STRATEGIES OF CULTURAL AND COMMUNICATION STUDIES: CAREY, HALL, AND FOUCAULT

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摘　　要

傳播實踐是一個交錯著整體文化活動的現像——包括社會、經濟、政治，及歷史等的網絡。因此我們必須以文化研究的策略來關照傳播實踐的各層面。本文將探討三種不同取向的文化研究模式：凱瑞的唯心主義文化研究，霍爾的唯物馬克斯主義的文化研究，以及福克的後現化主義文化研究。

本文的分析方式是首先解析他們如何詮釋文化，社會事實，人的本質，以及如何在這個大的觀念架構下定位傳播理論和進行傳播研究。本文一方面批評唯心與唯物的文化研究不足之處，同時並試圖描繪文化研究如何邁向後現代主義的模式：以社會情境的網絡分析取代單一因果關係的分析；強調外部效力，不再追尋內在意義；重視日常生活中各層面「瑣碎」的抗爭，而非僅著眼於對權力中心所做的霸權分析。

Abstract

Communication needs to be conceived as a collective phenomenon fabricated closely into a larger cultural network — including the social, political, and historical context. In this paper, I will triangle Michel Foucault's genealogical approach with the other two important approaches to cultural study: the idealistic cultural study articulated by James W. Carey, and the Marxist cultural studies best represented by Stuart Hall.

My general project is to lay out how they interpret culture, reality, human beings, and locate communication theory and study within this broad theoretical framework. Particularly, I try to map out how cultural studies move toward the post-modernist strategies characterized by the rhizomatic analysis of social context rather than the search for mono-causal relationship; by the emphasis on the exterior effectivities rather than the reading of interior meanings; and by the focus on the trivial struggles in everyday resistances rather than the totalistic target of the hegemonic dominance.

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Foucault does not have much to say directly or simply about the nature of communication, but his work has numerous implications for it. To understand what Foucault has offered for communication study cannot be discussed in terms of communication. This is just as we cannot understand the role of the media by analyzing the media alone. Communication is not an isolated personal behavior occuring in an isolated time and space. Rather, it is a collective phenomenon fabricated closely into a larger cultural network — including the social, historical context. Therefore, the first point I would like to make is that the discussion of communication study should be located in the general strategies of cultural study.

Foucault deals with neither of these two terms, culture or communication, specifically. However, his study of discourse, power/truth, knowledge is apparently closely related to these categories. To understand Foucault's uniqueness and richness, I will triangle his genealogical approach with other two important approaches to cultural study: the idealistic cultural study articulated by James W. Carey, and the Marxist cultural studies best represented by Stuart Hall.

My general framework is to lay out how they interpret culture, reality, human beings, and locate communication theory and study within this broad theoretical framework.

Carey: the idealistic approach

Carey's view of culture and communication is rooted in a Weberian interpretive sociology. He also draws theoretical underpinnings from Dewey, Clifford Geertz, R. Williams, and the tradition of popular culture studies in Great Britain and the United States. (Carey, 1975b) He proposes that, if we are to understand the role of the media in the context of culture, the starting point should be the analysis of the cultural process itself. The cultural process is interpreted as a subjective construction of reality in which people produce meaning to make sense out of their life situations.

Culture is thereby seen as a fabricated webs of meaning constructed by men. The task of cultural study constitutes in the consistent challenge to untangle the multiplicity of complex conceptual structures, i.e., to "grasp hold of the meaning people build into their words and behavior and to make these meanings, these claims about life and experience, explicit and articulate." (Carey, 1977: 421)

This task is drastically different from the natural science model in which the research goal is to explain and control, but not to understand and share; to predict, not to interpret; to be objective, not to be contexually subjective. (ibid., 418)

The American mainstream communication research, as rooted in a natural science model, is thus faulted as a "transmission" model which derives from a commitment to an objective "science" of society. Their aim is to state the "precise psychological and sociological conditions under which attitudes are changed, formed, or reinforced..." (ibid., 413)

For Carey, this model fails in analyzing the "subjective" cultural meaning. Though, some mainstream communication research such as various "uses and gratifications" approaches attempt to modify the simplistic and manipulative sender-receiver paradigm by inserting a concern for user's intentions, however, as Carey argues, the "uses" are generally interpreted in very utilitarian terms — to achieve the "gratifications" of information needs or entertainment needs. The subjective meaning is analyzed as a "means" to achieve other goals rather than as an "end" in itself. (Carey and Kreiling, 1974)

For carey, communication is not means, but a "constitutive activity". It is not just a constellation of representation", but is an ongoing process in which the subjects not only represent and describe but actually mold and construct the world with "enough coherence and order to support their own purpose." (Carey, 1983: 30) Carey uses the term "ritual model" to explain how to conduct communication study within this symbolic cultural network. In a ritual model, communication is

> Viewed as a process through which a shared culture is created, modified, and transformed. The archetypal case of communication is ritual and mythology. A ritual view of communication is not directed toward the extension of message in space, but maintenance of society in time: not act of imparting information or influence, but the creation, representations, and celebration of shared beliefs. If a transmission view of communication centers on the extension of messages across geography for purpose of control, a ritual view centers on the sacred ceremony which draws persons together in fellowship and commonality. (Carey, 1977: 412)

The emphasis on shareness, commonality, and fellowship in a ritual model proposed by Carey manifests his teleological concern which is originated from Dewey's view of community crisis. For Dewey, communication is the basis of human fellowship because it produces the social bonds which tie men together and

make public life possible. (Carey, 1975: 9) However, Dewey observes that there is a decline and eclipse of public life because certain models of modern communication that dominate everyday life preclude the possibility of community life. Analysis of communication must begin with a genuine crisis in culture, i.e., a crisis of community life, since the loss or betterment of such a public life directly influences the democratic social order. (Carey, 1983: 28-9)

It is now clear that Carey's cultural study, at an ontological level, privileges an idealistic perspective in which reality (culture) is viewed in terms of a meaning context constructed by human beings. The theoretical priority is given to the subjective moment in which human beings create reality. At an epistemological level, Carey's emphasis on understanding and his subjective approach to culture is obviously opposed to the positivist tradition that sees social phenomena as governed by law, and the researcher's task is to use objective methods to observe and measure in order to control and predict.[1] At a teleological level, Carey can be categorized as a liberal-pluralist who sees shared consensus as the basis of social order and a democratic community life as the basis of an ideal cultural environment.

While this general framework gestures a significant move away from the U. S. mainstream communication research predominated by a positivist orientation, it invites critiques at all three levels.

The idealistic emphasis on the subjective aspect of the construction of reality faces the Marxist challenge that human is virtually a social product rather than a creative source of social reality. Social reality constitutes in the material structure, rather than the meaningful context; the latter is conceived as merely the product of the former. Understanding, as a hermeneutic of faith, is in its nature conservative, because it fails to inquire into the power structure which underlies the social network of meaning. To be critical, a hermeneutic of suspicion[2] must be stressed.

As Carey himself is also aware of the weaknesses of the idealistic approach to culture, in his recent essay "The Origin of the Radical Discourse on Cultural

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[1] The above discussion is informed by Wuthnow, etc., (1984: 27-29)

[2] According to Ricoeur (1981), hermenautic of suspicion means the demystification, destruction of illusion, critique of ideology, and illusory consciousness. In contrast, hermeneutic of faith is positive, which offers access to some essential source of understanding in life such as the consensus formed through, following Gadamer's term (1975), the historical effectivity.

Studies in the United States" (1983), Carey has made two major modifications of his earlier works. First, he compromises with the Marxist perspective and recognizes that Dewey's ideal of a democracy based on the notion of consensus ignores the role of class, states, and power in the structure of communication. Second, Carey argues that to claim that reality is a product of human activities does not mean to deny, ignore, or mystify social conflict; in fact, it is an attempt to locate the social conflict and make it intelligible. The construction of reality involves not only the process in which men make reality, but also the process in which reality makes men. (Carey, 1983)

In the same article, Carey tries to articulate the nature of conflict over communication is the problem of the determination of the real "at the points of exclusion, repression, and denial; where forms of thought, technique and social relations are cast beyond the glow of the real into the darkness of unintelligibility, subversion, and disgrace." (Carey, 1983: 32) Reality is thus redefined as a "scarce source" to be struggled for by different classes and status. Culture, for Carey, is no more just a network of meaning, but embraces the notions of "power and dominance." (ibid., 313)

In fact, Carey's theory of culture and communication has rarely been applied to a concrete analysis of the communication practice. Carey's work remains only as a general schema which lacks any detailed analysis. His later modification borrows obviously from the British cultural studies which represent a corpus of much more sophisticated theories.

Hall: the Marxist cultural study

Contrast to Carey's earlier work in which culture is seen as the process of subjective construction of meaning, Hall's view of culture is marked by two major differences. First, as Carey recognizes in his later work that culture is not merely construed by meanings, it is also structured by power and domination. Second, culture is not understood as continuously produced by subjective human beings, rather, it is continuously reproduced by the non-autonomous subjects.

Grounded in a Marxist paradigm, Hall locates culture within a political and economic power structure and then is engaged in elaborating the relationships between these three realms. While the general correspondence between the political and the economic structure is presupposed in the Marxist framework

and remains unproblematic, the major problems turn out to be: How does the cultural order fit into the political order (i.e., the problem of domination)? And, how is the culture realm (over) determined by the economic structure (i.e., the problem of determination)?

Unlike Carey's idealistic approach, culture is seen by Hall as closely associated with the political power system because culture is conceived as an ideological power which constitutes the basis of social control in contemporary societies. Within a theory of hegemony, the cultural realm is not considered, as some crude Marxists do, as the direct reflection, or expression of the material interests and relationships of the economic base. Though the ideology of a hegemonic group always starts with the basic economic interests, to become a hegemonic power, there must be a transcendence over a class's own economic interests and there also must be an incorporation of other groups' interests. That is, social consensus is won through ideological struggle rather than imposed on the society. To maintain a hegemony depends upon a continuous struggle to articulate, re-articulate, and de-articulate various interests emerging from subaltern social groups in different time and space. Cultural practices are thus seen as a terrain for power struggle among subalternate groups and the hegemonic system.

The notion of hegemony as conceived through ideological struggle is thus differentiated from that of domination exerted through military, legal, or administrative means. The ideological struggle is a set of discursive practices to articulate meaning, as Hall illustrates that ideology is the work of fixing one particular meaning through articulation, selection and combination. (Hall, 1985: 93) Ideological struggle consists in attempting to win some new set of meaning for an existing term or category, or to dis-articulate it from its place in a signifying structure. (ibid., 112)

However, how to fix the "specific" meaning and achieve the definition of reality in a particular way posits the problem of dominance.

Certainly, in contemporary societies, culture is by no means directly "dominated" by the ruling system. Yet, the privilege of the existing power to maintain its hegemonic ideology lies in the established consensus and discourse structures. These existing consensus and discourse structures provide a limited explanatory and ideological repertoire for people to "make sense" of events and the world. (Hall, 1977) Although people are not dominated or imposed in a direct sense, domination is achieved since it seems difficult for the operation of signific-

ation to extend beyond the limited domain of the prevailing, and always the dominant, ideological discourse(s).

The cultural study is thus reformulated by Hall into an integration between the discursive theory and the Marxist perspective. Conflicts are originated from the economic interests but are signified and become effective through discursive practices.

In addition, the relations between culture and subjects are also re-examined. As pointed out, Carey repeatedly stresses the "subjective" meaning within the process of construction of social reality. In his later work, he tries to modify this position by arguing that the real is continuously made by men as well as makes men himself. (Carey, 1983: 20) The notion of "dominance" in Hall's articulation of culture shows clearly how the "real" makes men, and how the "objective" meaning structure is reproduced in a hegemonic system.

To elaborate the relationship between human beings and ideology (or culture), Hall borrows Althusser's notion of "interpellation" to expound the relationship between human beings and ideology. Interpellation means, for Althusser, the mechanism that the concrete individuals become subjects by the "functioning of the category of the subject." (Althusser, 1971: 174) That is, subjects are constituted through being categorized into different roles and practices, e.g., the role of workers, managers, the dominant, or the dominated. According to Althusser, individuals are almost "always-already" subjects even before they are born. The new born baby, for instance, has no choice but to accept the rituals and categories given to it at its birth. (ibid., 17)

This does not mean, however, that there is no "subjectivity." Yet, unlike Carey's idealistic perspective, subjectivity is not naturally, transcendentally given, rather, as Hall explains:

> We experience ideology as if it emanates freely and spontaneously
> from within us, as if we were its free subjects; "working by ourselves".
> Actually, we are spoken by and spoken for in the ideological discourses
> which await us even at our birth, into which we are born and find
> our place. (Hall, 1985: 109)

As noted above, Hall's cultural study is marked by two major differences from Carey. First, cultural realm is also a realm for power and dominance, the study of culture is therefore in its nature as a demystification of power, or a hermeneutic of suspicion. Second, the relationship between culture and subject is reversed.

Culture is not understood as created by men, rather, culture is a constituent force that functions to position human beings in its terrain.

Following this framework, it can be argued that Hall's cultural study is simultaneously a communication study, for what we are studying in this context are the ways in which meaning is maintained, disseminated, and reproduced. Hall thus arques that the role of communication serves, ceaselessly, to perform the critical ideological work of classifying out the world within the discourse of the dominant ideologies. (Hall, 1977: 346) This is by no means a conscious reproduction. Rather, it is unconsciously achieved through selection from a limited repertoire of social knowledge, as discussed earlier, which people use subjectively to perceive the world, live the relations with others, and form an intelligible "lived totality." (Hall, 1977: 340)

The role of the media is therefore conceived as an ideological force as Hall explains:

> Media as a major cultural and ideological force, standing in a
> dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations
> and political problems were defined.... (Hall, 1980: 117)

Hall's contribution to the cultural and communication studies lies primarily in his articulating the role of culture as well as communication as inseparably connected with the political context, rather than as an abstract, self-sustained meaningful network envisioned in Carey's earlier work, or a transmission model concerning merely with the linear relation between senders and receivers.

A critical theoretical advancement is made by Hall as he expands the notion of culture to include the problem of power. Culture becomes the most important means for achieving social control. The "meanings" of cultural practices and products are therefore must be understood in terms of how they are related to the hegemonic structure, rather than how they serve, as Carey argues, the "subjective" purposes of those who construct them. Moreover, he rejects the subjective approach and moves toward a structuralist and discursive analysis of the subject and culture. Subjects are not seen as transcendental beings who have their needs and desires independent from the social context. Rather, following structuralism, Hall decenters the "subject" as the source of meaning. The "function" of culture is to constitute human beings into subjects moving within the discourse terrain.

Rooted in a base/superstructure perspective, Hall's teleological goal is again

ramarkably contrasted with Carey's. Adhering to the thesis of "economic deter-
mination", though in a less deterministic way, Hall stresses the necessary relations
between culture and the economic. It is thereby not difficult to understand that
Hall's teleological goal is to "transform the capitalist system" into a socialistic
one. (Hall, 1983: 59) However, Hall's ideal of socialism lacks detailed discussion
about how democracy can be achieved. (Blumler, 1983) If cultural practices,
according to Hall, serve as a terrain for ideological struggle, there is no reason to
see a "socialist" cultural realm as something else. In addition, if the "economic"
determines only through discursive practices, the socialist "economy" cannot
be guaranteed to have an absolute nature which is necessarily different from
the capitalist one. The notion of ideological struggle in its nature contradicts with
any notion of a prescribed "determining" causal center.

Although Hall is in favor of the term of structural "tendency" rather than
"determination", it seems quite difficult to prevent the notion of "tendency"
from lapsing into functionism which does not allow for explanation of the
mechanism of social change. This is especially so when the "subject" is understood
as an ideological "product". While the subjectivity is incapable of going beyond
the discursive domain, be it a single domain or contradictory domains, it is difficult
to explain how new discourse emerges.

Finally, though cultural study is defined in terms of power and dominance,
the exclusive concern with how a hegemonic order is maintained reduces cultural
studies to a hegemonic analysis and ignores the non-hegemonic cultural practives,
or communication activities occuring in people's daily life or in places other than
that of the hegemonic system. Foucault's work marked by a genealogical study
seems significant at this point to reformulate the explanation of power, domination,
culture, as well as communication.

Foucault: a genealogical approach

Foucault, unlike Carey or Hall, never looks at culture or communication as
an analytic or empirical category, but the subjects of his study are undoubtedly
those cultural practices or discourses such as his research on madness, penal system,
or sexuality. (Wuthnow, 1984: 133) Foucault does not make any global claim
about what is culture or communication in general. The lack of a general theory
is in fact the first strategy Foucault offers for study of culture, that is, cultural

practices must be understood from their specific historical context rather than approached from a universalizing attempt, as Foucault remarks:

> My aim is most decidedly not to use the categories of cultural totalities (whether world-views, ideal types, the particular spirit of the age) in order to impose on history, despite itself, the forms of structural analysis. The series described, the limits fixed, the comparisons and correlations made are based not on the old philosophies of history, but are intended to question teleologies and totalizations. (Foucault, 1972: 15-6, cited from Jay, 1984: 522.)

Under this reasoning, the Marxist presupposition of culture as the superstructure determined by the material base is therefore seen by Foucault as reductionist. Even though Hall has reformulated the notion of determination into a less deterministic term of structural tendency, the improvement does not go far enough for Foucault. Because, as Poster argues, "the perspective of the reciprocal relations of base and superstructure is still unable to account for the internal complexity of any aspect of the 'superstructure' and remains tied to a totalizing impulse that Foucault finds problematic." (Poster, 1984: 86)

For Foucault, the complexity of cultural practices can not be understood merely in terms of "meaning" or "ideology". Foucault suggests that we need to "restore to discourse its characteristic as event" (Foucault, 1977: 229) which involves not only signification, the rules of signification, but also the material effectivities of the existence of discourse. The existence of a discourse, or a text, or any event, at a particular social site, as Grossberg argues, is the occasion for multiple planes of effects beyond the meaningful or the ideological. (Grossberg, 1984: 414)

The ideological analysis is thus far from an adequate tool to understand the aspect of the "materiality" of a discourse. Foucault posits a genealogical analysis of the event instead of the study of language, ideology, or meaning. Genealogy gestures that the study of discourse must be broader than just the discourse itself.[3]

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[3] Foucault's study of discourse can be divided into three distinctive periods: his earlier works are concerned with the archaeology of knowledge, i.e., the analysis of historically situated systems of institutions and discursive practices, such as *The Order of Things* (1973), *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (1972) etc., after 1970's, he turns sharply away from the attempt to develop a theory of discourse and uses Nietzsche's geneaology as a strategy to theorize the relationship between discourse, truth, institutional practices which combine power and knowledge, including *Discipline and Punish* (1977), *History of Sexuality, Vol.* (1980b), and *Power/ Knowledge* (1980). His later work as *The Use of Pleasure* (1985) shifts focus again to problem

He argues that "I believe one's point of reference should not be the great model of language and signs, but that of war and battle." (Foucault, 1980. 114)

Similar to Hall, the practices of discourse involves the operations of power, because the production of discourse is "at once controlled, selected, organized, and redistributed according to a certain numbers of procedures." (Foucault, 1972: 216) Yet, Foucault goes further to analyze that these procedures consist in both discursive and non-discursive practices. There are discursive rules about ways of exclusion, prohibitions, rejections, and divisions, as well as those non-discursive ways of institutional designs, behavior patterns, forms of rituals, and disciplines, etc. (ibid.)

Among these procedures, Foucault also includes the "will to truth" of subjects. However, the will to truth in constituting a specific discourse is neither a pure and neutral one, it is closely tied to various forms of institutional support. (ibid., 219) Therefore, discourse in itself is not universal, but tied to specific exclusions, limitations and restriction, will to truth, institutional support, and all kinds of interior and exterior practices. Discourses thereby always have their own specific place in society that makes them what they are. The goal of discursive analysis can hardly be a universal theory which is expected to explain the relationship between a given discourse and other social structures.

The genealogical approach is thus distincted from Hall's ideological approach, Foucault suggests the differences nicely:

> I do not question the discourses for their silent meanings but on the fact and the conditions of their manifest appearance; not on the contents which they may conceal, but on the transformations which they may have effectuated; not on the meaning which is maintained in them like a perpetual origin, but on the field where they co-exist, remain, and disappear. It is a question of an analysis of the discourses in their exterior dimensions. (Foucault, 1978: 15)

Unlike Hall's ideological study which always draws connections between the cultural practices with the ruling power center, Foucault's genealogical study refuses to see a "prediscursive fate" disposing the language in anyone's favor. Moreover, Foucault gears toward finding the "different manifestations" in any specific event. His analysis is "rhizomatic", as Grossberg explains, connecting the event with other events that constitute it and its effects: drawing lines of multiple effectivities and determinations.

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of subjectivity, the thesis is to analyze how human beings are historically rendered into subjects in various cultural practices.

Subject

Foucault's way of dealing with the problematic relationship between subject and discourse is also fundamentally different from that of Carey and Hall. Both Hall and Carey attempts to constitute general principle of subjectivity which is assumed to remain constant over time and accross cultures. For instance, Carey presupposes an autonomous and active subject which constitutes the source of meaning: Hall assumes a positioned subject which, in most cases, is constituted in discourse(s). Foucault does not have a general theory of subject in relation to language, culture or ideology. In contrast, Foucault again emphasizes the historical specificity of the positions occupied by subjects within particular discursive practices. As Weedon points out, it is difficult to "abstract out" any general theory of subjectivity, which is obviously directed principally against the construction of general theoretical or universalistic conceptions for Foucault. (Weedon, 1980: 210)

In his historical study, a decisive distinction is made between culture and subjects. The research focus falls exclusively on the examination of cultural elements without consideration of the subjective meanings. (Wuthnow, etc., 1984: 245) That is, Foucault's study focuses on the "effect" of the discursive practices rather than on the "origin" of it. For instance, in *History of Sexuality* (1980b), Foucault locates the emergence of a number of new discursive subject positions — most significantly — the "mother", the "child", and the "pervert". There is no trans-historical nature of the body which can be universally defined through physiology and anatomy. Rather, what we should seek to understand are the innovatory ways in which the body is constituted within discourse to form a distinctly modern politics of biology, population and welfare.

Although Foucault has not made any general claim beyond his study, his work shows a clear rejection of the idealistic theory of subject as the transcendental beings, and his concern with the constituted subject gestures a stance closer to the structuralist theory about subject and discourse. I will analyze these two points respectively in the following.

Foucault's genealogy is against a centered position of subject as the source of knowledge and meanings as he remarkes:

> Genealogy (is) a form of history which can account for the con-
> stitution of knowledge, discourses, domains of objects, etc., *without*
> having to make reference to a subject which is either transcendental
> in relation to the field of events or runs in its empty sameness
> throughout the course of history... One has to dispense with the
> constituent subject, to get rid of subject itself, that is to say, to
> arrive at an analysis which can account for the constitution of the
> subject within a history framework. (Foucault, 1980: 117; emphasis
> added)

The concern with the "effect" of discourse in terms of the "constitution" of the subject implies a structuralist stance about subjectivity and embraces the weakness of the latter as well. Weedon presents the critique as:

> Foucault's understanding of discursive subject positions can lead
> to the assumption that discourse constructs passive and unresisting
> subjects, who are only interpellated within the discursive realm.
> (Weedon, 1980: 214)

Yet, it is misleading to understand Foucault's dealing with subjectivity simply from a structuralist point of view. His emphasis on the exterior conditions, and the material effectivity of discourse, cannot be fully understood in isolation from his notion of power which is radically different from structuralism.

Power for Foucault is not something which can be seized or possessed by men, rather, it constitutes in various strategies and techniques to construct or transform the relationship among people. Therefore, what he studies is not power but power relationship which can be grasped only in the "diversity of their local sequences, their abilities, and their interrelationships." (Foucault, 1980h: 219)

The constitution of subject thereby must not be understood from the discursive practice only, but from the power relationship. Power is co-extensive with the social body and interwoven with all other kinds of relationships (e.g., production, family, sexuality, etc.). More important, power does not work just through prohibition, oppression, or punishment, power is also a productive and resistant force. (Foucault, 1980: 142) Power does not just constitute in a sweeping, general type of control, or domination; but rather in multiple forms of social networking. (ibid.)

Hall's focus on the ideological power and the hegemonic dominance is therefore considered as inadequate. To analyze culture, for Foucault, one must be neither confined within the category of culture only, nor limited to the notion of power which explains only the connection between the cultural practice and the

hegemonic system. Instead, one needs to locate the specific discursive practice, including the rules governing the formation of the discourse such as the inclusion and exclusion of the true-false statements, and the exterior strategies and technical management associated with the operation of the specific discourse itself. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault shows clearly how power is exercised through not only the discursive discipline but also through the "Panoptican", an all-seeing mechanism which places human beings under continuous surveillance.

Foucault distances himself from Marxism not because that he is not concerned with domination, but because he neither takes the economic base as the mono-causal determining force nor considers the hegemonic (state) domination as the singular most important way of domination.

This does not mean that Foucault is opposed to the importance of the political dominance and the economical exploitation, rather, Foucault suggests that nowadays, "the struggle against the forms of subjectivities − against the submission of subjectivity − is becoming more and more important even though the struggle against forms of domination and exploitation have not disappeared." (Foucault, 1982: 781) Foucault makes it clear that his objective is "to create a history of different modes of objectification by which, in our cultures, human beings are made subjects." (Foucault, 1982: 777) Foucault further explains that

> the political, ethical, social, philosophical problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's institutions, but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualation which is linked to the state. We have to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries. (Foucault, 1982: 785)

Foucault's goal of study is apparently different from Carey and Hall. The earlier Carey is pursuing a "democratic" society through an idealistic notion of communication without recognizing the problem of power and dominance fabricated with the communication activities. Hall is aiming at a socialist state without being able to justify the nature of ideological struggle within it. Foucault's concern with the subjectivity is much more practical. Since power consists in the social relationship, he recognizes that there is no freedom from power, and thus requires that people be engaged in a constant "war and battle" with various power mechanisms which contitute men into subjects. Cultural studies, for Foucault, is not just a text analysis, but a human studies which involves the basic problem of

how human beings become "subjects" through various discursive practices as well as power relationships.

Conclusion

Foucault's notion of discourse as an event which is interconnected with all kinds of material conditions of its existence, and the notion of power as not just discursive hegemonic, or dominant, but as a relationship maintained in various strategies, techniques, and discourses, are immensely suggestive for communcation inquiry. Yet there will be no general theory of communication, since Foucault's objective is not to "proppose a global principle" for analyzing either culture or society. (Foucault, 1982: 14) No general type of relationship between discursive practice and power would be universalized. Rather, "there are diverse forms, diverse places, diverse circumstances or occasions in which these interrelatinships establish themselves according to a specific mode." (ibid.)

Communciation is a particular way of acting upon other people, which involves transmission of information by means of a language, a system of signs, or any other symbolic medium. But the production and circulation of elements of meaning must be located in the whole context which includes the technical process in institutions, patterns of behaviors, forms and rules of transmission and diffusion, and the pedagogical system which at once support and confine the way in which communication occurs. Foucault does not mean that the realm of communication is the same as that of power; yet, the two may overlap with each other, support each other, and use each other mutually as a means to an end. (Foucault, 1982: 217)

Here we are reminded of Carey's vague but suggestive notion that communication needs to be studied as a "constitutive activity". Foucault's work reveals the full meaning of this notion: communication is an activity occuring in a social context, it is at the same time a transmission of information or meaning, but also an act upon one another through multiple ways of relationships which must be understood from historical, contextual, and genealogical study.

As it is, Foucault did not study mass communication. But his post-modern strategies[4] can help us understand some new approaches to mass communication.

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[4] There are certainly other important postmodernist's works which converge at the same strategies though. such as Deleuze and Gutarri, Baudrillard, etc.

For instance, some post-modernist studies of MTV and Rock and Roll refuse to link media practice to signification. What is emphasized is not "what it means," but "what it does." As Grossberg questions: "If Rock and Roll communicates, why is it so noisy?" "If MTV intends to give meaning," as Chen askes "why does it move so fast?" (Chen, 1986)

If those media practices do not "mean", what do they do? For Grossberg, "Rock and Roll won't get rid of your problem, but it will let you *dance* all over them..." (1983/4: 108: emphasis added.) Similarly, MTV's effectivity, as Fiske says, is that "the flashing crashing image sounds ARE energy, speed, illusion the hyperreal themselves: they simulate nothing, neither the reality nor the social machine." (1986) The fun of dance, the physical pleasure, the energy, the speed, the hyperreal, in short, the power of MTV or Rock and Roll is located in its "affectivity," that is, in its ability to produce and organize structures of desire" rather than its meanings. (Grossberg, 1983/4: 104)

This short analysis is meant to suggest how Foucault's idea may lead to new way of analysis through new concepts (as power) and new mode of method (as the genealogical study of an event). However, it is not meant to argue that Foucault's discourse (or discourses) is in any sense truer than others. Foucault's writing is in fact a political intervention attempting to do justice to the specific characteristics of conerete events. His challenge lies in his restlessness, constantly going beyond the existing concepts, categories, and always in search of their opposites. Foucault's work is particularly exciting for those who expect not a set of conclusions, but novel ways of questioning significant dimensions of social and cultural experiences.

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