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印尼反恐政策: 研究分析與探討
Indonesia's Counterterrorism Policies: An
Analytical Framework

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Abstract

Terrorism worldwide has been a threat for quite long time. Indonesia is not an exception. Since the Bali bombing in 2002, there are attacks happening almost every year. The situation now is getting even more serious with the jihadists that are returning from Syria back to Indonesia. The purpose of this thesis is to introduce the situation in Indonesia and discuss Indonesia's counterterrorism policies with a special focus on its international cooperation with ASEAN, Australia and the United States. The cooperation concentrates on these main fields – Legal, Finance, Military and Intelligence, Bilateral Agreements and Social Communication. The weaknesses of these policies are described as well as some suggestions that outlines how Indonesian government could do better in order to reduce the risks of terrorist attacks in the country.

長時間以來，包含印度尼西亞在內，全世界不斷受到恐怖主義威脅。巴厘島爆炸後，印度尼西亞幾乎每年都有襲擊事件發生。甚者，從敘利亞返回印度尼西亞的聖戰分子情況亦正加劇。本文旨在介紹印度尼西亞的情況，討論印度尼西亞的反恐政策，特別關注與東盟，澳大利亞和美國的國際合作。合作集中在這些主要領域 - 法律，金融，軍事和情報，雙邊協議和社會交流。描述這些政策的弱點以及提出印度尼西亞政府如何更有效地減少恐怖分子襲擊該國的風險的建議。

Key words: Indonesia, Terrorism, Counterterrorism, Security

印尼，印度尼西亞，恐怖主義，反恐，保安

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List of abbreviations

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASG	Abu Sayyaf Group
AU	Australian Dollar
BIN	Badan Intelijen Negara (the State Intelligence Agency)
BNPT	Indonesian: Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terrorism (Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency)
DI	Darul Islam (House of Islam)
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FPI	Front Pembela Indonesia (Islamic Defenders Front)
GAM	Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GPI	Gerakan Pemuda Islam (Islamic Youth Movement)
INTRAC	Indonesia Financial Transaction Report and Analysis Centre
IR	Indonesian Republic
ISIS	Islamic State of Iraq and Syria
JAD	Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid
JI	Al-Jamaah al-Islamiyyah (Islamic Congregation)
KMM	Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia
LJ	Laskar Jihad (Warriors of Jihad)
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MMI	Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Mujahidin Council of Indonesia)
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NII	Negara Islam Indonesia (Islamic State of Indonesia)

POLRI	Kepolisian Negara Republik Indonesia (The Indonesian National Police)
Rp	Indonesian Rupiah
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Armed Forces)



1. Introduction

Terrorism is one of the most frequently discussed issues all around the world. The attacks that happened in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 marked a turning point in the studies of terrorism and were the reason for launching the US-led 'War on Terror'¹. The events of 9/11 changed everything, especially regarding the international security worldwide.

Before 9/11, the acts of terrorism causing mass outrages seemed to be more or less hypothetical, but post-September 11 showed that the era of science fiction had unfortunately become the reality. There was a surge of Muslim anger and frustration. Prior to 9/11, the US economy was doing very well. China was seen as the country that posed the greatest danger to the United States, but the dominant view among both the public and the elites was that China was just a problem to be managed, not an enemy to be defeated. Some elite groups perceived the spread of radical Islam as a threat to US interests, but no international issues or concerns were dominant at that time. Therefore, 9/11 was a surprise. The Americans were shocked by the country's vulnerability and by the anti-American sentiment across the globe. However, the Americans recovered quickly and within a year, New York had returned to a certain degree of normality. By early 2002 it was clear that there were going to be huge risks of terrorist attacks not only for the USA (because of its war in Iraq). By the end of 2002, after the Bali bombing, Indonesian democracy had also been undermined by Islamic extremism and there were warnings of Al Qaeda threats in Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand (Thackrah, 2003).

After 2015, the terrorist attacks started to be more frequent. In January 2015, two terrorists invaded the headquarter of the satirical weekly magazine Charlie Hebdo in Paris, France, and killed 12 of their employees. The two terrorists were members of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the motive of their action was to take "avenge" for the honour of Mohammad as the magazine published cartoons joking about the Islamic leaders (BBC, 2015). This attack was

¹ The War on Terror or the Global War on Terrorism is the counterterrorism campaign launched in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 by the US and its allies.

followed by the deadliest attack in France, so far, – the bombing, shooting and killing of 130 people during the Eagles of Death Metal concert in the Bataclan Stadium and in the nearby bars and restaurants in Paris in November 2015 (BBC, 2015). Attacks in other European countries followed – In Brussels, there was a bombing in the Zaventem airport and in the Maalbeek Metro Station in March 2016 (Rtbf, 2016), in Nice, France, a vehicle was driven into people celebrating the Bastille Day in July 2016 (Liberation, 2016), in Berlin, another truck was driven into crowds of people in the Christmas Market in December 2016 (Zeit, 2016), in the UK, there was a bombing in May 2017 in the Manchester Arena after the concert of Ariana Grande (BBC, 2017), in the UK, a minivan drove into people on the London Bridge in June 2017 (Alexander, 2017). With these and, unfortunately, many other attacks around the world, people realized that terrorism is actually affecting our daily lives and the whole world's attention has turned to Europe.

In Indonesia, terrorism has always been a serious concern, however until 2002 and the Bali bombing (CNN, 2002), it was mainly a regional problem. The attacks of 2002 brought the issue onto the world stage and the approach of the Indonesian government and its precautions had to be reviewed. This thesis will focus on Indonesia because it seems that after the attacks that have happened at the turn of century such as the Bali bombing in 2002 and 2003 Jakarta bombing, the interest and attention to this problem has faded. A week after the bombing in Bali, the government of Indonesia published two emergency anti-terrorism decrees. These decrees allowed police to expand their powers to arrest and interrogate suspected terrorists and allows a penalty of death for those accused of terrorism. After the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the discussion about how to strengthen the anti-terror law had been opened again, but no crucial steps have been taken in order to improve the current situation. The terrorism in Indonesia is a permanent threat, but its importance stays in the shadow of other Asia's "hot topics" and the global attention is paid to more "known" issues such as the current fight with the Islamic State in Marawi, the Philippines. However, even in the last three years (2016 to 2018), like Europe, Indonesia has equally suffered from terrorist attacks. For example:

- 1) January 14, 2016: A suicide bomber detonated a device in Starbucks Coffee in the capital city Jakarta, followed by gunfire and other explosions. 7 people died and more than 20 were injured. ISIS claimed responsibility for these attacks (Parameswaran, 2016).
- 2) December 21, 2016: Indonesian police raided a Jakarta neighbourhood and killed three suspected ISIS members. The men planned to attack police officers and detonate suicide bombs in crowds during the Christmas holiday. The raid came less than two weeks after police foiled a plot to use a female suicide bomber in an attack against the presidential palace (Counter Extremism, 2017).
- 3) February 27, 2017: A terrorist exploded a pressure cooker bomb in Bandung, West Java. It did not cause any casualties and the bomber was shot by police after he ran into the building where he tried to set fire to a government building (Da Costa and Suroyo, 2017).
- 4) May 24, 2017: Two suicide bombers killed three police officers and injured 12 other people in an attack on the Kampung Melayu bus terminal in the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta (Rappler, 2017).
- 5) June 25, 2017: Two alleged ISIS extremists stabbed a policeman to death in Medan, North Sumatra (Al Jazeera, 2017).

The fight with terrorism doesn't seem to be at its end in Indonesia. Western countries should take it into consideration and not forget that they are not the only one who is facing the terrorist threats.

1.1. Motivation

The main motivation for this thesis was to point out, that the Western is not the only one who has to deal with terrorist attacks. A reader of this thesis coming from Asia might be aware of this fact, but for most of the Western world that is busy right now with the war in Syria and terrorist attacks in Europe, they might not be aware of the situation on the Asian continent. The medias all over the world are mentioning terrorism every day, but not so much attention is given particularly to the Indonesian archipelago and its problems. In the following text, there is a comparison of attention that has been paid by Western media to the

attacks that happened in Indonesia and stand in contrast to the attacks that happened in Europe.

The attack that happened in Jakarta in January 2016, which killed 7 people, was a major attack since 2009 and has been considered as an indication of ISIS starting to focus on Southeast Asia (Parameswaran, 2016). But how was the feedback of the Western medias, that are almost every day coming up with news about terrorism and its analysis regarding this incident? Three countries and their most read newspapers have been selected – the United Kingdom (The Guardian, Daily Mail UK), France (Le Figaro, Le Monde) and the Czech Republic (Mladá Fronta Dnes) to look at the articles they published (or not) about these incidents in Indonesia. The UK and France have been especially chosen because both countries suffered many attacks at the same time, as Indonesia did, but the awareness of the terrorism issue in Asia in the British and French medias is quite unbalanced compared to news issued about the European countries. Compared to UK and France that have been substantially affected by terrorism, the Czech Republic has no experience with terrorist attacks at all, so it was particularly interesting to see how the media reflected the situation in Europe and in Asia. On the other hand, for example the medias from Singapore and Australia, that are “closer” to Indonesia, definitely pay more attention to this issue.

Compared to other attacks that happened in Indonesia, the Jakarta bombing has been marginally mentioned in the European news. Only one of the online medias in the Czech Republic commented briefly on the attack, providing basic information about what happened and how many people got hurt (Idnes, 2016).

In the UK, the Guardian devoted two articles to the attacks – *Jakarta attacks: Islamic State militants claim responsibility – as it happened* (Safi and Weaver) and *As Isis attacked Jakarta, I didn't know how to react* (Rambatan²⁰¹⁶). The second article is the testimony to the attacks by Bonni Rambatan, a Jakarta-based freelance writer and illustrator, who described the situation in the capital during the attacks. The first article provides basic information about what had happened.

Similarly, the Daily Mail UK provided the readers with three articles: *Jakarta attacks in busy area filled with Western brands* (Daily Mail, 2016), *Indonesia police say Jakarta attackers had planned to attack other cities* (Daily Mail, 2016) and *Indonesian police declare cleric key suspect in 2016 attack* (Daily Mail, 2017). The first article described the situation and emphasised the fact that the area where it happened is popular among foreigners and expats. The second article is just a short text about possible attacks that might have happened in other Indonesian cities. Finally, the last article is more recent and informs about Aman Abdurrahman the leader of an Islamic State group-affiliated militant network, who probably ordered the attack from prison.

French Le Monde and Le Figaro, both issued one article about the attack. Le Monde in *Indonésie: l'Etat islamique revendique l'attaque de Djakarta* (Indonesia: ISIS claims responsibility for the attacks in Jakarta; Le Monde, 2016) as well as Le Figaro's *Attaques terroristes à Jakarta: la police annonce la fin des opérations* (Terrorist attacks in Jakarta: The Police announced the end of the operations; Le Figaro, 2016) only very briefly inform the readers about the situation.

To find out if the foreknowledge about the incidents has improved and more articles have been written, I was also searching for news about the latest attack in Indonesia – the stabbing in Medan in June 2017 (Al Jazeera, 2017). However, even fewer articles were devoted to this incident. But compared to these few articles, the English-written Indonesian online news the Jakarta Post devoted to the Medan attack about 10 articles to inform the public not only in Indonesia and many articles have been published in Bahasa Indonesia. The first article *Attack on North Sumatra Police headquarters kills one officer* (The Jakarta Post, 2017) is explaining what has happened in Medan right before Idul Fitri² when two perpetrators attacked a police officer at 3 am when he was taking a rest in a checkpoint (The Jakarta Post, 2017). In two other articles *Tito suspects JAD terror group behind North Sumatra police post attacks* (Natalia, 2017) and *Medan Police attackers linked to IS: Police* (Gunawan, 2017), the Police and the National Police

² Idul Fitri or Eid al-Fitri is a religious holiday for Muslims that indicates the end of the fasting during the holy month of Ramadan celebrated all around the world.

chief Gen. Tito Karnavian announced that the two perpetrators were connected with the terrorist group Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) that was also behind the Jakarta Kampung Melayu bus terminal attacks and that is also linked to ISIS. Following article *Medan attack perpetrators want to steal weapons for next terrorist operations: Police* (Gunawan, 2017) emphasises that the primary goal of the Medan perpetrators was to steal weapons from the police officers to use for other terrorist attacks later on. The police raided one of the perpetrators houses where they found a combat knife, an IS flag and several documents on how to commit a suicide. In the article *Police closely monitor Syria returnees after IS-linked attack in Medan* (Halim, 2017), they warn that in the future the police needs to monitor the people returning from the Middle East more carefully as one of the terrorists also came from Syria before the attack.

In the Czech Republic, there was no media that wrote about this attack, which is also the case for the UK's media outlet, The Guardian – zero articles published about the Sumatra's case. On the other hand, the Daily Mail UK published two articles - *Two ISIS knifeman screaming 'Allahu Akbar' stab a policeman to death hours before Eid prayers to mark the end of Ramadan in Indonesia* (Davies, 2017) and a more detailed *Militants hit Indonesia police; 1 officer, 1 attacker dead* (Daily Mail, 2017).

The French media did not mention this attack at all. When looking at news about Indonesia published at the same time as the attack happened, there was only one short article published about an erupting volcano in Sumatra (Le Figaro, 2017), nothing else regarding the terrorism or other news from the country.

In August 2017, a terrorist attack happened in Barcelona, Spain. A car was driven into people in the most famous street Las Ramblas (Smith-Spark, 2017). Of course, the Western medias brought a lot of information about it. Unlike the number of articles on terrorism in Indonesia which were quite lacking. The author of this thesis chose Barcelona to show how much the media focused on an attack that happened in the “West” compared to an attack that happened in Indonesia. Barcelona has been chosen as a city in a country different than Czechia, France or

the UK itself (even though France and Great Britain suffered from terrorist attacks in 2017).

Articles have been published by Mladá Fronta Dnes about the attack including diverse analysis of the attacks (Hajek, 2017), interviews with Czech people living in Barcelona (Klicnar and Havlicka, 2017) or specialist commenting the attack (Havlicka, 2017). Even greater extent and number of articles (in average 50 articles in each of the media) have been issued by the French and British newspapers. They provided the exact timeline of the attacks (Zhou, 2017), different approaches and analysis about what we can learn from this incident (Chichizola, 2017), interviews with survivors and witnesses (The Daily Mail, 2017), profiles of the terrorists as well as victims (Le Monde, 2017) or reactions of world leaders (Borger, 2017).

From the examples given, it is evident that the Western public doesn't pay enough attention to the course of events in Indonesia during the past two years (2016 – 2017). Indonesia has suffered from terrorist attacks as well, but there has not been much concentration on this issue. As the world is getting more and more connected, the same focus, as on the European issues, should be placed on the Indonesian cases. One of the objectives of this thesis is also to raise the awareness about the terrorism disturbances in Indonesia.

The media in Southeast Asia commented on the situation more. The media outlets in Singapore provided useful information. The English-written Straits Times issued articles about the attacks itself. About the attack in Sumatra, they published a few articles such as *Policeman in Medan killed during alleged terrorist attack* (Chan, 2017) or *Police officer stabbed to death in Medan terror attack; 4 held* (Chan, 2017) informing about what happened.

They are also quite often analysing and informing about the terrorist threats in Indonesia, especially when there are some Indonesian nationals that became radicalised, like Indonesian women working as maids, who were arrested in Singapore (Bei Yi, 2017). They are either warning about the worsening of the situation in Indonesia, for instance in *Indonesia police find ISIS propaganda targeting children* (Straits Times, 2017).

Another Singaporean newspaper published in English – *The New Paper* has not published anything about the attack that happened in Sumatra in summer 2017, but on the other hand, provides the readers with many articles about Indonesia, including information about the latest “news” regarding terrorism. For example, the article *Indonesia strengthens anti-terror unit* (Soeriaatmadjam, 2017) talking about the new threats that Indonesia is facing and the Detachment 88 has to deal with or about the danger of terrorism that is spreading through social media in the article *Terrorism in Indonesia funded via social media* (The New Paper, 2017).

This thesis focused also on news published in two Australian medias – *BBC Australia* and *The New Daily*. From the research and its results, it seems that BBC Australia is not paying attention to terrorist attacks in Indonesia anymore. Many articles were devoted to the Bali bombing in 2002 and the processes with terrorists that were responsible for it. For example, the articles of *Australia 'ignored' Bali terror warnings* (BBC, 2003), *Bali bombers 'do not want pardon'* (BBC, 2005) or *'Bali bomber' Dulmatin confirmed dead in Indonesia raid* (BBC, 2010). The newest article that is addressing terrorism in Indonesia is from the year 2015 and is more of a warning for Australians nationals to travel to Indonesia which was under permanent terrorist threat (*Australians warned to avoid Bali due to terror fears*; BBC, 2015). The same issue about the timing of the news concerns the New Daily newspaper as well. They issued articles regarding the bombing that happened a long time ago, for example the article *Australian embassy 2004 bomber linked to Jakarta attacks* (The New Daily, 2016) or *Victim speaks 10 years after 2005 Bali bombings* (The New Daily, 2015), but not mentioning anything about the recent attacks. The last article commenting the situation in Indonesia - *Concerns Indonesia may become recruitment ground for young IS radicals* (Hawley, 2017) - is describing how Indonesian jihadists tried to take part in the Marawi fights and that another potential threat for Australia might be Myanmar.

The Indonesian government is taking the action with its counterterrorism policies and seeks to crackdown on the terrorists, but its policies are not 100 % successful. There are many obstacles that the Indonesian government is facing and

that remains a challenge. So far, not many scholars concentrated solely on this issue. This thesis uses Indonesia's counterterrorism policies as a case study in order to present a framework, which could be considered to analyse similar counterterrorism policies in other countries beyond the Asia-Pacific region.

1.2 Objectives

The primary purpose of this thesis is to examine the counterterrorism policies of Indonesia and to address the debate over the effectiveness of those counterterrorism policies. The thesis will present a framework which will include the instruments of counterterrorism including bilateral agreements, military and intelligence, finance and social communication. The main goal is to get an overview of possible steps that the Indonesian government could undertake in order to reduce the risks of terrorist threats in the country.

The framework and its findings might later also serve scholars that will conduct research about counterterrorism in other countries beyond the Asia-Pacific region. The current literature might be also stronger with this new framework as many of the already existing methodologies lack the analyses of the current situation and do not take into account the obstacles that Indonesia has recently been facing.

1.3 Research question

Countries worldwide are now more aware of the danger of terrorism. In 2001, after the attacks in New York and Washington, D.C., terrorism has been identified as a cross border issue. It concerns all of us, especially in the trend of globalization. Transnational security is a crucial area and states are giving high priority to it. Increasingly, national security strategies have begun to recognise that nations cannot assure their own security without also developing their regional and international security. The national as well as international cooperation is required to respond to these risks. This thesis analyses the responses of Indonesia's government to terrorist activities in the country and aims

at answering the primary research question of *Why are the Indonesian counterterrorism policies not effective?*

1.4 Research design

To accomplish the objective of this thesis and answer to the research question, this thesis will use a qualitative research method to analyse documents and articles. All the data obtained will be collected in the analytical framework. This framework will be described later in a separate chapter. Document analysis is an efficient way of gathering information as the governments' regulations, agreements and other reports are useful and stable sources of information that can be reviewed many times and remain "unchanged". This thesis tried to analyse all available documents regarding the counterterrorism issued by Indonesian government as well as by its partners: the USA, Australia, and ASEAN. Except for those documents, the analysis is mainly based on internet articles as the available literature does not describe the current situation sufficiently.

1.5 Literature Review

The topic of terrorism is quite large; it has been elaborated many times and a lot has already been written about it – in books, magazines or special articles on the internet. Because the literature on terrorism is so extensive, this thesis is only based on the compilation and analysis of previous literature relevant to this specific study. Besides the scholarly articles and books used for this research, official governments' and intergovernmental organisations' reports and studies written on the subject matter have been analysed. Due to the timing and nature of most of this information obtained (especially all those official treaties, documents and declarations), the text is mainly based on Internet resources.

There were a few problems with the published books that I encountered. First of all, the fact that most of the books are out of date and do not provide actual data. Secondly, it was the topic of the literature. Many writers focused on analysing the attacks committed in Bali or write about terrorism in general. Of course, there are many books that focus solely on Indonesia and its history, culture and politics in general, such as Hamish McDonald's publication from 2015 –

Demokrasi: Indonesia in the 21st century (McDonald, 2014). These books usually briefly mention that terrorism is a threat in Indonesia and provide the example of the Bali bombing in 2002. The general basic information about Indonesia comes from the book *Indonesia, a country study* (Worden and Frederick, 2011) that was published in 2011 by the US Government Printing Office.

Another problem with the literature is the credibility of the literature and authors' points of view. For example, the book *Roots of violence in Indonesia* (Freek and Lindblad, 2002) written by Freek Colombijn and J. Thomas Lindblad. On the first page of the book they have formulated the following: "*Indonesia is a violent country. Both civilians and fighters are losing their lives in the armed conflict between Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and the army. In the final week before the fall of President Suharto in May 1998, people who protested against the regime were killed or disappeared, Chinese shop owners lost their lives and property and Chinese women were publicly raped in Jakarta. The same week the centre of Solo was reduced to ashes. Madurese trans migrants in Sambas, West Kalimantan, and Sampit, Central Kalimantan, have clashed repeatedly with long-standing Malay and Dayak residents since 1996, with the result that many Madurese have been driven from homes and killed. In a witch-hunt for dukun santet (practitioners of black magic) in East Java set in motion in 1998, hundreds of people have been murdered and others hanged themselves from fear of being accused of sorcery. Churches and Chinese property were destroyed in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya in 1996. Christians attacked Muslims in Poso. Muslim-Christian conflicts in Maluku took a multitude of lives. After the referendum in East Timor in 1999, proponents of Timorese independence were intimidated and killed. The province of Papua is haunted by violence originating from the desire of part of the Papua population for independence.*" This whole part is evidence that the authors' conviction about violent Indonesia can easily and negatively affect the readers who might stick on this kind of information and will obtain a wrong impression about it. Even though this book was published before the 2002 bombings in Bali, the author of this thesis believes that text is very pessimistic (especially with statements such as "*Violence imposed by military on civilians has, regrettably,*

become a familiar feature of Indonesian society.”) and is definitely not up to date anymore.

Regarding the terrorism itself or, more specifically, the terrorism in Southeast Asia, there is also a wide range of publications to choose from. The book that was absolutely essential in understanding the terrorism in Indonesia and notably the evolution of the Front Pembela Islam is called *Defending the Majesty of Islam: Indonesia's Front Pembela Islam* (Jahroni, 2004) by Jajang Jahroni. This work very clearly explains the development of Islamic fundamentalism. Equally important was also the book from Zachary Abuza, the specialist on politics and security in Southeast Asia, the *Political Islam and Violence in Indonesia* (Abuza, 2007). Abuza is analysing the Jemaah Islamiyah's documents and is trying to explain the motives and strategies of the radical Islamist movements in Indonesia.

There are many books about Indonesia with similar content, most of them are concentrating on the Sukarno and Suharto presidential regimes, Indonesia's transition to democracy as well as the role of Muslims in Indonesian society. Lastly, already mentioned several times, but not very well explained in details, are books about the causes of conflicts in Aceh, Timor Leste or Sulawesi. These books were nonetheless not fundamental to this thesis, because they describe conflicts that have been already solved and, they do not analyse the actual situation and strategies. However, they can provide the readers with a good background, for example Chris Wilson's *Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia* (Wilson, 2008), Marcus Mietzner's *Military, Politics, Islam, and the State in Indonesia* (Mietzner, 2008), Donald J. Porter's *Managing Politics and Islam in Indonesia* (Porter, 2002) or Chiara Formichi's *Islam and the making of the nation* (Formichi, 2012).

Regarding the internet articles and actual information, the most useful websites were those of the Al Jazeera and Diplomat magazine which deals mainly with the current issues in the Asia Pacific. Actual information from Indonesia, that was particularly useful and provided detailed descriptions and analysis of attacks, comes from the local websites of CNN Indonesia, BBC Indonesia, detikNews and

kompas.com. The problem with the internet resources is that many interesting internet articles are not available in English, but only in the Indonesian language. So, for people who are not knowledgeable in an Indonesian language and who want to know more about the terrorism in Indonesia, it is quite difficult to find information.

There are many different approaches that have been taken in order to study the terrorism issue in Indonesia. Depending on which framework scholars choose, certain aspects show up while others remain overshadowed. Some academic papers compare Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia in particular. For instance, Kumar Ramakrishna in *The Southeast Asian Approach” to Counter-Terrorism: Learning from Indonesia and Malaysia* (Ramakrishna, 2006) argues that it is important to find a longer-term approach designed to neuter the ability of terror networks to regenerate. Tammy M. Sittnick focuses on the security in the sea in his *State responsibility and maritime terrorism in the Strait of Malacca: persuading Indonesia and Malaysia to take additional steps to secure the Strait* (Sittnick, 2005). Silvia Haryani examined how Indonesia has responded to the presence of an international terrorist threat and how its international partners in the global war on terrorism have assisted the Indonesian government in combating the violence in her work, *The Indonesia and Australia Counter - Terrorism Cooperation: Comparison between Megawati Soekarnoputri and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Government* (Haryani, n.d.). Likewise, professors Azizuddin, Sani and Nadaraja from the University of Northern Malaysia investigated the *Cooperation between Indonesia and ASEAN to Counterterrorism in Indonesia* (Azizuddin, Sani and Nadaraja, 2012). As one part of this thesis also deals with international cooperation, these works are particularly inspiring.

Jennifer Widjaya Yang Hui dealt with a quite unique approach in her paper *Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia: Velvet-Glove Approach Works* (Widjaya, 2007). She argues that: „*The Indonesian public insisted on an explanation from the police for being too “soft” to the terrorist for their unconventional interrogation techniques when they hold terror convicts in luxurious apartments. Her article provides a different perspective to countering terrorism. It argues that such “soft-measures” are proving more effective in uncovering terror networks and*

rehabilitating terror suspects.” This is a notable interesting fact for this thesis as it also partially focuses on the “soft approach” from the government side. In fact, Indonesia recently came up with many different programs of deradicalization and prevention, but there are still many deficiencies to be improved. These “soft measures” are just one of them.

Another work has been published in the University of Oslo - *Counter-terrorism and social rights: The assessment of adverse effects of counter-terrorism on social rights of families of terror suspects and convicts in Indonesia* (Linha, 2014) that aims to answer whether counterterrorism enforcement in Indonesia has led to interference with social rights of families of terror suspects and convicts and aim to elaborate on how potential violations may be determined and avoided. Even though this paper has no effect on this thesis for its focus, this approach is definitely unique and it is important to understand.

Some of the researches focus on the military dimension but the problem is that these works are not up to date, such as *Counter-Terrorism in Indonesia: The End of Special Detachment 88?* (Priamarizki, 2013) written by Adhi Priamarizki in 2013. The Detachment 88 has developed and improved significantly since this time. Same problem is with the *Is Counterterrorism in Indonesia a triumph?* (Damayanti, 2011) published in 2002 by Angel Damayanti or *Counter-terrorism in Indonesia: enter the TNI's task force* (Yang, 2013) by Jennifer Hui Yang in 2013. With every single attack, the government is trying to improve its approach and security measures. Detachment 88 and TNI, which are two key actors in the Indonesia's fight against terrorism, are also working on their strategies and activities to be more effective. That is why these works could not be taken into consideration in this thesis and more current information and strategies were used and analysed.

Regarding terrorism in general (and especially focused on the West), a huge scale of diverse approaches can be found - comprehensive, experimental, community, socio/computational, or comprehensive approaches addressing the root causes of the violence –all of these are cases mostly from the United Kingdom, the United States, or studies of Nigeria's Boko Haram³. A lot of

³ Islamic State in West Africa

materials can be found with different approaches regarding terrorism in general that are not limited to only one country, for example Basia Spalek's and Robert Lambert's *Muslim communities, counter-terrorism and counter-radicalisation: A critically reflective approach to engagement* (Spalek and Lambert, 2008) which is a very notable topic after the recent attacks in Europe as the public still struggles with what kind of attitude should have been taken towards Muslims.

Another interesting attitude has been described by Prof. Dr. Edwin Bakker and Ms. Tinka Veldhuis in their work *A Fear Management Approach to Counter-Terrorism* (Bakker, 2012) where they explain that the „*Fear of terrorism can impact both individuals and communities and can cause severe disruptions in society. It can provoke suspicion and derogation of 'others', erode trust in governmental institutions, catalyse support for offensive counterterrorism policies and erode social cohesion. Such drastic consequences, however, are exactly what terrorists are after.*” Their main purpose was to emphasize that „*Terrorism may only lose its appeal if terrorists realise they are not able to influence and disrupt society. The capacity of societies to deal effectively with the psychologically damaging impact of terrorist threats, and to bounce back to healthy levels of functioning in the face of danger might prove a powerful tool in the struggle against terrorism.*” The author of this thesis agrees with their statements that people should not be afraid and show fear, however the “fear management” will not be described in this thesis for it is a different point of interest.

To get a more complex idea about the analysis of terrorism and counterterrorism strategies in Southeast Asia, the resources and approaches to the case of Malaysia have been researched. Malaysia seems to be quite successful with its policies. The approaches are different in the Malaysian case than in the Indonesian one. Most of the scholars chose to analyse the financial dimension (sometimes combined with the legal field as well). Such as Zaiton Hamin has done in his *Airing Dirty Laundry: Reforming the Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Regime in Malaysia* (Hamin, Omar and Rosli, 2016) where he aims to highlight the instrumental and normative problems surrounding the AMLATFA legislation. Similarly, the *Anti-terrorism financing laws in Malaysia: Current Trends and Developments* (Zubair, Oseni and Yasin, 2015)

written by Aishat Abdul-Qadir Zubair, Umar A Oseni and Norhashimah Mohd Yasin or Wee Ching Pok, Normah Omar and Milind Sathye's *An Evaluation of the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering and Anti-Terrorism Financing Legislation: Perceptions of Bank Compliance Officers in Malaysia* (Pok, Omar and Sathye, 2014) can be cited. In the Indonesian case, the financial side is just one part of the counterterrorism fight. It has to be combined with the legal side as well as with the traditional means to be successful. That is why this thesis is analysing all these aspects and it is not focusing on just one part.

What is very common among the scholars seems to also be the human rights' approach, especially because of the Malaysian controversial Internal Security Act of 1960, which was later replaced by the Security Offences and Special Measures Act of 2012. For example Behnam Rastegari and Rohaid Nordin are trying to find out how to make a balance between security and human rights in their paper *Counter-Terrorism Legislation: Human Rights vs. Peace and Security. Malaysia as a Case Study* (Rastegari and Nordin, 2001). The human rights problem in the counterterrorism fight concerns Indonesia as well. In the past, the Indonesian government promised to protect its citizens and issue laws that will not be similar to Security acts from Malaysia or Singapore. These laws do not seem to be issues in Indonesia, but its security units are often accused of human rights violations, which will be also analysed in this thesis.

Few researchers have paid attention to cyberterrorism. For instance, Zahri Yunos and Rabiah Ahmad in their paper *Evaluating cyber terrorism components in Malaysia* (Yunos and Ahmad, 2014) argue that there is no universally accepted definition of cyber terrorism, which seems to be a fundamental challenge in countering cyber terrorism threats. Their aim was to discover various definitions of related terms used in this area. This might be interesting for the research of counterterrorism policies; however, this paper was not crucial or inspirational for this thesis as the cyber terrorism does not concern Indonesia.

Other scholars studied terrorism in Malaysia from other perspectives – such as development in counterterrorism policies in Malaysia after 9/11, the country's cooperation with the United States, comparison of anti-terror laws in

Malaysia and Great Britain, comparing the Malaysian case with other Southeast Asian countries (Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Indonesia), or conducting research about the maritime security in the Malacca strait (Sittnick, 2005). The readers may suggest that these approaches and the Malaysian strategies could be used for the Indonesian case. However, it would not work for Indonesia as the situation in both countries is very different and they do not consider the new challenges that Indonesia is now facing.

When looking for information about counterterrorism in Indonesia, articles focusing on different issues (compare to resources studying terrorism in the Western world, Indonesia is being rather neglected) can be found. However, all this literature does not address the current situation appropriately. There are several weaknesses in the approaches that academic scholars have already taken in order to study the Indonesian case. A major gap in the existing literature is due to the limited scale of topics that have been taken into consideration and does not satisfy this thesis' intended research goal. Many of those academic works related to terrorism and counterterrorism in Indonesia particularly aim at the studies of attacks in Indonesia in the past or analyse the functioning of Indonesia's Detachment 88 Unit or the Indonesian National Armed Forces. Many of the scholars did not take Indonesia as a "unique case" and even though the title of their papers says Indonesia, just a short text is devoted only to Indonesia after all. Another limitation in existing literature is the time frame of the scholarly works which mostly analyse the major attacks in Indonesia till 2005 and the current situation is not presented, even though Indonesia is the leader in the counterterrorism policies in Southeast Asia and terrorism is still very serious concern.

1.6 Chapter Organisation

The first part of the thesis will be mainly descriptive – introducing the current situation and the threat of terrorism in Indonesia. The second part is analytical and will provide the framework. The whole thesis consists of six chapters and a bibliography.

The first chapter is the Introduction. In this part, the motivation and main objectives of this thesis will be explained. This part will also contain the literature review and research design that will explain how to meet the objectives of this thesis.

Chapter 2 - Nature and Terrorism in Indonesia will provide a background of the situation and some basic information about terrorism in Indonesia. Firstly, it will offer the definitions of terrorism by Indonesia, ASEAN, Australia, and United States as well as different typologies of terrorism. Furthermore, this section will present the current situation in Indonesia. It will introduce the terrorist organisations active in the country and the attacks they committed since the Bali bombing in 2002.

Following Chapter 3 - Analytical Framework will describe in detail the structure of this framework and explain the dimensions that have been chosen for this framework which should be helpful to analyse the current counterterrorism strategies of Indonesia.

Chapter 4 - Indonesia's Counterterrorism Policies will review the current Indonesia's counterterrorism strategies under this framework. It will take into account both domestic policies as well as international cooperation of Indonesia with ASEAN, Australia and the United States. At the domestic level, it will present the dimensions of Law and Regulations, Finance, Military and Intelligence, and Social communication. At the international level, it will focus on the Bilateral agreements, Economy and Finance, and Military and Intelligence.

Next Chapter 5 - Indonesia's New Efforts to Counterterrorism will evaluate and discuss the current strategies and suggest possible changes in order to improve the policies. It will refer to the main weaknesses such as for example the system of imprisonment, bureaucracy, or military failures.

The last part is the Conclusion that contains contribution and weaknesses of the thesis as well as suggests the possibilities for future studies.

This thesis also provides a list of all the attacks that happened in Indonesia since the Bali bombing in 2002 until June 2018.

2. Nature of Terrorism in Indonesia

2.1 Definition of Terrorism

There is no one and only official definition of terrorism that would be agreed on among politicians and academics throughout the world. Every country and international organization provide their own definition. Their interpretation depends on what do they focus on – the acts or the actors themselves. Why is it actually so difficult to define what terrorism is? In a word, it is labelling, because ‘terrorist’ is a description that has almost never been voluntarily adopted by any individual or group. It is applied to them by others, first and foremost by the governments of the states they attack. States have not been slow to brand violent opponents with this title, with its clear implications of inhumanity, criminality, and – perhaps most crucially – lack of real political support (Townshend, 2003). In contemporary political rhetoric, terrorism seems to be more of an accusation than a descriptive term (Kaplan, 2008). We will probably never formulate a perfect uniformed definition to which we can all agree, although terrorism does have some universal characteristics, like violence or threats. In this chapter, the definitions from Indonesia, Australia, the United States, and ASEAN will be introduced.

2.1.1 Indonesia

In the Great Dictionary of Indonesian Language (*Kamus Besar Bahasa Indonesia*), terrorism is explained as “*the use of violence to generate fear in the pursuit of goals (especially political goals)*” or as “*the practice of terror acts*” (KBBI, n.d.).

The official website of the Ministry of Defence of Indonesia is adopting the definition from the 1939 United Nations Convention claiming that “*terrorism is any form of crime directed against the state with the intention of creating terror against certain individuals or groups of people or the wider community* (Sudarto, 2012).” The website is also mentioning the Indonesian encyclopaedia from the year 2000, which provides another definition: “*Terrorism is violence or the threat of violence that is calculated in a way to create an atmosphere of fear and danger with the intention of drawing national or international attention to an action or a demand.*” For further understanding, it implies that “*terrorism is not part of a war,*

so it should still be regarded as a criminal act and civilians are the main targets of terrorism, and thus attacks on military targets cannot be categorized an act of terrorism” (Sudarto, 2012).

The main characteristics of terrorism according to the ministry are:

- 1) Relatively good organization and high discipline within terrorist groups
- 2) Does not respect universal norms, religions, laws, and human rights
- 3) Aims at provoking fear and gaining attention of masses/ public
- 4) Uses violent methods such as bombings, kidnappings, hostage-taking, piracy etc.

The motives for such terrorist attacks may differ as well. Terrorists’ goals may be liberating the homeland from invaders, separating from a legitimate government, and eliminating political enemies etc. (Sudarto, 2012).

2.1.2 The United States of America

Many definitions can be found in the US – depending on which government’s department or organization we would like to look at. This thesis provides two different definitions – one by the Department of Defense and the second one by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

The US Department of Defence’s definition of terrorism is formulated as follows: *“the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological (Zalman, 2017).”*

The American FBI distinguishes between two kinds of terrorism:

International terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with designated foreign terrorist organizations or nations (state-sponsored).

Domestic terrorism: Perpetrated by individuals and/or groups inspired by or associated with primarily U.S.-based movements that espouse extremist ideologies of a political, religious, social, racial, or environmental nature (FBI, 20116).

2.1.3 Australia

According to the Australian law, *“a ‘terrorist act’ is an act, or a threat to commit an act, that is done with the intention to coerce or influence the public or any government by intimidation to advance a political, religious or ideological cause, and the act causes:*

- *death, serious harm or endangers a person*
- *serious damage to property*
- *a serious risk to the health or safety of the public*
- *seriously interferes with, disrupts or destroys critical infrastructure such as a telecommunications or electricity network.*

A terrorist act does not cover engaging in advocacy, protest, dissent or industrial action where a person does not have the intention to urge force or violence or cause harm to others. If found guilty of committing a terrorist act, a person could face up to life imprisonment.”

2.1.4 ASEAN

When ASEAN members signed the 2001 Declaration on Joint Action to Counterterrorism on 5 November 2001, they did not define the term terrorism per se. The declaration only describes “terrorism” as a direct challenge to the attainment of peace, progress and prosperity of ASEAN and the realization of ASEAN Vision 2020. There was even a deliberate attempt on the part of ASEAN not to provide a definition of terrorism because of the presence of Muslim communities in the region that might perceive any definition as anti-Islamic in the context of the emergence of militant Islam in Southeast Asia (Banlaoi, 2009). ASEAN expressed commitment to combat terrorism in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, other international laws and relevant UN resolutions. They also underlined that cooperative efforts in this regard should consider joint practical – counterterrorism measures in line with specific circumstances in the region and in each member country (Elagab and Elagab, 2007). The ASEAN summit urged ASEAN members to *“intensify our efforts, collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of terrorist groups in the region.”*

Nonetheless, the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures initially signed by Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines in May 2002 attempted to define terrorism as: *“any act of violence or threat thereof perpetrated to carry out within the respective territories of the Parties or in the border area of any of the Parties an individual or collective criminal plan with the aim of terrorizing people of threatening to harm them or imperilling their lives, honour, freedoms, security or rights or exposing the environment or any facility or public or private property to hazards or occupying or seizing them, or endangering a national resource, or international facilities, or threatening the stability, territorial integrity, political unity or sovereignty of independent States”* (Banlaoi, 2009).

2.2 Typology of terrorism

Similar problem as it is with the exact definition of terrorism, is with the typology of terrorism. Every scholar looks at things from a different perspective and offers different categories of terrorism. Nowadays when people hear about terrorism, they are very likely to immediately think about ISIS. While Islamic extremism does contribute to certain types of terrorism, there are many other forms as well, all with their own characteristics and challenges for policy makers (Grothaus, 2011). The types of terrorism depend on the country and its political system as well as the time period and the actual focus. Here are 8 different types of terrorism that are usually provided in most of the current literature:

1) *Issue oriented terrorism* – carried out for a for the purpose of advancing a special issue and, is usually social in nature, or the terrorist activities are committed in the name of environmental causes (Free Project Topics, n.d.). An example is the Earth Liberation Front established in 1992 in the United Kingdom, that became “known” for activities such as the burning of a ski resort or laboratories in the United States or sabotaging power lines (Barcott, 2002). Another example might be the non-governmental environmental organisation Greenpeace that the American FBI as well as Indian intelligence bureau marked an eco-terrorist organisation (Burnett, 2016).

2) *Left-wing terrorism:* Left-wing terrorists have been influenced by communist and socialist currents; their goals are to overthrow capitalist democracies and erase the class distinctions. Left-wing terrorism was common in the 1960s and 1970s in particular (Grothaus, 2011). Many terrorist groups were active all around the world, for instance the Japanese Red Army, the Red Army Faction in Germany or the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka.

3) *Narco-terrorism:* It has been used to mean violence waged by drug producers to extract political concessions from the government. Latin America is the birthplace of narco-terrorism and the most famous example might be Pablo Escobar, the head of the Colombian Medellin drug cartel - that was fighting against the Colombian government. The Taliban in Afghanistan also falls into this category (Zalman, 2017).

4) *Pathological terrorism:* It is kind of terrorism which is committed by individuals operating alone for the joy of terrorizing others, usually without any specific political motives (Grothaus, 2011). The United States is especially dealing with pathological terrorism very often. The most recent shooting happened in Florida in February 2018 when a 19-year-old former student Nicolas Cruz opened fired in the Stoneman Douglas High School and killed 14 students and 3 staff members (Chavez and Almasy, 2018).

5) *Religious terrorism:* Terrorism can be motivated by religious ideologies. The perpetrators use religious scriptures to justify their acts. Religious terrorism is dangerous for the fanaticism of those who practice it and their willingness to sacrifice themselves for the cause (Grothaus, 2011). Examples are the National Liberation Front in India, the Orange Volunteers in Ireland, or Al Qaeda. The role of Islam in the religious terrorism will be described later.

6) *Right-wing terrorism:* Is usually committed by racially motivated groups or gangs (neo-Nazi, neo-fascist, anti-Muslims etc.), that aim to preserve

traditional social orders (Grothaus, 2011). For example, the French and European Nationalist Party.

7) *Separatist terrorism*: Separatists seek nationalist aims, usually desiring to secure self-determination or home-rule for a certain faction or geographic community. Common examples might be the Basque Fatherland and Liberty that claims the creation of the new Basque state independent from Spain, and the Irish Republican Army that demands to unite the Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic (Encyclopedia, 2006).

8) *State terrorism*: Governments are often the targets of terrorism, but they can also sponsor terrorists or use the tactics of terrorism. Some governments conduct terrorism against other governments or against their own citizens (Encyclopedia, 2003). The Khmer Rouge regime and its genocide in Cambodia in the 1960s stands for an example.

Indonesia itself, according to the descriptions stated above, is dealing with the Religious and Separatist terrorism. Meanwhile the separatist terrorism was mainly concerning the separation of Aceh or Papua in the past, the threats of religious terrorism remain until the present because of jihadists committing attacks in the name of the Islamic State.

2.3 Islam and terrorism in Indonesia

With more than 200 million Muslim inhabitants, the country contains the largest Muslim population in the world. This number is roughly equal to 13 % of the total number of Muslims all around the world. However, this group of 200 million people does not represent a homogeneous group. Much variety can be found in Indonesian Islam as well as in their perceptions regarding the role that Islam should play within Indonesian politics and society (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

Indonesia is not a Muslim state that is based on Islam, as it does not implement the Sharia laws as the dominant law of the country. Furthermore, it is

not a theocracy, but a secular state that officially recognizes six religions. According to a 2000 census report, 88 % of the population is Muslim, 6 % Protestant, 3 % Roman Catholic, 2 % Hindu, and less than 1 % Buddhist, traditional indigenous religions, other Christian groups, and Jewish. Some Christians, Hindus, and members of other minority religious groups argued that the census undercounted non-Muslims (US Department of State, n.d.). The Government requires officially recognized religious groups to comply with Ministry of Religious Affairs and other ministerial directives, such as the Revised Joint Ministerial Decree on the Construction of Houses of Worship (2006), Overseas Aid to Religious Institutions in Indonesia (1978), and the Guidelines for the Propagation of Religion (1978; US Department of State, n.d.).

Indonesians believe that religion has an important role to play in society, but that it should be an individual choice and a private matter (Wanandi, 2002). Indonesian people can be labelled as moderate Muslims, the majority approves of a secular democracy and a pluralist society. This attitude is visible in the results of legislative elections as Islamic political parties that stress the importance of a stricter Islamic stream in the government received only few votes. The secular political parties that support a moderate and tolerant Islamic democracy and society, on the other hand, proved to be very popular (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

Indonesian Muslims can be grouped into practicing Muslims (Santri) and non-practicing Muslims (Syncretists). Devout Muslims can be further subdivided into traditionalists and modernists (Baswedan, 2004). There is a contrast between traditionalist views that would consecrate the world in the name of Islam and reformist views that would insist on remaking it, but these views now interpenetrate one other. Instead of a clear divide between so-called moderates and so-called radicals, there is a broad spectrum of individual opinions which shift and recombine on different issues (Fox, 2004).

It is also important to note that Indonesian radical movements have their origin in reform movements in the Middle East. Wahhabism, a very strict interpretation that aims for a return to the true nature of Islam, was founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Saudi Arabia in the mid-18th century. The

purification of Islam would strengthen the position of Islam vis-a-vis the growing western powers. Around 1800, Indonesian hajji's arriving back in the archipelago after the pilgrimage to Mecca, brought with them this Wahhabi ideology and aimed for reviving Indonesian Islam. Not coincidentally Wahhabism spread through the archipelago when the Dutch began to expand their political role. Another radical movement that would gain much influence in Indonesia was the Salafi-movement that stemmed from Egypt at the end of the 19th century. Its ideology is similar to Wahhabism. Today, these links to the Middle East are still very important for present radical Indonesian movements for ideological support and for financial funding (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

In the past, secularist-minded leaders like Sukarno or Hatta controlled the Indonesian state from its birth in 1945. They defended the Pancasila as the means of ensuring mutual tolerance and freedom of belief in order to maintain Indonesian national unity. But Islamist longings did not disappear. They were most strongly evidenced in the long and violent efforts from the late 1940s to the early 1960s of S. M. Kartosuwiryo and his followers to establish Indonesia as an Islamic state, a Darul Islam. They were also alive in the minds of many supporters of the large Muslim party, Masyumi that pursued the ideal of an Indonesian Islamic state, 'a nationalistic state on the basis of Islamic principles'. But later, when elections arrived in 1955, they proved a disappointment - under 44 % of voters registered support for Muslim parties (Elson, 2010).

When Indonesia became an independent country, the stricter Muslim groups were to become disappointed. In Soekarno's secular government there was no room for an Islamic state. Part of the radical Indonesian Muslim community joined the Darul Islam rebellion which aimed for the establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia. This movement started in the 1940s but was eventually crushed by the Indonesian military in 1962. However, segments of the Darul Islam went underground and would produce and inspire other radical movements. During Suharto's New Order government radical Muslim voices and organizations were pushed underground even more severely as Muslim activists were

imprisoned, often without trial. They were considered a threat to Suharto's political power (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

Territories of Ambon, Poso or Timor are taken as bitter instances of threat that derives from corrupting and immoral influences on Muslim life. The response has been a call for the defence of Islam. Although the defenders of Islam – the mujahidin – are not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, the past decade and the period since the end of Suharto's New Order has seen the emergence of a great variety of mujahidin organizations or of Muslim organizations with associated militia auxiliary. The diversity of these groups varies significantly. In 1999, the *Majalah Tajuk* listed no less than twenty-three such groups. By 2004, the number of these groups had increased. The three most prominent groups are the Front Pembela Islam, Forum Komunikasi Ahlussunnah Waljama'ah (FKAWJ), which is better known by the name of its armed militia Laskar Jihad and Jemaah Islamiyah (Fox, 2004).

Although not specifically classified as Sharia ordinances, many local governments maintained Sharia-inspired regulations. According to the Indonesian Women's Coalition, local governments throughout the country have issued at least 100 such ordinances. Many Muslim scholars and human rights activists claim that these ordinances have created or increased discrimination against women. In many cases these laws require Muslim women to wear headscarves in public, mandate elected Muslim officials, students, civil servants, and individuals seeking marriage licenses to be able to read the Quran in Arabic and prohibit Muslims from drinking alcohol and gambling. Some of these laws were attempts to deal with local social problems and in many cases the laws were not enforced (US Department of State, n.d.). The North Sumatra's province of Aceh is thus the only Indonesian province for which the central government specifically authorized Sharia law. Presidential Decree 11/2003 formally established Sharia courts in Aceh, however, according to data from the Indonesian Women's Coalition, there have been no new Shari'a ordinances implemented since 2006 (US Department of State, n.d.).

In August 2000, thousands of Muslims from a variety of Islamic organizations gathered in Yogyakarta to hold the founding meeting of the Indonesian Council of Mujahidin at which Abu Bakar Ba'asyir was chosen as Amir. The purpose of the council was declared to work for the implementation of Sharia Law, the establishment of an Islamic State in Indonesia and the reconstitution of the caliphate. In 2000 and 2001, the activities of the three mentioned groups – Front Pembela Islam, Laskar Jihad and Jema'ah Islamiyah – were at the forefront of attention. While none of these groups, or more specifically the networks that support them, have disappeared, they are certainly no longer able to mobilize as many followers as they had previously done (Fox, 2004).

The current various terrorist cells in Indonesia seem to operate independently from each other forming splinter groups. This is a change from the past - radical Muslims now prefer to operate in smaller networks instead of bigger ones (on a national scale) as it is much more difficult for the authorities to trace such smaller networks. Another difference with the past is that all these terrorist cells seem to have changed tactics regarding the target of their attacks. In the past, targets consisted mainly of western or foreign people and symbols of the western world, such as embassies, nightclubs or hotels. Since 2010, however, more and more attacks are directed towards symbols of the Indonesian state, particularly Indonesian police officers (probably in reaction to the many arrests made by Densus 88; Indonesia Investments, n.d.). Indonesia is today also one of the world's largest suppliers of Islamic State fighters, with more than 500 Indonesians having joined the war in Syria and Iraq, while more than 100 are believed to have travelled back to Indonesia after having fought alongside the militant organization. These "returnees" form a risk as they may try to recruit new members for IS by offering attractive income (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

2.4 Jemaah Islamiyah, Al Qaeda and ISIS

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the jihadist South East Asian group, has been one of the most active militant groups in Indonesia for long time. JI was founded in 1993 by Abdullah Sungkar which established contact with Al Qaeda and Abu Bakar Bashir who pledged loyalty to ISIS in 2014. In its formative years JI advocated using more peaceful means to pursue its goals, but in the mid-1990s the group took on a more violent edge. Under the influence of al-Qaeda, JI embraced the idea that its goals could only be secured through a "holy war" (BBC, 2012). Similarly, to ISIS, the group aims at establishing an Islamic state with Islamic law in the region by using violate means (Counter Extremism Project, n.d.).

JI has its cells not only in Indonesia, but also in Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines. Jemaah Islamiyah is also believed to have an operational alliance with Abu Sayyaf, an Islamic State affiliated group operating in the Philippines (Paton, 2016). However, one of the most concerning interactions of the JI is the one with the Al-Qaeda network. This relationship was formed during the presence of JI leaders in Afghanistan between 1985 and 1995. Some evidence suggests that although JI personnel might be inspired by figures such as Bin Laden, the South East Asian group remains operationally and organisationally distinct. We cannot consider these links as an Al-Qaeda's direct control capability of JI (Galamas, 2015). Experts disagree on the extent of this relationship. Some experts refer to JI as Al-Qaeda's Southeast Asian wing and say the group is capable of opening a second front against particularly US interests in the region. Other experts argue that the two groups are not that closely linked and add that Jemaah Islamiyah's regional goals do not fully match Al-Qaeda's global aspirations. Abu Bakar Bashir denied the fact that JI has ties to Al-Qaeda, but has expressed support for Osama bin Laden (Council on Foreign Relations, 2009). Actually for these links with Al-Qaeda, JI was listed as a terrorist group linked to Al Qaeda and Taliban in the UN Security Council Resolution 1267 (United Nations, 2002). JI also has links with other violent South East Asian Islamist groups, mainly as a result of their simultaneous presence at training camps in Afghanistan (BBC, 2012).

The relationship between Jemaah Islamiyah and ISIS is not clear and brings a lot of controversies. When the conflict in Syria erupted in 2011, JI became one of the most active jihadi organizations collecting funds to help. At the same time, JI saw the conflict in Syria as an opportunity for members to gain combat experience and military training.

Recently, experts in Indonesia have expressed their fears over the security challenges brought by ISIS. The last time when Indonesians travelled abroad to train in jihadist camps resulted in the unfortunate Bali bombing in 2002. Nowadays, these experts worry, because ISIS is recruiting more and more people from Indonesia to join them in Syria (Galamas, 2015). And while the international attention has been focused on ISIS, the dormant Jemaah Islamiyah has found the environment conducive for its own growth and expansion. Even though the last JI bombing in Indonesia was in 2009, unfortunately, it does not mean that the group had renounced terrorism. It had adopted a strategic decision to lie low in line with the concept of *I'dad* that advocated preparation to participate in a future jihad. This partly explains the intermittent reports of JI members being arrested in the last few years, including the four that were detained in Indonesia in December 2016 (Singh, 2017).

Ji has also links to Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid - a splinter cell of the JI established by Abu Bakar Baasyir in 2008 and the group responsible for the last attacks in Surabaya in May 2018. It has welcomed many members of the militant Jemaah Islamiyah but clashed with the JI leadership over strategy and tactics. It used to preach jihad against Islam's enemies but insisted it stays within the law – though it rejects man-made laws as illegitimate (International Crisis Group, 2010). After the recent attacks, it doesn't seem to be the truth anymore. JAD is now the largest local terror group pledging allegiance to ISIS (Tehusijarana and Ompusunggu, 2018).

2.5 Terrorist attacks in Indonesia

The first “incident” that could have been counted as a terrorist attack in Indonesia happened in May 1962. It was an assassination attempt on president Sukarno which took place in Central Jakarta (Silalahi, Prima and Sumber, 2004). Despite this first incident, as the “real” terrorist attack could have been considered the hijack of the Garuda Indonesia Flight 206 from March 1981. The hijackers asked for release of their allies from jails. The passengers on board were rescued and the hijackers have been killed. Until the most fatal attack that happened in Kuta, Bali in 2002, the terrorist attacks in the country were rather rare. In October 2002, terrorism hit Indonesia very hard. More than 200 people died in the touristy area of Bali. Since this is the deadliest attack in Indonesia so far, attacks occur almost every year. Moreover, with the situation with the war in Syria that seems to be getting to its end, the jihadists started to plan attacks individually out of Syria and the lone wolf attacks have become quite common in the last few years. At the end of this thesis, a list of attacks, that happened since the “major” incident – the Bali bombing in 2002, is provided.

2.6 Summary

Terrorism is not new to the world, but even though some of the countries have more experience with terrorism than others, terrorism is still difficult to define and even more difficult to counter. Everything in the world is developing and improving fast – communication, transportation, technologies... and unfortunately the same applies to terrorist and their “strategies.” The problem with terrorism is already its definition per se. Every country or international organisation provide different definition. Indonesia has been struggling for long time before coming up with its own definition. Despite the fact that the majority of Muslims are moderate, the country is nowadays confronted with the religious terrorism and its consequences. In the past, most of the attacks were committed by the members of Jemaah Islamiyah, whereas nowadays the attackers report to the Islamic State and the attacks are, unfortunately, still quite common. Since the bombing in Bali in 2002, when global attention turned to Indonesia, there are attacks in Indonesian territories every year, with the last ones from May 2018.

With every attack, the government is trying to improve security, but it goes very slow, as Indonesia is a huge country with people from different ethnics and religions and they have to take this into consideration when implementing their policies, that so far, seems not to be 100 % effective. However, Indonesia is disposing several instruments for fighting terrorism or, at least, reduce its risks. What are Indonesia's policies will be thus described in the following text.




3. Analytical Framework

This thesis would like to provide an analytical framework that should describe and contrast different strategies of Indonesia in its fight with terrorism. The purpose of the framework is to clarify these concepts and point out the major weaknesses of these policies. It might be inspiring for the researchers and government in terms of what could be improved or focused on in order to fight with terrorism more effectively. Scholars interested in terrorism in other countries might also get inspired by this framework and just fit in information regarding the other countries to analyse it.

The framework will be as follow:

Analytical Framework



The framework is split into two main parts – the Domestic counterterrorism strategies and the International counterterrorism strategies which are further divided according to the domains researched. The attacks that happened in the archipelago led to questioning whether the current counterterrorism policies are efficient enough to deal with these situations. The threat posed by ISIS in Southeast Asia is comparatively small, but real, and it has the potential to become larger if not addressed properly. Terrorism in Indonesia is a deep problem with various causes, hence the approach should be also multisectoral.

The main issues that Indonesia is facing nowadays are different from other countries and make Indonesia a unique case to study. Some of those issues, that are significantly affecting the current situation in Indonesia and should be thought of when suggesting the new counterterrorism strategies follow as examples:

- 1) Indonesia leads Asian countries in the number of foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria. Some Indonesian foreign fighters have sided with the Nusra Front (Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), but the majority have joined ISIS's ranks (Counter-Extremism, 2017).
- 2) Indonesian "fighters" and their families are coming back from Syria to Indonesia. According to official government estimates, approximately 800 fighters have left Indonesia as of December 2015. Indonesian law enforcement believes that at least 52 Indonesians have died in Syria and that 60 to 100 have returned to Indonesia as of January 2016. Between January and June 2017, government officials believe that 152 Indonesian foreign fighters have returned to their hometowns (Counter-Extremism, 2017). The country will need to work on their integration.
- 3) Indonesia has relatively lax immigration laws, which allow Indonesian citizens to travel freely in and out of conflict zones (Counter-Extremism, 2017).
- 4) Radicalisation of women: Women played key roles in Jemaah Islamiyah's plots, from translators to accomplices, but nowadays, women's involvement as well as a new practice of online marriages, when an Indonesian girl marries a

jihadist not necessarily from Indonesia are more common. Indonesian women, drawn to the idea of raising their children in an Islamic state, are joining their husbands and enticing others to come to Syria (Counter-Extremism, 2017).

5) Radicalisation and Deradicalisation: Indonesia suffers from radicalisation problems within its prisons. Prison dynamics allows the spread of extremism, with guards failing to closely monitor terrorists in jail (Parameswaran, 2016).

6) Social media and apps: used to spread terrorism and jihad (Tisnadibrata, 2015). Of course, this is not an issue only in Indonesia but in other countries worldwide. However, this fact together with other points that have been mentioned, partakes in the specific situation in Indonesia.

7) Lone wolf attacks: Less professional cells carried out attacks without central coordination that are difficult to predict and prevent (Straits Times, 2016).

8) Human rights problems: For example, the proposed amendments to Law No. 15/2003 on the Eradication of Terrorism would allow Indonesians to be stripped of their citizenship if suspected of traveling abroad to *“join wars overseas in order to commit terrorism crimes,”* and permit criminal penalties for any *“speech, thought, behaviour or writings”* that could lead to *“actions which adversely impact other people/communities.”* International law prohibits the arbitrary deprivation of citizenship. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 15 provides that everyone has the right to a nationality and that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of their nationality (Human Rights Watch, 2017).

National security is a fundamental responsibility of every government. Without basic security, people live in a highly volatile environment that does not support traditional functioning in a society and leads to mistrust in all institutions and individuals in a position of power (Watsons, 2002). Every government should be able to respond to the threats with policies that are effective in preventing violence, punishing crime, and protecting citizens. No reforms or policies are likely to succeed without effective, professional mechanisms involving the

parliament, the courts, parts of the executive branch itself, and civil society. Without both fiscal and human rights accountability, legislative or bureaucratic changes can only go part way toward solving the problems. That is why the first part of the framework is dedicated to the national counterterrorism strategies of Indonesia. The leaders of Indonesia are the first to decide how the country can deal with the terrorism and how to ensure citizens' safety.

Transnational and non-state threats are major concerns in Southeast Asia. National security strategies have begun to recognise that nations cannot assure their own security without developing their regional and international security. Unilateral and isolated responses, as they are incomplete and partial, are not effective against challenges requiring a multidisciplinary approach and joint action. Therefore, the national strategies as well as international cooperation is required to respond to these risks. Only this perspective encompasses all the aspects which are potentially or actually affected.

Terrorism is not a matter of only one single country, but concerns most of the countries around the world, that is why Indonesia should seek to maximise its national security through bilateral, regional, and global cooperation. Bilaterally, Indonesia has developed close security and defence cooperation with other ASEAN countries. Regionally, the country continues to encourage ASEAN fellow members to deepen cooperation among them. Outside the region, Indonesia has enhanced its partnership with major powers and regional middle powers. The Indonesian government should consider formulating a policy to meet its obligations nationwide (Sukma, n.d.).

Non-traditional security challenges – or challenges to the survival of people and states worldwide that arise mainly out of non-military sources, like for instance the climate change, smuggling of people, drug trafficking, other forms of transnational crime and terrorism – are all issues that are now confronting Southeast Asian countries (Emmers, 2012). The non-traditional security threats have a few common characteristics and are in contrast with the traditional security issues. They refer to factors different than military, political, or diplomatic conflicts (Chaudhuri, n.d.). They are non-military in nature and transnational in scope - neither totally domestic nor purely inter-state. Those issues arise anywhere

in the world and are transmitted rapidly thanks to the globalization and the revolution of communication.

After 9/11, the re-emergence of state security became a crucial feature of regional security. The rise of the non-traditional security issues brought a new dilemma on how to coordinate the non-traditional and traditional security issues at both – national as well as regional levels, because the non-traditional security issues may weaken the role of a state in its process of securitisation. The transnational character of non-traditional issues does not depend only on actions from the government but requires as well the active involvement of non-state actors such as the civil society and international organizations to deal with these issues.

Terrorists threats are unconventional types of conflicts and it is more difficult to prevent them and deal with them compared to the traditional issues of security. The main concern of the non-traditional security is the fact that we don't know the enemy, his goals and strategies in advance, thus it is difficult for governments around the world to prepare and to take any kind of precautions. Only after an attack has been committed, we can identify the enemy and come up with other possible ways how to improve counterterrorism strategies.

However, merely national strategies are often inadequate and insufficient to solve non-traditional security issues. As a result of augmenting uselessness of the unilateral measures, there is a growing recognition that the region needs to develop a regional approach and international cooperation to solve those new challenges (Emmers, 2012).

The first part contains the national counterterrorism policies of Indonesia. This part is followed by counterterrorism cooperation of Indonesia with ASEAN, Australia and the United States – one of the most important players in the Asia-Pacific region and Indonesia's partners.

ASEAN has been chosen because it is an important regional organisation and partner not only for Indonesia, but also for other Southeast Asian countries. One of the ASEAN's crucial goals is to help to maintain peace and to promote unity in the area with so many different people, cultures, religions, political

systems, but also possible different kind of conflicts. To maintain peace in the region is not an easy task, that is why the organisation needs close cooperation and exchange of information not only with Indonesia.

Australia became more engaged in the antiterrorist fight after the bombing in Bali in 2002. The majority of the victims, almost 90 persons, were Australian nationals. Since the Bali bombing until the present, because Indonesia is Australia's closest neighbour, Australians still see the Indonesian Islam as one of the main threats and symbols of terrorism that can influence the situation in the Asia-Pacific. That is why Australia decided to help Indonesia with the counterterrorism not only militarily and financially, but also by emphasising the importance of, especially religious, education.

The stability and peaceful situation in Southeast Asia also matters to the United States that is equally an important power in the Asian region. The United States know very well that the rise of Asia has deep implications for its own future, therefore president Obama sought to extend the engagement of the US in the region. The main goal is a stable and prosperous Asia (Nehru, 2013). Another reason for helping Southeast Asia to grow is not only its boom, but also rebalancing the dominance and economic rise of China expanding in the region. To accomplish its goals, the United States need a strong and peaceful Asia-Pacific. The US is trying to offer a comprehensive partnership that is based on mutual respect and equality with every country. Not only for that reason, they are working on strengthening their relationship and helping Indonesia with its fight with terrorism. Their cooperation might also be an inspiration for further US cooperation with other countries in the region like Malaysia or Thailand.

Although this thesis wants to look at the counterterrorism policies, the study paradigm is the security perspective. That is why these following dimensions have been chosen for this thesis – Law, Economy and Finance, the traditional means such as the Military and Intelligence, Social communication, and Bilateral agreements. It is necessary to look at both levels – national as well as international.

The first dimension is the dimension of Law and Regulations in the case of Indonesia's domestic counterterrorism strategies. Laws are important for every society, they are created in order to protect citizens and for them, laws serve as "guidelines" on how to behave. Without those regulations, societies would be in chaos. However, the issuance of laws and regulations is particularly sensitive regarding the terrorism problem. On one hand, governments are trying to protect their citizens and thus prevent possible attacks, but on the other, they should avoid limiting citizens' freedoms. How Indonesia deals with this problem, will be described in following text.

Secondly, the emphasis is on the traditional means such as Military and Intelligence which are crucial in the fight with terrorism or other kinds of violence. Governments always try to maintain a strong and flexible military presence to support them and facilitate their policies. If they want to protect the citizens and territories from diverse threats, professional military that is authorized by the state to defend, is inevitable. Without military, countries can easily become soft targets. However, militaries can serve not only during wars or riots. They are also helpful during natural disasters, outbreaks of disease or rescue operations. In the case of Indonesia, military is highly needed to support the police in the counter terrorism fight.

It is also important to look at the economic side. Without money and funding, Indonesia would not be able to proceed further with its counterterrorism policies. Nevertheless, the country's capital is not sufficient and Indonesia is still in need from outside help and funds. This dimension will also be analysed further.

Another important part in the counterterrorism strategies is already above mentioned international cooperation. Without agreements between different countries and people, we wouldn't have many things we have today, which of course can be taken as a positive as well as negative fact. Of course, countries can somehow exist without real international exchange (like for example North Korea), but it is believed that international interactions bring more benefits, countries can learn and inspire one another, they also become "closer" and better cooperate on maintaining peace.

Lastly, it is also important to look at the religious education, prevention and deradicalisation. Indonesia recently started to focus more on these factors, but of course the country will need more time to figure out what works the best and how to stop the spread of radical jihadist ideas.

3.1. Summary

The thesis aims at putting together information from all these dimensions – Law, Finance, Military, Regional, and Bilateral Cooperation together and provide a comprehensive framework that might be used in other countries. On the regional and bilateral level – the cooperation of Indonesia and ASEAN, Interpol, Australia and the US will be evaluated. Of course, different information will be fit into the framework, but the dimensions should remain the same as in the Indonesian case. Each of these dimensions mentioned will be analysed in detail one by one and its current functioning will be described. Further, its weaknesses and issues will be considered and a way of possible changes and improvements will be suggested. All these dimensions are linked together and all of them should be taken into account in order to develop a successful counterterrorism policy.

4. Indonesia's Counterterrorism Policies

This chapter will focus on the counterterrorism policies and what are the countries and intergovernmental organisations doing in order to help to fight terrorism in Indonesia. The policies and strategies are divided into three main factions for every mutual cooperation – Law, Defence and Intelligence and Finance.

4.1 Indonesia's Domestic Counterterrorism Strategies

4.1.1 Law and Regulations

“Terrorists are very likely to try to carry out attacks in Indonesia.

Terrorist groups have the capacity and intent to carry out attacks at anytime and anywhere in the country. The threat from Islamist extremism remains high, though the Indonesian authorities continue to disrupt attack planning, including arresting alleged terrorists reportedly in the advanced stages of preparation (UK

Government, n.d.).” This warning has been issued by the UK government as a travel advise for British citizens when traveling to Indonesia. Similar advisories have been published by ministries of foreign affairs all around the world.

Nevertheless, what is Indonesia itself doing to combat terrorism? What are Indonesia's strategies and how have they developed? Before terrorism became a global phenomenon recently, the fight against terrorism per se was not a priority for the Indonesian authorities. Of course, they cared about the safety and security of the citizens, but there was no need to issue any anti-terror bills. The Indonesian criminal code in force since the country's independence was basically the Netherlands Indies Criminal Code, which was put into effect in 1918. In the Dutch East Indies, criminal law was important for the establishment of the colonial state. However, the multiple cultural backgrounds of suspects and victims also made the implementation of the criminal code extremely complicated, because the judges coming from Europe and presiding then the colonial courts had to deal with unique colonial situations incomparable with criminal cases in their home country (NOW, n.d.). The Criminal Code incorporates certain amendments

promulgated by the revolutionary government in 1946. Since 1958 the Code has been applied throughout the national territory (Country Data, 1992).

The first real and most important document that shaped the country's policies and behaviours was the Indonesian Constitution from 1945. The second shortest constitution in the world, used to serve as an apologia by successive authoritarian regimes. The text was originally designed as a temporary measure. It did little beyond establish basic state organs and did not offer citizens real guarantees or protections. The amendments to the Constitution, which were completed in 2002, changed it. Enlarging and rethinking the Constitution, policymakers presented a liberal democratic system based on human rights, an open society and separation of powers (Butt and Lindsey, 2012). The Constitution of Indonesia guarantees right to protection from the threat of fear to its citizens (Article 28G) which should be provided by the people's defence and security system, Indonesian National Military (TNI) and the Indonesia National Police (POLRI), according to the Article 30 of the Constitution ("Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia,"1945).

In the beginning of the 80s, President Suharto signed the Act of Criminal Procedure (Act No. 8/1981). This law book is defining important terms with regard to crime such as arrest and detention, rights of suspects, public prosecutor's behaviour, investigation, court procedures and many more. Following the Act of Criminal Procedure, in 1982, the Ministry of Justice released the Penal Code of Indonesia to protect the Indonesian people against the crime that is becoming more and more transnational and define it ("Penal Code of Indonesia", 1982). At that time, the Penal Code never used the term "terrorism" as terrorist activities were not so common. But with people going abroad, the criminality and international crime raised. The document is thus describing individual acts and its punishments, sentencings and the role of justice.

After the Bali bombing in October 2002, Indonesian government came up with two emergency anti-terrorism decrees just about a week after the attacks. The first decree (or Regulation in Lieu of Law) is specific to the Bali bombings and the second one is a general anti-terror decree. The law expands powers to arrest

and interrogate suspected terrorists and allows a penalty of death for those convicted in certain cases of terrorism (CNN, 2002). Shortly after the unfortunate events, in the beginning of 2003, both decrees have been confirmed by the legislature and became the Anti-terror law that gives police the power to use intelligence data as the basis for arrest of a suspect person (The Star, 2003). The full title of this Indonesia's anti-terror law is 'Interim Law No 1 of 2002 on the Eradication of the Crime of Terrorism'. It was issued by former President Megawati Soekarnoputri (Butt, 2008). This new rule allows the police to arrest the suspected terrorists for seven days and detain them for six months for questioning and prosecution. Police obtained the right to examine personal emails, wiretap phone calls as well as block bank accounts that belong to people financing terrorist activities (Lindsey, 2012). The government also proclaimed the Jamaah Islamiyah as a terrorist organization responsible for the bombing in Bali (YLBHI, 2002). This law and its Article 6 gave a general description of terrorism: " - ...*any person who by intentionally using violence or threats of violence, creates a widespread atmosphere of terror/fear or causes mass casualties, by taking the liberty or lives and property of other people, or causing damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, public facilities or international facilities, faces the death penalty, or life imprisonment, or between 4 and 20 years' imprisonment*" (Butt, 2008). Indonesian people welcomed the Anti-Terrorism Law with ambivalence. Although they hoped terrorism would soon cease with the issuance of the Law, they were also worried that the Law would give rise again to the authoritarian government and the revival of the military. Indonesians are very sensitive to any neglect or violation of human rights. People were afraid as well that Indonesia had joined an American-led war against Islam, not terrorism (Juwana, 2012).

After the bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the discussion about how to strengthen the anti-terror law has been opened again. The current legislation was passed in the wake of the terrorist bombing in Bali, but new proposals appeared to improve it. Security minister Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono stressed that the new legislation would still respect human rights and would not be a duplicate of the controversial Internal Security Acts (law that enables

government to act against what it deems to be threats to national security by employing various measures; Foo, 2014) used in Malaysia and Singapore (Voa News, 2009).

The revision of the Anti-terrorism law started to be discussed again after the bombings in Jakarta in 2016. Some of the modification considered were for example the following:

- 1) Granting the security apparatus powers to hold a suspect longer than a week without a criminal charge to allow the police more time to gather sufficient evidence to charge an individual.
- 2) Giving intelligence officers the right to arrest terrorist suspects.
- 3) The revocation of citizenship for Indonesians who join a foreign terrorist group or participate in wars in a foreign country.
- 4) That acts of insulting the Indonesian State be criminalised, including viewing an Indonesian as a traitor if he fights for or pledges loyalty to other states such as ISIS (Singh, 2016).

In summer 2017, after a deadly attack on a policeman in North Sumatra by two supporters of the ISIS, the Indonesian legislator Mulfachri Harahap called for the immediate revision of the country's law against terrorism. The House of Representatives discussed the role of the military in fighting terrorism. They stressed that the National Police and the Army should cooperate against terrorism and police should be given the authority to be able to prevent terrorist attacks (Johnson, 2017).

The Indonesian President Joko Widodo also signed a decree that makes it possible to ban radical organizations without a court procedure. The decree is designed to protect the unity of Indonesia, because there might be some groups *“threatening the nation's existence and creating conflict in the society.”* The change is implemented through an amendment to the country's law on mass organizations, which covers nongovernmental organizations (Johnson, 2017). Indonesia is the world's most populous Muslim-majority country, but Christians make up about 10 percent of the country's 250 million people. The ban would

apply to any kind of extremist groups – no matter if Muslims, Christians, Hindu etc. The President himself did not mention any specific groups to be banned, but, if enforced, the decree could ban Islamic group Hizbut Tahrir that campaigns for Indonesia to adopt Islamic law and become a caliphate. The government announced in May 2017 that it planned to ban the group because its activities were not in line with the state's secular ideology and were "*causing friction in society*" (Al Jazeera, 2017). President's decision didn't win support from many groups and organizations. For example, Human Rights Watch condemned the move, calling it a "*troubling violation*" of the rights to freedom of association and expression despite it being supported by moderate groups such as Nahdlatul Ulama, Indonesia's largest Muslim organisation (Al Jazeera, 2017). The President has been labelled as a "dictator" and his step has been seen as a backward move for Indonesian democracy. According to Amnesty International Indonesia, another risk would be that the ban leads Hizbut Tahrir's more hardcore members to go underground and "*become drawn into extremist and terrorist circles*" (Rahadiana, 2017).

Indonesia in July 2017 temporarily blocked the access to the encrypted messaging service Telegram, citing concerns that it was being used to spread "*radical and terrorist propaganda*" by members and supporters of the Islamic State. The communications ministry stated that the Telegram mobile application as well as its desktop version would be blocked throughout the country because there are channels that present radical and terrorist propaganda, hatred, manuals how to make bombs, how to carry out attacks, which are all in conflict with Indonesian law. It did not say if it would take similar action against other messaging platforms (Reuters, 2017). However, the ban has been lifted shortly in August and steps have been taken to block "negative" content that includes forums for ISIS supporters. But the government warned that other sites could now face scrutiny. The co-founder of Telegram Pavel Durov promised that the company will find ways how to block public channels available for the propaganda of terrorism, not only in Indonesia but worldwide (Bloomberg, 2017).

4.1.2 Military, Defence and Intelligence

a) Role of Police and Military in Indonesia

Indonesia is also confronting the problem of balance of powers and roles of the police and the military. The relationship between these two security units remains complicated until the present. Under the rule of president Suharto from 1967 until 1998, the police used to be under military control. The police unit separated from the military after 30 years in 1999. At that time, the police as well as the army have been accused for taking part in illegal logging, prostitution and drug dealing. After both units split, it was easier for the police to get money for such sources because they had more jurisdiction of local affairs – exactly the place where the money was (Hays, 2008).

The Indonesian military has been involved in making of the national politics for quite long time. The presidents Sukarno and Suharto had close relationships with the military leaders and even chose some of them for the government positions. The situation is different nowadays and there are no military seats in parliament anymore and the military seems to be trying to turn into a professional fighting force.

The police in every country are state components that are designed to maintain order and stability within the state, prosecute criminals and to protect rights, property and security of citizens. However, in the eyes of ordinary peoples of Indonesia, the police seem to be and are often criticized for being disorganised, cruel and corrupt. Indonesia is number 18 in the most corrupted police ranking (global Police Corruption Perceptions Index), after Brazil and Peru and followed by Bolivia, Zimbabwe and Bangladesh (IPAC, n.d.).

Indonesian government is still confronting the sensitive issue of security and the precise division of labour between the police and military. The key issue is that the division of labour between the police and military has never been defined in law. Police are in charge of the internal security, but two laws - the 2002 Defence Law and the 2004 Armed Forces Law - require the military to assist

the police with internal security and emergency management when the police or government call them (IPAC, n.d.).

Formal responsibility for internal security has been allocated to the police but there are "*grey areas*," such as the counterterrorism, where the roles are poorly defined (Asia Report N°90, 2004). Moreover, even in areas that are exclusively the responsibility of police, such as upholding law and order, police capacity remains weak. The question now is how to define a transition role for the military in internal security while police capacity is being developed, without further blurring the lines between them (Asia Report N°90, 2004).

The Indonesian military is still involved in state civil affairs, much to the dislike of the police that is bothered by the persistent interference. Neither president Widodo nor the government came up with a reform of the military or police, however he emphasised the importance of cooperation of police and military on the counterterrorism but also on keeping peace before the upcoming elections in 2019. Especially after an incident occurred in September 2017, when Indonesian military confiscated weapons and ammunition imported by police that were purchased through an agent rather than through legal way of government demand. This incident proved again the still ongoing political role of the military and its ambitions for a greater autonomy in the country's internal security.

Even though until 2018 both units seemed to be rivals, situation changed again after the attacks in Surabaya in 2018. The police and military agreed on inviting the elite military's command troops (Koopssusgab) to help police with the counterterrorism activities and cracking down on terrorist cells in the country. The future will show, how this cooperation is or is not successful.

b) Interpol Indonesia

An important role not only in the fight with terrorism is also played by Interpol Indonesia. As an intergovernmental organization, Interpol guarantees cooperation of police units among Interpol member countries in the area of crime. Indonesia joined Interpol in 1954 and its International Relations Division (sub organization under Indonesian National Police) was established in 2010 and is mainly in charge of combating international crime.

However, the Interpol in Indonesia is not only in charge of terrorism, but also with different types of crime, like illegal fishing, which is a serious problem in Indonesia. The government is seeking Interpol's help in order to track poachers' boats from other Asian countries. For example in April 2017, Interpol has been called to seize a Chinese vessel that escaped after being stopped by the Indonesian navy (Straits Times, 2011).

In November 2016, Interpol organised its 85th General Assembly in Bali. The main goal of the meeting was to call for a more intense cooperation in order to stop the spread of ISIS to the Asia Pacific Region and to prevent any attacks that might be committed by the returnees from Iraq and Syria (Halim, 2016).

To increase the security in the region, the Operation Red Lotus II was initiated by Interpol under the second EU-ASEAN Migration and Border Management Program in May 2017 in international airports of Denpasar in Bali, Manila, Phnom Peng and Yangon. The police and immigration authorities focused on preventing the movement of terror suspects and criminals in Southeast Asia. The officers carried on more than 18 million searches against Interpol's Stolen and Lost Travel Documents and criminal databases (Interpol, 2017). The result of the operation was the identification of more than 200 potential threats and the arrest of internationally wanted persons accused of fraud and abduction.

Indonesia recently made a step towards a deeper cooperation among the Southeast Asian countries. The Indonesia's Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu came up with a plan to create a - mini-Interpol - for the first time during the 11th ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting in October 2017 in the Philippines. The so called Our Eyes Initiative was then formally established in January 2018. The

reason for its establishing was that Indonesia sees the rise and spread of radicalism and terrorism as a serious threat to the Asia-Pacific region. The minister claimed at the meeting that this new initiative was needed to better monitor the movement of terrorists and other militants in the ASEAN countries and they could thus more effectively prevent potential terrorist attacks and destroy the terrorist cells. The initiative includes six countries – Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei and the Philippines. Each of these countries should create a new unit for intelligence sharing and a country representative is in charge of communication about the collection of information (Straits Times, 2017).

The information about functioning and current counterterrorism activities of Interpol Indonesia are very difficult to obtain. The medias only inform about the operations once they are completed and the website of Interpol Indonesia doesn't provide any current information either. Even though there are attacks committed every year, the last news on the official website about the fight with terrorism comes from January 2007 and informs about the arrest of the senior procurement of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Pratheepan Thavarajah (Interpol, 2007). It might seem doubtful to the citizens what exactly is the Interpol doing to prevent the terrorist attacks and to protect people.

c) Military

After the Bali bombing, a new anti-terror special force unit has been formed in 2003 within the Indonesia Police – the Detachment 88 (Detasemen Khusus 88, Delta 88, or Densus 88). The unit has been established to combat various terrorists' threats. Detachment 88 is being funded by the US government through its State Department's Diplomatic Security Service and being trained in West Java by CIA, FBI, and the US Secret Service (Indonesia Elite Forces, n.d.). The Detachment 88 has enjoyed success in busting up jihadi terrorist cells in Central Java. Indeed, the unit's operations have been praised by some Western media outlets and even got a nod from the Obama administration (McBrien, 2013). In 2010, a Reuters analysis of data shows that Detachment 88 has prevented at last 54 plots or attacks in Indonesia (Allard and Kanupriya, 2016). On the other hand,

Densus 88 has been accused by human rights groups of abuses, including beatings of separatists and other Islamist suspects. Indonesia's National Human Rights Commission has identified 121 terrorism suspects who have died in custody since 2007 but the police strongly deny using torture or inappropriate force in their interrogations (Allard and Kanupriya, 2016).

Some problems have appeared even when investigating the terrorist crimes. The members of TPM (the Muslim Lawyers Team – group of lawyers in charge of defending the suspects in the Bali bombing) claimed that the Indonesian police had committed human rights abuses during several raids that had resulted in the death of suspects in 2010 (Johnson, 2010). To avoid similar incidents, the government should revise the anti-terrorism law and place it under the criminal justice system, which would be able to investigate abuses.

On July 30, 2010, it was reported that the Indonesian government had issued a regulation formalizing the establishment of a new National Anti-Terrorism Agency. The new National Antiterror Agency (BNPT) has united Indonesia's antiterror agencies under one authority, shifting the weight to include other institutions besides the National Police's Detachment 88 (The Jakarta Post, 2010).

In summer 2015, there has been a transformation in the Indonesian military (TNI – *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*) which launched a brand-new counterterrorism force – the TNI Joint Special Operations command or so called Koopsusgab. The group should consist of 81 trained counterterrorism personnel from the Army, the Navy's special forces and the Air Force's Bravo 90 special forces unit. Despite the fact that Jakarta wanted to show that the government is resolute in fighting terrorism, this transformation brought also concerns that the role and position of the military in the country is becoming stronger and that the military will profit from this group not only to fight the terrorism in Indonesia, but also deal with different security problems (Parameswaran, 2015).

To protect the country's interest, the Ministry of Defence categorized a few factors as threat to the Indonesian stability and safety in the Defence White

Paper in 2015. Beside the factors such as Epidemics, Espionage, Natural Disasters or Climate Change ("Defence White Paper 2015", 2015), the terrorism was either very shortly mentioned as a threat that results from the global changes in the recent years like economic issues and the rise of radicalism.

In order to keep Indonesia safe, the country also has to cooperate with its regional neighbours, especially with the Philippines and Malaysia because of the weak borders and its control. In 1975, Indonesia signed with the Philippines the Philippines-Indonesia Agreements on Border Crossing and Border Patrol that was revised in 2015. Later on, in 2017, the two countries formulated agreement also with Malaysia and launched an arrangement whereby naval military personnel from these countries will coordinate efforts in order to give chase to Islamic militants who navigate the disputable seas of these nations (notably in the Sulu Sea). The naval personnel from any of the three nations may enter the maritime waters of the others in pursuit of suspected militants and criminals responsible for illegal activities such as piracy, terrorism and kidnappings. The arrangement is supposed to facilitate responding to recent developments in Marawi City in the Philippines, where the military has been battling ISIS militants who can try to escape to Indonesia, posing as refugees (Guerra, 2017).

The important part of the defence and anti-terror system, the Indonesian National Police, has also been through a significant change. During the New Order era, the INP was incorporated into the armed forces with disastrous results for law enforcement. In 1999, after 30 years, the police and the military finally separated. Thus, the police could develop into a more professional, civilian force focused on conducting criminal investigations in a domestic role, rather than part of a military force designed to preserve state authority (Strang, 2008).

The Indonesian president Joko Widodo has been recently facing criticism for his attitude towards counterterrorism policies. He has never presented a clear counterterrorism strategy or new anti-terror laws. Experts are also worried about the deradicalisation programs that are not funded properly and Jokowi's administration that relies too much on police actions to fight terrorism (Emont,

2016). Nevertheless, after the series of attacks in Surabaya in May 2018, President Widodo asked for the Indonesian military to be given more power in the counterterrorism processes, including ability to act on terror threats against embassies and missions of foreign countries and taking actions against militant groups that are hiding in Indonesian jungles and mountains. Widodo also demanded the BNPT to keep developing preventive programmes in schools, places of worship, in prisons and via social media to fight against radical jihadism (Ismail, 2017).

4.1.3 Finance and Economy

To prevent the sponsoring of terrorism from different kinds of crimes (particularly from the money laundering), pursuant to Law No. 15/2002 pertaining to the Crime of Money Laundering, the government of Indonesia has also established an independent financial intelligence unit, the Indonesia Financial Transaction Report and Analysis Centre (INTRAC), its main task is to prevent and eradicate the crime of money laundering (Prajna, 2007).

Another step of the government to fight terrorism was to tighten the anti-money laundering and terror funding rules. Indonesia is still vulnerable to corruption, money laundering and terrorist financing. The reasons might be the gaps in financial system legislation and regulation, a cash-based economy, weak rule of law, ineffective law enforcement institutions and also due to the fact that major terrorist groups, which obtain financial support from both domestic and foreign sources, are still present in the country. Most money laundering in Indonesia is connected to non-drug criminal activity such as corruption, illegal logging, illegal sale of subsidized fuel, illegal wild animal trafficking, theft, bank fraud, credit card fraud, maritime piracy, sale of counterfeit goods, illegal gambling, and prostitution (US Department of State, n.d.). Indonesian authorities have found that leading Islamic State-linked terrorists have been using online services like Paypal or Bitcoin and other forms of financial technology to send payments to Indonesia from other regional countries, which made these transactions more difficult to detect (Parameswaran, 2017). Therefore, Bank

Indonesia issued a new regulation designed to further limit money laundering and financing of terrorism (Johnson, 2017). The new regulations aimed at curbing money laundering and terror-related financing across a broader range of financial service providers, including money changers, credit card issuers and electronic money providers (Reuters, 2017). Bank Indonesia also announced that the new rules balanced a need to contain the risks of money laundering and terrorism-related financial crimes and promoting economic growth (Parameswaran, 2017).

In 2017 the BNPT asked for an over-50 % increase of its budget for deradicalisation and counterterrorism programs to Rp 826.38 billion (increase from the 2016 budget of Rp 531.91 billion; Sapiie, 2016). Every year the budget keeps increasing, however in the aftermath of the Surabaya bombing, the members of the People's Legislative Assembly (DPR) asked the government to immediately increase the budget as the terrorist threat is still alarming in the country. Same request came from the members of Commission III of the House of Representatives. They claimed that the terrorist threat and its more sophisticated strategies (such as cybercrime or chemical weapons) should be taken more seriously to deal with.

The economy experts from Indonesia see a linkage in the recent attacks and unfunded counterterrorism policies. For example, the Indonesian National Police, from the total budget of Rp 95 trillion, almost half of it (Rp 44.2 trillion) is spent on personnel expenditures, while related to the act of terrorism crime is only budgeted worth Rp 435.8 billion. Countermeasures of domestic security disturbances only worth Rp 3 trillion. Similar case is with the State Intelligence Agency: The budget of Rp 5.6 trillion, mostly used for the cost of administrative and human resources (p 3.5 trillion). The rest is used for the development program of investigation, security, and state security raising worth only Rp 1.9 trillion. The internal intelligence operations are budgeted at Rp 899 billion, counter-intelligence operations worth Rp 411.2 billion. Lastly, the BNPT has a total budget of Rp 505.5 billion. The part of the budget spent on prevention of terrorism is Rp 169 billion and countering terrorists' costs Rp 122 billion (Indopos, 2018).

4.1.4 Indonesia's Responses to Radicalisation

While much research has been conducted on the radicalization of Muslim militants and roots of Indonesian radical movements, far less analysis has centred on how and why individual militants may come to disengage from violence. Indonesian government focuses not only on the hard measures, but also on the soft approach. The government is trying to reintegrate the perpetrators back into the society, however, it is not always successful.

Disengagement in this case can be defined as a process through which a member of a terror group or radical movement comes to reject the use of terror methods in pursuit of their goals (Chernov, 2015). Such a change may occur for a variety of reasons, usually involving changes in personal circumstances. The “physical disengagement” might be followed by a more important phase, namely “psychological disengagement”, an emotional distancing arising from a fear of being killed or arrested, from concern for one's family, or simply from boredom (Horgan, 2005).

With the return of hundreds of militants linked to ISIS from overseas means that there is a need for programs to reintegrate militants back into society. Indonesia has to look at how to boost its budget for deradicalisation programs as the country faces a rising threat from the Islamic State (Parameswaran, 2016). Nevertheless, it doesn't only aim at the fighters that are coming back. The term “returnees” encompasses different categories: returning fighters as well as women and children who have accompanied fighters, but also minors and non-combatants. The question of how to deal with returnees falls upon two issues:

- 1) The problem of evidence - how to prove someone was involved in violence and the permissibility of internet-based evidence
- 2) Lack of capacity of states to conduct rehabilitation and reintegration. In the Indonesian case, most known returnees constitute those who have not managed to gain entry into Syria, and thus are lacking in training and experience. These “returnees” may then actually be classified as “deportees” and should not be included in the returnees count. The distinction is critical to make (Jawaid, 2017).

Another category of the returnees are terrorists that have been released from prisons. About 600 of them have left the jail since 2016, but the Indonesian government has only been able to locate approximately 184 of them. Some of

those released remained welded to a militant mind-set and kept committing acts of terrorism again while out of jail (Renaldi, 2017). Some former jihadists have “disengaged provisionally” but remain vulnerable: they have only disengaged for tactical or practical reasons. Yet some have also begun to disengage emotionally (Chalmers, 2017).

In 2014, the government launched a deradicalisation program in prisons housing terrorists. The program included religious lectures, programs countering religious extremism, and courses on Indonesia's pluralist national ideology - Pancasila. The government does not release data on reoffending rates, and the public has no access to information on how successful the deradicalisation program is, which has led to concerns about potential future terrorist attacks. Many questions raised about the strategy as the deradicalisation seems unclear. The government is not able to properly define a radical and they base what they think a radical is on stereotyping and physical appearances. Another issue is that the deradicalisation program is held back by bureaucracy and the lack of a long-term strategy. Under the current law, convicted terrorists must attend a mandatory deradicalisation program while in prison. But once out, there is no government mandate for convicts to continue the program and prevent them from falling back into terrorism networks. The facilities in Indonesia do not have the necessary monitoring and empowerment mechanism needed to deradicalise, they are mostly responsible for administrative work. Convicted terrorists need organized support systems that help them find new social circles once out of prison, to keep them away from the terrorist networks (Renaldi, 2017). Another “tactic” is to send moderate Muslim scholars to speak with the radicals in prisons. Although the institutions admit that some of the perpetrators in prison remain to be hard-liners. But there are flaws in the system. For example, Afif alias Sunakin, one of the terrorists who died during the Jakarta attacks in 2016 and was pictured carrying a gun in a photo that has gone viral on social media, trained in an Islamic paramilitary camp in Indonesia's semi-autonomous Aceh region in 2010, before he was sentenced to 7 years in jail for his involvement in the camp. Afif underwent deradicalisation with a Muslim scholar and was released, but not monitored, because he appeared to have been deradicalised. But he was just a good actor. Some specialists believe that rather

than assigning Muslim scholars, it is more effective to send ex-jihadists to persuade the prisoners, because ex-jihadists share the same life experiences and might become an “eye opener” to prisoners when helping them realize that their terror acts and killing of innocent people are not allowed by the Quran (Gutierrez, 2016).

Indonesia’s national counterterrorism agency, *Badan Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme*, outlined its approach to reintegration in its 2013 Deradicalisation Blueprint. The idea was to manage a prisoner’s transition back into society through psychological and religious counselling, while promoting self-reliance through life skills training (Sumpter, 2017). The country has been filled now with counter-extremism programs, but one major criticism of them is that anti-radicalism efforts from moderate Muslim groups like Nahdlatul Ulama⁴ target those who would probably not get radicalized in the first place (Varagur, 2016).

Indonesia is still trying to come up with new ideas on how to deal with jihadists and their deradicalisation. A landmark reconciliation meeting between survivors of terror attacks and the perpetrators was held in February 2018. The meeting was touted as a first for Muslim-majority Indonesia, which has long struggled with Islamist militancy and attacks. The meeting was quite unique and never happened before. More than a hundred former terrorists and around fifty survivors attended the three-day meeting, which was organized by the National Counterterrorism Agency and held at the Borobudur Hotel in Central Jakarta. The government-led meeting aimed to specifically tackle the issue of terrorism at its roots and to offer reconciliation to those who were affected by attacks. Indonesia's efforts in tackling terrorism have been focused on a soft approach, especially through BNPT's deradicalisation programs, in recent years. The event also saw former terrorists convey their apologies to victims in an open dialogue. The event provided an opportunity for survivors to share their struggles and voice what they viewed as a lack of balance in the government’s support toward those affected by radicalism and terrorist attacks (Jakarta Globe, 2018).

⁴ Nahdlatul Ulama is a traditionalist Sunni Islam movement that was established in response to the rise of Wahabism in Saudi Arabia and Islamic modernism in Indonesia. NU also is a charitable body funding schools and hospitals as well as organizing communities to help alleviate poverty.

The reconciliation was designed to end the harrowing chain of reciprocal acts of revenge, particularly among the survivors, in the aftermath of terror attacks of the past. As an idea and concept, the proposed conciliatory meeting is good, and a successful outcome is not unthinkable, as most of the perpetrators and the survivors or their relatives are still alive. However, as they say, “It’s easier said than done.” The way to reconciliation will be a very long and painful journey, as it will address the pain and suffering of the victims, examine the motives of the perpetrators, bring together the estranged communities and try to find a path to justice, truth and, ultimately, peace and harmony. There is no simple roadmap for reconciliation, as there is no shortcut or simple prescription for healing the wounds and social divisions in the aftermath of sustained violence or terror (Razak, 2018).

The government should facilitate health and educational services and also support survivors through training sessions or coordinated job placement. Survivors’ testimonies at the event revealed the unfortunate reality that they have been neglected by the government and for years struggled to live a decent life (Jakarta Globe, 2018).

Indonesia, mainly through the National Counterterrorism Agency has addressed the issue of terrorism through various soft approaches – an effort commended by many of the country's counterparts around the world (Jakarta Globe, 2018). Societal reintegration is a resource-intensive process, involving personalized attention and coordination among relevant stakeholders. But where stretched Indonesian state agencies have come up short, small but committed NGOs often fill the gaps. Yayasan Prasasti Perdamaian is one Jakarta-based organization that helps former prisoners get back on their feet by helping with business plans to secure loans for small start-ups. Employers are reluctant to hire convicted terrorists for obvious reasons, so modest entrepreneurial projects such as catfish farms and electrical repair shops are seen as constructive alternatives. The motorbike taxi industry presents another potential option. Obtaining driving licenses has been an obstacle, but according to Dete Aliah of YPP, a group of former prisoners successfully persuaded the national counterterrorism police unit, Densus 88, to facilitate the process last year. Aliansi Indonesia Dumai also attempts to assist with prisoner transitions. Project officer Laode Arhan described

one case in which a former extremist was struggling to reintegrate with a community in Ambon, due to trust issues. AIDA sent people to intervene, and because of the NGO's legitimacy as a peace organization, people agreed to give the individual a chance to prove himself (Sumpter, 2017).

4.2 Indonesia and ASEAN: Counterterrorism

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in July 1967. Its founding members were the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. At that time, Indonesia was represented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Adam Malik. Malik described Indonesia's vision of a Southeast Asia developing into "*a region which can stand on its own feet, strong enough to defend itself against any negative influence from outside the region*" (Francisco, 2017)". The main purpose was to build political and economic connections and encourage economic development in its member states. Terrorism was never high on ASEAN's agenda in relation to transnational crime, unlike illicit drug trafficking, smuggling of weapons, money laundering, people trafficking and piracy. Such a position had to change because of the multidimensional impact of terrorist crimes (Ahmad, 2013). The ASEAN states considered the internal communist insurgencies to be the most immediate sources of threat. By promoting internal security, ASEAN would make its members less vulnerable to the machinations of outside powers.

As Southeast Asia is a region with one of the largest concentration of Muslims in the world the cooperation among the ASEAN member states is quite important, because many of the terrorists and militant groups are associated with radical Islamic ideologies. Muslims are also a majority in Malaysia and constitute significant minorities in southern Thailand and the southern Philippines. They represent just a small minority of Muslims, but they have the potential to influence a larger substratum of the Muslim population. In fact, the strategy of some of the terrorist groups is to radicalize and capture a larger share of mainstream Muslim public opinion to increase their power and influence and destabilise secular and moderate governments in the region. The deterioration of economic and social conditions after the economic crisis in Southeast Asia and the

associated political upheaval in Indonesia has produced an environment favourable to the activities of terrorists, radical groups, and separatists (Rabasa, 2001).

4.2.1 Bilateral agreements

The founding document – the Bangkok declaration from 1967 claimed to promote regional peace and stability. The Declaration did not stipulate specific security cooperation among the member states. The only method suggested maintaining regional peace and stability was for member states to adhere to the principles of the UN Charter, and ASEAN did not provide its own regional code of conduct regarding security in Southeast Asia (Koga, 2014). When founded, ASEAN did not focus on security issues such as terrorism or counterterrorism cooperation as the situation with the attacks was different than today. The following text is the only one in the Declaration mentioning security: „*The countries of South East Asia share a primary responsibility for strengthening the economic and social stability of the region.*” The priority seemed to be the end of the Borneo confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia and then economic and cultural cooperation.

Even though some terrorist incidents occurred in the ASEAN area in the 70s (in Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand), none of the documents and declarations issued by ASEAN stated counterterrorism cooperation. In 1971 in Kuala Lumpur the foreign ministers of ASEAN member countries signed another document called Zone of peace, freedom and neutrality declaration. The ministers agreed on a tight cooperation of South-East Asian countries. The only statement addressing security, no counterterrorist cooperation yet, was to “*ensure stability and security from external interference in any form or manifestation in order to preserve their national identities in accordance with the ideals and aspirations of their peoples*” (“1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality Declaration“, 1971). ZOPFAN declaration was later followed by the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in South East Asia that seems to only enlarge the Zone of peace, freedom and neutrality declaration.

The Bali Concord stipulated ASEAN's objectives, and prioritization, including 'the stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region. For the first time, ASEAN prioritized fostering national development and strengthening ASEAN solidarity over regional solidarity. ASEAN also began to promote security cooperation in the so-called non-traditional security fields, such as natural disasters and human security. However, ASEAN's transformation still lacked an institutional consensus on its prioritization and methods of implementation. Indonesia offered potential security cooperation within the ASEAN framework, implicitly proposing ASEAN's functional expansion into the security field. In 1969, Indonesian president Muhammad Suharto stated in his letter to the Second ASEAN Ministerial Meeting that "*ASEAN member states must strengthen their dedication and increase their efforts to implement the aims of ASEAN, not only to achieve economic and technical progress, but also to help safeguard peace, security and stability in our region, as a contribution towards peace, security and stability in the world.*" Whether or not the Indonesian concept of 'security' meant military cooperation, other member states rejected his proposal. Singapore argued that ASEAN should focus solely on economic cooperation and that those who were "*preoccupied with ideological and security problems could perhaps profitably set up other organizations for this purpose.*" There was a clear opposition among ASEAN members to form military cooperation under ASEAN's framework. Indonesia's proposal was rejected for three reasons: First, the multilateral defence cooperation would send a wrong signal to major powers. It might be seen as another regional security bloc, which would provoke external powers, especially the Communist bloc, since most of ASEAN member states had security linkage with the western states. Second, ASEAN had little defence practicality to prevent external interference due to member states' limited military capabilities. Most Southeast Asian states struggled to stabilize domestic politics and foster economic development and did not have the capacity to drastically increase their military budgets. Third, it would become more difficult to integrate all Southeast Asian states into ASEAN. Thus, Indonesia's proposal for multilateral security cooperation under ASEAN was rejected by member states, solidifying ASEAN's norm against multilateral defence pacts (Koga, 2014).

The situation regarding the security and counterterrorism cooperation has not changed much until the terrorist attacks in New York in September 2001. Nevertheless, by this year, ASEAN member states held a few conferences that focused on international crime – in Perth in 1992, then the first International Conference on Terrorism (Baguio, 1996) and the first ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime (Manila, December 1997). Themes covered included state sponsorship of terrorism, the potential use by terrorist of weapons of mass destruction, how to stop the flow of funds reaching terrorist organizations and intelligence information exchanges. The ASEAN members were facing two problems by then. Firstly, the fact that recently they focused more on the economic matters relating to security issues. Indonesia, as the most influential country in regional institutional framework was significantly weakened by economic and political developments in 1998 and 1999. Secondly, the struggle over how far the member states may intervene in each other's internal affairs (Isaacson and Rubenstein, 2002).

After the September 11th attacks in the USA, the ASEAN member states started to develop their cooperation in terms of international crime and terrorism. The impact of the September 11th, 2001 has had a great bearing on the security agenda in the region. The event and its aftermath saw the region finally embarking on its own “war” against terrorism amidst prevailing concerns that Al Qaeda or other Al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups were operating in the region. Since this time, ASEAN has taken steps to respond to the threat of terrorism. During the 7th ASEAN summit, the members issued an ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counterterrorism, where member countries condemned the attacks and considered it as an attack against humanity and an assault on everyone, not only US citizens (“ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counterterrorism“, 2001). The Declaration also outlined several measures to fight terrorism including: deepening cooperation among front-line law enforcement agencies in combating terrorism and sharing “best practices” and enhancing information exchange to facilitate the flow of information, in particular, on terrorists, their movements, funding, and any other information needed to protect lives, property and security of all modes of travel and others (Haacke and Morada, 2010).

The year 2002 followed with the attacks in the ASEAN area – the bombing in October 2002 in Bali and the Philippines. Before the attacks, the ASEAN Work Programme on Counterterrorism was adopted in May, outlining a three-stage process to combat terrorism by ratifying international conventions and protocols, prescribing practical cooperation between national law enforcement agencies under the headings of ASEANAPOL, and encouraging extra-regional cooperation with ASEAN partners. During this period the ASEAN Ministerial Committee on Transnational Crime emerged as a useful platform for sharing best practices and enhancing information exchange, intelligence sharing, and capacity building (Desker and Pavlova, 2005).

While ASEAN's immediate response to the September 11 terrorist attack was to utilise the existing bilateral security arrangements, the scenario changed significantly after Bali bombing, which forced the organisation to reconsider its own position. ASEAN became aware that the current security arrangements were insufficient when dealing with terrorist crimes. ASEAN required a comprehensive strategy and a multilateral convention (Ahmad, 2013). After the attacks, the heads of member countries promised to Indonesia and the Philippines to support their determined pursuit of the terrorist elements responsible for the attacks and urged the international community to support ASEAN's efforts to combat terrorism and restore business confidence in the region. On the 8th ASEAN summit in Cambodia, the representatives agreed on a stronger cooperation in the security field and on the establishment of the Regional Counterterrorism Centre ("A Compilation of ASEAN Declarations, Joint Declarations, and Statements on Combating Transnational Crime and Terrorism", 2007).

Still in 2002, under ASEAN framework, the member states signed the Agreement on Information Exchange and Establishment of Communication Procedures to promote cooperation in combating transnational crime, including terrorism. In the same year, ASEAN and the United States issued a Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism, which committed the US and all the ASEAN members to improve intelligence-gathering efforts,

strengthen capacity-building measures and enhance mutual cooperation (Haacke and Morada, 2010).

On the occasion of the 36th anniversary of ASEAN, the Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri gave a speech where she pointed out to the counterterrorism cooperation among ASEAN members: *“Another challenge that is not at all new but has become such a great source of anxiety in recent times is the threat of international terrorism along with all the other non-traditional threats to security, such as the traffic in illicit drugs, arms smuggling, money laundering and people smuggling. Regional plans of action to tackle such problems had long been established as part and parcel of ASEAN’s functional cooperation, but suddenly these appeared to be inadequate in the face of the cataclysms like terrorist attacks in the United States and in Bali. These two tragedies roused the entire civilized world to the immense danger of international terrorism and other transnational crimes. It became clear that no single country or group of countries could overcome this threat alone. In Indonesia’s view, which is shared by the rest of the ASEAN members, it would take a global coalition involving all nations, all societies, religions and cultures to defeat this threat...”*(ASEAN, 2012).

The member states signed The Bali Concord II in 2003, named after the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, or The Bali Concord, which was produced at the First ASEAN Summit in Bali in 1976. This declaration was more detailed than the first one. It consists of three pillars, namely an ASEAN Security Community, an ASEAN Economic Community and an ASEAN Socio-cultural Community. The Bali Concord II with the three envisioned communities as its pillars was necessitated by the challenges posed by globalization and by the economic and security situations after the 1997 financial crisis and the terrorist attacks with their severe impact on the region and worldwide. As for the ASEAN Security Community, the concept has become more relevant after the Bali bombings. The ASEAN Security Community is essentially a community that relies exclusively on peaceful processes in the settlement of intra-regional differences (People’s Daily, 2003). The goal was to achieve a dynamic and integrated ASEAN Community that shall fully utilize the existing institutions and mechanisms within ASEAN to

strengthen national and regional capacities to counterterrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in persons and other transnational crimes. The ASEAN Security Community shall also explore cooperation with the United Nations as well as other international and regional bodies for the maintenance of international peace and security (“Bali Concord II, 2012”).

After the bombing in Bali in 2002, another blow to Indonesia and ASEAN came in 2003 and 2004 with the bombing in Jakarta. ASEAN member-states sought to strengthen the regional legal framework for combating terrorism by signing the Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters on 28 November 2004 (Desker and Pavlova, 2005). ASEAN also decided to strengthen the cooperation with Australia. The country has had a multilateral relationship with ASEAN since April 1974. Since then, interactions have been advanced by successive governments. The early years of the relationship were dominated by discussions about trade and economic issues but dialogue on security matters became increasingly important from the late 1970s. Cooperation on security issues expanded with the ASEAN countries in the wake of terrorist attacks internationally and in Southeast Asia from 2001. From 2004 a phase of further substantial cooperation developed (Frost, 2013) - both sides signed the ASEAN-Australia Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. By this declaration, they seek a strong co-operation on security, intelligence and law enforcement matters, and desiring to strengthen and expand this co-operation to fight international terrorism through the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, as a leading ASEAN body for combating terrorism, and other mechanisms (“A Compilation of ASEAN Declarations, Joint Declarations, and Statements on Combating Transnational Crime and Terrorism”, 2007).

After the attacks in Indonesia and the Philippines, the cooperation among countries in the security field with an emphasis on terrorism started to be much more intense. In the years to come, ASEAN was working on cooperation with different countries worldwide. The first declarations were, nevertheless, adopted with the countries in Asia. To begin with India in 2003 and the ASEAN-India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism. In 2004,

ASEAN together with the People's Republic of China signed the Joint Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues (including strategies how to deal with cyber-crime, money laundering, smuggling and terrorism). The ASEAN-Canada Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism claiming a stronger cooperation between both sides on matters of regional security and law enforcement has been signed in Kuala Lumpur in 2006. Other countries and contracts followed: ASEAN-Russian Federation Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 2004, ASEAN-Japan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 2004, ASEAN-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 2005, ASEAN-New Zealand Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism in 2005 and ASEAN-Pakistan Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism either in 2005.

The change in the ASEAN security policy came in 2007 when ASEAN adopted the Convention on Counterterrorism - a framework to combat all forms of terrorism, and to deepen cooperation among law enforcement agencies in the region (Bueza, 2017). The speed in which ACCT was first introduced until it was formally accepted was a great achievement by ASEAN standards in the securitisation of terrorism. ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta felt that ASEAN could deal better with regional countries rather than international establishments like the United Nations. The Philippines and Indonesia then prepared the draft in September 2006 and the Convention was accepted by the ASEAN summit two months later. Realising that security cooperation must go beyond domestic political and bilateral diplomatic spheres, ASEAN introduced the Convention, which aspired to provide a more constructive regional cooperation regime for combating terrorism. Also, some of the ASEAN members suffered from varying antiterrorism laws, so some degree of harmonisation was fundamental to achieve an effective regional regulatory framework. The Convention presented more structured legal framework and was supposed to consolidate diverse anti-terrorism laws in the region. ASEAN seemed to have convinced member countries that no other institutional arrangements could better serve the interest of regional security

except ASEAN itself. Other regional institutions such as the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation are essentially an economic and trade forum, while the Asian Regional Forum used to lack the institutional capacity (Ahmad, 2013). The organisation stressed the importance of the Convention and its full implementation even in the ASEAN Political Security Community Blueprint in 2009.

Three years later, ASEAN published the Bali Concord III. The previous treaties mentioned terrorism, but it hasn't seemed as a priority for ASEAN when published. Nonetheless, in Bali Concord III, there is only a very short remark that the countries should keep fighting against terrorism together according to the ASEAN law.

In order to promote greater transparency and a better understanding of countries' defence policies, ASEAN is also preparing a compilation – the ASEAN Security Outlook which describes the security situation in the region and the policies of individual member countries. These outlooks are being issued every year by the ASEAN Jakarta Secretariat during the ASEAN ministerial meeting since 2001. From the first compilation that is available on, the structure has slightly changed as in the first publications the authors focused also on the security cooperation with other world powers such as the US, Australia, Canada, China, but also EU (the 2017 Outlook pays again attention to these countries and institutions). In the recent books, the emphasis is only on the ASEAN members and their defence policies. As for Indonesia, the text hasn't been modified much recently. There is always a clear statement that, with regard to the security policy, Indonesia is of the view that ASEAN must strengthen regional architecture based on the principle of dynamic equilibrium. To ensure its leadership in the regional architecture, ASEAN must constantly maintain and nurture unity and cohesiveness. The country is committed to the peaceful resolution of any differences and disputes through dialogue in an amicable manner. As mandated by its constitution, Indonesia actively contributes to the maintenance of world and regional peace and stability based on the principles of the UN Charter, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, the ASEAN Charter and other related international and regional norms and values. Indonesia also attaches great importance to defence

cooperation at bilateral, regional, or international level. Indonesia also believes that counterterrorism efforts must address the root causes of terrorism. Since the root causes of terrorism vary, the strategy to address them must be comprehensive and interlinked. It should take into account all factors that work against terrorism—including law enforcement, the legislative framework, foreign policy, and socio-economic policy. It should also address local circumstances and conditions that give rise to terrorism: political grievances and marginalization to cite a few (“ASEAN Security Outlook 2013”, 2013).

From May 2016 to May 2017, Indonesia served as the Chair of Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime and proposed to update the existing ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counterterrorism, taking into account the changing trends of terrorism in the world, including the rise of radicalization and violent extremism globally (“ASEAN Security Outlook 2017”, 2017). In the last few years, ASEAN seems to focus more on the terrorism issue.

For the stability of the Southeast Asian region, Indonesia should not let the Philippines walk alone during crises such as the ongoing conflict in Mindanao. As Islamic State in Syria is moving closer to defeat, it has declared its intention to form an outpost in Southeast Asia. The seizure of the predominantly Muslim city of Marawi in the Philippines are all part of the group’s attempt to realize this goal. Indonesia, which like the Philippines has been combating terrorist groups, including those affiliated with IS, cannot intervene too far into the Philippines’ domestic affairs, but it can initiate regional cooperation under the ASEAN framework to tackle terrorism threats. Attacks are expected to affect the region at an increasing rate. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the terrorism, as fighters are likely return to the region to continue their campaign. Furthermore, existing conflicts, racial and religious tensions and pockets of instability in ASEAN countries provide the ideal conditions for the expansion of IS-inspired ideology (Di Matteo, 2017). The Indonesian Military and National Police are ready to deal with any local repercussions from the crackdown on terrorist groups in Marawi, despite the fact that the porous border between Indonesia and the

Philippines has allowed terrorists to slip through the fingers of security forces (The Jakarta Post, 2017).

According to the results of recent surveys conducted in schools in Indonesia, the majority of the students admit to adopting radical religious attitudes. 11 countries in Southeast Asia realised that the role of religious education is becoming more and more important and committed to prevent spreading of violent ideologies. Their commitment was confirmed by issuing of the Jakarta Declaration on Violent Extremism and Religious Education in December 2017 (UNDP, n.d.). The document highlighted seven areas that should be addressed in order to counter the extremism such as dialogue and conflict prevention, strengthening good governance and human rights, engaging communities, empowering youth, gender equality, education and employment facilitation and strategic communication including internet and social media (UNDP, n.d.).

The latest step taken by ASEAN members and Australia concerning their common fight against terrorism, was the agreement and signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Cooperation to Counter International Terrorism in March 2018. To support the MoU, all the parties agreed on joint initiatives, for instance ASEAN-Australia workshop on using electronic evidence in terrorism related prosecutions, ASEAN-Australia counterterrorism and foreign fighter workshop for border security officials or the DIGI Engage Forum ASEAN-Australia Week held as part of ASEAN-Australia Week (ASEAN Straliaia, 2018).

4.2.2 Military and Intelligence

Since 1981, the so called ASEANAPOL has been acting in the ASEAN area. The group deals with the of law enforcement and crime control (ASEANAPOL, n.d.). In September 2017, an Improved Database System was launched in order to improve connectivity and information exchange regarding terrorism and organized crime among ASEAN members. While the web-based system was launched in 2006, this version contains new features such as a discussion forum, which would allow law enforcement officials to share best practices, intelligence information and trends in crime and terrorism in an efficient and secure manner. Enhanced information sharing on counterterrorism issues is

particularly necessary due to weak border security in the South-East Asia (Di Matteo, 2017). This system without doubts constitutes a step forward in speeding up connectivity between security forces to share best practices and statistical information (Parameswaran, 2017).

The heterogenous region has, on one hand a strategic position, but on the other hand, the spacious land boundaries between insular and peninsular Southeast Asia make it very easy for terrorism to spread. Despite large intelligence and internal security apparatuses in the area, there does not seem to be much comprehension about differing capabilities of the ten nation-states in the region and the lack of technical or analytical capabilities to address regional security issue. Military cooperation at the ASEAN level remains limited due to the members' sensitivities and national sovereignty concerns, such as different approaches to national defence and cooperation, and various levels of development and operational procedures that reflect the region's inherent complexities (Cabalza, 2017). Even though the cooperation among ASEAN members is improving and becoming more intense, there is still a lot of work ahead. The individual members should unify or compromise when it comes to the security and sovereignty issues in relation to terrorism. The members should fight against terrorism together and should take part in joint operations. One of the reasons that the conflict in Mindanao hasn't ended yet is the fact that the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines does not allow foreign forces engaging directly in the current struggle. As the attacks are getting more and more common, it is up to ASEAN now to take the precautionary measures and unify its members in order to avoid such conflicts in the near future.

4.2.3 Finance and Economy

Ministers from the member states gathered in Manila in September, for the Eleventh ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime to consolidate and further strengthen regional cooperation in combating transnational crimes, including terrorism. In addition, one day prior to AMMTC, the Second Special ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Rise of Radicalization and Violent Extremism

took place in order to exchange views and best practices in combating the rise of radicalization and extremism. Despite these efforts for regional cooperation, the question of security is still quite challenging for the region. One of the main difficulties in panning a common counterterrorism strategy has been attributed to the member states' significant developmental, economic, political and social discrepancies, which result in different approaches to combat terrorism at the national level. This diversity among ASEAN members is likely to generate unequal results. Members such as Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines share strong geographical bonds and are affected by extremism to a similar degree, whereas Laos or Cambodia may face economic difficulties in complying with stricter counterterrorism rules dictated by ASEAN (Di Matteo, 2017).

4.3 Indonesia and Australia

Indonesia is Australia's nearest neighbour. Their relationship has a long history but has been quite bitter since Indonesia's independence. Both countries share important position and are important players in the geopolitics contributing to regional stability, but only very recently, they started to develop their cooperation, especially in the security field ("Defence White Paper 2015", 2015).

4.3.1 Bilateral Agreements

In 1995, the then Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating came up with a Security agreement with the Republic of Indonesia that was signed in Jakarta. The Agreement was a turning point for Indonesia that committed to an independent approach in foreign policies from the country's inauguration in 1948. That is why Indonesia insisted that the agreement does not use the word "defence" for its sensitivity and the agreement being seen as a military pact, which would be inconsistent with Indonesia's non-aligned principles and national self-reliance (SBS news, n.d.).

For Australia, the Agreement presents a step forward in strengthening the country's position in the Asia-Pacific. Experts emphasise that the terms of the agreement are largely symbolic – the document does not commit either party to the defence of the other or draw them into any kind of binding pact. Despite this

fact, the agreement has been criticised by some Australian human rights organisations and has been regarded as legitimizing actions of Indonesian government in East Timor and West Papua (Brown, Frost and Sherlock, 1996). The cooperation between Indonesia and Australia, after years of turbulent relationship, has been strengthened by the agreement between the Republic of Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation, or so-called Lombok Treaty that was signed in 2006. The objective is a closer cooperation in the security field, counterterrorism and dealing with other non-traditional security threats ("Defence White Paper 2015", 2015). The agreement is providing directions to agencies that are involved in cooperative activities to combat terrorism and other transnational crime (Australian Government, 2006). In 2014, the two countries decided to tighten their relationship and reaffirm the Lombok Treaty by signing a Joint Understanding on the Code of Conduct to improve their intelligence cooperation (Australian Government, 2006). However, the events before the final signing of the paper were equally important as Australia asked the document to be named as a Joint Understanding, but Indonesia demanded a Code of Conduct (to be understood as a document that determines the legal and ethical responsibilities of one serving in a professional capacity. While daily moral codes may not apply in a professional situation, a code of conduct should provide more specific set of ethical boundaries to work within. This is what Indonesia wanted Australia to consider). The authors of the document after all just combined both of the names (Croft-Cusworth, 2014).

By this document, both countries agreed on

- 1) Not using any of their intelligence or surveillance capacities in ways that would harm the interests of the Parties.
- 2) Promoting intelligence cooperation between relevant institutions and agencies in accordance with their respective national laws and regulations (The Australian, 2014).

In 2015, Australia and Indonesia also held the first meeting of the Indonesia-Australia Ministerial Council on Law and Security. This meeting will be first after the Jakarta attacks in January (Parliament of Australia, 2016) and is considered as the primary forum to discuss matters of domestic law and security,

including counterterrorism, complementing the “2+2” dialogue, which deals with defence and strategic issues (Parameswaran, 2016).

4.3.2 Military and Intelligence

The defence cooperation between Australia and Indonesia started already in the 1970s and has grown in importance since then on. Nevertheless, three major events influenced the development in the defence and military cooperation. The first one was Indonesia’s annexation of East Timor in 1999 (Singh, 2002).

After the Bali bombing in 2002, the militaries of both countries began working together more closely. The Defence exchanges, that stopped because of the East Timor conflict, started fully again. The intelligence agencies, especially the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Indonesian National Police started to cooperate tightly. As the significance of the threat posed by Jemaah Islamiyah became clearer, Australia recognized in the 2005 Defence Update, that Indonesia had a ‘pivotal role to play in counterterrorism in the region’ (Taylor, 2008).

Another result of this cooperation was the establishment of the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JLEC) which has provided counterterrorism training to law enforcement officers. A Transnational Crime Centre in Jakarta has been also opened in 2006 (is also jointly funded by Australia) and aims at enhancing the Indonesian National Police’s capacity (Taylor, 2008). In December 2015, Indonesian police even successfully arrested nine people over a terror threat after a tip-off that came from the Australian Federal Police (BBC, 2017).

Australian and Indonesian defence forces also conduct the highest levels of training and exercises with each other since the mid-1990s (McGrath, 2013).

Australia is financing and training the counterterrorism squad Detachment 88 and the Australian and Indonesian militaries hold a joint annual exercise near Darwin, known as Operation Cassowary (CA10; Storey, 2017). Since 2010, Indonesian Defence Force led combined patrol boat exercise, designed to enhance interoperability in maritime operations between the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the Royal Australian Navy (RAN; Australian Embassy, 2010). In 2016, the Australian Border Force (ABF) conducted a maritime security patrol with the Indonesian Coast Guard (BAKAMLA; Parameswaran, 2016).

More than 100 Indonesian military officers also attend study courses in Australia worth AU \$2.5 million. In the past the army also trained the Kopassus Indonesian special- forces unit (McPhedran, 2015).

In 2012, the Royal Australian Air Force's (RAAF) organized as every year an air combat training exercise, Pitch Black 2012. The training concluded three weeks of offensive counter air and air support operations. For the first time, Indonesian Air Force's (TNI-AU) Sukhoi SU 27 and SU 30 Flanker aircraft participated in the event (Air Force technology, 2012).

Despite all this cooperation and training, the following two turning points limited the cooperation. The second incident was an attempt by Australian spies in 2013 to listen on personal phone calls of Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and his wife as well as other senior ministers. The attempt has been discovered in a top secret document from the whistle-blower Edward Snowden (MacAskill and Taylor 2013).

Lastly, in January 2017, Indonesia suspended military cooperation with Australia for "technical reasons" – most probably for materials displayed at an Australian military base. It's believed a Kopassus officer was offended by propaganda material about West Papua and human rights abuses by the Indonesian military and its leaders that were called murderers and criminals (Doherty, 2017). Later in 2017, President Widodo and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull ensured that the problem has been solved and the defence cooperation can continue (Karp, 2017).

In February 2018, Australian Defense Minister Marise Payne and Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu signed a new Australia – Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement that should boost the relationship between the two countries, which has recently been marked by distrust and doubts (Parameswaran, 2018).

4.3.3 Finance and Economy

The Bali bombing in 2002 was a major event in the Indo-Australian relations. After the bombing, Australia promised to help to crack down the terrorism in Indonesia and offered AU \$10 million four-year counterterrorism assistance package, which even increased to \$20 million in October 2004 (Taylor, 2008).

Apart of the military cooperation, Australia is trying to help through the Australia's Education Partnership and promote Indonesian moderate democratic Islam that could serve as a beacon to other countries with dominating religion of Islam in fighting radicalism (Fealy, 2017). Before the Bali bombing, Australian Education Aid to Islamic schools and universities played just a minor role, the budget for the program was less than AU\$1 million per year. In 2004, more than AU\$167 million was distributed into Islamic sector assistance (Fealy, 2017) and between 2011 and 2017, the amount was AU\$368 million. The aid aimed at improving the education services by increasing participation in schooling and improving the quality of education in religious schools as well as supporting more than 1500 madrasah over Indonesia to improve their quality against national education standards (Australian Government, n.d.).

In 2015, Australia (namely the Australian Financial Intelligence Unit; AUSTRAC) and Indonesia (Pusat Pelaporan Dan Analisis Transaksi Keuangan Indonesian; PPATK) hosted the first Asia-Pacific Counterterrorism Financing Summit in Sydney. Even though it is quite a new event, it is already a crucial assessment on financing of terrorism in South East Asia (Parameswaran, 2016). Experts from different fields from 19 countries worldwide agreed on a stronger cooperation and establishing a project group of Australia, Indonesia, and other regional countries to produce regional terrorism financing risk assessment that should identify and disrupt terrorism's centres and show what should have been done more in order to reduce the risks of terrorism. Another goal was to set up a taskforce to develop a regional framework for a better intelligence sharing to detect the networks earlier. This taskforce includes two different groups. The first one should be the working group to develop a mechanism for regional financial intelligence analyst exchanges in ASEAN countries. The second group should be able to find the ways to capitalise on the data, intelligence, technology and

expertise that government and industry can share on terrorism financing (The Sydney Communique, 2015).

The second Counterterrorism Financing Summit was held a year later, in 2016, in Bali and was attended this time with representatives from 26 countries and members of the United Nations. The main outcome of the meeting was agreement on activities of the Financial Intelligence Consultative Group (FICG) which should analyse the cross-border cash movements in the region to underpin the development of strategies for stronger monitoring and disruption at critical border points. The second important outcome was the establishing of the Community Outreach Consultative Group, which should be in charge of developing a funding model to deliver regular and ongoing community engagement and education on terrorist financing risks (Australian Government, 2017).

4.4 Indonesia and the United States

The United States are the last partner that will be introduced in this thesis. Both countries have close relationship and cooperate in many fields, not only in terrorism. The US is greatly contributing to improving the education in Indonesia and also guides Indonesia in the counterterrorism, because the US also aims at keeping Asia-Pacific in peace.

4.4.1 Bilateral Agreements

In 2009, first year in the office, the US president Barack Obama announced the reorientation of US foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific and strengthening old alliances with the Asian countries. A year later, in 2010, Obama together with president Yudhoyono launched the US – Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership to bolster the mutual relations and advance US interests in the region. The new relationship should focus more on following pillars: political and security; economic and development; and socio-cultural, education, science, and technological cooperation (Almond, 2016). It includes

also a Security Working Group, that aims at modernization of Indonesia's defence system and its role in the regional security. These efforts include the transfer of Excess Defence Article (EDA) F-16s, initiation of Foreign Military Sales (FMS) cases for Maverick missiles and other equipment to meet Indonesian defence requirements. Indonesia also agreed to purchase Apache helicopters worth \$720 million. In the same time, the United States and Indonesia initiated a Defence Planning Dialogue to strengthen bilateral defence cooperation, exchange best practices for organizing and managing the defence sector, and support Indonesian-led reform efforts. Additionally, the United States was also able to join the East Asia Summit thanks to a strong support from Indonesia and ASEAN (Almond, 2016).

During Obama's second term, the deepening of Indonesia's and US' relations continued. When president Widodo visited Washington in 2015, both countries upgraded the relationship to a Strategic Partnership that strengthened ties even more in maritime cooperation and security, counterterrorism and countering violent extremism, but also in areas such as environmental protection or the economic growth. The partnership particularly focused on and included also collaboration in far-reaching areas like the co-development and co-production of defence equipment (Parameswaran, 2015). To channel all these efforts, the countries started consultations through an annual Ministerial Strategic Dialogue (Almond, 2016).

Between 2011 and 2016, the US and Indonesia jointly performed 998 defence and security activities. Military officials of both countries exchanged views on regional and global security issues through the Indonesia-United States Security Dialog (IUSSD) meetings. They focus mainly on Cooperation on Maritime and Peacekeeping Operations, Defence Procurement and Joint Research and Development or Countering Trans-National Threats and improving military professionalization (Mitra, 2018).

Even though Barack Obama is no longer the acting president, but has been replaced by Donald Trump, the strategic logic of a stronger US-Indonesia partnership still seems to be clear. Indonesia wants to have firm ties with major players such as United States to support its rise as a regional power with global interests. On the other hand, Washington needs to engage emerging powers like

Jakarta to face challenges in a more and more multipolar world ranging from terrorism to climate change (Parameswaran, 2017).

4.4.2 Military and Intelligence

Indonesia and the US have been organizing annual military meetings through the Indonesia-United States Security Dialog (IUSSD) since 2002, in which high-ranking military officials of the two countries review their bilateral cooperation, as well as exchange their views on regional and global security issues (Embassy of the Republic of Indonesia, Washington, D.C., n.d.).

In July 1993, after years of unlimited weapons transfers to Indonesia, the US State Department blocked a transfer of US F-5 fighter planes from Jordan to Indonesia for human rights concerns (Berrigan, 2001). US weapons manufacturers see Indonesia as a strong market and were keen on resuming the sales again. The top six US weapons manufacturers had a total business worth \$60 million in contracts for Indonesia in 1999, which actually ended in October, after President Bill Clinton imposed the ban on military transfers. The figure offers a good sense of the stake that US weapons corporations have in “normal” relations with Indonesia. In 1999 before the ban, the United States delivered more than \$8.9 million in weapons, including aircraft and missiles (Berrigan, 2001). In 2000, the US began allowing Indonesia to purchase again, with proper disclosure, some military spare parts for “non-lethal” items. For example, after the tsunami disaster in 2004, the US sold spare parts for Hercules C-130 military transport planes so that Indonesia could deliver humanitarian supplies to Aceh province, where a long separatist insurgency has been ongoing (O’Brien, 2005). In 2010, the United States lifted the ban on military contacts with Kopassus, that used to be involved in the affair with human rights abuses in the 1990s.

Until the Bali bombing in 2002, nothing much has changed in the military cooperation. However, with the help of Australia and the United States, Indonesia undertook a highly controversial path towards ending the violence. Turning the terrorists greatest tool against them – *fear*, through the creation of the Densus 88, that would do whatever it took to hunt down the terrorists (Xialin, n.d.). The unit is equipped with US-made Colt M4 carbines, Armalite AR-10 sniper rifles,

Remington 870 shotguns, and Austrian-made Steyr AUG assault rifles. Training is provided by American security services and Australian Special Forces (Zenn, 2011). Densus 88 seems to be a symbol of improved security cooperation with Western nations. On the other hand, the functioning of the Densus 88 brings also a lot of controversies regarding not only human rights abuse. There have been reports of US intelligence officers helping tap cell phones and reading SMS messages of Indonesian civilians (Davies and Rondonuwu, 2010).

Indonesian Navy's Frogmen's Force (Paska TNI-AL) and the US Navy Seal carried out a joint military exercise in 2009 in order to boost skills to prevent terrorism particularly at sea. The exercise took 24-day in western parts of Indonesia and was participated by one platoon (40 to 50 personnel) from both countries. The main goal was to sharpen and increase professional skills, which should be useful in tackling the danger of terrorism (Du, 2009).

In 2013, the United States promised that the country will keep providing technical assistance and support to Indonesia's military reform and its professionalization. Other priorities included a focus on maritime security and assistance programs to support the Indonesian National Police – a significant contributor to security forces and the primary implementer of counterterrorism strategies and programs in Indonesia. Indonesia provides the greatest number of troops to peacekeeping missions worldwide and is also building a training centre for peacekeepers that the US government strongly supports.

Between May and July 2017, the Indonesian Marine Corps (KORMAR) of the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) and the US Marine Corps in the Pacific (Marine Forces Pacific or MARFORPAC) held a training session at Baluran Marine Corps Combat Training Centre in Karangtekok, in East Java (Parameswaran, 2017). Later in September, both countries kicked off the 23rd iteration of a key bilateral naval exercise. CARAT Indonesia, that lasted for a week, was an example of the growing military ties between both countries that are continuing despite some challenges under new presidency of US President Donald Trump (Parameswaran, 2017). Concerning exercises, both countries participated in bilateral engagements – such as the army exercise, Garuda Shield, the air force exercise, Cope West, the

humanitarian assistance and disaster relief-focused Gema Bhakti – as well as multilateral ones such as Cobra Gold and the Rim of the Pacific exercises (RIMPAC). CARAT Indonesia is part of a set of annual bilateral exercises known as the Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (hence the acronym CARAT) that the United States conducts with partner navies from South and Southeast Asia. Indonesia has been part of CARAT since 1995 (Parameswaran, 2017).

In February 2018, the United States and Indonesia held a ceremony to commemorate the completed delivery of F-16 fighter jets to Indonesia. One of the elements of the US-Indonesia defence relationship is military equipment, and the delivery of the F-16 fighter jets might be an example. An initial deal was struck in 2011 under the Obama administration, but it was nonetheless significant because it marked the largest transfer of defence articles in the history of US-Indonesia relations and aimed at boosting Indonesia's efforts to modernize its air force (Parameswaran, 2016).

4.4.3 Finance and Economy

The United States has been Indonesia's long-time trade, security and military partner. Both countries even strengthen their relations after the Bali bombing. President George Bush Jr. promised an economic aid worth more than \$700 million, including money for police training and civilian courses in defence under the E-IMET program (Expanded-International Military Education and Training) after the terrorist attacks in 2002 (Berrigan, 2001) as Indonesia became the crucial centre in the war on terrorism by many policymakers in the Bush administration. George Bush brought IMET back to live after the program has been suspended for concerns about human rights abuses in East Timor (O'Brien, 2005). Indonesia with the largest Muslim population worldwide, combined with fluctuating poverty, political instability, could fuel the growth of any kind of terrorist cells (O'Brien, 2005). As President George Bush undertook his global War on Terror, he also started to fund countries like Indonesia. A joint project between Australia, Indonesia, and the United States invested money through the US Diplomatic Security Service into this new Special Forces detachment (Densus 88). The CIA, FBI and even the US Secret Service worked together with the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and Australian Special Forces to run

recruits through a training program at a secret compound on Megamendung, 50kms out of Jakarta (Xialin, n.d.).

Thanks to the Anti-Terror Assistance program, salaries, weapons, close-combat warfare, forensic sciences and surveillance training were financed by the US government. When the task force was first established in 2003, more than *\$130 million* was allocated for Densus 88's establishment with an operational budget of \$1.3 million in 2004 that would grow to more than \$40 million by 2006. Australia is also a huge backer for the group, allocating \$35 million over five years for the establishment of an anti-terror training centre (Xialin, n.d.).

In 2005, the US Congress provided \$6 million to the Indonesian navy for maritime security. Amnesty International and other rights groups opposed this move, as they argued that Indonesia's armed forces have not acted to end their human-rights abuses (O'Brien, 2005). In 2006, the budget increased to \$40 million. Later in 2008, the US administration requested almost \$41.7 million as foreign aid for Indonesia. Their goal was an effective joint fight of both countries against terrorism, weapon expansion and other trans-national crimes (Mitra, 2018).

In 2013 US has contributed financially to the Peace and Security Centre in Bogor, south of Jakarta. The centre is divided into seven smaller divisions: peacekeeping operations, language training, Indonesian Defense University, military sports training, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief training, counterterrorism training and peacekeeping mission standby forces. The US sponsored also a 300-bed barracks and Washington is also buying \$2.2 million of heavy construction equipment that will be used for training. The US delivered about \$400,000 worth of training supplies, computer simulation equipment, driving simulators and English-language instructional materials (Olson, 2013).

USAID, the international development agency, is also present in Indonesia. Its economic growth program is helping accelerate Indonesia's economic recovery and strengthen the capacity of key institutions and policy-makers and create a market-oriented legal and regulatory environment that also reflects new counterterrorism priorities.

4.5 Summary

Transnational and non-state threats are major concerns in Southeast Asia. Increasingly, national security strategies have begun to recognise that nations cannot assure their own security without also developing their regional and international security. The national as well as international cooperation is required to respond to these risks. Unilateral and isolated responses, as they are incomplete and partial, are not effective against challenges requiring a multidisciplinary approach and joint action. Only this perspective encompasses all the aspects which are potentially or actually affected. The most important thing in making the counterterrorism policies efficient is to find out and identify the groups or individuals who are threatening the nation, so the government will be able to adopt strategies that would weaken the terrorists. That is why Indonesia itself is still working on improving its counterterrorism policies and trying to bolster its international counterterrorism policies with ASEAN, Australia and the United States. ASEAN is Indonesia's important regional partner whose goal is also peace in the Asia-Pacific. Australia became more involved in the fight with terrorism after the bombing in Kuta, Bali in 2002 and is a significant contributor not only for Indonesia's military, but also in the field of prevention. The cooperation with United States was chosen, because the US has also quite long experience with terror fighting and is also keen in maintaining peace in the region. The international and regional cooperation is crucial but must be combined with the traditional means such as military and also look at the root causes and prevention. Even though the country is making efforts and improving its policies, there are still many gaps and shortages. What Indonesia could do better, will be therefore introduced in the following chapter.

5 Indonesia's New Efforts to Counterterrorism

During autumn 2017, the US president Donald Trump announced that “*the end of the Isis caliphate is in sight*” (Wilts, 2017). Even though some cities were captured back from the Islamic State, the war with ISIS is not over yet. Terrorism is not a new thing, it has been here for years and will probably not go away in the near future. In addition to ISIS, Al Qaeda and other extremist groups are still active and some of them even more powerful. ISIS itself sent many of its members and supporters to other countries to continue with the terrorist attacks (Mikoláš, 2017). Furthermore, terrorism threats are much more diverse now and seem to be less centrally organised. Additionally, tools used by terrorists have become more sophisticated.

As noted above, Indonesia is facing not only the threats of ISIS, but also other terrorist organizations. In the previous chapter, the policies and counterterrorism strategies of Indonesia have been discussed. In the following text I will try to point out the weaknesses and suggest some changes that the Indonesian government might focus on in order to eliminate the terrorist threats.

5.1 System of imprisonment and Criminal Code

In May 2017, about 200 prisoners destroyed the gate and broke out of the jail in Sumatra (Reuters, 2017). In June 2017, four prisoners escaped from the Kerobokan prison in Bali thanks to a tunnel that they have dug previously (Cochrane, 2017). In May 2018, a riot broke out at the Mako Brimob (National Police's Mobile Brigade) in Depok, close to Jakarta. The prisoners including terrorist convicts, pro-ISIS Indonesians and other criminals stole weapons from a killed officer and from a storage room. According to police, 5 members of the Brimob and one detainee have been killed (The Jakarta Post, 2018). These most recent examples point out at the dysfunction of prisons all over Indonesia.

The prison's system in the country is facing many issues. Most of the jails are overcrowded and are missing guards. The official capacity of Indonesian prisons is about 130 000 prisoners, in reality there are more than 228 000 prisoners. One of the prisons in Riau, Sumatra, was 500 percent over-capacity in May 2017 (Renaldi, 2017). One guard should be in charge of 20 inmates, but in

these conditions, one person is in charge of about 65 prisoners (Cochrane, 2017). As the jails' staff is also underpaid, it is very easy to corrupt them so they provide the captives with whatever they pay for – drugs, prostitutes or even outings out of prisons. Some of them have also been accused of helping the prisoners escape. A second major issue is the incompetence of prison guards (Cochrane, 2017). No training is provided for them and most of them don't have experience when using weapons.

However, the main problem with full prisons is the Law No. 35/2009 ("Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 35 About Narcotics", 2009), that Indonesia introduced in 2009. The rule, that all people using drugs and narcotics will serve a three-year sentence in prisons, entered into force. Nowadays, about half of the Indonesian inmates are all drug offenders and many others are serving in prisons their long sentences for nonviolent crimes such as illegal harvesting, gambling or pickpocketing (Cochrane, 2017). The government should change its strategy and rules and instead of building new and new prisons, they should try to revise the criminal code and law sentences. Some alternative punishments should be included, for example to make inmates do some social work, to relieve the overcrowded prisons (Asian Correspondent, 2017). The government should instruct the judges, courts and police to sentence less people in prisons if they really haven't committed serious crimes and find some alternatives for them instead. Similarly, the country's Criminal Code from 1981 is an out-dated document that need a revision either as every single harmless violation of law in the country necessarily implies a jail sentence (Renaldi, 2017).

The overcriminalization and full prisons are even more dangerous nowadays as it might make it even easier and faster to spread the idea of jihadism among the prisoners. The prisoners that have not committed serious crimes might become weaker in the prisons and easier to be influenced by the benefits of jihad. Some of the ISIS members have been recruited in Indonesia's prisons. Indonesian prisoners are released when their sentences are over, regardless of whether they have been deradicalised or not. Some of the prisoners become even more radical as it is easy in crowded jails to meet and learn new things from each other (Beech, 2016). After being released, it is hard to

monitor all of them and make sure they will not commit crimes or, in worse scenarios, terrorist attacks again.

5.1.1 Prevention and the Soft Approach

Despite the impressive military achievements of ISIS and the bravery of its fighters, the organization suffers from structural weaknesses: the absence of a positive governance plan and a lack of ideas. In addition to ideological and moralizing rhetoric, Sunni communities in Iraq and Syria have no action program or clear government vision (Hlídací Pes, 2017).

ISIS, along with other Salafist jihadists, proclaims the Quran as the basic document and the only source of law, which everyone regards as their constitution. In such a narrow and strict interpretation of the sacred text, ISIS ideologists somehow overlook the fact that the Quran is a two-edged sword. On the one hand, they take it as a weapon against all their enemies, but this weapon may break their neck if they fail to build the utopian Islamic state that the group is so promiscuously promising. Due to desperate living conditions and the loss of personal freedoms, the general dissatisfaction of people is rising. ISIS offers no positive program, just an unclear future (Hlídací Pes, 2017). This kind of excessive attitude and cruelty of ISIS may discourage the ordinary Muslims to follow the jihadist project.

ISIS is more than any other Salafist-jihadist organization of the youth movement. Experts believe that the group's attractiveness among youngsters is due to its military successes and its victory in the battlefield. In other words, all the glory of ISIS is related to warfare, not to the building of opportunities or hopes for a better future, regardless of the institutions it has established, or its claims that it will build an Islamic state. ISIS seems to be just a big hype without real ideas about how to revive the collapsed economy or education system and give people hopes for a better future (Hlídací Pes, 2017).

Terrorism has no borders and is affecting almost all societies worldwide. The young people are the most vulnerable and therefore they often become the targets of jihadist recruiters and their victims as they are searching for their identities and meaning of their life and are not resilient enough to violent and

extremist ideas. All the countries, not only Indonesia, should pay attention and focus on how to prevent terrorism and put emphasis not only on the hard approach, but also the soft one – prevention and education. Even president Joko Widodo clearly stated in March 2018, that hard measures are not the only solution but preventive capacity must be included as well (Tempo. Co, 2018). In contrast to the hard approach, the main goal of the soft approach should be attacking the extremist ideology itself – undermine the foundations of terrorism, stop spreading the jihadist and violent ideas through mental power and prevent vulnerable citizens to become radicalised (Scribbles from the Ivory Tower, n.d.).

Focus should be paid on schools as school is especially for young kids one of the most important places outside their own home and their families. They learn a lot of new things there as well as meet with other members of the society and have to communicate and exchange ideas together. The education should be of good quality so it becomes more difficult for jihadist or other extremist ideologies and thoughts to spread. In any cases, the government should make sure that schools are not becoming breeding grounds for any kind of extremism – instruct and train the teachers as well as make sure that the teaching material can build students' resilience to extremism. All students should learn critical thinking, how to coexist peacefully, how to be tolerant and respect human rights and diversity. This is particularly important in Indonesia with many different ethnics and people with different religions and traditions. (UNESCO, 2017).

The soft approach does not include only schools, religious or nonreligious, but also religious leaders and organisations. People often contact the religious leaders for counselling so they should be prepared and trained for it. They are the ones with religious credibility who help to create the climate of trust and respect within a society and are in charge of providing support to people (UNESCO, 2017). Their reactions, opinions and beliefs should encourage people to overcome all kind of prejudices and thus ensure that radical organisations will not be able to entice people to join because they don't share same thoughts and objectives.

The religious organisations in Indonesia such as Nahdlatul Ulama, The Wahid Institute, Muhammadiyah or LibForAll ("Liberty for All") Foundation

should also get more of the general support as they are trying to help interpret Quran, explain how the Muslim world should look like, boost mutual cooperation and respect with others – whether Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Jewish, Muslim or atheist (LibForAll Foundation, n.d.) and promote anti-radical ideas and open discussions. These and other moderate religious institutions denounced the Islamic State and its activities and stressed that they will keep spreading the tolerant Islam and cooperate to fight radicalism and terrorism that have nothing to do with the religion of Islam (Varagur, 2015).

5.1.2 Administration and Bureaucracy

One of the issues in Indonesia is also the one of bureaucracy and legal processes that might take very long time to pass. Or, in other words, the rhetoric of counterterrorism or the politicians' speeches come easily, but the reality and their actions then come hard and seem impossible to happen. Sometimes it even seems that the stronger and more the leaders speak about counterterrorism, the weaker then are the activities and steps taken. It is not problem only in Indonesia, but all around the world – governments always lagged in action, not in rhetoric. After every terrorist attack, governments and country representative are calling for fight with terrorism, but once the situation calms down a bit and new problems appear, everything become forgotten again.

The fight with terrorism is both a series of institutional practices and a set of political discourses that should make the fight look reasonable and make people feel safe and countries stable (Jackson, 2015). On the national, but also international level, it is easier to call for cooperation than really try to achieve it. From the Indonesian case, we can see that Indonesia is trying to cooperate with countries and organisations not only in the Asian region and there are many laws, regulations and agreements being issued quite often. But what people can not see are the real results.

This is also the case of Indonesia, which is a big country, with many wide-spread islands, with people from different minorities and facing many challenges on a daily basis - infrastructure, unemployment, healthcare, education or ordinary crimes, not necessarily terrorism. During the New Order Era under president Suharto, the Indonesian civil service used to be a stable working and organized

system. Today, Indonesians are dealing with a system that is perceived as very slow, ineffective, corrupt, and backward (Stamboel, 2014). For quite a while already, the government is discussing a reform of the whole system to make it clean, open, efficient, and able to deal more accurately with other issues.

For example, implementing new policies or even passing and agreeing the new laws take very long time in Indonesia. The government has been long time discussing new anti-terrorism bill that would give more power to the security forces when arresting the terrorist. Because the house of representatives could not reach an agreement regarding the law, President Widodo announced that he would issue a regulation in lieu of law (Perppu) if they fail to pass it by June 2018 (Jakarta Globe, 2018). It shows enough about the president's patience and the urgent need to change the situation. However, they should first reform the administration processes and in order to deal effectively with the terrorism issue.

Indonesia has a separation of power into three branches - judiciary, executive and legislature, but like in many other countries worldwide there is also a debate over matters of influence and power and relationship between these three branches that are not very well defined and thus this imbalance is also one of the factors that contribute to the slow administration in the country (Indonesia Investment, n.d.). Moreover, all these three branches are corrupted. The decentralisation in Indonesia that began in 2001 brought benefits as well as disadvantages like the new opportunities for corruption, because more power and resources have been given to the regions. Many regional leaders have been jailed for corruption since this time. Especially the Indonesian parliament is well known for its speakers being arrested for corruption. Similarly, the corrupted judiciary is a serious issue as it endangers the credibility of the courts (Indonesia Investment, n.d.). According to the Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index 2017 is Indonesia on the 96th place together with Peru, Colombia, Zambia or Thailand (Transparency International, 2018). In the first years of president Jokowi being in the office, the Indonesian parliament tried to weaken the country's anti-corruption agency (KPK), Transparency International, the global anti-corruption movement and Transparency International Indonesia. In particular, they tried to ban the agencies to conduct wiretappings, which is the key tool of the

agency's success in prosecuting cases (Transparency International, 2017).

President Widodo started to implement many new reforms, most of them are still in progress. 2018 is being Jokowi's last year in the office. In 2019 he might be re-elected, but if not, his successor might propose new reforms again which might have placed Indonesia back to the beginning.

5.2 Economy and Finance

Terrorist attacks have always had huge impact on the economy of the affected country. Of course, the human cost is devastating and irreversible, but the economy of the country suffers as well. The most immediate impact of a terrorist attack on the economy of a country is the destruction of buildings, cars or infrastructure. Terrorist attacks might have greater impact on less advanced or developing countries as it is more complicated for them to relocate the economic activities from a risky area to a safer sector. It negatively influences the foreign investment as the investors may turn to other, safer, countries. The outflow of the foreign investment is an issue for, in particular, smaller countries, because greater economies get investment from many countries and are thus able to recover faster.

Furthermore, two sectors involved in the economy of a country are highly sensitive to terrorist attacks – insurance and tourism. The attacks that happened in the holiday island of Bali can be the best example. The impacts of terrorism were more visible compared to the western countries. Before the attacks in Bali in 2002, tourism accounted for approximately 3 % of Indonesian GDP and Bali island specifically is dependent on tourism which forms about two-thirds of the island's revenues – the tourism industry provides employment for 12 million people and contributed US\$5.7 billion and \$5.4 billion in foreign exchange to the country's economy in 2000 and 2001 (Wulandari, 2002). After the bombings in Kuta, tourists' arrivals drop from an average of 5,000 visitors a day to less than 1,000. Ten days after the bombings, the number of arrivals had dropped by 82% compared to the day of the attacks (Hotel Online, n.d.). Naturally, people started to be more cautious and looked for other destinations, where they would feel safer.

Governments' budget on security are becoming greater with every attack. After every incident, the government have to provide compensation for victims, but also spend more on terrorism prevention and country's security.

During Suharto's era, government provided insufficient funding for the military. Only one-third of the administrative and operational costs had been covered from the defence budget. The rest of military's funds had been provided from other government institutions (Global Security, n.d.).

Indonesia used to be quite a unique case among developing countries, because only relatively low priority had been given to defence spending. In 2009 the military budget accounted for US\$3.3 billion, about the same military budget and force level as Thailand, a country with less than one-third of Indonesia's population, and Burma, which has only one-quarter of Indonesia's population (Global Security, n.d.).

The situation with Indonesian economy had improved after the financial crisis that hit Asia in the late 1990s. Indonesian GDP per capita has steadily risen, from \$857 in the year 2000 to \$3,603 in 2016. Today, Indonesia is the world's 10th largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity and a member of G20. The country was either successful in cutting poverty to more than half since 1999, to 10.9% in 2016.

The new Widodo's government in 2014 admitted that needs to increase the funding of military and defence forces – almost triple the current budget by 2019 - to bring on par with neighbouring countries. The plan was to increase the national defence budget to 1.5 % of GDP between 2014 and 2019, which means around \$20 billion per annum. By 2020, Indonesia's defence spending is expected to reach US\$25 billion. In 2014, the country has allocated Rp 83 trillion (\$6.6 billion), which represents 0.8 percent of the total state budget.

The military in Indonesia is still viewed by Indonesian society as less corrupt than other sectors of the government. Nonetheless, the low salaries of military staff are still being an issue (Global Security, n.d.). After the Mako Brimob riot in 2018, the country leaders had to re-evaluate the ability of police personnel in detention centres as well as activities of other security forces after the

attacks in Surabaya in 2018. Military expenditure in Indonesia increased to US\$ 7910.80 Million in 2017, compared to US\$ 7385.40 in 2016. Military Expenditure in Indonesia averaged US\$ 3341.14 from 1974 until 2017 (Trading Economics, n.d.). The police itself then received Rp 95 trillion (US\$6.75 billion) in 2018, up from Rp 78 trillion in 2017. However, the security forces will need to increase its abilities not only for the fight with terrorism, but also the 2019 general and presidential elections (Ramadhani, 2018).

It is crucial to work on the prevention in order to avoid spending less on the aftermath of possible attacks. The problem in Indonesia is that the money or budget that was appointed for the fight of terrorism, just a small part of it is spared on the real action and goes to the police, military or the Densus 88. Most of the money is used for all the administrative processes or human resources, which are of course important, but don't save citizen's lives. The salary of the security employees should also rise in order to motivate the staff enough to be committed to their mission and perform their work on 100 % as working in the security field is one of the most important and most demanding jobs.

5.3 Military, Defence, Intelligence

In May 2018, after the devastating attacks in Surabaya, President Widodo acknowledged to reinstate the suspended military's Joint Special Operations Command (including Indonesian Military's three armed forces: the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus), the Navy's Denjaka specialized squad and the Air Force's Bravo 90 unit) to help the National Police solving the terrorism issue in certain cases, when Police would not be able to deal with the terrorists by itself (Sapiie, 2018). It was a long awaited move from President Widodo, as he never came up with his own counterterrorism strategy. He should offer a clear plan how to deal with terrorism in order to ensure people that their security will be taken care of. Similar attitude has been expressed also by the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces Hadi Tjahjanto who asked for greater power for the TNI in the fight with terrorism.

The TNI is still being considered as the strongest institution in the country. People trusted the military as it was exactly the Indonesian military unit who won the war of independence against Dutch long time ago. However, recently there

have been some doubts arising regarding the functioning of the Indonesian military. The reason of their doubts are the economic activities and funding of the military. The military's involvement in economic activities date back to the 1945-1949 Indonesian war for independence from the Netherlands. At that time, Indonesian military was responsible for raising its own funds, because the official state budget allocations to the military were very low. They used to rely on popular backing and material support, but in some areas military units turned to illegal activities such as smuggling in order to finance their operations (Human Rights Watch, 2006). The military involvement in the economy is a harmful practice that undermines not only the civilian control over the armed forces, but also causes the human rights abuses. The military's economic involvement contributes to crime, corruption and thus weakens the economy and distorts the function of the military itself (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Human Rights Watch has proofs of TNI being involved in timber and coal businesses in which the military had a stake. For instance, a coal company in Kalimantan sub-contracted part of its business to a military-run cooperative in order to limit the illegal mining. But the military cooperative organized the illegal miners, exploited workers, brokered sales of the illegally mined coal and increased their profits by demanding protection payments from miners, whom they also subjected to beatings and intimidation (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Also, sometimes the major obstacle in reforming the military financing is the military leadership that has benefits from the military's economic activities. Nevertheless, not only the economic activities are the reason of the human rights abuses. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the Indonesian military is often called on to assist in preserving or restoring public order (Human Rights Watch, 2006).

The Indonesian government should set the parameters for how it will reconstruct these economic activities of the TNI. They should come up with regulations to control and limit the military's business activities as well as provide funding to support it. The government should not lose more time, because until the regulations are adopted to implement the law, they remain in military's hands (Human Rights Watch, 2007). The situation with terrorism in the country is becoming more critical every year, the government should therefore provide quality equipment to the military and police as well as make sure that all the

funding is transparent, training is provided for the military and police personnel, the corruption is eliminated and all the security forces are led by competent and trustworthy leaders.

As regards the international cooperation in the military field, all the sides should role concentrate on important matters that can really change things and not waste time with trivial arguments, like already mentioned interruption of cooperation between Australia and Indonesia. Terrorism became an international issue, that is why countries should foster their cooperation instead of cutting of their relations. It is particularly important in the field of defence and military, where all the sides can learn a lot from techniques, strategies to trainings from each other to eliminate the risks of terrorism together.

5.4 Summary

Terrorists are still trying to conceive new ways how to carry on attacks in different places. Similarly, the governments are trying to catch up and improve their counterterrorism policies. However, there are still a lot of steps to be done. One of the solutions should be faster and more effective bureaucracy as well as focusing on important matters not solely after an attack has been committed. To process new laws or regulations take way too much time in Indonesia. Even president Jokowi pointed at this fact after the attacks in Surabaya in 2018. Similar problem regards the financial side of counterterrorism. The money obtained are hardly used for the real “action.” For example, in the military, a great deal of the money goes for these already mentioned bureaucratic processes or HR, but just a smaller part is devoted to improving the military equipment or army’s salaries. This is thus quite demotivating for the security workers – no matter if in the prisons, police or military personnel. They might get easily corrupted, don’t have the right training and are thus reluctant to perform their work at hundred percent. It is critical to concentrate on essential matters and build mutual trust between all countries involved in order to fight against the same enemy together. If Indonesia decides to solve all these issues together at the same time, it might be too much. Indonesia is a huge country and the government should make sure that their counterterrorism policies are not discriminating anyone and can protect all their citizens no matter where they are from or what religion they profess.

6 Conclusion

6.1 Contribution and Weaknesses

The contribution of this thesis is important because it should be a clear analysis of current issues in Indonesia's counterterrorism strategies which is one of the most serious issues of foreign policies worldwide. It is beneficial not only to Indonesia but might be also an introduction for people that are not working in the Security field or the area of Social Sciences and help them to understand the current situation. This thesis should also lay down foundation that might serve other scholars and their future researches. New approaches to the issue not only help us to understand it better but might also allow us to find new ways how to deal with it.

Unfortunately, I do not have enough time to travel to Indonesia again when writing this thesis to conduct interviews and talk to Indonesian officials or people conducting research about Indonesian terrorism and counterterrorism policies. That is why the perspective of Indonesians and their opinions regarding the issue cannot be presented in this thesis.

6.2 Conclusion

Terrorism, a form of violence that is used to achieve desired goals, has recently become part of our daily lives. TVs and newspapers worldwide are bringing information about terrorism almost every day. Indonesia itself has been also dealing with the issue of terrorism for many years. It is not a new thing for the country, however the Indonesian counterterrorism policies are not yet effective enough to eliminate the risks of terrorist attacks in the country. To contribute to this issue and raise awareness of the fact that not only Western world is facing the threats of terrorism, this thesis focused on current Indonesia's counterterrorism strategies and its weaknesses.

The fundamental weakness of the counterterrorism policies in the Indonesian case, is the lack of a single comprehensive national strategy. It is quite difficult to find clear information about how the country deals with terrorism,

because such a strategy is still non-existent. Adoption and implementation of any kind of law in Indonesia take very long time. Only the fact, that the government could not agree on a simple definition of terrorism delayed all the next steps that should have been taken in order to fight with the terrorism in reality, not only on a paper.

This thesis is offering a framework with following dimensions – Law and Regulations, Economic dimension, Military and Intelligence, Social Communication and Bilateral Agreements - that are crucial for the fight with terrorism. First of all, the national counterterrorism strategies are described under this framework and are followed by overview of Indonesia's international cooperation with ASEAN, Australia and the US in the counterterrorism field. The development of globalization affects the security environment of both states and regions on a global scale. The process of globalization itself is irreversible and it is a matter of political representation and of the citizens themselves whether the nature of the processes of globalization is interpreted as a threat or a challenge. Regional policy issues go far beyond the traditionally understood geopolitics. Terrorism has no borders; therefore, the international cooperation and coordination of national policies has become a necessary requirement for coping with the consequences of globalization in the world. Because terrorism in this thesis is regarded as a transnational issue and the mobility of terrorists, not only in the region, is well known, the cooperation of Indonesia and ASEAN, Australia and the United States is necessary.

The United States has long experience with counterterrorism. Australia is culturally similar to the States but as it shares the position close to Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries, Australia might be more aware and better informed about all the events in the region. If Indonesia take advantage of these relationships, will work on detailed exchange of information and intelligence services, their counterterrorism measures might improve and the country can become stronger and more self-sufficient in the future.

However, not only due to historical context, different policies and level of developments, but also mistrust among the countries, it seems to be quite difficult to find a common and effective solution in the security field worldwide. Last part of this thesis is reviewing the weaknesses and offering suggestions of what could

have been done better to make the policies more effective. This is why this thesis especially merits attention among all the other literature that has been written about terrorism and Indonesia. It describes the contemporary situation and it is not focusing solely on one single issue or attack that happened but provides an overview of current strategies.

The cooperation in the counterterrorism field is still a sensitive topic. If Indonesia decides to fight terrorism more effectively and not keep failing the country's potential effectiveness, the government should concentrate on every single problem one by one to solve it in order to come up with a clear counterterrorism strategy.

One of the key points in how to fight terrorism efficiently might be the fact that the government needs to win the hearts and minds of its citizens. The people should feel protected and trust their government. If the governance will be good, people will be quite satisfied and will not have any reasons to support terrorists. To make people happy will be a long way that needs lots of efforts from the government side. However, to accomplish this, the government needs to support its police and military that are in charge of maintaining peace and defeating perpetrators as well as combine it with stable social and economic situation. The social communication and education are important factors. From the news or governments' statements it sees that the fight against terrorism concerns just the present time and the very near future. However, the political leaders should think more ahead. The young generation nowadays is the one that the terrorists are focusing on and that will need to keep fighting against terrorism in the future.

Of course, Indonesian police and military play crucial role in the antiterror fighting. Their relationship is still rather competitive. Moreover, both were blamed in the past for being too violent and corrupted. The government should take measures and make their functioning, tasks and engagement in counterterrorism clearer.

Counterterrorism needs to be tackled in a comprehensive way. Both classical police methods and the whole range of legislative, social, foreign policies or military forces are being deployed. However, as we know from the past, once a terrorist group is defeated, it unfortunately doesn't prevent emergence of a new

one. The fight with terrorism is a long-term process, not only in Indonesia and the efficient counterterrorism policies should take into considerations many aspects. It should not ignore the geographic conditions, different ethnics living in Indonesia with different customs and religions as well as the educational and economic disparities among Indonesian people.

Future studies about terrorism in Indonesia could focus on the issue that is becoming more and more serious, but unfortunately, there is not enough space in this thesis to concentrate on it. The issue is the comeback of the Indonesian nationals from Iraq and Syria. One of the core questions that is arising is – Why did they decide to leave and fight for the jihadists? What made them leave? These questions might be crucial and might help understand the government what should have been done better in order to stop them leaving. Furthermore, the government could also consider how to reintegrate these people back to Indonesian society better.

Terrorism or other causes of political or religious violence are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. We can only hope that one day it will be defeated or at least limited to a level that people will consider as more "acceptable."

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
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Annex 1: Overview of terrorist attacks since Bali bombing 2002

2002

12. 10. 2002, Kuta, Bali: Explosions in two nightclubs in the touristy area in Kuta Bali killed more than two hundred people. The perpetrators were members of the radical group Jemaah Islamiyah. The testimony from the captured terrorists revealed that the targets were selected just two days prior to the attack and aimed at Western tourists. The Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden claimed that the attacks were conducted in retaliation for the US War on Terror and Australia's involvement in securing East Timor's independence from Indonesia in 1999 (Chalk, 2013).

5.12.2002, Makassar, Sulawesi: One bomb exploded in the McDonald's fast food restaurant and another one in the restaurant Warung Cotto Bagadang. 3 people were killed (Liputan6, 2002).

2003

3.2. 2003, Jakarta, Java: A bomb was installed in the lobby of Wisma Bhayangkari, Police Headquarters and discovered before it exploded, no casualties were reported (Politik Indonesia, 2003).

27.4.2003, Jakarta, Java: A bomb exploded at the Soekarno-Hatta International Airport in Jakarta. 10 people got seriously injured (Liputan6, 2013).

5.8.2003, Jakarta, Java: At least 11 people were killed and approximately 150 wounded when a vehicle borne improvised explosive device detonated outside the entrance of the Marriott Hotel, popular with foreign nationals, government officials, and the international business community. The attack took place during lunch and was designed to inflict maximum casualties. Experts noted that this attack occurred at the same time as three highly controversial trials were proceeding. This led to speculations that it might have provided motivation for the bombing. The first involved proceedings against Major General Adam Damiri,

sentenced for having failed to stop violence to East Timor's vote for independence from Indonesia in 1999. The second had to do with the Bali bombing 2002. The court was just two days from announcing the verdict against the chief suspect accused in the attack—Amrozi bin Haji Nurhasyim, a member of Jemaah Islamiyah. He was later sentenced to death for his role in the 2002 incident. The third involved the case of Abu Bakar Bashir, a Muslim cleric and spiritual head of JI, who was convicted of plotting to overthrow the government and providing directions for explosions that destroyed several churches in December 2000 (Chalk, 2013).

31.12.2003, Aceh, North Sumatra: At least 10 people, including two children, were killed and 40 others wounded when a powerful bomb exploded during a concert at a crowded nightmarket in Peureulak, East Aceh. Indonesia's military announced that the region's separatist rebels (Free Aceh Movement) were in charge of the bombing. However, the local rebel commander Ishak Daud denied that GAM was behind the attack (The Jakarta Post, 2004).

2004

10.1.2004, Palopo, Sulawesi: A homemade bomb blast killed four people in Sampoddo Indah Cafe in Palopo City (Liputan6, 2004). Officials expressed surprise at the blast, saying that the Palopo area was peaceful as the south of Sulawesi has generally escaped religious violence, which is common in central areas with a high Christian population (BBC, 2004).

9.9.2004, Jakarta, Java: A bomb hidden in a minivan detonated in front of the Australian embassy in Jakarta. The attack took place at approximately 10:30 am and killed 9, wounding another 161. The diplomatic mission was badly damaged, as were surrounding buildings in the Kunigan business district. Jemaah Islamiyah claimed responsibility for the bombing and Al Qaeda had financed the operation through an intermediary based in Malaysia.

The actual perpetrator was an Islamist militant Heri Golun. Oddly enough, even though the weapon of choice was a truck bomb, he did not know how to drive. He

was assisted in guiding the vehicle through the rush hour by an accomplice before he was allowed to take over. If true, this could explain why the van did not crash through the gates of the embassy in the more dramatic fashion but detonated in the street in front of the embassy (Chalk, 2013).

13.11.2004, Poso, Sulawesi: A bomb blew up on a minibus on its daily trip between Poso and Tentenna when the bus stopped near a crowded market in Poso, just 50 meters from the city's main police station, killing six Protestants and injuring three from the predominantly Christian village of Sape (Asia News, 2014).

12.12.2004, Palu, Sulawesi: Bombs again shook the city of Palu. The bomb exploded at around 7:15 pm at Immanuel Church, when church members worshiped on Sunday. No casualties were reported (Liputan6, 2004).

2005

21.3.2005, Ambon Island, Moluccas: A bomb exploded in the Ongkoliong region at 9:30 pm. The blast wounded 3 residents who were sitting and relaxing about 10 meters from the place of the explosion (Detik News, 2005).

28.5.2005, Tentena, Sulawesi: Attackers detonated an improvised explosive device in a crowded market in a predominantly Christian town and detonate another IED nearby 15 minutes later, killing 19 civilians and injuring at least 57. No group claimed responsibility (Combs and Slann, 2002).

8.6.2005: Pamulang, Java: A low explosive bomb exploded at the yard of the Council of Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly. No casualties reported (Narendra, 2015).

1.10.2005, Kuta, Bali: Suicide bombers in Kuta and Jimbaran Bay in Bali simultaneously detonated three improvised explosive devices at three restaurants, killing at least 26 civilians and wounding 129 others. Although it does not claim

responsibility, the Jemaah Islamiya Organization is believed to have carried out the attacks. Further investigations revealed that the masterminds behind the attacks were two leading Malaysian members of JI, both men had been directly tied to several prior incidents, including the Bali bombing in 2002 (Chalk, 2013).

31.12.2005, Palu, Sulawesi: An improvised explosive device detonated within a butcher's market in Palu. The bomb exploded in the busy morning hours at a stall selling pork and dog meat (both forbidden under Islamic custom) in a largely Christian part of the town. Killing eight people and wounding a further 50 (BBC, 2005).

2009

17.7.2009, Jakarta, Java: A suicide terrorist bombed the J. W. Marriott Hotel in Jakarta just before a similar explosion hit the Jakarta's Ritz Carlton. The simultaneous strikes killed 9 and injured 53 people. The target of the Marriott attack was a breakfast meeting for business executives associated with the Indonesia Country Program. American James Castle, the head of a prominent Indonesian consulting firm, CastleAsia, was hosting the event. A message from Mohammed Noordin Top, a onetime commander in Jemaah Islamiyah, claimed credit for the attack. The statement said the meeting had been targeted because its participants represented companies that exploited Indonesia's resources. It further asserted that the bombing had been undertaken to commemorate the November 2005 death of Azahari bin Husin, a JI's former master bomb maker (Chalk, 2013).

2010

January 2010, Aceh, North Sumatra: Civilians shooting (Narendra, 2015).

2011

15.3.2011, Jakarta, Java: A package of explosive devices hidden in a book was delivered to Ulil Abhsar Abdalla, a Liberal Islam Network activist in Komunitas Utan Kayu complex in Jakarta. The suspected package was discovered before the bomb exploded and caused any casualties (Kompas, 2011).

15.4.2011, Ciberon, Java: A suicide bomber detonated an improvised explosive device inside a mosque in a police compound in Cirebon, killing the bomber and injuring 26 people. The attack is the first successful attack on a mosque in Indonesia and could serve to ignite existing religious tensions. However, it is not clear if sparking religious violence was the motive behind the attack, or if the mosque was simply a soft target with a concentration of officers (Stratfor Worldview, 2011).

22.4.2011, Serpong, Java: A bomb of 100 kilograms was discovered on the gas pipeline, but successfully thwarted by police before blowing up. According to the military officers, the bomb was intended to explode in the Christ Cathedral Church and was related to other bombing incidents in Indonesia in the previous days (Kompas, 2011).

25.9.2011, Solo, Java: A suicide bomb exploded at Bethel Injil Sepenuh Church, killed the perpetrator and injured 14 people when they were leaving after the Sunday service (Kompas, 2011).

2012

March 2012, Bali: Densus 88 killed 5 Muslim radicals who were planning robberies to finance future terror attacks (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

8.4.2012, Puncak Jaya, Papua: A Trigana Air PK-YRF aircraft had to land in emergency at the Airport of Kota Mulia because of a tyre rupture as the plane was shot by a separatist gunman (Movanita, 2017).

17.4.2012, Solo, Java: Two police officers were shot and injured during their guard at the Police Headquarter by two unidentified men on a motorcycle (BBC, 2012).

September 2012, Solo, Java: Densus 88 arrested a group of 11 Muslim radicals and confiscated homemade bombs that are assumed to be used for attacks against the Indonesian police and the parliament building (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

16.10.2012, Poso, Sulawesi: Two policemen who had been previously reported missing, had been killed. Their burnt bodies have been found in a forest near to Poso which has been used several times as a terrorist training site (Maharani, 2012).

27.11.2012, Jayawijaya, Papua: Three policemen at the Prime Police Headquarters were killed when serving their duty by a group of strangers. The attack was allegedly committed by a group that had been hunted by police (BBC, 2012).

2013

May 2013, Java: May 2013 Densus 88 killed seven and arrested 20 suspected terrorists in raids throughout Java. One week earlier a plot to bomb the embassy of Myanmar was uncovered (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

9.6.2013, Poso, Sulawesi: A suicide bomber blew himself up and targeted the policemen in front of the Mapolres Mosque in Poso. The terrorist was killed on the spot and one policeman got slightly injured (BBC, 2013).

2016

14.1.2016, Jakarta, Java: The blasts and gun attacks took place in Jl. MH Thamrin, one of Jakarta's busiest main streets, located not far from government ministries and the State Palace. It left 7 people dead (including all 5 terrorists, all

from Indonesia) and 19 people injured. The perpetrators are believed to be related to the ISIS (Amindoni, Anindita, Sapiie and Wijaya, 2016).

5.7.2016, Solo, Java: A suicide bomber was killed after blowing himself up in the yard of Mapolresta Solo Police office. Brigadier Bambang Adi Cahyanto, a member of Police Headquarter, was the only injured victim as he tried to stop the perpetrator from entering the Police Headquarter's yard (Safitri, 2016).

28.8.2016: Medan, North Sumatra: The mass worship at St. Joseph Church, Medan, North Sumatra, was dispersed when a man ran with a knife to the altar and the priest. Sparks came out of the man's backpack filled with homemade bombs and hurt him. The priest suffered minor injuries (Efendi and Syah, 2016).

13.11.2016, Samarinda, Kalimantan: A Molotov cocktail exploded in front of the Oikumene church, where the congregation had just finished, and injured 4 people. The perpetrators, that were members of the ISIS, escaped and jumped into Mahakam River, but were later arrested by the citizens (Amelia, 2016).

14.11.2016, Singkawang, Kalimantan: Similar incident as on November 13, 2016 happened one day later in a Budi Dharma monastery building that was also targeted by a Molotov cocktail. The floor of the house of worship was damaged by a bomb blast and four children got injured (Putra, 2016).

21.12.2016, Jakarta, Java: Indonesian police raided a Jakarta neighbourhood and killed three suspected ISIS members. The men planned to attack police officers and detonate suicide bombs in crowds during the Christmas holiday. The raid came less than two weeks after police foiled a plot to use a female suicide bomber in an attack against the presidential palace (Counter Extremism, 2017).

2017

27.2.2017, Bandung, Java: A terrorist exploded a pressure cooker bomb in Bandung, West Java. It did not cause any casualties and the bomber was shot by police after he ran into the building where he tried to set fire to a government building (Da Costa and Suroyo, 2017).

March 2017, Jakarta, Java: Densus 88 arrested eight terror suspects in a series of raids around Jakarta. One was shot dead as he resisted arrest. These people were alleged Islamic State supporters who were involved in attacks and the smuggling of firearms (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

24.5.2017, Jakarta, Java: Two suicide bombers killed three police officers and injured 12 other people in an attack on the Kampung Melayu bus terminal in the Indonesian capital city of Jakarta (Rappler, 2017).

25.6.2017, Medan, North Sumatra: Two alleged ISIS extremists stabbed a policeman to death in Medan, North Sumatra (Al Jazeera, 2017).

August 2017, Bandung, Java: Five suspected Islamic militants were arrested in Bandung and bomb making material was confiscated at their houses. They were believed to be preparing attacks on the Presidential Palace in Jakarta and local Police headquarters (Indonesia Investments, n.d.).

2018


10.5.2018, Depok, Java: A policeman has been stabbed to death by a 22-year-old terrorist when he was standing guard in the Police Hospital in Depok, close to Jakarta (The Jakarta Post, 2018).

13.5.2018, Surabaya, Java: On Sunday morning a family of 6 detonated bombs at three different churches in Surabaya. The attack has been the worst in a decade, killing 11 people including the whole family with little kids and wounded 40 more people (Hincks, 2018).

13.5.2018, Surabaya, Java: Another bomb exploded in the evening in the Wonocolo low-cost housing complex, killing two – mother and daughter. The perpetrator – father of the family – was later shot by police (Boediwardhana, 2018).

14.5.2018, Surabaya, Java: Another family on motorbikes drove into Surabaya police station and detonated bombs there. The 8-year-old-daughter of the perpetrators survived the attack as she was flung away (Lloyd, 2018).

16.5.2018, Pekanbaru, Sumatra: A minivan with four terrorists crashed into the gate of Riau Police headquarters. One policeman and the four perpetrators have been killed (Telly, 2018).



Annex 2: Corruption Perception Index 2017

Source: 2018 Transparency International

Country	ISO3	Region	CPI Score 2017	Rank	Standard error	Lower CI	Upper CI	Number of sources
New Zealand	NZL	AP	89	1	2.4	85	93	8
Denmark	DNK	WE/EU	88	2	2.75	83	93	8
Finland	FIN	WE/EU	85	3	2.84	80	90	8
Norway	NOR	WE/EU	85	3	1.83	82	88	8
Switzerland	CHE	WE/EU	85	3	1.71	82	88	7
Singapore	SGP	AP	84	6	2.26	80	88	9
Sweden	SWE	WE/EU	84	6	2.27	80	88	8
Canada	CAN	AME	82	8	1.49	80	84	8
Luxembourg	LUX	WE/EU	82	8	2.08	79	85	6
Netherlands	NLD	WE/EU	82	8	2.23	78	86	8
United Kingdom	GBR	WE/EU	82	8	1.7	79	85	8
Germany	DEU	WE/EU	81	12	1.87	78	84	8
Australia	AUS	AP	77	13	1.4	75	79	9
Hong Kong	HKG	AP	77	13	2.37	73	81	7
Iceland	ISL	WE/EU	77	13	4.38	70	84	7
Austria	AUT	WE/EU	75	16	1.17	73	77	8
Belgium	BEL	WE/EU	75	16	1.63	72	78	8
United States of America	USA	AME	75	16	3.24	70	80	9
Ireland	IRL	WE/EU	74	19	3.68	68	80	7
Japan	JPN	AP	73	20	2.66	69	77	9
Estonia	EST	WE/EU	71	21	2.21	67	75	10
United Arab Emirates	ARE	MENA	71	21	6.26	61	81	7
France	FRA	WE/EU	70	23	1.36	68	72	8
Uruguay	URY	AME	70	23	2.67	66	74	7
Barbados	BRB	AME	68	25	3.24	63	73	3
Bhutan	BTN	AP	67	26	1.83	64	70	5
Chile	CHL	AME	67	26	2.03	64	70	9
Bahamas	BHS	AME	65	28	5.39	56	74	3
Portugal	PRT	WE/EU	63	29	2.56	59	67	8
Qatar	QAT	MENA	63	29	7.5	51	75	7
Taiwan	TWN	AP	63	29	3.28	58	68	8
Brunei Darussalam	BRN	AP	62	32	8.72	48	76	3
Israel	ISR	MENA	62	32	2.19	58	66	7
Botswana	BWA	SSA	61	34	2.74	57	65	7

Slovenia	SVN	WE/EU	61	34	2.78	56	66	10
Poland	POL	WE/EU	60	36	1.36	58	62	10
Seychelles	SYC	SSA	60	36	8.32	46	74	4
Costa Rica	CRI	AME	59	38	2.98	54	64	7
Lithuania	LTU	WE/EU	59	38	2.21	55	63	9
Latvia	LVA	WE/EU	58	40	3.21	53	63	9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	VCT	AME	58	40	3.39	52	64	3
Cyprus	CYP	WE/EU	57	42	3.78	51	63	7
Czech Republic	CZE	WE/EU	57	42	1.98	54	60	10
Dominica	DMA	AME	57	42	2.55	53	61	3
Spain	ESP	WE/EU	57	42	3.78	51	63	8
Georgia	GEO	ECA	56	46	3.1	51	61	6
Malta	MLT	WE/EU	56	46	1.18	54	58	5
Cabo Verde	CPV	SSA	55	48	4.19	48	62	4
Rwanda	RWA	SSA	55	48	6	45	65	6
Saint Lucia	LCA	AME	55	48	4.27	48	62	3
Korea, South	KOR	AP	54	51	2.24	50	58	10
Grenada	GRD	AME	52	52	3	47	57	3
Namibia	NAM	SSA	51	53	3.22	46	56	6
Italy	ITA	WE/EU	50	54	3.72	44	56	8
Mauritius	MUS	SSA	50	54	4.41	43	57	5
Slovakia	SVK	WE/EU	50	54	3.32	45	55	9
Croatia	HRV	WE/EU	49	57	2.64	45	53	10
Saudi Arabia	SAU	MENA	49	57	6.14	39	59	7
Greece	GRC	WE/EU	48	59	2.98	43	53	8
Jordan	JOR	MENA	48	59	2.99	43	53	8
Romania	ROU	WE/EU	48	59	3.12	43	53	10
Cuba	CUB	AME	47	62	2.36	43	51	5
Malaysia	MYS	AP	47	62	2.67	43	51	9
Montenegro	MNE	ECA	46	64	2.45	42	50	5
Sao Tome and Principe	STP	SSA	46	64	5.21	37	55	4
Hungary	HUN	WE/EU	45	66	2.89	40	50	10
Senegal	SEN	SSA	45	66	2.52	41	49	9
Belarus	BLR	ECA	44	68	4.12	37	51	7
Jamaica	JAM	AME	44	68	3.96	37	51	7
Oman	OMN	MENA	44	68	7	33	55	5
Bulgaria	BGR	WE/EU	43	71	2.66	39	47	10
South Africa	ZAF	SSA	43	71	3.98	36	50	8
Vanuatu	VUT	AP	43	71	3.93	37	49	3
Burkina Faso	BFA	SSA	42	74	2.18	38	46	7
Lesotho	LSO	SSA	42	74	4.08	35	49	6

Tunisia	TUN	MENA	42	74	3.73	36	48	7
China	CHN	AP	41	77	1.96	38	44	9
Serbia	SRB	ECA	41	77	2.8	36	46	8
Suriname	SUR	AME	41	77	4.08	34	48	4
Trinidad and Tobago	TTO	AME	41	77	5.47	32	50	6
Ghana	GHA	SSA	40	81	2.56	36	44	9
India	IND	AP	40	81	2.16	36	44	9
Morocco	MAR	MENA	40	81	2.6	36	44	7
Turkey	TUR	ECA	40	81	1.8	37	43	8
Argentina	ARG	AME	39	85	2.92	34	44	8
Benin	BEN	SSA	39	85	4.17	32	46	6
Kosovo	KSV	ECA	39	85	2.13	36	42	5
Kuwait	KWT	MENA	39	85	2.47	35	43	6
Solomon Islands	SLB	AP	39	85	3.71	33	45	3
Swaziland	SWZ	SSA	39	85	5.81	29	49	3
Albania	ALB	ECA	38	91	1.81	35	41	8
Bosnia and Herzegovina	BIH	ECA	38	91	2.56	34	42	7
Guyana	GUY	AME	38	91	1.84	35	41	5
Sri Lanka	LKA	AP	38	91	1.82	35	41	7
Timor-Leste	TLS	AP	38	91	7.5	26	50	3
Brazil	BRA	AME	37	96	4.24	30	44	8
Colombia	COL	AME	37	96	2.77	32	42	8
Indonesia	IDN	AP	37	96	3.12	32	42	9
Panama	PAN	AME	37	96	1.79	34	40	7
Peru	PER	AME	37	96	3.35	32	42	8
Thailand	THA	AP	37	96	2.03	34	40	9
Zambia	ZMB	SSA	37	96	2.46	33	41	9
Bahrain	BHR	MENA	36	103	1.81	33	39	4
Côte D'Ivoire	CIV	SSA	36	103	2.03	33	39	8
Mongolia	MNG	AP	36	103	1.4	34	38	9
Tanzania	TZA	SSA	36	103	1.55	33	39	9
Armenia	ARM	ECA	35	107	3.79	29	41	6
Ethiopia	ETH	SSA	35	107	1.36	33	37	9
Macedonia	MKD	ECA	35	107	4.49	28	42	6
Vietnam	VNM	AP	35	107	2.78	30	40	8
Philippines	PHL	AP	34	111	1.9	31	37	9
Algeria	DZA	MENA	33	112	2.32	29	37	6
Bolivia	BOL	AME	33	112	2.98	28	38	6
El Salvador	SLV	AME	33	112	3.25	28	38	7
Maldives	MDV	AP	33	112	1.71	30	36	3
Niger	NER	SSA	33	112	3.27	28	38	6
Ecuador	ECU	AME	32	117	2.66	28	36	7

Egypt	EGY	MENA	32	117	4.04	25	39	7
Gabon	GAB	SSA	32	117	3.22	27	37	4
Pakistan	PAK	AP	32	117	2.11	29	35	8
Togo	TGO	SSA	32	117	3.29	27	37	6
Azerbaijan	AZE	ECA	31	122	5.64	22	40	7
Djibouti	DJI	SSA	31	122	5.32	22	40	4
Kazakhstan	KAZ	ECA	31	122	3.59	25	37	9
Liberia	LBR	SSA	31	122	3.24	26	36	8
Malawi	MWI	SSA	31	122	1.85	28	34	9
Mali	MLI	SSA	31	122	2.08	28	34	7
Nepal	NPL	AP	31	122	2	28	34	6
Moldova	MDA	ECA	31	122	1.54	28	34	9
Gambia	GMB	SSA	30	130	6.22	20	40	6
Iran	IRN	MENA	30	130	3.51	24	36	7
Myanmar	MMR	AP	30	130	3.91	24	36	7
Sierra Leone	SLE	SSA	30	130	1.95	27	33	9
Ukraine	UKR	ECA	30	130	2.27	26	34	9
Dominican Republic	DOM	AME	29	135	2.56	25	33	7
Honduras	HND	AME	29	135	2.32	25	33	8
Kyrgyzstan	KGZ	ECA	29	135	2.59	25	33	7
Laos	LAO	AP	29	135	5.89	19	39	5
Mexico	MEX	AME	29	135	1.69	26	32	9
Papua New Guinea	PNG	AP	29	135	2.55	25	33	6
Paraguay	PRY	AME	29	135	3.1	24	34	6
Russia	RUS	ECA	29	135	2.5	25	33	9
Bangladesh	BGD	AP	28	143	3.19	23	33	8
Guatemala	GTM	AME	28	143	2.19	24	32	7
Kenya	KEN	SSA	28	143	1.94	25	31	9
Lebanon	LBN	MENA	28	143	2.11	25	31	7
Mauritania	MRT	SSA	28	143	2.41	24	32	6
Comoros	COM	SSA	27	148	8.87	12	42	4
Guinea	GIN	SSA	27	148	2.37	23	31	7
Nigeria	NGA	SSA	27	148	1.97	24	30	9
Nicaragua	NIC	AME	26	151	1.29	24	28	8
Uganda	UGA	SSA	26	151	2.11	23	29	9
Cameroon	CMR	SSA	25	153	2.58	21	29	9
Mozambique	MOZ	SSA	25	153	2.87	20	30	8
Madagascar	MDG	SSA	24	155	2.72	20	28	8
Central African Republic	CAF	SSA	23	156	3.28	18	28	5
Burundi	BDI	SSA	22	157	3.29	17	27	6
Haiti	HTI	AME	22	157	2.05	19	25	6

Uzbekistan	UZB	ECA	22	157	2.11	19	25	7
Zimbabwe	ZWE	SSA	22	157	2.22	18	26	9
Cambodia	KHM	AP	21	161	2.43	17	25	8
Congo	COG	SSA	21	161	1.08	19	23	6
Democratic Republic of the Congo	COD	SSA	21	161	1.96	18	24	8
Tajikistan	TJK	ECA	21	161	2.36	17	25	5
Chad	TCD	SSA	20	165	2.73	16	24	6
Eritrea	ERI	SSA	20	165	5.74	11	29	5
Angola	AGO	SSA	19	167	1.28	17	21	5
Turkmenistan	TKM	ECA	19	167	1.78	16	22	5
Iraq	IRQ	MENA	18	169	2.47	14	22	5
Venezuela	VEN	AME	18	169	1.6	15	21	8
Korea, North	PRK	AP	17	171	4.18	10	24	4
Equatorial Guinea	GNQ	SSA	17	171	3.56	11	23	3
Guinea Bissau	GNB	SSA	17	171	1.7	14	20	5
Libya	LBY	MENA	17	171	3.05	12	22	5
Sudan	SDN	SSA	16	175	2.31	12	20	7
Yemen	YEM	MENA	16	175	1.85	13	19	7
Afghanistan	AFG	AP	15	177	1.39	13	17	5
Syria	SYR	MENA	14	178	1.93	11	17	5
South Sudan	SSD	SSA	12	179	1.56	9	15	5
Somalia	SOM	SSA	9	180	2.26	5	13	5