

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告 期末報告

國際合作的意義空間協商及其溢出效果：以中加關係為例

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計畫主持人：吳得源

計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：許凱棻
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報告附件：出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文

處理方式：

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中文摘要：國際合作的意義及空間協商以及溢出作用：以中加關係為例
(摘要)

本項研究計畫專注於國際合作的雙邊面向，檢視雙邊合作所涉及的意義及空間協商(meaning/spatial negotiations)過程以及其在特定政策範疇執行所產生該範疇合作之外的其他溢出效應(spill-over effects)。本計畫是以中加關係為例，運用從1970年雙邊建交前後到1990年代中後期的加拿大的官方解密檔案以及中國大陸相應文獻，探討加拿大如何藉由環境與發展領域上高等教育人才培育或公私部門人力資源培訓，對中國大陸環境治理及其他環境與發展以外領域產生何種效應。研究過程中，以社會建構論、新制度論等提供的「行動者的權力、利益與身分的可塑性」、「雙邊互動的意義與空間協商」或「行動者和制度結構的相互構成」等三大基本命題作為蒐集與分析資料的參考過濾架構(frame of reference)。

本計畫規劃分成兩個主要部分：第一階段將側重國際合作與意義/空間協商的理論探討以及中加1970年建交前後擴展雙邊關係、推動雙邊交流的種種嘗試；第二階段則以1980年代中期以來中加以環境或發展為雙邊合作主軸，特別是呈現在高等教育人才培育以及公私部門人力資源培訓議題上的意義與空間(項目範圍)協商，探討雙邊合作關係制度化如何影響中國大陸環境治理以及公私部門或知識社群如何看待利益、身份或對加國態度等溢出作用。

中文關鍵詞：國際合作、社會建構論、環境與發展、政策學習、中國環境治理、加拿大外交政策

英文摘要：The Meaning and Spatial Negotiations of International Cooperation and Its Spill-over Effects: A Case of Sino-Canadian Relations
(abstract)

The research project aimed to focus on the bilateral aspect of international cooperation and to examine the meaning and spatial negotiations involved in international cooperation process as well as its spill-over effects on areas in addition to the specific domain. The project used Sino-Canadian Relations as illustration and, through 1970-1990s Canadian archival documents and corresponding Chinese sources on human resources cooperation on environment and development, explored how Canada made an impact on China's environmental governance as well as domains outside the realm. It took serious some propositions derived from Social Constructivism and New Institutionalism and use them as "frame of reference" when collected and analyzed those archival materials.

The project will involve two stages of research: first of all, the meaning and spatial negotiations in cooperation as

well as the general picture of Sino-Canadian exchanges and various measures taken during post-1970 period; the second stage with a special focus on bilateral cooperation in environment and development mainly from the mid-1980s onward.

英文關鍵詞：International Cooperation, Social Constructivism, Environment and Development, China Environmental Governance, Canadian Foreign Policy

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫 期中進度報告
V 期末報告

國際合作的意義空間協商及其溢出效果：以中加關係為例

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計畫主持人：吳得源

共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：梁依婷、許凱棻、陳泓儒、曾韋霖、張嘉舫

本計畫除繳交成果報告外，另含下列出國報告，共 ____ 份：

移地研究心得報告

V 出席國際學術會議心得報告

國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告

處理方式：除列管計畫及下列情形者外，得立即公開查詢

涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，一年 V 二年後可公開查詢

中 華 民 國 105 年 2 月 29 日

國際合作的意義及空間協商以及溢出作用：以中加關係為例
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本項研究計畫專注於國際合作的雙邊面向，檢視雙邊合作所涉及的意義及空間協商(meaning/spatial negotiations)過程以及其在特定政策範疇執行所產生該範疇合作之外的其他溢出效應(spill-over effects)。本計畫是以中加關係為例，運用從1970年雙邊建交前後到1990年代中後期的加拿大的官方解密檔案以及中國大陸相應文獻，探討加拿大如何藉由環境與發展領域上高等教育人才培育或公私部門人力資源培訓，對中國大陸環境治理及其他環境與發展以外領域產生何種效應。研究過程中，以社會建構論、新制度論等提供的「行動者的權力、利益與身分的可塑性」、「雙邊互動的意義與空間協商」或「行動者和制度結構的相互構成」等三大基本命題作為蒐集與分析資料的參考過濾架構(frame of reference)。

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關鍵字：國際合作、社會建構論、環境與發展、政策學習、中國環境治理、加拿大外交政策

The Meaning and Spatial Negotiations of International Cooperation and Its Spill-over Effects: A Case of Sino-Canadian Relations

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Key words: International Cooperation, Social Constructivism, Environment and Development, China Environmental Governance, Canadian Foreign Policy.

(一) 前言：

本項專題研究計畫從計畫構思、提出到核准與實際執行，時間超過兩年。本期末報告除前言與研究目的外，謹就本期執行期間的文獻探討、研究過程與方法及成果略作說明。

本研究計畫緣起主要是：「國際合作」在實務界早已被視為國家政策的重要一環，除外交部業務主要涉及這方面之外，在全球化趨勢下，大部分政府或學術部門均廣泛設有「國際合作」專責單位，負責國際交流與合作的推動與聯繫事項。長久以來，「國際合作交流」並作為維繫、深化或提升對外雙邊關係的重要政策工具，但除極少數研究（如：對外援助）之外，在學術界常常被視為是所當然，極少被問題化(problematized)，也鮮少成為有系統探討的研究「標的」(object)。再者，現有學術研究文獻處理國際合作多以「多邊合作」為主要關注對象與一般功能性公部門或政策實務界強調「雙邊交往合作」有相當落差。另外，「國際合作」除可能有國際層面的外溢效果，在國內層面也可能影響國內政策界定與執行或影響國內菁英或民眾對夥伴國的態度。加拿大在西方國家與中華人民共和國交往中比較具有特殊、「相對中性」色彩，因而中加關係可以作為本專題研究的初步觀察對象。

(二) 研究目的：

本研究計畫是以中加關係為例，運用從 1970 年雙邊建交前後到 1990 年代中後期的加拿大的官方解密檔案以及中國大陸相應文獻，探討加拿大如何藉由歷史傳承與優先建交的優勢推動與中華人民共和國的雙邊合作，特別是 80 年代以後藉由環境與發展領域上高等教育人才培育或公私部門人力資源培訓，對中國大陸環境治理或其他環境與發展以外領域產生何種效應。研究基本假設是：雙邊關係沒有過去的民族主義歷史上不快經驗是否即減少中國決策者對合作對象國的「和平演變」動機或「真心誠意度」有深度戒心懷疑，進而甘心接受，正面影響後者合作項目在中國大陸境內的推動成效？

(三) 文獻探討（請一併參見「參考文獻」）

本期研究計畫成果涉及研究文獻種類繁多，大致將本期研究計畫的成果與文獻探討再區分成以下區塊：(1) 國際關係理論與國際合作；(2) 加拿大角色；(3) 中加關係正常化前後的交往；(4) 中加環境合作。茲分別呈現如下：

(1) 國際關係理論與國際合作：

在國際關係之中，「合作」常和「衝突」作對比，並常常被視為「戰爭」與「和平」的延伸層面，在國際關係學門與理論發展中，就一直被視為國際關係的關注主要狀態。尤其，在 19 世紀多次武裝衝突和一次大戰與二次大戰爆發的陰影下，當時現實主義(realism)與理想主義(idealism)對戰爭與和平的種種爭辯，乃至後來前者逐漸凌駕成為國際關係主導的觀點下，毋寧是較偏向「衝突」或戰爭爆發原因的研究。這種偏向戰爭與衝突往往表現在 1980 年代及之前的一些經典專書書名上。例如：Kenneth N. Waltz 的 *The Structure of Foreign Relations*, Robert Gilpin 的 *War & Change in World Politics*, 「衝突」成為當時國際關係學界熱門面向影響所及，甚至當時由 Michael Banks 所彙編、提出號稱「世界社會」(World Society) 新觀點、強調國際上蘊含「社會」及蛛網交織(cobweb)特徵、隱含面向國際「合作」的專書 *Conflict in World Society* 也不能免俗的以「衝突」作為標題。同時，在國際體系「無政府狀態」(anarchy)下，國家的自利與自

助(self-help)被視為理所當然，「衝突」常被現實主義者假定是國際關係的「常態」情況，「合作」或「和平」則被假定是「一時」的例外，要如何克服衝突或戰爭的缺陷，創造和平或持續合作的條件，於是成為國際關係研究的衍生或附帶的課題。

傳統國際關係學術界對「合作」的處置，雖然提及頻繁卻多停留在是所當然(taken for granted)或將它廣泛視為更重要的「衝突」的相對應的狀態。這種偏向「衝突」情況除上面列舉之外，甚至進入到1990年代或世紀之交仍復如此，Joseph Nye的《認識國際衝突》(Understanding International Conflicts)即為一例；許多有關國際關係理論發展也常以「衝突與合作」作為標題(如：Genest 1996)或實質偏重「衝突」的理論化(如：Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1990)如果「合作」被單獨凸顯為研究課題，極多研究文獻所關注在：什麼因素觸發「合作」、如何維繫「合作」。就此而言，因而較強調「國際合作」作為「因變項」(dependent variable)，或相關的研究著重在「合作」的「範圍大小」(size)之上。除了強調「互惠」可以維繫「合作」的持續也留意到雙向的關係以及正向「回饋」強化合作的廣度或深度外，上述「因變項」導向的觀點常忽略「合作」作為「自變項」(independent variable)造成的合作本身以外的其他效果。(Touval and Zartman 2010: 230-232)

事實上，自變項導向的「合作」觀點，並非完全付諸闕如，強調對外援助的「合作」計畫(programs)帶來多大的或哪方面的作用，向來是發展援助(development aid)計畫中極為重要的一部份，也是「政策評估」的重要關注對象。(國際合作發展基金會 2007)然而，這些對「發展合作」產生效應的評估從早期偏重「經濟成長」目標的達成程度，1980年代逐漸也朝向「社會公平」(如：扶貧、婦女地位是否獲得改善)，或進入1990年代以來附帶強調的「善治」(good governance)或「能力建設」(capacity-building)等層面，卻較少直接觸及到的是政治或其他政策範疇層面在受援國內部發酵，甚至促成行為者行為、態度的朝向民主法治的「改變」效果。就此而言，「合作」和一個國家外交「軟實力」(soft power)的結合，是可能造成相對國家或甚至大眾或菁英本身的被「和平演變」，因此「溢出效應」是國際合作值得探索的重要政治與政策問題。

回到「國際合作」來說，國際關係一般性理論觀點(現實主義 realism、自由制度主義 liberal-institutionalism、社會建構論 social constructivism)針對「合作」與「衝突」的論爭，延續著對國際和平的樂觀與否及「永恆性」的看法歧異上，也常常著眼在「合作究竟是出自一時或永久」的狀態，這一取向研究的政策意涵即在於要設法找到能持久維繫的合作機制或途徑。現實主義將「合作」視為國家追求權力與國家利益的手段而非目的，甚至以「合」養「戰」、以合作為下回合的「衝突」作準備，合作因而是一時、相對短暫、權衡利弊得失後的理性選擇；自由制度主義則樂觀認為合作可以持續，藉由國際組織與建制等合作平台或機制的創設發展，為持續合作提供充分的誘因，合作本身就是國家與國際關係發展的目的。與此脈絡相關的「功能主義」(functionalism)更認為在「低階政治」(low politics)領域的合作可能溢出到「高階政治」(high politics)領域的合作。社會建構論則強調無政府狀態及衍生的衝突並非一成不變的國際關係發展的終極宿命所在，關鍵在於國家等行為者的「利益」與「認同」如何在互動過程中被塑造或重塑，使得他們相信「合作」是可能與可欲的。

現實主義者 Kenneth N. Waltz 認為國際體系限制國際合作的前景，主權國家在相對獲利與不確定狀態下會擔心「合作」是否造就國與國的「依賴」關係，認定不符合國家主權獨立與平等、有礙國家安全的追求(Waltz 1979: 105-7)，這說明現實主義對國際合作可能對國際關係產生負面的溢出作用有所顧慮。現實主義和前述「功能主義」雖然對「合作」的一時手段或長久目的看法有所歧異，卻共同關注「國

際合作」可能在國際關係上產生「溢出作用」。

從上述來看，「國際合作」不只對國與國關係有所影響，不論是鞏固或深化國際關係（如：前述「功能主義」(functionalism)強調從「低階政治」(low politics)議題「溢出」(spill over)到「高階政治性」(high politics)議題)，或如同 Waltz 所慮及的「負面」依賴效應。在當事國各自內部也有「溢出作用」。國際關係學門傳統上專注於國際層面的溢出作用，有關當事國各自內部可能產生的「溢出作用」則涉及到國關學門和比較政治或公共政策的若干重疊之處。因此，國際合作及其溢出效應議題涉及「國內」與「國際」的連結領域(frontiers)(Rosenau 1997)。

從比較政治或公共政策角度來看，「國際合作」對執政者、政黨或所屬官僚機構而言，是作為「政策學習」(policy learning)的重要管道，本身也可歸在「交往」(engagement)作為三大類「政策工具」(policy instruments)的額外類別。(Howlett and Ramesh 1995: 80-102)「國際合作」既然作為國家政策發展的重要政策工具，也涉及國家或該國執政黨「能力的建立」(capacity building)的調適過程。就國家能力的建設而言，在現代歐洲民族型國家(national states)歷史發展上經歷「功能分化」(differentiation of functions)的過程。對外交往、聯繫與交流相關事務，在建國建立(state-building)也劃定在外交或國際事務部門的主管範圍。(Tilly 1990) 隨著國際交往日漸密切與全球化的趨勢下，政府部門不論是中央或地方層級均有跨國網絡連結(Global Government Networks) (Slaughter 2004) 國際合作也涉及非政府組織或公民社會之間的跨國合作(Rohrschneider and Dalton 2002)，這一部份不僅只於多邊各方，在雙邊關係上同樣具有意義。

國際關係對國際合作的現有研究文獻大部分也偏重在「多邊主義」場域的合作，許多對國際合作的理論建構或界定也侷限在多邊主義觀點，欠缺對雙邊性合作應有的關注與理論化。(Doran 2010; Hampson 2010; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Touval 2010; Young 1989; Zartman and Touval 2010a; 2010b) 以新近 I. William Zartman 和 Saadia Touval 合編的專著《國際合作》(International Cooperation)為例，他們將合作界定為「當事各方同意一起協力，以創造單方行動無法獲致的新得利狀態」。(Zartman and Touval 2010: 1) 這一定義本身即具有明顯的多邊合作色彩，是否適用在雙邊合作關係上有待探討。

(2) 加拿大角色：

本研究計畫初期以 1970 年代初期加拿大官方檔案為主要蒐集範圍。這牽涉到加拿大在本項計畫案例作為媒介上與官方資料上的雙重重要性。在案例媒介上，首先，加拿大是第一個在與中共建交談判中面臨後者堅持必須對「台灣問題」表態且最終形諸於建交公報上的西方國家，且在 1970 年 10 月 13 日順利達成建交「破冰」後隨即引發不少國家與中共建交的連鎖效應，同時也對中華民國在 1971 年聯合國第 26 屆大會「中國代表權」保衛戰造成間接或直接衝擊。其次，加拿大並不像主要西方國家如英、法、德、美、日等國家有類似「帝國主義」遺緒或政策，因而在他們與中共交往時常面臨「霸權侵凌」的「原罪」或歷史包袱衍生的正當性質疑，加上加拿大有二次大戰前後白求恩(Norman Bethune)教士的捨身奉獻等歷史傳承以及過去重要領導人物如杜魯道(Pierre Elliott Trudeau)總理及特別外交顧問 Ivan Head 和毛澤東與周恩來等跨國菁英情誼乃至若干決策範疇的重要推動者（如環境議題的 Maurice Strong）對當代中共領導人的好感與網絡連結，使得加拿大順理成章成為中國大陸加入世界初期以來獨特且相當倚重的國際合作夥伴。另一方面，加拿大在中國大陸進入世界過程扮演的重要媒介角色，也呈現在中國大陸第一任駐加拿大大使黃華在中共進入聯合國後即轉任中共第一任駐聯合國首席副代表

的職務。再者，在冷戰期間，相對於美國對蘇聯與中共的圍堵(containment)政策，加拿大主張對中共交往(engagement)政策並在1960年代前後積極推動該一政策，(影響所及，在聯合國「中國代表權」議題上加國在1960年代中期即曾推動「一中一台」政策)以及同期間其「中型外交」(Middle Power Diplomacy)的聲譽斐然、參與聯合國維持和平的作為及活躍在聯合國體系包括防止海洋污染國際海事組織、國際海洋法會議等多邊舞台並多受到國際高度的肯定，也有助於中共在加入聯合國後將其納入政策諮商的重要西方夥伴。

由於加國自冷戰期間以來利用其「中型國家」身份以拓展其國際活動空間並在美蘇兩超強間、美歐間以及西方國家與開發中國家的南北關係中積極創造外交利基(niche)，遂行「中型國家國際主義」(Middle Power Internationalism) (Pratt 1990; Smith and Sjolander 2013)，其駐在各主要國家及聯合國體系的外交官透過本身在駐地的資料蒐集、觀察與和其他國家代表進行訊息交換分享的結果，早已累積豐富可觀的外交檔案。但現有加國外交政策的研究在探討文獻「中型國家國際主義」議題上，多以加國在其他國家地區為主要研究範疇(Pratt 1990; Smith and Sjolander 2013)；有關與中國的交往和本議題的連結較少。利用加國官方檔案來連結「中型國家國際主義」以及「中加關係」者更是鳳毛麟角。(詳見(3)中加關係)

至於在研究時間範圍上，1970年初構成重點之一，主要著眼於於一系列歷史事件的發生順序上：中國大陸在1970年10月13日和加拿大建交、1971年10月25日進入聯合國、1972年6月首度派出龐大代表團參加前述聯合國人類環境會議並曾參加同年的聯合國海底會議及1973年12月聯合國第三次海洋法會議全部11期會議並獲選擔任大會副主席等(劉中民等2007: 291-295)。這些聯合國體系的國際會議的接連召開，中共的參與雖不是全面性而是有選擇性的，但包括加拿大在內的國家從中協助中國大陸瞭解並熟悉相關國際規範的程度，頗非常值得探究。尤其，在中共與英國在1972年提升雙邊官方關係以及和日本與美國先後在1972年9月及1979年1月1日起關係正常化之前，有關加拿大政府和該一階段中加雙邊交流提供中共加入世界的重要諮商管道的命題與檢驗構成本計畫執行的重點之一。

(3) 中加關係正常化前後的交往：

有關1970年中加外交關係的建立，筆者先前已經有所著墨(吳得源2009; Wu 2001; 2005)，相關過程也有若干加拿大學者探討類此問題。(Edmonds 1998; Evans and Frolic 1991)本項研究計畫即建立在這一基礎上，強調的重點是雙方在建交前後在「低階政治性」或文教、環境或醫療等功能議題範疇的交往，80與90年代初期特別是在環境與發展相關議題上的交流合作。建交後雙邊關係的相關研究近來陸續出現(Cao and Poy 2011; Evans 2015; Potter 2011)，然相當程度上仍以傳統雙邊關係的描述為見長，尤其並未試圖與加國「中型國家國際主義」做連結。除少數例外之外，許多既有文獻仍以當代即期的關係面向為主要關注對象，鮮少以歷史官方檔案探討近期關係的理論意涵。

(4) 中加環境合作：

這一部份既有二手研究文獻十分稀少，極少數也停留在政策描述性的概述。(Hanson 2011)運用加國外交部或環境部官方檔案探討這一議題，更是付之缺如。此一研究計畫初期在規劃即以此作為研究計畫執行第二階段(主為第二年)的重點。然而因故，原本兩年期計畫核定縮減為一年期，後雖延期三個月執行，多僅止於有限環境相關官方資料的蒐集。

(四) 研究方法：

本研究計畫在執行期間著重質的研究方法(qualitative method)，主要以第一手文獻及官方檔案分析為主，第二手以及統計資料為輔的資料蒐集與分析方法。進行研究文獻及檔案分析。在文獻檔案分析上，係先就既有理論性文獻與相關學者經驗研究成果呈現在研究報告、期刊論文或專書的部分進行檢視回顧，再蒐集加拿大官方檔案，旁及中國大陸或民間機構出版或網站公布的資料。首先，文獻及官方檔案分析，係先就既有相關經驗研究成果與理論性研究文獻進行回顧檢視，藉以奠定基本分析架構，再就案例相關的官方檔案文獻加以蒐集與分析。因此，本研究計畫案，一方面針對既有相關理論性文獻，如「社會建構論」、「新制度論」、「國際合作」等方面以及國內外學者相關研究文獻，進行補充蒐集與涉獵；尤其，本研究計畫蒐集加拿大國家檔案館(National Archives of Canada)所控存之外交部(Department of External Affairs)、加拿大國際發展總署(Canadian International Development Agency)、人力資源部及環境部(Environment Canada)等相關政府部會之 1970 至 1990 年代解密檔案。其次，本研究計畫的執行，也蒐集其他相關國家可供運用的同期官方解密檔案進行比對或補充，同時，也就 1970 年代中加建交等議題大陸學界與新聞界，乃至相關國內外論著作廣泛蒐集。

(五) 研究成果與討論及自評：

本研究計畫已達成之書面成果，計有國際學術研討會論文兩篇，茲臚列如下：

1. Wu, Der-yuan 2015 “Practicing to Bridge IR and ir: Bringing Archival Research Back In” paper delivered to 2015 Canadian Political Science Association annual conference, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, May 30-June 5. (全文請詳附件一)
2. Wu, Der-yuan 2015 “English School and Sustainable Cooperation: A Case of Canada-China Relations” paper delivered to 2015 Canadian Political Science Association annual conference, University of Ottawa, Ottawa, Canada, May 30-June 5. (全文請詳附件二)

以下針對上述論文發表及本計畫案的研究成果作討論與自評：

本項研究計畫原規劃兩年執行期並申請移地研究，擬在加拿大國家圖書檔案館進行密集三週資料蒐集。本案因故科技部最後核准為一年期，也沒核准關鍵的移地研究，對計畫的執行的第二階段（原規劃的第二年）有若干實質影響。具體而言，本案後雖經同意延長三個月執行，多侷限於有限的環境相關官方資料的蒐集，尚未及作檔案資料整理分析以及形之於環境與發展部分的實際論文發表。同時，有關參加國際學術會議部分，也經另案追加預算，終於圓滿成行。儘管如此，筆者仍勉力執行，最後達成在 2015 年加拿大政治學會（CPSA）年會發表兩篇論文的成果。

上述第一篇論文是筆者就多年來其他先前研究計畫案及本案手邊所蒐集到的加拿大官方檔案的心得結晶。剛好，CPSA 以國際實踐(international practices)作為研討會主要主題之一，尋求探索理論與實踐的連結及倡導學者與實踐者新對話方式，論文題綱終獲通過。(全文請詳附件一)就此而言，本研究

可說具有承先啟後的一大額外收穫。歸結而言，官方檔案研究對於實際瞭解決策者或執行者在政策審議(policy deliberation)過程及政策真實過程，不論是對於政策實務界或學術界來說，可說具有無可取代的優勢與貢獻。本次論文發表攜回資料已經陸續整理歸類，部分也已經連同二手研究文獻回顧集結呈現在上面所臚列的研討會論文一，未來將汲取改進意見，再行提交期刊審查。

第二篇論文構成本研究計畫主題執行的主要成果之一。唯論文在理論部分係圍繞在國際關係「英國學派」(English School)，可說是延伸擴大，而非僅止於計畫原規劃的「社會建構論」與「新制度論」相關綜合命題的檢視，可說是本計畫執行的額外收穫。該一論文探討「英國學派」在國際「永續合作」上的著墨，以及對中加關係案例的可能貢獻啟示。(全文詳見附件二)這一部份的論文業已集結成前述研討會論文初稿，並透過同一 CPSA 年會研討會進行發表(即上列 2 研討會論文)以進一步汲取改進意見，將待補正後再行提交期刊審查。

綜合而言，本研究計畫在核准一年執行期間，計畫主持人因加國官方檔案中特定檔案不開放一般調閱，需經正式申請及送交有關單位審查程序，致進度上有所延宕，因此申請展延三個月執行。儘管如此，計畫主持人大致已經完成相關研究文獻資料蒐集並將現階段研究成果在國際學術研討會發表等預定目標，與原計畫內容相符程度甚高。

本研究計畫執行所蒐集加拿大官方資料以及大陸相關資料甚豐富，加上前述有關「英國學派」的再發現以及理論與實踐對話的意外豐碩收穫，使得本計畫研究成果極具匯集成專書的潛能。據此，本計畫的執行為未來類似研究計畫的規劃奠下基礎或提供學習的新方向。

然而，無可諱言，本計畫在執行過程也因前述原規劃兩年執行期在核准時縮減為一年，影響到第二階段(主要是第二年)有關環境與發展議題在 1980 年代及 1990 年代中期的相關官方檔案的蒐集、系統化與匯集成另一重要研究成果。同時，在官方資料現有蒐集上，仍多停留在加國聯邦政府部門相關檔案的蒐集，尚不及擴及民間非政府組織的環境國際合作的發動與推展。由於這些以民間行為者為主的官方或民間資料取得將超過執行時程仍須留待未來另案處理或補充。

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附件一：

Practicing to bridge IR and ir: Bringing Archival Research Back in

I. Introduction:

The recent “practice” turn in International Relations (IR) scholarship (eg. Adler and Pouliot 2011a) aroused much attention in academic communities for a refocus on practitioners’ world. As Emanuel Adler and Vincent Pouliot put it, practices “are competent performances, or socially meaningful patterns of action which...simultaneously embody, act out and possibly reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world.” (Adler and Pouliot 2011b: 6). The 2015 CPSA/ISA workshop is moving further to problematize the gap dividing intellectuals from practitioners of international relations. While not seeking to deal with the policy-academy divide in the field, in this paper I will simply focus on addressing the available pathways for bridging this divide. One such available pathway, as I would argue, is to take archival research more seriously.

It would be further argued that the divide between IR intellectuals and international relations (ir) practitioners is neither “natural” nor irreconcilable. The relationship between IR and ir, or between academics and practitioners’ worlds in many ways is mutually constitutive. There is no ever-widening gulf between the two worlds. Each has to (re-)produce their world by reference to the other’s world, at least sometimes, if not all the time. That is the essential purpose of the practice turn being all about.

It would be also maintained that archival research, while highly appreciated by historians, especially diplomatic historians, was often under-appreciated by political scientists partly thanks to “disciplinary division of labour”, could become an available pathway through which the seemingly widening gap might be mediated. The paper will use various archival sources deposited in the Library and Archives Canada (LAC), namely those on international reactions to the first nuclear tests by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the mid-1960s, to show the reconcilability of the divide by archival research. Meanwhile, Department of External Affairs (DEA) files also betrayed abundant evidences that at least Canadian ir practitioners’ policy analysis reports were drafted along the lines of concepts and perspectives, ranging from Realism to Constructivism and English School, evidently learned from IR intellectuals in Canadian higher education institutions. In addition, the paper will also highlight potential contribution and advantages of archival research, by referring to DEA files on the Sino-Canadian negotiations in 1969-70. Nevertheless, it will point out some challenges and disadvantages for political scientists to use archival research with concluding remarks.

II. The Case of China’s Nuclear Tests and IR-ir Linkage:

The first PRC nuclear test was conducted on October 16, 1964. According to DEA files deposited at the LAC, at least one year before the blast, the NATO had begun discussing how the West should respond to the anticipated event.¹ A Working Paper, entitled “the Implications for NATO of China’s Becoming a Nuclear Power”, was produced on July 22, 1963 as a background material for disarmament negotiations. The Paper noted that “it seems probable rather than improbable that sometime during the next two years Red China will explode a nuclear device.” While maintaining that “China will not have a strategically significant nuclear weapon establishment for many years...(and) there would not seem to be much prospect of stretching the NATO Treaty to include mutual defence against China”, the Paper made it clear that “the advent of China as a nuclear power is a prospect to be seriously reckoned with”. Then it concluded that “*a new Asia will have emerged with an indigenous power balance likely involving Japan and India*”. (Italics my emphasis; DEA file A: Working Paper Jul.22/63)

Noteworthy is the Paper’s highlighting “strategic implications for NATO” of the anticipated blast:

There have been suggestions that a re-examination is desirable of Article VI of the North Atlantic Treaty which defines the geographical concept of NATO defence. With the steady shrinkage of the world under the impact of modern technology, especially of high-speed communications, and long-range weapons, it has been suggested that China policy should become the concern of the NATO alliance and that China’s possession of the bomb will underline this fact. (A: Working Paper, Jul.22/63)

Later on, the signature of Partial Test Ban Treaty by Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States in Moscow in early August 1963 was bitterly attacked by the PRC as a “fraud” aiming to “consolidate their monopoly” of nuclear weaponry. While perceiving the event as “a blow” aimed straightly at it, the PRC singled out the Soviets as the object of its verbal assault. Meanwhile, Zhou Enlai made a proposal for Heads of Government Conference on nuclear disarmament. (CCPCDSO II 1997: 568) The NATO Political Advisers Committee (PAC) convened meetings to discuss if a common policy should be adopted in response to the Chinese summit proposal. (DEA file A: NATOParis tel to DEA no.1894, Sept.17/63) Three weeks later, NATO’s Atlantic Policy Advisory Group (APAG) meeting was held to discuss again the implications of the PRC’s acquisition of a nuclear capability.

Aside from NATO arena, in early May 1964, British Foreign Office convened an informal meeting to discuss public information devices which might be employed to minimize the public impact of the anticipated Chinese nuclear explosion when it occurs. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and USA missions were invited. (DEA file A: Ldn tel to DEA no.1420, Apr.30/64; Ldn let to USSEA no.678, May 13/64) It was agreed that lines of western common reaction include at least the following: (i) The Chinese tests will have no immediate effect on the *overall strategic balance*; (ii) There is a wide gap between the ability to detonate a nuclear device and an effective nuclear capability; (iii) Even when the Chinese eventually acquire a regional nuclear capability, there will remain a great gulf between Chinese and western nuclear capabilities; (iv) *The western allies are determined to uphold their defence commitments in the Far East and South-East Asia*; (v) It is a cause for regret and concern that a Chinese explosion will increase substantially the difficulty of restraining the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It dashes the hopes of

¹ A more comprehensive part of the international reaction was presented as Wu 2014: “Spatial Expansion and Norm Negotiation: ‘China and the World’ Revisited”, The 55th Annual Conference of International Studies Association, Toronto, Canada, March 26-29, 2014

securing full international acceptance of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. (DEA file A: Ldn memo to USSEA no.678, May 13/64)

Prior to the actual detonation of nuclear device, issues related to an assessment on the state of Chinese economy, its prospect to support the development of nuclear arms there and views along above possible common lines continued to be discussed in various meetings within the NATO framework. (DEA file A: NATO lets to USSEA no.1113, Jul.27/64; no.1119, Jul.28/64; no.1391, Sept.22/64; NATOParis tel to DEA no.1856, Sept.22/64) At the end of September, Dean Rusk, the US State Secretary, made a statement on Beijing's nuclear capability generally along the lines of what had been agreed in May or July. (DEA file A: US Information Service, Sept.29/64) One week later, the British representative to the NATO also circulated in a PAC meeting their draft contingency statement on PRC's nuclear test. (DEA file A: NATO Paris tels to DEA no.1960; no.1963, Oct.6/64) Almost on the eve of the PRC's blast, in a PAC meeting, German, the Dutch and Norwegian representatives indicated their authorities were prepared to be guided by thoughts expressed in papers circulated by the UK and US delegates. (DEA file A: NATOParis tel to DEA no.2011, Oct.13/64)

On October 16, 1964, Beijing announced its making the first nuclear test and justified that act as for "world peace and self-defense" aiming to "protect Chinese people from the US nuclear threats and blackmail," while declaring "in no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons" and assuring its ultimate goal of "complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons." Meanwhile, a proposal was made to convene a summit conference of all the countries of the world to discuss the ways to achieve the eventual goal. (DEA file A: PRC statement Oct.16; Zhou let Oct.17, 1964; CCPCDSO II 1997: 676)

From these archival materials, it is evident that before and after the PRC's detonation of her first nuclear device, the implication of changing balance of power or strategic balance relationship between China and the outside world had been contemplated. More importantly, Canadian and other NATO practitioners did meet for meaning negotiations on the top of material nuclear detonation and produce discourse afterwards, which constitutes practitioners' *practices* as defined by Adler and Pouliot. Equally important, as clearly shown in the adoption of phraseology such as "balance of power", "strategic balance", or "alliance commitment", Realist discourse could be discerned in the practitioners' account.

Also evident is the acknowledgement of the role of modern nuclear technology in compressing spatial relationships thereby changing the perception of security and threat. This stress on the linkage between materialist capability development and security was echoing much of the Realist IR's literature. In the DEA file, NATO practitioners' assessment revealed that although from the western perspective, a single explosion and the short of effective delivery system did not make Beijing's newly-demonstrated ability drastically increasing to become "real" and "immediate" threat, the implication of that blast for security in South and East Asia regions was rather felt differently and imminently thanks to China's geographical proximity to Asian neighbours especially India. In other words, a relatively tangible transformation of spatial relationship in the East and South Asia context had evidently occurred.

Besides, English School's conceptualization of "Great Powers" status, at least insofar as Barry Buzan's

definition is concerned, was also unfolded in the practitioners' world. In Barry Buzan's characterization, the key distinction between "Great Powers" and regional ones is that the former "are responded to by others on the basis of system-level calculations, as well as regional ones, about the present and near future distribution of power." (2004: 69-70) The fact that China and the Far East did not fall within the defence parameter of the NATO and yet its members bothered putting the issue of PRC detonations on its formal agenda and engaging in collective deliberations demonstrated the existence of the social recognition process of China's "Great Power" status. The need to recognize the PRC's newly-acquired status was disclosed in practitioners' world, ranging from diplomats to media commentators. For example, after series of detonations, Canadian diplomats in Hong Kong were of the views that political problems of western relations with China needed urgently to be reflected in the aftermath of the first nuclear explosion. (DEA file B: Hong Kong tel to DEA EX-18, Feb.26/65) In particular, in the aftermath of the first blast, the voice of seating the PRC in the UN and bringing it in disarmament negotiations began to (re-)surge.

In this regard, Pakistani officials reportedly advocated that "there is now greater urgency than ever in need to engage Communist Chinese in disarmament negotiations and to seat them in UN where they will be forced to assume responsibility as well as rights." (DEA file A: Karachi tel to DEA no. 778, Oct.20/64) Similar lines of argument later were also formally made in Pakistani President's reply to Zhou Enlai's summit proposal. (DEA file A: Karachi tel to DEA no.913, Dec.16/64)

In fact, the necessity to place Beijing in world forum was not only acknowledged by China's longstanding allies such as Pakistan, but also was taken by some western as well as non-alignment countries. In the West, the NATO meetings were also held to discuss issues including the possibility of getting the PRC to accede to the Test Ban Treaty even in the absence of recognizing the Beijing regime. (DEA file A: NATOParis tel to DEA no.2067, Oct.21/64) Meanwhile, In the same series of DEA files, at least Denmark officials and public shared the view that the Chinese bomb reinforced the arguments for an early seating of China in the UN. (DEA file A: Denmark let to USSA no.558, Oct.23/64) Belgian representative to the NATO admittedly expressed their concerns that the Chinese blast led to the situation that "the position of his government to refuse to recognize Communist China and to countenance its seating in UN was becoming more and more difficult." (DEA file A: NATOParis tel to DEA no.2136, Oct.29/64) Likewise, the linkage between Beijing's nuclear test and its representation in the UN was explicitly highlighted as the title of Talking Points prepared for Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin's press conference. (DEA file A: Talking Points, Oct.26/64) Similar messages were respectively reported in the cases of Ghana and Yugoslavia as well. (DEA file A: let to USSEA no.420, Oct.24/64; let to USSEA no.589, Oct.28/64)

The "real" effects of the transformation of balance of power between China and its Asian neighbours as well as support/alliance-seeking in broader context were vividly reported by Canadian diplomats. In particular, India's attitudes and policy in response to the first PRC's nuclear test obviously received much attention before and after the blast. As the detonation was to put into implementation, India's anxiety over the decrease of diplomatic space became more and more evident.

Prior to the occurrence of the event, it was first noted that India's Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri

took initiative on October 7 at Cairo conference of Non-Aligned nations in proposing that a special mission be sent to China to dissuade Beijing from undertaking nuclear tests. Meanwhile, Shastri reaffirmed India's determination to develop atomic energy only for peaceful purposes. (DEA file A: Delhi tel to DEA no.1147, Oct.8/64) After the Chinese test was put into practice on October 16, international concerns for India's stance became even more and more evident. In general, India's reaction, as anticipated, was typically critical toward the Chinese while reiterating its commitment to the policy of utilizing atomic energy for peaceful purposes only. (DEA file A: Delhi tel to DEA no.1210, Oct.26/64) New Delhi's stated policy and prospective options that it might adopt were comprehensively examined and analyzed by Canadian representative there. (DEA file A: Delhi tel to DEA no.1232, Oct.30/64) It was also reported that senior officials in New Delhi explicitly expressed fear of dwindling of India's diplomatic space among Third World countries: "China's successful explosion of nuclear device would *enhance that country's prestige* in eyes of Afro-Asian world." (Italics as author's emphasis; DEA file B: Delhi tel to DEA no.1292, Nov.14/64) India's attempt to recapture diplomatic command heights was made through its seeking Canadian support and co-sponsorship of two resolutions in the forthcoming 19th UN General Assembly: one on Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the other on Discontinuance of Nuclear Tests. (DEA file B: Memo for Minister, Nov.20/64) In the meantime, Sweden, Belgium and Danmark were also approached for similar partnerships. (DEA file B: Stockholm tel to DEA no.167, Nov.20/64; NATOParis tel to DEA no.2338, Nov.24/64; Copenhagen tel to DEA no.360, Nov.26/64)

Likewise, Canadian and British practitioners' narratives captured the gist of Japanese reaction and possible policy move. (DEA file B: Rundall dispatch to Stewart, Mar.3/65) The DEA files also revealed that Canadian diplomats' accounts on the American initiatives attempting to consolidate her international constituencies in relation to the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty:

"The Americans were asking their missions to make an appeal to all those countries which have not signed the partial test ban treaty to sign as soon as possible. They were also urging those countries that have signed but not ratified to act quickly to bring about ratification. The Americans had been on the whole pleased with the comparatively calm reception given the Chinese test. They regretted, however, that certain countries, or at least the press of certain countries, seemed to stress the power which China had proven she possessed rather than the fact that China also proved its failure to meet international standards by carrying out a nuclear test in the face of the worldwide support given (to) the partial nuclear test ban treaty. The Americans were planning in this connection to make a special approach to certain governments, including Mali, Pakistan, Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, and perhaps Ghana, pointing out that they found it hard to equate the current enthusiasm for the Chinese success in those countries with their support of the partial nuclear test ban treaty and their criticism of tests by other countries." (DEA file B: Far Eastern Div memo to Disarmament Div, Nov.3/64)

For its part, the PRC did not sit idly for the emergence of a new possible alliance. She had approached some of those non-alignment nations for a support of Zhou Enlai's proposal for comprehensive summit while urging them not to publicly express regret over its detonation of nuclear device. According to the Canadian practitioners, Ceylon had been evidently targeted by the PRC. (DEA file B: Colombo let to USSEA no.454, Dec.7/64)

Overall, the archival materials on the Chinese nuclear tests and international reactions have shown that the vivid narratives of international relations by practitioners at the time were not irreconcilable with IR academic conceptualization based on Realist or English School's perspectives. In particular, the strategic- or security-related ideas referred to in practitioners' accounts by Canadian diplomats remain largely imbued

with those concepts often emphasized by the respective IR perspectives, especially those of Realism. While the development of IR academics and theoretical enterprise ideally should be able to benefit from policy practitioners' world, occasional overplay of detachment by some intellectuals might end up roosting themselves in their "ivory towers", losing touch with everyday account of international life. To bridge the seemingly irreconcilable gulf between the two worlds, IR academics may well constantly refer to those historical or contemporary accounts of practitioners. One way to keep constantly track of practitioners' world is to take archival research seriously as the primary approach. Should existent theoretical perspectives remain inadequate for providing convincing rationale for given practices, practitioners' narratives on the details of those practices might also suggest complementary or alternative way of conceptualizing the puzzling aspects of international relations. Again, my personal experience in using the Canadian archival materials related to Sino-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm, 1969-70, as to be outlined in the following², testifies to the potential contribution archival research may be able to make.

III. Archival Research Contribution: Conceptualization of "Engaged Independence" in Canadian Foreign Policy:

Canada established diplomatic relations with the PRC on October 13, 1970. Prior to that co-practice, both sides engaged in a 20-month, 18-session negotiations in Stockholm, beginning from February 21, 1969 and concluding on October 10, 1970. Most interestingly, the process witnessed a coupling networking and information-sharing with several countries. Arguably, the institutionalization of international engagements constituted a distinct characteristics of Canadian diplomacy.

In fact, the Canadian practice of international information-sharing, insofar as China was concerned, was firstly laid down in the China Policy Review in summer 1968. It was recommended that as soon as a date to contact the Chinese was set, Ottawa should begin consultations with those friends and allies most directly concerned. Those targeted countries that were explicitly listed for recommendation were: France, Great Britain and the US, Australia, New Zealand, Belgium, Italy, Japan, West Germany, Sweden and Taiwan. It was further suggested that Canada keep its close allies as closely informed as possible as to the progress of negotiation. The underlying rationale for this information-sharing practice was that "*if we are able to take our allies into our confidence, it will help mitigate whatever apprehensions there may be regarding Canadian action.*"(Italics as my emphasis; DEA file D, 2, 10088: Memo for Min Jul.3/68)

As the negotiations progressed, this consultation policy was being implemented in a consistent way. Overall, Canadian missions in those specific countries, if any, had been listed as information addressees of virtually all telegram reports emanated from the Stockholm embassy on almost all sessions of negotiations with the PRC agents. More importantly, those Canadian missions had been authorized to contact local foreign affairs departments to brief them on the progress. Among the major targeted countries was the US.

² For comprehensive narratives of the negotiations based on the DEA files, please see Wu (2001a: 129-214) On the part of international engagement in the negotiation process, please see Wu (2001b): "Engaged Independence: A Case of the Sino-Canadian Negotiations in Stockholm, 1969-70," 2001 Canadian Political Science Association Annual Conference, Quebec City, Canada, May 27-29, 2001

1. The USA:

While the Canadians had experienced a complex delicate state of relations with the Americans since the early 1960s, the importance of “timely and sufficient consultation in candor and good faith” was reaffirmed as a cornerstone for bilateral relations, as embodied in the Heeney-Merchant Report published in June 1965. In the wake of surging Canadian nationalism and ensuing concern for an independent foreign policy vis-a-vis the USA, the tone of the Report no doubt irked many Canadian nationalists. In a retrospective defence seven years later, Heeney asserted its position in the following passage:

But total national independence in foreign policy is as impossible as is total independence for an individual in organized society. The trick is to achieve and maintain that sufficiency of freedom of action which will enable the nation (and the individual) to contribute best to its own and to world society. In the Canadian situation there is no alternative to partnership with the United States..The first Canadian objective surely should be to influence American decision making.. (Italics as my emphasis; Heeney 1972: 171; Granatstein 1992:115)

Although Heeney did not exemplify in the article Canada-USA consultations during Trudeau's China Policy Review and ensuing Stockholm negotiations, interestingly, there are abundant evidences from the DEA files demonstrating the existence of an elaborative practice of what was called “engaged independence” in Canadian foreign policy.

As Heeney's critics heralded an ability to confront and defy Washington to demonstrate “genuine” independence of Canadian foreign policy, what was overlooked was the part “engagement” might play in the fulfilment of “independence”. This involves a process of institutionalizing interactions or networking through diplomatic briefings, exchange of views/information or consultations, in order to protect and assert national position, or to retain or promote freedom of action in broader social environment, or to influence another country's foreign policy making. Canadian interactions with the Americans on the issue of PRC recognition, as disclosed in the DEA files, pertinently elaborates the practice of “engaged independence”.

Prior to the conclusion of the China Policy Review, first of all, Ambassador Ritchie had recommended that Canada consult closely and precisely with the Americans when a move became imminent and as far as possible in advance of any public announcement of a Canadian decision. He also advised that a new American Administration is given a chance at least to offer their views and arguments, thereby minimizing American objection or reaction.(DEA file D,2,10088: WSHDC Tel to Ott Jun.20/68)

As soon as the cabinet decision was taken, Ottawa immediately sent a telegram instructing the Washington embassy to inform the State Department. In view of American preoccupation with Canadian policy toward Taiwan, the telegram devoted majority of pages to trying to tell the Americans that while Ottawa did not envisage being able to maintain diplomatic relations with Taipei after the establishment of official ties with Beijing nor would it let negotiations with the Chinese break down over refusal to say so, it intended to continue dealing with Taipei in matters of mutual concern.(DEA file D,2,10088: Ott Tel to WSHDC Jan.30/69) The Canadian embassy subsequently reported the American response as being “disappointment and surprise” that Ottawa did not intend to make an effort to achieve a “dual relationship”

before “chopping off” relations with Taipei. William Rogers, the then Secretary of State, in the wake of the SSEA's imminent announcement of Canadian intention to contact the PRC, made a formal representation. He was reported to have advised that “in talking to Peking, Canada should not give up too soon, and should be seen not to be giving up too soon, possibility of dual relationship”. He also stressed that any explicit or implicit acknowledgement that Beijing has a rightful claim to Taiwan would pose very difficult problem for the USA.(DEA file D, 6, 8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.6/69)

The American concern over Taiwan was obviously taken seriously in Ottawa. As the negotiations began, the Canadian embassy in Washington reported its briefings to the State Department as instructed regarding the first encounter with the Chinese. (DEA file D,7,8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott Feb.26/69) Notwithstanding the set-up of information-sharing as a major principle to deal with Canadian allies, the extent to which information on each session's discussion with the Chinese should be made available to foreign governments concerned, including the USA, remained subject to further clarification. To control the extent of information flow, the SSEA proposed to prepare after each meeting in Stockholm a guidance telegram indicating what part of information can be passed over to which governments. (DEA file D,10,8814: Ott Tel to WSHDC May 22/69) Ambassador Ritchie then took the opportunity to press for fuller briefings to the Americans, and in so doing, also elaborated the policy of “engaged independence”. In a telegram to the SSEA and USSEA only, he argued that:

The USA acquiescence in the course which we are following seems to me most probable if they are satisfied that we are being frank with them. In my view, *the risk of USA interference or pressure will be greater if we attempt to keep them in the dark. The USA authorities might then suspect that something was happening which was worse than the reality. If we are reasonably forthcoming and give them a credible account they should feel under some obligation to respect our confidence and to be not too unhelpful..* (Italics as my emphasis; DEA file D,10,8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott May 23/69)

To this suggestion, the USSEA and SSEA agreed to have greater disclosure to the Americans at least for short-term experimental purpose. While Ottawa was about to implement this policy, Washington at one moment became impatient about being withheld from detailed information on the first substantive meeting of May 20. For example, a senior State Department official was instructed to convey to the Canadian embassy that there were "some disappointment" that one week after the talk, the State Department has no substantial or detailed information on what took place. He reminded the Canadians that they had been briefed in detail after each USA-PRC meeting in Warsaw.(DEA file D,10,8814: WSHDC Tel to Ott May 27/69)

After this episode, briefings to the Americans following each session of Stockholm negotiations were gradually institutionalized to the extent that the Americans tended to receive fuller extent of information than other governments. And the Washington embassy routinely reported its briefings to the State Department after each instruction telegram.

On the other hand, the Italians had at the same time requested Canadian provision of written draft text of agreed minute for their reference. Ottawa then faced a difficult situation. The Canadian embassy expressed its hope that Ottawa would not need to provide actual texts to Rome. (DEA file D,13,8815: Blouin Let to

Seaborn Nov.3/69) However, as it proceeded, Ottawa decided to provide a written text of agreed minute to the Italians.

An exchange of views between Ottawa and its embassy in Washington then ensued. Among them, a passage of reply letter to Blouin, the Minister of the Washington embassy, from J. Blair Seaborn, Director-General of the Far Eastern Division, testified to the delicate relationship between information-sharing, freedom of action and the merit of “engaged independence”:

It seems to me, from the American point of view is that if they have in fact not been given prior access to exact texts, they are ultimately in a much better position to criticize the wording of such texts should they fall short of American desires. *If they have seen the texts and have implied that the texts are not objectionable to them, the State Department would be hard pressed later on to defend itself publicly in the US against charges of having aided and abetted the Canadian move toward recognition...*(Italics my emphasis; DEA file D,13,8815: Seaborn Let to Blouin Nov.14/69)

Ottawa then decided to authorize its embassy to give text of agreed minute orally to the State Department but also to stress to the Americans that the briefing does not imply any Canadian obligation to give them full text of each and every piece of paper that is put forward for discussion with the Chinese. (DEA file D,14,8815: Ott Tel to WSHDC Nov.24/69) The senior State Department official who received the oral information of the text offered no comment and assured the Canadians that neither Ottawa nor Washington should have difficulty refuting accusations of collaboration since the briefings Canada gave were for information rather than consultation and absence of comment on their part did not imply approval of text.(DEA file D,14,8815: WSHDC Tel to Ott Dec.2/69)

After this encounter, the Canadians continued to brief the Americans after each session of discussions with the Chinese in Stockholm. Overall, this stage of briefings included Canadian passing over information on relevant paragraphs of various versions of Canadian as well as Chinese draft communique and the text of the SSEA's intended public statement for announcing completion of negotiations. (DEA file D,15,8815: Ott Tel to WSHDC Feb.19/70; Ott Tel to STKHM Mar.16/70;D,16,8816:Ott Tel to WSHDC Mar.26/70; D,18,8816: Ott Tel to WSHDC Sep.21/70) The American reactions to this phase of Canadian-initiated consultations were typically “no comment” on major substantial parts of the meetings and the content wordings of the various texts involved.

Nevertheless, as the negotiations were on the brink of success, Ottawa continued to ponder if its final two proposals on communique texts should be made available to the Americans. The new Canadian Ambassador Marcel Cadieux recommended for an explicit disclosure of the Take Note of (Chinese position on Taiwan) phraseology to Washington: “Canada is apparently given credit both at the State Department and at the White House for liaison maintained during course of negotiations; greater candour now, it seems to me, would protect that credit at little foreseeable cost.” (DEA file D,18,8816: WSHDC Tel to Ott Sep.23/70) The suggestion was taken by the SSEA then.(DEA file D,18,8816: Ott Tel to WSHDC Sep.29; WSHDC Tel to Ott Sep.30/70)

As soon as the Canadian cabinet approved the text of the Sino-Canadian Joint Communique, Ottawa notified Washington the approval and transmitted the text of communique. (DEA file D,18,8816: Ott Tel to WSHDC Oct.7/70) In the end, the Canadian embassy gathered a general impression that the State Department and the Nixon Administration seemed to be privately pleased with the Canadian action. (DEA file D,18,8816 : WSHDC Tel to Ott Oct.15/70)

2. Networking with Italy:

Aside from routine, close and detailed exchanges of views with Washington, Ottawa also engaged in a networking process with Italy and other countries. The account of information-sharing with Italy could be briefly recast as follows.

Rome was one of the few closest partners of Ottawa in information exchange, partly because Rome was almost simultaneously engaged in a similar series of negotiations with Beijing's representatives in Paris. However, this was not so intended at least in the beginning. Indeed, when the Canadian Ambassador to Italy proposed to brief Rome in detail Canadian first meeting with the Chinese, Ottawa was hesitant about the suggestion in light of the possibility that Rome might take advantage of its knowledge to enhance its chance of success. (DEA file D,7,8814: Rome Tel to Ott Mar.3;5/69)

The Italians in Paris embassy first gave to the Canadians a detailed account of their meeting with the Chinese there. Further information-sharings ensued and institutionalized, albeit with a sort of competitive complex. Noteworthy is when the Canadian Ambassador briefed Italian Foreign Ministry on the 9th and 10th Sino-Canadian meeting, the Italians formally requested a copy of Canadian text of agreed minute put forward to the Chinese.(Ibid: Rome Tel to Ott Nov.7/69) Shortly later, Ottawa decided to authorize its Rome embassy to hand over the text of agreed minute to the Italians partly in view of the “surprising discreetness” of the Italians in handling Canadian information.(Ibid: Ott Tels to Rome Nov.12; Seaborn Let to Blouin Nov.14/69)

The Canadian practitioners reported that the Italian officials appeared to be taken aback by the Canadian openness and appreciated the confidence Ottawa placed in Rome and undertook to respect the condition of confidentiality. In return, the Italian official showed to the Canadian Ambassador his policy recommendation in a memorandum to Foreign Minister Moro.(DEA file D,14,8815: Rome Tel to Ott Nov.17/69)

At the later stage of negotiations with the Chinese, the Italians further provided the Canadian Embassy with an intended unilateral statement to be accompanied with joint communique with the Chinese in time of mutual recognition, and inquired if Ottawa would be willing to coordinate with Rome the timing of announcement of agreement with the Chinese. (DEA file D,16,8816: Rome Tel to Ott Apr.17/70) The Italian proposal, however, was declined later. But Ottawa undertook to inform the Italians at the earliest possible moment in the event of a Sino-Canadian agreement. (Ibid: Memo for Min Apr.23; Ott Tel to Rome Apr.27/70)

Notwithstanding this episode, the Canadian-Italian consultation continued up until the very end of Canadian negotiations.(DEA files D,16-8,8816 Rome Tels to Ott May 27; Aug.6;27;Sep.15;18) As soon as the Canadian cabinet took a decision, in the end, Ottawa instructed its embassy in Rome to inform such decision

and to pass over the whole text of communique. (DEA file D,19,8816: Ott Tel to Rome Oct.7/70)

In sum, there was a continuing networking process while Canada was negotiating with the PRC representatives in Stockholm. The actual list of countries included France, Sweden, Belgium, India, West Germany and the NATO as a whole, and of course the US. This networking practice, nevertheless, begs a question: To what the extent did the overall Canadian international information-sharings have been effective in bringing about its smooth transition of recognition to Beijing. This could be addressed by reference to Australia and the Soviet Union, as shown in the DEA files.

3. Effects of Engaged Diplomacy: Canberra and Moscow

Actually, Canadian multilateral engagement during the negotiations was evident not only in its networking with the countries mentioned above, but also in its consultation with Australia, New Zealand and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the case of Australia and the Soviet Union is insightful in their testaments to the effect of Ottawa consultations on its ultimate recognition of Beijing.

(1) Australia:

Prior to the Canadian briefing to the Australians regarding its intention to contact Beijing's representative in Stockholm, the Canadian High Commissioner in Canberra had obtained a copy of Australian representation text handed to the Italian Ambassador there. The Italian Ambassador made no secret of his unhappiness to his Canadian colleagues with Canberra's blatant reference to an "unjustified" Italian decision. The Italian interlocutor also warned the Canadians that the Australians indicated that Ottawa would receive a similar serious representation on the subject.(DEA file D,6,8814: CNBRA Tel to Ott Feb.4/69) However, in the DEA file on China Policy Review, there is no evidence showing that Canberra had made any representation in such a high-profile manner as it had to the Italians.

Three days later, Ambassador Menzies, after notifying the Australian Department of External Affairs on the Canadian decision to initiate contacts with the Communists, reported that he observed even Australian right-wingers seemed to receive the statement of Canadian intentions as "better than they feared", and concluded that "we do well to keep our Australian friends fully informed and to show ourselves interested in their comments."(Ibid: Feb.7/69)

Canadian briefings to Canberra continued throughout the Stockholm negotiations. Nevertheless, no evidence available disclosed that Canberra had ever made any trace of strong objection publicly to the Canadians despite its displeasure. In the end, to the contrary, the Canadian High Commissioner heralded a triumph of Canadian engagement at his briefings to the Australians on the conclusion of the Stockholm negotiations. He reported that the delivery of the SSEA's text of announcement came as no surprise to them and there were no known Australian apprehensions and criticisms. To this he concluded that "clearly frank confidential briefings of (the Australian) DEA here and Australian High Commissioner Ottawa since Stockholm negotiations began have been successful."(DEA file D,19,8816: CNBRA Tel to Ott Oct.14/70)

(2) The Soviet Union:

From the outset, the Trudeau initiative to negotiate with the Chinese coincided with the deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations. In 1969 when the negotiations were underway, border clashes between Chinese and Soviet troops took place in the west and the northeast. Against this backdrop, Moscow was highly attentive to the Sino-Canadian contacts.

In fact, before the Sino-Canadian negotiations began, the Soviets had expressed high interest in the Canadian move and implicitly indicated their desire to have an arrangement that would provide some accommodation for Taiwan.(DEA file D,5,8814: Ldn Tel to Ott Jan.16/69) The Canadian Ambassador in Moscow then proposed to contact the Soviet Foreign Ministry by providing some necessary information on Canadian China policy in order to gauge real Soviet interests, and accordingly recommended to add Moscow as one of information addressees on Stockholm negotiation reports. (Ibid: Moscow Tel to Ott Jan.27/69) Ottawa agreed to this suggestion and further authorized Ambassador Ford to give brief outline of Canadian intentions including general approach to the Taiwan issue.(Ibid: Ott Tel to Moscow Jan.29/69)

After the negotiations started, the Canadian embassy in Moscow generally reported its briefings to the Soviet Foreign Ministry on a regular basis. More importantly, there were at least two instances that could indicate that Canadian information-provision helped contribute to lessening the Soviets' concerns, at least compared to those received by the Italians, although their suspicion over Canadian motive appeared to persist.

For example, in a telegram reporting his briefings to and the comments made by the Soviets, Ambassador Ford concluded that “our gesture in keeping Russians informed of the progress of our negotiations is very wise and is already paying dividends (in terms of) giving me extra information.” (DEA file D,11,8815: Moscow Tel to Ott Jun.21/69) The other instance was directly drawn from an Italian testimony. At the end of a meeting with Canadian diplomats in Rome, an Italian official mentioned to his guest that the Soviet embassy had made a demarche regarding the Italian move toward recognition of the PRC negatively and remarked in a similar vein about the Canadian negotiations.(Ibid: Rome Tel to Ott Jun.20/69) Throughout the DEA's China Policy Review file, however, there was no record showing that the Soviets had ever made a demarche publicly and directly against the Canadians on the subject.

In brief, from the cases of Australia and the USSR, it could be reasonably concluded that Canadian information-sharing mattered, albeit not exclusively, in smoothening the negotiation process and with a successful conclusion. This should be evident in the juxtaposition of the divergent approaches Ottawa and Rome had adopted in their negotiations with Beijing's representatives: while Canada did not make hasty move in recognizing Beijing but went on steadily by semi-openly giving briefings to the public and other countries, Italy tended to take a secretive approach. The available evidence has confirmed that both the Australians and the Soviets had shown their concerns or displeasure to the Italians in a formal and outright manner, whereas they at least restrained themselves in making a public demarche against the Canadians despite their displeasure. The effect of Canadian international networking and information-sharing on its smooth transition therefore is evident.

Overall, the DEA files revealed detailed policy deliberation as well as consultation process, domestic

intra-department and international, undergoing in the Sino-Canadian negotiations on the establishment of diplomatic relations, 1969-70. While there was no ready intellectual IR or foreign policy perspectives existent handily to make a meaningful IR-ir linkage in this case of international engagement practices, an ex post facto conceptualization of “engaged independence” could still be drawn and distilled from those archival source and research process. More importantly, the case also reveals the merit of archival research in disclosing the detailed policy deliberation and consultation process involved as well as the rich practitioners’ narratives on the process. By referring to archival sources, at least occasionally if not constantly, IR intellectuals may be able to bridge the seemingly wide gap between their and practitioner’s worlds. That said, admittedly, there are some inherent disadvantages and challenges for scholars pursuing the archival research approach.

IV. Challenges of Archival Research and Concluding Remarks:

Compared to other sources-driven research, the archival approach contains some disadvantages easily discouraging new beginners from adopting it and consistently implementing to the end. First of all, the whole process, beginning from preparatory review of existent literature, to search for possible relevant materials among voluminous files, then to request files, readings, note-taking, is indeed time-consuming. Unlike academic books that usually contain index at the end of each volume which undoubtedly helps shorten time for search, imperfect cataloguing of those archival materials could even complicate and prolong the whole scrutiny process. The concise introductory clues accompanied with each file might not be as helpful as thought to be. To make things worse, for those classified or closed materials, a review process upon request, in accordance with Access to Information Act, is normally required. It could take up to six months, or even longer time, for those documents, if declared “de-classified”, to be made available for consultation.

Secondly, although those archival materials are full of accounts of “facts”, the comprehensive representation of “reality” could not be automatically guaranteed. The overall picture of ir practitioners’ world remains largely imperfect and incomplete, and achievements at the end depend very much upon various contingent factors. Ultimately, with deadlines posed by academic community or funding agencies, at some point of never-ending research process, it is really up to scholars to assemble and make the most of what are available, trying to make sense of them in a coherent, albeit selective way. Moreover, the archival materials, especially those related to international affairs and foreign policy, typically contains documentation accounts of state officials as primary practitioners, narratives coming from those representatives working in societal sector might be in need for more comprehensive picture.

Nevertheless, the pay-off of archival research, if perseverance works out, could still be tremendous. One note may suffice to convince the merit of that approach: it does not entail the sort of risks of academic autonomy being compromised thanks to “close to the power”. Although the approach is actually to the power’s accounts, rather than their authors or practitioners, maintaining a “critical” stance might be relatively affordable, compared to those face-to-face interactions required in speaking to the power.

Finally, for IR intellectuals, irrespective of taking archival research or not, Hedley Bull’s advice on the

role the academic may well be born in minds. For Bull, as highlighted by Andrew Hurrell, it is the duty of the academic to pose unfashionable questions and to be skeptical of all conventional wisdom. Although he himself had served as a policy adviser and believed that the ideas of practitioners are important source for study, he advised that academic enquiry maintain analytical and critical distance away from the temptations of power or from the pressure of being “policy relevant”. He strongly believed in that academic commitment, as demonstrated at the end of *the Anarchical Society*: “The search for conclusions that can be presented as “solutions” or “practical advice” is a corrupting element in the contemporary study of world politics, which properly understood is an intellectual activity and not a practical one.” (Bull 2012: 308; Hurrell 2013: 141) The question may be posed then: Will archival research’s potential contribution to bridge IR and ir, if accepted at the end, make the approach remain subject to the pitfalls of too much dose of “practicalness”, as Bull admonished against?

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A: DEA file 28-COMBLOC-8-1-PRC, part 1, vol. 11555

B: DEA file 28-COMBLOC-8-1-PRC, part 2, vol. 11555

C: DEA file 28-COMBLOC-8-1-PRC, part 3, vol. 11555

D: DEA file 20-1-2-CHINA-1, parts 1-18

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附件二：

English School and Sustainable Cooperation: Canada-China relations as a Case

I. Introduction:

Bilateralism, compared to multilateralism, in International Relations theoretical or empirical practice received not much attention. Much of IR theories such as Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism were often referred to in the context of multilateralism. English School was no exception to this tendency. It was seldom applied to bilateral relations.

In a sort of parallel, "cooperation" tended to be less problematized than "conflict" in IR, although both were often put together in texts to suggest the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced approach. Moreover, where cooperation was the research focus, it tended to be linked more with multilateralism than bilateralism. Further, existing bilateral relations literature, much of which adopted a primarily descriptive mode of

approach, was often criticized for inadequate theoretical relevance.

In this context, this paper aims to bring bilateral cooperation back for attention in IR. The paper will argue that English School, in terms of conceptualizing three traditions of international system, international society and world society as well as pluralism vs solidarism, provides some important insights for the development of bilateral relations and the extent to which the state of cooperation may become sustainable. As will be demonstrated subsequently, Canada-China relations that was often characterized with more cooperation than conflict could be considerably recast along the line of English School.

Canada and the People's Republic of China (PRC) are to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in the coming October. The bilateral ties have been re-strengthened to a sort of "strategic partnership" and with frequent ministerial visits since 2009, despite previously strained relationship. In characterizing Canadian foreign policy towards the PRC, prominent Canadian scholars often invoked the term of "engagement policy" to navigate through the development of Canada-PRC relations. (eg. Evans 2014) Nevertheless, the Canadian way to engage China with a longstanding aim to foster a condition for its re-entry into international community remained largely under-explored in Canadian Foreign Policy and under-appreciated by outside world.

Canada was unique and instrumental in helping bring China back in international society process for at least three reasons. First of all, Canada is one of the few western countries that have firm belief in the merit of engagement approach and has put it into practice fairly consistently. In the heyday of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the story for Canada-China being "reluctant adversaries" (Evans and Frolic 1991) could be partially traced to the Canadian policy preference for the approach vis-à-vis the American way of containment. Second, unlike Great Britain that advocated similar engagement approach but recognized the PRC much earlier in the 1950 with lingering diplomatic squabbles with it, Canada had never been a colonial power and had not subjugated China. Third, Ottawa adopted an innovative "Canadian formula" to normalize relationship with Beijing on October 13, 1970, which had circumvented much diplomatic log-jam, thanks to Taiwan issue, at the time and were followed by many other countries that intended to recognize the PRC.

In the wake of Beijing's growing assertiveness in ir as well as IR circles, it is timely to re-examine China's relations with outside world and Canada's role in it in terms of the relevance of western perspectives. Specifically, the major research question is: in what ways elements of English School could be identified in the case of Canada-PRC relations? In what conceptual way the bilateral cooperation could be sustainable? It would be argued that English School thinkers such as C. A. W. Manning, Alan James and Adam Watson provides some insightful conceptualization of pragmatic-needs- as well as norm-based cooperation, which also made the Perspective a distinct candidate to reconcile not only the longstanding "interest vs ideas" debates but also to bridge the gap between academic and practitioners' worlds, as highlighted in CPSA-ISA Canada section.

The paper draws much from archival sources in the Library and Archives Canada. The paper focuses on Canadian perspective of Canada-China relations. It is also hoped that this approach would help bridge the gap

between academic and practitioners' world, given archival materials contains abundant accounts of policy practitioners.

II. English School Perspective: Then and Beyond?

The concept of “international society” becomes a landmark of English School. Hedley Bull define it concisely: “a society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” (Bull 2012: 13) In the elaboration of “international society”, it was often juxtaposed with “international system” and “world society”. They all together stem from Martin Wight’s “three traditions” of IR theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Three thinkers are identified with the primary founders of “international system”, “international society” and “world society”: Hobbes, Grotius and Kant, respectively. (Wight 1991) Each envisioned with emphases on different facets of world affairs. In brief, “international system” highlighted the feature of a struggle for power and ensuing conflicts among sovereign states and an anarchical environment where they pursued their policy goals with self-interests. “International society” emphasized the institutionalization of mutual interest and understandings, in the form of shared norms, rules and institutions among states. “World society” takes individuals, voluntary associations and human beings as a whole as the building blocks of world order and justice. (Buzan 2004: 7-9)

In many ways, the aim of English School is to elaborate the theory of international politics which arguably involves all speculation at anytime and anywhere on the international spectrum. (Dunne 1998) As such, international society perspective was often pursued without much reference to the foreign policies of its individual members, and insofar as structure-agent relations are concerned, tended to be more structure-oriented. Although English School and the three concepts were developed in this context, they are not irrelevant to agent-oriented foreign policy analysis and bilateral relations. The triads of the concepts could be re-deployed in a way pertinent for foreign policy analysis, not only in general sense but also in narrower sense of responsibility drivers. (Harle 2006; Jackson 2000: 169-78) In many ways, the three concepts could be viewed as environment or medium within or through which foreign policy was formulated.

Within the idea of international society, particularly in the context of debates about value priorities of order and justice, human rights and (non-)intervention, a spectrum could be conceived with pluralist-oriented and solidarist-oriented posed towards either endpoint. Pluralism represents the disposition towards a state-centric arrangements where co-existence and non-interference of sovereign states serve to maintain inter-state status quo. By contrast, solidarism envisions an alternative arrangements that could transcend the preoccupation with coexistence and nonintervention and move further to be more concerned with global “justice” than with interstate “order” maintenance.

In English School, cooperation is often attributed to the effect of norm which derived primarily from cultural commonality among members of international society. Aside from common culture as a major basis for

cooperation, “pragmatic needs” were an important motive for sovereign states, even without overarching culture in play, to subject voluntarily themselves to some institutions of international society. (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 26-27) As one form of the institutions, international law, though not necessarily backed with sanctioning power or compulsory jurisdiction from world bodies, could still be indispensable, or as C.A. W. Manning put it, “a situationally generated pragmatic inevitability”, (quoted from Linklater and Suganami 2006: 27) even for those latecomer states that did not participate in its earlier development. In this regard, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson went even further to suggest that the states of Asia and Africa perceived strong interests in accepting the rules and institutions of international society because they could not do without them even in their relations with one another. (Bull and Watson 1984: 433-34)

In elaborating the existence of various international societies, English School scholars often traced its development to the historical genesis of the Westphalia system in the first half of the 17th century. Throughout the 20th century, the contemporary European-originated international society was expanded globally. With new actors were drawn into the society, how to socialize those new members and make them comply with rules, norms or institutions involved became of increasing concerns and English School was relatively weak in providing much detailed account. Arguably, to make the new members tie deeply and firmly into international society is to try to foster the condition in which they are embedded in the international society. As such, the notion of “embeddedness” could be introduced to help address the inadequacy of English School in the relationship between latecomers members and international society. Similarly, the extent to which cooperation is sustainable could also be made reference to the degree of embeddedness condition that could be created.

Embeddedness was genetically conceptualized by Karl Polanyi in stressing the way in which economic life is socially situated and market did not really function in a vacuum. Mark Granovetter went further to stress the role of personal relationship and structures (or networks) of such social relations in building trust. (Granovetter 1992: 60) The concept of embeddedness was elaborated and expanded further, by Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, into four aspects: cognitive, cultural, structural and political embeddedness. Cognitive embeddedness refers to “the ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of economic reasoning,” whereas cultural embeddedness stresses “the role of shared collective understandings in shaping economic strategies and goals.” (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990: 15-17) Besides, structural embeddedness which considerably correspond with what Granovetter highlighted pointed to “the contextualization of economic exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations,” political embeddedness emphasized “the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions, particularly the state and social class.” (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990: 18, 20)

The four aspects of embeddedness could be insightful for highlighting some important features of Sino-Canadian relations and point to the extent to which the bilateral cooperation involved can become sustainable. Before tackling this part of linkage between English School, embeddedness and the case, I shall briefly outline the development of Canada-PRC relations.

III. Canada, China and the Development of Bilateral Relations till the 1990s

From the genetic English School perspective, both Canada and the PRC constituted “new” members of international society in the sense that neither states had participated in the formation of international society in the European setting in the 17th and 18th centuries. Notwithstanding latecomer status of both countries, there existed some difference in membership between Canada and the PRC at the time. They could be further differentiated as “quasi-” and “alien-“ members of that society in view of some cultural divide between them. Since Canada was composed of two founding nations, English and French, in its embryo formation, and used to be a British dominion, in many ways it was already immersed in the western-orchestrated international society. To the extent that Canadian foreign policy in post-World War II was characterized with Pearsonian internationalism aspiring to uphold international norms and to advocate responsibility that a “good international citizen” is supposed to fulfil and commit, Canada could arguably be treated as a “spokesperson” of international society. By contrast, China was a “semi-colony” in the 19th century, in Sun Yat-sen’s word, in facing up the expansion of western civilization, the encounter of which involved series of traumatic experiences, or “Humiliation of Hundred Years”. (Unschuld 2013: 35-96) More importantly, Mao’s China came into the world stage with a “Chinese characteristics” of Marxist-Leninist ideology and deep suspicion against the West, which reinforced its longstanding anti-imperialist mentality. Nevertheless, Canada has long adopted an engagement policy toward the PRC well ahead of the outside world, which arguably constitutes a distinctive feature of the bilateral relationships. (Evans 2008; 2014: xiv) With the ideological and cultural divergence between the two countries as well as a distinctive Canadian engagement policy, Canada-PRC relationships constitute a worthy subject from English School’s perspective.

Canada was on the brink of recognizing the PRC before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. (Beecroft 1991: 49-52; Ronning 1974: 171-5) The historical contingency of the Korean War, Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1950s and the Canadian-American relations made the plan on hold for nearly two decades. Before eventual diplomatic normalization in 1970, Canadian preference for engagement approach vis-à-vis American containment policy was already unfolded. The sort of longstanding engagement policy with Canadian characteristics involves “the aspiration to create a constructive relationship with another state with the intent to alter its behavior and character.” (Evans 2014: 12) In the context of Mao’s China, this was meant to deal with the dangerous outliers and helped them “learn their way into international society.” (Evans 2014: 13) Nevertheless, during the Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s, the Liberal government was cautious in taking initiatives to approach Beijing. Then, in the policy review of 1958, the Diefenbaker government decided to adopt an incremental approach, as some European countries and Japan began to move in that direction, by expanding trade contacts with the mainland while maintaining diplomatic recognition of Taipei. (Beecroft 1991:65-67) Among the contacts, the wheat sales to Beijing were most noted. The first transaction was made in 1958 and another larger-scale deal was further struck in 1960-61. (Evans 2014: 21; Kyba 1991: 168-72) This bridge-opening move set the stage for expanding non-political exchanges with Beijing under the new atmosphere.

As the Liberals returned to office afterwards, the Canadian policy toward China began unfolded in a

two-pillar approach. A major decision was taken to expand non-governmental contacts with Communist China, which was notably manifested in a program of exchanging correspondents between the Globe and Mail and New China (Xinhua) News Agency. Besides, policy proposals were made to resolve an institutional impasse on China's representation within the UN framework. (DEA file B, 1, 8874: Briefing Notes Dec.23/63) The new "progressive attitude" for an explicit engagement approach is demonstrated by Paul Martin's call for "broadening contacts at a variety levels...to penetrate the curtain of ignorance and blunt the edge of ideological differences." (quoted from Beecroft 1991: 68; Evans 2014: 22)

Other than that, there were exchange programs set up in pre-recognition period. For example, the Norman Bethune Medical Exchange was launched between the Chinese medical institute in Beijing and McGill University, the only North American university to have an academic exchange with the PRC at the time. (Lin 2011: 147)

After having negotiated in Stockholm for 18 months, Canada established diplomatic relations with the PRC, on October 13, 1970, through the adoption of "Canadian formula" by which Canada recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China while taking note of the Chinese position on the inalienability of Taiwan within Chinese territory. (Wu 2001; 2005) One year later, the PRC was admitted to the UN system. At the time, it not only broke the ice for members of international community to embrace the PRC, but also set the stage for post-recognition exchanges and cooperation. In the 1970s, overall, these exchanges and cooperation were primarily undertaken in trade, consular, cultural and educational realms as well as several ministerial visits. Major environment-related cooperation was not really initiated until the early 1980s when the government decided to designate the PRC as an eligible recipient of development aid.

Marcel Masse, the president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), announced in 1980 that Canada's goal in China should be "the multiplication of contacts at the thinking level." CIDA funding in various projects served as a catalyst for bilateral cooperation and capacity-building that met Chinese needs for international training and the acquisition of management and technical skills which significantly grew out of Deng Xiaoping's Open Door policies. Initially, four sectors of concentration were identified for bilateral cooperation: human resources and management training; agriculture; forestry; energy. Later on, transportation and telecommunications were added into the list of cooperation activities. As a result, Canadian universities, community colleges became key players. Local entities such as towns, cities and provinces entered into twinning relationships with Chinese counterparts. Various non-government actors in sports, arts and performance engaged in incessant exchanges across the Pacific. (Evans 2014: 31; Wilson 2001)

Bilateral exchanges persisted into most of Mulroney's years, albeit with preoccupations more with trade and investment than human rights. This priority was laid down evidently in the China Strategy of 1987. (Frolic 2011) Nevertheless, the shocking occurrence of the Tiananmen incident of 1989 brought about transitional setbacks in bilateral cooperation. CIDA-funded development cooperation projects as well as several consultations were suspended. (DEA file C, 23, 12612; Evans 2014: 39-40) Nevertheless, Ottawa fell short of imposing general sanctions and terminating completely the aid program. Engagement continued for fear of unwittingly pushing China toward isolation, albeit in a limited and low-key way. High-level visits resumed in

1991. In the meantime, as another tool of engagement, Radio Canada International, while negotiating various exchanges programs with Chinese local services and reaching agreements on sharing transmitters, inaugurated on Oct. 1, 1989 its daily broadcasts in Mandarin, much ahead of original plan of April 1990. (DEA file D, 1, 21043: BFE memo to BKR Jul.24/87; PEK tel to Ott Feb. 15/89; Ott tel to PEK Oct.4/89)

Later on, as bilateral relations resumed gradually, CIDA launched another round of bilateral cooperation. It was formulated through Interim Canadian Development Strategy for China in November 1991. It pursued three new programming opportunities: strategic energy planning, applied economic research institute linkages, and CIDA's major role in establishing the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). (Wilson 2001) The CCICED project, initially was thought to be transitory when it was launched in April 1992, turned out to be institutionalized as China's advanced policy consulting institute on environment and development and have functioned as one of the landmarks for Sino-Canadian environmental cooperation for more than two decades.

Overall, nevertheless, the eruption of the Tiananmen incident and Chinese official responses afterwards suggested that the PRC remained adamant in its position on the primary importance of social stability and order the definition of which fell firmly in the hands of the Communist Party and that the state's views on individual political and civic rights continued to diverge significantly from those of the West. Canada-China official relations and cooperation projects gradually returned to normal transactions, while public disquiet about China, mainly from some corner of civil society, began to revolve around three themes: human rights, democratic development and good governance. Policy debates then focused on the priority of a robust commercial agenda vs promotion of Canadian values. (Evans 2014: 42)

IV. The Bilateral Relationships through the Eyes of English School and Beyond

To begin with, foreign policy analysis could be readily recast along several key themes identified by English School perspective. As laid out in a new foreign policy framework, by a Finnish scholar Vilho Harle, based on Wight's three traditions, foreign policy makers could be seen as facing three sets of environment: international system, international society and world society. (Harle 2006: 32) The "objects" foreign policy is directed toward are "other states" (for international system environment), "international society and its institutions" (for international society environment) and "humanity" (for world society environment), respectively. The values or purposes foreign policy is pursuing are "international order defined in state's interests and security" (for international system), "international society membership, its institutions and order" (for international society) and "human dignity and justice" (for world society), respectively. The actors foreign policy is conducted by are mainly "great powers" (for international system), "those additionally included middle or small powers and international organizations" (for international society) and "transnational actors, human subjects and civil organizations" (for world society), respectively.

In the international society setting in particular, middle or small powers not only passively adapt to the international society and associated rules, norms and institutions (such as democracy and human rights), but

also attempt to influence or reinvent them. Besides, the state does not normally pay much attention to reactions by other states. Nor are they always engaging mechanical, billiard ball-like intercourse or power struggle with one another, as envisioned in international system environment. Instead, the state devotes itself to sustaining or strengthening international society and its associated rules, norms and institutions. Other states then reacts to the given state's policy action by proposing their own alternatives (views or positions) to the maintenance or promotion of the institutions concerned. As such, inter-state interaction becomes indirect, and mediated through international society and its associated rules, norms and institutions that define the legitimacy of the actors' interests, interpretations or policy actions. (Harle 2006: 34) Moreover, the state often found it desirable to cherish, uphold or promote her membership in international society as well as the associated values, institutions and order of international society. The state's membership also equips them with an independence status which must be recognized symbolically and practically, and also means its willingness and capability to participate or getting its voice heard in that society. Some states adopting a pluralist-oriented worldview prefer a minimum number of international institutions: sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and such institutions as international law, trade, diplomacy, balance of powers and war that all involved need to pursue in a reciprocal exchanges. Other states, or called solidarists, accept and promote institutions that tend to clash with traditional view of sovereignty: human rights, responsibility to protect or humanitarian intervention. (Harle 2006: 38-39)

The aforementioned English School-inspired foreign policy framework is applicable in the context of bilateral relations. The three settings of international system, international society and world society very much function as an intermediary between the two sides, mediating in varying degree the undergoing process of bilateral relations. Canada-PRC relations could be recast through this framework as well. Given Canada was not treated as a Great Power historically and have neither confronted directly in a strategically calculated way nor engaged in military or diplomatic conflict with the PRC, realist-based international system might not present itself as a predominant feature of setting, insofar as Canada-PRC bilateral relations are concerned. At the other end, world society mode of setting might not be so prevalent in the case of Canada-PRC relations, given both adopted divergent political systems and state players were readily to orchestrate and participate in the bilateral interaction, albeit a sort of asymmetrical way. Canada-PRC relations could then be more appropriately dealt with through the lens of international society.

Canada was deeply immersed in West-orchestrated international society particularly in the post-World War II era, although it did not participate in its making at early stage. To the extent that Canada highly identified with and supported much of underlying norms and institutions of international society, arguably it could even be seen as a sort of "honest broker" or "spokesperson" for the international society insofar as the PRC, an outlier in that society, was concerned. There were abundant evidences of official statements showing Canadian policy objective at the time was to bring the PRC back in international community. (see DEA file A, 12, 10840) For example, the Trudeau Government released "Foreign Policy for Canadians" in 1970, stating the rationale for its recognizing the PRC:

"Achieving this participation and cooperation (by the PRC) will be a slow and difficult process, given the ideological limitations that govern Chinese foreign policy combined with their almost total lack of historical experience in dealing with other countries on an equal basis. Nor has China's isolation been entirely

self-imposed. The importance for world peace and stability of ending this isolation is so great that the Government decided to enter negotiations with Peking for the establishment of diplomatic relations in the hope that Canada would be able to make a contribution towards bringing China into a more constructive relationship with the world community.” (DEA 1970)

Since much of international society was embodied through the UN, the Canadian move to recognize the PRC was believed to be a necessary means to achieve a more effective cooperation within the world body framework. As put by Chester Ronning, Canada’s last ambassador to China in the 1940s and early 1950s, Canadian recognition was due mainly to the basic premise that Canada wishes to continue its policy of making the UN an effective instrument for international cooperation. (DEA file A, 11, 10840: Ronning address Dec. 10/70) By establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, Ottawa opened a new and important channel of communication through which the Canadian state could develop and expand its relations with China in every sphere.

It should be added that the Canadian concern for China’s membership in international society did not dissipate, after the establishment of diplomatic relationship in October 1970. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, the concern for PRC status in that society remained persistently evident. For example, on June 30, 1989, Joe Clark, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, while outlining several areas of sanction against Deng Xiaoping’s Chinese state, set out clear guidelines for the future Canada-China relationship, with the fundamental purpose of ensuring that China would not be isolated from the international community, by reinforcing and preserving existing cross-society institutional links and people-to-people relationships. (Wilson 2001: 20-21)

Back in the 1960s, Mao’s China was defiant against “illegitimate”, western-dominated international society that was characterized with Great Power politics and helped prop up “Chiang Kai-shek’s gang” in the UN. For some years it had thus declined to join the world body and even made known its intention to establish another international organization as an alternative to the existent international society. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Mao’s China had completely disregarded any of existing norms and institutions of the international society. The fact that it launched a revolutionary war to defeat the Nationalists and sought for a sovereign independence status for a newly-established PRC to be recognized and treated equally by western powers suggests its acceptance of the desirability of a membership within the international society, or at least identified itself with a minimum of institutions that characterized a pluralist order of international relations. “The five principles of peaceful coexistence” propounded by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s also explicitly accepted the non-interference in internal affairs as one of the foundational rules of international society. This very acceptance was demonstrated in the account of exchanges of views on that subject between Mitchell Sharp, the State Secretary for External Affairs, and Yao Kuang, Chinese Ambassador to Canada, on March 13, 1972.

The dialogue, besides showing consensual acceptance of non-interference principle, incidentally also revealed some ambiguity of these principles that could be subject to pluralist interpretations by the Soviets, Chinese and Canadian. In that exchanges, Mitchell Sharp first picked up the subject by commenting that “these principles, as formulated, appeared to be insufficient as a basis for relations between countries, for two reasons: firstly they contained the basic assumption that countries should attempt to live peacefully but

without really trying to break down the barriers between them; secondly the Soviet Union in particular while claiming to practice peaceful coexistence, had in fact drawn a sharp dividing line between itself and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other, and invoked the five principles to justify its interference in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries.” In response, Yao Kuang “seemed at first somewhat startled by the SSEA’s challenge to one of the fundamental tenets of Chinese foreign policy, but a lively exchange ensued in the course of which the Ambassador proved only too happy to expound his views on the Soviet Union’s misuse of the term ‘peaceful co-existence.’” (DEA file A, 18, 10840: GPE memo to MIN, Mar. 14/72)

Evident are also in examples where the PRC explicitly espoused the fundamental norm of the recognition of sovereign independence as exercising the entitled right of a member of international society. There are numerous cases involving the PRC, Taiwan and other countries seeking to switch sides for diplomatic recognition. The Sino-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm were full of narratives on such meaning negotiations as well as the divergent views of both sides on whether or not the rule should be extended to include formal recognition of territorial boundaries of that country. (It is related to the status of Taiwan in the Chinese claim.) (Edmonds 1998; Frolic 1991; Wu 2001: 146-174)

The consensually acceptance of the pluralist-oriented institutions of international society by Beijing and Ottawa is certainly demonstrated in the text of joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970:

The government of Canada and the government of the PRC, *in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and equality and mutual benefit*, have decided upon mutual recognition... The Canadian and Chinese governments have agreed to exchange ambassadors within six months, and to provide all necessary assistance for the establishment and the performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their respective capitals, *on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with international practice*. (Italics as author’s emphasis, External Affairs 1970)

Notwithstanding the consensus on non-interference in internal affairs, post-normalization relations sometimes show its ambiguity that could become subject of meaning negotiation. For example, when it came to the issue of 240 Tibetan refugees admitted to Canada disclosed in Canadian media, Lao Hsin, then First Secretary, and his accompanying staff of the PRC embassy called on the DEA to lodge protests on March 26, 1971. On that occasion, J. L Wilder, Acting Director of East Asian Division of the DEA responded that “in Canada the Government does not exercise any control over the press and cannot, therefore, be held responsible for statements made by Canadian newspapers or press agencies. If the Chinese objected to the viewpoint of an element of the media, they were free to bring their objection to its attention and to seek to redress the balance of reporting on any issue of concern to them. They could not expect, however, that the Canadian government would undertake such representations on their behalf.” (DEA file A, 13, 10840: GPE Memo to PDM Mar.26/71) Later, Wilder wrote a letter to clarify further that “the decision by Canada to accept this small number of refugees from India for resettlement was taken on purely humanitarian grounds” and reminded that “while we have no intention of giving offence to China we consider the admission to Canada of people of

whatever origin to be within the sole competence of the Canadian government. The admission of these particular refugees, therefore, is an internal affair of Canada.” (DEA file A, 13, 10840: Wilder Letter to Lao Mar.31/71) In mid-April, the same Tibetan refugees issue remained a contentious subject on which the Chinese continued to protest against “Canadian unfriendly act and interference in Beijing’s internal affairs” by admitting these refugees. (DEA file A, 13, 10840: GPP Memorandum to GPE, Apr. 16/71)

Moreover, both parties’ views on the desirability of the solidarist-oriented fundamental institutions of human rights, humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect and democracy were persistently far apart. As such, within the context of international society, it might be tempting to conclude that Canada-PRC relations were tilting more toward pluralist than toward solidarist end. That said, the objectives of bilateral relations were to forge still with several solidarist elements, albeit less controversial, of institutions on which cooperation projects are built. CIDA’s focuses on human rights, democracy and good governance in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident are cases in point.

By late 1993 CIDA’s China Program had identified three strategic policy objectives for a new Country Development Policy Framework (CDPF): to promote economic linkages and partnerships between the two countries, environmentally sustainable development in China by enhancing its capacity to manage its environment, and to increase China’s capacity to improve governance, respect for human rights and democratic development processes. Specifically, women’s rights and poverty reduction in China was incorporated into the new programs. Through negotiations and consultations with Chinese government, the China CDPF was officially approved by Andre Ouellet, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Wu Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, in July 1994. (Wilson 2001: 15) Thus, solidarist-oriented institutions based on human rights-related values and concerns were quietly adopted in Canada-PRC bilateral cooperation albeit through innovative policy projects coined in less politically sensitive areas such as capacity-building and poverty reduction. More recent projects revolving around migrant rights and rule of law strengthening in China arguably are launched in this solidarist concerns in minds.

Paul Evans had similarly argued that the underpinning of Canadian style of engagement policy, traceable to the missionary impulse, is the institutions and universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law that are to be uphold and promoted. (Evans 2014: 14, 17-20) This longstanding missionary legacy, which could be traced to Canadian missionary’s concerns for universal human rights and welfare in the late 19th century and evidently corresponded with world society’s mode of features, was inherited, picked up and reinvented by the Canadian state to pursue on its foreign policy agenda. Insofar as inter-state relations are concerned, this means that in dealing with the PRC, the Canadian state has attempted to incorporate the missionary spirit and appeal to solidarism for international society. (Mitchell 1991)

The bilateral cooperation that set up in Canada-PRC case evidently betrayed the dual motives: common-cultural-based as well as “pragmatic needs” cooperation. This was not only in post-recognition bilateral relations, but also could be traced to the years before normalization.

Prior to diplomatic normalization, the Liberal government under Lester Pearson leadership already

demonstrated firm beliefs in the approach of engagement and cooperation. On the one hand, it envisioned linkages-forging to transcend or even to convert ideological divergence with the Communist Chinese into some sort of cultural commonality upholding together such values as freedom, democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, pragmatic need-based cooperation was also sought to both expand multi-tiered contacts and to advocate a stance to seat the Communist China in the UN for the sake of strengthening UN universality as well as reducing a prospect of recurrent crises posed by an isolated China. This did not mean a sympathy with the Communist cause, but contact with them was seen as necessary. (cf. Evans 2014: 22) This dual motives for cooperation could be demonstrated evidently by Paul Martin's statements. On the one hand, he thought diplomatic contacts among antagonistic countries, if used properly, would be beneficial as in the case of Soviet-American communication at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and emphasized that "the net effect of isolation and non-recognition has been to leave Communist Chinese owing nothing to anyone not even to the USSR..(to the extent that they could) hot up and cool down military and political situation in the Far East as they wished.." (DEA file C, 1, 8924: Ott Tel to WSHDC Dec.3/64) On the other, he called for "broadening contacts at a variety levels...to penetrate the curtain of ignorance and blunt the edge of ideological differences." (quoted from Beecroft 1991: 68; Evans 2014: 22)

The establishment of diplomatic relations, as shown in the joint communique, indicated the existence of some minimal common culture ("principles") as well as pragmatic needs ("mutual interest"). For the Canadian side, the continuing promotion of policies on human rights, democracy and good governance could be seen as aiming to expand the basis of existent common culture to include with more solidarist-oriented values and institutions supported by international society. In this aspect, the debates in Canadian foreign policy on whether or not its China policy should pursue to change Chinese domestic and international behavior or policies eventually, or simply to "solve an immediate problem that needed to be solved", reflected the existence of the dual motives for bilateral cooperation. The motive of "pragmatic needs" for cooperation was consistently evident in Pierre Trudeau's approach towards Beijing. According to Paul Evans, for Trudeau, the Canadian initiative for recognition was to "solve an immediate problem that needed to be solved." There was no hint that a diplomatic opening would change Chinese society and value system. (Evans 2014: 24).

With these two motives in play, how bilateral cooperation could become sustainable deserves consideration. This is also linked to Canadian role in China's re-entry into or immersion in international society. In theoretical term, we may want to take a look at embeddedness concept for possible way for moving beyond existent state of relationship. The four aspects of embeddedness for linking economic action to social structure may be applied to examine the bilateral relations where trade constituted substantial part of bilateral transactions.

First of all, cognitive embeddedness, insofar as Canada-China relations is concerned, would emphasize the ways to instill continuously passionate attachment to some icon contributors in the history-making process. Evidently, some steps have been taken to forge that special identity through Norman Bethune. For example, as Paul Evans highlighted, the Trudeau government purchased Norman Bethune's birth place in Gravenhurst, Ontario in 1973 and converted it into a museum, which was the first step to reclaim him. (Evans 2014: 30) Other well-known Canadian figures such as Pierre Trudeau may also serve in similar function. Nevertheless,

Chinese contributors such as Zhou Enlai appear much less recognized, compared to Canadian counterparts. Whenever Canada-PRC relations are referred by both sides, there is no other conceivable alternative except following that special legacy. In effect this would limit the cognitive ability of reasoning of any latecomers in the bilateral relations to conceive any alternative path of relationship that could be reconstructed instead. When it comes to mutual visits and exchanges, these symbols are definitely invoked to reclaim and reproduce the unique legacy. In this sense, cognitive embeddedness arguably is built upon structural embeddedness that stressed interpersonal bond created in earlier stage of development.

Secondly, cultural embeddedness in the case is to build and increase common understandings that in turn shape diplomatic strategies and policy goals of both sides. Theoretically, the more levels and channels of exchanges and consultations are opened up and pursued, the more likelihood shared bilateral understanding would bear to fruit and would be in a position to shape their respective goals and perception of interests. In my observation, this is the part of embeddedness strategies that remained less evident in available literature and archival materials. More strenuous efforts should be made to search for possible feedback linkage, if any, in order to assess the state of cultural embeddedness that have in turn shape respective strategies, goals and perception of interests. Nonetheless, this also suggest more room be developed further along the strategies, if sustainable cooperation is so desired by both sides.

Third, structural embeddedness in the case means “the contextualization of bilateral exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations.” The participants of bilateral exchanges involved have no doubt changed from relatively limited number of agencies or sectors to wider members composed of various players from public, private and non-governmental sectors. The categories of visa applicants in some way might be used as indicators in this regard. When diplomatic relations were just established, DEA had identified three major categories of visa applicants who would be interested in visiting China: businessmen, scholars and journalists. (DEA file A, 12, 10840: GPE Memo to ECL etc, Jan. 27/71) Over nearly 45 years, the list of categories presumably have exceeded far beyond the old ones. More importantly, this is often accompanied with the complication of interpersonal ties and networks across sectors and national boundaries. From the staffing of diplomatic and consular services to that of private and societal sectors, interpersonal relations on both sides or cross Pacific boomed and multiplied. This also entailed a transformation of interpersonal ties limited to mainly elite level at the beginning, then diffusing to mass level. From the outset, inter-personal networks across Canada-PRC relations were evidently created mainly at Canadian elite level. Figures like Norman Bethune, Pierre Trudeau, Maurice Strong, John Small who were able to build up its local and transnational personal ties at the early stage of development, or even left a legacy that continued to be commemorated by late participants. As such, the pool of stakeholders in the bilateral relations enterprises also increase tremendously. For bilateral relations to become sustainable, the cultivation and expansion of the pool of stakeholders who have at stake primary interests in the prosperity of bilateral relations must be ensured.

Finally, political embeddedness in bilateral relations emphasized the manner in which bilateral relations and decisions are shaped by broader political relations or a struggle for power that involves other close actors or international institutions related to one or both sides. In contemporary setting, the American factor and how bilateral relations are anchored in multilateral organizations such as the UN, APEC. Nevertheless, the degree

or configuration of political embeddedness may turn out to act like a double-edged sword to cut both ways of bilateral relationships. This is where more investigation should be pursued in the future.

Overall, cultivating interest stakeholders are necessary, which would reinforce “pragmatic needs” for expanding and deepening relations. That said, strategies making efforts to expand stakeholders pool alone may not be sufficient to ensure bilateral cooperation on a sustainable track. Equally, if not more, importantly, how to forge common understandings and cultural embeddedness to shape in turn both sides’ strategies and interests remain crucial tasks in the long run.

V. Concluding remarks:

In this paper, I attempted to apply English School perspective to the case of Canada-PRC relations. The evidence was primarily drawn from Canadian archival materials and literature from Canadian foreign policy. It was highlighted that while international system, international society and world society elements appeared to be present, at least from Canadian perspective, with varying degree, the development of bilateral relations were prevalent especially in the environment of international society. That said, within that international society framework, the bilateral relationship remained more pluralist-oriented than solidarist-oriented, in the sense that minimal institutions of sovereignty integrity, non-interference in internal affairs were readily recognized albeit with occasional contests, whereas norms and institutions related to human rights and democracy remained largely contentious. The paper then proceeded to discuss briefly the dual foundations of bilateral cooperation: cultural commonality and “pragmatic needs”. The paper then introduced the concept of embeddedness and proposed to examine the state of bilateral relationship in four aspects: cognitive, cultural, structural and political embeddedness. While strategies oriented towards cognitive and structural embeddedness were shown to be evident at least from Canadian perspectives, evidence on cultural and political embeddedness remain to be probed into in the future. The four aspects may also point out the ways in which sustainable cooperation may lie in. That said, the English School story of bilateral relations relying on Canadian narratives alone remain incomplete and may well be cross-checked with accessible Chinese sources in the near future.

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A: 20-1-2-PRC
B: 20-PRC-1-3
C: 20-1-2-CHINA-1
D: 56-21-8-CHINA

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國科會補助專題研究計畫出席國際學術會議心得報

告

日期：104__年_6_月10__日

計畫編號	MOST 103-2410-H-004-125		
計畫名稱	國際合作的意義空間協商及其溢出效果：以中加關係為例		
出國人員姓名	吳得源	服務機構及職稱	政治大學國際關係研究中心副研究員
會議時間	2015 年 5 月 30 日至 2015 年 6 月 5 日	會議地點	加拿大渥太華
會議名稱	(中文) 2015 年加拿大政治學會年度國際學術研討會 (英文) 2015 Canadian Political Science Association annual Convention		
發表題目	(中文) 英國學派與永續合作：加拿大與中國關係為例 (英文) English School and Sustainable Cooperation: A Case of Canada-China Relations		

一、參加會議經過

本人在 5 月 30 日上午自桃園機場出發，並在當地時間 5 月 30

日夜間抵達加拿大渥太華，隨即入住旅館。次日至會場渥太華大學社會科學學院大樓辦理報到手續，並瞭解所發表論文的兩個場次地點所在。本人的論文發表（題目：Practicing to bridge IR and ir: Bringing Archival Research Back in）在週二下午 13:30-15:00 的第三場次（主題：Of Scholars and Practitioners: Bridges，由蒙特婁大學 Anthony Amicelle 主持，渥太華大學 Srdjan Vucetic 評論，論文發表人則為來自台灣、加拿大與伊朗的學者）。綜觀該場次包括前述主持、評論與發表人在內共有 15 位左右、涵蓋加國、美國等其他國家地區參與者，來自主持、評論人以及不少現場聽眾的發言與討論多能聚焦於國際關係學者與實踐者關係以及彌合理論與實踐隔閡的主題上，意見頗具建設性，整場次堪稱成功圓滿；其中，本人於該場次最後階段，綜合回應與會者提問，準備將若干評論意見納入未來修改文稿之參考，深覺受益良多。

發表完該場次個人論文後，並曾利用空檔短暫參加隨後場次會議進行觀摩與來自加拿大及美國等國學者進行意見交流，也順道參觀主辦單位主辦的年度大型書展汲取出版新資訊。週四（6月4日）上午本人再在第一場次(08:45-10:15)（主題：Canadian Foreign Policy and the World、主持與評論人為約克大學 Susan Henders）發表第二篇論文（題目為：English School and Sustainable

Cooperation: A Case of Canada-China Relations)，連同主持、評論、發表人共有加拿大、英國、日本、美國等地約 16 位學者共同參與，熱烈討論場面並不因上午第一場次而略有遜色。所發表兩篇論文結束後，束裝於 6 月 6 日上午搭機返國，台北時間 6 月 7 日晚間順利飛抵國門。

二、與會心得

綜觀本次與會經驗，成果可謂十分豐碩。本人除執行科技部計畫部分研究成果呈現於 6 月 4 日議程的論文發表外，由於另外一篇論文題綱申請也獲通過，故一併予以執行，因而是近年參加國際會議首度同時發表兩篇論文的創舉，最後也順利圓滿完成任務，可說是個人空前難得的經驗與成果。另外，個人主要參與的兩個場次，除了少數來自東亞地區的參與者，更有不少來自西方國家、不同國籍學者針對眾多論文及研究所共同關切的「加拿大外交政策及國關學者與實踐者關係」議題上有腦力激盪，也針對其他議題範疇展開類似專家參與知識社群的相互切磋，發言也相當貼切熱烈；就此而言，相較於本人往年參加國際研究學會主辦研討會的經驗，這次的收穫更為不同凡響。

三、發表論文全文或摘要

English School and Sustainable Cooperation: Canada-China relations as a Case*

Paper delivered at 2015 Canadian Political Science Association
Annual Conference
Ottawa, Canada

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* This draft paper is subject to further revision. Please do not cite without permission from the author. Nevertheless, any comment and suggestion are welcome.

English School and Sustainable Cooperation: Canada-China relations as a Case

I. Introduction:

Bilateralism, compared to multilateralism, in International Relations theoretical or empirical practice received not much attention. Much of IR theories such as Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism were often referred to in the context of multilateralism. English School was no exception to this tendency. It was seldom applied to bilateral relations.

In a sort of parallel, “cooperation” tended to be less problematized than “conflict” in IR, although both were often put together in texts to suggest the adoption of a comprehensive and balanced approach. Moreover, where cooperation was the research focus, it tended to be linked more with multilateralism than bilateralism. Further, existing bilateral relations literature, much of which adopted a primarily descriptive mode of approach, was often criticized for inadequate theoretical relevance.

In this context, this paper aims to bring bilateral cooperation back for attention in IR. The paper will argue that English School, in terms of conceptualizing three traditions of international system, international society and world society as well as pluralism vs solidarism, provides some important insights for the development of bilateral relations and the extent to which the state of cooperation may become sustainable. As will be demonstrated subsequently, Canada-China relations that was often characterized with more cooperation than conflict could be considerably recast along the line of English School.

Canada and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are to celebrate the 45th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations in the coming October. The bilateral ties have been re-strengthened to a sort of “strategic partnership” and with frequent ministerial visits since 2009, despite previously strained relationship. In characterizing Canadian foreign policy towards the PRC, prominent Canadian scholars often invoked the term of “engagement policy” to navigate through the development of Canada-PRC relations. (eg. Evans 2014) Nevertheless, the Canadian way to engage China with a longstanding aim to foster a condition for its re-entry into international community remained largely under-explored in Canadian Foreign Policy and under-appreciated by outside world.

Canada was unique and instrumental in helping bring China back in international society process for at least three reasons. First of all, Canada is one of the few western countries that have firm belief in the merit of engagement approach and has put it into practice fairly consistently. In the heyday of the Cold War in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the story for Canada-China being “reluctant adversaries” (Evans and Frolic 1991) could be partially traced to the Canadian policy preference for the approach vis-à-vis the American way of containment. Second, unlike Great Britain that advocated similar engagement approach but recognized the PRC much earlier in the 1950 with lingering diplomatic squabbles with it, Canada had never been a colonial power and had not subjugated China. Third, Ottawa adopted an innovative “Canadian formula” to normalize relationship with Beijing on October 13, 1970, which had circumvented much diplomatic log-jam, thanks to Taiwan issue, at the time and were followed by many other countries that intended to recognize the PRC.

In the wake of Beijing’s growing assertiveness in IR as well as IR circles, it is timely to re-examine China’s relations with outside world and Canada’s role in it in terms of the relevance of western perspectives. Specifically, the major research question is: in what ways elements of English School could be identified in the case of Canada-PRC relations? In what conceptual way the bilateral cooperation could be sustainable? It would be argued that English School thinkers such as C. A. W. Manning, Alan James and Adam Watson provides some insightful conceptualization of pragmatic-needs- as well as norm-based cooperation, which also made the Perspective a distinct candidate to reconcile not only the longstanding “interest vs ideas” debates but also to bridge the gap between academic and practitioners’ worlds, as highlighted in CPSA-ISA Canada section.

The paper draws much from archival sources in the Library and Archives Canada. The paper focuses on Canadian perspective of Canada-China relations. It is also hoped that this approach would help bridge the gap between academic and practitioners’ world, given archival materials contains abundant accounts of policy practitioners.

II. English School Perspective: Then and Beyond?

The concept of “international society” becomes a landmark of English School.

Hedley Bull define it concisely: “a society of states exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.” (Bull 2012: 13) In the elaboration of “international society”, it was often juxtaposed with “international system” and “world society”. They all together stem from Martin Wight’s “three traditions” of IR theory: realism, rationalism and revolutionism. Three thinkers are identified with the primary founders of “international system”, “international society” and “world society”: Hobbes, Grotius and Kant, respectively. (Wight 1991) Each envisioned with emphases on different facets of world affairs. In brief, “international system” highlighted the feature of a struggle for power and ensuing conflicts among sovereign states and an anarchical environment where they pursued their policy goals with self-interests. “International society” emphasized the institutionalization of mutual interest and understandings, in the form of shared norms, rules and institutions among states. “World society” takes individuals, voluntary associations and human beings as a whole as the building blocks of world order and justice. (Buzan 2004: 7-9)

In many ways, the aim of English School is to elaborate the theory of international politics which arguably involves all speculation at anytime and anywhere on the international spectrum. (Dunne 1998) As such, international society perspective was often pursued without much reference to the foreign policies of its individual members, and insofar as structure-agent relations are concerned, tended to be more structure-oriented. Although English School and the three concepts were developed in this context, they are not irrelevant to agent-oriented foreign policy analysis and bilateral relations. The triads of the concepts could be re-deployed in a way pertinent for foreign policy analysis, not only in general sense but also in narrower sense of responsibility drivers. (Harle 2006; Jackson 2000: 169-78) In many ways, the three concepts could be viewed as environment or medium within or through which foreign policy was formulated.

Within the idea of international society, particularly in the context of debates about value priorities of order and justice, human rights and (non-)intervention, a spectrum could be conceived with pluralist-oriented and solidarist-oriented posed towards either endpoint. Pluralism represents the disposition towards a state-centric arrangements where co-existence and non-interference of sovereign

states serve to maintain inter-state status quo. By contrast, solidarism envisions an alternative arrangements that could transcend the preoccupation with coexistence and nonintervention and move further to be more concerned with global “justice” than with interstate “order” maintenance.

In English School, cooperation is often attributed to the effect of norm which derived primarily from cultural commonality among members of international society. Aside from common culture as a major basis for cooperation, “pragmatic needs” were an important motive for sovereign states, even without overarching culture in play, to subject voluntarily themselves to some institutions of international society. (Linklater and Suganami 2006: 26-27) As one form of the institutions, international law, though not necessarily backed with sanctioning power or compulsory jurisdiction from world bodies, could still be indispensable, or as C.A. W. Manning put it, “a situationally generated pragmatic inevitability”, (quoted from Linklater and Suganami 2006: 27) even for those latecomer states that did not participate in its earlier development. In this regard, Hedley Bull and Adam Watson went even further to suggest that the states of Asia and Africa perceived strong interests in accepting the rules and institutions of international society because they could not do without them even in their relations with one another. (Bull and Watson 1984: 433-34)

In elaborating the existence of various international societies, English School scholars often traced its development to the historical genesis of the Westphalia system in the first half of the 17th century. Throughout the 20th century, the contemporary European-originated international society was expanded globally. With new actors were drawn into the society, how to socialize those new members and make them comply with rules, norms or institutions involved became of increasing concerns and English School was relatively weak in providing much detailed account. Arguably, to make the new members tie deeply and firmly into international society is to try to foster the condition in which they are embedded in the international society. As such, the notion of “embeddedness” could be introduced to help address the inadequacy of English School in the relationship between latecomers members and international society. Similarly, the extent to which cooperation is sustainable could also be made reference to the degree of embeddedness condition that could be created.

Embeddedness was genetically conceptualized by Karl Polanyi in stressing the way in which economic life is socially situated and market did not really function

in a vacuum. Mark Granovetter went further to stress the role of personal relationship and structures (or networks) of such social relations in building trust. (Granovetter 1992: 60) The concept of embeddedness was elaborated and expanded further, by Sharon Zukin and Paul DiMaggio, into four aspects: cognitive, cultural, structural and political embeddedness. Cognitive embeddedness refers to “the ways in which the structured regularities of mental processes limit the exercise of economic reasoning,” whereas cultural embeddedness stresses “the role of shared collective understandings in shaping economic strategies and goals.” (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990: 15-17) Besides, structural embeddedness which considerably correspond with what Granovetter highlighted pointed to “the contextualization of economic exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations,” political embeddedness emphasized “the manner in which economic institutions and decisions are shaped by a struggle for power that involves economic actors and nonmarket institutions, particularly the state and social class.” (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990: 18, 20)

The four aspects of embeddedness could be insightful for highlighting some important features of Sino-Canadian relations and point to the extent to which the bilateral cooperation involved can become sustainable. Before tackling this part of linkage between English School, embeddedness and the case, I shall briefly outline the development of Canada-PRC relations.

III. Canada, China and the Development of Bilateral Relations till the 1990s

From the genetic English School perspective, both Canada and the PRC constituted “new” members of international society in the sense that neither states had participated in the formation of international society in the European setting in the 17th and 18th centuries. Notwithstanding latecomer status of both countries, there existed some difference in membership between Canada and the PRC at the time. They could be further differentiated as “quasi-” and “alien-“ members of that society in view of some cultural divide between them. Since Canada was composed of two founding nations, English and French, in its embryo formation, and used to be a British dominion, in many ways it was already immersed in the western-orchestrated international society. To the extent that Canadian foreign policy in post-World War II was characterized with Pearsonian internationalism aspiring to uphold international norms and to advocate responsibility that a “good international citizen” is supposed to fulfil and commit, Canada could arguably be

treated as a “spokesperson” of international society. By contrast, China was a “semi-colony” in the 19th century, in Sun Yat-sen’s word, in facing up the expansion of western civilization, the encounter of which involved series of traumatic experiences, or “Humiliation of Hundred Years”. (Unschuld 2013: 35-96) More importantly, Mao’s China came into the world stage with a “Chinese characteristics” of Marxist-Leninist ideology and deep suspicion against the West, which reinforced its longstanding anti-imperialist mentality. Nevertheless, Canada has long adopted an engagement policy toward the PRC well ahead of the outside world, which arguably constitutes a distinctive feature of the bilateral relationships. (Evans 2008; 2014: xiv) With the ideological and cultural divergence between the two countries as well as a distinctive Canadian engagement policy, Canada-PRC relationships constitute a worthy subject from English School’s perspective.

Canada was on the brink of recognizing the PRC before the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950. (Beecroft 1991: 49-52; Ronning 1974: 171-5) The historical contingency of the Korean War, Taiwan Strait crisis in the 1950s and the Canadian-American relations made the plan on hold for nearly two decades. Before eventual diplomatic normalization in 1970, Canadian preference for engagement approach vis-à-vis American containment policy was already unfolded. The sort of longstanding engagement policy with Canadian characteristics involves “the aspiration to create a constructive relationship with another state with the intent to alter its behavior and character.” (Evans 2014: 12) In the context of Mao’s China, this was meant to deal with the dangerous outliers and helped them “learn their way into international society.” (Evans 2014: 13) Nevertheless, during the Korean War and Taiwan Strait Crises in the 1950s, the Liberal government was cautious in taking initiatives to approach Beijing. Then, in the policy review of 1958, the Diefenbaker government decided to adopt an incremental approach, as some European countries and Japan began to move in that direction, by expanding trade contacts with the mainland while maintaining diplomatic recognition of Taipei. (Beecroft 1991:65-67) Among the contacts, the wheat sales to Beijing were most noted. The first transaction was made in 1958 and another larger-scale deal was further struck in 1960-61. (Evans 2014: 21; Kyba 1991: 168-72) This bridge-opening move set the stage for expanding non-political exchanges with Beijing under the new atmosphere.

As the Liberals returned to office afterwards, the Canadian policy toward China began unfolded in a two-pillar approach. A major decision was taken to expand

non-governmental contacts with Communist China, which was notably manifested in a program of exchanging correspondents between the Globe and Mail and New China (Xinhua) News Agency. Besides, policy proposals were made to resolve an institutional impasse on China's representation within the UN framework. (DEA file B, 1, 8874: Briefing Notes Dec.23/63) The new "progressive attitude" for an explicit engagement approach is demonstrated by Paul Martin's call for "broadening contacts at a variety levels...to penetrate the curtain of ignorance and blunt the edge of ideological differences." (quoted from Beecroft 1991: 68; Evans 2014: 22)

Other than that, there were exchange programs set up in pre-recognition period. For example, the Norman Bethune Medical Exchange was launched between the Chinese medical institute in Beijing and McGill University, the only North American university to have an academic exchange with the PRC at the time. (Lin 2011: 147)

After having negotiated in Stockholm for 18 months, Canada established diplomatic relations with the PRC, on October 13, 1970, through the adoption of "Canadian formula" by which Canada recognized the PRC as the sole legal government of China while taking note of the Chinese position on the inalienability of Taiwan within Chinese territory. (Wu 2001; 2005) One year later, the PRC was admitted to the UN system. At the time, it not only broke the ice for members of international community to embrace the PRC, but also set the stage for post-recognition exchanges and cooperation. In the 1970s, overall, these exchanges and cooperation were primarily undertaken in trade, consular, cultural and educational realms as well as several ministerial visits. Major environment-related cooperation was not really initiated until the early 1980s when the government decided to designate the PRC as an eligible recipient of development aid.

Marcel Masse, the president of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), announced in 1980 that Canada's goal in China should be "the multiplication of contacts at the thinking level." CIDA funding in various projects served as a catalyst for bilateral cooperation and capacity-building that met Chinese needs for international training and the acquisition of management and technical skills which significantly grew out of Deng Xiaoping's Open Door policies. Initially, four sectors of concentration were identified for bilateral cooperation: human resources and management training; agriculture; forestry;

energy. Later on, transportation and telecommunications were added into the list of cooperation activities. As a result, Canadian universities, community colleges became key players. Local entities such as towns, cities and provinces entered into twinning relationships with Chinese counterparts. Various non-government actors in sports, arts and performance engaged in incessant exchanges across the Pacific. (Evans 2014: 31; Wilson 2001)

Bilateral exchanges persisted into most of Mulroney's years, albeit with preoccupations more with trade and investment than human rights. This priority was laid down evidently in the China Strategy of 1987. (Frolic 2011) Nevertheless, the shocking occurrence of the Tiananmen incident of 1989 brought about transitional setbacks in bilateral cooperation. CIDA-funded development cooperation projects as well as several consultations were suspended. (DEA file C, 23, 12612; Evans 2014: 39-40) Nevertheless, Ottawa fell short of imposing general sanctions and terminating completely the aid program. Engagement continued for fear of unwittingly pushing China toward isolation, albeit in a limited and low-key way. High-level visits resumed in 1991. In the meantime, as another tool of engagement, Radio Canada International, while negotiating various exchanges programs with Chinese local services and reaching agreements on sharing transmitters, inaugurated on Oct. 1, 1989 its daily broadcasts in Mandarin, much ahead of original plan of April 1990. (DEA file D, 1, 21043: BFE memo to BKR Jul.24/87; PEK tel to Ott Feb. 15/89; Ott tel to PEK Oct.4/89)

Later on, as bilateral relations resumed gradually, CIDA launched another round of bilateral cooperation. It was formulated through Interim Canadian Development Strategy for China in November 1991. It pursued three new programming opportunities: strategic energy planning, applied economic research institute linkages, and CIDA's major role in establishing the China Council for International Cooperation on Environment and Development (CCICED). (Wilson 2001) The CCICED project, initially was thought to be transitory when it was launched in April 1992, turned out to be institutionalized as China's advanced policy consulting institute on environment and development and have functioned as one of the landmarks for Sino-Canadian environmental cooperation for more than two decades.

Overall, nevertheless, the eruption of the Tiananmen incident and Chinese official responses afterwards suggested that the PRC remained adamant in its position on

the primary importance of social stability and order the definition of which fell firmly in the hands of the Communist Party and that the state's views on individual political and civic rights continued to diverge significantly from those of the West. Canada-China official relations and cooperation projects gradually returned to normal transactions, while public disquiet about China, mainly from some corner of civil society, began to revolve around three themes: human rights, democratic development and good governance. Policy debates then focused on the priority of a robust commercial agenda vs promotion of Canadian values. (Evans 2014: 42)

IV. The Bilateral Relationships through the Eyes of English School and Beyond

To begin with, foreign policy analysis could be readily recast along several key themes identified by English School perspective. As laid out in a new foreign policy framework, by a Finnish scholar Vilho Harle, based on Wight's three traditions, foreign policy makers could be seen as facing three sets of environment: international system, international society and world society. (Harle 2006: 32) The "objects" foreign policy is directed toward are "other states" (for international system environment), "international society and its institutions" (for international society environment) and "humanity" (for world society environment), respectively. The values or purposes foreign policy is pursuing are "international order defined in state's interests and security" (for international system), "international society membership, its institutions and order" (for international society) and "human dignity and justice" (for world society), respectively. The actors foreign policy is conducted by are mainly "great powers" (for international system), "those additionally included middle or small powers and international organizations" (for international society) and "transnational actors, human subjects and civil organizations" (for world society), respectively.

In the international society setting in particular, middle or small powers not only passively adapt to the international society and associated rules, norms and institutions (such as democracy and human rights), but also attempt to influence or reinvent them. Besides, the state does not normally pay much attention to reactions by other states. Nor are they always engaging mechanical, billiard ball-like intercourse or power struggle with one another, as envisioned in international system environment. Instead, the state devotes itself to sustaining or strengthening international society and its associated rules, norms and institutions.

Other states then reacts to the given state's policy action by proposing their own alternatives (views or positions) to the maintenance or promotion of the institutions concerned. As such, inter-state interaction becomes indirect, and mediated through international society and its associated rules, norms and institutions that define the legitimacy of the actors' interests, interpretations or policy actions. (Harle 2006: 34) Moreover, the state often found it desirable to cherish, uphold or promote her membership in international society as well as the associated values, institutions and order of international society. The state's membership also equips them with an independence status which must be recognized symbolically and practically, and also means its willingness and capability to participate or getting its voice heard in that society. Some states adopting a pluralist-oriented worldview prefer a minimum number of international institutions: sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs, and such institutions as international law, trade, diplomacy, balance of powers and war that all involved need to pursue in a reciprocal exchanges. Other states, or called solidarists, accept and promote institutions that tend to clash with traditional view of sovereignty: human rights, responsibility to protect or humanitarian intervention. (Harle 2006: 38-39)

The aforementioned English School-inspired foreign policy framework is applicable in the context of bilateral relations. The three settings of international system, international society and world society very much function as an intermediary between the two sides, mediating in varying degree the undergoing process of bilateral relations. Canada-PRC relations could be recast through this framework as well. Given Canada was not treated as a Great Power historically and have neither confronted directly in a strategically calculated way nor engaged in military or diplomatic conflict with the PRC, realist-based international system might not present itself as a predominant feature of setting, insofar as Canada-PRC bilateral relations are concerned. At the other end, world society mode of setting might not be so prevalent in the case of Canada-PRC relations, given both adopted divergent political systems and state players were readily to orchestrate and participate in the bilateral interaction, albeit a sort of asymmetrical way. Canada-PRC relations could then be more appropriately dealt with through the lens of international society.

Canada was deeply immersed in West-orchestrated international society particularly in the post-World War II era, although it did not participate in its making at early stage. To the extent that Canada highly identified with and

supported much of underlying norms and institutions of international society, arguably it could even be seen as a sort of “honest broker” or “spokesperson” for the international society insofar as the PRC, an outlier in that society, was concerned. There were abundant evidences of official statements showing Canadian policy objective at the time was to bring the PRC back in international community. (see DEA file A, 12, 10840) For example, the Trudeau Government released “Foreign Policy for Canadians” in 1970, stating the rationale for its recognizing the PRC:

“Achieving this participation and cooperation (by the PRC) will be a slow and difficult process, given the ideological limitations that govern Chinese foreign policy combined with their almost total lack of historical experience in dealing with other countries on an equal basis. Nor has China’s isolation been entirely self-imposed. The importance for world peace and stability of ending this isolation is so great that the Government decided to enter negotiations with Peking for the establishment of diplomatic relations in the hope that Canada would be able to make a contribution towards bringing China into a more constructive relationship with the world community.” (DEA 1970)

Since much of international society was embodied through the UN, the Canadian move to recognize the PRC was believed to be a necessary means to achieve a more effective cooperation within the world body framework. As put by Chester Ronning, Canada’s last ambassador to China in the 1940s and early 1950s, Canadian recognition was due mainly to the basic premise that Canada wishes to continue its policy of making the UN an effective instrument for international cooperation. (DEA file A, 11, 10840: Ronning address Dec. 10/70) By establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing, Ottawa opened a new and important channel of communication through which the Canadian state could develop and expand its relations with China in every sphere.

It should be added that the Canadian concern for China’s membership in international society did not dissipate, after the establishment of diplomatic relationship in October 1970. In the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident, the concern for PRC status in that society remained persistently evident. For example, on June 30, 1989, Joe Clark, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs, while outlining several areas of sanction against Deng Xiaoping’s Chinese state, set out clear guidelines for the future Canada-China relationship, with the fundamental purpose of ensuring that China would not be isolated from the international community, by reinforcing and preserving existing cross-society institutional

links and people-to-people relationships. (Wilson 2001: 20-21)

Back in the 1960s, Mao's China was defiant against "illegitimate", western-dominated international society that was characterized with Great Power politics and helped prop up "Chiang Kai-shek's gang" in the UN. For some years it had thus declined to join the world body and even made known its intention to establish another international organization as an alternative to the existent international society. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Mao's China had completely disregarded any of existing norms and institutions of the international society. The fact that it launched a revolutionary war to defeat the Nationalists and sought for a sovereign independence status for a newly-established PRC to be recognized and treated equally by western powers suggests its acceptance of the desirability of a membership within the international society, or at least identified itself with a minimum of institutions that characterized a pluralist order of international relations. "The five principles of peaceful coexistence" propounded by Zhou Enlai in the 1950s also explicitly accepted the non-interference in internal affairs as one of the foundational rules of international society. This very acceptance was demonstrated in the account of exchanges of views on that subject between Mitchell Sharp, the State Secretary for External Affairs, and Yao Kuang, Chinese Ambassador to Canada, on March 13, 1972.

The dialogue, besides showing consensual acceptance of non-interference principle, incidentally also revealed some ambiguity of these principles that could be subject to pluralist interpretations by the Soviets, Chinese and Canadian. In that exchanges, Mitchell Sharp first picked up the subject by commenting that "these principles, as formulated, appeared to be insufficient as a basis for relations between countries, for two reasons: firstly they contained the basic assumption that countries should attempt to live peacefully but without really trying to break down the barriers between them; secondly the Soviet Union in particular while claiming to practice peaceful coexistence, had in fact drawn a sharp dividing line between itself and Eastern Europe on the one hand, and the rest of the world on the other, and invoked the five principles to justify its interference in the internal affairs of Eastern European countries." In response, Yao Kuang "seemed at first somewhat startled by the SSEA's challenge to one of the fundamental tenets of Chinese foreign policy, but a lively exchange ensued in the course of which the Ambassador proved only too happy to expound his views on the Soviet Union's misuse of the term 'peaceful co-existence.'" (DEA file A, 18, 10840: GPE memo to MIN, Mar. 14/72)

Evident are also in examples where the PRC explicitly espoused the fundamental norm of the recognition of sovereign independence as exercising the entitled right of a member of international society. There are numerous cases involving the PRC, Taiwan and other countries seeking to switch sides for diplomatic recognition. The Sino-Canadian negotiations in Stockholm were full of narratives on such meaning negotiations as well as the divergent views of both sides on whether or not the rule should be extended to include formal recognition of territorial boundaries of that country. (It is related to the status of Taiwan in the Chinese claim.) (Edmonds 1998; Frolic 1991; Wu 2001: 146-174)

The consensually acceptance of the pluralist-oriented institutions of international society by Beijing and Ottawa is certainly demonstrated in the text of joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations on October 13, 1970: The government of Canada and the government of the PRC, in accordance with the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in each other's internal affairs and equality and mutual benefit, have decided upon mutual recognition... The Canadian and Chinese governments have agreed to exchange ambassadors within six months, and to provide all necessary assistance for the establishment and the performance of the functions of diplomatic missions in their respective capitals, on the basis of equality and mutual benefit and in accordance with international practice. (*Italics as author's emphasis, External Affairs 1970*)

Notwithstanding the consensus on non-interference in internal affairs, post-normalization relations sometimes show its ambiguity that could become subject of meaning negotiation. For example, when it came to the issue of 240 Tibetan refugees admitted to Canada disclosed in Canadian media, Lao Hsin, then First Secretary, and his accompanying staff of the PRC embassy called on the DEA to lodge protests on March 26, 1971. On that occasion, J. L Wilder, Acting Director of East Asian Division of the DEA responded that "in Canada the Government does not exercise any control over the press and cannot, therefore, be held responsible for statements made by Canadian newspapers or press agencies. If the Chinese objected to the viewpoint of an element of the media, they were free to bring their objection to its attention and to seek to redress the balance of reporting on any issue of concern to them. They could not expect, however, that the Canadian government would undertake such representations on their behalf." (DEA file A, 13, 10840: GPE Memo to PDM Mar.26/71) Later,

Wilder wrote a letter to clarify further that “the decision by Canada to accept this small number of refugees from India for resettlement was taken on purely humanitarian grounds” and reminded that “while we have no intention of giving offence to China we consider the admission to Canada of people of whatever origin to be within the sole competence of the Canadian government. The admission of these particular refugees, therefore, is an internal affair of Canada.” (DEA file A, 13, 10840: Wilder Letter to Lao Mar.31/71) In mid-April, the same Tibetan refugees issue remained a contentious subject on which the Chinese continued to protest against “Canadian unfriendly act and interference in Beijing’s internal affairs” by admitting these refugees. (DEA file A, 13, 10840: GPP Memorandum to GPE, Apr. 16/71)

Moreover, both parties’ views on the desirability of the solidarist-oriented fundamental institutions of human rights, humanitarian intervention, responsibility to protect and democracy were persistently far apart. As such, within the context of international society, it might be tempting to conclude that Canada-PRC relations were tilting more toward pluralist than toward solidarist end. That said, the objectives of bilateral relations were to forge still with several solidarist elements, albeit less controversial, of institutions on which cooperation projects are built. CIDA’s focuses on human rights, democracy and good governance in the aftermath of the Tiananmen incident are cases in point.

By late 1993 CIDA’s China Program had identified three strategic policy objectives for a new Country Development Policy Framework (CDPF): to promote economic linkages and partnerships between the two countries, environmentally sustainable development in China by enhancing its capacity to manage its environment, and to increase China’s capacity to improve governance, respect for human rights and democratic development processes. Specifically, women’s rights and poverty reduction in China was incorporated into the new programs. Through negotiations and consultations with Chinese government, the China CDPF was officially approved by Andre Ouellet, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Wu Yi, China’s Minister of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation, in July 1994. (Wilson 2001: 15) Thus, solidarist-oriented institutions based on human rights-related values and concerns were quietly adopted in Canada-PRC bilateral cooperation albeit through innovative policy projects coined in less politically sensitive areas such as capacity-building and poverty reduction. More recent projects revolving around migrant rights and rule of law strengthening in China arguably are launched in this solidarist concerns in

minds.

Paul Evans had similarly argued that the underpinning of Canadian style of engagement policy, traceable to the missionary impulse, is the institutions and universal values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law that are to be upheld and promoted. (Evans 2014: 14, 17-20) This longstanding missionary legacy, which could be traced to Canadian missionary's concerns for universal human rights and welfare in the late 19th century and evidently corresponded with world society's mode of features, was inherited, picked up and reinvented by the Canadian state to pursue on its foreign policy agenda. Insofar as inter-state relations are concerned, this means that in dealing with the PRC, the Canadian state has attempted to incorporate the missionary spirit and appeal to solidarism for international society. (Mitchell 1991)

The bilateral cooperation that set up in Canada-PRC case evidently betrayed the dual motives: common-cultural-based as well as "pragmatic needs" cooperation. This was not only in post-recognition bilateral relations, but also could be traced to the years before normalization.

Prior to diplomatic normalization, the Liberal government under Lester Pearson leadership already demonstrated firm beliefs in the approach of engagement and cooperation. On the one hand, it envisioned linkages-forging to transcend or even to convert ideological divergence with the Communist Chinese into some sort of cultural commonality upholding together such values as freedom, democracy and human rights. Meanwhile, pragmatic need-based cooperation was also sought to both expand multi-tiered contacts and to advocate a stance to seat the Communist China in the UN for the sake of strengthening UN universality as well as reducing a prospect of recurrent crises posed by an isolated China. This did not mean a sympathy with the Communist cause, but contact with them was seen as necessary. (cf. Evans 2014: 22) This dual motives for cooperation could be demonstrated evidently by Paul Martin's statements. On the one hand, he thought diplomatic contacts among antagonistic countries, if used properly, would be beneficial as in the case of Soviet-American communication at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, and emphasized that "the net effect of isolation and non-recognition has been to leave Communist Chinese owing nothing to anyone not even to the USSR..(to the extent that they could) hot up and cool down military and political situation in the Far East as they wished.." (DEA file C, 1, 8924: Ott Tel to WSHDC Dec.3/64) On the other, he called for "broadening

contacts at a variety levels...to penetrate the curtain of ignorance and blunt the edge of ideological differences.” (quoted from Beecroft 1991: 68; Evans 2014: 22)

The establishment of diplomatic relations, as shown in the joint communique, indicated the existence of some minimal common culture (“principles”) as well as pragmatic needs (“mutual interest”). For the Canadian side, the continuing promotion of policies on human rights, democracy and good governance could be seen as aiming to expand the basis of existent common culture to include with more solidarist-oriented values and institutions supported by international society. In this aspect, the debates in Canadian foreign policy on whether or not its China policy should pursue to change Chinese domestic and international behavior or policies eventually, or simply to “solve an immediate problem that needed to be solved”, reflected the existence of the dual motives for bilateral cooperation. The motive of “pragmatic needs” for cooperation was consistently evident in Pierre Trudeau’s approach towards Beijing. According to Paul Evans, for Trudeau, the Canadian initiative for recognition was to “solve an immediate problem that needed to be solved.” There was no hint that a diplomatic opening would change Chinese society and value system. (Evans 2014: 24).

With these two motives in play, how bilateral cooperation could become sustainable deserves consideration. This is also linked to Canadian role in China’s re-entry into or immersion in international society. In theoretical term, we may want to take a look at embeddedness concept for possible way for moving beyond existent state of relationship. The four aspects of embeddedness for linking economic action to social structure may be applied to examine the bilateral relations where trade constituted substantial part of bilateral transactions.

First of all, cognitive embeddedness, insofar as Canada-China relations is concerned, would emphasize the ways to instill continuously passionate attachment to some icon contributors in the history-making process. Evidently, some steps have been taken to forge that special identity through Norman Bethune. For example, as Paul Evans highlighted, the Trudeau government purchased Norman Bethune’s birth place in Gravenhurst, Ontario in 1973 and converted it into a museum, which was the first step to reclaim him. (Evans 2014: 30) Other well-known Canadian figures such as Pierre Trudeau may also serve in similar function. Nevertheless, Chinese contributors such as Zhou Enlai appear much less recognized, compared to Canadian counterparts. Whenever

Canada-PRC relations are referred by both sides, there is no other conceivable alternative except following that special legacy. In effect this would limit the cognitive ability of reasoning of any latecomers in the bilateral relations to conceive any alternative path of relationship that could be reconstructed instead. When it comes to mutual visits and exchanges, these symbols are definitely invoked to reclaim and reproduce the unique legacy. In this sense, cognitive embeddedness arguably is built upon structural embeddedness that stressed interpersonal bond created in earlier stage of development.

Secondly, cultural embeddedness in the case is to build and increase common understandings that in turn shape diplomatic strategies and policy goals of both sides. Theoretically, the more levels and channels of exchanges and consultations are opened up and pursued, the more likelihood shared bilateral understanding would bear to fruit and would be in a position to shape their respective goals and perception of interests. In my observation, this is the part of embeddedness strategies that remained less evident in available literature and archival materials. More strenuous efforts should be made to search for possible feedback linkage, if any, in order to assess the state of cultural embeddedness that have in turn shape respective strategies, goals and perception of interests. Nonetheless, this also suggest more room be developed further along the strategies, if sustainable cooperation is so desired by both sides.

Third, structural embeddedness in the case means “the contextualization of bilateral exchange in patterns of ongoing interpersonal relations.” The participants of bilateral exchanges involved have no doubt changed from relatively limited number of agencies or sectors to wider members composed of various players from public, private and non-governmental sectors. The categories of visa applicants in some way might be used as indicators in this regard. When diplomatic relations were just established, DEA had identified three major categories of visa applicants who would be interested in visiting China: businessmen, scholars and journalists. (DEA file A, 12, 10840: GPE Memo to ECL etc, Jan. 27/71) Over nearly 45 years, the list of categories presumably have exceeded far beyond the old ones. More importantly, this is often accompanied with the complication of interpersonal ties and networks across sectors and national boundaries. From the staffing of diplomatic and consular services to that of private and societal sectors, interpersonal relations on both sides or cross Pacific boomed and multiplied. This also entailed a transformation of interpersonal ties limited to mainly elite level at the beginning, then diffusing to

mass level. From the outset, inter-personal networks across Canada-PRC relations were evidently created mainly at Canadian elite level. Figures like Norman Bethune, Pierre Trudeau, Maurice Strong, John Small who were able to build up its local and transnational personal ties at the early stage of development, or even left a legacy that continued to be commemorated by late participants. As such, the pool of stakeholders in the bilateral relations enterprises also increase tremendously. For bilateral relations to become sustainable, the cultivation and expansion of the pool of stakeholders who have at stake primary interests in the prosperity of bilateral relations must be ensured.

Finally, political embeddedness in bilateral relations emphasized the manner in which bilateral relations and decisions are shaped by broader political relations or a struggle for power that involves other close actors or international institutions related to one or both sides. In contemporary setting, the American factor and how bilateral relations are anchored in multilateral organizations such as the UN, APEC. Nevertheless, the degree or configuration of political embeddedness may turn out to act like a double-edged sword to cut both ways of bilateral relationships. This is where more investigation should be pursued in the future.

Overall, cultivating interest stakeholders are necessary, which would reinforce “pragmatic needs” for expanding and deepening relations. That said, strategies making efforts to expand stakeholders pool alone may not be sufficient to ensure bilateral cooperation on a sustainable track. Equally, if not more, importantly, how to forge common understandings and cultural embeddedness to shape in turn both sides’ strategies and interests remain crucial tasks in the long run.

V. Concluding remarks:

In this paper, I attempted to apply English School perspective to the case of Canada-PRC relations. The evidence was primarily drawn from Canadian archival materials and literature from Canadian foreign policy. It was highlighted that while international system, international society and world society elements appeared to be present, at least from Canadian perspective, with varying degree, the development of bilateral relations were prevalent especially in the environment of international society. That said, within that international society

framework, the bilateral relationship remained more pluralist-oriented than solidarist-oriented, in the sense that minimal institutions of sovereignty integrity, non-interference in internal affairs were readily recognized albeit with occasional contests, whereas norms and institutions related to human rights and democracy remained largely contentious. The paper then proceeded to discuss briefly the dual foundations of bilateral cooperation: cultural commonality and “pragmatic needs”. The paper then introduced the concept of embeddedness and proposed to examine the state of bilateral relationship in four aspects: cognitive, cultural, structural and political embeddedness. While strategies oriented towards cognitive and structural embeddedness were shown to be evident at least from Canadian perspectives, evidence on cultural and political embeddedness remain to be probed into in the future. The four aspects may also point out the ways in which sustainable cooperation may lie in. That said, the English School story of bilateral relations relying on Canadian narratives alone remain incomplete and may well be cross-checked with accessible Chinese sources in the near future.

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A: 20-1-2-PRC

B: 20-PRC-1-3

C: 20-1-2-CHINA-1

D: 56-21-8-CHINA

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四、建議

科技部補助國內研究生與學者出國出席國際學術會議制度，行

之多年，對於獎勵學者擴展視野與進行國際交流貢獻卓著，頗值得讚許與肯定。唯會議結束返國後聽聞有國內有研究生或學者原本計畫參與國際會議，因申請經費補助時間超過期限等因素，而未能順利成行之情事。鑒於像國際研究學會所舉辦年會盛事每年多在三月中旬到四月初舉行，依科技部現有六週期限繳交全文規定推算，申請截止日期極易和春節假期重疊，建議未來似可就申請期限再考慮因應不同國際會議舉辦日期及每年假期不同、作彈性調整或縮短，並考慮增加補助參與國際會議之年度預算，以進一步鼓勵我國研究生與學者多進行國際學術交流，提高我國學術國際能見度。

五、攜回資料名稱及內容

1.“Canadian Political Science Association annual conference at Ottawa, 2015”: (加拿大政治學會 2015 年渥太華年會議程資料手冊)：詳列各場次議程、活動、論文發表人及評論人、贊助書商廣告等；

2. 主要歐美加大型出版商 2015 年出版目錄：包括，Ashgate, Cambridge University Press, McGill-Queen’s University Press, MIT Press, Oxford University Press, Palgrave Macmillan,

Routledge, Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group,

University of British Columbia (UBC)

Press, University of California Press, University of Toronto Press 等；

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科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2016/02/28

科技部補助計畫	計畫名稱: 國際合作的意義空間協商及其溢出效果: 以中加關係為例
	計畫主持人: 吳得源
	計畫編號: 103-2410-H-004-125- 學門領域: 國際關係
無研發成果推廣資料	

103年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：吳得源		計畫編號：103-2410-H-004-125-				計畫名稱：國際合作的意義空間協商及其溢出效果：以中加關係為例		
成果項目		量化			單位	備註（質化說明： 如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）		
		實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數（含實際已達成數）	本計畫實際貢獻百分比				
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇		
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%			
		研討會論文	0	0	200%			
		專書	0	0	100%	章/本		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件		
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%			
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件		
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元		
	參與計畫人力（本國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次		
		博士生	0	0	100%			
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%			
		專任助理	0	0	100%			
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	研究計畫原規劃發表一篇論文，唯另一篇論文題綱申請也獲加拿大政治學會通過，因此參加2015年加拿大政治學會年會發表兩篇論文，內容也構成計畫執行成果。	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%			
		研討會論文	2	1	200%			
		專書	0	0	100%	章/本		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件		
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%			
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件		
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元		
	參與計畫人力（外國籍）	碩士生	3	2	150%	人次	本計畫在執行期間雇用人力上初期不足規劃原額，後來補足並增加雇用研究生以	

							加速資料蒐集整理與初步分析。
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		
其他成果 (無法以量化表達之 成果如辦理學術活動 、獲得獎項、重要國 際合作、研究成果國 際影響力及其他協助 產業技術發展之具體 效益事項等，請以文 字敘述填列。)	本計畫執行涉及加拿大國家檔案館檔案申請與當場閱讀，在過程中也有不少機會與當地加國學者同行相互切磋討論，無形中增加實踐國際學術合作的機會。						
	成果項目	量化			名稱或內容性質簡述		
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0					
	課程/模組	0					
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0					
	教材	0					
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0					
	研討會/工作坊	0					
	電子報、網站	0					
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0					

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請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

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2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

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本項研究計畫的主題與成果均在凸顯雙邊國際合作，不論是「較高政治性」或功能性議題範疇上，往往程度不一的牽涉到意義空間協商，而不僅止於雙方商談技術層面本身合作的範圍及技術項目的諸多細節。計畫執行是以加拿大與中華人民共和國在1970年建交後的官方檔案為主，也涉及1980年代至1990年代中期的環境與發展相關議題中加合作。唯因執行期限原為兩年期，因故核准縮短為一年期，因此相關檔案的蒐集仍侷限於官方政府部門之間的合作，尚不及擴及官方所控存有民間行為者的國際環境合作紀錄，此一部份有待未來擴充進行研究。同時，有關現有環境與發展相關檔案的蒐集待整理撰成論文後，未來將另行發表並修正後進行出版。