LOCAL FACTIONS, PARTY COMPETITION, AND POLITICAL DEMOCRATIZATION IN TAIWAN

Teh-Fu Huang*

黃　德　福

摘　要

當代的政治分析裏，地方派系政治並非臺灣地區的獨特現象。從民國三十五年起，即使處於威權黨國的統治時期，地方派系在臺灣地區的中央與地方政治舞臺上，始終扮演著舉足輕重的角色。在不挑戰國民黨的政治主宰性與合法性之情形下，地方派系得以透過威權體制內特殊的恩寵系統，壟斷地方的政治與經濟特權；結果，國民黨與地方派系的依恃關係，阻礙了政黨競爭的制度化，以及進一步政治民主化的推進。藉著臺灣省議員選舉與臺灣省區域增額立法委員選舉的歷年資料之分析，本研究發現，在臺灣地區的中央與政治舞臺上，地方派系確實具有相當的重要性，而且國民黨與地方派系也長期維持著相互依存的關係。我們認爲，地方派系影響力的持續與擴張，對於臺灣地區的政治民主化歷程，必然會產生負面的影響；因此，在未來邁向一個良好的民主政治發展之過程中，臺灣地區的國會選舉應考慮採用比例代表制的選舉制度。

Abstract

In contemporary political analysis, the politics of local factions is not a unique phenomenon for Taiwan. Under the authoritarian party-state, local factions have played significant roles in the arena of Taiwan's national and local politics since 1946. Without challenging

*The author is associate professor in the Graduate School of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the International Conference on Elections and Democratization in East Asia, organized by the Institute for National Policy Research and the Asia Foundation, Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C., October 7-8, 1989. The author would like to thank Mr. Ming-tong Chen and the research group of "Electoral Participation of Political Elites in Taiwan" led by Professor Hu Fu of National Taiwan University for providing their valuable data. The author is also indebted to Professor Chu-cheng Ming of National Taiwan University for his insightful comments, and Ms. Hsing-yuan Sheng, Mr. Hsiang-rong Wu and Nien-hsia Liu of National Chengchi University for their cordial assistance. However, any views and flaws in this paper remain the sole responsibility of the author.

the Kuomintang's political domination and legitimacy, local factions monopolize local political and economic privileges through a patronage system of the party-state. As a result, the patron-client relation of the Kuomintang and local factions hinders the institutionalization of party competition and in turn political democratization. Using the longitudinal data of the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen and the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, this study confirms the importance of local factions and the interdependence of the Kuomintang and local factions in the national and local arena. This study also argues that the continuation and extension of local factions' influence will have negative impacts on Taiwan's political democratization. Moving toward a better democracy in the future, Taiwan should introduce the proportional representation system to the elections of national legislative bodies.

I. Introduction

There is no doubt that the politics of local factions in Taiwan is not a unique phenomenon in the study of contemporary political change. Whatever marginal effects they have on national politics, local factions or political factions do play a role in the process of public policy-making for either the developing countries or the advanced industrial democracies. It is also true that in no other countries than Taiwan have local factions dominated the political arena for such a long history. Since 1946, the first local election after Taiwan's return to China, local factions have emerged as the powerful and indispensable forces to the operation of local and national politics in Taiwan.

How could local factions coexist with an authoritarian regime? Unquestionably, the politics of local factions and the rule of authoritarian party-state have been reinforcing each other. Without challenging political legitimacy and domination of the ruling party, on the one hand, local factions monopolize the privileges of access to local political power and economic interests under a patronage system of the authoritarian party-state. By controlling most of the economic and political resources in Taiwan, on the other hand, the ruling party of the authoritarian regime consolidates its dominant rule with full support of local factions. As a result, the politics of local factions in Taiwan retards the inter-party competition and further democratization of the authoritarian system.

Above all, this co-optive system of political-economic interests between the authoritarian party-state and local factions finds its root in Taiwan's peculiar

electoral system. The adoption of the single non-transferable system undoubtedly enhances the influence of local factions, and in turn the domination of the predominant party – the Kuomintang – in the authoritarian regime. Though it might have created a governable authoritarian regime for the past forty years, the electoral system is no longer helpful in offering a structural precondition of party competition after the lifting of the Martial Law. In way of political transition, moreover, Taiwan's electoral system becomes an obstruction on the institutionalization of party competition and therefore the transformation of authoritarian regime into a democratic one.

To understand the characteristics and processes of political democratization in Taiwan, in this regard, it is essential to investigate the role of local factions and its relation to party competition, and it is the purpose of this paper. First of all, I am trying to explore the influence of local factions in terms of both local and national elections. Using the same data collection, thereafter, I am going to examine the close relationship between the ruling party and local factions in order to expose its patron-client connection. Based on this empirical research, in the final section, I will conclude with some implications of this study and provide reforms of Taiwan's electoral system for the purpose of constructing a better democracy. Before discussing the empirical evidence in details, an analysis of the role of the electoral system in Taiwan's political democratization would be in order.

II. The Role of Electoral Systems in Political Democratization

In contemporary political analysis, political party and democracy are intimately correlated. Pennock (1979: 275) argued that party systems are the common features of democracy. Mayo (1960: 66) and Dahl (1967: 203) added that the existence of political party in a system is one of the major criteria for the measurement of democracy. Schattschneider (1942: 1) even declared that political party creates democracy, and the development of modern democracy is founded on political party. Most students agree that political party is an intermediary between the citizens and the government. It provides the possible alternatives of political leaders and public policies for the people. Trying to get access to power by ways of regular elections, political party does provide the dynamics for modern democracy. Hence, there is a common belief that modern democracy

would be the politics of political party. The existence of political parties is a necessary condition of modern democracy.

Although the two-party system or the multi-party system is common for democracy, it is still debatable that the single party system is compatible with political democracy. Duverger (1951: 278-279), the pioneer scholar of political party, asserted that the single party system may coexist with democracy if the party could reflect the pluralist environment in the society. Macpherson (1966: 21) also argued that the single party system would be compatible with democracy only if the political party had enough intra-party democracy, open memberships, and low costs of intra-party participation. In contrast with these arguments, however, Sartori (1976: 47) claimed that the intra-party competition of factions is merely an inside power struggle, and has no necessary connection to the operation of democracy. A genuine democracy is based on the inter-party competition for the support of the electorate in order to control the government. In spite of the multiparty system, the two-party system or the predominant party system, therefore, the institutionalization of party competition is the most important indicator of democratic development or political democratization (Huang, 1989: 106).

What are the factors influencing the institutionalization of party competition of party competition in a democratic country? Doubtlessly, a society's cultural traditions, social structure, economic situation, political structure and even foreign relations would have some important influence in the institutionalization of party competition. However, the key factor in determining the institutionalization of party competition and thus political democratization in a given society will be its electoral system. Whether political parties could seize the power of government is not only related to their organizations, leadership and platforms, but also dependent upon the characteristics of their electoral systems. Electoral systems condition the interests of political parties and the development of party systems by influencing behaviors of the electorate, campaign tactics of alternative candidates, and mobilization strategies of political parties (Lee, 1989: 62-63). But what significant impacts do electoral systems have on the institutionalization of party competition?

In general, electoral systems in democratic countries can be classified into the single-member district system, the proportional representation system, and the single non-transferable system. The single-member district and proportional

representation systems account for most of the national electoral systems that are currently used for the national legislative elections in 20 of the 21 democracies. The only exception is Japan, which uses the single non-transferable system (Lijphart, 1984: 152; Lijphart and Grofman, 1984. 4).

There are two arguments predominate in the debate on choices between the single-member district system and the proportional representation system. The proponents of the single-member district system argue that its great advantage is that it produces firm government. It allows the citizens to choose a concrete set of policies and a team to execute them (Duverger, 1984: 32). They claim that under the single-member district system there is a tendency for a two-party system to develop in the sense that only two can expect either to win a majority of the seats, or to be the strongest opposition which will have a chance to win an absolute majority in the next election. The result means that major parties appeal to voters with a wide range of issues, and the decision will be made by the "floating" vote in the center. Even though such parties do have different tendencies within themselves, in this case, their influence is limited and the entire line-up is characterized by fluidity and flexibility (Hermens, 1984: 22). By discriminating against small parties, the single-member district system thus encourages a two-party competitive system, which in turn makes stable and responsible one-party government possible.

On the other hand, the advocates of the proportional representation system (either the party-list system or the single transferable system) assert that a democratic government should be representative of all of the interests and viewpoints of the electorate, hence the only proper form of representation is proportional representation (Lakeman, 1984). Because it is usually a long-term coalition of one major party and several small parties, moreover, the government under the proportional representation system would be easier to maintain the consistency of governmental policies than the government under the single-member district system does. It also contributes to the autonomy of government in constraining the pressures of specialized interest groups by the disciplined parties (Rogowski, 1987: 207-208). In sum, the proportional representation system enhances the discipline of political parties and the inter-party competition, and therefore creates a stable and responsive government in terms of governmental autonomy and policy consistency.

These arguments, at any rate, seem to suggest that both the single-member

district system and the proportional representation system induce the institutionalization of party competition which in turn accelerates political democratization in a given country. However, the single non-transferable system has the opposite effects on the institutionalization of party competition and political democratization. On the one hand, by reducing the role of political parties in elections, it overemphasizes each candidate's personal charisma and qualifications regardless of his own party's platforms and policies. On the other hand, it encourages the intra-party power struggle of political factions instead of the inter-party competition for nominating two or more candidates in each consituency. In both cases, it would be very difficult to maintain the discipline of political parties, especially the larger parties. Consequently, the single non-transferable system impedes the processes of further institutionalization of party competition and political democratization.

The Taiwan case presents sufficient empirical evidence in regard to negative effects of the single non-transferable system on party competition and political democratization. In the pages that follow, I will first deal with the role of local factions in both national and local elections, and thereafter the interrelations of the Kuomintang and local factions as patron-client politics.

III. The Politics of Local Factions

In Taiwan, local factions are the key actors in both national and local elections. Without the knowledge of the role of local factions in elections, despite of their merits or faults, it is impossible to grasp the dynamics of Taiwan politics. By definition, local factions refer to those groupings whose goals are to influence the process of public policy-making and even control the operation of political systems at local levels. Although they usually nominate their own candidates for elections, local factions do not have formal organizations and solid policy appeals different from those of political parties. Meanwhile, the relationships between leaders and followers of local factions are built on personal connections instead of organizational channels. In substituting the role of political parties, sometimes, they perform the functions of check-and-balance in local political systems (Chen, 1970. C67-C68).

Ever since the restoration of local elections in 1946, local factions have been functioning in the political system. Up to now, according to one statistics, more

than one hundred cases of local factions exist all over Taiwan. In the early period, local factions appeared as a political coalition across county or city borders in terms of their size and influence. After the middle 1950s, ninety-eight cases of local factions have operated in all counties or cities of the Taiwan area except for Taipei City. Although their influence can no longer extend beyond one county or city, above all, all counties and cities except for Taipei City in the Taiwan area have more than one local factions (Chen, 1989. 11-14, 27-29). Therefore, it is quite interesting to examine the influence of local factions in Taiwan's national and local elections in a more systematic way.

Concerning with national and local elections in Taiwan, the election of county/city mayors is undoubtedly one of the most important elections. Because the single member district system is in effect, the Kuomintang has played a very active and powerful role in this kind of elections despite the fact that local factions might have some influence. The case of the county/city mayor elections is hence not very adequate in determining the significance of local factions' power. Except for that, the elections of two legislative bodies which use the single non-transferable system, the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators and the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections, have been recognized as the crucial tests of the importance of local factions in Taiwan politics. The investigation of these two kinds of election will contribute to our understandings of the role of local factions in Taiwan elections and politics.

To begin with, the case of the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections will be discussed. How significant is the influence of local factions in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections? From Table 1, the statistics show that the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout in nine elections from 1954 to 1985 is 54.3%. Among these elections, most of the total average of all counties and cities in Taiwan Province are higher than 50% except for the elections of 1972 and 1985. We also notice that the statistics of the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout in most of counties and cities are very high, which exceed 44%, with the exception of Nantou County, Pintung County, Taipei City, and Chia-I City.

As compared with non-faction candidates, in addition, the statistics of Table 2 seem to indicate that the percentage of faction candidates in the period of 1954 to 1985, which is 38.2%, is not very high. However, it is not the case when we take into account the distribution of faction and non-faction elected members

Table 1: Faction and Non-faction Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections by County/City, 1954–1985

County/City	1954		1957		1960		1963		1968		1972		1977		1981		1985		Total Average	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Taipei County	84.7	15.3	61.5	38.5	63.1	36.9	51.5	48.5	34.8	65.2	40.1	59.9	60.6	39.4	51.8	48.2	32.4	67.6	53.4	46.6
I-Lan County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	41.6	58.4	79.3	20.7	81.6	18.4	28.1	71.9	30.9	69.1	23.8	76.2	16.6	83.4	55.8	44.2
Taoyuan County	76.9	23.1	66.9	33.1	76.9	23.1	71.5	28.5	67.5	32.5	48.4	51.6	31.2	68.8	31.7	68.3	48.8	51.2	57.8	42.2
Shinchu County	75.4	24.6	66.9	33.1	52.5	47.5	52.1	47.9	77.1	22.9	62.7	37.3	62.5	37.5	48.0	52.0	29.3	70.7	58.5	41.5
Miaoli County	86.6	13.4	77.0	23.0	73.2	26.8	83.4	16.6	83.2	16.8	85.0	15.0	100.0	0.0	93.6	6.4	85.0	15.0	85.2	14.8
Taichung County	50.7	49.3	53.4	46.6	59.4	40.6	74.0	26.0	73.5	26.5	68.4	31.6	57.0	43.0	63.1	36.9	64.8	35.2	62.7	37.3
Changhwa County	34.9	65.1	56.9	43.1	61.8	38.2	63.5	36.5	75.4	24.6	74.8	25.2	94.5	5.5	79.9	20.1	73.9	26.1	68.4	31.6
Nantou County	61.7	38.3	0.0	100.0	31.1	68.9	51.8	48.2	18.8	81.2	28.7	71.3	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	21.3	78.7
Yunlin County	48.3	51.7	19.8	80.2	27.4	72.6	22.4	78.6	14.9	85.1	41.1	58.9	64.5	35.5	74.8	25.2	83.8	16.2	44.1	56.0
Chia-I County	100.0	0.0	61.2	38.8	23.6	76.4	5.0	95.0	22.9	77.1	14.7	85.3	47.6	52.8	60.2	39.8	81.2	18.8	46.3	53.8
Tainan County	63.0	37.0	83.1	16.9	68.8	31.2	70.6	29.4	73.1	26.9	40.1	59.9	52.3	47.7	48.4	51.6	64.9	35.1	62.7	37.3
Kaohsiung County	62.1	37.9	31.4	68.6	29.5	70.5	45.5	54.5	39.6	60.4	58.7	41.3	82.8	17.2	75.0	25.0	58.7	41.3	53.7	46.3
Pintung County	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	23.7	76.3	23.2	76.8	45.8	54.2	57.4	42.6	21.9	78.1	23.8	76.2	23.2	76.8	24.3	75.7
Taitung County	55.3	44.7	100.0	0.0	91.1	8.9	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	42.6	57.4	65.6	34.4	46.2	53.8	33.9	66.1	59.4	40.6
Hwalian County	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	57.5	42.5	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.9	33.1	68.6	31.4	0.0	100.0	54.8	45.2
Penghu County	72.2	27.8	93.5	6.5	100.0	0.0	90.9	9.1	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	81.6	18.4	100.0	0.0	70.9	29.1
Taipei City*	57.5	42.5	0.0	100.0	9.8	90.2	10.3	89.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	19.4	80.6
Keelung City	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	76.8	23.2	74.7	25.3	75.1	24.9	30.2	69.8	58.5	41.5	47.5	52.5	73.6	26.4
Shinchu City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	47.5	52.5	47.5	52.5
Taichung City	33.2	66.8	54.8	45.2	66.8	33.2	34.1	65.9	46.8	53.2	82.8	17.2	74.4	25.6	97.7	2.3	86.6	13.4	64.1	35.9
Chia-I City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Tainan City	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	83.2	16.8	64.8	35.2	0.0	100.0	3.0	97.0	22.1	77.9	29.0	71.0	0.0	100.0	44.7	55.3
Kaohsiung City*	76.9	23.1	29.7	70.3	60.6	39.4	58.0	42.0	8.2	91.8	37.0	63.0	45.3	54.7	–	–	–	–	45.1	54.9
Total Average	63.8	36.2	59.8	40.2	57.2	42.8	53.7	46.3	51.9	48.1	49.4	50.6	50.5	49.5	55.6	44.4	46.6	53.4	54.3	45.7

Note: * Taipei City is not a part of Taiwan Province after July 1968, and Kaohsiung City is not a part of Taiwan Province after July 1979.
** Shinchu City was a part of Shinchu County before July 1982, and Chia-I City was a part of Chia-I County before July 1982.

Sources: The data of candidates' factions was provided by the research group of "Electoral Participation of Political Elites in Taiwan" led by Professor Hu Fu of National Taiwan University. The data of electoral turnout for each candidate was provided by the Taiwan Provincial Election Commission of the Department of Civil Affairs and the Central Election Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and supplemented by newspaper reports.

in the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen. From Table 3, the statistics suggest that members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly who are affiliated with local factions are 374 out of 613 in total. The percentage of faction members is 61.0% for all elections, and more than 55% for each election in the years of 1954 to 1985. The statistics of Table 2 and Table 3 also indicate that those candidates who are affiliated with local factions have more opportunities to be elected. Based on these findings, in sum, it is reasonable to argue that local factions have dominated the elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen, and played a major role in the Taiwan Provincial Assembly up to the present time.

Table 2: Distribution of Faction and Non-faction Candidates in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections, 1954 – 1985

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1954	49 48.0%	53 52.0%	102 100%
1957	45 40.5%	66 59.5%	111 100.0%
1960	49 40.2%	73 59.8%	122 100.0%
1963	56 42.1%	77 57.9%	133 100.0%
1968	42 34.7%	79 65.3%	121 100%
1972	44 37.6%	73 62.4%	117 100.0%
1977	51 42.1%	70 57.9%	121 100.0%
1981	61 32.3%	128 67.7%	189 100.0%
1985	48 32.4%	100 67.6%	148 100.0%
Total	445 38.2%	719 61.8%	1,164 100.0%

Sources: Same as Table 1.

Table 3: Distribution of Faction and Non-faction Elected Seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblyment Elections, 1954–1985.

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1954	38 70.4%	16 29.6%	54 100.0%
1957	37 58.7%	26 41.3%	63 100.0%
1960	42 60.0%	28 40.0%	70 100.0%
1963	40 56.3%	31 43.7%	71 100.0%
1968	38 56.7%	29 43.3%	67 100.0%
1972	39 56.5%	30 43.5%	69 100.0%
1977	46 63.0%	27 37.0%	73 100.0%
1981	51 69.9%	22 30.1%	73 100.0%
1985	43 58.9%	30 41.1%	73 100.0%
Total	374 61.0%	239 39.0%	613 100.0%

Sources: Same as Table 1.

I now will discuss the influence of local factions in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province. At first, the statistics in Table 4 indicate that the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout is 39.9% for five elections from 1972 to 1986. For these elections except for the case of 1980, all statistics of the total average in the Regional District of Taiwan Province are equal to or higher than 35%. It also shows that 9 out of 22 counties and cities are higher than 50% in terms of the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout. Even though their influence in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators is not very significant in comparison with the Elections of Taiwan

Table 4: Faction and Non-faction Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout in Regional District Votes of the Supplementary Legislators Elections by County/City of Taiwan Province, 1972–1986

County/City	1972		1975		1980		1983		1986		Total Average	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Taipei County	39.5	60.5	63.7	36.3	39.2	60.8	53.5	46.5	64.7	35.3	52.1	47.9
I-Lan County	3.0	97.0	26.5	73.5	2.7	97.3	3.5	96.5	8.7	91.3	8.9	91.1
Taoyuan County	74.2	25.8	96.3	3.7	36.2	63.8	43.7	56.3	43.9	56.1	58.9	41.1
Shinchu County	12.6	87.4	5.3	94.7	4.8	95.2	10.4	89.6	17.9	82.1	10.2	89.8
Miaoli County	70.2	29.8	96.3	3.7	60.7	39.3	82.2	17.8	62.7	37.3	74.4	25.6
Taichung County	68.1	31.9	87.9	12.1	46.8	53.2	61.7	38.3	43.3	56.7	61.6	38.4
Changhwa County	28.2	71.8	23.7	76.3	22.1	77.9	24.9	75.1	44.9	55.1	28.8	71.2
Nantou County	29.8	70.2	9.0	91.0	3.9	96.1	4.8	95.2	35.4	64.6	16.6	83.4
Yunlin County	40.6	59.4	11.0	89.0	10.8	89.2	40.6	59.4	6.8	93.2	22.0	78.0
Chia-I County	88.5	11.5	94.2	5.8	50.2	49.8	38.9	61.1	25.3	74.7	59.4	40.6
Tainan County	88.8	11.2	93.2	6.8	41.7	58.3	29.1	70.9	35.7	64.3	57.7	42.3
Kaohsiung County	38.1	61.9	53.4	46.6	69.0	31.0	77.4	22.6	91.4	8.6	65.9	34.1
Pintung County	8.0	92.0	7.1	92.9	9.0	91.0	44.7	55.3	37.4	62.6	21.2	78.8
Taitung County	100.0	0.0	94.4	5.6	1.8	98.2	1.7	98.3	0.0	100.0	39.6	60.4
Hwalian County	100.0	0.0	76.6	23.4	61.9	38.1	60.2	39.8	0.0	100.0	59.7	40.3
Penghu County	2.0	98.0	1.0	99.0	25.5	74.5	33.9	66.1	46.7	53.3	21.8	78.2
Keelung City	9.0	91.0	23.0	77.0	7.6	92.4	77.1	22.9	77.5	22.5	38.8	61.2
Shinchu City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.0	97.0	48.9	51.1	26.0	74.1
Taichung City	78.4	21.6	49.5	50.5	6.0	94.0	4.4	95.6	7.8	92.2	29.2	70.8
Chia-I City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	29.0	71.0	43.6	56.4	36.3	63.7
Tainan City	92.4	7.6	95.7	4.3	23.9	76.1	9.7	90.3	33.7	66.3	51.1	48.9
Kaohsiung City*	9.0	91.0	6.8	93.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	7.9	92.1
Total Average	49.0	51.0	50.7	49.3	27.6	72.4	35.0	65.0	37.0	63.0	39.9	60.1

Note: * Kaohsiung City is not a part of Taiwan Province after July 1979.
** Same as Table 1.

Sources: Same as Table 1.

Provincial Assemblymen, in this case, it seems safe to argue that the role of local factions is still very important in these national elections.

In addition to these statistics, Table 5 shows that the percentage of candidates who are affiliated with local factions in the period of 1972 to 1986 is only 27.9%. But other statistics suggest some important implications when we examine the distribution of faction and non-faction elected members in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators. The statistics in Table 6 indicate that supplementary legislators of the regional districts who are affiliated with local factions are 79 out of 161, which is about 49.1% of the total. Except for the election of 1980, the percentages of faction members for these elections are higher than 46%. Moreover, Table 5 and Table 6 together show that those candidates who are affiliated with local factions are more likely to be elected. Thus, we can conclude that local factions have had important influence in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators and the operation of group politics of supplementary members in the Legislative Yuan since the election of 1972.

Table 5: Distribution of Faction and Non-faction Candidates in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, 1972–1986

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1972	13 39.4%	20 60.6%	33 100.0%
1975	15 36.6%	26 63.4%	41 100.0%
1980	18 17.6%	84 82.4%	102 100.0%
1983	22 24.7%	67 75.3%	89 100.0%
1986	27 36.0%	48 64.0%	75 100.0%
Total	95 27.9%	245 72.1%	340 100.0%

Sources: Same as Table 1.

Table 6: Distribution of Faction and Non-faction Elected Seats in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, 1972–1986.

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1972	12 57.1%	9 42.9%	21 100.0%
1975	13 59.1%	9 40.9%	22 100.0%
1980	15 39.5%	23 60.5%	38 100.0%
1983	20 51.3%	19 48.7%	39 100.0%
1986	19 46.3%	22 53.7%	41 100.0%
Total	79 49.1%	82 50.9%	161 100.0%

Sources: Same as Table 1.

In summary, these statistics indicate that local factions have important influence in both the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections and the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators, but they are more powerful in the former than the latter. Above all, those candidates who are affiliated with local factions have a greater chance to be elected in elections, and the members who are endorsed by local factions in both legislative bodies are more influential than the non-faction ones.

IV. Patron-Client Politics of the Kuomintang and Local Factions

For the last four decades, there exists a patron-client relationship between the Kuomintang and local factions in Taiwan. The patron-client politics of the Kuomintang and local factions is the key to understand how the authoritarian party-state consolidates its rule. In this study, the patron-client politics refers to a reciprocal exchange relation between two actors of unequal political power and social-economic status. The patrons offer material and non-material goods

to the client supporters. In return for these favors, the clients give their political support to the patrons (Wu, 1987: 14-15).

To consolidate the cohesion of ruling coalitions, the ruling elites in some authoritarian regimes usually allocate political and economic privileges to the clients – their supporters and loyal followers. If and only if its domination and legitimacy are maintained, the authoritarian state would allow the clients to monopolize economic interests and share political powers in some degrees. In this regard, the authoritarian party-state of the Kuomintang provides not only economic privileges but also political privileges for local factions since the recovery of Taiwan. The sharing system of economic and political interests between the Kuomintang and local factions is hence the common foundation of political stability and legitimacy for the regime (Chu, 1989: 140-141).

Since 1951, according to one study, there are 81 out of 89 local factions which have owned more than one kind of local monopolized economies – co-operative banks, credit cooperatives, non-credit cooperatives, credit department of farmer's associations, credit department of fisherman's associations, and passenger transportation corporations. For the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen, most of candidates who are affiliated with local factions (442 out of 518) owned one of the local monopolized economies at least. And few candidates who are not affiliated with local factions (72 out of 774) had one of the local monopolized economies (Chen, 1989: 17-18). With the exception of these economic privileges, did the authoritarian party-state of the Kuomintang provide enough opportunities and channels of political power-sharing for local factions?

To investigate their patron-client relation in politics, it is necessary to explore the interdependent connection between the Kuomintang and local factions in both national and local elections. As the last section, in this case, I will use the data from the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen and the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators in Taiwan Province. At first, I am going to deal with the case of the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections. How close is the relationship between the Kuomintang and local factions in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections? The statistics in Table 7 indicate that, in nine elections from 1954 to 1985, the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout for the Kuomintang is 62.1%. Moreover, the total average of all counties and cities in Taiwan Province is higher than 50%. Except for Nantou County, Pintung County, Taipei City, and Chia-I City, we also

Table 7: Faction and Non-faction Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout for the Kuominatang in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections by County/City, 1954 – 1985***

County/City	1954		1957		1960		1963		1968		1972		1977		1981		1985		Total Average	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Taipei County	100.0	0.0	80.0	20.0	73.6	26.4	79.4	20.6	55.9	44.1	43.6	56.4	67.9	32.1	58.7	41.3	44.9	55.1	67.1	32.9
I-Lan County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	66.5	33.5	81.4	18.6	40.6	59.4	41.6	58.4	40.6	59.4	33.9	66.1	67.2	32.8
Taoyuan County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	81.6	18.4	56.3	43.7	43.1	56.9	45.0	55.0	80.0	20.0	78.4	21.6
Shinchu County	100.0	0.0	76.9	23.1	57.3	42.7	56.1	43.9	87.0	13.0	61.0	39.0	52.7	47.3	53.9	46.1	32.2	67.8	64.1	35.9
Miaoli County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	61.5	38.5	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	94.1	5.9	95.1	4.9
Taichung County	36.9	63.1	70.3	29.7	73.2	26.8	78.1	21.9	81.9	18.1	77.6	22.4	75.8	24.2	88.0	12.0	67.8	32.2	72.2	27.8
Changhwa County	43.6	56.3	64.7	35.3	73.8	26.2	74.6	25.4	70.2	29.8	69.6	30.4	100.0	0.0	83.4	16.6	80.3	19.7	73.4	26.6
Nantou County	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	55.2	44.8	64.1	35.9	26.5	73.5	54.5	45.5	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	33.4	66.6
Yunlin County	36.5	63.5	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	14.9	85.1	55.7	44.3	74.6	25.4	81.7	18.3	100.0	0.0	40.4	59.6
Chia-I County	100.0	0.0	38.9	61.1	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	24.2	75.8	17.3	82.7	64.6	35.4	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	49.4	50.6
Tainan County	57.4	42.6	74.4	25.6	77.0	23.0	69.4	30.6	79.5	20.5	34.7	65.3	37.6	62.4	61.4	38.6	67.0	33.0	62.0	38.0
Kaohsiung County	64.1	35.9	41.4	58.6	28.1	71.9	28.7	71.3	30.2	69.8	71.4	28.6	100.0	0.0	72.1	27.9	40.9	59.1	53.0	47.0
Pintung County	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	28.5	71.5	58.3	41.7	57.4	42.6	35.9	64.1	28.9	71.1	35.0	65.0	27.1	72.9
Taitung County	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	42.6	57.4	100.0	0.0	56.6	43.4	34.1	65.9	59.3	40.7
Hwalian County	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	66.7	33.3
Penghu County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	81.6	18.4	100.0	0.0	75.7	24.3
Taipei City*	70.5	29.5	0.0	100.0	14.7	85.3	20.3	79.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	26.4	73.6
Keelung City	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	45.2	54.8	100.0	0.0	68.1	31.9	90.4	9.6
Shinchu City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0
Taichung City	45.6	54.4	49.7	50.3	100.0	0.0	51.2	48.8	53.5	46.5	100.0	0.0	72.0	28.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	74.7	25.3
Chia-I City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0
Tainan City	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	64.7	35.3	62.0	38.0	0.0	100.0	3.0	97.0	34.2	65.8	53.8	46.2	0.0	100.0	46.4	53.6
Kaohsiung City*	100.0	0.0	51.3	48.7	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	15.9	84.1	22.0	78.0	74.9	25.1	–	–	–	–	66.3	33.7
Total Average	69.3	30.7	64.2	35.8	67.5	32.5	60.9	39.1	58.1	42.0	53.4	46.6	61.0	39.0	68.7	31.3	56.1	43.9	62.1	37.9

Note: * & ** Same as Table 1.

*** In this table, candidates refer to those candidates who were nominated by the Kuomintang.

Sources: The data of candidates' factions and electoral turnouts was from the same sources as Table 1. The data of candidates' party affiliation was provided by the research group of "Electoral Participation of Political Elites in Taiwan" led by Professor Hu Fu or National Taiwan University, and supplemented by the Taiwan Provincial Election Commission of the Department of Civil Affairs, the Central Election Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and newspaper reports.

found that the statistics of the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout for the Kuomintang in most of counties and cities, which exceed 40%, are very high. And the total averages for Miaoli County and Keelung City in the entire period of 1954 to 1985 are even higher than 90%.

Concerning with the distribution of faction and non-faction candidates for the Kuomintang, the statistics in Table 8 indicate that the percentage of faction candidates in the period of 1954 to 1985 is 61.4%. Also, from Table 9, the statistics show that members of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly who are affiliated with local factions are 257 out of 393. The percentage of faction members for the Kuomintang is 65.4% for all elections from 1954 to 1985. Undoubtedly, Table 8 and Table 9 also indicate that the Kuomintang's candidates who are affiliated with local factions are more likely to be elected. Based on these statistics, therefore, we can conclude that the patron-client politics of the Kuomintang and local factions was quite significant for the last four decades in terms of the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen and the operation of the Taiwan Provincial Assembly.

In the pages that follow, the role of the Kuomintang's local factions in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province will be discussed. For five elections from 1972 to 1986, first of all, the statistics in Table 10 indicate that the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout for the Kuomintang is 48.8%. With the exception of 1986, all statistics of the total average in the Regional District of Taiwan Province are higher than 45%. This table also suggests that 10 out of 22 counties and cities are higher than 50% in terms of the total average of faction candidates' percentage shares of electoral turnout for the Kuomintang. Even though their influence in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators is lower than the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen, it can be argued that the role of local factions is still very important for the Kuomintang in these national elections.

Furthermore, the statistics in Table 11 also indicate that the percentage of the Kuomintang's candidates who are affiliated with local factions in the period of 1972 to 1986 is only 50.4%. And the statistics in Table 12 show that the Kuomintang's supplementary legislators of the regional districts who are affiliated with local factions are 60 out of 116. The percentage of faction members for the Kuomintang is 51.7% for all elections in the period of 1972 and 1986. Moreover, the percentages of faction members for all five elections are higher than 46%.

Table 8: Distribution of the Kuomintang's Faction and Non-faction Candidates in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections, 1954–1985***

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1954	29 70.7%	12 29.3%	41 100.0%
1957	30 60.0%	20 40.0%	50 100.0%
1960	29 60.4%	19 39.6%	48 100.0%
1963	34 59.6%	23 40.4%	57 100.0%
1968	29 59.2%	20 40.8%	49 100.0%
1972	24 48.0%	26 52.0%	50 100.0%
1977	35 59.3%	24 40.7%	59 100.0%
1981	27 77.1%	8 22.9%	35 100.0%
1985	37 64.9%	20 35.1%	57 100.0%
Total	274 61.4%	172 38.6%	446 100.0%

Note: *** Same as Table 7.
Sources: Same as Table 7.

Table 11 and Table 12 together indicate that the Kuomintang's candidates who are affiliated with local factions have a better chance to be elected in these elections. Based on these findings, I will argue that the patron-client politics of the Kuomintang and local factions have operated in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators, and within the group of supplementary members in the Legislative Yuan since the election of 1972.

In summary, the Kuomintang and local factions have close connections in both the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections and the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators. Inside the Kuomintang, local factions

Table 9: Distribution of the Kuomintang's Faction and Non-faction Elected Seats in the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections, 1954–1985***

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1954	27 71.1%	11 28.9%	38 100.0%
1957	28 68.3%	13 31.7%	41 100.0%
1960	29 65.9%	15 34.1%	44 100.0%
1963	32 60.4%	21 39.6%	53 100.0%
1968	27 58.7%	19 41.3%	46 100.0%
1972	23 52.3%	21 47.7%	44 100.0%
1977	32 71.1%	13 28.9%	45 100.0%
1981	25 80.6%	6 19.4%	31 100.0%
1985	34 66.7%	17 33.3%	51 100.0%
Total	257 65.4%	136 34.6%	393 100.0%

Note: *** Same as Table 7.
Sources: Same as Table 7.

have much more influence in the Elections of Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen than the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators. And those candidates who are affiliated with local factions for the Kuomintang have more opportunities to be elected in both kinds of election. And the Kuomintang's faction members in both legislative bodies have more influence than the non-faction members. Thus, this analysis concludes that the patron-client politics of the Kuomintang and local factions have been operated for the past four decades. In this case, it will be very difficult to have a powerful opposition party and hence the institutionalization of party competition in Taiwan.

Table 10: Faction and Non-faction Candidates' Percentage Shares of Electoral Turnout for the Kuomintang in Regional District Votes of the Supplementary Legislators Elections by County/City of Taiwan Province, 1972–1986***

County/City	1972		1975		1980		1983		1986		Total Average	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Taipei County	59.1	40.9	89.6	10.4	32.0	68.0	69.6	30.4	78.8	21.2	65.8	34.2
I-Lan County	3.8	96.2	1.0	99.0	1.0	99.0	4.6	95.4	11.6	88.4	4.4	95.6
Taoyuan County	89.1	10.9	96.3	3.7	97.3	2.7	91.1	8.9	65.0	35.0	87.8	12.2
Shinchu County	20.4	79.6	5.3	94.7	9.5	90.5	16.7	83.3	14.2	85.8	13.2	86.8
Miaoli County	91.8	8.2	96.3	3.7	96.1	3.9	94.7	5.3	88.9	11.1	93.6	6.4
Taichung County	75.2	24.8	92.6	7.4	75.0	25.0	75.5	24.5	69.9	30.1	77.6	22.4
Changhwa County	21.2	78.8	14.3	85.7	9.0	91.0	31.9	68.1	47.5	52.5	24.8	75.2
Nantou County	21.8	78.2	5.5	94.5	5.2	94.8	6.4	93.6	43.4	56.6	16.5	83.5
Yunlin County	43.0	57.0	11.1	88.9	18.8	81.2	46.9	53.1	4.9	95.1	24.9	75.1
Chia-I County	91.5	8.5	94.5	5.5	94.4	5.6	89.8	10.2	35.4	64.6	81.1	18.9
Tainan County	93.9	6.1	94.8	5.2	37.8	62.2	46.5	53.5	9.9	90.1	56.6	43.4
Kaohsiung County	42.4	57.6	74.3	25.7	97.7	2.3	70.5	29.5	68.7	31.3	70.7	29.3
Pintung County	9.2	90.8	8.1	91.9	14.5	85.5	56.1	43.9	47.6	52.4	27.1	72.9
Taitung County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	2.1	97.9	0.0	100.0	60.4	39.6
Hwalian County	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	100.0	0.0	85.8	14.2	0.0	100.0	77.2	22.8
Penghu County	2.2	97.8	1.0	99.0	87.1	12.9	30.2	69.8	24.3	75.7	29.0	71.0
Keelung City	10.0	90.0	4.1	95.9	21.3	78.7	97.3	2.7	94.5	5.5	45.4	54.6
Shinchu City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	3.5	96.5	19.3	80.7	11.4	88.6
Taichung City	81.6	18.4	55.3	44.7	25.0	75.0	5.7	94.3	9.1	90.9	35.3	64.7
Chia-I City**	–	–	–	–	–	–	89.1	10.9	71.0	29.0	80.1	20.0
Tainan City	96.8	3.2	97.3	2.7	8.3	91.7	13.2	86.8	2.7	97.3	43.7	56.3
Kaohsiung City*	10.0	90.0	10.5	89.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	10.3	89.8
Total Avetage	53.2	46.9	52.6	47.4	48.9	51.1	48.9	51.1	38.4	61.6	48.4	51.6

Note: * & ** & *** Same as Table 7.
Sources: Same as Table 7.

Table 11: Distribution of the Kuomintang's Faction and Non-faction Candidates in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, 1972–1986***

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1972	10 52.6%	9 47.4%	19 100.0%
1975	10 55.6%	8 44.4%	18 100.0%
1980	9 47.4%	10 52.6%	19 100.0%
1983	17 51.5%	16 48.5%	33 100.0%
1986	16 47.1%	18 52.9%	34 100.0%
Total	62 50.4%	61 49.6%	123 100.0%

Note: *** Same as Table 7.
Sources: Same as Table 7.

Table 12: Distribution of the Kuomintang's Faction and Non-faction Elected Seats in the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, 1972–1986***

Year	Faction	Non-faction	Total
1972	10 52.6%	9 47.4%	19 100.0%
1975	10 55.6%	8 44.4%	18 100.0%
1980	9 50.0%	9 50.0%	18 100.0%
1983	17 54.8%	14 45.2%	31 100.0%
1986	14 46.7%	16 53.3%	30 100.0%
Total	60 51.7%	56 48.3%	116 100.0%

Note: *** Same as Table 7.
Sources: Same as Table 7.

V. Conclusion: Toward a Better Democracy

The development of political democracy in a given society depends on the institutionalization of party competition. During the last four decades, the drastic transformation of international political and economic environments, high rate of economic growth, and rapid socio-economic change have all contributed to the Democratic Progressive Party and the lifting of the decree of Martial Law, the Rebpulic of China on Taiwan has moved into the transitional phase of political democracy. It is certain that the institutionalization of party competition is an important turning point on the road of political democratization in Tiwan.
turning point on the road of political democratization in Taiwan.

Comparing with the single-member district system and the proportional representation system, as I have argued, the single non-transferable system discourages the discipline of political party which in turn retards the institutionalization of inter-party competition. By using the longitudinal data of both the Taiwan Provincial Assemblymen Elections and the Regional District Elections of Supplementary Legislators for Taiwan Province, the findings of this study suggest that the single non-transferable system has a negative impact on institutionalizing Taiwan's party competition for the past forty years. Despite the fact that they enjoy more influence in local elections, local factions have played a significant role in the arena of both national and local politics. Under the rule of authoritarian party-state which treats the maintenance of political legitimacy and stability as the supreme developmental goal, above all, the patron-client politics of the Kuomintang and local factions becomes a necessary evil in Taiwan. If the above situation continues, it is predictable that local factions will gradually change their operational arena from the local to the national political and economic business. In this case, the prospects for the institutionalization of party competition and further political democratization in Taiwan is worrisome for all of us.

In order to promote political democratization, it is quite important to restrict the influence of local factions, and to enhance the discipline of political parties at the same time. After examining the experience of the advanced industrial democracies, the reform of electoral systems is crucial for reducing the importance of local factions and encouraging the discipline of political parties. In recent two decades, many democratic countries have reformed the electoral systems in the direction of the proportional representation system, either the party-list system

or the single transferable system. Northern Ireland elections introduced the single transferable system in 1973. France adopted the proportional representation system for the election of its representatives in the European Parliament in 1979. And Japan adopted the party-list proportional representation system instead of the single non-fransferable system for the election of two-fifths of its upper house in 1982 (Lijphart and Grofman, 1984: 11). According to one statistics, 14 out of 21 advanced industrial democracies have used the proportional representation system in their national legislature elections (Lijphart, 1984: 152). To create a better democracy, Taiwan therefore should introduce the proportional representation system, either the party-list system or the single transferable system, to the elections of national legislative bodies in the process of political democratization.

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