>2</sup>John Higley and Richard Gunther, eds., *Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela, eds., *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992).

opening up in 1986 and continuing through its full democratic elections for the National Assembly in 1991 and Legislative Yuan in 1992, before climaxing with its first direct presidential election in 1996, at which time it claimed to have turned itself into a full-fledged democracy. Moreover, Taiwan is under the general influence of Confucian culture, a factor regarded by some Western political scientists as nonconducive to democratization,<sup>3</sup> and has no previous experience of democracy apart from some minor elections both during Japanese colonial rule and under Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) martial law rule. Furthermore, its process of democratic transition appears, at least on the surface, to have been less violent, less affected by the military, and more successful and recognized than many newly-democratized countries. In addition, the long-term ruling KMT has also transformed itself in the transition process into one of the competing forces for power, and has thus far maintained its status as the country's largest political party. Furthermore, Taiwan's transition has been unprecedented in that its external environment, notably its long confrontation and conflict with China, has had a profound impact on its internal political development. In short, Taiwan can very well be used as a case to test the findings and general conclusions drawn by previous studies of democratic transition and consolidation, which indeed is this article's intention. In the following sections, the author will first review previous studies of democratic consolidation and outline their general conclusions, followed by a general description of Taiwan's democratization process. The efforts and immense difficulties encountered in keeping Taiwan's democracy intact will then be examined. The institutional aspect of democratic consolidation, largely ignored or dismissed by some studies, is seen here as the most difficult area that Taiwan's democratic consolidation has encountered.

### **Democratic Consolidation: What Is It?**

As Huntington describes, there have been cases of reverse democrati-

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<sup>3</sup>Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 71-73.

zation, i.e., replacement of democracy by authoritarian rule, following each of the three waves of democratization, with many newly-democratized countries unable to sustain democratic institutions and processes.<sup>4</sup> Consequently, the issue of democratic consolidation, or how democracies can remain democratic after the transition, is critical, if not more critical than studies of how countries can be democratized following the collapse of authoritarian regimes in the first place, which have been carried out by comparative political scientists throughout the 1980s.

The notion "democratic consolidation" generally implies the continuation of democratic rule after the transition from authoritarian rule into democracy, and the political system's relative freedom from disruptive forces or from the possibility of retreat into authoritarian rule. A new democracy is usually described as "consolidated" when it remains democratic for a period of time after the initial transition and sustains the turnover of the main forces vying for national political offices. Conceivably, the key political actors and the general public in a "consolidated" democracy would, to a great extent, agree to the constitutional rules of the political game in deciding who governs the country and accepts the results of competition (i.e., elections) without resorting to extra-institutional or violent means to change those rules or reverse the results.

Despite general agreement on the procedural definitions of democracy and the notion of democratic consolidation, there has been a lack of precision with regard to the definition of the latter, and the substance and measurement of the concept still arouse plenty of serious debate in the field. Some, such as Diane Ethier,<sup>5</sup> accept the above general characterization of democratic consolidation without giving the concept itself fair treatment or providing a vigorous definition. Others have attempted to define the concept with more vigor and precision. For instance, coming from the procedural definitions of democracy, Michael Burton, John Higley, and Richard Gunther argue in their studies on democratization in Latin America

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<sup>4</sup>Ibid., 14.

<sup>5</sup>Diane Ethier, ed., *Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Southern Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia* (London: Macmillan Press, 1990).

and Southern Europe that "a consolidated democracy is a regime that meets all the procedural criteria of democracy and also in which all politically significant groups accept established political institutions and adhere to democratic rules of the game."<sup>6</sup> But as the authors recognize, just like the procedural definition of democracy, this view stands as an ideal type, and democratic consolidation should best be regarded as the "process of adaptation/freezing of democratic structures and norms, which come to be accepted as legitimate by part or all of civil society"<sup>7</sup> or the "process through which democratic forms come to be valued in themselves, even against adverse substantive outcomes."<sup>8</sup> This treatment of democratic consolidation is generally accepted and reiterated by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, who condense the concept into a single sentence: "Democracy has become the only game in town."<sup>9</sup>

Nevertheless, the above definition does not entirely clarify the vague differences between "consolidated" and "unconsolidated" democracies undergoing transition and the ambiguity about whether a new democracy is consolidated after transition from authoritarian rule. As many cases of reverse democratization have demonstrated, there is a distinct possibility that a new democracy which appears to be consolidated in the first few years after the transition will later lose public support and finally give way to authoritarian rule. Because of this concern, Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela propose the concept of a "second transition," at the closure of which "all major political actors take for granted the fact that democratic procedures dictate government renewal," while "the elected governments of transitional democracies operate in a political environment in which democratic continuity is still uncertain."<sup>10</sup>

The distinction between two transitions clears up the ambiguity to

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<sup>6</sup>Higley and Gunther, *Elites and Democratic Consolidation*, 3.

<sup>7</sup>See *ibid.*, 4.

<sup>8</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup>Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 5.

<sup>10</sup>Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 3.

some extent, but as the term itself implies, a "consolidated" democracy is a democracy that endures the test of time. A new democracy, including its political institutions, political processes, and norms of political behavior, may initially be accepted by most parts of society, but then regarded by many as illegitimate after one or two national elections (for reasons such as the system's inability to deal with national problems, or meet the public demands and expectations which led to the breakdown of the authoritarian regime in the first place). Because of this consideration, Huntington provides a "two-turnover" test to the concept: "a democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of transition loses a subsequent election and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to the winners of a later election."<sup>11</sup> However, this test, which appears to be easy, is obviously problematic: Why two turnovers but not one or three? What if a major political force emerges in a new democracy and continues to govern after several elections? Apparently many democracies, young or old, would certainly be deleted from the list of consolidated democracies if one holds Huntington's test as the major criteria to measure the concept.

In order not to be constrained by concerns over time and the aforementioned ambiguity, Valenzuela tries to approach the concept with a logical test of falsification by arguing that "a consolidated democracy would be one that does not have perverse elements undermining its basic characteristics,"<sup>12</sup> including tutelary powers, reserved domains of authority, major discrimination in electoral processes, and means other than election to constitute governments.<sup>13</sup> Approaching the concept of consolidated democracy by arguing what is not a consolidated democracy is an effective means of clearing up some of the conceptual ambiguities currently troubling students of democratization. With all these arguments and counter-arguments, one can certainly come to a better understanding of the concept

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<sup>11</sup>Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 266-67.

<sup>12</sup>Mainwaring, O'Donnell, and Valenzuela, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, 62.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid.*, 62-70.

of democratic consolidation and the complicated process of consolidating a new democracy.

By the most generally agreed definition, democratic consolidation entails acceptance by major political actors, political forces, and the general public of established institutions and the constitutional rules of the game. Acceptance and respect of the established constitution and institutions is undoubtedly a key part to the definition. However, institutionalization, i.e., establishing political institutions and specifying the rules of political competition and the political process, is frequently ignored and sometimes dismissed by comparative political scientists as a crucial aspect (or even a condition or prerequisite) in the literature discussing the consolidation process.<sup>14</sup> It is certainly true that when one approaches the substance of the concept, one tends to be confused by how different countries approach the issue or even get bogged down by examining the virtue of each proposition. Furthermore, this lack of emphasis can be rationalized by the fact that most democratizing countries have had little internal disagreement in selecting a particular form of constitutional government, and their institutionalizations have seemed to be a relatively easy task—with most European countries opting for variations of the parliamentary or semi-presidential models and Latin American countries adopting presidential forms of government.<sup>15</sup> However, to establish a political system that is accepted by a great majority (if not all) of the political contenders would greatly strengthen the legitimacy of the young democracy undergoing transition. Consequently, a constitutional order that is deemed legitimate has a much greater chance of survival than those that are not. As Linz and Stepan write, "Consolidation requires that habituation to the norms and procedures of democratic conflict regulation be developed. A high degree of institutional routinization is a key part of such a process."<sup>16</sup> Thus, a new

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<sup>14</sup>Ibid., 62.

<sup>15</sup>The newly-democratized countries that have adopted a parliamentary model of government include Spain, Hungary, and the Czech Republic; those that have adopted a semi-presidential system include Portugal, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine; and those that have adopted the presidential system include Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico, among others.

<sup>16</sup>Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 10.

democracy constantly arguing over issues such as the merit of the adopted form of the government and electoral system while frequently attempting to revise the most fundamental constitutional laws would likely have more difficulty in consolidating the constitutional process as well as the norms and procedures of democracy. In this regard, a more in-depth case study on constitutional politics could illuminate the importance of institutionalization in democratic consolidation. Taiwan, which has gone through a major constitutional revision in 1997 to establish a semi-presidential form of government, is therefore a case which should be investigated.

### **Taiwan's Democratic Transition and Consolidation**

It is frequently argued that Taiwan's democratic transition process began when the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was formed on September 28, 1986 in defiance of the government ban on opposition political parties. The movement toward a more open political system started to gain momentum on October 6 of the same year when then-President Chiang Ching-kuo revealed his determination to lift martial law and permit opposition parties.<sup>17</sup> The DPP consequently won thirteen seats in its 1986 Legislative Yuan election debut.<sup>18</sup> In the following summer, martial law was abolished, visits to mainland China were permitted, the ban on new news publications was lifted, and censorship was markedly eased. In 1989, the DPP took one step further, winning twenty-one seats in Legislative Yuan elections. As the 1980s ended, Taiwan had transformed itself from a polity tightly controlled and deeply penetrated by the KMT into an open and vigorous one ridding itself of the political, social, and cultural bondage imposed by the previously authoritarian regime.

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<sup>17</sup>Chiang was interviewed by Katharine Graham of the *Washington Post*.

<sup>18</sup>In addition to the Legislative Yuan, Taiwan's parliament had two other chambers: the National Assembly, which is empowered by the Nanjing constitution to elect and recall the president and to amend the constitution, and the Control Yuan, the main government ethic watchdog organ whose members were appointed after the 1991 constitutional revisions and is no longer deemed to be a parliamentary chamber.



At the time when liberalization was gaining momentum, political democratization was also pursued vigorously, mainly by opposition politicians and liberal scholars. Their first target was the senior deputies in the three chambers of the parliament, who were mostly KMT members who were elected in mainland China in 1948, fled to Taiwan with the Nationalist government, and had remained in their positions ever since. These senior parliamentarians comprised about 70 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan and 50 percent in the Control Yuan in the late 1980s, allowing the KMT to dominate the chambers and the political process despite the growing numbers of locally-elected representatives in these institutions. Even though the Legislative Yuan passed a bill in January 1989 to call for the voluntary retirement of senior parliamentarians with fabulous financial incentives, most of them stayed on until thousands of students poured onto the street of downtown Taipei in March 1990 to protest the snail's pace of political reform.

Faced with strong pressure from society to reform on the one hand and bitter internal disputes within the KMT on the other, Lee Teng-hui, who took over the presidency when Chiang Ching-kuo died in January 1988, decided to embark on democratic reform by calling for a National Affairs Conference to deal with the most challenging issues facing the country. Taking the conclusions of the National Affairs Conference as his own legitimate initiative, in 1990 Lee pushed through the cancellation of the "Temporary Provisions" (or emergency decree), adopted in 1948 to legalize unlimited terms for senior parliamentarians, and aging senior deputies were forced to step down at the end of the year. In the following year, the Control Yuan became a quasi-judicial body to serve as the government watchdog with its members appointed by the president and confirmed by the National Assembly. The National Assembly and Legislative Yuan held their first full-chamber elections in 1991 and 1992, respectively, entirely based on the choices of the local population.

Even though the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan had become popularly elected chambers, the democratization process continued on as the public revealed its desire to directly elect the head of the state and other major executive positions. In late 1994, elections for the mayors of Taipei and Kaohsiung and governor of Taiwan were opened to public con-

test as a result of constitutional revisions earlier in the year. In the same round of revisions, it was also decided that the president would be elected by the people in Taiwan, and no longer through the National Assembly. This paved the way for the adoption of the electoral law regarding the exact method of electing the president in 1995, and a direct presidential election was subsequently held in the spring of 1996. By then, Taiwan had basically fulfilled the most agreed-upon procedural requirement for being a democracy: the most important decision-making positions being determined by free and open periodic elections based on universal suffrage, with a relatively high degree of freedom of speech and press. Even though there have been frequent charges of vote-buying during different election campaigns, particularly against KMT candidates, few would question the democratic nature of the current Taiwan political system, and emphasis has gradually shifted toward the consolidation of the new democracy.

One of the major differences in democratic consolidation between Taiwan and other newly-democratized countries, particularly those in Latin America, is that there is much less concern about a return to authoritarian rule or the possibility of military intervention in politics in and after the mid-1990s. A tiny fraction of the population have praised the clean-cut martial law rule of Chiang Kai-shek and his son, who maintained a high degree of social and political order, while some have even openly called for the support of the Chinese authorities in Beijing, but these groups do not have tangible support among the local population and are usually dismissed by major political forces in Taiwan as having no political significance.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in 1988, there has been no one left from the authoritarian era who is popular or powerful enough to disrupt the democratic process, not to mention reimposing martial law, without fear of provoking the general population to oppose the regime.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>The Worker's Party (Laodong dang) in Taiwan has adopted Chinese socialism as its ideology and calls for immediate unification with Beijing under Beijing's terms. The party has been running in Taiwan's recent elections but has failed to gain any significant support. In the 1995 Legislative Yuan elections, the two candidates nominated by the party received 1,207 votes in total. See *Zhongguo shibao* (China Times), December 3, 1995, 10.

<sup>20</sup>After Chiang Wei-kuo died in the summer of 1997, the only person in Chiang's family who still occupies a significant political office is Ching-kuo's son John Chang, a former minister

Even though the possibility of electing a DPP president raises some questions about the attitude of the military, which has been indoctrinated to be vigilant against the notion of Taiwan independence to which the DPP adheres, and there may be periods of uneasiness or even tension between the military and the elected civilian leadership, the general public does not seem to be very concerned about a possible military coup and the chances of its success. Moreover, the line between the DPP and KMT ideology has been blurred by the fact that the KMT has been pursuing pragmatic diplomacy, which has been interpreted by many as pursuing Taiwan independence, while the DPP has been moderating its tone on the issue. To many, there is therefore practically no difference in their respective ideology on the issue. Furthermore, the result of the 1997 constitutional revisions, which will be discussed in detail in the following sections, is such that a DPP president may have to form a governing coalition with other political parties to avoid intense confrontation, or even face the possibility of a coalition formed by other parties. This will be an effective means to reduce and perhaps eliminate any suspicion on the part of Taiwan's military of the DPP's pursuit of separatism. In short, unlike many other newly-democratized countries in the Third World, the possibility of reverse democratization or military intervention in civilian affairs has not been an important issue in Taiwan's democratic consolidation.

Nevertheless, in contrast to many newly-democratized countries, the constitutional setup has been a serious concern in Taiwan. Most notably, the relations between the president and the premier and between the premier and the legislature have been a topic of intense debate and a source of political crisis. The original constitution, which was drawn in Nanjing in 1947, had a very strong flavor of parliamentarism, with the Executive Yuan (cabinet) being responsible to the Legislative Yuan and the presidential nomination of the premier needing to be confirmed by the legislature. Nevertheless, as Chiang Kai-shek and his son both served as the party

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of foreign affairs who became vice-premier in August 1997, and was also elected as a member of the National Assembly in 1996. However, Chang does not seem to be interested in or is capable of bringing the country back to the authoritarian era.

chairman and the president at the same time, and ruled the country with a strong arm, the system tilted heavily toward presidentialism except for a very brief interlude when Chiang Ching-kuo was serving as the premier after his father died in 1975. Due to long years of practice, the premier was merely a chief administrator of a strong president despite the fact that the constitution provided that the premier was the "chief executive" of the government.

After Lee Teng-hui assumed power in January 1988 and survived the challenge of the party's old guard in the weeks after, the system began to show its problems in adaptability. Lee Huan, selected by Lee Teng-hui as the premier to head the Executive Yuan, gradually revealed his intention to challenge the president, and during the 1990 presidential election enlisted Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo as candidates to compete with President Lee. The confrontation between the president and the premier set off the first round of a constitutional crisis<sup>21</sup> after martial law was lifted in 1987, and resulted in social, political, and economic disorder. The crisis was highlighted by the aforementioned student demonstrations, and President Lee took these public pressures into his own initiative, calling for the National Assembly to begin the first round of constitutional reform in 1991. However, efforts in 1991 did not accomplish much in establishing a new government setup other than abolishing the emergency decree. The National Assembly went further in revising the constitution in 1992 and 1994, but the relations among key political institutions, the factor giving rise to the 1990 constitutional crisis, were not altered.

Even though the 1990 crisis was temporarily defused by Lee Teng-hui after his appointment of Hau Pei-tsun—the most powerful military figure at the time and a close associate of Lee Huan and Lin Yang-kang—as the new premier, leading to a truce between the two KMT factions, tension between the president and the premier surfaced again in 1992 when it became apparent that Hau was calling his own military meetings without the pres-

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<sup>21</sup>The event is characterized as a constitutional crisis here, rather than as a mere political crisis, because it has been caused by the fact that the participants in the confrontation have different interpretations of constitutional provisions which do not provide sufficient answers regarding rules that the political players should follow.

ident's knowledge. The tension came to a climax toward the winter of 1992 when the president and the premier stopped seeing each other in their weekly meetings. When the Legislative Yuan was reelected at the end of 1992 and convened in February 1993, Hau publicly expressed his desire to stay on his position as the premier without regard to the attitude of the president, and a new constitutional crisis seemed to be in the making. However, it later became apparent to Hau that the KMT legislators loyal to President Lee and the DPP legislators who were more than eager to drive him out of office made up well more than half of the seats in the chamber, and he resigned. Lien Chan consequently took over as the new premier, and a final showdown between Lee and Hau was averted. During this period of confusion, some DPP legislators requested explanation of the relations among the three key institutions from the Council of Grand Justices in 1993; the Council ruled in October 1995 that based on political responsibility, a premier needed to submit his resignation before a new Legislative Yuan convened.<sup>22</sup> Nevertheless, the Council of Grand Justices did not clear up the confusion entirely, and the debate on the relations between the president and the premier continued over the issue of whether the president's power in nominating the premier (to be approved by the Legislative Yuan) was real or symbolic.

The first direct presidential election in the spring of 1996 posed a further burden on the political system, even though it was generally regarded as a major and perhaps the final step in Taiwan's democratization. The most urgent challenges included: the relationships between the popularly elected president and the premier and between the Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan needed to be redefined; and contrary to the existing constitutional stipulations of parliamentarism, there was a popular belief that a directly elected president should acquire more power in the political establishment. Moreover, in the development of the party system circa 1996-97, the KMT was only able to master slightly more than half of the seats in the Legislative Yuan, and the party had difficulties in imposing party discipline

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<sup>22</sup>Council of Grand Justices Decision No. 387.

in the legislature. When the new legislature convened in February 1996 to elect its new speaker and vice-speaker, there were KMT legislators willing to rebel against their own party, and the opposition alliance between the DPP and the New Party almost succeeded in unseating the incumbent speaker and vice-speaker.

Moreover, after Lien Chan was elected as the vice-president in May 1996, the Legislative Yuan, under pressure from the opposition, passed a non-binding resolution to request the newly-elected president to submit a new premier candidate for legislative confirmation. President Lee ignored the resolution and Lien stayed on as the premier, leading the opposition in the Legislative Yuan to submit the case to the Council of Grand Justices for explanation on the constitutionality of Lien Chan concurrently holding the two top political offices. The confrontation between the executive and legislative branches reached its peak in August 1996, when Lien Chan was barred from entering the Legislative Yuan to deliver his executive reports and answer the legislators' interpellation as required by the constitution. Even though the Council of Grand Justices did not clearly and directly rule on the constitutionality of the dual role played by Lien Chan, it was quite obvious that the relationship among key government institutions needed to be redefined in order to resolve the constitutional deadlock and prevent crises such as the ones which took place in 1990 and 1996-97.

In this brief review of Taiwan's democratization and the problems faced in the current stage of political development, it is clear that institutionalization has been the most challenging aspect in consolidating its young democracy. The constitutional setup of the government, as well as its reform, has been a focal point of academic and political debate, and there have been attempts in the National Assembly to address and resolve the issue. But in previous rounds of constitutional revision which took place in 1991, 1992, and 1994, the conflict among key government institutions which gave rise to the 1990 constitutional crisis was not properly addressed, with the only change to the central government setup being direct elections of the president. Against this background, the 1997 constitutional revisions were specifically geared toward the goal of establishing a central government system that could avoid further constitutional crisis and inter-institutional confrontation.

## Politics of the 1997 Constitutional Reform

In his inaugural speech on May 20, 1996, President Lee called for a national effort, in the form of an extra-partisan conference, to deal with the challenging issues facing the nation, similar to the opening of the National Affairs Conference. To fulfill the promise, the presidential office organized the National Development Conference (NDC) toward the end of 1996, inviting representatives from parties of any political significance,<sup>23</sup> with proportional distribution based on the relative strength of the party, to discuss the most important national issues, most notably those related to the constitution. After numerous rounds of preparatory meetings and a week of formal conferences, the NDC reached consensus on some drastic measures to revise the constitutional setup.<sup>24</sup> Agreements affecting the relations among key government institutions included:<sup>25</sup> (1) the presidential appointment of the premier not requiring the approval of the Legislative Yuan; (2) under necessary regulations and limits, the president and the premier having the power to dissolve the Legislative Yuan; (3) the Legislative Yuan being allowed to pass a vote of no-confidence against the premier; (4) transferring auditing power from the Control Yuan to the Legislative Yuan; (5) transferring the power to impeach the president and the vice-president from the Control Yuan to the Legislative Yuan; and (6) empowering the legislative committees to hold public hearings and investigations.

Other important agreements reached in the NDC but not directly related to the central government setup included the power of national referendum; cancellation of the provincial elections and the streamlining of the provincial government; cancellation of township-level elections; formation of the National Assembly based on proportional representation;

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<sup>23</sup>Participants in the conference included those representing the KMT, the DPP, the New Party, and the Taiwan Independence Party.

<sup>24</sup>The New Party withdrew from the National Development Conference to protest the close alliance between the KMT and the DPP, and their sidelining of New Party positions on constitutional reform. See *Zhongguo shibao*, December 28, 1996, 3.

<sup>25</sup>*Lianhe bao* (United Daily News), December 28, 1996, 3. The text of the agreement is translated from KMT internal document no. 1A\1A8601.28.

changing the electoral system for the Legislative Yuan from the current multi-member districts with a single nontransferable voting (SNTV) system to a combination of single-member districts and proportional representation with two ballots, among others. But the focal point in the conference was undoubtedly on central government structure, which generated a tremendous amount of public debate.

The seemingly difficult task of reaching agreement on changing the government from a parliamentary system to a semi-presidential system was much smoother than expected. As a KMT official noted, the KMT approached the DPP with the proposal of a semi-presidential system with the anticipation that the DPP would have rejected it out of hand, but to the KMT's surprise, the DPP accepted it with only some minor reservations.<sup>26</sup> As the news media characterized it, top KMT and DPP representatives came to an agreement during the NDC's final round of negotiations in a very brief fifteen minutes.<sup>27</sup> In other words, adopting a semi-presidential system was very much determined before the formal opening of the NDC and the subsequent constitutional revisions, as the leaders of the two major political parties had no differences with each other on the idea. The New Party and Taiwan Independence Party, which together had no more than 15 percent of the seats in the National Assembly and were therefore not in a position to block any revisions that required a three-fourths quorum, were not taken seriously during the conference, although the New Party proposed a parliamentary model of government while the Taiwan Independence Party opted for a presidential system.

Nevertheless, contending political forces in Taiwan and within each of the major political parties are more complicated than what the leaders of the two parties can dominate or manipulate. Consequently, there were moments of ups and downs, and even scuffles, in the National Assembly, and both the KMT and the DPP were plagued by internal disputes which almost tarnished the prospects of any significant achievement. It is therefore necessary to outline the two parties' intentions and the internal problems they faced.

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<sup>26</sup>Personal interview, September 25, 1997.

<sup>27</sup>*Lianhe bao*, December 28, 1996, 3.



*The KMT's Intentions and Internal Divisions*

As mentioned earlier, the KMT barely maintained a majority in the Legislative Yuan in 1996-97, and there is a distinct possibility that it will lose its majority in the 1998 elections. Under the original constitutional setup, a president-nominated premier needed to be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan. Without a majority in the legislature, and faced with the prospect of opposition parties joining in a coalition alliance as they did in the 1996 elections of Legislative Yuan speaker and vice-speaker, the KMT would clearly lose its control over the executive branch of the central government. Moreover, the KMT's small margin in commanding the legislative majority also allowed for individual legislators, including KMT or members of other parties, to frequently make very outrageous demands on the party when a vote was required on the floor.<sup>28</sup> The KMT had already learned hard lessons in the Legislative Yuan speaker election in February 1996, as well as the adoption of a resolution demanding the president to submit another premier candidate for approval in June of the same year. Changing the existing basically parliamentary constitutional order thus became a pressing task for the ruling party in its hopes to hold its grip on executive power.

As revealed by one of the scholars involved in the drafting of the KMT constitutional revision proposals, the KMT considered the possibility of establishing a presidential system to replace the Nanjing constitution, but gave up the idea very quickly for fear of losing everything if it were to be defeated by the DPP in future presidential elections.<sup>29</sup> Its defeat in the Taipei mayoral election in 1994 had been a hard blow, as it has been excluded from the distribution of major resources in the capital city ever since. Moreover, the KMT calculated that if the president could retain some policymaking power, it could retain executive resources at least in the very short run, since President Lee's term will not expire until 2000. Even if the KMT loses in the 2000 presidential election, it will still be one of the

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<sup>28</sup>This was described by one of the interviewed KMT officials as the most important motivation behind the KMT's desire to rid itself from the burden of legislative confirmation on premier candidates.

<sup>29</sup>Personal interview, October 23, 1997.

largest political forces, if not the largest, in the national legislature. With some manipulation in building coalitions with other political parties, the KMT should be able to remain in the power equation. With these considerations, a semi-presidential system similar to that of France was a convenient solution, as it will still be calling shots from the presidential office before 2000, and will at least be a significant part of the Executive Yuan after 2000.

Furthermore, the majority run-off system to elect the president adopted in the French semi-presidential system serves the KMT's needs. It can count on the support of other social forces if it happens to lose to a DPP candidate in a first-round election. It is quite possible that no candidate can win a majority in the first round of a majority run-off election if the system is adopted by the National Assembly. But because of ideological proximity, New Party supporters may, in strategic voting which would prevent the rival DPP from taking power, decide to vote for the KMT candidate in the second round. Due to these considerations, the majority run-off electoral system was pursued by the KMT with great enthusiasm. In short, the KMT's choice of a semi-presidential system was based entirely on its short-term calculations to remain in power.

Nevertheless, the KMT's pursuit of a semi-presidential system was complicated, and almost thwarted, by the issue of streamlining the provincial government, which can only be understood through the KMT's internal power struggle. The KMT has been bitterly divided among younger power contenders in recent years. Lien Chan, vice-president of the state, vice-chairman of the party, and the former premier, has generally been regarded as being hand-picked by President Lee to succeed him after he completes his term in 2000. However, Lien's relationship with provincial governor James Soong turned sour after the gubernatorial election in 1994, as Soong frequently unleashed bitter criticism against the Executive Yuan under Lien while attempting to consolidate his own power base by strengthening his relations with local politicians and faction leaders through channeling provincial resources directly to the township and village level. Perhaps the most alarming sign to Lien was that while he continued to suffer from low popularity ratings because of his seeming inability to deal with national problems and was boycotted by the legislature, Soong continued to enjoy

high ratings for his publicity campaign in visiting the countryside and solving local issues. The ousting of Mikhail Gorbachev by current Russian President Boris Yeltsin thus seemed to be repeating itself in Taiwan—a very powerful governor who ruled about 90 percent of the country, both demographically and geographically, was threatening the authority and legitimacy of the central government. Without effective or even drastic measures to reverse the situation and pull Soong away from his power base, Lien's hope of succeeding Lee would be doomed.

Lien's opportunity came when President Lee called for the National Development Conference in late 1996. As the KMT prepared to enter the conference with the other two parties, the issue of streamlining the provincial government was suddenly placed on the agenda. Even though the DPP has always made it clear that it intended to abolish the provincial government for the purpose of demonstrating to Beijing that Taiwan is a sovereign state and not a province of China, it has never been an issue on the KMT side for fear that abolishing the provincial government would portray Taiwan as pursuing a policy of independence, which would jeopardize Taiwan's security vis-à-vis China. Nevertheless, as the conference moved forward at high gear, the provincial government issue received more and more attention, and as the KMT and the DPP basically agreed on trimming down the provincial government's size and power, a formal agreement between the two parties on the issue was reached quickly. Consequently, the rivalry between Soong and Lien intensified to the point that Soong submitted his resignation as governor in protest.<sup>30</sup>

As the National Assembly readied to discuss the issue of "freezing" the provincial government in May, Soong gathered a large number of assembly members, with most of whom belonging to the "Xianghe hui"<sup>31</sup> and mainlander-based non-mainstream politicians, and aligned himself with the New Party to fight against the proposal. Some estimated that the num-

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<sup>30</sup>Strangely enough, the popularly elected governor Soong stayed on because the resignation was not approved by his superior, Premier Lien Chan.

<sup>31</sup>The "Xianghe hui" is an association of local politicians in the National Assembly without an apparent political ideology distinctive from the rest of the KMT. It decided to fight against the party center because one of its top leaders, Tsai Yung-tsang, was arrested and detained by police on violent and organized crime charges.

ber of KMT assembly members joining Soong was as large as 70, which together with the 46 New Party members would have been enough to kill the motion, since it required a three-fourths majority in the 334-member chamber. The situation alarmed both President Lee and Lien Chan, who recognized that if the motion was killed, there would be nothing left to check Soong's growing power and prestige, which in turn would leave the KMT in serious turmoil as the 2000 presidential election approached. Moreover, the ferocious fight between the two sides threatened to spill over into the issue of establishing a semi-presidential constitutional order. Under the control of Lee and Lien as well as Party Secretary-General Wu Po-hsiung, the conflicts were eventually worked out and proposals for a semi-presidential system and streamlining the provincial government were passed. However, the moves clearly showed that Lee and Lien were warring against Soong, and that the whole purpose of "freezing" the province was to "pull the plug" on Soong, with the National Assembly the battle field for the showdown between the two sides.

#### *The DPP's Intentions and Divisions*

The DPP's reasons for joining with the KMT in establishing a semi-presidential system was based on a different set of considerations, and reflected more of its central leadership's calculations in 1996-97. Hsu Hsin-liang, elected chairman of the DPP in 1996 and head of the "Meilidao" (Formosa) faction, has never concealed his intention to run for Taiwan president even though he lost his bid in the 1995 party primary to Peng Ming-min. But with Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian enjoying extremely high popularity ratings both within the party and among the general public, it will be difficult for Hsu to compete with Chen in the near future. For Hsu to become a viable candidate before 2000, he needs to take drastic action to boost his popularity. Thus, finding a way for the DPP to play a more important decision-making role in the central government, significantly weakening the KMT's power, or leading the party to electoral success in 1997 and 1998, would certainly constitute important achievements during his rein as the party chairman.

Based on the consideration that Hsu needed to find some way for the DPP to play a more important decision-making role, refining the parlia-

mentary nature of the central government setup would necessitate the KMT forming a coalition government with the DPP in 1998 if the long-term ruling party lost its legislative majority. If there are no surprises in the 1998 elections, the DPP is expected to win at least one-third of the seats in the national legislature, which would make a vice-premier position for Hsu more attainable. With that position in hand, Hsu would have a very good chance to boost his popularity and compete against Mayor Chen in a presidential primary race. On the other hand, a constitutional setup in which the president is a mere figurehead would lessen the impact of a DPP representative in the office. Consequently, a semi-presidential system would best serve Hsu personally and the DPP generally.

The DPP, under the leadership of "Meilidao" and "Xin chaoliu" (New Tide) factions in 1996-97, is a diversified combination of opposition forces which do not often come to terms with one another on major issues. Two other major factions—the "Zhengyi lianxian" (Justice Alliance) and "Fuli-guo lianxian" (Welfare State Alliance)<sup>32</sup>—have not always followed the party leadership and have frequently charged that party chairman Hsu has been engaging in a conspicuous "grand design" to increase the power of the Meilidao faction as well as his own at the cost of the DPP in general and other factions in particular. An important and interesting question is what Hsu's motives were in forging his agreement with the KMT. At the National Affairs Conference, factions under the leadership of Chen Shui-bian, former legislator and vice-presidential candidate Frank Hsieh, and former party chairman Shih Ming-teh argued that the party had formally adopted a constitutional draft based on the presidential system in 1990, and without a formal process to reverse that decision, agreeing with the KMT for a semi-presidential system would create confusion within the party.<sup>33</sup> Without prior consultation with other faction leaders on his agreement with the KMT over constitutional issues, Hsu ran a very high risk of setting the party

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<sup>32</sup>The strength of the four main DPP factions is relatively equally distributed both in formal institutions and the party membership. There are also a substantial number of independents both on the elite level and among ordinary followers who are not associated with any faction.

<sup>33</sup>*Lianhe bao*, June 6, 1996, 2.

into internal conflict. Persuading others in the party to follow his decision of coming to terms with the KMT thus became an important task in keeping those agreements intact.

Even though the agreement on revising the constitution generated debate in Taiwan society and in the Legislative Yuan, the period after the conclusion of the NDC leading up to the May constitutional revisions was relatively quiet within the DPP camp. The reason for the truce between the central leadership and other factions was based on the promise by Chairman Hsu that the party would submit two versions of the constitutional reform proposal, one based on the presidential system and the other based on a semi-presidential system, to the National Assembly when it convened in May. However, the submission of two proposals, despite the fact that it temporarily halted the feud within the party, showed that there was no consensus within the party on the central government system to be adopted. Even though Hsu promised that the party would place equal weight on both proposals, in a long letter published by the party center entitled "Don't Be a Sinner in History," the central DPP leadership openly called for public support of a semi-presidential system and revealed its intention to submit the other proposal as a token gesture to other factions advocating a presidential model of government.

As could be expected, the DPP entered intense negotiations with the KMT during the National Assembly convention, suffering from sharp internal criticism. At several points, the party was on the brink of collapse as Shih Ming-teh and other DPP notables threatened to quit the party to form a new one.<sup>34</sup> In the third, final reading of the constitutional bills, Mayor Chen suddenly slid into the process by claiming that the DPP had made too many concessions to the KMT and should at least insist that the bill of public referendum be accepted by the KMT, and the election method of the presidential system should remain a simple plurality; the other option would be for the DPP to withdraw from the National Assembly and let the constitutional revision process collapse altogether. It was obvious that Chen did not support the idea of a majority run-off presidential election

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<sup>34</sup>*Zhongguo shibao*, June 5, 1997, 3.

since it gave the KMT the advantage. Chen's actions in the final hour sent a shock wave through the two parties, and the National Assembly was on the brink of ending without any achievements. However, the high-level representatives of the two parties signed an agreement after the National Assembly adjourned to make referendums a part of the constitution, and stated that the method for electing a future president would be decided in the next round of constitutional revisions, scheduled for 1998.

In addition to dissent on the elite level, the DPP's nine-person negotiation team, which was composed of top faction leaders to ensure the participation of all factions in negotiating with top-level KMT officials, and another team composed of National Assembly caucus leaders, which negotiated with its assembly counterpart to work out the details on constitutional bills, had problems in command and communication. Most notably, the negotiation team formed by the party caucus in the National Assembly was not successful in getting the DPP members to accept the agreements reached with the KMT team, with some agreements reached by the caucus team causing bitter criticism within the party center.<sup>35</sup> Lack of consensus was indeed the main characteristic of the DPP in negotiating with the KMT over constitutional revisions.

"Zhengyi lianxian" legislator Hseng Fu-hsiung, one of Hsu's most outspoken opponents during this period and a likely successor to Chen Shui-bian's mayorship, characterized the DPP's participation in the constitutional revision process as "giving up a nice suit for three lousy pairs of underwear but in the end not even getting the underwear," since the DPP agreed to give up legislative confirmation of presidential nominations of the premier, but wanted to increase the power of the Legislative Yuan by granting it the powers of auditing, impeachment against the president, public hearings, and investigations. However, all these propositions to increase legislative power were killed by the National Assembly, which has traditionally been hostile to the Legislative Yuan. In a personal interview, Hseng complained that Hsu's chairmanship was leading the DPP into disaster because he was only concerned about his chance of running

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<sup>35</sup>*Lianhe bao*, June 27, 1997, 2.

in the 2000 presidential election. In his view, reversing constitutional reform and establishing an operable presidential system is the goal the party should pursue in the future.<sup>36</sup>

### **Prospects for the New Constitutional Setup**

The final version of the 1997 constitutional revisions was passed by the National Assembly on August 18, with only minor changes to the agreements reached in the NDC on the central government setup. Under the new system, the president has the power to call and to chair National Security Council meetings to deal with policies concerning national security, and appoint the premier without need for legislative approval. The Legislative Yuan in turn may decide on a vote of no-confidence against the premier, and if the vote of no-confidence is passed by the Legislative Yuan, the outgoing premier in turn may request the president to dissolve the Legislative Yuan. Another important provision passed by the National Assembly is a halt to any further provincial-level elections after 1998, with the size and power of the provincial government being streamlined by the Executive Yuan. The proposition to change the Legislative Yuan's electoral system was killed without serious debate, the National Assembly's status was not decided, and a decision on the majority run-off method to elect the president was postponed.

Even though these changes seem to be small on the surface, the relations among key government institutions have changed tremendously. In the original constitutional setup, the president had an enormous amount of political power at his disposal, but that power did not come from the constitution; rather, it stemmed from the fact that the president was also the KMT chairman and the KMT had a clear majority in the Legislative Yuan. And although the original constitutional setup resembled a parliamentary model of government, the Executive Yuan could not dissolve the Legislative Yuan, which only had the power to confirm presidential nominations

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<sup>36</sup>Personal interview, September 26, 1997.



for premier but did not have the equivalent power to remove him (removing a premier required a quorum of two-thirds majority). Under the new system, the president has an independent source of political power rendered unto him by the constitution. Beneath the president, the executive branch needs to be responsible to the legislature because a vote of no-confidence can now do away with a premier who has lost the support of the legislative majority.

This new system, in which the president has more power than a mere figurehead, may cause confusion in the very near future in spite of its straightforwardness. The ruling KMT has been losing an average of 7.9 percent of its seats and 5.8 percent of the popular vote in every Legislative Yuan election held since 1983.<sup>37</sup> The performance of the party stood at 52 percent of the seats and 46 percent of the popular vote in the 1995 race. The result of the 1997 county magistrate election, in which the DPP won twelve seats over the KMT's eight seats, with nearly three quarters of the population under DPP local jurisdiction, has generally been taken as a prelude to a KMT defeat in the 1998 Legislative Yuan election.<sup>38</sup> Without any electoral surprises to reverse this downward trend, the KMT will soon likely hold less than half of the seats in the legislature for the first time in its history.

The key issue, then, is how the president will appoint the premier and how the cabinet will be formed when and if the national legislature does not have a clear majority. A coalition government composed of two parties is a natural outcome if a KMT president consults other key political forces in order to avoid his premier from being toppled by a vote of no-confidence cast by the Legislative Yuan. Of course, a KMT president may interpret the constitution as giving him sole legitimate power to appoint the premier, and consequently appoint his own premier or retain Premier Vincent Siew (if he is still the premier in 1998) without consulting other parties. However, the resulting constitutional crisis could be a high price for the nation to pay.

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<sup>37</sup> Jaushieh Joseph Wu, "The 1995 Legislative Yuan Election in Taiwan," *Issues & Studies* 31, no. 12 (December 1995): 111.

<sup>38</sup> *Lianhe bao*, October 30, 1997, 1.

With the warm relationship between President Lee and DPP Chairman Hsu and the strained relationship between the New Party and President Lee himself, a coalition government is likely to be formed by the KMT and DPP. Yet the KMT may not be willing to make an extensive compromise with the DPP in order to make the cabinet "coalitional" in nature; it may insist that since the constitution gives the president power to appoint the premier, he therefore has the prerogative in choosing individual DPP politicians for the cabinet. And if a president decides to deal with individual DPP members instead of the party as a whole, the DPP would be subject to bitter internal disputes over who should and who should not join the cabinet, and in what position. DPP internal disputes, in turn, would likely cause political turmoil and render the coalition government highly unstable. Even if the DPP, as a whole, agrees to join the cabinet in the wake of the 1998 elections, there would be a tremendous hurdle in the policy-making process because this will be the first time the KMT has had to share executive power with any other political party, and it is hard to anticipate whether two political adversaries could sit peacefully with each other in the cabinet.

Moreover, the possibility of a coalition government composed of the KMT and the DPP has been sharply reduced in the wake of the 1997 county-level elections. Even though Chairman Hsu led the party to a historic victory in the elections, he was widely criticized by other leaders of the party, especially Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian, for advocating the idea of forming a coalition government with the KMT. With Chen enjoying immense popularity inside the party, Hsu faced the cold reality that without Chen's endorsement, he stood no chance of being re-elected as the party chairman in mid-1998. Under pressure, Hsu announced that he would not seek re-election. A coalition government by the KMT and the DPP has thus become unlikely as Chen Shui-bian emerges as the top leader of the DPP. The only viable option left for the KMT after the 1998 legislative election, then, is to form a minority government which will face the constant threat of being toppled by the opposition.

Furthermore, with the 2000 presidential election approaching, whether the Executive Yuan is a coalition or not, it can be reasonably anticipated that the intense competition between the major parties will make the

government highly unstable before the race is over. Moreover, even though it is still too early to make any predictions for the 2000 presidential election, the possibility of a DPP victory cannot be ruled out, based on the premise that highly popular Taipei Mayor Chen Shui-bian could maintain his popularity until the presidential election. If the DPP does manage to win the race, the power game between the two parties would shift. As revealed by key DPP policy planner Kuo Chen-liang in a personal interview, if the KMT is defeated, it is most likely that it will boycott the DPP president until he forms a cabinet with the KMT in a strong position, and it is also likely that it will defend its vested interests and do its best to hang onto the political and economic resources located in the Executive Yuan.<sup>39</sup> If the DPP president is to deliver cabinet positions on an individual basis but ignores the KMT as a whole, the KMT in the legislature will continue to be a threat. Kuo points out that the best situation would be for the DPP president to avoid a vote of no-confidence by the legislature and difficulties in forming his cabinet, by choosing a nonpartisan premier, with about half of the cabinet positions offered to the KMT. That situation would be somewhat similar to cohabitation, as a DPP president works with a KMT-based coalition cabinet.

A more drastic situation, as provided by a KMT scholar involved in constitution drafting, could come to pass in that a desperate KMT could form an alliance with the New Party in the Legislative Yuan. As President Lee's term expires in 2000, thus removing one of the major sources of mutual hatred between the two parties, it would pave the way for a KMT-NP coalition cabinet stripping the DPP president, now considered a common enemy, of his executive power. The situation would be a repetition of cohabitation in contemporary French politics, and tensions and possibly confrontations between the president and the cabinet would set national politics on fire again.

In short, the semi-presidential political system established by the 1997 constitutional revision is very new to Taiwan's young democracy. Even though there has been a long tradition in which the president is the

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<sup>39</sup>Personal interview, October 3, 1997.

center of political power, that tradition and public belief will have to face the challenge of an emerging party system after Legislative Yuan elections in 1998 and the presidential election in 2000. The habituation of the system and its inherited norms as well as the consolidation of institutional operations will encounter further uncertainties in the next few years.

### **Conclusion**

As this paper has demonstrated, the agreements on the constitutional revisions in 1997 were based on very short-term calculations by KMT and some DPP leaders. However, the new central government setup, designed to deal with the likely scenario that there is no single party holding a clear majority in the Legislative Yuan, may cause more confusion than solve potential problems. The key issue that gave rise to the 1990 and 1996 constitutional crises (i.e., lack of clarification in jurisdiction and power among key government institutions) has not been properly dealt with in the process of constitutional revisions. Since the new system has never been experienced by Taiwan before, the major political parties and leading politicians will have to muddle through the hurdles put up by the constitution's semi-presidential setup. This is all the more worrisome in light of the statement put forward by a KMT-affiliated scholar: the top KMT leaders do not seem to have a full understanding of the nature of the semi-presidential system, as the KMT simply wants to increase the power of the popularly elected president on the one hand and resolve the deadlock between the executive and the legislative branches on the other.<sup>40</sup>

More significantly, the possibility that the president, now authorized with more constitutional power, will run into a confrontation against the premier has been heightened, instead of minimized, by the constitutional changes. These institutional difficulties and the seeming inability to establish a forward-looking constitutional order are haunting Taiwan's democratization efforts. Worse yet, frequent attempts to revise the constitution,

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<sup>40</sup>Personal interview, October 23, 1997.

as those which took place in 1991, 1992, 1994, and 1997, have made it difficult for the country to become accustomed to the norms and procedures of democracy and solidify the operation of key government institutions. They have also provided future political leaders with sufficient justification to further tamper with the constitution.

Thus, reversing the 1997 constitutional revisions or establishing a political system that may function with less problems will become more difficult in the future. On the one hand, the National Assembly, empowered by the constitution to revise the constitution, has lost its legitimacy in the eyes of the public, and there has been a strong outcry to abolish the National Assembly itself altogether on the grounds that many deputies of the chamber seem to be only interested in increasing their own power and the assembly's power at the cost of the Legislative Yuan and the nation as a whole. On the other hand, the emerging political party system may discourage any attempt to revise the constitution, which requires a three-fourths quorum. Taiwan's democratization and democratic consolidation, viewed from the perspective of institutionalization described by Huntington as the most fundamental element in maintaining political order in changing societies,<sup>41</sup> have thus actually not been as successful as it has been claimed. And Taiwan, which is more than eager to establish itself as a model of democracy, still has much to accomplish before the norms and procedures of its new political system can be routinized and fully respected, so it can claim that democracy has been fully consolidated.

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<sup>41</sup>See Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), chap. 1.