

## A Simple Model for Predicting the Outcome of the 2008 Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan\*

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*The 2008 Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan were held under a new electoral system, a combination of single-member districts with a plurality system, the national nonpreferential list proportional representation system, and the single nontransferable vote system for the aboriginal districts. This work develops a forecasting model and hypothesizes that the partisan voting behavior of Taiwan's citizens largely remains identifiable and durable. There are two methodologies used in this study. The first is the use of three-wave aggregate-level electoral data to estimate the outcomes of the 2008 legislative elections. The second employs ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations to evaluate the effects of previous three-wave electoral results on the 2008 elections. Using the first method, the forecast success rate is more than 80 percent. The findings also reveal that the OLS model performs satisfactorily because two of the three coefficients reach statistical significance. This study concludes by listing three implications of the election: that it was a critical watershed in Taiwan's politics, that*

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*there is a geopolitical gap between the north and south, and that minor political parties were eliminated from Taiwan politics.*

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*The first effect of any electoral reform is to modify not only the distribution of seats but also the distribution of votes.... The distribution of votes and not only of parliamentary seats amongst the different parties was profoundly altered by the electoral reform.<sup>1</sup>*



This study is primarily aimed at developing a model to predict the results of Taiwan's Legislative Yuan (立法院) elections, which were held on January 12, 2008. These elections were important theoretically and practically for at least two reasons. First, there had been a reform of the electoral system for the Legislative Yuan under which the system of multiple constituencies had been replaced by a single nontransferable vote (SNTV), using a new parallel two-ballot voting system. The new electoral system is mainly based on single-member districts (SMD) with a plurality (or "first-past-the-post") system and national nonpreferential list proportional representation (PR). From the perspective of comparative politics, the introduction of SNTV involves rational-choice institutionalism, and it will continue to have a salient impact on the political agenda. Second, the legislative elections were commonly considered to be a prelude to the presidential election, which was held on March 22, 2008. For a nascent democracy like Taiwan, it is uncertain whether legislative and presidential elections can maintain political stability, benefit democratic consolidation, make party politics more workable, reduce corruption within the political process, and alleviate conflicts and confrontation among ethnic groups. All of these issues are worthy of the attention of political scientists.

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<sup>1</sup>Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*, second edition (London: Methuen, 1962), 377. Emphases are original.

With these issues in mind, my research explores three interrelated issues. It first provides a brief description of Taiwan's electoral system, including the electoral formula, the operation of SNTV, and the electoral reform and its possible political consequences. It then clarifies the research hypothesis and addresses the research design and measurement of the forecasting model for the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections in more detail. Next, this study offers two systematic assessments of the aggregate-level data to evaluate the 2008 legislative elections and also examines the forecasting model. Conclusions are then drawn regarding the implications of the electoral outcomes for interpretations of the predictive model.

### Taiwan's Electoral System in Perspective

The term "electoral system" has broad implications. Douglas Rae analyzed elections of national parliaments, characterizing electoral systems by means of three elements: *ballot structure*, *district magnitudes*, and *electoral formula*.<sup>2</sup> With Rae's classification as a basis, students of electoral studies have developed more refined typologies. Two additional dimensions that are generally employed in the classification of electoral systems are *provisions for supplementary seats* and *electoral thresholds*.<sup>3</sup> Electoral practices vary greatly but four types commonly used in democratic regimes are: single-member district (SMD) plurality or majority, proportional representation (PR), semi-PR, and mixed systems.<sup>4</sup> There are considerable

<sup>2</sup>For the detailed definitions of ballot structure, district magnitudes, and electoral formula, see Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971), 16-17, 19, 21-39.

<sup>3</sup>Concerning the provisions for supplementary seats and electoral thresholds, see Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1999), chap. 8; and Rein Taagepera and Matthew Soberg Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), 36-37.

<sup>4</sup>For thorough analyses of electoral rules, see Gary W. Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); David M. Farrell, *Electoral Systems: A Comparative Introduction* (New York: Palgrave, 2001); Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart, eds., *Electoral Laws and Their Political*

variations within each system.

Three types of electoral system are used in Taiwanese elections. First, the SMD at-large plurality system is used for the election of administrative leaders, such as village heads, city mayors, county magistrates, and the president.<sup>4</sup> Second, the single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system is used for local legislative elections, such as for village boards as well as city and county councils. Third, since the early 1990s, a mixed system has been used for the Legislative Yuan elections, which is a combination of the SNTV and a nonpreferential list PR system, with greater weight given to the former. In this hybrid system, the voter is given only *one* vote for an individual candidate. The overall ratio of votes each political party receives in the election then determines the number of PR seats allotted to the party.

The SNTV system was originally employed for elections to the Japanese Diet (House of Representatives), and is used in Taiwan only for local legislative elections.<sup>5</sup> In an SNTV election, each voter casts only one vote for a preferred candidate and the votes received by one candidate cannot be transferred to another. Seats in a constituency are allocated by plurality rule, and the district magnitude is usually larger than one (usually lying between two and six, or the so-called "medium-sized districts").<sup>6</sup> The win-

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*Consequences* (New York: Agathon Press, 1986); Pippa Norris, *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); and Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg, eds., *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

<sup>5</sup>In 1994, the Japanese electoral system underwent a historic reform with the introduction of the *heiritsu-sei* (parallel system). The boundaries of the 130 multi-member districts were redrawn to form 300 new SMDs and an additional 200 seats (reduced to 180 seats in 2000) were allocated by PR in 11 PR districts ranging in magnitude from 7 to 33 seats. The voter has two votes, one for an individual candidate and one for the party list. Although the *heiritsu-sei* combines SMD and PR, it is not like the German system of "personalized PR," which completely determines the number of seats allocated to each party; the SMD election only determines which candidates are elected. See Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, passim; Jih-wen Lin, "The Politics of Reform in Japan and Taiwan," *Journal of Democracy* 17, no. 2 (April 2006): 118-31; Steven R. Reed, "The Nomination Process for Japan's Next General Election: Waiting for the *Heiritsu-sei*," *Asian Survey* 35, no. 12 (December 1995): 1075-86; and Eugene L. Wolfe, "Japanese Electoral and Political Reform: Role of the Young Turks," *ibid.*, 1059-74.

<sup>6</sup>In Japan, there was only one single-member electoral district (out of 130), Amami Gunto.

ners are the top  $M$  vote-getters, where  $M$  is the district magnitude. In districts with only one seat, the SNTV and SMD with plurality rule are similar in electoral arrangement.<sup>7</sup>

With respect to electoral proportionality between vote shares and seat shares, a comparison of the electoral strategies for the SMD and SNTV systems may provide a clearer picture. Under candidate-centered systems (e.g., SMD and SNTV) the major work of political parties is to nominate a "correct" number of candidates for consideration. Under SMD, the selection of the most "qualified" candidate becomes the essential task of the political party. Two strategies are always at the heart of SNTV: the number of nominees and vote equalizations. If a party endorses too few candidates, it may not win as many seats as its popular support would justify. If the party endorses an excessive number of candidates who compete with each other, it may end up with more losers than popular support would indicate. However, an "optimum" endorsement is still not enough because the political party may encounter the problem of vote division among its candidates in the same district. Therefore, a political party has to instruct its members to distribute their votes as equally as possible among its candidates.

In theory, under SNTV, if all parties in an election field "optimum" numbers of candidates and allocate their votes efficiently, the allocation of seats among them should be very nearly proportional. With certain assumptions, the SNTV system is equivalent to the d'Hondt formula of the PR system.<sup>8</sup> Because of its high degree of electoral proportionality, the

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In the 2004 Legislative Yuan elections in Taiwan, there were four such districts (out of 27), Jinmen County (Quemoy, 金門縣), Lianjiang County (連江縣; Mazu 馬祖), Penghu County (澎湖縣), and Taitung County (台東縣). In both countries, these districts were in less-developed areas where constituency sizes are relatively small.

<sup>7</sup>Arend Lijphart, Rafael Lopez Pintor, and Yasunori Sone, "The Limited Vote and the Single Nontransferable Vote: Lessons from the Japanese and Spanish Examples," in Grofman and Lijphart, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, 154-69.

<sup>8</sup>The d'Hondt formula is one of a number of mathematical formulas for seat allocation to political parties in the list PR system. See Taagepera and Shugart, *Seats and Votes*, 29-35; and Gary W. Cox, "SNTV and d'Hondt Are 'Equivalent'," *Electoral Studies* 10, no. 2 (June 1991): 118-32.

use of SNTV has been controversial. Critics charge it with such flaws as stimulating the development of extreme ideologies, encouraging factional politics, weakening the border in the competition between political parties, facilitating candidate-centered electoral politics, and fostering vote-buying and "black-and-gold" problems.<sup>9</sup>

In tune with the mounting dissatisfaction with and challenges to SNTV, some political leaders in both of Taiwan's major parties, the Kuomintang (KMT, 中國國民黨) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), have, since the late 1990s, been in favor of electoral reform. After a series of intertwined negotiations among political forces, the Legislative Yuan passed a resolution for a constitutional amendment on electoral reform in August 2004; the amendment was ratified by the ad hoc National Assembly (國民大會) in June 2005.

Under this amendment, the reform of the Legislative Yuan electoral system can be summarized as follows: (1) a reduction of the number of seats from 225 to 113; (2) an extension of the term of office from three to four years; (3) the adoption of the "SMD with two-ballot system" in which voters cast one vote for a political party to elect legislators for the national at-large district (34 seats) and one vote to elect a legislator for an SMD (73 seats); (4) two at-large districts with an SNTV system reserved for the "mountain" aborigines (three seats) and "out-of-mountain" aborigines (three seats); and (5) a 50 percent quota of female candidates to be elected in the at-large district representing each party that has obtained no less than

<sup>9</sup>For the political consequences of the SNTV, see Gary W. Cox, "Is the Single Nontransferable Vote Superproportional? Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," *American Journal of Political Science* 40, no. 3 (August 1996): 740-55; Gary W. Cox and Emerson Niu, "Seat Bonuses under the Single Nontransferable Vote System: Evidence from Japan and Taiwan," *Comparative Politics* 26, no. 2 (January 1994): 221-36; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "The SNTV System and Its Political Implications," in *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave*, ed. Hung-mao Tien (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 193-212; John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Manipulating the Electoral System under the SNTV: The Case of the Republic of China on Taiwan," in *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institution*, ed. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winckler, and Brian Woodall (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1999), 65-84; and Yeh-lih Wang, "The Political Consequences of the Electoral System: Single Nontransferable Voting in Taiwan," *Issues & Studies* 32, no. 8 (August 1996): 85-104.

5 percent of the total votes. These new electoral rules are far from simple. However, even taking these unusual electoral arrangements into account, the system basically remains a parallel system, similar to the one employed in Japan since 1994.

### **Research Design and Measures**

This study develops a forecasting model to estimate the outcomes of the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections, including the SMDs, national at-large PR, and the aboriginal districts. I first collect three-wave aggregate-level electoral data, reallocate them to the current legislative districts, and then use these figures as a reference to estimate the electoral strengths of the two major political camps, the "pan-Blue" (泛藍) and "pan-Green" (泛綠), in each individual constituency.<sup>10</sup> To obtain the percentages of votes gained by the pan-Blue camp, I combine the numbers of the KMT, the People First Party (PFP, 親民黨), the New Party (NP, 新黨), and the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU, 無黨團結聯盟), since these four political parties formally combined to form an electoral coalition for the 2008 race. The numbers of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟) are combined for the pan-Green.

Considering the attributes of the electoral districts, I gather different data sets as the basis for classification and calculation. For the SMDs, the data include the 2004 presidential, 2004 legislative, and 2005 and 2006 local elections. Note that the last two are compiled from the 2005 county magistrate and city mayoral elections and the 2006 Taipei (台北市) and

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<sup>10</sup>I especially wish to thank one referee for her/his heuristic suggestion that I use three elections, rather than four or five elections of different kinds and levels. Frankly it is somewhat arbitrary to choose *three* previous elections as the references for electoral estimations, the reason being that I wish to offer a systematic model that is both concise and inclusive. To that end, another constructive comment raised by the same referee concerned the weighting effects of different levels of election. However, it may be methodologically arguable to reassign weighting effects unless the reassignment is grounded in solid theoretical explanations. Even so, I firmly believe that this suggestion still has much potential for future research.

Kaohsiung (高雄市) city mayoral elections. For both national at-large and aboriginal districts, the data includes the 1998, 2001, and 2004 elections to the Legislative Yuan. Note that the reason for taking the 2004 presidential and 2005 and 2006 local elections into account to estimate the 2008 legislative elections for SMDs is based on their analogous electoral characteristic—SMD with plurality system. As for the national PR and aboriginal constituencies, I simply employ the three preceding elections as the references for analysis. All the electoral data were collected from material officially released by the Central Election Commission (CEC, 中央選舉委員會).

The purpose of this study is to offer a systematic assessment of the results of the 2008 legislative elections. Two analyses are performed. The first analysis evaluates the 2008 legislative elections using three-wave aggregate-level electoral statistics. In order to produce a generalized prediction model, the second analysis employs ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations to gauge the effects of three previous electoral results on the 2008 legislative elections in SMDs.<sup>11</sup>

Before proceeding, two propositions should be kept in mind with respect to the forecasting analyses. First, the theoretical premise of this forecasting model assumes that the political parties in the electorate are, in fact, identifiable and durable, and that stable partisan voting patterns exist both nationwide and district-wide, as much empirical evidence has shown.<sup>12</sup> Following this argument, the reason for the election prediction is

<sup>11</sup>I appreciate one referee's suggestion concerning the second approach, which was omitted in the earlier version of this paper. Based on past election data, the SMD prediction model can be presented as the following equation: *2008 legislative elections* = *b0* + *B1*\**2004 presidential election* + *B2*\**2004 legislative elections* + *B3*\**2005 or 2006 local elections* + *e*. Here, *B1*, *B2*, and *B3* are the estimated coefficients based on election levels and time span.

<sup>12</sup>For the consistency of partisan voting behavior in Taiwan and the United States, see Nathan Batto, "Geographical Voting Bases and the Stability of Candidates' Voter Coalitions (1989~1998)," *Xuanju yanjiu* (Journal of Electoral Studies) 8, no. 1 (May 2001): 211-51; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1960), 64-88, 552-54; M. Margaret Conway, *Political Participation in the United States*, third edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1984), 59-60, 167-71; Yun-tai Hung, "Xuanju yuce: yige yi zhengti ziliao wei fuzhu gongju de moxing" (Election prediction: an aggregate data assisted model),



simple and straightforward: in any given district, the more frequently a political party has won (lost) in the preceding elections, the greater its probability of winning (losing) in the following election. Second, the 2008 elections to the Legislative Yuan were the first to be held under a parallel system. Although the electoral effects of the new system may vary, one thing is almost certain: according to Duverger's law, the SMD plurality system tends toward a stable two-party system because of its mechanical and psychological effects.<sup>13</sup> The mechanical effect denotes how votes are translated into seats and how a minor party can win a certain proportion of votes in a district but still fail to win a seat. This inherent electoral disproportionality leads to a party winning a certain share of the votes but a disproportionately small number of seats in the legislature. The psychological effect concerns how electoral rules influence the voting behavior of the general public, in that voters tend to abandon their preferred parties in favor of less preferred parties that have a better chance of winning. Over time, the party system is therefore expected to move toward some sort of equilibrium, where two parties get all or almost all the votes. Viewed in this light, it becomes much easier to predict the election outcomes under SMD than under SNTV, which always involves a number of nominees and vote equalization, as discussed above.

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*Xuanju yanjiu* 1, no. 1 (May 1994): 93-110; V. O. Key, Jr., "Secular Realignment and the Party System," *Journal of Politics* 21, no. 2 (May 1959): 198-210; Warren E. Miller and Merrill J. Shanks, *The New American Voters* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 120; Peter F. Nardulli, "The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 1 (March 1995): 10-22; and Gerald M. Pomper, "Classification of Presidential Elections," *Journal of Politics* 29, no. 3 (August 1967): 535-66.

<sup>13</sup> See Duverger, *Political Parties*, 217, 224-26. For interpreting, testing, criticizing, or revising Duverger's Law, see Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws*, 95; Gary W. Cox, "Strategic Voting Equilibria under the Single Nontransferable Vote," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 3 (September 1994): 608-21; William H. Riker, "The Two-Party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science," *ibid.* 76, no. 4 (December 1982): 753-66; and William H. Riker, "Duverger's Law Revisited," in Grofman and Lijphart, *Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences*, 19-42. For the impacts of Taiwan's electoral reform on the party system, see Emile C. J. Sheng, "Danyi xuanqu liangpiaozhi dui weilai Taiwan zhengdang zhengzhi fazhan zhi keneng yingxiang tantao" (A discussion of the potential influences of a mixed-member electoral system on Taiwanese partisan politics), *Taiwan minzhu jikan* (Taiwan Democracy Quarterly) 3, no. 2 (June 2006): 72-73.

### Discussion of Findings

According to the research framework presented in the preceding section, I have conducted analyses to assess the results of the legislative elections of January 2008. The details of the electoral information are presented in Appendices 1, 2, and 3. Appendix 1 contains details of the seventy-three SMDs. As shown in the fourth column from the right, the figures range from 0 to 3, implying the winning frequency of the then-governing pan-Green in the three recent elections. Simply put, the scores 3 and 2 imply that the DPP nominees have a good chance of winning, while 1 and 0 suggest that the pan-Blue candidates have the electoral advantage. Also note that there is little room for TSU candidates, since the relationship between the DPP and the TSU soured after 2006 and they failed to form an electoral alliance in 2008, in contrast to the pan-Blue coalition. Considering Duverger's law, this analysis predicts that all of the TSU nominees were destined to be caught in the crossfire between the two major political forces.

As for both the nationwide at-large and the aboriginal districts, I take the average percentages of votes received by different political parties in the past three legislative elections, as shown in Appendices 2 and 3. There were more than a dozen list-PR candidate slates for the 2008 elections, but the empirical data reveal that only three are viable, the KMT and PFP alliance, the DPP, and the TSU. The average numbers for the NP and the NPSU are less than 5 percent of the votes cast and therefore would be ineligible for a share of the PR seats. In the aboriginal SNTV districts, the pan-Blue was dominant in the previous three races, garnering approximately 88 percent of the votes. The pan-Green vote share was steady at about 12 percent over the three elections, although the percentage increased gradually.

The estimated and actual results of the election are presented in table 1. The pan-Blue coalition is predicted to win the most seats, while it is estimated that the TSU will win only three PR seats. In reality, the pan-Blue coalition enjoyed a landslide victory over the DPP and secured a three-fourths majority. The DPP experienced a debacle, winning only 23.89 percent of the available seats. The other parties fared poorly, with none of them reaching the 5 percent threshold required to win an at-large seat.

**Table 1**  
**Predicted and Actual Results of the 2008 Legislative Elections**

	Pan-Blue		DPP		TSU	
	Predicted	Actual	Predicted	Actual	Predicted	Actual
Single-member districts	48	60	25	13	0	0
National at-large district	18	20	13	14	3	0
Aboriginal districts	5	6	1	0	0	0
Total	71	86	39	27	3	0

**Note:** The pan-Blue coalition includes the KMT, the PFP, the NP, and the NPSU.

The forecast success rate is calculated as the percentage of correct predictions. As shown in the last column of Appendix 1, among the seventy-three SMDs, sixty-one districts were predicted correctly and twelve incorrectly, making the rate of accuracy 83.56 percent. Of the PR and aboriginal districts, the model estimated three seats correctly and one seat incorrectly. On the whole, the simple model performs quite well, with more than 80 percent of the results correctly forecast.

The data in table 1 yields some interesting findings, but it is necessary to have a sophisticated model for examining three time-span variables simultaneously. The relative impacts of different variables on the dependent variable are approached better through a multivariate analysis. The results displayed in table 2 are, at the very least, an encouraging initial step toward a persuasive and respectable explanation of the vote shares in the seventy-three SMDs in the legislative elections. Taken as a whole, the equation provides a good, if not excellent, fit, with nearly 75 percent of the variance explained.<sup>14</sup>

Two of three coefficients reach statistical significance, and they run in the expected directions. The evidence is overwhelming that the vote

<sup>14</sup>In the model, the units of analysis are the vote shares of the pan-Blue and pan-Green, and therefore the number of units is 146. Note that an examination of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables reveals that the partial coefficients are not highly multicollinear. There are no partial coefficients over  $\pm .55$ , including the correlations between the 2004 legislative and 2005 and 2006 local elections ( $-.541$ ), the 2004 presidential

**Table 2**  
**Regression Estimates for Vote Shares in SMDs for the 2008 Legislative Elections**

	2008 Legislative Yuan elections (%)		
	Unstandardized coefficients	Standardized coefficients	
	B	Std. error	Beta
Constant	-2.522	2.862	
2004 presidential election (%)	-.067	.104	-.053
2004 Legislative Yuan elections (%)	.707***	.113	.550
2005 and 2006 local elections (%)	.426***	.099	.391
R-squared		.741	
Adjusted R-squared		.736	
N		146	

Note: \*\*\*p < .001; two-tailed test of significance.

shares of the 2004 legislative and 2005 and 2006 local elections are positive and statistically significant determinants of the electoral results of the 2008 legislative races. Contrary to expectations, the estimations for the 2004 presidential election are consistently weak and insignificant, which indicates that it provides relatively little explanatory power in the SMDs for the 2008 elections to the Legislative Yuan.

In addition to the analyses of the legislative elections, there are at least three political implications that can be drawn from these election outcomes. First, the elections could turn out to be a critical watershed as the DPP suffered a serious setback, winning only about one quarter of the available seats, while the pan-Blue coalition now controls approximately 76 percent of the legislature. In a sense, the DPP's crushing defeat was due to public dissatisfaction with the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) administration's lackluster performance over the past few years. To some extent, it may also imply that emphasizing national identity and ethnic issues is no longer

and 2005 and 2006 local elections (-.445), the 2004 presidential and 2004 legislative elections (-.374). Due to limitations of space, the data analysis cannot be presented in detail. The author will be pleased to provide the data to anyone who wishes to contact him.

a panacea for winning elections.

Second, the results revealed that the DPP still had an electoral advantage, although not a monopoly, in the south, but was only sporadically successful in other regions. On the flip side, the pan-Blue tends to control most of the legislative seats in the north, center, and east. These geographical differences are consistent with the common assumption of "north Blue, south Green" (北藍南綠). In view of Taiwan's historical background and sociopolitical environment, such a geopolitical gap might be regarded as a serious social cleavage.

Last but not least, for the minor political parties the effect of the election was very simple. Just as Duverger's law predicts, under the parallel system it is not surprising to find that the TSU, the NP, and even the PFP were reduced to political insignificance after the elections, although they appealed to their supporters to use split-ticket voting.

This study has presented a forecasting model for the 2008 Legislative Yuan elections in which three-wave aggregate-level electoral data are used to forecast the parties' shares of the votes. The model produces satisfactory results without taking certain predictive factors into account, for instance, economic conditions (gross national product [GNP], unemployment, inflation, personal income, etc.), candidate popularity or appeal, campaign strategies, incumbent advantages, campaigning expenditures, cross-Strait relations, and the spillover effects of referenda. Developing an electoral model that is both concise and accurate awaits future research.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Note that one referee provided a valuable list of literature for this study and for further research on election predictions, including Lu-huei Chen, "Zhongguo Guomintang 'Huang-fuxing dangbu' de fuxuan xiaoguo fenxi" (The electoral effect of party effort and social context on voters: the case of the Kuomintang veteran association "Huangfuhsing"), *Xuanju yanjiu* 1, no. 2 (November 1994): 53-96; Jih-wen Lin, "Dipán huafen yu xuanju jingzheng: duiying fenxifa zai duoxici xuanju yanjiu shang zhi yingyong" (Territorial division and electoral competition: the application of correspondence analysis in the study of multi-seat elections), *ibid.* 5, no. 2 (November 1998): 103-28; I-chou Liu, "Campaigning in an SNTV System: The Case of the Kuomintang in Taiwan," in Grofinan, Lee, Winckler, and Woodall, *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable Vote*, 181-208; and Shing-Yuan Sheng, "Zhengdang peipiao yu houxuanren piaoyuan de jisandu: 1983 zhi 1985 nian Taiwan diqu lifa weiyuan xuanju de fenxi" (Parties' vote-equalizing strategies and their impacts under an SNTV electoral system: a study of Taiwan's legislative elections from 1983 to 1995), *Xuanju yanjiu* 5, no. 2 (November 1998): 73-102.

**Appendix 1**  
**Electoral Information for the 73 Single-Member Districts in the 2008 Legislative Yuan Elections**

No.	Electoral district	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU	Others <sup>2</sup>	2004 Presidential (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
						Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>				
1	Taipei City 1	丁守中	高建智		張歷元 曾耀順	52.38	47.62 (0)	48.77	44.38 (0)	50.36	44.94 (0)	0	丁守中	丁守中	Yes
2	Taipei City 2	周守訓	王世堅		周英成	45.15	54.85 (1)	39.09	53.25 (1)	42.32	53.40 (1)	3	王世堅	周守訓	No
3	Taipei City 3	蔣孝嚴	郭正亮	謝聰米	李林耀 簡瑞寬	55.52	44.48 (0)	48.05	41.69 (00)	53.8	42.03 (0)	0	蔣孝嚴	蔣孝嚴	Yes
4	Taipei City 4	蔡正元	徐國勇		莊純均 許家琛 柯逸民 張慶源	57.92	42.08 (0)	52.60	38.35 (0)	55.67	39.26 (0)	0	蔡正元	蔡正元	Yes
5	Taipei City 5	林郁方	殷宜盛		葉政 吳建毅 黃啓彬 純至中	54.56	45.44 (0)	49.07	42.88 (0)	51.10	43.58 (0)	0	林郁方	林郁方	Yes
6	Taipei City 6	李慶安	羅文嘉		林俊賢 王保善 余少鈞 林裕發 樂可銘 古文樂	63.16	36.84 (0)	54.56	34.77 (0)	60.06	34.49 (0)	0	李慶安	李慶安	Yes

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	2004 Presidential (%)			2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
		Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Others <sup>2</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>				
7	Taipei City 7	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup> 費鴻泰	DPP 田欣	TSU 張國慶 Others <sup>2</sup> 秦政煌 連石磊 潘翰聲 陳顯奇	59.42	40.58 (0)	54.43	36.97 (0)	56.61	38.32 (0)	0	費鴻泰 費鴻泰 Yes
8	Taipei City 8	賴士葆	周柏雅	史美延 任立民 方景鈞 彭濟安 梅峰	65.55	34.45 (0)	58.67	31.17 (0)	62.64	31.70 (0)	0	賴士葆 賴士葆 Yes
9	Kaohsiung City 1	黃昭順	姚文智	錢繼穎	51.18	48.82 (0)	45.47	46.75 (1)	55.10	44.54 (0)	1	黃昭順 黃昭順 Yes
10	Kaohsiung City 2	羅世雄	管碧玲	李淨瑜 林稱雄 曾文聖	41.31	58.69 (1)	35.08	56.17 (1)	46.28	53.26 (1)	3	管碧玲 管碧玲 Yes
11	Kaohsiung City 3	侯彩鳳	李昆澤	林進興 蘇經孟 莊緒慈 吳春香	43.28	56.72 (1)	34.48	54.49 (1)	48.29	51.36 (1)	3	李昆澤 侯彩鳳 No
12	Kaohsiung City 4	李復興	黃昭輝	林幸元 林志聰 劉慧雯	44.91	55.09 (1)	32.02	53.64 (1)	49.93	49.52 (0)	2	黃昭輝 李復興 No

Source: 2008年立法委員選舉資料

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU	Others <sup>2</sup>	2004 Presidential (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
						Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>				
13	Kaohsiung City 5	林國正	郭政成	楊掌朝 楊美蘭 曹文玟 趙建出		40.19	59.81 (1)	28.91	56.21 (1)	45.88	53.55 (1)	3	郭政成	郭政成	Yes
14	Taipei County 1	吳育昇	李顯榮	莊孟學	吳金治 王天裕 楊仁清	51.97	48.03 (0)	53.71	43.73 (0)	53.83	44.80 (0)	0	吳育昇	吳育昇	Yes
15	Taipei County 2	柯淑敏	林淑芬	林志嘉	楊建福	44.72	55.28 (1)	44.97	54.63 (1)	46.56	52.51 (1)	3	林淑芬	林淑芬	Yes
16	Taipei County 3	朱俊晚	余	劉一德	劉英芮 蘇御序	44.57	55.43 (1)	46.13	53.36 (1)	46.01	53.12 (1)	3	余	余	Yes
17	Taipei County 4	李鴻鈞	吳秉敏	鄭余豪	徐文彥	47.41	52.59 (1)	49.39	49.86 (1)	49.32	50.11 (1)	3	吳秉敏	李鴻鈞	No
18	Taipei County 5	黃志雄	廖本煙	陳誠鈞 王文秀 溫炳原		47.80	52.20 (1)	46.63	52.99 (1)	50.02	49.00 (0)	2	廖本煙	黃志雄	No
19	Taipei County 6	林鴻池	王淑慧	林景松		48.74	51.26 (1)	50.46	49.22 (0)	51.02	48.56 (0)	1	林鴻池	林鴻池	Yes
20	Taipei County 7	吳清池	莊頌漢	林育任	林淑慧	50.31	49.69 (0)	53.14	46.54 (0)	52.93	46.44 (0)	0	吳清池	吳清池	Yes
21	Taipei County 8	張慶忠	趙永清	甘仰榮		59.97	40.03 (0)	61.16	38.07 (0)	61.45	37.90 (0)	0	張慶忠	張慶忠	Yes



Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU	Others <sup>2</sup>	2004 Presidential (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>	Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
						Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>					
22	Taipei County 9	林德福		周倪安	洪一平 楊錫周	66.23	33.77 (0)	68.48	30.49 (0)	67.67	0	林德福	林德福	Yes
23	Taipei County 10	盧嘉辰	李文忠		李俊光	51.82	48.18 (0)	51.85	47.81 (0)	54.42	0	盧嘉辰	盧嘉辰	Yes
24	Taipei County 11	羅明才	陳永福		葛彭台 許政茵 林美秀	64.42	35.58 (0)	66.39	32.96 (0)	66.01	0	羅明才	羅明才	Yes
25	Taipei County 12	李慶幸	陳朝龍		廖學廣 蕭振	54.76	45.24 (0)	55.52	43.65 (0)	56.25	0	李慶幸	李慶幸	Yes
26	Keelung City	謝國樑	游祥耀		呂貞中 王冠之	59.44	40.56 (0)	59.01	36.83 (0)	67.03	0	謝國樑	謝國樑	Yes
27	Ilan County	林建榮	陳金德		謝李靜宜	42.29	57.71 (1)	46.44	53.57 (1)	51.39	2	陳金德	林建榮	No
28	Taoyuan County 1	陳振德	李錫堉		姚敬君 陳志明	52.11	47.89 (0)	52.85	44.61 (0)	59.45	0	陳振德	陳振德	Yes
29	Taoyuan County 2	廖正井	郭榮宗		蔡錫和松	49.30	50.70 (1)	50.42	48.82 (0)	53.26	1	廖正井	廖正井	Yes
30	Taoyuan County 3	吳志揚	彭添富		張明松	57.83	42.17 (0)	60.19	38.98 (0)	64.34	0	吳志揚	吳志揚	Yes
31	Taoyuan County 4	楊麗環	黃宗源		蔡佩宜	53.28	46.72 (0)	47.21	51.44 (1)	60.19	1	楊麗環	楊麗環	Yes

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	2004 Presidential (%)			2004 Legislative (%)			2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
		Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Others <sup>2</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>					
		Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU									
32	Taoyuan County 5	朱鳳芝	李月琴	劉俊儀 黃嘉華	59.84	40.16 (0)	58.84	40.09 (0)	63.86	35.30 (0)	0	朱鳳芝	Yes
33	Taoyuan County 6	孫大千	邱劍良	姚吉鴻	59.41	40.59 (0)	60.41	35.77 (0)	64.29	34.89 (0)	0	孫大千	Yes
34	Hsinchu County	邱鏡淳		徐欣瑩 余玉池	64.06	35.94 (0)	63.10	36.90 (0)	67.09	32.91 (0)	0	邱鏡淳	Yes
35	Hsinchu City	呂學樟	鄭宏輝	鄭秀寶	55.12	44.88 (0)	48.75	44.49 (0)	69.27	30.73 (0)	0	呂學樟	Yes
36	Miaoli County 1	李乙廷	杜文卿		54.02	45.98 (0)	53.27	45.45 (0)	71.00	28.99 (0)	0	李乙廷	Yes
37	Miaoli County 2	徐耀昌 何智輝	詹運喜	郭玉枝 賴金明 莊 嚴	66.72	33.28 (0)	69.15	28.70 (0)	69.39	30.61 (0)	0	徐耀昌 何智輝	Yes
38	Taichung County 1	劉銓忠	蔡其昌		47.34	52.66 (1)	56.26	38.76 (0)	59.14	39.35 (0)	1	劉銓忠	Yes
39	Taichung County 2	顏清標	劉瑞北	李順涼	48.90	51.10 (1)	56.52	38.16 (0)	58.98	39.17 (0)	1	顏清標	Yes
40	Taichung County 3	江連福	簡馨棣		49.18	50.82 (1)	52.37	42.07 (0)	59.22	39.70 (0)	1	江連福	Yes
41	Taichung County 4	徐中雄	高基崇		47.65	52.35 (1)	49.43	46.58 (0)	60.01	38.73 (0)	1	徐中雄	Yes

Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	2004 Presidential (%)			2004 Legislative (%)			2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
		Pan-Blue	Pan-Green	Others <sup>2</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green	Pan-Blue	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green				
		Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU									
42	Taichung County 5	楊慶堃	郭俊銘		47.64	52.36 (1)	48.58	44.13 (0)	60.04	38.56 (0)	1	楊慶堃	Yes
43	Taichung City 1	蔡錦隆	蔡明憲		53.72	46.28 (0)	52.95	36.79 (0)	61.87	37.73 (0)	0	蔡錦隆	Yes
44	Taipei City 2	盧秀燕	謝明源	沈智慧 楊宗澄	51.82	48.18 (0)	49.70	43.56 (0)	57.15	42.55 (0)	0	盧秀燕	Yes
45	Taichung City 3	黃義文	何啟豪	賀安華 王名江 林振東	47.33	52.67 (1)	48.11	47.48 (0)	51.37	48.39 (0)	1	黃義文	Yes
46	Changhua County 1	陳秀卿	柯金德		46.39	53.61 (1)	59.36	30.76 (0)	51.42	40.55 (0)	1	陳秀卿	Yes
47	Changhua County 2	林進敏	邱朝進	林招彰	49.35	50.65 (1)	58.69	32.62 (0)	56.64	40.63 (0)	1	林進敏	Yes
48	Changhua County 3	鄭汝芬	林重渡	楊宗哲	47.05	52.95 (1)	47.76	28.44 (0)	55.23	41.56 (0)	1	鄭汝芬	Yes
49	Changhua County 4	蕭景田	江昭儀	陳朝容 謝章捷	48.20	51.80 (1)	51.01	34.73 (0)	58.43	39.30 (0)	1	蕭景田	Yes
50	Nantou County 1	吳敦義	林仁生		52.89	47.11 (0)	53.27	42.64 (0)	45.20	54.80 (1)	1	吳敦義	Yes
51	Nantou County 2	林明添	湯火聖	陳翠容	49.51	50.49 (1)	46.26	44.13 (0)	45.42	54.57 (1)	2	湯火聖	No

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU	Others <sup>2</sup>	2004 Presidential (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
						Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>				
52	Yunlin County 1	張嘉郡	陳憲中		蔡相生 黃山谷	40.06	59.94 (1)	49.22	34.52 (0)	44.48	53.35 (1)	2	張嘉郡 <sup>5</sup>	張嘉郡	Yes
53	Yunlin County 2	張碩文	劉建國		尹伶瑛 廖桂如 張昆煌 黃國華	39.32	60.68 (1)	49.81	42.28 (0)	44.48	53.38 (1)	2	張碩文 <sup>5</sup>	張碩文	Yes
54	Chiayi County 1	翁重鈞	蔡啓芳			36.70	63.30 (1)	44.04	50.65 (1)	38.30	61.70 (1)	3	蔡啓芳	翁重鈞	No
55	Chiayi County 2	蔡文生	張花冠	黃 茂		37.66	62.34 (1)	42.52	52.30 (1)	36.34	63.66 (1)	3	張花冠	張花冠	Yes
56	Chiayi City	江義雄	莊和子	凌子楚	林瑞霞	43.94	56.06 (1)	45.84	53.68 (1)	54.63	45.37 (0)	2	莊和子	江義雄	No
57	Tainan County 1	洪玉欽	葉宜津	陳俊倫		32.34	67.66 (1)	45.14	50.03 (1)	46.17	50.79 (1)	3	葉宜津	葉宜津	Yes
58	Tainan County 2	李和順	黃偉哲			33.57	66.43 (1)	44.19	49.56 (1)	45.37	52.19 (1)	3	黃偉哲	黃偉哲	Yes
59	Tainan County 3	吳健保	李俊毅			39.63	60.37 (1)	45.70	50.12 (1)	50.20	47.69 (0)	2	李俊毅	李俊毅	Yes
60	Tainan City 1	王昱婷	陳亭妃			36.91	63.09 (1)	43.96	53.42 (1)	36.55	63.45 (1)	3	陳亭妃	陳亭妃	Yes

Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	DPP	TSU	Others <sup>2</sup>	2004 Presidential (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction
						Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>				
61	Tainan City 2	高思得	賴清德			44.10	55.90 (1)	45.12	52.22 (1)	40.65	59.35 (1)	3	賴清德	賴清德	Yes
62	Kaohsiung County 1	鍾紹和	顏文章	江嘉盛		40.44	59.56 (1)	40.86	53.71 (1)	39.34	60.66 (1)	3	顏文章	鍾紹和	No
63	Kaohsiung County 2	林益世	余政憲	劉政璋		40.59	59.41 (1)	43.67	50.61 (1)	39.47	60.53 (1)	3	余政憲	林益世	No
64	Kaohsiung County 3	吳光訓	陳啓昱	徐慶煌 黃愈南 簡宏德 簡家弘		39.05	60.95 (1)	38.61	58.28 (1)	39.71	60.29 (1)	3	陳啓昱	陳啓昱	Yes
65	Kaohsiung County 4	江玲君	林岱樺	陳明政 楊東杰 張美媚		45.82	54.18 (1)	46.68	52.50 (1)	45.17	54.83 (1)	3	林岱樺	江玲君	No
66	Pingtung County 1	蔡豪	蘇震清	藍輝傑 張惠裕 王樹園 蕭立應		39.34	60.66 (1)	42.67	55.04 (1)	51.20	48.80 (0)	2	蘇震清	蘇震清	Yes
67	Pingtung County 2	王進士	李世斌			45.28	54.72 (1)	50.24	46.24 (0)	58.30	41.71 (0)	1	王進士	王進士	Yes
68	Pingtung County 3	蘇清泉	潘孟安	周碧雲		41.26	58.74 (1)	41.65	56.87 (1)	52.53	47.47 (0)	2	潘孟安	潘孟安	Yes

## Appendix 1 (Continued)

No.	Electoral district	2004 Presidential (%)				2004 Legislative (%)		2005 & 2006 Local (%) <sup>4</sup>		Winning freq.	Potential winner	Elected	Correct prediction			
		Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Others <sup>2</sup>	TSU	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>							
69	Taitung County	黃健庭	Pan-Blue <sup>1</sup>	盧博基	DPP	許志雄 劉尚宏	70.17	29.83 (0)	69.00	31.00 (0)	80.14	19.86 (0)	0	黃健庭	黃健庭	Yes
70	Hualien County	傅聰其	盧博基	盧寶珠 鍾尚廷 何智弘	TSU	廖益萬 鍾寶珠 鍾尚廷 何智弘	70.17	29.83 (0)	69.00	31.00 (0)	80.14	19.86 (0)	0	傅聰其	傅聰其	Yes
71	Penghu County	林炳坤	陳光復	陳中藏 黃中陽	TSU	陳中藏 黃中陽	50.53	49.47 (0)	59.87	39.47 (0)	50.69	48.16 (0)	0	林炳坤	林炳坤	Yes
72	Jinmen County	吳成典	唐惠禎	陳福海 李沃土 高振騰 胡傳生	TSU	陳福海 李沃土 高振騰 胡傳生	93.95	6.05 (0)	78.77	5.92 (0)	97.87	0.00 (0)	0	陳福海 吳成典	陳福海	Yes
73	Lianjiang County	曹顯忠 林惠官	曹成傑	曹顯忠 林惠官	TSU	曹顯忠 林惠官	93.78	6.22 (0)	95.60	4.40 (0)	97.41	0.00 (0)	0	曹顯忠 林惠官	曹顯忠	Yes

Sources: <http://map.mywoo.com/ty.html> and various news reports from mass media.

1. The pan-Blue coalition includes the KMT, the PFP, the NP, and the NPSU.

2. The others include independent candidates and other nominees from politically insignificant parties.

3. The pan-Green includes the DPP and the TSU.

4. The data are compiled from the 2005 county magistrate and city mayoral elections and the 2006 Taipei and Kaohsiung city mayoral elections.

5. Because of their factional backgrounds and local connections in Yunlin County, 張嘉郡 and 張項文 should have a good chance of winning.

## Appendix 2

### Electoral Information for the National At-Large District in the 2008 Legislative Yuan Elections

Magnitude = 34	1998 Legislative (%)		2001 Legislative (%)		2004 Legislative (%)			Potential votes (%) <sup>9</sup>	Potential seats
	KMT <sup>6</sup>	NP	DPP <sup>7</sup>	Pan-Blue <sup>8</sup>	NP	DPP	TSU		
KMT and PPP <sup>1</sup>	50.10			47.20			46.73	48.01	18
NP <sup>2</sup>		7.10			0.12			3.27	0
NPSU <sup>3</sup>				2.60				3.63	0
DPP <sup>4</sup>			31.10			33.40		33.41	13
TSU <sup>5</sup>							7.80	7.79	3

Sources: The Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (<http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/cec/vote4.asp>) and various news reports from mass media.

1. The KMT and the PPP's joint list-PR candidates are王金平, 洪秀柱, 曾永權, 潘維剛, 邱毅, 鄭金玲, 陳杰, 李紀殊, 張顯耀, 趙麗雲, 李嘉進, 廖婉汝, 紀國棟, 羅淑蕾, 李明星, 郭素春, 劉盛良, 鄭麗文, 鄭麗文, 徐少萍, 許舒博, 陳淑慧, 李全教, 許宇甄, 黃良華, 楊玉珍, 林正峰, 華興, 姚江臨, 邱美瑛, 江綺雲, 呂春霖, 邱國富, and 謝坤宏.
2. The NP's list-PR candidates are 周陽山, 雷倩, 高家俊, 林美倫, 徐宗慈, 郭家芬, 葛建埔, 孫吉珍, 李勝峰, and 郝慕明.
3. The NPSU's list-PR candidates are 劉憶如 and 陳傑儒.
4. The DPP's list-PR candidates are 陳師如, 蔡煌琅, 涂醒哲, 邱議瑩, 柯建銘, 黃淑英, 王幸男, 薛凌, 高志鵬, 陳璧, 余政道, 翁金珠, 蔡同榮, 田秋堂, 洪奇昌, 張富美, 游盈隆, 許榮淑, 游錫堃, 楊芳婉, 周清玉, 陳茂男, 吳明敏, 張秀珍, 范巽綠, 鄭素華, 王塗發, 張慶惠, 周光富, 劉美德, 施威芳, 羅依京, 尤瑪, 梁碩祥, and 陳慧玲.
5. The TSU's list-PR candidates are 陳永興, 陳玉峰, 賴幸媛, 施朝賢, 錢林慧君, 江偉君, 黃昆輝, 羅志明, 李宜潔, 范盛保, 張金生, 傅馨儀, 黃昭展, 葉津鈴, and 李安妮.
6. The figure includes the KMT and the Democratic Union (民主聯盟).
7. The figure includes the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Party (建國黨).
8. The pan-Blue includes the KMT and the PPP.
9. A given political party must win at least five percent of the votes cast in the general election to get a share of the PR seats.

### Appendix 3 Electoral Information for the Aboriginal Districts in the 2008 Legislative Yuan Elections

			1998 Legislative (%)		2001 Legislative (%)		2004 Legislative (%)		
			Pan-Blue	DPP	Others <sup>1</sup>	Pan-Blue <sup>2</sup>	Pan-Green <sup>3</sup>	Pan-Blue <sup>4</sup>	Pan-Green <sup>5</sup>
Mountain-Aboriginal District									
Magnitude = 3									
	孔文吉	侯金助	薛宜柔	宋仁和		90.62	7.54	88.96	10.12
	簡東明								
	林春德								
	高金素梅								
Out-of-Mountain-Aboriginal District									
Magnitude = 3									
	廖國棟	陳秀惠	宋進財			93.47	6.53	84.89	14.41
	楊仁福								
	林正二								

Sources: The Election Study Center of National Chengchi University (<http://vote.nccu.edu.tw/cec/vote4.asp>) and various news reports from mass media.

1. The others include independent candidates and other nominees from politically insignificant parties.
2. The pan-Blue includes the KMT and the National Democratic Non-Partisan Union (全國民主非政黨聯盟).
3. The pan-Green includes the DPP only.
4. The pan-Blue includes the KMT, the PFP, the NPSU, and the Taiwan No. One Party (台灣吾黨).
5. The pan-Green includes the DPP and the TSU.
6. The pan-Blue includes the KMT, the PFP, and the NPSU.



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