Empowerment Theory and Ethnic Politics in Taiwan*

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Ethnicity has been a critical issue in Taiwan's political life, especially in its relation to the ethnic differences between the "majority" Taiwanese and the "minority" mainlanders. In contrast to previous research on ethnic politics in Taiwan, this study uses 2002 national sample survey data and examines the impact of political empowerment on the political trust and efficacy of mainlanders. The findings reveal that empowerment, as indicated by control of the local executive's office, has a considerable influence on mainlanders' political attitudes, and this confirms the hypothesis that in the high-mainlander-empowerment regions, the differences in political trust and efficacy between mainlanders and Taiwanese are relatively small. In the low-mainlander-empowerment regions, these differences between

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mainlanders and Taiwanese are markedly higher, and the political trust and efficacy of mainlanders significantly lower. This work concludes that political empowerment could be a field worthy of continued research in Taiwan's politics.

KEYWORDS: empowerment theory; ethnic politics; political attitude; political trust; political efficacy.

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We are not enemies, but friends. We must not be enemies. Though passion may have strained it must not break our bonds of affection. The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battlefield and patriot grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet swell the chorus of the Union, when again touched, as surely they will be, by the better angels of our nature.

—Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, 1861

In general, minority ethnic (or racial) groups maintain a relatively apathetic disposition toward politics. The logic is simple: in contrast to the majority, and regardless of how actively they participate, due to the constraints imposed on them by their share of the total population, the influence that they exercise over the political outcome is relatively limited, with the result that they are hardly able to play any significant role at all. When the concerns and opinions of minorities are neglected over a long period of time, this results in a sense of alienation, and minorities become more politically inactive. In a political system, alienated minorities have a negative influence on the stability of that system, which may result in the legitimacy of the power base being challenged.[1] When the political trust and efficacy of minorities are relatively high, legitimacy is increasingly secure, and thus the participation of minor-

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[1] Michael Corbett, *American Public Opinion: Trends, Processes, and Patterns* (New York: Longman, 1991); David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979); Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America* (New York: Longman, 2003); David C. Schwartz, *Political Alienation and Political Behavior* (Chicago: Aldine, 1973); and William F. Stone and Paul E. Schaffner, *The Psychology of Politics*, 2nd edition (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988).

ity groups in the political process can be viewed as a norm that supports a democratic regime.

This study is aimed primarily at the political attitudes of the so-called "mainlanders" (外省人) in Taiwan. For many years, ethnicity has been a sensitive issue in Taiwan's politics, particularly in relation to "majority" Taiwanese and "minority" mainlanders. In view of Taiwan's historical background and sociopolitical environment, ethnicity and its related issues (e.g., ethnic consciousness, national identity, and disputes over unification with or independence from the mainland) may all be regarded as social cleavages.[2] In the political process, these cleavages frequently become hotly contested, even becoming the means by which political parties or candidates mobilize the electorate.

The central question here is about Taiwanese-mainlander differences in sociopolitical participation. In this study we employ the empowerment theory developed by Bobo and Gilliam in their work on racial issues in the United States, and analyze the influence that political empowerment has brought to bear on the sociopolitical behavior of main-

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[2]Taiwan's ethnic tensions may be traced back to the February 28th Incident of 1947, which not only resulted in the deaths of a large number of the Taiwanese elite, but also caused the loss of receptivity and mutual trust between the two ethnic groups. In addition, the unequal distribution of political power heightened the ethnic discord. One analysis of the ethnic distribution of political posts between 1969 and 1988 noted that the "Taiwanese fare better in low-level positions and local government administration, whereas mainlanders control the national levels of power in both the KMT [Kuomintang, 國民黨] and the government." See Hung-mao Tien, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1989), 37-38. Since the mid-1970s, when Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) began to recruit more Taiwanese into the ruling circle, the political ecology has changed. Chiang's efforts initiated a process of Taiwanization, whereby political power was increasingly shared by mainlanders and Taiwanese. Beginning in the late 1980s, with the lifting of martial law and the end of the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion (動員戡亂時期), members of the national parliamentary bodies have been subject to direct popular election. The most important development was the first popular presidential election that took place in 1996. At present, all representative bodies and major executive officials—except the premier who is appointed by the president—are subject to popular election. Once the Taiwanese had significant political power, particularly after the election of a Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) president in 2000, the mainlanders became a minority group politically. See Cal Clark, *Taiwan's Development: Implications for Contending Political Economy Paradigms* (New York: Greenwood, 1989); and Shao-chuan Leng, ed., *Chiang Ching-kuo's Leadership in the Development of the Republic of China on Taiwan* (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1993).

landers.[3]   Put simply, when the mainlander elite are in power and hold office as city mayors or county magistrates, the question asked concerns the extent of their influence on the political attitudes of mainlanders. With this end in mind, this research explores three interrelated issues. It first addresses the theoretical idea of empowerment and the way in which it is measured. Second, it briefly reviews the ethnic issue in Taiwan and then clarifies the research insights in more detail. Third, it uses data from a national survey to examine the effects of empowerment on ethnic differences in political trust and efficacy. In conclusion, this study examines the implications of these results for interpretations of ethnic differences in Taiwan's politics.

The Context for Empowerment Studies

In the United States, blacks generally are less active in politics than whites. With regard to racial differences in political participation, some attempts have been made to discuss the following issue: Under what circumstances will blacks increase the extent of their political participation, and thereby reduce the disparity between themselves and whites? Researchers have offered various explanations for the influence of race on political behavior. For one, some scholars have attributed black apathy to blacks' socio-demographic characteristics; empirical findings have shown that they generally have less education, less information, face worse economic conditions, and are of a lower social class than whites.[4]

The psychological approach is another important factor explaining the differences in political participation on the basis of race. Two theories emerge, namely, the compensatory theory and the racial community theory.

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[3] See Lawrence Bobo and Franklin D. Gilliam, Jr., "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment," *American Political Science Review* 84, no. 2 (June 1990): 377-93.

[4] Ken Auletta, *The Underclass* (New York: Random House, 1983); Lester Milbrath and M.L. Goel, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977); and Katherine Tate, "Black Political Participation in the 1984 and 1988 Presidential Elections," *American Political Science Review* 85, no. 4 (December 1991): 1159-76.

According to the compensatory theory, the participation of blacks in politics primarily lies in their making up for (or opposing) the feelings of inferiority forced upon them by mainstream white society.[5] From the perspective of racial community theory, members of minority groups tend to develop a strong group attachment and group consciousness. With the stimulus given by these sentiments, the members adopt collective actions to improve the stature of the group, which in turn leads to a high degree of political participation.[6]

Aside from the above socio-demographic and psychological factors, some scholars have addressed the influence of empowerment on the participation of racial minorities (covering such issues as the voter registration rate, community activities, the formulation of public policy, social welfare, the allocation of educational resources, and employment opportunities in both public and private sectors), and this issue is becoming a key focus of research on minority politics.[7]

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[5]Cedric Herring, James S. House, and Richard P. Mero, "Racially Based Changes in Political Alienation in America," *Social Science Quarterly* 72, no. 1 (March 1991): 123-34; Anthony M. Orum, "A Reappraisal of the Social and Political Participation of Negroes," *American Journal of Sociology* 72, no. 1 (July 1966): 32-46; and Richard D. Shingles, "Black Consciousness and Political Participation: The Missing Link," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 1 (March 1981): 76-91.

[6]Thomas M. Guterbock and Bruce London, "Race, Political Orientation, and Participation: An Empirical Test of Four Competing Theories," *American Sociological Review* 48, no. 4 (August 1983): 439-53; Arthur H. Miller, Patricia Gurin, Gerald Gurin, and Oksana Malanchuk, "Group Consciousness and Political Participation," *American Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 3 (August 1981): 494-511; and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., "American Voter Turnout in Comparative Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 1 (March 1986): 17-43.

[7]Timothy Bates and Darell L. Williams, "Racial Politics: Does It Pay?" *Social Science Quarterly* 74, no. 3 (September 1993): 507-22; Rufus P. Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb, *Protest Is Not Enough* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984); Frank D. Gilliam, Jr., "Exploring Minority Empowerment: Symbolic Politics, Governing Coalitions and Traces of Political Style in Los Angeles," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 1 (February 1996): 56-81; Stan Humphries, "Who's Afraid of the Big, Bad Firm: The Impact of Economic Scale on Political Participation," ibid. 45, no. 3 (August 2001): 678-99; Richard A. Keiser, "Explaining African-American Political Empowerment: Windy City Politics from 1900 to 1983," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 29, no. 1 (1993): 84-116; Thomas A. LaVeist, "The Political Empowerment and Health Status of African-Americans: Mapping a New Territory," *American Journal of Sociology* 97, no. 4 (January 1992): 1080-95; Jan E. Leighley and Arnold Vedlitz, "Race, Ethnicity, and Political Participation: Competing Models and Contrasting Explanations," *Journal of Politics* 61, no. 4 (November 1999): 1092-1114; Kenneth R. Mladenka, "The Distribution of an Urban Public Service:

According to Bobo and Gilliam, when blacks hold more positions of authority, and wield greater political power for longer periods of time, larger numbers of blacks will tend to actively participate in politics. In other words, the greater their level of political empowerment, the more politically involved blacks become. Bobo and Gilliam further reason that:

> [E]mpowerment influences black participation because it is a contextual cue of likely policy responsiveness to black concerns. If so, the empowerment effect on participation should work through those psychological factors that facilitate political involvement; that is, level of empowerment should influence participation because it increases attentiveness to politics among blacks as well as increasing their levels of political trust and efficacy.[8]

The level of political empowerment, according to Bobo and Gilliam, means the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision-making. The mayoral level is the dimension Bobo and Gilliam used to decide whether or not a certain area is characterized by high black empowerment. By employing data from the National Opinion Research Center's 1987 General Social Survey (GSS) and primary sampling units (PSUs) as survey units, Bobo and Gilliam defined a PSU in which the largest city has a black mayor as a high-black-empowerment area. A PSU in which blacks live without a black mayor or in which there are only black mayors in smaller cities is regarded as a low-black-empowerment area. As hypothesized, the results show that blacks in high-black-empowerment areas are more active than either blacks living in low-empowerment areas or their white counterparts of com-

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The Changing Role of Race and Politics," *Urban Affairs Quarterly* 24, no. 4 (1989): 556-83; Kenneth R. Mladenka, "Public Employee Unions, Reformism, and Black Employment in 1,200 American Cities," ibid. 26, no. 4 (1991): 532-48; Huey Perry, "The Evolution and Impact of Biracial Coalitions and Black Mayors in Birmingham and New Orleans," in *Racial Politics in American Cities*, ed. Rufus Browning, Dale Rogers Marshall, and David H. Tabb (New York: Longman, 1990), 140-52; Richard J. Timpone, "Mass Mobilization or Government Intervention? The Growth of Black Registration in the South," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (May 1995): 425-42; Chung-li Wu, "Is Winning Local Office Comparable to Getting a Magic Lamp? Examining the Impact of Political Empowerment on the Employment Opportunities of African-Americans," *Southeastern Political Review* 27, no. 2 (1999): 341-61; and Chung-li Wu, "Psycho-Political Correlates of Political Efficacy: The Case of the 1994 New Orleans Mayoral Election," *Journal of Black Studies* 33, no. 6 (July 2003): 729-60.

[8]Bobo and Gilliam, "Race, Sociopolitical Participation, and Black Empowerment," 382.

parable socioeconomic status. In addition, the findings demonstrate that empowerment influences black participation by contributing to a more trusting and efficacious orientation to politics and by greatly increasing black attentiveness to political affairs.

Having described how empowerment theory has developed in the context of political science in the United States, we shall now go back to the issue of ethnicity in Taiwan, and see what we can learn from empowerment theory in that context.

Ethnicity and Empowerment in Taiwan

The population of Taiwan is composed of four ethnic groups. The largest group, approximately 70 percent of the population, consists of native-born Taiwanese, who usually speak the Fujian (福建) dialect of Chinese (customarily referred to as Minnan [閩南] dialect since 1949). Most of their ancestors migrated across the Taiwan Strait from Fujian Province before 1895. The second group, about 15 percent of the population, is the Hakka (客家人), whose ancestors mostly migrated from Guangdong Province (廣東省) before the late 1940s. They speak the Hakka dialect. These two ethnic groups, nearly 85 percent of the population, are regarded as Taiwanese. The third group, about 12.4 percent of the population, consists of mainlanders, who came to Taiwan after 1945, especially between 1948 and 1950 after the Chinese civil war. All three groups are of Chinese descent. The aborigines, the fourth group, are descendants of the earliest inhabitants of the island and live mostly in the mountainous regions. They are racially non-Chinese and number only about 351,000, or 1.66 percent of the total population. The status of the aborigines is comparable to that of the Native American Indians in the United States. They are marginalized in contemporary society and are virtually without influence in politics.[9]

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[9]Nowadays it is hard to get precise figures on Taiwan's ethnic composition, as since 1992 the

Just as the core issue in the United States is racial politics, the issue of ethnicity in Taiwan has long been a major factor in the political system, and it is also an important variable determining voters' political attitudes as well as voting behavior. The reason for this is that the ethnic issue is characterized as being an "easy issue."[10] The general public does not need to incur high costs to obtain information about it, nor do they rely on a profound knowledge of politics; all they need is basic information to judge the issues. Since ethnic identity includes a high degree of sentiment, it is easily used as a tool for political mobilization. The pan-Green (泛綠; i.e., DPP and Taiwan Solidarity Union [TSU, 台灣團結聯盟]) have gained disproportionate support among Taiwanese, while the pan-Blue (泛藍; i.e., KMT, People First Party [PFP, 親民黨], and New Party [NP, 新黨]) have established highly homogeneous mainlander bases, revealing the staying power of ethnicity, a factor which will become even more critical in the future.

Probably because of its importance, ethnicity has become a major field of research in the humanities and social sciences in Taiwan. A detailed analysis of the existing literature reveals that a number of studies approach the subject from the anthropological and sociological perspectives, examining the similarities and differences in each ethnic group's culture, customs, traditions, social patterns, and lifestyles.[11] From the standpoint of

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Ministry of the Interior (內政部) has not asked respondents' ethnicity in the census. Due to a lack of official data, there are discrepancies in the existing literature. Concerning the population sizes of the four ethnic groups, see Peter R. Moody, Jr., *Political Change on Taiwan* (New York: Praeger, 1992), 37; Tien, *The Great Transition*, 35-36; Alan M. Wachman, *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), 16-17; and Government Information Office, *Taiwan Yearbook 2004* (Taipei: Government Information Office, 2004), 22-23.

[10]Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1989), 11.

[11]For example, Mau-kuei Michael Chang, "Toward an Understanding of *Sheng-chi Wen-ti* in Taiwan, Focusing on Changes after Political Liberalization," in *Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives*, ed. Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, and Huang Shu-min (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), 93-150; Chen Mau-tai, "Ethnic Labels and Political Participation of Taiwan's Aborigines," in *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong* (Ethnic relations and national identity), ed. Mau-kuei Michael Chang (Taipei: Yeqiang, 1993), 161-86; Leo Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001);

political science, other researchers discuss how the mobilization of ethnic groups takes place, as well as the influence that this has on political participation.[12] As regards the political participation of ethnic groups, some scholars argue that the reason why certain minorities, especially the Hakka and aborigines, participate little in political activities is by and large due to their socioeconomic status.[13]

Some researchers explain the differences in political participation between ethnic groups from the standpoint of cognitive psychology. Two theories have been advanced from this standpoint. First, it is noted that minority ethnic groups, due to the social pressure and unequal treatment they have received, must by means of self-assertion and self-encouragement actively mobilize their people to participate in political affairs, in order to counter feelings of rejection and inferiority in relation to mainstream society.[14] Second, other studies emphasize the importance of ethnic culture and "we-group consciousness," and how ethnic identity is gradually formed. This results in a high degree of political participation, thereby en-

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Hsiau A-chin, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2000); and Wu Mi-cha and Hsu Hsueh-chi, "The Han People's Country Consciousness and Ethnic Identity," in *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia* (Building Taiwan's nation-state), ed. Liu Hua-chen and Chang Jun-mei (Taipei: Qianwei, 1993), 60-74.

[12]Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 1997); Wang Fu-chang, "Ethnic Assimilation and Mobilization: An Analysis of Party Support in Taiwan," *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan minzuxue yajiusuo jikan* (Bulletin of the Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica) 77 (Spring 1994): 1-34; Wang Fu-chang, "Ethnic Consciousness, Nationalism, and Party Support: Taiwan's Ethnic Politics in the 1990s," *Taiwan shehuixue yanjiu* (Studies on Taiwan's Sociology) 2 (July 1998): 1-45; Wu Naiteh, "Ethnic Consciousness, Political Support, and National Identity: A Pilot Study on Taiwan's Ethnic Political Theory," in Chang, *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong*, 27-51; and Wu Naiteh, "Liberalism, Ethnic Identity, and Taiwanese Nationalism," *Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan* (Taiwanese Political Science Review) 1 (July 1996): 5-39.

[13]Chen, "Ethnic Labels and Political Participation of Taiwan's Aborigines," 172-73; Lin Chung-cheng and Lin Ho-ling, "The Economic Differences of Taiwan's Ethnic Groups," in Chang, *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong*, 152; and Fu Hu, *Zhengzhixue de kexue tanjiu. III: Zhengzhi canyu yu xuanju xingwei* (Scientific explorations of political science, vol. 3: Political participation and electoral behavior) (Taipei: Sanmin, 1998), 87.

[14]Fan Zhen-qian, *Cunzai caiyou xiwamg: Taiwan zuqun shengtai Kejia pian* (Hopes with existence: The ethnic ecology of the Hakka) (Taipei: Qianwei, 2002), 4-5, 42; and Wang Fu-chang, "Ethnic Mobilization of the Opposition Movement in the 1980s," in Liu and Chang, *Jianli Taiwan de guomin guojia*, 97-102.

hancing the group's sociopolitical status.[15]

To sum up, these contributions to the literature on Taiwan's ethnic politics are rather similar to the research conducted by American political scientists on the socio-demographic and psychological factors (compensatory theory and racial community theory) in minority politics. In this study, we adopt a research framework that differs from those employed in the past, in which we refer to empowerment theory, with mainlanders as the focus of the research, and discuss the extent of the influence of empowerment on sociopolitical participation.

Taiwanese have gradually gained more political power, including key policymaking positions in the central and local governments. According to the logic of empowerment theory, in those areas where the mainlander elite have so far been unable to obtain important political positions, all other factors being equal, the political trust and efficacy of mainlanders should be lower. However, in areas where the mainlander elite have obtained governmental positions, its performance and effectiveness should enable it to find favor with mainlanders, thus raising their levels of political trust and efficacy. Political trust is typically conceptualized as an indicator of the basic ethical qualities of public officials, the efficiency of government, and the correctness of its policies, while a sense of political efficacy appears to be a primary orientation and an important theoretical component in studies of individual attitude sets and belief systems.[16]

We therefore hypothesize that, in those counties and cities where mainlanders are in office, the degree of political trust and efficacy among mainlanders should be relatively high, and not so greatly different from that of Taiwanese. Conversely, in those counties and cities in which the

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[15]Mau-kuei Michael Chang, "Ethnic Problem and Nationalism," in Chang, *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong*, 235-36; and Hu, *Zhengzhi canyu yu xuanju xingwei*, 289-90.

[16]For the theoretical implications of political trust and efficacy, see Rosenstone and Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*, 2, 15, 147-50; Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston, Ill.: Row, Peterson, 1954), 187; M. Margaret Conway, *Political Participation in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1991), 37-38, 51-52, 57-58; and Marc J. Hetherington, "The Political Relevance of Political Trust," *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 4 (December 1998): 791-808.

mainlander elite are not in power, the political trust and efficacy of mainlanders should be relatively low, and the difference from that of Taiwanese should be markedly greater.

Preliminary Analysis

The data for this study come from "Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study, 2001."[17]   This is a nationally representative multi-stage probability sample of adults living in the twenty-one counties and cities of Taiwan as well as the two municipalities of Taipei (台北市) and Kaohsiung (高雄市). It does not include Jinmen County (金門縣) or Lianjiang County (連江縣; Mazu 馬祖), both of which are part of Fujian Province.[18]   The face-to-face interviews were completed in mid-April 2002. Of the 2,022 eligible voters interviewed, 1,536 were Minnan, 225 Hakka, 202 mainlanders, 38 aborigines, and 21 others (aborigines and others being excluded from all analyses). Details of the relevant questions and the scale scores for the measures are presented in the appendix.

The research hypothesis is that, when the mainlander elite is in power in a city or county, the degree of political trust and sense of political efficacy of mainlanders in that city or county should be relatively high, and vice versa. The impact of empowerment should also change the nature of Taiwanese-mainlander differences in levels of trust and efficacy. We divide the twenty-three cities and counties into the three "high-mainlander-

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[17]The data were weighted by the factors of gender, age, education level, and area (based on the level of socioeconomic development). The aggregative indexes of gender, age, and socioeconomic development are based on the official documents released by the Ministry of the Interior. In addition, since the level of education in the official documents might be underestimated, the index of education comes from the adjusted estimates of Professor Yung-tai Hung (洪永泰) of the Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University. See Chi Huang, *2001 nian Taiwan xuanju yu minzhuhua diaocha yanjiu jihua* (Taiwan's election and democratization study, 2001) (Final Report of National Science Council Research Project NSC 90-2414-H-194-028-SSS, 2002).

[18]In 1992, the government announced the end of martial law and military rule in Jinmen and Lianjiang counties. They elected their county magistrates for the first time in 1993. Even though the TEDS 2001 does not take these two counties into consideration, we believe that the data are complete and representative of Taiwan as a whole.

empowerment areas" that are run by mainlanders: Taipei City by Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (台北市長馬英九), Taoyuan County by Magistrate Chu Li-lun (桃園縣長朱立倫), and Taichung City by Mayor Jason Hu (台中市長胡志強);[19] and the twenty "low-mainlander-empowerment areas" that are led by Taiwanese, including Minnan and Hakka. Based on differences in provincial affiliation, respondents are merely divided into "Taiwanese" and "mainlanders."[20] In addition, this paper examines the joint effect variables of empowerment and a respondent's ethnicity, and accordingly distinguishes between "mainlanders in high-mainlander-empowerment areas," "mainlanders in low-mainlander-empowerment areas," "Taiwanese in high-mainlander-empowerment areas," and "Taiwanese in low-mainlander-empowerment areas."

In terms of the dependent variables, political trust is composed of four items, and political efficacy is composed of three. A person's score on the political trust and efficacy index is the sum of his or her scores on each of the items. The trust index therefore ranges from 4 to 8. The larger the score, the higher the level of political trust; after recoding, 4 is referred to as "low," 5 or 6 as "medium trust," and 7 or 8 as "high." As for political efficacy, the three items are combined, with their scores ranging from 3 to 6. The higher the score, the higher the sense of efficacy; after recoding, 3 is referred to as "low," 4 as "medium," and 5 or 6 as "high."

As shown in table 1, in terms of the overall distribution of political trust among respondents based on their provincial affiliation, significant differences are, by means of a chi-square test, found to exist between mainlanders and Taiwanese. Just as expected, the political trust of mainlanders is relatively low, with there being only 6.0 percent in the "high," 32.7 per-

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[19]Note that this study is concerned with the mayor's or magistrate's ethnicity, and not with his or her party affiliation. Of the twenty-three counties/cities in the study, the KMT holds ten, of which seven are Taiwanese and three mainlanders. Ma Ying-jeou originates from Hunan Province (湖南省), Chu Li-lun from Zhejiang Province (浙江省), and Jason Hu from Jilin Province (吉林省).

[20]The reason for not making a distinction between Minnan and Hakka is that the empirical results would not be significantly different even if we distinguished them. Since the research focus is on the Taiwanese-mainlander differences in sociopolitical participation, the Minnan and Hakka peoples are combined and referred to as "Taiwanese."

Table 1
Political Trust by Ethnicity

	Political Trust			
	High	**Medium**	**Low**	**Total**
Taiwanese	131	535	490	1,156
	(11.3%)	(46.4%)	(42.4%)	(100.0%)
Mainlanders	9	49	92	150
	(6.0%)	(32.7%)	(61.3%)	(100.0%)
Total	140	584	582	1,306
	(10.7%)	(44.7%)	(44.6%)	(100.0%)

Note: Pearson chi-square = 19.719; $p < .001$; D.F. = 2.

cent in the "medium," and 61.3 percent in the "low" categories. In contrast, the political trust of Taiwanese is relatively high, with the percentages for the "high", "medium," and "low" categories being 11.3 percent, 46.4 percent, and 42.4 percent, respectively. We further analyze the empowerment variable, in order to understand whether the fact of the mainlander elite being in power is able to enhance the political trust of mainlanders. The results reported in table 2 somewhat support this hypothesis. When compared with the figures in table 1, although the "high" share in relation to "high-mainlander-empowerment areas" has not increased, the "medium" has slightly increased, while the "low" has somewhat decreased.

We take the same steps to engage in cross-tabulation analysis in relation to political efficacy. As shown in table 3, although the political efficacy of mainlanders is relatively low, it is not significantly different from that of Taiwanese. However, after the empowerment factor has been included, the levels of political efficacy of the two ethnic groups appear to be different (see table 4). In addition, as hypothesized, in different empowerment areas the differences in relation to mainlanders are significant. Fifty percent of "mainlanders in high-mainlander-empowerment areas" are characterized by a "high" sense of political efficacy, 29.6 percent by a "medium" sense, and 20.4 percent by a "low" sense. By contrast, for "mainlanders in low-mainlander-empowerment areas," the corresponding percentages are 41.1 percent, 33.0 percent, and 25.9 percent.

Table 2
Political Trust by Ethnicity and Mainlander Empowerment

	Political Trust			
	High	**Medium**	**Low**	**Total**
Taiwanese in low-empowerment areas	100 (10.6%)	450 (47.6%)	396 (41.9%)	946 (100.0%)
Taiwanese in high-empowerment areas	31 (14.8%)	85 (40.5%)	94 (44.8%)	210 (100.0%)
Mainlanders in low-empowerment areas	6 (6.1%)	30 (30.6%)	62 (63.3%)	98 (100.0%)
Mainlanders in high-empowerment areas	3 (5.9%)	18 (35.3%)	30 (58.8%)	51 (100.0%)
Total	140 (10.7%)	583 (44.7%)	582 (44.6%)	1,305 (100.0%)

Note: Pearson chi-square = 25.768; $p < .001$; D.F. = 6.

Table 3
Political Efficacy by Ethnicity

	Political Efficacy			
	High	**Medium**	**Low**	**Total**
Taiwanese	703 (53.4%)	332 (25.2%)	282 (21.4%)	1,317 (100.0%)
Mainlanders	73 (44.0%)	53 (31.9%)	40 (24.1%)	166 (100.0%)
Total	776 (52.3%)	385 (26.0%)	322 (21.7%)	1,483 (100.0%)

Note: Pearson chi-square = 5.544; $p = .063$; D.F. = 2.

The above analysis confirms the research hypothesis, at least initially. In cities or counties in which the local executives are mainlanders, the mainlanders' feelings of political trust and efficacy are relatively high. Conversely, in areas in which the local executive is a Taiwanese, their levels of trust and efficacy are relatively low. The data yield some interesting findings, but the relationship may be spurious when other control

Table 4
Political Efficacy by Ethnicity and Mainlander Empowerment

	Political Efficacy			
	High	**Medium**	**Low**	**Total**
Taiwanese in low-empowerment areas	555 (51.4%)	280 (25.9%)	245 (22.7%)	1,080 (100.0%)
Taiwanese in high-empowerment areas	149 (62.6%)	52 (21.8%)	37 (15.5%)	238 (100.0%)
Mainlanders in low-empowerment areas	46 (41.1%)	37 (33.0%)	29 (25.9%)	112 (100.0%)
Mainlanders in high-empowerment areas	27 (50.0%)	16 (29.6%)	11 (20.4%)	54 (100.0%)
Total	777 (52.4%)	385 (25.9%)	322 (21.7%)	1,484 (100.0%)

Note: Pearson chi-square = 17.330; p = .008; D.F. = 6.

variables are considered. One way of solving this problem is to use multi-variate analyses.

Elements of the Model

Beyond the variables of ethnicity and empowerment, the literature on political attitudes leads us to hypothesize that levels of political trust and efficacy are a complex function of various other factors. In relation to this, some determinants are considered, including gender, age, education, political knowledge, party identification, ethnic consciousness, unification/ independence preference, and sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations. The reason for using socio-demographic characteristics as explanatory variables is the presumption that an individual's social background is central to the development of their political attitudes, including their sense of political trust and efficacy.

Previous research has evaluated the connection between gender and political attitudes. Much empirical evidence has shown that men are more

inclined to participate in political activities than women.[21] Milbrath and Goel's explanation for the gender difference relates directly to political efficacy: "What distinguishes male political participation rates from female political participation rates is the male's sense of political efficacy; men are more likely than women to feel that they are qualified to deal with the complexities of politics."[22]

Age has also been regarded as a predictive variable of sociopolitical participation. It has been found that political participation increases steadily with age, and reaches a peak when an individual is in their late fifties and early sixties. Participation among the oldest age group declines primarily because these people are in poorer health and less mobile physically.[23]

Education is another important variable that is likely to correlate with political participation. There is considerable evidence that people with higher levels of education are more likely to participate in politics than those with less education.[24] Several reasons have been given to explain the relationship between educational attainment and political participation. One is that an individual with a higher level of education is more likely to have a higher income, to enjoy higher social status, to interact with others in social and political groups, to possess more information about government and politics, and, therefore, to be more likely to participate in politics.

In addition to examining the effects of background characteristics, cognitive variables are also considered in the model. Previous studies have

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[21]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civil Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 177-78; Stone and Schaffner, *The Psychology of Politics*, 209-12; and Rosenstone and Hansen, *Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America*, 77-78.

[22]Milbrath and Goel, *Political Participation*, 117.

[23]Conway, *Political Participation in the United States*, 19-24; Milbrath and Goel, *Political Participation*, 114-16; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 485-87; and Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 187-89.

[24]Almond and Verba, *The Civil Culture*, 379-87; Conway, *Political Participation in the United States*, 25-29; and Lipset, *Political Man*, 187-89.

demonstrated that these factors could be more important than the objective factors noted above. Researchers have confirmed that a person's political knowledge is directly related to political participation. Participation is linked strongly with information about government and politics. The available empirical evidence on this point indicates that individuals who are better informed about what the government is doing tend to be more active politically.[25] Actually, there is an interaction between participation and information: i.e., as individual citizens have more political information, they participate more, thereby acquiring more experience and skills, and thus reciprocally increasing their political knowledge.

Party identification, in theory, is closely related to political involvement.[26] This refers to how closely a person identifies with one of the major political parties. It is a key part of an individual's belief system and is characterized by long-term stability. In terms of its overall effect, party identification greatly influences the stability of the political system. Since the DPP is the party in power at the central government level, we hypothesize that, compared to the independents, the political trust and efficacy of those who identify with the DPP is relatively high, whereas for those who identify with the KMT or PFP it is relatively low.[27]

In Taiwan's politics, the influence of ethnic consciousness on political behavior should not be neglected. Over the decades when Taiwan was under the control of a mainlander-dominated authoritarian regime, "Chinese consciousness" was apparently a mainstream value. However, as

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[25]Michael X. Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter, *What Americans Know about Politics and Why It Matters* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), 62-104; and Stone and Schaffner, *The Psychology of Politics*, 204-5.

[26]Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes, *The American Voter*, 142-45; Conway, *Political Participation in the United States*, 59-60; Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, *Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1995), 116-20; and Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, *The New American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 87-88, 95-97.

[27]Based on the existing party system in Taiwan, six categories should be distinguished, namely, the KMT, DPP, PFP, NP, TSU, and independents. However, according to the TEDS 2001, only seven respondents identified with the NP, and eighteen with the TSU, thereby seriously limiting the effective sample. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, only the KMT, DPP, PFP, and independents were selected.

democratization has progressed since the mid-1980s, "Taiwanese consciousness" has gradually risen to prominence. It is necessary to explain that although ethnicity and ethnic consciousness should have a close relationship, the former is an objective characteristic, while the latter is based on a subjective psychological sense of belonging.

Intimately connected with ethnic consciousness is unification/independence preference. Without a doubt, this critical issue is currently receiving the most attention in Taiwan's politics, and it is also an important variable in research on the political behavior of voters. The DPP is more inclined to favor Taiwan's independence from China. For this reason, we hypothesize that following the election of a DPP president, Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), in 2000, the political trust and efficacy of individuals that advocate Taiwan's independence would be relatively high, whereas that of advocates of cross-Strait unification would be relatively low.

Four economic variables—namely, retrospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations and prospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations—are under investigation. It is generally accepted that economic conditions could be important factors influencing political behavior.[28] In this domain, both retrospective voting[29] and prospective voting[30] are leading theories in regard to evaluating the economy at both the macro- and micro-level, as is the political participation of the general public. Accord-

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[28]Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting," *American Journal of Political Science* 23, no. 3 (August 1979): 495-527; Donald R. Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case," *British Journal of Political Science* 11, no. 2 (April 1981): 129-61; Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Richard Nadeau, "National Economic Voting in U.S. Presidential Elections," *Journal of Politics* 63, no. 1 (February 2001): 159-81; and George Rabinowitz and Stuart Elaine Mac-Donald, "A Directional Theory of Issue Voting," *American Political Science Review* 83, no. 1 (March 1989): 93-121.

[29]Morris P. Fiorina, *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), 3-19; and Morris P. Fiorina, "Explorations of a Political Theory of Party Identification," in *Controversies in Voting Behavior*, ed. Richard Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 406-26.

[30]Christopher H. Achen, "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables, and Linear Regression: Breaking the Iron Triangle in Voting Research," *Political Behavior* 14, no. 3 (September 1992): 195-211.

ing to retrospective voting, people's political attitudes are influenced by their evaluation of the government's performance, and they use their votes to convey their encouragement or disapproval to the incumbent. By contrast, prospective voting involves an attempt by the people to compare and evaluate politicians' future policy plans and promises, from which political attitudes and behavior are formed. In this regard, both macro- and micro-economic conditions are taken into account, and we hypothesize that, for those whose evaluations of economic situations are relatively favorable, their political trust and sense of political efficacy will be relatively high, and vice versa.

Discussion of Findings

In the analysis of the dependent variable of political trust and efficacy, a distinction is still made between "high," "medium," and "low," and "high" is employed as the reference group. With regard to the independent variables, while age and political knowledge[31] are continuous variables, the remaining variables are categorical or ordinal variables.[32] As for the statistical models that are applied, the dependent-variable attributes are considered and ordered logit analyses adopted, with Stata 7.0 being used to analyze the data. In equation 1, the empowerment and ethnicity variables are included. In equation 2, only the multiplicative terms of ethnicity and

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[31] A person's score in terms of the political knowledge index is the sum of his or her scores for each of the five items. The knowledge index therefore ranges from 0 to 5. The larger the score, the higher is the level of political knowledge.

[32] Concerning gender, "females" are used as the reference group. Education is subdivided into "primary school and below," "junior high school," "high or vocational school," and "some college and higher"; ethnicity into "mainlanders" and "Taiwanese"; empowerment into "high-mainlander-empowerment areas" and "low-mainlander-empowerment areas"; party identification into those who identify with the KMT, DPP, or PFP, and independents; ethnic consciousness into "Taiwanese consciousness," "Chinese consciousness," and "both"; and unification/independence preference into "China unification," "Taiwan independence," and "maintain the status quo." With respect to retrospective/prospective sociotropic and pocketbook evaluations, a distinction is made between "gotten better," "gotten worse," and "stayed about the same."

empowerment are considered, in order to facilitate the comparison.

The chi-square statistics of overall model fit in tables 5 and 6 show, at the very least, an encouraging initial step toward a persuasive and respectable explanation of political trust and efficacy, and most of them run in the expected directions.[33] Model 1 in table 5 indicates that age, ethnicity, party identification, microeconomic performance in retrospect, and prospective national economy are the significant factors associated with a person's political trust. In model 2, the joint effect of empowerment and ethnicity on political trust is significant, with the extent of the influence of the remaining variables being much the same. In terms of the sense of political efficacy, model 1 in table 6 indicates that variables such as gender, educational attainment, ethnicity, empowerment, party identification, ethnic consciousness, retrospective pocketbook evaluation, and prospective sociotropic situation emerge as statistically significant. In model 2, the joint effect variable has a significant influence, and the conditions regarding the other variables are by and large the same.

As the data show, the variable of age has a significant effect on the level of political trust. To be more precise, political trust increases with age. As expected, the results also reveal that mainlanders generally have a relatively low degree of trust in political actors and governmental institutions. This might imply that the coming to power in 2000 of the DPP, which is seen as the political party of the Taiwanese, has increased the "crisis consciousness" of mainlanders, leading them to lose confidence in both the government and its public officials.

In addition, the variables of party identification, retrospective pocketbook evaluations, and prospective national economy each have a signifi-

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[33]Note that by examining the correlation coefficients among the independent variables, the partial coefficients are not highly multicollinear. There are four partial coefficients over .30, including the correlation between age and education (-.626), the correlation between education and political knowledge (.467), the correlation between prospective national economy and prospective personal finances (.306), and the correlation between age and political knowledge (-.300). Due to limitations of space, it is hard to present the data analysis in detail. Those who are interested in the data may contact the authors who will be pleased to provide such information.

Table 5
Ordered Logit Regression Estimates for Political Trust

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
Cut 1	−.042	.332	−.048	.332
Cut 2	2.781	.351	2.778	.352
Gender (male)	.199	.131	.202	.131
Age	.014*	.006	.014**	.006
Education				
Primary school and below	−.037	.249	−.041	.249
Junior high school	.065	.233	.062	.233
High or vocational school	.040	.156	.041	.156
Ethnicity (mainlanders)	−.542*	.218	−	−
High-mainlander-empowerment areas	−.002	.159	−	−
Ethnicity × empowerment				
Taiwanese in high-empowerment areas	−	−	−.090	.172
Mainlanders in low-empowerment areas	−	−	−.747**	.271
Mainlanders in high-empowerment areas	−	−	−.290	.318
Political knowledge	−.094	.063	−.095	.063
Party identification				
Kuomintang	.139	.194	.136	.194
Democratic Progressive Party	.505**	.167	.502**	.167
People First Party	−.240	.200	−.245	.200
Ethnic consciousness				
Taiwanese consciousness	−.058	.149	−.054	.149
Chinese consciousness	.366	.231	.378	.231
Unification/independence preference				
China unification	−.171	.150	−.170	.150
Taiwan independence	.223	.186	.226	.186
Retrospective national economy				
gotten better	.193	.274	.186	.275
gotten worse	−.225	.155	−.227	.155
Retrospective personal finances				
gotten better	.377	.325	.383	.326
gotten worse	−.344*	.144	−.339*	.144
Prospective national economy				
get better	.753***	.161	.763***	.162
get worse	−.317[#]	.179	−.321[#]	.179
Prospective personal finances				
get better	.011	.184	.011	.184
get worse	−.213	.195	−.208	.195
Log likelihood	−890.494		−889.623	
χ² statistic of overall model fit	153.570***		155.310***	
N	1,028		1,028	

Note: [#]$p < .10$; *$p < .05$; **$p < .01$; ***$p < .001$.

Table 6
Ordered Logit Regression Estimates for Political Efficacy

	Model 1		Model 2	
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
Cut 1	−1.514	.315	−1.515	.315
Cut 2	−.249	.311	−.250	.311
Gender (male)	−.252*	.125	−.252*	.125
Age	.008	.005	.008	.005
Education				
Primary school and below	−.403[#]	.234	−.403[#]	.234
Junior high school	−.258	.212	−.259	.212
High or vocational school	−.070	.148	−.070	.149
Ethnicity (mainlanders)	−.463*	.191	−	−
High-mainlander-empowerment areas	.335*	.154	−	−
Ethnicity × empowerment				
Taiwanese in high-empowerment areas	−	−	.307[#]	.170
Mainlanders in low-empowerment areas	−	−	−.506*	.222
Mainlanders in high-empowerment areas	−	−	−.056	.304
Political knowledge	−.012	.059	−.011	.060
Party identification				
Kuomintang	.396*	.187	.394*	.187
Democratic Progressive Party	.390*	.159	.389*	.159
People First Party	−.041	.183	−.042	.183
Ethnic consciousness				
Taiwanese consciousness	.034	.143	.036	.143
Chinese consciousness	.397[#]	.218	.399[#]	.218
Unification/independence preference				
China unification	−.049	.141	−.048	.141
Taiwan independence	−.097	.178	−.098	.178
Retrospective national economy				
gotten better	.015	.274	.014	.274
gotten worse	−.186	.151	−.185	.151
Retrospective personal finances				
gotten better	.436	.335	.437	.335
gotten worse	−.423***	.135	−.422**	.135
Prospective national economy				
get better	.437***	.153	.438**	.153
get worse	−.269[#]	.164	−.270[#]	.164
Prospective personal finances				
get better	−.108	.172	−.106	.172
get worse	−.035	.177	−.034	.177
Log likelihood	−1,074.849		−1,074.777	
χ² statistic of overall model fit	92.610***		92.760***	
N	1,136		1,136	

Note: [#]p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.

cant effect on personal sense of trust. In particular, with the DPP in power in the central government, the trust of those who identify with the DPP is relatively high, whereas the political trust of those who identify with the KMT and PFP is not significantly different from that of the independents. Likewise, the microeconomic reviews emerge as statistically significant and in the anticipated direction. As hypothesized, the evidence reveals that the political trust of those who are more economically disadvantaged tends to be lower. The findings also demonstrate that individuals who predict that macroeconomic conditions will get better tend to have a higher level of political trust in the government. By contrast, for those people who believe that economic conditions will get worse in the future, the feelings of trust are markedly reduced.

Whether or not empowerment is able to increase mainlanders' political trust is one of the major concerns of this research. Model 2 in table 5 indicates that the political trust of "mainlanders in low-mainlander-empowerment areas" is much lower than that of "Taiwanese in low-main-lander-empowerment areas." That is, in cities or counties in which the mayor or magistrate is a Taiwanese, mainlanders maintain a lower degree of political trust as compared with the Taiwanese. In addition, even though the political trust of "mainlanders in high-mainlander-empowerment areas" is still lower than that of "Taiwanese in high-mainlander-empowerment areas," the difference between the two is not statistically significant. These findings apparently confirm the assumption that in Taipei City, Taoyuan County, and Taichung City, in which mainlanders are in power, the Taiwanese-mainlander differences in political trust are relatively small. Conversely, in regions in which the local executive is Taiwanese, the gap between mainlanders and Taiwanese markedly increases.

As shown in table 6, gender, education, and ethnicity are the significant factors associated with a person's sense of political efficacy. The data reveal that men have a lower sense of efficacy than women, a finding that does not conform to the research hypothesis. A possible explanation for this is that where competition among political parties is stronger and there is more election activity, men tend to have a greater understanding of political issues. However, such people may also be characterized by a

higher degree of political cynicism and alienation, and therefore a lower sense of efficacy. In addition, as expected, individuals with lower educational attainment (primary school or below) are more likely to have negative feelings of efficacy than those with higher levels of education. As for ethnicity, this follows the same pattern as political trust; i.e., the sense of political efficacy of mainlanders is relatively low.

As for party identification, in contrast to the independents, the political efficacy of those who identify with the DPP and KMT is relatively high. Likewise, those who are characterized by a "Taiwanese consciousness" have a relatively high sense of efficacy. In contrast, those who cling to a "Chinese consciousness" are associated with a lower level of political efficacy.

Furthermore, the influences of retrospective personal finances and prospective national economy very much correspond to expectations. The evidence shows that even though individuals consider that microeconomic conditions in the past were relatively good, this does not necessarily mean that they have a high level of efficacy. Nevertheless, in the case of those people who believe that their personal economic conditions were relatively bad, their feelings of efficacy are markedly low. Moreover, it is expected that those who believe that the Taiwan economy will get better tend to have a relatively high level of political efficacy, and vice versa.

As for the multiplicative terms of ethnicity and empowerment, model 2 in table 6 empirically demonstrates that the political efficacy of "mainlanders in low-mainlander-empowerment areas" is lower than that of "Taiwanese in low-mainlander-empowerment areas," and that the difference is statistically significant. Although the political efficacy of "mainlanders in high-mainlander-empowerment areas" is still lower than that of "Taiwanese in low-mainlander-empowerment areas," the difference between the two is not statistically significant. This suggests that in the regions in which the mainlander elite is in power, the gap between mainlanders and Taiwanese in terms of the sense of political efficacy should be relatively small. The findings once again prove that empowerment does exert an influence on the sociopolitical participation of mainlanders.

Conclusion

> It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
> oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice
> of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citi-
> zens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority
> will be insecure.
>
> —James Madison, *Federalist*, no. 51 (1788)

It is widely accepted that the distribution and intensity of the socio-political participation of ethnic/racial minority groups are strongly related to the stability, integration, and development of any given political system.[34] What factors tend to raise the extent of political participation among minority groups? This study examines the case of Taiwan, and investigates the connection between political empowerment and ethnic differences in sociopolitical involvement. By approaching the subject from the perspective of political behavior, this study attempts to understand the influence of ethnic empowerment on sociopolitical participation.

Note that the empowerment theory developed in the United States in the context of racial issues may produce different results when applied to ethnic politics in Taiwan, due to differences in the historical environment. While blacks in the United States and mainlanders in Taiwan each account for about 13 percent of their respective populations, the two groups differ significantly in terms of their political influence. In a sense, ethnic politics in Taiwan may be more similar to ethnic politics in South Africa, where a minority ran an authoritarian regime that discriminated against the major-ity. Until Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) succeeded to the presidency and the KMT chairmanship in January 1988, the mainlander elite held a near monopoly of political power. According to the 1978, 1981, and 1983 surveys, the

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[34] Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, 230-31; Corbett, *American Public Opinion*, 114-19; Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 286-88; Schwartz, *Political Alienation and Political Behavior*, 17-18; David Easton and Jack Dennis, "The Child's Acquisition of Regime Norms: Political Efficacy," *American Political Science Review* 61, no. 1 (March 1967): 25-38; David Easton, "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, no. 4 (October 1975): 435-57; and William A. Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey, 1968).

sociopolitical participation of mainlanders was generally higher than that of Taiwanese,[35] while the results of more recent surveys indicate that the political involvement of mainlanders is now generally lower.[36]

A possible reason for this is the influence exerted by political empowerment. That is to say, in the past when the mainlander elite were in power, it was that power that caused the mainlanders' political trust and efficacy to be higher. Now that the Taiwanese elite are in power, the mainlanders have become less politically active. From the standpoint of empowerment theory, it is expected that in those cities and counties where the mainlander elite are in power, the degree of political trust and efficacy among mainlanders would be relatively higher, and vice versa. Put simply, it is our belief that, although racial politics in the United States and ethnic politics in Taiwan differ in terms of their respective social backgrounds, it should be possible to apply empowerment theory to the political participation of mainlanders in Taiwan.

By using the political trust and sense of political efficacy of mainlanders as an example, the research examines the relationship between political empowerment and Taiwanese-mainlander differences in political attitudes. The findings confirm the research hypothesis, which is that in those regions in which a mainlander is the city mayor or county magistrate, the political trust and efficacy of mainlanders is relatively high, being not much different from that of Taiwanese. In contrast, in those regions in which the local executive is not a mainlander, the differences between mainlanders and Taiwanese markedly increase.

This paper has by and large confirmed empowerment theory by applying it to Taiwan's ethnic politics. Even so, this study is based on a cross-sectional analysis, and we are of the opinion that longitudinal analyses should be of significant research value in examining the impact of political

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[35]See Hu, *Zhengzhi canyu yu xuanju xingwei*, 77-87, 108, 128, 164, 170.

[36]See Huang, *2001 nian Taiwan xuanju yu minzhuhua diaocha yanjiu jihua*; and Chi Huang, *2002 nian Taiwan xuanju yu minzhuhua diaocha yanjiu jihua* (Taiwan's election and democratization study, 2002) (Final Report of National Science Council Research Project NSC 91-2420-H-194-001-SSS, 2003).

empowerment. In addition, attempts could be made to apply empowerment to the sociopolitical behavior of other minority groups, even to the extent of making cross-national comparisons. Clearly there is still much potential for future research in this field.

APPENDIX
Survey Questions and Coding of Variables

Political trust.

1. "People have different ideas about the government. We want to see how you feel about these ideas. Do you think that people waste a lot of the money we pay in taxes?" (1 = *agree*; 2 = *disagree*)
2. "Do you think the decisions made by the government are always right?" (1 = *disagree*; 2 = *agree*)
3. "Would you say the government only responds to current events and doesn't have any long-term plans?" (1 = *agree*; 2 = *disagree*)
4. "Do you think quite a few of the people running the government are honest and not corrupt?" (1 = *disagree*; 2 = *agree*)

Political efficacy.

1. "People like me don't have any say about what the government does." (1 = *agree*; 2 = *disagree*)
2. "I don't think public officials care much what people like me think." (1 = *agree*; 2 = *disagree*)
3. "Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what is going on." (1 = *agree*; 2 = *disagree*)

Gender. Respondent's sex (1 = *male*; 0 = *female*)

Age. Respondent's age measured in years (20 to 70)

Education. Respondent's level of educational attainment measured on a four-tier scale. (1 = *primary school* [through 6th grade]; 2 = *junior high school* [grades 7 to 9]; 3 = *high or vocational school*; 4 = *some college and higher*)

Ethnicity. Ethnic background of respondent's father (1 = *mainlander*; 0 = *Taiwanese* [Minnan and Hakka])

Empowerment. The twenty-three cities and counties in this study are divided into the three *"high-mainlander-empowerment areas"* that are run by mainlanders, namely Taipei City by Mayor Ma Ying-jeou, Taoyuan County by Magistrate Chu Li-lun, and Taichung City by Mayor Jason Hu, and the twenty *"low-main-lander-empowerment areas"* that are led by Taiwanese.

Ethnicity × empowerment. Respondent's ethnicity and empowerment factor (1 = *Taiwanese in low-mainlander-empowerment areas*; 2 = *Taiwanese in high-mainlander-empowerment areas*; 3 = *mainlanders in low-mainlander-em-powerment areas*; 4 = *mainlanders in high-mainlander-empowerment areas*)

Political knowledge.

1. "Who is the current Vice President?" (1 = *correct*; 0 = *wrong*; 0 = *don't know*)
2. "Who is the President of the PRC?" (1 = *correct*; 0 = *wrong*; 0 = *don't know*)
3. "Who is the President of the United States?" (1 = *correct*; 0 = *wrong*; 0 = *don't know*)
4. "How many years is a legislator's term?" (1 = *correct*; 0 = *wrong*; 0 = *don't know*)
5. "Which body has the power to interpret the Constitution?" (1 = *correct*; 0 = *wrong*; 0 = *don't know*)

Party identification. "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as close to any particular political party?" Those who classify themselves as independents are asked the following question: "Do you think of yourself as being a little closer to one of the political parties than the others? [If yes] "Which party do you feel closest to?" (1 = *Kuomintang*; 2 = *Democratic Progressive Party*; 3 = *People First Party*; 4 = *independent*)

Ethnic consciousness. "In our society, some people say they are Taiwanese, some people say they are Chinese, and some people say they are both Taiwanese and Chinese. Do you think you are Taiwanese, Chinese, or both?" (1 = *Taiwanese*; 2 = *Chinese*; 3 = *both*)

Unification/independence preference. "Concerning the relationship between Tai-wan and mainland China, which of these six positions do you agree with: (1) im-mediate unification; (2) immediate independence; (3) maintain the status quo, but in the future move toward unification; (4) maintain the status quo, but in the future move toward independence; (5) maintain the status quo, but in the future decide to move toward either unification or independence; or (6) maintain the status quo forever?" (1 = *China unification* [immediate unification and maintain

the status quo, but in the future move toward unification]; 2 = *Taiwan independence* [immediate independence and maintain the status quo, but in the future move toward independence]; 3 = *maintain the status quo* [maintain the status quo, but in the future decide to move toward either unification or independence, and maintain the status quo forever])

Retrospective national economy. "Would you say that over the past twelve months, the state of the economy in Taiwan has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" (1 = *gotten better*; 2 = *stayed about the same*; 3 = *gotten worse*)

Retrospective personal finances. "Would you say that over the past twelve months, your household's economic situation has gotten better, stayed about the same, or gotten worse?" (1 = *gotten better*; 2 = *stayed about the same*; 3 = *gotten worse*)

Prospective national economy. "Would you say that in the forthcoming year, the state of the economy in Taiwan will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?" (1 = *get better*; 2 = *stay about the same*; 3 = *get worse*)

Prospective personal finances. "Would you say that in the forthcoming year, your household's economic situation will get better, stay about the same, or get worse?" (1 = *get better*; 2 = *stay about the same*; 3 = *get worse*)

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
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