國立政治大學八十[illegible]學年度研究所博士班入學考試命題紙　第　頁

考試科目		所別		考試時間	月　日　上午/下午　第　節

考試科目	英文	所別	地政學系博士班	考試時間	六月廿四日（星期二） 上午08:20 — 10:00

請從後面所附三篇文章（A、B、C）中選出你覺得較有把握的一篇，閱讀完該篇文章之後回答下列四個問題：（請將你所選的文章題目抄寫於答案卷上）

一、以不超過五個關鍵詞整理出該文章的中英文關鍵詞（五分）

二、以不超過五百個字整理出該文章的中文摘要（十五分）

三、以不超過五百個字整理出該文章的英文摘要（二十分）

四、參照國內的社經發展背景，如何將該文章的精髓及內涵應用在你自己的專長或領域（六十分）

A

Optimism and pessimism in Bristol and Glasgow

This section briefly considers whether expectations in the housing market reflect local, national or individual characteristics and explores the links between stated expectations about the economy and the housing market. In the light of the differences between the two cities surveyed, it would be expected that perceptions and expectations would be systematically amongst owners in the two areas, shaped by the respective local experiences. Table 1 compares the responses in Glasgow and Bristol as to expectations of the future and shows a considerably more pessimistic view in Bristol than in Glasgow. Under half of all respondents in Bristol think that house prices might increase in the future, although this is actually the most common answer given. Approaching 20 per cent of those surveyed in Bristol believe that house prices might fall. In Glasgow the very great majority expect to see house price increases over the next two years, although it is interesting to note that there is a minority view that prices will decrease, which has not been a common experience in Glasgow to date. Uncertainty about price uses is associated with the belief that buying a house has become more risky, and is the most common response in Bristol, which is also held by 40 per cent of those surveyed in Glasgow, although in this more stable housing market the most common perception is that risks have broadly stayed the same. Overall, it appears that expectations about future changes in the two cities reflect the local, recent experience in the two housing markets.

Table 1 - Beliefs about future change

	Glasgow	Bristol
House prices will[1]:-		
Increase	63.4	45.3
Decrease	14.0	18.2
Stay the same	22.6	36.6
Total (= 100%)	**372**	**358**
Buying a house is now (cf 3 years ago)[1]:-		
More risky	40.5	43.2
Less risky	13.1	24.6
Same	46.5	32.2
Total (= 100%)	**383**	**382**
Interest rates will[1]:-		
Rise	62.6	50.4
Fall	15.0	14.5
Stay the same	22.4	35.0
Total (=100%)	**366**	**351**
Tax relief will[3]		
Rise	18.8	18.4
Fall	49.9	42.6
Stay the same	31.3	39.1
Total (= 100%)	**351**	**343**

Source: Household Survey, 1995

Note: Chi square significant at: [1] 1 per cent [2]5 per cent [3] 10 per cent

Table 1 also presents the expectations that owners held with respect to two major economic variables which would be expected to be of relevance to housing market decisions: interest rates and tax relief on mortgages. The general pessimism in relation to the future of interest rates and tax relief on houses is very evident. Glasgow respondents are more pessimistic overall than those in Bristol: a greater majority expect interest rates to increase and more expect tax relief to fall. Only a small minority in both cities expect the economic conditions to change in a way favourable to owner occupiers. Table 2 presents the same questions divided by type of owner, to assess the extent to which the decision to enter the housing market is associated with greater optimism about the state of the housing market and the future of economic variables.

Table 2 - Beliefs about future change, by type of owner

	Stayer	Recent mover	First time buyer
House prices will[1]:-			
Increase	47.9	53.5	60.5
Decrease	18.9	15.1	14.8
Stay the same	33.2	31.3	24.6
Total (= 100%)	190	284	256
Buying a house is now (cf 3 years ago)[1]:-			
More risky	52.1	42.4	32.3
Less risky	13.1	18.1	24.6
Same	34.7	39.5	43.1
Total (= 100%)	213	304	248
Interest rates will[2]:-			
Rise	53.9	54.3	61.2
Fall	14.7	12.7	17.2
Stay the same	31.4	33.0	21.6
Total (=100%)	191	276	250
Tax relief will[2]			
Rise	19.8	16.2	20.3
Fall	36.9	49.8	49.6
Stay the same	43.3	33.9	30.1
Total (= 100%)	187	271	236

Source: Household Survey, 1995

Note: Chi square significant at: [1] 1 per cent [2] 5 per cent [3] 10 per cent

Table 2 confirms that here are significant associations between activity in the housing market and expressed beliefs both about the housing market and the future course of economic variables. First time buyers are the most optimistic and 'stayers' are the most pessimistic about the housing market. First time buyers are more likely than other owners to think that buying a house has become less risky, although this remains the minority view. However, there is more pessimism about the future course of economic variables amongst those who have recently transacted in the market than those who have not moved. First time buyers, in particular, are most likely to expect interest rates to rise in the next three years and both traders and first time buyers are more likely to believe that mortgage interest tax relief will fall in the future. This is somewhat unexpected, in that a simple link might have been hypothesised between general economic optimism and propensity to move and buy a house. Instead, the data suggest a more complex picture where housing market risks are assessed and, arguably, buyers are entering the market with a generally pessimistic view and their eyes open: they have taken the risk of buying *despite* their expectations that the economic variables will move against them. In this sense, the decision to move does not seem to reflect any 'feel good' factor. It can further be argued that those who have not moved have had less reason to give serious consideration to what might happen to these variables in the future, which may underpin the greater expectation of stability that they give. Stayers are distinguished from other respondents by the extent to which they perceive buying a house to have become *more* risky compared to 3 years ago, suggesting that some of this group would have entered the housing market had they believed that conditions in the market were better.

When these relationships are examined for the two cities separately, it becomes clear that perceived riskiness of buying is only related to propensity to have moved in Bristol, but not Glasgow. In Glasgow, propensity to have moved is more strongly distinguished by expectations about future house prices as optimism about future price rises is least among stayers, higher for recent traders and highest for first time buyers (of whom 70 per cent expect price increases) while in Bristol, the relative pessimism about future price change is equally shared by all types of owners surveyed. This indicates that the local effects remain significant and impact differently upon different types of owners.

An obvious issue is whether expectations in the housing market are related to those about economic variables; do owners' make systematic linkages between expected housing outcomes and other factors? First, it was found that expectations with respect to housing market variables are strongly related: those who think that house purchase has become more risky are also disproportionately likely to expect prices to fall. Conversely, those who believed that house purchase had become less risky were also the most likely to expect price increases. However, the relationships between the housing market and economic expectations are relatively weak. Perhaps unexpectedly, there is no significant association between expectations about future house prices and either expected future interest rates or tax rate changes. The lack of any systematic relationship persists even when controlling for area and buyer type. There *is* a significant relationship between expectations of the future of interest rates and the future of tax relief: where pessimism about the two is the most commonly held view, and optimism is also typically associated. However, these consistencies are found only in Bristol and not in Glasgow. There is no relationship between perceived current riskiness of buying a house and interest rate changes and only in Bristol is there a significant association between perceptions of riskiness of buying a house and expected tax rate change. Here, an over-representation of those who believe that tax relief on mortgages will fall also believe that house purchase has become *less* risky, while a disproportionate number of those who expect tax relief increases think that house purchase has become *more* risky. This association is counterintuitive, in the sense that these respondents do not hold the expected consistency in beliefs between expectations that would be considered to be broadly 'optimistic' or 'pessimistic'.

There is, further, evidence of significant associations between some socio-economic characteristics and expectations in housing market. This would be consistent with a view that, say when considering the relative riskiness of house purchase, people evaluate their answer in relation to their own circumstances as much as their perceptions of general market conditions and political trends. This is witnessed when considering the relationship between household income and perceived riskiness of house purchase. There is some tendency for those with higher incomes to perceive house purchase to have become less risky, but a disproportionate percentage of those in the very highest income groups believe house purchase has become *more* risky. However, there is a strong association between respondents' assessment of how their own financial position has changed over the last three years and their beliefs about the riskiness of house purchase. Those who believe they are now better off are relatively more likely than other groups to believe that house purchase has become less risky, while those who believe they have become worse off are more likely than others to state that house purchase has become *more* risky. Interestingly, this subjective assessment of the change in their own financial position did not impact significantly on their expectations of house prices or interest rates.

In summary, analysis of the data from the structured survey show a rather complex picture. At the most aggregate level, expressed expectations about the housing market are consistent with the hypothesis that they would be shaped by local experience and also appear to influence the willingness to enter the housing market. However, it is also clear that people do not make simplistic connections between what they expect to happen in the housing market and other policy changes, which are shaped by political views and may also reflect a more general judgement of the future of economic policy. There are local differences, suggesting that recent experience in the housing market is influential. To understand better how expectations are taken into account, the more detailed evidence on the ways in which owners perceive economic variables and the way that they articulate the extent to which these factors impinge upon their decision-making process which is available in the qualitative survey is now considered.

Expectations for the future

For the trading owners in the qualitative sample, their own experience of the housing market had been of considerable instability. The high interest rates that had been experienced at the end of the 1980s were clearly remembered by some respondents. The fact that they have fallen more or less constantly since that time was regarded as being a bonus in terms of reducing housing costs more rapidly than expected. It also influenced the way financial choices about the next house were taken for the next house. Most of our respondents were very clear that they did not want to take the maximum mortgage possible, this was seen as being an important way of reducing the risks of an uncertain world; where financial, economic, labour market or family changes could all threaten a position too exposed to high costs and debts.

> *Interviewer 'How would you see interest rates going in the future?'*
> *Ms Graham 'Probably up (laughs).... probably up, I'm not sure.... At the time I was told that the highest they had been for so long had been 15% and I asked them to work out what my mortgage would be at 15%, just to see how I could afford it. I* ***could****, I wouldn't have a life, but I could still make it. So I didn't mortgage myself to the hilt and I had no intentions of ever doing that'. (FTB Glasgow)*

> *Mr Martin ' I would see them (interest rates) rising, but I don't see them going... much beyond, much over 10%. I would not see them going up to 15%. However, when we bought this property on a similar sort of ratio of income, then we were about 15% so.... I don't think we've over-stretched ourselves against the next property. And we have experienced, with the similar sort of ratio, what I would call high interest rates'. (Trader: Bristol)*

Other respondents remember the period of high interest rates as more of a struggle.

Mrs Walker ' At one point we were paying 16% in interest rates and of course it was spam we were eating, spam (laughs). Um, yes I think our first two years were hard'. (Trader: Glasgow)

Mrs Robb 'When I bought this house, interest rates were 15½%. The mortgage payments took over half my disposable income - you know take home pay. You know, they took over half of that. How we ever paid it, I don't know'. (Trader: Bristol)

These comments also implicitly reveal the extent to which people were willing to risk large debts in the booming property market of the late 1980s; indeed the conventional wisdom of the time was that it was worth taking the risk of a large mortgage because of the promise of returns in the future. These attitudes have not completely disappeared; one respondent directly echoes the sentiments of that time in relation to current choices.

Mrs Orr ' Next time, we've said, we always said we didn't stretch ourselves enough this time, we should have stretched up to the two bed (house). We should have done it, we would have had more space, it would have been easier to sell. We should have done it, we should have stretched ourselves, but we said oh no, we want to go out, we want to do this that and the other and we don't want to stretch ourselves - we only need a one bed. This time, before he (the baby) came along, we said next time we will stretch ourselves to the limit, you know me, won't make the same mistake twice'. (Trader: Bristol)

In one sense, this respondent is highlighting the particular problems that have impinged on the very bottom end of the market in Bristol; the relative affordability of larger and more attractive houses appears to have left the small starter homes market stranded, with little effective demand, as the current cohort of first time buyers is able to buy bigger properties. It is however interesting that the direct linkage made is between their unwillingness to have taken more of a risk last time and their current difficulties. There is, for instance, no comparative consideration of how much money might have been lost had they borrowed more. It also appears that the phrase 'stretching ourselves' which is frequently used in discussion about debts and financial management with the largely negative connotation of being in a position which is risky or hard to manage, is here used to suggest that they should have made more of an effort. In fact this respondent goes on to describe selecting a house some £10-£15,000 less than they could afford at the maximum.

As indicated, however, most people are actively seeking to find ways of reducing the risks they now feel are inherent in house purchase. The strategy described above involves limiting the amount of borrowing so that repayments would remain manageable if economic factors charge. Other people are now very conscious of the merit of having accumulated some equity in their house. This obviously reduces the likelihood of negative equity and eases the process of moving. The main strategies that are used for ensuring a greater accumulation of equity are to seek to put more of a deposit down at the time of purchase (sometimes at the behest of the lender) or to take a repayment mortgage.

> *Mr Todd ' A friend of mine has got a negative equity situation of about £9,000, but he's paid off that much on his mortgage, through the repayment mortgage. It means he's got to take out another 25 year mortgage when he starts, but in theory he hasn't lost any on it. Well, he hasn't got to pay any hard cash for it, it's just sort of paper money... We'd probably stay in the next house for at least 10 years.... If we take out a repayment mortgage hopefully that would cover any negative equity we had. (Trader Bristol)*

An interesting aspect of this account is that his friend's continuing monthly mortgage repayments do not seem here to be counted as 'real' money.

> *Mrs Arnold 'Yeah, it was a 100% mortgage but hopefully you know we'll have a deposit to put down for the next one... If there was a problem with it again I'll just stay put.. You know and save more so that I've got a big deposit to put down'. (Trader: Glasgow)*

Another important aspect of considering the future in the choice decision would be expected to be the consideration of the prospective saleability of the house. This might be considered either in relation to finding a house that others would also find attractive to buy or as a house that could be expected to accumulate value faster than others. This was an explicit consideration for some, frequently articulated in relation to the mistakes they had made in the past.

> *Mrs Orr 'I'd never do it again. I'd never buy a new property again, never, never ever' (Trader: Bristol)*

However, there was also a strong expectation for some that the next house was to be a long term prospect and the resale value was therefore irrelevant.

Mrs Robb 'Oh, I'm not moving again. That's it. I don't want to move anywhere again. I want to be settled, and the house that I'm going to buy hopefully is a house that I can live in, have a family and not want to move again'.

Interviewer ' Do you see housing now as an investment or as providing a roof over your heads?'
Mr Pitt 'I think it's... not really an investment, no, not now, not for the foreseeable future. I mean, it would just, it would.... you'd be buying a house for it to be our home, nothing more, nothing less really. If it gained all well and good, but even if it shot up in value, I wouldn't have thought we'd be too keen to sell. If we liked it there as our home'. (Trader: Bristol)

In general, although it was clear that people hoped they would not find themselves in financial difficulty through their choices in the housing market, very few will now say they consider purchase to be house as a potential way of making money. They are keen to debunk the idea that trading in the market might produce real returns or that they now expect, or have ever expected to make money on housing. However there is still a notion of investment, as a long-term return, in the sense that people identify one of the main advantages of owner occupation as ultimately getting something in return for the money spent. The long-term notion of investment is in this way linked with having something to leave to children.

Interviewer: ' Do you see housing as an investment for the future?
Mr Stevens ' I see at as being put to stay (laughs) oh no, I suppose it is, it obviously is an investment, but I think I would look on it more as an investment for like, I've got two children from my previous marriage and my fiencées three children from her previous marriage. So I think I would look on it as being helping them with their future. I don't, my personal experience has been that I've never bought property, sold it and made thousands of pounds off it that you can sort of stick in your back pocket and go oh that was a great bit of business there. So primarily it's somewhere

to rest my head at the end of the day. In the long-term it's the children's future'. (Trader: Glasgow)

In this sense, the theoretical complexity of the decision is reduced, because consumption motives can dominate, without having to have great regard to the asset values and aspects of choice. Overall, despite the uncertainties faced in the financial aspects of home ownership, the respondents' frequent direct experience of housing market instability and the ill consequences arising from that instability, the commitment to owner occupation remains very high. This emerges clearly in relation to whether renting might be a sensible alternative. For the established owners, renting does not merit serious consideration as a long term prospect, even though a few respondents expected to 'fall out' of owner occupation on a temporary basis. Typically renting was seen as a maverick idea.

Mr McLeod ' Well we do not want to pay rent and find out after about 20 odd years that you've got nothing for it' (Trader: Glasgow)

Mr Martin '(owner occupation) suits us better. I mean, we went through a phase of renting as students and that was fine at the time, but now this is what is right for us'. (Trader: Bristol)

For many of the first time buyers, the choice is a more real one, they are much more likely either to have been in private renting immediately before their move or to have expressly considered the choice. Interestingly, on balance, their experience of the private rented sector was rather good. However, the potential asset value of owner occupation was a decisive factor for some of these respondents, particularly as buying is actually cheaper in most cases.

Mr Morris ' I think you're mad if you don't buy a house' (First time buyer:- Bristol)

Ms McDonnel 'I'd heard about other students buying properties and I don't get any grants, it's my parents that pay for my education so rather than spending like £4,000 a year on rent surely you can invest the money in buying something' (First time buyer: Glasgow).

Again it seems evident that the theoretical complexity of the decision making process is reduced by making the tenure choice a prior decision. Once tenure choice has been made, the choice of the next house to live in is therefore restricted to those available to buy.

B

Fostering Technologies for Sustainability

One of the most fundamental flaws of today's economies is that they often insulate businesses and consumers from the environmental side effects of their actions. Even though one person's contribution to acid rain or smog harms other people's health and property, there is no practical way for the "victims" and "perpetrator" to meet in court or strike a compromise, especially since some of the victims are not even born yet. As a result, environmental destruction often seems cheap or free to its beneficiaries: in effect, they are cross-subsidized by the people whom they harm. Government intervention is indispensable to ending this self-destructive pattern.[38]

If traffic police handed out bonuses to people who stopped at red lights rather than ticketing those who did not, they would quickly drive local governments into insolvency. By the same token, any society that tries to subsidize itself all the way to sustainability, paying people not to pollute, will soon be bankrupt. Taxes and regulations on pollution and resource depletion are ultimately needed to level the economic playing field for environmentally sound ways of living and producing.

That said, targeted subsidies can sometimes play a useful role in protecting the environment—and will always be more popular. In late 1992, for example, a 1.5¢-per-kilowatt-hour tax credit for electricity from wind and biomass sailed through the U.S. Congress with little controversy. Only a few months later, President Clinton's energy tax proposal, which would have handicapped conventional sources by only 0.3¢ more, fell victim to vociferous industry and popular opposition. Subsidies for environmental protection, then, though a second-best policy solution, will likely be useful for decades to come.[39]

Funding specifically for research, development, and commercialization activities for new technologies can also grease the machinery of economic change. At their best, R&D subsidies work with the grain of culture, technology, and economics rather than against it, in order to leverage small amounts of money into enough technological change that the subsidies themselves become obsolete. The strength of such subsidies lies not in the brute force of megabucks but in careful design and experimentation. They are more catalytic than coercive.

In practice, however, the track record of R&D subsidies has been poor. One important example of both the strengths and the dangers of targeted commercialization subsidies is provided by the Green Revolution—the combination of new grain varieties, pesticides, fertilizers, and irrigation that received active government support in developing countries starting in the sixties. Though not without serious social and environmental side effects, the Green Revolution did persuade millions of risk-averse farmers to grow food in new, high-yielding ways, which reduced hunger even among rapidly growing populations. The revolution is now largely complete. Yet many of the subsidies that helped spawn it persist, skewing farmers' decisions about when, for example, pesticides are worth the costs and health risks.[40]

One realm in which subsidies for environmentally important technologies have worked fairly well is energy efficiency. Three of the most successful technologies supported by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)—heat-reflecting windows, electronic ballasts for fluorescent lights, and variable-capacity supermarket refrigeration systems—are now saving enough energy to easily justify DOE's entire $425-million efficiency R&D budget.[41]

Though tiny, the $23.7-million public investment in these three technologies was pivotal to their development. In all three cases, it was small companies, which would have had difficulty embarking on such risky research on their own, that vied for the initial grants. Only when their efforts bore fruit did established firms take notice. Most likely, then, it would have taken much longer for the

B

technologies to have developed without government help. The efficient windows, ballasts, and refrigerators already sold in the United States will save $8.9 billion in fuel costs over their lifetimes—375 times what DOE spent developing them.[42]

A key circumstance behind these impressive numbers is that with businesses and consumers spending so much on energy—$500 billion per year in the United States alone—one successful energy efficiency R&D grant can quickly save enough money to make up for dozens of failed ones. In contrast, public investments in new ways of producing energy have not paid off nearly as well. Western industrial countries alone spent $52 billion (in 1995 dollars) on energy R&D between 1990 and 1995. Forty-one percent of that was devoted to a single technology: traditional nuclear fission. Another 21 percent went for advanced fission and fusion technologies, which seem forever on the horizon. Only 17 percent went for renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies, which are growing rapidly in percentage terms and are less polluting and often more labor-intensive to produce and operate than conventional power plants. Thus the energy sources that are the least polluting, fastest-growing, and best job creators received the least support.[43]

People working at the grass roots, who have less money but a better sense of what is needed, have often had more success in catalyzing change. A U.S.-based nonprofit called Enersol, founded by a former nuclear and coal plant engineer, has parlayed modest grants from the World Bank, the Rockefeller Foundation, and other donors into the creation of a nearly self-sustaining solar industry in the Dominican Republic.[44]

Enersol's customers are rural peasants who want to bring electric light into their homes but have no access to the national electricity grid. The nonprofit does not pay for the imported solar panels, but instead has established a revolving loan fund that lets buyers spread payments over several years. The subsidy in this case is modest: some funding to train marketers and system installers and the willingness to risk losing part of the seed money should buyers default. But the leverage has been tremendous. By 1995, it had brought solar power to 4,000 families and created local employment. Other organizations are now copying the approach in China, Honduras, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe.[45]

These forays into technology commercialization and development hold several important lessons. The first is that including expiration dates in subsidies for specific technologies may be warranted to guard against their becoming entrenched despite failure or obsolescence. The second is that the bottom-up approach to technology commercialization typically works better than top-down because it tends to be more responsive to commercial imperatives such as making equipment reliable and meeting customers' needs. The last lesson is that, given governments' generally poor track record in picking winners, it may make more sense to favor broad-gauge subsidies, such as the U.S. tax credit for electricity generation from wind and biomass, over much R&D. By focusing more on results, governments can lessen the risk of subsidizing failures, and leave it to the market to pick winners.

Tellingly, the world's most successful wind power industries have arisen in countries where governments have spent little on R&D, instead favoring across-the-board production and investment incentives. Denmark, for example, instituted subsidies for both investment in and power generation from wind turbines in 1979, leaving the choice of technology to turbine buyers. It retired the investment credit in 1989 after advances had driven prices down and pushed

B2

installed capacity from next to nothing to nearly 300 megawatts. The industry continued to thrive.[46]

More recently, Denmark helped India spark a wind revolution of its own. Inspired by a demonstration wind farm built by the Danish foreign aid agency and spurred by tax breaks from the Indian government, local companies jumped into the wind business. At first they imported most of their components, but over time they cut costs and increased domestic value-added by drawing on the country's own manufacturing strength. By 1995 the Indian wind industry had created hundreds of new jobs and had catapulted to second in the world in annual capacity additions. The striking contrast with India's stagnant, problem-plagued domestic nuclear program suggests that wind technology is easily a better fit for the country's economy.[47]

Subsidy Reform for Sustainable Development

Worldwide, scattered subsidy reforms have occurred over the last decade. Fiscal more than environmental concerns have motivated most of them. Subsidy cutoffs following the collapse of communism in the former Eastern bloc are a prime example. Whatever has propelled them, the countries that have taken the first steps and, sometimes, missteps toward reform have offered the rest of the world valuable lessons on how best to proceed. That said, it is clear that many subsidies are as politically entrenched as ever. Clearly, comprehensive subsidy reform is no small task, but it is vital to making modern economies equitable and sustainable.

The conclusions that arise from applying the principles of good subsidy policy described earlier to the subsidies in place today can be distilled down to a few fundamental recommendations: withdraw almost all subsidies that perpetuate the cowboy economy; phase out protectionist subsidies that are now or will soon become, like dikes against a rising sea, unnecessary, ineffective, or too costly; target with precision what are now shotgun subsidies or completely replace them with other methods of helping the poor; and use a combination of broad-gauged incentives and more bottom-up approaches to speed the development of environmentally beneficial technologies. (See Table 8–2.)

Reform would make subsidies more useful, eliminate almost all of the $500 billion or more in direct costs to taxpayers and consumers, and help the environment. Subsidy reform would lower taxes and consumer prices, reducing the penalties for work and investment that taxes create. At the same time, farmers, companies, and consumers would begin to reduce pollution and use resources such as water and energy more efficiently. Unsustainable and polluting industries, from coal mining to virgin papermaking, would lose some of their artificial market advantage over more sustainable competitors such as solar panel makers and paper recyclers. The sooner reform began, the more orderly it could be, and the less pain would result from the dislocation of workers in losing industries. To the extent that the poor would lose out from higher prices for water and energy, they would be compensated by new, more efficient subsidies aimed directly at them.

Recent movements in the direction of reform include Brazil's cancellation in 1988 of the generous investment tax credits it had once offered to ranchers and farmers who cleared land in the Amazon; officials there believe this change contributed to the temporary deforestation slowdown that began at that time. The U.S.

Table 8–2. Critiques of and Remedies for Subsidies with Harmful Environmental Side Effects

Avowed Intent	Examples	Effects	How to Improve
Stimulating economic growth	Sales of timber, minerals, and land sometimes claimed by indigenous peoples, usually at below-market prices; tax breaks for forest clearance.	Usually slow economic traditional resource owners; cause massive environmental damage; reduce revenues.	Give traditional users more control over resources; sell resources at market rates; use savings to cut other taxes or fund public investment.
Protecting jobs in resource-based industries; protecting consumers from import dependence	Subsidies in most industrial countries for crop production, ranching, fishing, logging, or fossil fuel production.	Often fail to stem job losses or enhance national security; hurt workers in countries unable to offer subsidies; cost taxpayers and environment.	Convert subsidies for small operators to welfare; phase out where ineffective or too costly.
Reducing the cost of living, especially for the poor	Subsidies for water, electricity, and fuels.	Waste money because they usually benefit the poor least; discourage efficiency and renewable energy use.	Offer "lifeline" rates or free fuel coupons to poor customers; expand access; fund alternatives such as solar panels.
Supporting technological change	Subsidies for irrigation pesticides, and fertilizers in developing countries as part of "Green Revolution"; nuclear R&D.	Often continue operating after transition has been achieved or has failed, imposing unnecessary fiscal and environmental costs.	Halt for mature or failed technologies; subsidize the use of environmentally friendly ones; favor broad-gauged over selective subsidies.

SOURCE: Worldwatch Institute.

Congress has yet to reform the 1872 Mining Law, but it has placed a temporary moratorium on new mineral claims on public lands every year since 1994. Some developing countries, such as Indonesia, have cut agrichemical subsidies since the mid-eighties, partly in response to falling revenues from oil exports or the tightening vise of overseas debt, while encouraging the use of natural predators to control crop pests. And following the collapse of communism in the former Eastern bloc,

B4

the prices that businesses there pay for agrichemicals and fuel have shot up toward world levels. This has caused fertilizer and energy use to plummet, spurring the jolting economic contraction.[18]

When Belgium, France, Japan, Spain, and the United Kingdom eliminated or radically reduced coal subsidies, their combined output fell by half between 1986 and 1995. The imported coal that has replaced some of this output has in general contained less sulfur and ash, and has entailed less environmental damage in its mining. In the United Kingdom, moreover, coal consumption has also fallen, as natural gas from the North Sea has grabbed market share. As a result, U.K. carbon emissions have fallen during the nineties even as the economy has expanded—a rare phenomenon.[49]

Most of the coal subsidy cuts have been far from painless, unfortunately. In the United Kingdom—where the coal cutback of 27.5 million tons (48 percent) in three years was by far the largest and the most rapid—social ills such as high unemployment and drug abuse have struck many former coal towns. These tribulations dramatize both the seriousness of the trade-offs that policymakers sometimes face in deciding on subsidy reductions and the importance of trying to mitigate their effects.[50]

Though British Coal offered severance packages and some retraining, perhaps inevitably these have not been up to the formidable task of engineering a wholesale transformation of the job bases of dozens of local economies in just three years. Mine closing programs in Western Europe have often been slower, more generous, and more flexible. Miners in Baesweiller, Germany, for instance, will receive five years' notice if their pit is to close. In Belgian Flanders, the gradual mine closure program was once temporarily halted when local unemployment rose above the national average. Even in Europe, though, serious unemployment has often resulted from mine closings, showing that there is usually no easy way out.[51]

The choices in coal policy are unusually tough because there is no getting around the fact that coal use is a major source of greenhouse gases and other pollutants; but in some resource-based industries it is easier to reduce environmental harm while protecting jobs. The European Union took advantage of the maneuvering room in agricultural policy in 1993 when it decreased guaranteed prices for major crops and instituted flat per-hectare payments. In 1996, the United States leapfrogged the European Union in this direction by completely abolishing price guarantees for most crops in favor of fixed payments based on farmers' past production levels. Both these reforms are intended to support farmers' incomes but end the market manipulations that burdened farmers with complex regulations and encouraged overproduction and environmentally destructive farming.[52]

New Zealand almost completely eliminated farming supports in the mid-eighties—partly at the prompting of farmers themselves.

Remarkably, New Zealand almost completely eliminated its farming supports in the mid-eighties—partly at the prompting of farmers themselves, through the agency of the national Federated Farmers group. The move was part of a broader government effort to cut subsidies that had crept into many sectors of the economy over several decades, leading to high taxes and inflation that hurt farmers at least as much as other workers. After some difficult years of adjustment, during which the government wrote off many bad loans

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to farmers, the agricultural sector became much more efficient, and rebounded. Interestingly, New Zealand is now one of the few industrial countries where the number of farmers is rising.[53]

As with subsidies for producers, many subsidies for consumers remain in place worldwide, though here too some countries offer good examples for others to follow. The U.S. government, for instance, targets heating bill assistance at poor households in order to hold down costs and minimize the subsidy-induced incentive for energy use and pollution. Such targeting is rarer in developing countries. In Indonesia, although across-the-board kerosene subsidies have reduced the cost of living for most families in the poorest one fifth of the population, 90 percent of the payments actually benefit better-off people. If the subsidy were restricted to the neediest recipients, it could give them 10 times the benefit for the same cost, or the same benefit for one tenth the cost.[54]

In countries like Indonesia, where governments are strapped for cash and most economic activity occurs off the books, identifying and targeting the neediest for subsidization can be a daunting task. Yet there are proven, cost-effective ways to sharpen, if not perfect, subsidy focus even in developing countries. These include targeting particularly poor neighborhoods and regions, and involving schoolteachers, who know local communities well, in determining which families are deserving. Sri Lanka used such approaches to distribute "kerosene stamps" among the poorer half of the population, in order to soften the blow of the 1979 oil shock. In the same spirit, Sri Lanka is also among at least a dozen developing countries that offer "lifeline" rates for electricity: discounts on the first 20 kilowatt-hours or so used each month, enough to power a couple of light bulbs every evening.[55]

One problem with resource consumption subsidies, no matter how carefully targeted or vital to the poor they are, is that they handicap cleaner alternatives. This is why the U.S. government also offers some funding to help poor people invest in efficiency upgrades for furnaces and home insulation. In doing so, it lowers the very heating bills it is helping to pay. By the same token, if Sri Lanka and other countries continue to pursue a policy of using cheap energy to mitigate poverty, they will succeed better by subsidizing all the forms of energy used by the poor that are practical to subsidize. That would include renewable technologies such as solar panels, which are safer and cleaner than kerosene, as well as particularly appropriate in areas not reached by power lines.[56]

Much more than subsidy reform will ultimately be needed to right what is wrong with unsustainable modern economies. While societies will use subsidies to reward, they will need more fundamentally to use environmental taxes to penalize, and regulations to restrict. Yet as a political proposition, environmentally harmful subsidies have so many strikes against them that reforming them ought to be the easiest step along the path to environmental sustainability. The flaws of these subsidies bear repeating: they hike the cost of government; the resulting higher taxes and prices burden economies; the subsidies do little good even on their own terms; and they degrade the environment, further undermining long-term economic prospects.

Citizens and policymakers determined to forge economies that are just and prosperous for generations to come could do little better than to get out of the business of paying the polluter. If they cannot succeed in this, it is doubtful that they will prevail in the even tougher political fights for more fundamental reforms that lie beyond.

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The postwar United States, in fact, has witnessed two great human migrations: one, of Black workers and their families from the mainly rural areas of the South to the northern cities; a second, of White families from the central cities of metropolitan areas to their suburban rings. In quantitative terms, the second was the more important. Whereas 1,457,000 Blacks migrated from the South between 1950 and 1960, and another 1,216,000 between 1960 and 1970, the corresponding estimates for White migration to the suburbs were 5.8 and 4.9 million. Together, the two migrations resulted in a progressive occupation of northern cities by non-White populations. In the central cities of metropolitan areas of 1 million and more people, the proportion of non-Whites doubled between 1950 and 1970, reaching 25 per cent; the 12 largest central cities by then contained two-thirds of the Black population outside the South.

By 1980, Blacks made up nearly 22 per cent of the total in all central cities, as against a mere 5 per cent in their suburbs, but for the biggest cities the proportions were much higher: between 1970 and 1980, they went from 21 to 25 per cent in New York, from 33 to 40 per cent in Chicago, from 44 to 63 per cent in Detroit and from 41 to 45 per cent in St Louis; in Washington, where the proportion was already 71 per cent in 1970, it slipped marginally to 70 per cent a decade later. There was modest suburbanization of Blacks in this decade, but in none of these cases did Blacks make up more than 10 per cent of the suburban total, save in Washington where it reached nearly 17 per cent.

In addition came a great wave of people of Hispanic origin – from the Caribbean island of Puerto Rico, from Mexico, from other parts of Latin America and from Cuba – who by 1980 made up more than 10 per cent of total central city population but a much higher proportion in certain major cities nearly 20 per cent in New York, more than 27 per cent in Los Angeles, and nearly 56 per cent in Miami. And these figures were certainly serious underestimates, because of a large volume of illegal immigration. Finally, yet another major wave of immigration – across the Pacific, from eastern Asian countries like China, Taiwan, Korea, Hong Kong, Vietnam and the Philippines – made a major impact on West Coast cities like Los Angeles and San Francisco.

The motive for all the migrations was the same: improved economic and social status. But it operated in very different ways in each case. Whereas many of the Blacks who migrated north did so out of necessity – their traditional economic base, sharecropping, had been suddenly removed by the development of cotton-picking machinery in the early 1950s – the new White suburbanites were voluntary movers in search of better housing and general environment. Furthermore, though the Blacks moved unaided, the suburban White migration was powerfully assisted by federal policies. The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) had been created in 1934, a product of the Roosevelt New Deal; in 1949 the Housing Act established a Housing and Home Finance Agency (HHFA) to coordinate the activities of FHA and other official agencies. From the start, the emphasis of HHFA was on purchase of new homes; loans were easily available, on a 10 per cent down payment basis from FHA, and interest rates were low at first. Further, FHA established standards of construction and of appraisal, which became current throughout the building industry and which improved the quality and reliability of new home construction.

Logically, the new housing was built on land that was previously undeveloped. The widespread use of the septic tank – a device which is normally restricted to rural areas in Britain – together with almost universal car ownership, allowed a great deal of freedom in location; in particular, it meant that housing areas did not need to be as compact as in the interwar years. Thus sprawl developed in two ways: first, the house itself, and even more so its garden space (in American English, 'yard space') tended progressively to occupy more land, so that typical net residential densities dropped from ten to six and finally to between one and four houses to the acre; and secondly, the individual housing subdivisions tended to leap-frog, leaving areas of undeveloped land between them. Such far-flung development would have been inconceivable without mass dependence on the private car; but in turn the pattern encouraged further scatter, since the new suburban areas were typically too far from the city to make use of its shops or services. Thus big new shopping centres developed in, or between, the new suburbs, rivalling the older urban centres in scale and generally excelling them in design. Jobs tended to decentralize too – in the 1950s and 1960s, blue-collar manufacturing jobs, associated warehousing, and those service jobs that were tied to the needs of the suburban population; in the 1970s and 1980s, routine office work and even headquarters offices, drawn from their traditional downtown locales by the lure of cheaper land and the increasing availability of

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Plate 8.1 Levittown-Fairless Hills, New Jersey, USA. Postwar suburban development in the Atlantic urban region. Low-density single-family homes occupy subdivisions, with much leapfrogging of urban development over patches of vacant land. Commuting and movement generally in such areas depend almost exclusively on the private car.

the labour force in the next-door suburbs. After the mid-1950s an ambitious programme of inter-state highway (motorway) construction greatly eased the journeys of suburb-to-suburb commuters, further aiding the trend.

The suburban housing boom certainly performed a valuable service for many millions of Americans – in particular, those marrying and founding families, who made up record totals in the 1950s. Such people – ranging from highly paid managerial and professional groups, through the range of white-collar clerical workers, to the more skilled factory workers – enjoyed solid benefits from life in suburbia, whatever popular sociology might say by way of criticism: good well-built houses in pleasant neighbourhoods with congenial neighbours, good schools and convenient services. And the highly dispersed decision-making structure that guided the whole process did avoid massive social errors; like democ-



Plate 8.2 Milford Center, Milford, Connecticut, USA. Located in the fast growing suburban zone outside New York City, this is a good example of the suburban, edge-of-town, new shopping centres that have developed on a large scale for car-based shoppers in the United States since the Second World War.

racy in politics, it may have avoided the spectacular success, but it equally avoided spectacular failure.

Finally, with constantly rising prices, suburban house buyers found their purchase was a useful hedge against inflation, especially when prices rose sharply as in the mid-1970s.

The criticisms in fact are rather different. They are that the whole process could have been carried through so as to have given an equally good environment (or perhaps a better one) with less use of land and with lower resulting costs for public services, if the intervening undeveloped areas of land had been developed first; that sometimes the new suburbia was not as attractive visually as it might have been; and that, most seriously, the benefits have been denied to a substantial proportion of the total population. Comparing average mortgage payments

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with figures of annual earnings, it is not difficult to calculate that the possibility of buying a new house has been beyond the capacity of at least the whole lower half of the income scale. True, many of these could still hope to buy second-hand houses in the older residential neighbourhoods of the central city or the inner suburbs. But a substantial proportion were condemned to live in rented housing which, because of failings in the tax laws, tended to be left by its owners to decay.

And this problem may have actually worsened: by the end of the 1980s, at least in the more dynamic high-growth parts of the country, there were signs that continued suburbanization was failing to meet the needs of the great majority of the population. In the San Francisco Bay Area, where house prices escalated during the decade, it was calculated that a bare 17 per cent had the income to afford the deposit on the average-price home. One result was that in desperation, people were forced to search ever further from their place of work, where prices were lower; and this lengthened the daily commuter trip over freeways that had once been free-flowing, but now were increasingly gridlocked. To this must be added the problems of water supply, waste management and air quality, and the loss of open space and rural qualities in huge swathes of land around the major metropolitan areas. The almost inevitable result was the growth of special-interest groups devoted to maintaining and enhancing the quality of environment, but also to stopping further development: the arrival of the Nimby (Not In My Back Yard) movement as a dominant political philosophy of the 1980s. Everywhere from New Hampshire and Virginia to the San Francisco Bay Area and the Central Valley of California, these problems of growth and spread came to dominate the life of the average American. But the result was to add one more turn to the screw, making it perversely even harder for new arrivals to enter the housing market.

In contradistinction to Britain and many other European countries, the United States does not cushion the lower-income group to any extent by providing new public housing; over the period 1945–70, less than 3 per cent of all non-farm housing starts were in the public sector, as against about 57 per cent in Britain. Nor, until the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1970, was there any federal funding to develop new towns on the British model.

By concentrating so heavily on house construction for sale in an inflating market, and by failing to provide a stock of new well-designed housing for lower-income groups, then, American postwar housing policies have in effect condemned a large part of the people to live in poor, run-down, overcrowded neighbourhoods. At the same time, successive attempts to upgrade these inner urban areas have not had conspicuous success, with the exception of a number of major central business district redevelopments and a whole series of gentrified neighbourhoods, both of which ironically have displaced even more low-income and minority residents. As a result, American society is becoming increasingly stratified by income, occupation and race. Even if the suburban development process cannot bear the whole blame for this, it must bear a part. Moreover, and

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associated with this last criticism, the United States has had as little success as most other countries in remodelling its local government structures to grapple with the metropolitan problems which face it. The local pressures against change have been too strong; and, in the nature of the American system, the leverage exerted at the centre has been too weak.

In fact, many federal programmes actually rebounded against the disadvantaged low-income inner city resident. Urban renewal programmes, carried through under the 1949 Housing Act, became synonymous in many cases with bulldozing the homes of low-income residents, and there was all too little provision of alternative housing for those displaced. The proposals for rehabilitation of existing housing under the 1954 Act – designed to meet criticisms of the earlier urban renewal programmes – failed to have the expected impact on the condition of inner-city housing. In the 1960s, it is true, policies were redesigned to focus help on central city residents; more federal mortgage aid was concentrated on cheaper central city housing, and the federal government took the lead in trying to coordinate welfare and social service programmes for low-income families there.

This trend towards social planning, which was well marked in the 1970s, really indicates recognition that the problems of American low-income city residents – above all the non-White ones – have to be viewed as a whole; housing and physical planning form only a small part of the bundle of policies needed to deal with a complex problem. By 1980, unemployment rates in major central cities were often very high: nearly 9 per cent in New York, over 9 per cent in Chicago, over 14 per cent in Detroit, for instance.

They were particularly high, 35–40 per cent, for non-white teenagers and ran at over 20 per cent for the 20–24-year-old non-White group. In 1984, only 58 per cent of all young Black males, or 34 per cent of those aged 18–19, had jobs at all.

The result was huge concentrations of poverty. Even on very conservative official definitions, the numbers of poor people in central cities rose from 8 million to nearly 13 million between 1969 and 1982, nearly 20 per cent of the total. Further, these poor people were increasingly segregated in ghetto areas. In the 50 largest cities of the United States, the numbers living in officially defined poverty areas rose by more than 20 per cent between 1970 and 1980, even though total populations dropped by 5 per cent; but in the five largest cities – New York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Detroit – the position was much more extreme: the poor population rose by 22 per cent, but the population living in poverty areas rose by 40 per cent in only ten years and the numbers of poor people living in those areas increased by 58 per cent. In other words, the poor were being increasingly segregated in islands of urban poverty, shut off from the mainstream economy and mainstream society. Many Black families are thus caught in a vicious circle of poor job opportunities, poor education and family breakdown. It is small wonder that indices of social malaise – such as crime (especially violent crime), illegitimate births, drug abuse and poor health – are

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

Plate 8.3 A ghetto area. This is fairly typical of the racial ghettos that exist on a large scale in the inner areas of many American cities. Black people – many of whom have moved from the rural South since 1945 – find it difficult to escape into the suburbs where the better housing and job opportunities are found.

much higher in those areas where non-Whites are concentrated.

To cope with such problems, the central cities found themselves facing a progressively larger tax burden. In particular, police and fire services, aid to dependent children and educational expenditures were disproportionately high in cities like New York, Chicago, Boston and Detroit. The share of local and state spending that is funded by the federal government nearly doubled from 1950 to 1975. But this mainly reflected highway expenditure; only recently has local welfare expenditure benefited much. The flight of richer people and of industry from the cities has left them with rapidly increasing needs and a shrinking tax base, and Washington has had to step in. Between 1957 and 1978, it is estimated that, for a group of larger cities, direct federal aid rose from an average 1 per cent of spending to a staggering 47.5 per cent. Many non-Whites found themselves trapped in a vicious circle of social problems and rising expenditures from which they could not escape. Racial disturbances in the cities during 1967–8 intensified the desire of many Blacks to leave, but hardened the barriers against them in the White suburbs. Continued migration from the South, coupled with a high rate of natural increase, made many major cities more than half Black by 1980. To make matters even more problematic, during the 1970s and 1980s employment as well as White population was leaving the cities for the suburbs; not only did this intensify the cities' financial crisis, but it reduced the pool of well-paying jobs available within easy travelling distance to the Black city populations.



Figure 8.2 The Atlantic Urban Region: (a) Population densities, c. 1960; (b) Potential development by the year 2000. The Atlantic seaboard from Boston to Washington – 'Megalopolis', in the term of the geographer Jean Gottmann – is one of the greatest massings of humanity in the world, with over 30 million people. It is an example of a highly complex multinuclear urban structure, where the growth of one city impinges on that of another.

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

Plate 8.4 Baltimore Inner Harbour. One of the outstanding cases of 'urban revitalization' in the core of an old American industrial-port city, this 'festival marketplace' is now one of the biggest tourist attractions in the United States.

To these dilemmas, two kinds of solution appeared in the 1970s and 1980s. The first was public–private partnerships, in which cities allied with private developers – with major injections of federal and state money in the form of grants for public works, subsidies linked to private leverage, and tax exemptions including the designation of enterprise zones, as well as new institutional forms such as development corporations – to regenerate a major part of their decayed inner city area, often an old port area or an abandoned railroad freight yard, via a major construction-plus-rehabilitation project. The classic models were Baltimore's Inner Harbour (Plate 8.4), Boston's Quincy Market and Waterfront, San Diego's Horton Plaza and a score of imitators. (In Britain, the same phenomenon was observable on an even bigger scale in the London Docklands.) Critics might argue that this was simply urban renewal all over again – indeed, in Boston and in Baltimore one follows the other in an unbroken line – but now the ambitions are greater: against a background of unprecedented deindustrialization and urban decline, the transformation of decayed industrial and port cities into leading centres of the new service economy, through a combination of producer services, theme park entertainment, leisure shopping and street theatre. It can be criticized, indeed has been criticized, but it may be the only effective way of bringing employment to the most deprived inner city ghetto areas.

This raises a final and disturbing question. As the new information technologies permit ever more distant decentralization of urban activities, what is the role

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of the traditional central city? Even if some cities manage to survive through their special qualities – New York, Chicago and Los Angeles as major world centres, Boston and San Francisco as centres of education and technology, culture and tourism, Atlanta, Dallas and Denver as regional nodes – can all of America's older cities survive? Or do they represent some historic anomaly, destined to disappear like the ghost towns of the American West? Or is their fate to become theme park museums which recall the places they once were?

The other solution to the problem of the cities was somehow to bring the cities and the suburbs into some sort of closer relationship. As in most other countries, the political geography of the twentieth-century United States has long ceased to represent social or economic reality. City boundaries have been hardly extended for half a century, during which time suburban expansion has extended the effective urban area many times. From the start, it suited many suburban communities to go their own way and make their own rules; in the 1950s and 1960s, as the cities plunged into their vicious circle of poverty and civic bankruptcy, to maintain independence became for the suburbs a matter of survival. Consequently, though intellectual voices were raised in favour of metropolitan governments which would plan city and suburbs as a single unit for the common good of both, real-life experiments in this direction were few. Only Greater Miami went for full-scale metropolitan government, while Minneapolis and its suburbs adopted a looser form of federation. In other areas, like San Francisco, regional government initiatives foundered during the 1970s in the face of opposition from suburban localities – though San Francisco was making another effort at the start of the 1990s.

國立政治大學八十六學年度研究所博碩士班入學考試命題紙　第　頁

考試科目	土地經濟分析	所別	地政研究所	考試時間	6月24日 星期二 下午第 / 節

一、寇斯（Coase,R.H.）1960 年發表了「社會成本問題」（The Problem of Social Cost）一文，文中他提出了「透過協商」方式來解決外部性問題，請問寇斯和庇古（Pigou,A.C.）對於外部性問題的解決方法有何不同？為什麼有許多學者對於寇斯所提出的方法有所爭論？爭論的焦點為何？（25 分）

二、土地由低價值使用（例如農業區）變更為高價值使用（例如住宅區）的時候，往往被要求提供部分土地或代金作為改善地區公共設施使用，請問該課徵是否會產生轉嫁現象？在什麼條件下會產生土地閉鎖效果？並請繪圖說明。（25 分）

三、都市區位地租和都市獨占地租有沒有差別？請說明之。並請繪圖說明都市獨占地租的內涵。（25 分）

四、請問您適用於台北市容積獎勵的法令有那些？這些法令的政策目的為何？您是否能繪圖闡釋實施容積獎勵的經濟意義？當台北市在引用容積獎勵法令的時候，是否應該考慮台北市的總量管制？如果需要，又應如何管制？（25 分）

國立政治大學八十六學年度研究所博/碩士班入學考試命題紙　第　頁

考試科目	平均地權理論	所別	地政研究所	考試時間	6月24日 星期二 上/下午第二節

一、平均地權之基本觀念與重大作用何在？並試以經濟學觀點予以詳析之。（二十五分）

二、試以寇斯（Coase R.）之財產權理念，析論平均地權之土地所有權制度之內涵。（二十五分）

三、平均地權制度之本旨在於追求最大「公共利益」之滿足，並確保「私人利益」之充實，試詳析兩者之內涵及其在土地所有權制度上之意義。（二十五分）

四、試以公平正義之觀念，詳析平均地權制度下以上級所有權理念徵收私有土地所有權之應有作為。（二十五分）