

How Does a Rubber Stamp Become a Roaring Lion? The Transformation of the Role of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan during the Process of Democratization (1950-2000)*

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A legislature in an authoritarian system is usually portrayed as a "rubber stamp." That is, the legislature only has symbolic meaning and no substantive functions. If an authoritarian regime has been undergoing democratic change, however, its legislature must have also been transforming from one that is very weak (a rubber stamp) to one quite strong (a roaring lion). How does such a transformation take place? This phenomenon is the main focus of this paper.

Using the case of Taiwan, this paper manifests the relationship between legislatures and democratization from a dialectical perspective in which a legislature can neither alone promote democratization in a given

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system, nor arise as a strong legislature solely as an effect of democratization.

The changing relationship between legislatures and the political systems they establish should on the one hand be cumulative. That is, the systems must have been constantly undergoing some democratically oriented changes with their legislatures, thus correspondingly reflecting those changes. On the other hand, the changing relationship between the two should result from both institutional influence and individual initiative. That is, the institutional arrangements of a given system should establish the foundation for its legislature's being able to realize democracy. However, if individual efforts both from inside and outside of the legislatures are not focused on pursuing democracy, the institutional mechanisms cannot be fully utilized to fulfill their given functions. With the foregoing theoretical propositions, in the case study of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan, this paper further investigates the Legislative Yuan's change and how it has been linked to Taiwan's democratic development.

KEYWORDS: democratization; Taiwan; Legislative Yuan; rubber stamp; parliament.

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A legislature in an authoritarian system is usually portrayed as a "rubber stamp." That is, the legislature only has symbolic meaning and no substantive function.¹ If an authoritarian regime has been undergoing democratic change, however, its legislature must have also been transforming from one that is very weak (a rubber stamp) to one at least stronger than before (a roaring lion?).² How does this transformation take place?

The existing literature, especially after 1990, has paid some attention to this issue.³ The earliest study might be Paul S. Rundquist's "Legislative

¹Michael L. Mezey, "The Functions of Legislatures in the Third World," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 733-72.

²Since a legislature's function in a democracy is highly dependent on the constitutional design it resides in, at the very least its function may be an "arena" for legislators to shout in (as a roaring lion). Thus this conservative view of legislative function in a newly democratized country is adopted here. On legislative functions in different political systems, see Nelson W. Polsby, "Legislature," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 5:212-89.

³The Research Committee of Legislative Specialists (RCLS) of the International Political

Assemblies: The Seed of Democratic Reform."⁴ He observed that once the legislature was set up in a constitutional system, it should have the opportunity or the potential to push forward democratic reform in the system in which it is embedded. However, he did not fully explain this democratization process.

Gabriella Ilnszki studied the Hungarian legislature in the process of systemic change. She pointed out two roles the legislature plays in the process. One was as an "initiator," and the other as a "consolidator."⁵ She hypothesized that the role of the legislature should change from the former to the latter in the process of systemic democratization. After examining the case of the Hungarian legislature, however, she concluded this was not the case. The Hungarian legislature (the last communist parliament) was not an "initiator" of crucial democratic changes; nor was it a "consolidator" able to enhance the democratic characteristics of the Hungarian political system. It was still in search of a role in the Hungarian democratization and consolidation process.⁶

Longley then attempted to come up with a theoretical framework as well as a research agenda for studying the role of legislatures in the process of regime change.⁷ He described three distinct roles in observing parlia-

Science Association (IPSA) has continuously focused on this issue in its organization of panels ever since 1990. See a series of publications by RCLS: Lawrence D. Longley, ed., *The Role of Legislatures and Parliaments in Democratizing and Newly Democratic Regimes* (1994); Lawrence D. Longley and Drago Zajc, eds., *The New Democratic Parliaments: The First Years* (1998); and Lawrence D. Longley, Attila Agh, and Drago Zajc, eds., *Parliamentary Members and Leaders: The Delicate Balance* (1999).

⁴Paul S. Rundquist, "Legislative Assemblies: The Seed of Democratic Reform" (Paper presented at the 15th World Congress of the IPSA, July 21-25, 1991).

⁵Gabriella Ilnszki, "From Systemic Change to Consolidation. The Hungarian Legislature: An Institution in Search of Roles," in Longley, *The Role of Legislatures and Parliaments*, 216-76.

⁶Ibid.

⁷Lawrence D. Longley, "Parliaments as Changing Institutions and as Agents of Regime Change: Evolving Perspectives and a New Research Framework," *Journal of Legislative Studies* 2, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 22-44; Lawrence D. Longley and Drago Zajc, "The First Years of the New Democratic Parliaments," in Longley and Zajc, *The New Democratic Parliaments*, 3-25; and Lawrence D. Longley and Taylor M. Hoffman, "Parliamentary Members and Leaders as Agents of Reform: Parliamentary and Regime Change Revisited," in Longley, Agh, and Zajc, *Parliamentary Members and Leaders*, 135-82.

mentary functions in different stages of democratic development:

Initially many of the new parliaments emerged from traditional roles as rubber stamp parliaments, dominated by the single party, national elite, or other controlling power. As democratization took root, such parliaments as a result become to act as transformational institutions, providing arenas or sites for democratic change while themselves being changed by the process in which they were so deeply engaged. Later, the parliaments will evolve into more established autonomous legislative institutions where the reutilized politics of the relatively established regimes are played out.⁸

The main problem of Longley's role distinctions for the parliaments in a democratic process was they were too static. From his broad guidelines above, one might raise such questions as: How could democratization take root in the first place, given the fact that the parliaments have only been rubber stamps in pre-democratic regimes? How could a rubber stamp parliament become one that brings about a transformation? Moreover, would all parliaments be able to become autonomous in any kind of constitutional democracy?

Nevertheless, Longley himself did not fully follow his role distinctions for observing parliamentary and regime change later on. He more specifically focused on parliamentary members and leaders and viewed them as agents of reform.⁹ From the experience of those of the U.S. House of Representatives as agents of institutional change, Longley pointed out that "dramatic changes in the purposes and goals of parliamentary institutions in newly democratizing regimes have likewise been due to changes in the people who become parliamentarians and shifts in their recruitment and experience patterns."¹⁰

All in all, parliaments or legislatures have played some role in the process of regime change. Previous studies¹¹ concur that the role of parlia-

⁸Longley and Zajc, "The First Years of the New Democratic Parliaments," 5.

⁹Longley and Hoffman, "Parliamentary Members and Leaders as Agents of Reform," 135-82.

¹⁰Ibid., 171.

¹¹Some crucial ones are: Liao Ta-chi, "An Authoritarian Regime Legislature's Role in Promoting Democracy: An Examination of the Extra-Institutional Strategies of Taiwan Legislators," in Longley, *The Role of Legislatures and Parliaments*, 203-26; Mercedes Alda

ments in democratizing regimes shall be "simultaneously affected by and a part of the broader transformation of the whole political system... They are both the creatures of and major participants in the wider democratic transformation of their political system."¹²

The questions that need to be answered are: What roles have legislatures played in the process of democratization? Could we come up with some better ways to categorize these roles? Furthermore, since individual members or parliamentary leaders should be able to serve as agents of change, how could we fit the roles of these individuals into the picture of legislatures as a whole to better decode the transformation process with a more sophisticated methodology? Finally, how could we more thoroughly explain the dynamic relationship between legislatures and the democratization process?

This paper attempts to answer these questions by using Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (立法院) as a case study. Since Taiwan has been successfully transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democratic one, the role of the Legislative Yuan has also been substantially transformed. After briefly reviewing the Legislative Yuan's internal shifting structures in relation to change in its outside environment, this paper attempts to offer a theoretical framework and propositions to further examine Taiwan's case. Finally, the paper will draw conclusions on its findings and their implications.

The Legislative Yuan in Taiwan

A Profile of the Legislative Yuan

The Legislative Yuan was established in 1948 while the former ruling party in Taiwan, the Kuomintang (KMT 國民黨, the Nationalist Party),

and Lourdes L. Nieto, "Parliament in the Transition and in the Consolidation Process: The Case of Spain," *ibid.*, 179-202; David Olson, "The Parliaments of New Democracies: The Experience of Central Europe," in *World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures*, ed. George T. Kurian (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1997), 838-48; and Drago Zajc, "From Systemic Change to Consolidation: The Slovenian Parliament in a Process of Transition," in Longley and Zajc, *The New Democratic Parliaments*, 333-50.

¹²Olson, "The Parliaments of New Democracies," 847.



was still in control of the government and the mainland.¹³ The first election for the legislature for China as a whole was held the same year.

According to the Republic of China's (ROC) Constitution¹⁴ promulgated in 1947, legislators were to be elected by popular vote, primarily on the basis of geographical representation.¹⁵ The Legislative Yuan's operations more resemble those of the British Parliament than those of the U.S. Congress.¹⁶ The body currently has twelve standing committees mainly responsible for the review of bills, and also conducts Yuan sessions twice a week. During these meetings, legislators have the right to question the premier and other political appointees about anything they consider important. At committee meetings, they are also authorized to question political appointees, government functionaries, and/or other private persons on matters either related to a certain bill or not. Moreover, legislators can also initiate bills.¹⁷ Thus constitutionally speaking, the Legislative Yuan of the ROC on Taiwan is the highest legislative organ of the state, and it exercises legislative power on behalf of the people.

In practice, however, the Legislative Yuan was not an exception to its counterparts in many authoritarian regimes. It had been labeled a "rubber stamp" for quite a long period of time.¹⁸ The government ruled by the KMT was defeated by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the mainland, and then moved from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949. The KMT, however,

¹³The KMT did not relinquish control of the ROC presidency as well as the cabinet until the year 2000.

¹⁴The official title for Taiwan is "Republic of China." Since some political issues have revolved around this title both internationally and domestically, however, this paper mainly uses "Taiwan" instead of "ROC."

¹⁵There were five other categories of representation before 1991, when the Constitution was beginning to be amended. These five were: Mongolian Leagues and Banners, Tibet, various racial groups, overseas Chinese, and occupational groups.

¹⁶Teh-hou Jen, "The Constitutional Development of the R.O.C.: Law and Politics in Taiwan, 1949-75" (Ph.D. dissertation, New School for Social Research, 1978), 3.

¹⁷This right is provided in Article 63 of the Constitution. However, the internal regulations of the Legislative Yuan have established the criterion that twenty legislators' signing together is a basic requirement for initiating a bill.

¹⁸Chu Chi-hung and Richard L. Engstrom, "The Impact of the 1980 Supplementary Election on Nationalist China's Legislative Yuan," *Asian Survey* 24, no. 4 (April 1984): 447-58.

continued to claim sovereignty over the mainland,¹⁹ and strenuously attempted to find any means by which to legitimize this claim, also claiming legitimacy for an authoritarian regime from the continuing communist threat.

The 1948 legislators, elected from the whole of China, constituted such a means. As such, the KMT government prolonged the terms of these legislators—from three years to an indefinite period of time, though they eventually ended in 1991.²⁰ The consequence of these indefinite, prolonged terms of office is twofold. On the one hand, the KMT kept firm control over the Legislative Yuan, since more than 95 percent of the legislators elected in 1948 were KMT members. On the other hand, the KMT also had to face the reality of the issue of their gradually aging and dying,²¹ as well as the pressure from Taiwanese society for more participation in central government affairs.²²

The KMT government had managed to amend provisional articles to the Constitution in 1967, 1972, and 1991-92.²³ The first two of these

¹⁹The ROC government relinquished its claim of sovereignty over the mainland during Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) presidency (1988-2000).

²⁰This was in accordance with ruling No. 261 on the Constitution made by the Council of Grand Justices of the ROC to end the term of office for all those elected in 1948 by the end of 1991. Those elected in 1948, at that time, included legislators, members of the National Assembly (國民大會), and members of the Control Yuan (監察院). They were all designated representatives of the central government.

²¹For instance, the 1948 legislators' average age was 63 in 1967, and then 81 in 1988. These legislators numbered 500 in 1950; their number dropped to 431 in 1967, 210 in 1988, and 81 by the end of 1991. See Liao Ta-chi, "The Influence of Culture on Information Gathering in Organizations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1990), 244.

²²At that time, the Taiwan Provincial Assembly (台灣省議會) consisted of members regularly recruited through popular elections. These local elected members actually articulated many democracy-related issues, and often asked that the door be opened for more Taiwanese people to enter the central representative institutions. See Cheng Yu-feng and Li Fuchung, eds., *Guohui gaizao, 1948-1972* (Congressional reformation, 1948-72) (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2001).

²³In 1967, a "Temporary Provision" (臨時條款) was added to the Constitution (effective only during the period of communist rebellion) that authorized the president to call elections to fill vacancies in the Legislative Yuan and to increase the apportionment for areas under the ROC's control that had experienced population growth. In 1972, a further amendment ushered in a system of supplementary elections. In 1991-92, a new amendment designated the second term of central government representatives. See Jauschieh Joseph Wu, "Politics of Constitutional Reform in the Republic of China: Problems, Process, and Prospects," *Issues & Studies* 28, no. 9 (September 1992): 85-106.

revisions opened the door for adding a specified number of locally elected (i.e., so-called "supplementary," 增額) legislators. However, the legislators elected in 1948 were also maintained.

The number of legislators elected in Taiwan has steadily increased. Over the years the numbers were: 11, 51, 52, 97, 98, 100, and 130.²⁴ How this increasing number of supplementary legislators might have played a role in transforming the Legislative Yuan will be examined and discussed later.

The result of the 1991-92 constitutional revision was to provide the basis for the Legislative Yuan's second era. Through this revision, the legislators elected in 1948 were all retired by the end of 1991, though there were only 81 left at that time. Furthermore, the second era of the Legislative Yuan began with 160 members mainly elected from Taiwan,²⁵ and with a three-year term.

Not only was the Legislative Yuan's representative structure odd in terms of democratic standards, but so was its makeup in terms of party affiliation. Ever since the KMT government withdrew from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, it had imposed martial law for the period of communist rebellion.²⁶ Under this law, new parties were banned; and civil rights such as freedom of speech and assembly were also severely curtailed. Martial law was not lifted until July 1987. The direct impact on the Legislative Yuan from this law was the KMT's virtually absolute dominance in the Yuan for more than thirty years (1950-87).²⁷ However, the KMT gradually began losing its seats to other parties with the lifting of martial law. In 1987, the KMT still occupied 94 percent of the seats in the Yuan, then 85

²⁴These numbers are based on the records of the Personnel Office of the Legislative Yuan.

²⁵The total number of legislators changed in the next few terms was 160 in 1993, 164 in 1996, and 225 in 1999, 2002, and 2005.

²⁶Martial law was not lifted until July 1987. This issue certainly had become a focus of Taiwan's democratic movement. See Hsueh Yue-shun, Tseng Pin-tsang, and Hsu Jui-hao, eds., *Cong jieyan dao jieyan, 1945-1987* (The martial law era, 1945-87) (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000).

²⁷The KMT held nearly 99 percent of the seats in the 1950s. Roughly speaking, it kept more than 95 percent of the total seats on average during these years. Appendix 1 offers some of these figures.

percent in 1990, 63 percent in 1993, 52 percent in 1996, 51 percent in 1999, and 31 percent in 2002.²⁸

The first significant opposition party,²⁹ the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), was illegally established in 1986.³⁰ Its strength nevertheless grew quite fast in the beginning. In 1987, the party held only some 4 percent of the seats; then 10 percent in 1990, 32 percent in 1993, 33 percent in 1996, 32 percent in 1999, and 39 percent in 2002.³¹ Currently, the DPP is also the ruling party of Taiwan.³²

In the Legislative Yuan at the present time, other parties such as the People First Party (FPF, 親民黨), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟), the Non-Party Union (無黨聯盟), and the New Party (NP, 新黨) are represented. These political parties were all established after the 1990s.³³

Since the Legislative Yuan ceased to be dominated by one single party after 2002, its function and role has also been undergoing substantive change. How has this change evolved, and how can we best explicate it? The following attempts to offer a theoretical framework and propositions based on both Taiwan's experience and previous relevant literature.

²⁸These numbers are based on the same source as that cited in note 24 above.

²⁹There had been two so-called opposition parties in the Legislative Yuan ever since 1950. One was the Youth Party (青年黨), and the other the Socialist Democratic Party (社會民主黨). However, the two parties also came from the mainland and only shared a very small portion of the seats (about 1 percent), thus they were generally considered insignificant. See Chu and Engstrom, "The Impact of the 1980 Supplementary Election," 448.

³⁰Since martial law was not lifted until July 1987, organizing a new party in 1986 was still illegal. The DPP founding members were even prepared to be arrested by the government at that time. See Chen Shih-hung and Chou Hsiu-huan, eds., *Zudang yundong* (Organizing the opposition parties) (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2000), 590-96.

³¹These numbers are based on the same source as that cited in note 24 above.

³²The DPP has taken over the presidency as well as the Executive Yuan (行政院, the cabinet) since the 2000 presidential election. This is the first change of ruling party that has occurred in Taiwan's democratization process.

³³The FPF was established in 2000, the TSU in 2001, and the NP in 1993. The numbers of seats they currently (2005) hold are: 35, 12, and 1 respectively among a total of 225. The Non-Party Union now has 6 seats.

Theoretical Framework and Propositions

In order to emphasize the dynamics of the role of legislatures rather than merely be descriptive, this section uses three metaphors to describe the different roles that might be played by legislatures in the democratization process. A definition of democratization will be provided, since democratization, especially in accordance with Taiwan's experience, seemingly involves a long process with different stages that are also inextricably tied to the changing role of legislatures. Thirdly, theoretical propositions will be offered to further delineate the dynamic relationship between the role of legislatures and the democratization of the system in which the legislatures reside.

Three Metaphors

The sleeping lion: It is assumed that a legislature is a seed buried in the soil of a given constitutional system. Legally speaking, a legislature has functions such as regularly scrutinizing budgets and legislative bills, even though an authoritarian party may be in *de facto* control. As mentioned previously, a legislature in an authoritarian system is usually labeled a "rubber stamp." However, the metaphor of a "sleeping lion," rather than that of a "rubber stamp," implies potential power. Even though the legislature may look quite submissive to the party or the cabinet, and is often too quiet in doing its job, it is still alive. The legislature may even "growl" once in a while, an action which could bother the party or the cabinet a little bit, though that kind of sound may not be enough to substantially push forward democratic progress in the system at that moment.

The problem with a sleeping lion legislature is that it cannot be very alert to noises in the environment. However, the environment the lion sleeps in is also more peaceful and quiet than that in other situations.

The awakening lion: When the environment undergoes a rapid and dynamic transformation (e.g., becomes too noisy), the sleeping lion-like legislature should be awakening. It will yawn and growl to rouse itself. However, at this stage, this kind of legislature may mainly echo the demands or voices from the environment while not being ready actively to

pursue its own goals, a response which may directly relate to democratic reform and therefore enhance its legally assigned functions.

The roaring lion: "A lion that is roaring" signifies a legislature that is not only awakening but is also articulating constantly. As well as echoing environmental changes, this kind of legislature also tries to play a significant role in the environment. What a legislature articulates may have an impact on the furtherance of democracy as well as the improvement of its functions in the system. In other words, this kind of legislature is able to roar for certain democratic changes which the environment may not clearly articulate or which may be controversial.

The Meaning of Democratization

The above-mentioned three metaphors attempt to portray the roles of legislatures at different stages of democratic development in a given system. Consequently, what the meaning of democratization is and the plausible stages it may involve need to be defined and discussed. This article mainly adheres to the definition of democracy of Diamond, Linz, and Lipset:

[A] system of government that meets three essential conditions: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups (especially political parties) for all effective positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair elections such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and a level of civil and political liberties.³⁴

The above three conditions embody certain legal and institutional arrangements that should appear and be formalized. They not only render certain political powers and civil rights to citizens who did not have these in the past, but also establish the rules of the game for a fairer and more inclusive competition among different groups (or parties) than that in the past in a given polity. However, how do these legal arrangements come

³⁴Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour M. Lipset, eds., *Politics in Developing Countries* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1988), xvi.



into being? There should be a long process in which issues related to the three conditions might have been raised, debated, and pushed forward. The institutional constraints on the three conditions then were lifted either in an incremental manner or in a dramatic way.³⁵

Upon careful examination, this paper proposes to divide the long process of democratization into four stages. The first period is the one of hard authoritarianism in which a given government is often dominated by one party, not fulfilling the three democratic conditions mentioned above.³⁶ It does not "permit effective competition for political power, nor meaningful and widespread popular participation in the formulation of public policies, through elections or other means." Nor does it allow substantial levels of civil liberties.³⁷ The period of soft authoritarianism represents the second stage in which the given government has gradually relaxed some constraints on the three conditions.³⁸ For instance, the government gradually allows for more political participation in such a way that more major social groups could be included. The third period is one of rapid democratization in which the government has been undergoing transformation by rapidly lifting almost every constraint on the three democratic conditions. Lastly, the fourth stage is a period of democratic consolidation in which the government is learning to substantively implement the three democratic conditions through debate, compromise, and modification.³⁹

In this long democratization process, the efforts made by legislators to articulate democratic issues might not have a direct impact on the given polity in which the legislature resides or, as is often the case in an authori-

³⁵ Longley and Hoffman, "Parliamentary Members and Leaders as Agents of Reform," 135.

³⁶ Edward A. Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan: From Hard to Soft Authoritarianism," *The China Quarterly*, no. 99 (September 1984): 481.

³⁷ The foregoing description is mainly a traditional definition of authoritarianism. See Diamond, Linz, and Lipset, *Politics in Developing Countries*, 14.

³⁸ Dividing the concept of authoritarianism into hard and soft categories may have been begun by Edwin A. Winckler. See Winckler, "Institutionalization and Participation on Taiwan," 481-99.

³⁹ Juan. J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 3-15.

tarian regime, those efforts could be regarded simply as "the barking of dogs." Yet, neither of the above should be counted as useless in promoting democratization, for the process of democratization is a long one requiring sustained effort.⁴⁰ Therefore, this paper argues that the impact of the efforts made by legislators toward democratization in an authoritarian regime, however mild in degree, to question "what democracy is," "how it should come about," and "why it is not here" should also be counted as crucial pushes toward a democratizing polity. That is also the reason why this paper will invariably focus on the transforming roles and functions of legislatures in articulating democratization issues throughout the four stages.

Propositions

Proposition one:

In hard authoritarian regimes, the legislature is a sleeping lion.

This proposition mainly challenges the stereotyped image of a legislature in a "hard" authoritarian regime as merely a "rubber stamp." Indeed, as already noted, such a legislature is very much alive and should not be ignored, and it is not surprising if the legislature "growls" once in a while. That is, some members might occasionally raise issues promoting democracy in clear opposition to the regime's authoritarian policies.

Reason: As Rundquist argues, a legislature, once embedded within a modern constitutional framework, has the potential to function.⁴¹ Take the National People's Congress (NPC, 全國人民代表大會) in the People's Republic of China (PRC), for example. The NPC is formally established in the PRC Constitution, and has the power to scrutinize bills and budgets,

⁴⁰This seemingly denotes linear development toward democracy. One may argue that history does not move in such a linear manner. This author's view is that, on the one hand, the term "democratization" already embodies the sense of progressive change toward democracy. On the other hand, whether historical development is linear or not is subject to human interpretation. Even if we take a cyclical view in the long term, there is no reason why part of the "cycle" cannot appear linear.

⁴¹Rundquist, "Legislative Assemblies," 1.



functions which are quite analogous to those in any modern constitutional country. However, since NPC members are almost entirely recruited from the CCP and are elected indirectly, the NPC has long been viewed as a "rubber stamp."⁴² However, Kevin O'Brien's study of its role during the 1980s does not agree with this stereotyped image of a legislature in a very hard authoritarian regime, one in which institutional reforms are strictly limited to the economy.⁴³ He points out that the NPC has played an active role in lawmaking, oversight, representation, and regime support.⁴⁴ The NPC might appear conservative, sometimes, in its questioning of the unforeseen consequences of reform. On the other hand, the NPC has also displayed an ability to scrutinize initiatives and prevent their unrevised passage.⁴⁵ In other words, the NPC has, from time to time, obstructed the executive's proposals by highlighting negative public opinions and by insisting on procedural regularity.⁴⁶

By the same token, it would be reasonable to expect that a legislature in a hard authoritarian regime, which may bring about very little democratic reform, would not be as static as a rubber stamp. It would be better portrayed as a sleeping lion, one that is alive and able to be awakened at the right moment.

Proposition two:

A corresponding relationship exists between the evolving political environment and the changing role of the legislature.

That is, the legislature may behave like a sleeping lion in a period of hard authoritarianism; an awakening lion in a period of soft authoritarianism; a roaring lion in a period of rapid democratization; and then still a


⁴²Yu Keping, "The People's Congress System in Reform China" (Paper presented at the 17th World Congress, IPSA, July 17-21, 1997).

⁴³Kevin J. O'Brien, "Is China's National People's Congress a 'Conservative' Legislature?" *Asian Survey* 30, no. 8 (August 1990): 782-94.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 785-86.

⁴⁵*Ibid.*, 793.

⁴⁶*Ibid.*, 794.



roaring lion (though it might not sound as loud as before) in a period of democratic consolidation.

The political environment may be conceived of as having two layers.⁴⁷ One is the inner environment of the legislature, which mainly involves the structure of the legislature encompassing such factors as the background of its members (e.g., old/new proportion), and the configuration of parliamentary parties. The other is the outer environment of the legislature including such factors as institutional arrangements, public opinion, mass media attention, and international trends. An examination of the transformation of the role of a legislature should thus take both its inner and outer environments into account.

Reason: The previous literature and Taiwan's experience all seem to indicate that democratic reforms come from somewhere other than the legislature.⁴⁸ Furthermore, many legislative specialists also seem to admit that legislatures are "direct and immediate beneficiaries" of a democratization process.⁴⁹ Thirdly, organizational theorists who study legislatures from an organizational or institutional perspective also claim that "institutional context" or "institutional time" should be taken into account in understanding any institutional development in a broad sense or the development of legislative institutions in new regimes in a narrow sense.⁵⁰

Thus change in the environment that surrounds the legislature should be crucial to our understanding of the role change of the legislature in the democratization process. An environment defined as having two layers

⁴⁷David Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," *World Politics* 9, no. 3 (1957): 383-400.

⁴⁸The literature on democratization is vast. However, little of the literature has considered that parliaments can play a critical role in promoting democratization. A detailed review of the literature in this regard can be found in Liao Ta-chi, "Parliaments and Democratization: A Theoretical Framework Consideration" (Paper presented at the 18th World Congress, IPSA, August 1-5, 2000), 2-5.

⁴⁹Zajc, "From Systemic Change to Consolidation," 333.

⁵⁰Randall Strahan, "Leadership and Institutional Development in the Early Nineteenth Century U.S. House of Representatives," in Longley, *The Role of Legislatures and Parliaments*, 311-20. Also see Joseph Cooper and David W. Brady, "Institutional Context and Leadership Style: The House from Cannon to Rayburn," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 2 (June 1981): 411-25.

mainly follows Easton's theory of political systems.⁵¹


Proposition three:

A dialectical relationship exists between the changing role of the legislature and systemic democratic change.

This dialectical relationship encompasses three layers. The first one is that of the paradox of inclusion, namely, a legislature is obviously a part of the political system. Yet the precise role of the legislature in the alleged political system setting is to create a voice of negation. Although this power of negation might be weak at the initial stage of a constitutional system, the power to counterbalance, however minimal, still cannot be ignored and will definitely leave its mark on the system. Secondly, this mild voice of negation will incrementally aggregate, form a concrete counterbalance of power in the system, and ultimately adjust or reform the nature of an authoritarian state. The development of the power of negation of a legislature from being nonexistent to powerful will be discussed in a focus on the third dialectical relationship, the qualitative and quantitative relationship. The weak dissenting voice spreading in an authoritarian system interacts with the outside environment as elaborated on in the second proposition, and results in the dialectical relationship in which quantitative accumulation can trigger qualitative change such as changes in party composition.⁵² In the long run, such a qualitative change can also invite more quantitative change, demanding further democratization and further modifying the nature of an authoritarian system in response to the environment. An interesting snowball effect is observed in a process of democratization that occurs in incremental improvements. In this process, both quantitative and qualitative changes should be taken into consideration, and the effects of qualitative change especially cannot be ignored.

⁵¹Easton, "An Approach to the Analysis of Political Systems," 383-400.

⁵²This approach is an attempt at synthesis of Hegelian dialectic and Marxist dialectic. See Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory* (New York: Humanity Books, 1999), Part II (251-388).



In conclusion, in the above three layers of dialectical developments, one should keep in mind that the dialectical relationship is not linear and it will not be easy to find direct evidence for this kind of relationship. Yet empirically speaking, at least two trends in the dialectical relationship can be demonstrated: one is that the soft voice demanding democratization in a legislature, even in an authoritarian regime, can still trigger a certain degree of modification in the regime; the other is the changing role of the legislature measured quantitatively and qualitatively, modifying a regime from a hard authoritarian one to a soft one to one undergoing rapid democratization, a crucial element resulting from more articulation of the need for democratization and modification of an authoritarian regime.

Reason: The connection between legislative change and regime change has been fully accepted by legislative specialists. However, the legislature as a whole might not be very active in pushing forward systemic reform; it has even been considered conservative—in resisting and being relatively resistant to change. Longley and Hoffman have thus proposed that individual parliamentary members and leaders may serve as agents of reform, and the "influx of large numbers of new and different members" may serve as a transformative force in the legislature and therefore the system.⁵³ Moreover, the legislative changes, as described by Longley and Hoffman, sometimes come about through sweeping reconstitution and transformation of the legislature's character and purpose.⁵⁴ The third proposition above encompasses all these factors and considerations.

An Examination of Taiwan's Case According to the Three Propositions

Conceptual Operationalization and Data Collection

In order to apply the case of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan to the theoretical propositions laid out above, some concepts utilized by the theoretical

⁵³Longley and Hoffman, "Parliamentary Members and Leaders as Agents of Reform," 171.

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, 135.

framework need to be further operationalized in the context of the case.

The concept of articulations on democracy issues will be discussed first. As mentioned above, democracy entails three conditions: regular elections, broad participation, and civil rights guarantees. Given these three main conditions, the voicing of demands on democracy issues in the context of Taiwan's regime change would involve the following: (1) the retirement of representatives of the central government elected in 1948 or the reconstitution of the representative bodies of the central government;⁵⁵ (2) the lifting of martial law; (3) the broadening of political participation;⁵⁶ (4) freedom of speech, press, and assembly (including the formation new parties); (5) safeguards for human rights;⁵⁷ and (6) the neutrality of the military and the bureaucracy.⁵⁸

Other demands are certainly related to the democratization of the system, such as judicial due process either in the relationship between the Legislative Yuan and the Executive Yuan or in the internal procedural regularity of the Legislative Yuan, and the protection of disadvantaged groups. In order to assess the three main conditions, which constitute the threshold of any democratic polity, this paper mainly adopts the above-mentioned six sets of democracy issues articulated in the process of Taiwan's democratization. However, other related democracy issues, as exemplified above, are categorized as "other."

Lifayuan gongbao (立法院公報, Legislative Yuan Bulletin) was the main source for coding what the legislators articulated on democracy issues

⁵⁵The issue of retirement of the representatives elected in 1948 was discussed throughout the years 1950-1991. However, after these representatives were retired at the end of 1991, this issue changed to concern about reconstituting the Legislative Yuan either in terms of its size, or in terms of amending electoral rules for recruiting its legislators.

⁵⁶This mainly involves the issues of local self-governance, local direct democracy, and the four political rights of election, recall, initiative, and referendum for people to participate in public affairs.

⁵⁷This mainly involves the issues of judicial protection of individual rights, ending the use of military courts to adjudicate civilian cases, and compensation for tortured or wrongly punished individuals, etc.

⁵⁸This involves not only the issue of the relationship between a party and the military or the administration, but also the issues of institutionalizing the military, national defense, and national security systems.

over the past fifty years (1950-2000). Samplings from twenty-nine years were taken.⁵⁹ The oral questions raised by legislators during Yuan meetings were coded in accordance with the seven categories (six plus one "other").⁶⁰

Secondly, as mentioned in the propositions, the political environment can be conceived of as having two layers: the inner and the outer. In the case of the Legislative Yuan, the inner layer could be easily operationalized as structural change of the Yuan. The outside environment involves more complicated dimensions, such as international trends, public opinion, and varying institutional arrangements. However, for the sake of systemic observations, this paper uses the mass media's reports on issues related to democracy (as mentioned above) as its index for understanding changes in the external political environment of the Legislative Yuan.

Three of Taiwan's main newspapers—*Zhongguo shibao* (中國時報, China Times),⁶¹ *Lianhe bao* (聯合報, United Daily News), and *Zili wanbao* (自立晚報, Independence Evening Post)⁶²—were selected for coding. They all have been in existence long enough to cover the period under study from 1950 to 2000.⁶³

⁵⁹Samples were mainly drawn from even-numbered years in the Western calendar (1954, 1956, etc.). However, since the Legislative Yuan did not have issues of the *Gongbao* from 1950 to 1952, the coding years began with 1953. A detailed introduction to the sampling method as well as the coding format can be found in Liao Ta-chi, "Lifayuan yu Taiwan diqu zhengzhi minzhuhua (III)" (The Legislative Yuan and Taiwan's democratization III) (National Science Council [NSC] project report, no. NSC91-2414-H-110-009, 2003), 1-24.

⁶⁰Although both oral and written questions were coded for both the Yuan sessions and the committee meetings, the author decided to use only oral questions raised by legislators in the Yuan sessions for two main reasons. One is that in the beginning stage, a legislator would raise oral and written versions of a question at the same time. Later on, the written questions gradually became nothing more than a formality. The quantity of these questions is tremendous, and each written question is often signed by many legislators. It is therefore difficult to determine precisely which democratic articulation was made by whom. The second reason is that the committee meetings were not recorded in the *Gongbao* before 1957; thus they are simply coded from 1957 to 2000. Since the records for these do not cover the entire period under study, the author decided not to use this data in this paper.

⁶¹*Zhongguo shibao* was called "Zhengxin xinwen" (微信新聞, Trusted News) before September 1, 1958.

⁶²*Zili wanbao* ceased publication in 2001.

⁶³The coding method can be found in Liao, "Lifayuan yu Taiwan diqu zhengzhi minzhuhua (III)."

The democratization process is conceived of here as one mainly involving four stages. These are: hard authoritarianism, soft authoritarianism, rapid democratization, and democratic consolidation. In the context of the democratization process in Taiwan, these four stages can be quite easily identified by some obvious institutional changes.

The period of hard authoritarian rule in Taiwan can be identified as the period from 1950 to 1972. As mentioned before, the KMT achieved firm control of Taiwan in 1950. From then until 1972 the Taiwanese people had almost no chance to participate in central government affairs.⁶⁴ In 1972 a new electoral system was introduced which allowed for regular increases in the number of supplementary legislators representing Taiwan.⁶⁵

The period 1973-86 is thus one of "soft" authoritarian rule in Taiwan. This is because, despite the increasing number of supplementary legislators, martial law was still in effect, and various civil liberties and rights were still curtailed.⁶⁶

Beginning with the lifting of martial law in July 1987 and the legalization of the DPP (founded in 1986), the first opposition party rooted in Taiwan, the period of rapid democratization was from 1987 to 1991.⁶⁷ A great deal of progress toward democracy was made during this period, such as the passing of laws permitting freedom of speech and assembly, and the regulations for the retirement of central government representatives.⁶⁸

Finally, 1992 marks the beginning of democratic consolidation, as all the old legislators elected in 1948 were retired at the end of 1991 and

⁶⁴See note 23 above.

⁶⁵These numbers were fifty-one in 1972, fifty-two in 1975, ninety-seven in 1980, ninety-eight in 1983, and one hundred in 1986. See note 24 above.

⁶⁶Liao Ta-chi, "Taiwan's Legislature," in Kurian, *World Encyclopedia of Parliaments and Legislatures*, 657-63.

⁶⁷This means that the DPP had its own party caucus in the Yuan to instruct DPP members about their behavior.

⁶⁸The crucial bills for the lifting of martial law, freedom of association, and the retirement of the first-term central government representatives were passed in 1987, 1988, and 1989, respectively. See Liao Ta-chi, "Lifayuan yu Taiwan diqu zhengzhi minzhuhua (I)" (The Legislative Yuan and Taiwan's democratization I) (NSC project report, no. NSC89-2414-H-110-004, 2000), 16-17.

regular elections have been held since then.⁶⁹ Indeed, immediately after the removal of what had been long regarded as an obstacle to democratization in Taiwan—the unlimited terms of old legislators—the remaining task was to consolidate the three conditions of democracy emerging with the culture and society as a whole.⁷⁰

Whether or not the roles played by the Legislative Yuan in the four periods of democratization follow the theoretical propositions laid out previously is a question subject to examination in the following sections.

The "Sleeping Lion" Proposition

The first proposition suggests that the legislature is a "sleeping lion" rather than a "rubber stamp" in a period of hard authoritarianism. The term "sleeping lion" connotes a legislature which, though submissive to the executive branch, is alive and may "growl" in protest occasionally, thus upsetting the executive branch.

How did the Legislative Yuan perform during the period of hard authoritarianism (1950-72)? Was it completely quiet on democracy issues? Or, did a small portion of its members still articulate some democracy issues, breaking the political taboos of that time?⁷¹

Even though the total number of democracy-related issues raised by legislators during these years is not very impressive (109/1,930), it is apparent that the Legislative Yuan was not entirely submissive (see table 1). Some legislators did express their concerns about democratic reform in all seven categories. Furthermore, some of the legislators dared to raise questions related to the six categories that were viewed as directly challenging the hard core of authoritarian rule at that time, such as the lifting of martial law or the organization of new parties.⁷² A detailed qualitative illustration

⁶⁹There were 160 legislators elected. See note 25 above.

⁷⁰Even more bills related to democracy issues were passed by the Yuan during this period. See note 68 above.

⁷¹The political taboos of that time may have included the lifting of martial law, organizing a new party, and demanding freedom of the press. See Chen and Chou, *Zudang yundong*, i-x.

⁷²See Appendix 2, items 8, 36, 45, 55, 56.

Table 1
Oral Questions at Yuan Sessions (1953-72)

Year	1953	1954	1956	1958	1960	1962	1964	1966	1968	1970	1971	1972	Total	Average
Total Frequency	72	218	138	261	127	192	232	250	131	113	95	101	1,930	160.8
KMT	71	210	127	229	113	180	216	236	122	100	86	94	1,784	148.7
Others	1	8	11	32	14	12	16	14	9	13	9	7	146	12.2
H	0	5	0	0	4	0	0	3	2	2	0	1	17	1.4
R	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	5	0.4
M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0.2
F	0	7	0	1	1	0	0	2	1	1	1	6	20	1.7
N	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	3	0.3
E	0	4	0	0	0	0	1	1	1	2	0	2	11	0.9
O	1	13	3	4	6	0	2	1	12	4	3	2	51	4.3
Total	1	32	3	5	11	0	3	7	17	9	4	17	109	9.1

Notes: For this and other tables in this paper, **H** = human rights; **R** = retirement of central government representatives; **M** = the lifting of martial law; **F** = freedom of speech, association, etc.; **N** = neutrality of the military or administration; **E** = broadening of political participation; and **O** = other issues related to democratic reform.

Sources: *Lifayuan gongbao* (Legislative Yuan Bulletin), 1953 to 1972.

of these unwelcome "growls" can be found in Appendix 2.

The legislators who made crucial articulations on democracy issues at that time were indeed few in number. Only thirty-seven legislators spoke up on these issues on fifty-eight occasions during the twelve years (see Appendix 2), out of a total number of about five hundred legislators per year surveyed.⁷³ Among the thirty-seven legislators, five (about 13 percent) were non-KMT members.⁷⁴ It was they who spoke up on democracy issues in the six main categories on 25 percent of the total fifty-eight occasions.⁷⁵ Given the fact that the KMT held more than 95 percent of the

⁷³This is a rough estimate of the total number of members of the Yuan. See Appendix 1 for a clearer picture of the numbers in different periods.

⁷⁴These five were: Li Kung-chuan (李公權), Fei Hsi-ping (費希平), Tung Wei (董微), Wang Meng-yun (王夢雲), and Huang Hsin-chieh (黃信介). Fei Hsi-ping had been a KMT member, but he left the party in 1963 and became one of the founding members of the DPP in 1986.

⁷⁵See Appendix 2 marked with an X sign.

seats in the Yuan at that time, this small group of non-KMT members was able to make an impact beyond their numbers.

As mentioned in the first proposition, a "sleeping lion" legislature is usually found in a relatively peaceful environment. The inner political environment of the Legislative Yuan during the period 1950-72 was indeed quite peaceful because almost no new members were added to the Yuan.⁷⁶ As for the external environment of the Yuan, the coding results of the three main newspapers' reports on democracy-related issues during the same period seem also to reflect this quiet milieu.

There were a total of 1,122 media reports on democracy issues during 1950-72 (see table 2).⁷⁷ If we count only the reports that fall into the six main categories, the total is reduced to 622 and the yearly average is 44.4 items. This is much fewer than during the other three periods shown in table 2. The number of reports in each of the periods demonstrates that the external environment of the Yuan was changing in quite a fascinating manner. So did the "sleeping lion" Legislative Yuan first wake up, and then begin to roar?

The Relation between the Evolving Political Environment and the Changing Role of the Legislature

Proposition two, as detailed earlier, emphasizes the key role played by the political environment in the changing role of the legislature. In a period of hard authoritarianism, the legislature sleeps; it wakes up under soft authoritarianism; it roars during rapid democratization; and it continues to roar, but in a different way, under democratic consolidation.

The four periods of democratization in Taiwan have been identified by changes in institutional arrangements, which mainly influenced the internal environment of the Legislative Yuan.⁷⁸ Furthermore, the outer

⁷⁶Eleven new members were added to the Yuan in 1969. Since they only accounted for some 2.5 percent of the total seats and they did not need to face reelection, they are treated as those elected in the 1948. Also see Appendix 1.

⁷⁷Since the three newspapers have kept complete records dating back to 1951, this study coded them beginning from that year.

⁷⁸See the subsection on Conceptual Operationalization and Data Collection of this paper.

Table 2
The Three Newspapers' Reporting on Democracy Issues (1951-2000)

Year	N (1)	P (2)	H (3)	R (4)	M (5)	F (6)	Total (1-6)	7 (Others)	Total (1-7)
1951	1	5	6	0	0	3	15	14	29
1952	1	4	10	1	2	18	36	43	79
1953	2	8	6	0	2	10	28	34	62
1954	6	8	6	0	6	40	66	40	106
1956	0	6	8	0	1	7	22	18	40
1958	3	0	11	2	0	73	89	26	115
1960	5	11	11	2	12	11	52	59	111
1962	0	6	14	1	2	3	26	45	71
1964	1	3	9	3	2	7	25	24	49
1966	0	12	7	46	1	1	67	52	119
1968	1	8	16	1	0	9	35	38	73
1970	0	3	6	3	0	8	20	22	42
1971	2	1	5	28	0	6	42	38	80
1972	2	12	7	66	10	2	99	47	146
Total	24	87	122	153	38	198	622	500	1,122
Yearly average	1.7	6.2	8.7	10.9	2.7	14.1	44.4	35.7	80.1
1974	0	5	4	4	0	3	16	52	68
1976	2	5	24	3	0	11	45	23	68
1978	4	8	22	32	6	12	84	83	167
1980	5	8	113	18	1	20	165	66	231
1982	4	16	92	14	26	32	184	94	278
1984	0	14	33	20	16	85	168	241	409
1986	3	19	54	55	107	207	445	281	726
Total	18	75	342	146	156	370	1,107	840	1,947
Yearly average	2.6	10.7	48.9	20.9	22.3	52.9	158.1	120.0	278.1
1987	67	88	350	344	341	1,314	2,504	952	3,456
1988	103	130	486	764	45	882	2,410	961	3,371
1989	77	85	278	591	80	611	1,722	780	2,502
1990	79	262	217	404	127	289	1,378	522	1,900
1991	49	76	282	149	102	121	779	708	1,487
Total	375	641	1,613	2,252	695	3,217	8,793	3,923	12,716
Yearly average	75.0	128.2	322.6	450.4	139.0	643.4	1,758.6	784.6	2,543.2

Table 2 (Continued)

Year	N (1)	P (2)	H (3)	R (4)	M (5)	F (6)	Total (1-6)	7 (Others)	Total (1-7)
1992	54	38	182	75	36	55	440	415	855
1994	76	196	73	39	0	43	427	893	1,320
1996	4	9	96	0	0	20	129	175	304
1998	3	33	130	23	2	80	271	302	573
2000	95	37	102	54	0	43	331	616	947
Total	232	313	583	191	38	241	1,598	2,401	3,999
Yearly average	46.4	62.6	116.6	38.2	7.6	48.2	319.6	480.2	799.8

Sources: *Lianhe bao*, *Zhongguo shibao*, and *Zili wanbao*, 1951 to 2000.

environment of the Yuan, as shown in table 2, also demonstrates its having undergone significant change in the different periods of democratization in Taiwan. Thirdly, the "sleeping lion" (not rubber stamp) Legislative Yuan during the period of hard authoritarianism in Taiwan has been discussed in the examination of the first proposition. Then how did the Legislative Yuan perform in the next three periods?

The frequency of oral questions raised by legislators in the Yuan sessions differs from period to period quite amazingly (see tables 1, 3, 4, and 5). The average number of oral questions per year for the period 1950-72 is 160.8; for 1973-86, it is 277.3; then for 1987-91, it rises to 1,033; and for 1993-2000, it rises yet further, to 1,578.2. Only counting the frequency of oral questions involving democracy issues, the differences among the four periods are still very impressive. The average frequency of those per year is respectively 9, 65, 274, and 149 for each period.⁷⁹ These rough estimates of legislators' articulations in different periods seem primarily to confirm that the role of the Legislative Yuan has been undergoing change at the various stages of democratization. It looks like the Legislative Yuan was quite sleepy and quiet in the first period, gradually awakening in the sec-

⁷⁹See the bold columns separately marked in tables 1, 3, 4, and 5.

Table 3
Oral Questions at Yuan Sessions (1973-86)

Year	1974	1976	1978	1980	1982	1984	1986	Total	Average
Total frequency per year	223	130	244	185	561	396	202	1,941	277.3
KMT	200	110	203	166	447	318	157	1,601	228.7
DPP	14	4	11	4	79	45	31	188	26.9
Others	9	16	30	15	35	33	14	152	21.7
Supplementary	65	45	77	56	348	256	120	967	138.1
Elected in 1948	158	85	167	129	213	140	82	974	139.1
H	0	1	7	1	27	6	0	42	6.0
R	0	1	0	0	15	3	0	19	2.7
M	0	0	2	0	21	9	19	51	7.3
F	1	3	8	0	15	7	4	38	5.4
N	0	1	3	0	16	3	7	30	4.3
E	1	1	2	5	23	7	50	89	12.7
O	3	6	42	15	107	3	10	186	26.6
Total	5	13	64	21	224	38	90	455	65.0
The frequency for democracy issues raised by KMT	3	8	39	18	147	17	13	245	35.0
Raised by DPP*	1	2	5	0	75	12	74	169	24.1
Raised by others	1	3	20	3	2	9	3	41	5.9
Supplementary	2	8	23	8	136	28	70	275	39.3
Elected in 1948	3	5	41	13	88	10	20	180	25.7

*Although the DPP was established in 1986, some prominent members, such as Kang Ning-hsiang and Huang Huang-hsiung (黃煌雄), had been elected to the Yuan during this period and eventually became the founding members of the DPP. Thus the category "DPP" is listed from 1973, and those founding members of the DPP were included in this category.

Sources: *Lifayuan gongbao*, 1973 to 1986.

and, then suddenly becoming very active in the third period of rapid democratization. The Legislative Yuan was still active but paying more attention to issues other than democracy in the fourth period.

Table 4
Oral Questions at Yuan Sessions (1987-91)

Year	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	Total	Average
Total frequency per year	640	727	636	1,687	1,475	5,165	1,033.0
KMT	412	358	374	859	772	2,775	555.0
DPP	167	272	183	745	622	1,989	397.8
Others	61	97	79	83	81	401	80.2
Supplementary	514	628	520	1,656	1,457	4,775	955.0
Elected in 1948	126	99	116	31	18	390	78.0
H	18	14	48	8	40	128	25.6
R	40	37	27	11	42	157	31.4
M	15	15	13	6	11	60	12.0
F	29	51	10	30	81	201	40.2
N	12	32	39	3	19	105	21.0
E	15	9	6	3	26	59	11.8
O	31	34	74	266	255	660	132.0
Total	160	192	217	327	474	1,370	274.0
The frequency for democratic issues raised by KMT	80	78	86	169	222	635	127.0
Raised by DPP	59	82	103	141	230	615	123.0
Raised by Others	21	32	28	17	22	120	24.0
Supplementary	119	156	195	319	465	1,254	250.8
Elected in 1948	41	36	22	8	9	116	23.2

Sources: *Lifayuan gongbao*, 1987 to 1991.

Nevertheless, the second proposition also concerns the relationship between change in the political environment and change in the legislature. It hypothesizes that an "awakening lion" legislature should be more alert to change in the environment than a sleeping one. Moreover, a roaring lion should not only reflect changes in the environment, but also attempt to bring them about. Does the role change of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan

Table 5
Oral Questions at Yuan Sessions (1992-2000)

Year	1992	1994	1996	1998	2000	Total	Average
Total frequency per year	745	1,364	1,832	1,997	1,953	7,891	1,578.2
KMT	389	441	648	785	1,010	3,273	654.6
DPP	321	738	756	718	414	2,947	589.4
NP	0	104	320	358	145	927	185.4
PFP	0	45	58	81	340	524	104.8
Others	35	36	50	55	44	220	44.0
H	25	28	7	13	7	80	16.0
R	0	4	0	0	0	4	0.8
M	3	0	0	0	0	3	0.6
F	7	14	0	1	7	29	5.8
N	10	9	2	2	5	28	5.6
E	5	10	1	8	6	30	6.0
O	104	158	68	139	100	569	113.8
Total	154	223	78	163	125	743	148.6
The frequency for democratic issues raised by KMT	94	68	24	74	54	314	62.8
 Raised by DPP	52	117	26	50	37	282	56.4
 Raised by NP	0	20	27	18	9	74	14.8
 Raised by PFP*	0	6	1	15	21	43	8.6
 Raised by Others	8	12	0	6	4	30	6.0

*The PFP was not established until 2000. This study records the speaking frequency of PFP legislators based upon their current party affiliation.

Sources: *Lifayuan gongbao*, 1992 to 2000.

During the democratization process fit these two hypotheses?

This paper first correlates the total frequency with which issues in the six categories were raised by legislators each year with that of newspaper reports in the same years for each period (see table 6). The period 1972-86 appears to have a higher positive correlation between the two than the

Table 6

Pearson r between the Legislative Yuan and Newspapers on the Total Frequency of the Raising of the Six Main Democracy Issues during the Four Periods

Period	r	p
1950-72	0.195 (N=12)	0.35
1973-86	0.631 (N = 7)	0.13
1987-91	-0.267 (N=5)	0.67
1992-2000	0.903 (*) (N=5)	0.035

1950-72 period (0.195 vs. 0.631). The Legislative Yuan really looks as if it was more wide-awake in this period than in the previous one.

The third period of rapid democratization (1987-91) is the only one with a negative correlation between the two (-0.267). It seems that the Legislative Yuan really tried to run counter to the focus of the newspapers. That is, while the newspapers paid less attention to the six main democracy issues throughout this period, the Legislative Yuan, on the contrary, gradually increased its articulation of these issues (see tables 2 and 4). Whether the Legislative Yuan set its own agenda on these issues during this period will be further examined.

Yet the fourth period, namely the democratic consolidation period, might be problematic, as the correlation between the frequency of newspaper reporting on the six main democracy issues and that of these issues being raised by legislators during the same period is 0.903. This is the only one of the four periods in which the correlation reaches the significant level of $p < 0.05$ and confirms the correlative relationship existing between the newspaper reports and the questions raised by legislators.

Indeed, this significant positive correlation (0.9) for the fourth period means that it resembles the second period (0.6) more than the third period. Yet, according to the propositions, the Legislative Yuan should have been

Table 7
Ranking of the Cumulative Frequency of Main Democracy Issues Raised by the Newspapers and the Legislators' Oral Questions at Different Periods

	1953-72		1973-86		1987-91		1992-2000	
	Papers	L.Y.	Papers	L.Y.	Papers	L.Y.	Papers	L.Y.
H*	3	2	2	3	3	3	1	1
R*	2	4	4	6	2	2	5	5
M*	5	6	3	2	4	5	6	6
F*	1	1	1	4	1	1	3	3
N*	6	5	6	5	6	4	4	4
E*	4	3	5	1	5	6	2	2
Total ranking difference***	6		12		4		0	

*The ranking difference is counted as $(3-2) + |(2-4)| + |(5-6)| + |(1-1)| + (6-5) + (4-3) = 6$ for the first period, and so on for other periods.

Sources: The same as those cited in tables 1 through 5.

a roaring lion in both the third and fourth periods, and only an awakening lion in the second period. Moreover, examining the relation between the Legislative Yuan and media reports, the period of democratic consolidation shows a closer correlation with the third and fourth periods, rather than with the second, which has been proven statistically contradictory. From such observations, one can ask whether the roaring lion in the rapid democratization period transformed itself back into an awakening lion in the period of democratic consolidation.

Table 7 attempts to make clear the plausible corresponding relationship between the role of the legislature and the environment from an agenda-setting angle. The table presents a ranking by frequency of the six main democracy issues raised by both the newspapers and legislators' oral questions in different periods. It is interesting to note that the most pronounced difference arises between the second and the fourth period (see table 7). The ranking of the six democracy issues that appeared in the newspapers in the fourth period is exactly identical to that of legislators' oral questions, thus the difference in ranking between the two is zero for

this period. On the other hand, the second period showed the largest discrepancy in the ranking of the two data collection systems. There is not a single identical pair in the six main democracy issue categories between the newspaper side and the legislator side. The total ranking difference between the two in this period is twelve.

It would be safe to say that the Legislative Yuan in the fourth period of democratic consolidation did not behave as if it was just awakening as it did in the second period. On the one hand, although its role in the second period was that of one awakened by the cries for democracy coming from the environment, the Legislative Yuan was not able to bring out the importance of each issue, or to echo the specific demands of the environment. On the other hand, the Legislative Yuan seemed to be able to echo the environmental voices with greater sophistication than before in the third and fourth periods. However, a roaring lion cannot just echo; it has to lead sometimes.

The Legislative Yuan's role in raising democracy issues during the period of rapid democratization (1987-91), as mentioned above, was opposite from that of the newspapers. From a detailed examination of the frequency with which the six democracy issue categories were articulated by legislators each year during this period (see table 4), one distinctive issue may be singled out. This is the issue of the retirement of central government representatives. If one compares the frequency of articulations on this issue during this period with that of the newspapers (see table 2), the agenda-setting function of the Legislative Yuan seems to emerge.

According to table 4, legislators spoke up on this issue category most frequently in 1987 (40 times). In the same year, among the newspapers this issue was ranked third, after freedom and human rights issues. The reporting frequency was far below number one (344/1,314) and quite close to the fourth issue, martial law (341; see table 2). However, in 1988 the newspapers also paid a great deal of attention to this issue. Their frequency of reporting on this issue, though ranked second, dramatically increased to 764, only 118 less than that of the issue of freedom (764/882; see table 2). This frequency also enlarged the gap between this issue and the retirement

Table 8
The Raising of Issues in the Category of "Other" by the Legislators and the Newspapers for the Four Periods

	Newspapers			Legislative Yuan		
	Total	Others		Total	Others	
	N	N	%	N	N	%
1950-72	1,122	500	45%	109	51	47%
1973-86	1,947	840	43%	455	186	41%
1987-91	12,716	3,923	31%	1,370	660	48%
1992-2000	3,999	2,401	60%	743	569	77%

issue and other issues.⁸⁰ The Legislative Yuan, on the other hand, moved on to articulate some other democratic issues, though still paying attention to this one in 1988 (see table 4).

In the period 1992-2000, defined as the period of democratic consolidation, most of the main democracy issues were addressed in new legislation,⁸¹ thus what was left for the Legislative Yuan to roar about or help set an agenda for? Here one has to admit that hard evidence for this is difficult to find from the current data. Since all democracy-related issues that could not be categorized into the six main themes have been grouped into the category of "other," there is no way of differentiating these issues. Nevertheless, the category of "other" is still useful in indicating the shifting attention of the Legislative Yuan and the press as well as comparing the discrepancy between the two, which may offer a clue to understanding the changing role of the Legislative Yuan in a period of democratic consolidation (see table 8).

The agenda of the press was quite different from that of the Legislative Yuan where the "other" category was concerned in both the third and fourth periods. The newspapers paid about 17 percent less attention to

⁸⁰See table 2. The human rights issue ranked third in this year, but its reporting frequency was 486, i.e., 278 instances fewer than the retirement issue.

⁸¹See note 68 above.

other issues related to democratic reform than the Legislative Yuan did in both periods. In the previous two authoritarian periods, the Legislative Yuan and media reports suggest invariable trends in which the amount of attention devoted to "other" democratic issues is similar (41 vs. 43 percent, and 47 vs. 45 percent).

In sum, the changing role of the Legislative Yuan corresponds to the change in the environment of the Yuan. As the propositions predicted, the Legislative Yuan behaved like a sleeping lion in Taiwan's period of hard authoritarianism (1950-72). The Legislative Yuan was not awakened until its internal environment had been changed by bringing in some newly elected legislators and its external environment had also triggered a greater demand for democratization. In the period of soft authoritarian rule (1973-86), an awakening Legislative Yuan wanted to respond to the demands of the external environment, yet it could only do so to a mild degree, and could not yet attain the exact prerequisites for democratization. Furthermore, the Legislative Yuan in the periods of rapid democratization (1987-91) and democratic consolidation (1992-2000) can be symbolized as a "roaring lion" for not only could it respond to the demands from the outer environment, it could also set the political agenda. Moreover, the "roaring lion" in the third period roars louder than the one in the final period.

The Proposition of a Dialectical Relationship

This proposition first considers that the relationship between changes in the role of the legislature and systemic democratic change is not a linear one. Any effort made by legislators to promote progress toward democracy in a given system may not have a direct impact on the system. However, neither should the effort be seen as futile. Furthermore, this proposition also suggests that a quantitative change is sometimes even more important than a qualitative change in transforming the role of the legislature and therefore the system it resides in. Do these expectations also apply to the core of the Legislative Yuan's role change in Taiwan's democratization process?

It is not easy to offer hard evidence proving a non-linear and indirect relationship of cause and effect. Some interesting phenomena, however,

Table 9
Pearson r between the Legislative Yuan and Newspapers on the Individual Items of the Six Democracy Issues

	1953-72	1973-86	1987-91	1992-2000	1953-2000	
	r	r	r	r	r	p
H	0.54	0.40	-0.26	0.21	0.63(**)	0
R	0.24	-0.21	-0.17	0.02	0.76(**)	0
M	0.00	0.75	0.21	0.999(**) (p=0)	0.62(**)	0
F	-0.13	0.01	-0.42	-0.06	0.48(**)	0.008
N	0.00	0.32	0.35	0.66	0.68(**)	0
E	-0.13	0.868(*) (p=0.011)	-0.64	0.75	0.15	
Total	0.195	0.631	-0.267	0.903(*) (p=0.035)	0.746(**)	0.000

are worthy of being pointed out and should provide a sense of a cyclic relationship between the Legislative Yuan's articulations on democracy issues and the changes in Taiwan's system.

The first is that the frequency with which issues in the six categories were raised in the Yuan and the press separately correlates with each other throughout each period, as well in the 1953-2000 period as a whole.

The results of Pearson r between the two on each issue during these different periods are shown in table 9. There were almost no significant correlations between the Yuan and the press on each individual democracy issue in each period of democratization.⁸² However, when all these years are looked at together (1953-2000), the Pearson r between the two reaches a very significant level ($p < 0.01$) on almost all democracy issue categories, except the issue of the broadening of political participation. This suggests that the oral questions raised by legislators regarding democratic reforms,

⁸² There were only two Pearson r among 24 that reached the significant level of $p < 0.05$. One is the issue of the broadening of political participation in the period 1973-86. The other is the lifting of martial law in the period 1992-2000. See table 9.


though perhaps ignored by the news media in the short term, eventually correlate with the concerns of the press in the long term. Also, all of these main democracy issues have become salient topics in Taiwan, and the issues raised have led to the implementation of new laws which have substantially upgraded Taiwan's qualifications as a democracy.⁸³

Furthermore, among the six democracy issue categories, the issue of military and administrative neutrality has some distinctive characteristics. First, it is not a dead issue, as that of the lifting of martial law became after 1987. It is an enduring problem, but its scope is not as broad as that of the issues of civil liberties or human rights. It is more manageable than these two, but is not easily solved by enacting relevant laws alone. However, given its subtle nature, it is also more difficult to make this issue as hot as the retirement or political participation issue. In sum, the neutrality of the military and the administration is a subtle but enduring problem in the democratization process. Then, what has the Legislative Yuan done on this issue?

There is a general tendency in both the Legislative Yuan's and the news media's changing attention to this issue (see table 7). As one can see from table 7, the Yuan paid more attention to this issue than the media did from the very beginning (1953-72). The media's reporting rate on this issue ranked last among the six categories over the period 1953-91. However, legislators have shown their concerns on this issue in their oral questions, and this issue was ranked 5, 5, 4, and 4 respectively for each period according to the frequency with which it was raised. The news media eventually ranked the issue the same as the Yuan did in the fourth period (1992-2000).

If one further checks the content of the legislators' oral questions in the period of hard authoritarianism in Taiwan (1950-72) (see Appendix 2), one finds that some legislators even raised this issue as far back as 1954 (items 12 and 16, Appendix 2). Nonetheless, the efforts made by legislators in this regard over the long term should not be dismissed as futile. The first transfer of power to another political party occurred in

⁸³See note 68 above.



Taiwan in 2000, and since then the military has indeed played a decidedly neutral role.⁸⁴

The third proposition also emphasizes the importance of qualitative change in further decoding the force of transformation borne by both the system and the legislature *per se*. The role change of the Legislative Yuan has been mainly examined through its connection with change in the political environment as shown in the examination of the second proposition. As to what the driving force was that provoked the Legislative Yuan to pursue its designed functions so as to push forward democratic reform in the system has not been discussed. Since this paper has divided Taiwan's democratization process into four periods marked by some concrete changes in institutional arrangements, the criteria for making these divisions to a certain extent take both the quantitative and the qualitative changes in the Legislative Yuan into account. More specifically, the boundary marker between the first period of hard authoritarianism and the second soft one is the year 1972, since more supplementary members began to be regularly elected into the Yuan for three-year terms then.⁸⁵ This is certainly not only a quantitative change in terms of the total numbers of legislators, but also a substantial change in the composition of the Yuan.⁸⁶ Thus, what did these supplementary legislators do after they entered the Yuan? Were they the crucial force activating the Yuan and promoting democracy issues, given the fact that they had very different backgrounds from those elected in 1948?⁸⁷

The same question also applies to the second major qualitative change occurring at the Yuan. In considering the impact of the establishment of Taiwan's opposition party, the DPP, the primary interest of the following analysis lies in ascertaining both how the few elected DPP legislators performed and how the DPP as a whole performed in the period from

⁸⁴See note 31 above.

⁸⁵See notes 23 and 65 above.

⁸⁶See Appendix 1.

⁸⁷These differences mainly involved age, education, and provincial background. See Liao, "The Influence of Culture on Information Gathering in Organizations," 244.




Table 10
The Proportions for the Backgrounds of Legislators and the Frequency of
Articulations on Democracy Issues Made by Legislators of Different
Backgrounds


	Proportions for the different backgrounds	Proportions for the frequency of articulation on democracy issues		Proportions for the different backgrounds	Proportions for the frequency of articulations on democracy issues
1950-72					
KMT	98%	74%			
Others	2%	26%			
1973-86			1973-86		
KMT	95%	54%	Supplementary	20%	60%
DPP	2%	37%	Elected in 1948	80%	40%
Others	3%	9%			
1987-91			1987-91		
KMT	88%	46%	Supplementary	45%	92%
DPP	7%	45%	Elected in 1948	55%	8%
Others	5%	9%			

Note: The estimate of the proportions for the two different background factors in each period is a rough one. For instance, the proportion of KMT members for the period 1950-72 (98 percent) was calculated by averaging the proportions for 1960 (99 percent) and 1972 (97 percent). Appendix 1 offers more accurate membership proportions in three-year terms.

Sources: Tsai Yu-lun, "The Role Played by Political Elites, Electoral Mechanism, and Mass Media in the Process of Taiwan's Democratization" (M.A. thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, 2002), 61; and Ta-chi Liao, "The Influence of Culture on Information Gathering in Organizations: An Authoritarian Paradigm" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1990), 244.

1987 to 1991.⁸⁸ It seems quite obvious that the fact that certain categories of legislators were small in numbers did not constrain these legislators from articulating democracy issues. In the first period of hard authoritarianism, about 2 percent of the non-KMT members spoke out on democracy issues,

⁸⁸The estimate of the proportions for the two different background factors in each period is a rough one. For instance, the proportion of KMT members for the period 1950-72 (98 percent) was calculated by averaging the proportions for 1960 (99 percent) and 1972 (97 percent). Appendix 1 offers more accurate membership proportions in three-year terms.



accounting for 26 percent of the total number of articulations on these issues. A few founding members of the DPP also achieved much on raising democratic issues in the second period of soft authoritarianism. They were about 2 percent of the total number, but their articulations on democracy issues accounted for 37 percent of the total. In contrast, the KMT occupied 95 percent of the seats, but their articulations made up only 54 percent of the total. In the third period of rapid democratization, only 7 percent of the DPP members accounted for 45 percent of the total articulations made on democracy issues.

The supplementary legislators took the initiative to a degree disproportionate to their numbers. In the period 1973-86, they accounted for on average about 20 percent of the total members, but they made 60 percent of the articulations on democracy issues. In the next period, 92 percent of these articulations were made by supplementary members, who represented 45 percent of the total.

From the foregoing discussion, one should appreciate that in the role change of the Legislative Yuan in Taiwan's democratization process, there were some major qualitative changes in the backgrounds of legislators. Moreover, some individual legislators, such as Fei Hsi-ping,⁸⁹ Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥),⁹⁰ and Chu Kao-cheng (朱高正),⁹¹ who entered the Yuan in different periods, all played an important role in alerting the Yuan and its members to some democracy issues. Since their role in the Yuan and in Taiwan's democratization process has been discussed elsewhere,⁹² this paper will not elaborate further on their performance in the Yuan, leaving this for future studies.

⁸⁹Fei Hsi-ping spoke up on five occasions out of a total of fifty-eight on crucial democracy issues in the period of hard authoritarianism. See Appendix 2, and also see note 74 above.

⁹⁰Kang Ning-hsiang dared to raise critical questions about the authoritarian ruler Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) during Yuan sessions in the years 1972-78.

⁹¹Chu Kao-cheng, elected into the Yuan in 1986, was the first legislator to initiate disruptive strategies in the Yuan to emphasize the retirement issue in 1987. See Liao, "An Authoritarian Regime Legislature's Role," 203-23.

⁹²See notes 89, 90, and 91 above. Also see Liao, "Taiwan's Legislature," 657-63.

Even though there is direct evidence that the active articulation of democracy issues by individual legislators or legislators from different groups was the most crucial factor pushing forward the transformation from hard to soft authoritarianism in Taiwan, allowing more Taiwanese political representation, the retirement of the legislators elected in 1948, and the substitution of newly elected legislators was indeed a turning point in the democratization of Taiwan. As already elaborated above, on the one hand the legislature began to have the power to set the agenda, while on the other hand, individual legislators (such as Chu Kao-cheng), along with DDP legislators and supplementary members, fiercely demanded active democratization, which was eventually realized at the end of 1999, opening the period of democratic consolidation in Taiwan.

Conclusion

This paper utilizes the case of Taiwan to demonstrate the relationship between systemic democratic change and change in the role of the legislature. The paper first challenges a stereotyped image of a legislature in an authoritarian regime—i.e., that it is a "rubber stamp"—and offers an alternative image as a "sleeping lion." This metaphor not only conveys a dynamic sense of the legislature's role even in a hard authoritarian regime, but also indicates its ability to change with the political environment.

This paper also proposes that changes in the political environment should be tied into change in the role of the legislature; more specifically, that a "sleeping lion" legislature in a hard authoritarian regime is awakened by the relaxation of the regime's rules. An awakened lion is better able to echo the changes in the political environment than before. Furthermore, an "awakened lion" legislature is more able to transform itself into a roaring lion that not only responds loudly, but also fiercely leads discussions on issues of democratic rule when demands for rapid democratization are coming from the environment. This "roaring lion" legislature should continue to roar in a period of democratic consolidation, although it may not do so as loudly or as fiercely as it did in the previous period.

The third proposition laid out in this paper is that the process of democratic transformation involving changes in the role of the legislature and in the regime is dialectical, not linear. Moreover, both the qualitative and quantitative changes that occur in the process are valuable, because they mutually enhance each other's power to promote democratic change in the long term.

Taiwan's Legislative Yuan is a case that offers fruitful theoretical insights. In this paper, the Legislative Yuan was also subject to examination in accordance with the criteria of three propositions. The results of this examination often correlate with theoretical expectations. First, the Legislative Yuan did not behave like a "rubber stamp" but like a sleeping lion in the period of hard authoritarianism in Taiwan. A very small proportion of the legislators spoke up on democracy issues in that period (1950-72). The essence of these articulations has lived on.

Second, the correspondence between changes in the role of the legislature and changes in the political environment is also well exemplified by the case of the Legislative Yuan. Through the index for external change in the political environment affecting the Yuan, one finds there were differences in the Yuan's concerns about democracy issues and those of the outer environment. In the period of hard authoritarianism in Taiwan, the Yuan did not respond to the demands of the wider environment well. In the period of soft authoritarianism, the Yuan did better, but was not able to respond in a sophisticated way. In the period of rapid democratization, the Yuan really roared loudly and fiercely, not only responding to, but also setting the democratic agenda of the wider environment. In the period of democratic consolidation, the Yuan was still roaring, but it seemed to have a more harmonious relationship with the environment than before.

Third, the force of transformation that made its presence felt in the Yuan, making it change itself as well as bringing about change in the system, came both from certain individual legislators' efforts and from qualitative changes in the backgrounds of Yuan members in each period. This qualitative change was also concomitant with the quantitative changes in the institutional arrangement of the system.

In conclusion, the theories proposed in this paper are primarily based on the case study of Taiwan and the Legislative Yuan in a time frame of fifty years (1950-2000). Data are mainly from *Lifayuan gongbao* in which legislators' articulations on the issue of democracy were recorded and from the three main Taiwan newspapers reporting on democracy-related issues, which serve as a good index of changes in the outer environment. The advantage of such a data collection design is that it provides a systematic and symbolic representation of how the Legislative Yuan and the media have been concerned about the issue of democracy in various time frames. Although inevitably constrained in terms of whether media reports can precisely capture actual changes in the environment, especially under the hard authoritarian regime of the KMT, this paper has carefully chosen the three newspapers—*Zhongguo shibao*, *Lianhe bao*, and *Zili wanbao*. Indeed, these papers more or less reflect local opinion and the voice of the elite community, even though they might not reveal the whole truth a hundred percent of the time. They have already systematically demonstrated their usefulness and could hardly be replaced by any other index.

Secondly, since this paper only examines the case of Taiwan, one may wonder whether this theoretical framework can be applied to cases other than Taiwan's Legislative Yuan. Indeed, Taiwan's democratization experience may be unique in certain ways (for example, Taiwan's experience has been quite peaceful), but Taiwan's experience seems not to have been so extraordinary as to be very different from most newly democratized countries. However, if the theory is to be further generalized, it will be necessary to test Taiwan's experience against more cases in future research.

Finally, through the above analysis, this paper has clarified the interesting relationship between the evolving role of the legislature and democratization in the system, thereby offering two observations for further reference. The first one is that once a legislature has been established, regardless of how oppressive the regime is at that current stage, it will have opportunities to "grow!"; secondly, individual legislators, especially in an authoritarian regime, can "roar" for democracy if they are given a chance, for all efforts devoted to the cause will have some impact and will not be in vain.

Appendix 1**The Proportions for Legislators' Party and Supplementary Backgrounds**

	Total registered	KMT		DPP		Others		Supplementary	
1969	445	442	99.33%	—		3	0.67%	11	2.47%
1972	461	451	97.83%	—		10	2.17%	51	11.06%
1975	417	407	97.60%	—		10	2.40%	52	12.47%
1980*	406	388	95.57%	6	1.48%	12	2.96%	97	23.89%
1983	366	351	95.90%	6	1.64%	9	2.46%	98	26.78%
1986	323	302	93.50%	12	3.72%	9	2.79%	100	30.96%
1989	225	189	84.00%	21	9.33%	15	6.67%	130	57.78%

*A regular legislative election was scheduled for the end of 1978. However, after the United States shifted its formal diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC on December 16 that year, President Chiang Ching-kuo postponed the election indefinitely. The election eventually took place in 1980.

Sources: Tsai Yu-lun, "The Role Played by Political Elites, Electoral Mechanism, and Mass Media in the Process of Taiwan's Democratization" (M.A. thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan, 2002), 61; Ta-chi Liao, "The Influence of Culture on Information Gathering in Organizations: An Authoritarian Paradigm" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1990), 244; and sources cited in tables 1, 3, 4, and 5.

Appendix 2**Crucial Democracy Issues Raised by Legislators, 1950-72**

Year	Name	Party	Main category*	Main theme
1 1954	Chao Hui-mo (趙惠謨)	KMT	F	Why was there so little constructive criticism from society? The government should be humble about looking for reasons.
2 1954	Yang Yi-feng (楊一峰)	KMT	E	To enact a law to offer opportunities for manual workers and farmers to participate in public affairs.
3 1954	Tuan Yung-ching (段永慶)	KMT	H	It was wrong that many children stayed with their parents in detention houses.
4 1954	Chiu Han-ping (丘漢平)	KMT	H	Civilians should not be sent to the military court.
5 1954	Wen Chun (文群)	KMT	F	Politics is not healthy if freedom of speech is not guaranteed.

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Year	Name	Party	Main category*	Main theme
6	1954 Wu Shih-peng (武誓彭)	KMT	E	To enact a law for realizing local self-government at the provincial level.
7	1954 Teng Hsiang-yu (鄧翔宇)	KMT	F	Do we really have freedom of speech?
8	1954 Wen Chun (文群)	KMT	F	That a country needs to have opposition parties to be called a democracy.
9	1954 Li Kung-chuan (李公權)	X	R	Continuing to do our duty is equal to prolonging our terms. We should consider how to supplement previous back-up legislators.
10	1954 Ho Ching-liao (何景察)	KMT	E	When can we directly elect the provincial governor?
11	1954 Wu Yen-huan (吳延環)	KMT	H	Military courts often make mistakes that must be rectified.
12	1954 Liu Hsi-wu (劉錫五)	KMT	N	There should be laws governing the organs of the Ministry of National Defense.
13	1954 Yang Yi-feng (楊一峰)	KMT	E	The people should have the four rights of election, referendum, initiative, and recall.
14	1954 Wei Pei-lan (魏佩蘭)	KMT	H	The police should be careful about using their public power so as to avoid violating the personal freedom of people.
15	1954 Liang Su-jung (梁肅戎)	KMT	H	If a case should not be sent to a military court, it should not be investigated by it, either.
16	1954 Li Kung-chuan (李公權)	X	N	The party should separate itself from the military.
17	1954 Li Kung-chuan (李公權)	X	F	Opposition parties should not accept special grants from the government.
18	1954 Hsia Tao-sheng (夏濤聲)	KMT	F	New parties should not be banned in a democracy.
19	1954 Yang Pao-lin (楊寶琳)	KMT	F	The publication law should be openly scrutinized, since it involves freedom of speech.



Appendix 2 (Continued)

Year	Name	Party	Main category*	Main theme
20	1958 Peng Shan-cheng (彭善承)	KMT	F	Why has the government set up examination constraints for self-sponsored students who want to study abroad?
21	1960 Fei Hsi-ping (費希平)	X	F	I hope the government respects freedom of speech.
22	1960 Chou Shu-sheng (周樹聲)	KMT	H	Arrest of criminals should be limited to criminals themselves, and should not include their relatives.
23	1960 Fei Hsi-ping (費希平)	X	H	Lei Chen (雷震) is not a soldier, and there is not enough evidence against him to send him to a military court. Whether this is against the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty.
24	1960 Liang Su-jung (梁肅戎)	KMT	H	Whether Lei Chen should be sent to the military court.
25	1960 Tung Wei (董微)	X	H	Similar to above.
26	1964 Li Kung-chuan (李公權)	X	E	How to supplement new legislators.
27	1966 Li Kung-chuan (李公權)	X	F	Lifting the ban on publishing new newspapers.
28	1966 Tsao Chun (曹俊)	KMT	H	To enact a compensation law for those wrongfully imprisoned.
29	1966 She Ling-yun (佘凌雲)	KMT	H	Same as above.
30	1966 Liang Su-jung (梁肅戎)	KMT	H	To prohibit wrongful detentions.
31	1966 Wu Wang-chi (吳望俶)	KMT	E	To elect representatives from various occupational groups so as to enhance the legitimacy of the Legislative Yuan.
32	1966 Tung Wei (董微)	X	F	To allow privately-owned radio stations.
33	1968 Teng Hsiang-yu (鄧翔宇)	KMT	H	To protect human rights.

Appendix 2 (Continued)

Year	Name	Party	Main category*	Main theme
34 1968	Liu Hsi-wu (劉錫五)	KMT	N	To enact laws governing the organs of the National Defense Ministry.
35 1968	Mo Hsuan-yen (莫萱元)	KMT	H	To offer compensation to those wrongfully imprisoned.
36 1968	Mo Hsuan-yen (莫萱元)	KMT	F	To enact laws allowing people to organize associations or parties.
37 1968	Mo Hsuan-yen (莫萱元)	KMT	E	The leader of each district in Taipei city should be directly elected by the people in each district.
38 1970	Chao Chia-chuo (趙家焯)	KMT	F	People should have freedom of religion and freedom of association.
39 1970	Chao Chia-chuo (趙家焯)	KMT	H	People should have freedom of speech.
40 1970	Yang Ta-chien (楊大乾)	KMT	E	To enact laws for realizing provincial and county self-governance.
41 1970	Yang Pao-lin (楊寶琳)	KMT	E	To realize local self-governance.
42 1970	Huang Hsin-chieh (黃信介)	X	H	The measures for arresting gangsters during the period of martial law violate human rights; therefore they are against the constitution and the law.
43 1971	Hsu Chung-chi (徐中齊)	KMT	F	People should have freedom of publication.
44 1972	Ho Ching-liao (何景察)	KMT	E	To enact laws for realizing local self-governance.
45 1972	Ho Ching-liao (何景察)	KMT	M	Whether we should lift martial law.
46 1972	Wang Meng-yun (王夢雲)	X	H	Getting a confession by torture should be prohibited.
47 1972	Hu Tun-yu (胡鈍俞)	KMT	F	To lift the ban on publishing new newspapers.
48 1972	Teng Hsiang-yu (鄧翔宇)	KMT	R	We should gradually add new central government representatives.



Appendix 2 (Continued)

Year	Name	Party	Main category*	Main theme
49	1972 Huang Tong (黃通)	KMT	R	Similar to above.
50	1972 Li Wen-chi (李又齊)	KMT	F	People should have freedom of speech.
51	1972 Liu Chen-tong (劉振東)	KMT	F	The mass media should not be controlled by the government.
52	1972 Liang Hsu Chun-chu (梁許春菊)	KMT	R	Central government representatives should run for office in new elections.
53	1972 Hsu Chung-chi (徐中齊)	KMT	F	Freedom of speech should be guaranteed.
54	1972 Wu Chun-ching (吳春晴)	KMT	R	The central government representatives should be supplemented.
55	1972 Fei Hsi-ping (費希平)	X	F	We should have the freedom to organize parties.
56	1972 Fei Hsi-ping (費希平)	X	M	Martial law should be lifted.
57	1972 Fei Hsi-ping (費希平)	X	F	Freedom of speech should be guaranteed.
58	1972 Fei Yu-ming (費玉明)	KMT	E	There should not be an age limit of 61 for candidates in elections.

***H**: human rights; **R**: retirement of central government representatives; **M**: the lifting of martial law; **F**: freedom of speech, association, etc.; **N**: neutrality of the military or administration; **E**: broadening of political participation; and **O**: other issues related to democratic reform.

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