Different Immigrants, Same Attitudes? Making Sense of the Association Between Two Immigrant Groups

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Objective. Previous studies of public attitudes toward immigration have been set in economically developed areas such as the United States and the countries of Western Europe, implicitly applying the term "immigrants" solely to blue-collar laborers. In this article, we extend the discussion to Taiwan, a newly democratic and nearly developed country in East Asia. *Methods.* Our study investigates public attitudes toward immigrants with different occupations and test predictions derived from both economic and cultural approaches. *Results.* From an analysis of the survey data, we find different economic factors for pro-immigration attitudes toward foreign professionals and laborers. *Conclusions.* Specifically, people who have higher incomes are more likely to allow foreign professionals to become citizens, and people with positive assessments of national and individual economic conditions are more likely to favor the inflow of foreign workers. Furthermore, cultural tolerance and a high level of education are correlated to pro-migration attitudes toward both foreign professionals and laborers.

In the age of globalization, the movement of populations across national boundaries has accelerated due to economic and political reasons. This increase in international immigration has inevitably sparked debates over how to react to new cultural and racial realities. One such debate is whether to grant or deny citizenship to immigrants. The issue is particularly important in that mass attitudes toward immigrants play a crucial role in shaping the immigration policies of democratic countries. Recent scholarly work has shown that the public's pro- or anti-immigrant attitudes are skill specific, that is, highly skilled immigrants are preferred over low-skilled immigrants (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), while the factors that contribute to these differences remain unsettled.

A considerable amount of research has been done to examine the determinants of individual attitudes toward immigration, including attitudes both toward immigrants (e.g., Espenshade and Hempstead, 1996) and immigration policy (e.g., Chandler and Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997). In the literature, economic competition and cultural threats are commonly analyzed sources of anti-immigrant sentiments. Based on the assumption of labor-market competition, the former hypothesizes that individual workers will oppose

the immigration of workers with similar skills to their own due to the fear of having to compete for material resources (Mayda, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). The latter postulates that native people oppose immigration because of a symbolic prejudice toward specific immigrant groups (Lee and Fiske, 2006) and a perceived intergroup threat to cultural unity and/or national identity (Blumer, 1958; Burns and Gimpel, 2000; Quillian, 1995). Although both theories have been found to have the support of empirical evidence, more work is needed to identify the causal mechanisms and their effects on attitudes toward immigration (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014).

Economic and cultural concerns have been applied to explaining two broad types of attitudes toward immigration issues: opinions of immigrants and views on immigration policy (Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Regarding public attitudes toward immigrants, however, much of the literature does not consider the different skill levels among immigrants and presumes that the immigrants in question are low-skilled, blue-collar workers. There are at least two reasons to differentiate between different types of immigrants. First, the implicit presumption of immigrants as blue-collar workers is highly unreasonable since international immigration involves both blue-collar workers and white-collar immigrants. Second, it has been shown that the differentiation in the skill levels of immigrants is appropriate to test alternative theoretical arguments that explain the sources of negative sentiments toward immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Malhotra, Margalit, and Mo, 2013).

In this article, we follow the research that examines public attitudes toward immigrants with different skill levels. Specifically, we investigate public attitudes toward two groups of immigrant workers—professionals and laborers. By differentiating the immigrants based on occupational skills, we are able to test both economic and cultural explanations for public support for and opposition to immigration. Due to the possible association between the two outcome variables, we apply a Bayesian bivariate ordered probit model (BOPM) to analyze a nationally representative sample of 1,966 respondents in Taiwan. Our analysis of the data has come to two conclusions. First, different economic factors are related to attitudes toward highly skilled and less-skilled immigrants. Second, tolerance of cultural diversity is consistently associated with pro-immigration attitudes, regardless of the skill level of the immigrants.

This article offers two primary contributions. First, it contributes substantively to our understanding of how natives view immigrants across occupations in Taiwan, a postindustrial and monoethnic country. The evidence indicates that public attitudes toward immigration are related to both economic and cultural factors in different ways. Second, methodologically, the Bayesian BOPM describes the positive correlation between the two response variables while presenting the effects of the explanatory variables on them. The explicit modeling of the association between the two outcome variables potentially reflects the data-generating process, which in turn possibly leads to more correct inferences.

The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews the extant literature on public opinion toward immigration. We then develop theoretical arguments that explain the effects of economic and cultural concerns on attitudes toward immigrants in different occupations. The following section discusses the case of Taiwan and provides an illustration of the data and measurements. The last two sections present the statistical model, the results of the data analysis, and the conclusion.

Public Attitudes Toward Immigration

In the age of globalization and open economies, international immigration has undoubtedly accelerated and created debates in host countries. One such question is the extent to which immigration should be restricted, an issue that is shaped by the public's evaluations of its economic and social impact. In the following, we begin with a review of the literature on public opinion toward immigration. We then demonstrate that public support or opposition for the granting of citizenship to immigrants is induced by economic and cultural concerns. Finally, we provide several testable hypotheses that are appropriate both worldwide and for the particular case discussed in the following section.

Economic and Cultural Concerns About Immigration

As international immigration has gradually increased in the past two decades, both international immigrants and native populations have encountered numerous challenges. For either economic or political reasons, immigrants leave their home countries in search of a better life. Unlike low-skilled immigrants, highly skilled immigrants are able to use their professional expertise in other countries. Unfortunately, many countries and employers tend to have concerns about the language skills, educational backgrounds, and lower wages of the newcomers compared with the native born. The receiving countries then set up immigration policies that involve regulations concerning entry, residence, and citizenship in a country. These policies vary around the world, ranging from allowing most types of immigration to allowing no immigration at all. Generally speaking, the less restrictive the regulations, the more likely the influx of immigrants.

Native-born residents may have two contradicting attitudes about immigration. On the one hand, immigrants are welcomed due to a shortage of labor, especially in developed countries where the population is gradually aging. On the other hand, residents are also concerned with the economic effects such as native wages and job displacement (Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001), as well as social effects such as cultural homogeneity (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012; Citrin and Sides, 2008) and national security (Lahav and Courtemanche, 2012). According to the recent studies of public views on immigration, unfavorable attitudes toward immigrants and immigration are widespread and similar across receiving countries (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Zick, Pettigrew, and Wagner, 2008).

Political economy and sociopsychological approaches are currently the two main schools of thought explaining public attitudes toward immigration (Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Within the literature of political economy and material self-interest, one strand that draws from the factor-proportion analysis model focuses on the connection between individual skill levels and immigration-policy preferences (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). This model predicts that the inflow of immigrants affects the wages of the natives with similar skills and supposes that natives who are more skilled than immigrants are more likely to favor immigration (Mayda, 2006). The other strand in the political economy literature focuses on the welfare systems and the fiscal impact of immigration (Borjas, 1999). It argues that immigrants receive a large share of the welfare and increase fiscal pressures to raise taxes. In this regard, natives with higher incomes are more supportive of restrictive immigration policies than those with lower incomes (Dustmann and Preston, 2006).

Rather than explaining immigration issues in terms of material self-interest, other schools of thought emphasize the perceptions of sociotropic threats on the receiving country as a whole, including both economic and cultural threats. Research has shown that an

individual's personal economic situation matters little to public attitudes toward immigration, and that both assessments of the impact of immigration on the national economy and the general feelings about immigrants are important determinants of opinion formation (Citrin et al., 1997; Wilson, 2001). These findings open up an alternative avenue into the study of how opinions on immigration are formulated by indicating that the opinions of natives on immigration may be the result of racial and ethnic stereotyping. For example, Burns and Gimpel (2000) show that fears of economic insecurity are related to negative stereotypes of racial and ethnic groups, leading to the desire for a restrictive immigration policy.

Attitudes toward immigration are further influenced by symbolic predispositions such as preferences for cultural unity and prejudice against reference groups (Blumer, 1958; Quillian, 1995; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Under the broad framework of social comparison theories, individual attitudes and behavior can be influenced by community relationships. First, the categorization of people causes in-group members to favor their own group and disapprove of the out-group (Chandler and Tsai, 2001). Second, the influx of the out-group changes the composition of the population and compositional amenities (Card, Dustmann, and Preston, 2012). It has been shown that the perceptions of the cultural impact of immigration are prevalent in receiving countries such as the United States and countries of Europe (Citrin and Sides, 2008; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). In this regard, individuals with a higher level of tolerance for out-group members and/or fewer perceived cultural threats are more supportive of increased immigration.

Pro-/Anti-Immigration Attitudes Toward Different Immigrants

Most if not all studies of public attitudes toward immigration do not differentiate among immigrants, implicitly using the term to describe blue-collar workers. This is because scholars have focused more on immigration issues in economically developed countries such as the United States, Canada, and Western European countries, and most immigrants to these places have been laborers from developing countries. Failing to account for the differences among immigrants may cause inferential problems. For example, the positive correlation that has been found between the skill level of natives and support for immigration may result from the possibility that respondents think only of low-skilled labor when answering survey questions about immigration policy (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001).

To fill this gap, we wish to extend the discussion to include the attitudes of natives toward both immigrant laborers and professionals from the perspectives of political economy and sociopsychological approaches, respectively. According to the factor-proportion model that assumes perfect substitutability between natives and immigrants, the inflow of immigrants might lead to a decrease in the wages of similarly skilled natives (Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). It has been shown that natives tend to oppose the inflow of immigrants with similar skill levels (Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter, 2007a). This logic can be further applied to compare two types of occupations—workers and professionals—with respect to job availability (Pardos-Prado and Xena, 2019). As a result, native workers are likely to favor a less restrictive policy for immigrant professionals, but favor a more restrictive policy for immigrant laborers. By the same token, native professionals are likely to support an increase of immigrant laborers while opposing an influx of skilled immigrants.

Concerning the fiscal impact of immigration, the literature shows that income is negatively correlated to supportive attitudes toward immigration (Dustmann and Preston, 2006,

2007). At the same time, a negative correlation between income and pro-immigration attitudes has been found in countries where natives are more skilled than immigrants. There is a positive correlation between individual skills and pro-immigration preferences (Facchini and Mayda, 2006). These results suggest that the negative relationship between income and pro-immigration preferences found in previous studies is likely due to the premise that respondents think only of low-skilled laborers when answering survey questions about immigration policy. In this regard, low-skilled immigration increases fiscal pressure to raise taxes, while high-skilled immigration has the opposite effect. By differentiating between the skill levels of immigrants, Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter (2007b) show that natives with higher incomes are both more supportive of highly skilled immigrants and more opposed to low-skilled immigrants than those with lower incomes. In terms of occupations, we expect that natives with higher incomes are more likely to favor the inflow of immigrant professionals.

The sociopsychological approach discusses sociotropic threats on the receiving country and the general impression of immigrants held by natives. It argues that natives are concerned with the impact of immigration on the national economy (Citrin et al., 1997; Wilson, 2001), the difficulties immigrants may have fitting in culturally, and the social problems that they may cause (e.g., Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior, 2004). In this regard, natives should have the same concerns with both workers and professionals. That is to say, in terms of cultural unity, the natives would be opposed to the influx of immigrants regardless of their professions.

Natives do, however, differentiate among particular immigrant groups based on certain stereotypes based on nationality, race, and ethnicity (Lee and Fiske, 2006). Stereotypes of immigrants further influence information processing (Vinacke, 1957) and the formation of prejudice (Bodenhausen and Wyer, 1985), making certain immigrant groups preferable to others. For example, natives are more opposed to low-skilled immigrants than highly skilled ones, regardless of their own skills or welfare (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). Swiss voters are more likely to oppose the inflow of immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia than from elsewhere in Europe (Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013); in Britain, by the same token, respondents prefer white immigrant groups to nonwhite ones (Ford, 2011).

From a sociopsychological approach, public attitudes toward immigrant workers and immigrant professionals are shaped by stereotyping along with nationality, race, and ethnicity. A general perception of immigrants as being less competent is related to the fact that most of them are less-skilled workers who are nonwhite, non-Anglo-Saxons, or from developing countries (Lee and Fiske, 2006; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001). Stereotypes of immigrants further trigger the formation of negative emotions—anxiety, in particular—and shape anti-immigration attitudes (Brader, Valentino, and Suhay, 2008). In the United States, for example, people with negative stereotypes of Latinos or Asians are more in favor of restrictive immigration policies (Chandler and Tsai, 2001). Unlike the perceptions of laborers, people usually have positive impressions of immigrant professionals, speaking of qualities such as intelligence, gentleness, neatness, and good manners. These features are often part of an impression of white Anglo-Saxons from economically developed countries. In this regard, the natives are less likely to oppose the inflow of foreign-born professionals.

Several predictions are summarized in Table 1 in keeping with the discussion above. First of all, the factor-proportion model suggests that in labor-market competition, native workers are opposed to immigrant workers, while native professionals favor restrictive policies for skilled immigrants. Second, the strand within the political economy approach that focuses on the fiscal impact of immigrants states that natives with higher incomes are

TABLE 1

Associations Between Individual Characteristics and Attitudes Toward Immigrants

	Immigrant Professionals	Immigrant Workers
Factor-proportion model		
Native workers	+	−
Native professionals	−	+
Fiscal impacts		
Rich natives	+	−
Sociotropic effects		
Tolerant natives	+	+
Stereotyping		
Context dependency	+/−	+/−

more supportive of immigrant professionals and more opposed to immigrant workers than their poorer counterparts. Third, considering the sociotropic effects of immigrants, natives with preferences for cultural unity are equally opposed to immigrant professionals and immigrant workers. Finally, natives with group-specific stereotypes in mind have different levels of tolerance toward immigrant professionals and immigrant workers, depending on the context.

Case Selection, Data, and Measurements

In this section we discuss the case of Taiwan, a new electoral democracy and nearly developed country. Taiwan is made up of indigenous people who originated from Southeast Asia and the Pacific, Hakka and Minnan people who migrated from Mainland China in the 17th century, and Chinese Mainlanders who moved to Taiwan after the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War in 1945. Like other monoethnic countries, Taiwan also struggles to embrace multiculturalism and to accept immigrant workers at large (Lim, 2014). This feature makes Taiwan an appropriate case for us to test the predictions drawn from different theoretical approaches.

The Case of Taiwan

Most of the previous studies of immigration attitudes have focused on economically developed countries such as the United States (e.g., Citrin et al., 1997; Scheve and Slaughter, 2001) and the countries of Europe (e.g., Dustmann and Preston, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007), and found that both economic and cultural concerns are the determinants of pro- or anti-immigrant attitudes. The studies of immigration attitudes in Asian countries, however, have shown that cultural threat drives opinion on immigration. In Japan, for example, public negative sentiments toward immigration are induced by the perception of threats to ethnic homogeneity (Chung, 2010; Green, 2017; Strausz, 2010). In South Korea, by the same token, citizens who are concerned with cultural unity are more likely to favor a restrictive immigration policy (Ha and Jang, 2015). Like Japan and South Korea, Taiwan is also an ethnoculturally homogeneous country and, thus, examining public attitudes toward immigrants in Taiwan can further contribute to our understanding of immigration attitudes in general.

Moreover, as immigrants to economically developed countries possess different skill levels and occupations, their occupations are not strongly correlated to stereotypes of their home countries, races, or ethnicities. For nearly developed countries such as Taiwan, less-skilled workers and highly skilled professionals have immigrated from different countries, and the distinction between the two types holds stronger economic and cultural implications.

Public perceptions of citizenship in Taiwan are strongly connected to ethnicity, and immigrants can be easily recognized by their appearance for two reasons. First, nationality in Taiwan is determined by *jus sanguinis*, in which citizenship is determined by the citizenship of one's parents. Second, Taiwan has strict regulations for residency and citizenship. Foreigners in Taiwan can apply for citizenship or permanent residency if they marry a citizen of Taiwan. Otherwise, only managers, investors, or professionals can apply for permanent residency. In the future, mid-level technical personnel and caretakers will also be allowed to apply for permanent residency after working for seven consecutive years.[1]

Generally speaking, immigrants in Taiwan can be divided into three groups: immigrants by marriage, immigrant laborers, and white-collar foreign professionals. Since the 1990s, marriage immigrants have entered Taiwan on a large scale. One major reason is that young males in rural areas have lacked opportunities to meet young females, as many female labors have moved to urban areas to work in service industries. Up to the end of 2017, it was estimated that there were about 350,000 couples with one spouse from China and 176,000 from other countries (Gender Equality Committee of the Executive Yuan, 2017). Among these, 40 percent of Chinese spouses received residency permits and 68 percent of other spouses were granted national identity cards.[2] Many foreign spouses were working full-time or part-time as caretakers, waitresses, or domestic helpers.

In recent years, the transformation of demographic and economic structures has resulted in an unbalanced labor supply and demand in Taiwan. On the one hand, the birth rate dropped from 2.297 percent in 1981 to 0.823 percent in 2017. While the population size increased by 327,947 people in 1981, it only increased by 31,411 in 2017. On the other hand, Taiwan's economy has gradually been restructured from agriculture to production and service industries. The number of people who worked in production and service industries increased from 2.3 million in 1971 to 8 million in 2011. While changes in Taiwan's population have created a demand for laborers, its export-oriented economic development requires both more investment and educated professionals.

To respond to these issues, Taiwan's job market was opened to immigrant workers by the Council of Labor Affairs (CLA) in October 1989, an organization that was upgraded to become the Ministry of Labor (MOL) in 2014. Foreign blue-collar workers from Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, China, and Mongolia are now allowed to work in Taiwan as a solution to its labor shortage. According to official statistics from the MOL, there were 676,142 foreign workers in Taiwan as of the end of December 2017. Among them, 60.43 percent were employed in manufacturing, 0.76 percent in construction, 1.82

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[1]The legislature in Taiwan (Legislative Yuan) passed the Act for the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Professionals on November 22, 2017. The executive branch (Executive Yuan) approved the New Economic Immigration Law on May 15, 2018. The former eases policies regarding certification, residency, health insurance, tax, and pensions for foreign professionals and the latter broadens the scope of occupations by including mid-level technical workers in the industrial and social care sectors.

[2]According to the Cross-Strait People's Relations Ordinance, Chinese spouses can become naturalized after living in Taiwan for six years. Spouses from other countries also need to live in Taiwan for six years to become citizens, but they are required to renounce their nationality afterward.

percent on fishing crews, 36.71 percent as caretakers, and 0.29 percent as domestic helpers. Based on the latest regulations, these employees can stay and work for as long as 12 years.[3]

While immigrant workers and marriage immigrants may attenuate the labor supply issue caused by Taiwan's low birth rate, the economy must also be reconfigured to deal with a serious brain drain. For example, it is estimated that 724,000 Taiwanese worked overseas in 2015, which was about 10 percent higher than 2009, with most of them in highly skilled professionals. The stagnation of salaries in Taiwan has been cited as a major reason. Lin, Chang, and Lu (2017) analyzed data from 1980 to 2012, pointing out that the gross domestic product per capita was negatively correlated with real wages in Taiwan and showing that employees have had a very limited share of economic growth.[4]

Since the 1990s, Taiwan as well as Hong Kong, China, and South Korea have taken measures to attract skilled immigrants. Skilled immigrants, however, have chosen Taiwan as one of their relay stations rather than their destinations (Iredale, 2003). Although official statistics from the MOL show that the number of foreign professionals increased from 30,185 in 2015 to 30,928 in 2017, this increase has not made up for the brain drain. Among the 30,928 foreign professionals, about 51 percent of them are from Japan, the United States, and Malaysia.[5] Such a remarkable gap between the scale of immigration and emigration has pushed the government to amend the Act for the Recruitment and Employment of Foreign Professionals that was first passed by the Legislative Yuan in 2017. The new law allows foreign professionals to extend their work permits from three to five years. Foreigners can also apply for a temporary visa while searching for a new job. The Legislative Yuan also amended the Nationality Act at the end of 2016, allowing foreign professionals to be granted citizenship without giving up their citizenship in their countries of origin. They can apply for naturalization after living in Taiwan for five years, and it is reported that 65 foreign professionals have been granted citizenship according to the new measure. Most of these are from the United States, Malaysia, and New Zealand and almost half of them are university professors.

Generally speaking, the Taiwanese public has been less supportive of the inflow of immigrants from Southeast Asian countries (e.g., see Bélanger, Lee, and Wang, 2010; Rich, 2019). Since workers are mostly from Southeast Asian countries and professionals are from Western countries, an immigrant's country of origin influences how he or she is dealt with by native Taiwanese. As is the case in other countries, Taiwanese are concerned that immigrant workers are taking their jobs. Lin (2001) investigated the geographical distribution of immigrant workers and concluded that it is difficult for domestic workers to move to an area that is populated by immigrant workers. Tsay and Lin (2001) found that foreign labor has a negative effect on the semi- and less-skilled construction workers, but benefits employment for managerial and professional workers. Lan (2010) found that while employers of immigrant workers tend to agree that they can supplement local workers, employers of local workers believe that they are being replaced by immigrant laborers.

Second, immigrant workers have not been treated well, as has been seen in the abuse of immigrant caretakers in local headlines. These workers lack the freedom to change their employer, suffer from poor living conditions, and pay high broker fees in their home countries (Oliver, 2017). In an effort to improve the system, the government amended

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[3]The information can be found on the MOL website: ⟨https://www.wda.gov.tw/NewsFAQ.aspx?n=9C9CC 6640661FEBA&sms=A1CA5B0D37C1A94B⟩.

[4]It should be noted that Taiwan has also pursued the return of its emigrants. Tsay and Lin (2003) analyzed the 1990 Taiwan Population Census and pointed out that many of these returnees had some university education. This reversal of the brain drain in the 1990s, however, needs to be updated as many Taiwanese corporations have set up production lines in China starting in the 2000s.

[5]The information can be found at ⟨https://www.mol.gov.tw/announcement/2099/36868/⟩.

TABLE 2

Public Attitudes Toward Granting Citizenship to Immigrants in Taiwan, 2016

Questions	Definitely Not	Probably Not	Probably	Definitely	Missing
Professionals being citizens	5.65	11.29	42.37	34.79	5.90
Workers being citizens	17.60	30.32	32.60	14.85	4.63

NOTE: Data were weighted to reflect the characteristics of the national population and are presented in percentage.

the Employment Service Act in 2016. After being hired, immigrant workers are no longer required to leave Taiwan every three years, reducing the brokerage fees for reentering Taiwan. Employers are also required to offer paid leave as required by the Labor Standards Act, a statute that mainly regulates the affairs of domestic laborers and their employers. According to a survey conducted by the MOL, the average salary of foreign manufacturing workers and caretakers has been increasing over the past three years (Li, 2018).

Finally, human trafficking is another pressing challenge for Taiwan. The victims include girls and women from Vietnam, Thailand, and China. Huang (2017) examined the characteristics of victims in 132 court proceedings related to the Human Trafficking Prevention Act (HTPA) enacted in 2009, finding that about half of the cases (56.8 percent) involved adult foreign victims. Lured by higher wages and not allowed to switch employers, some immigrant workers have chosen to work in the sex industry (Liu, 2015). The MOL estimated that the number of missing foreign workers has declined over the years and had reached a total of 52,000 in 2017 (Central News Agency, 2018).

In brief, immigrant laborers and professionals are treated differently in Taiwan. For immigrant workers on the one hand, the abuse and mistreatment suffered ranges from age exploitation to verbal abuse and physical violence, which constitutes an infringement on human rights, remaining a serious problem in Taiwan. On the other hand, Taiwanese people treat foreign professionals with high respect, and the government is dropping some restrictions in an attempt to embrace them. With this in mind, we anticipate that Taiwanese citizens may have somewhat different views on immigrant laborers and professionals.

Data Description and Measures

Survey data in Taiwan were analyzed with a nationally representative sample of 1,966 respondents conducted by the Taiwan Social Change Survey Project (Fu, 2017). The survey data were collected through face-to-face interviews from August 7 to November 27, 2016, as a part of the seventh round of the Taiwan Social Change Survey Project from 2015 to 2019. The theme of the survey in 2016 was Citizens and the Role of Government. In addition to a series of questions about the demographic backgrounds of the respondents, the questionnaire also covered questions about what the government should do on immigration.[6] We began by evaluating public attitudes toward foreign professionals and laborers. As can be seen in Table 2, a majority of the respondents (77.16 percent) believed that the government should allow foreign professionals to become citizens of

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[6]The questions are provided in the Appendix.

TABLE 3

Cross-Tabulation of Attitudes Toward Two Types of Immigrants

Allowing Foreign Professionals to Become Citizens	Allowing Foreign Workers to Become Citizens			
	Definitely Not	Probably Not	Probably	Definitely
Definitely not	80.18(89)	11.71(13)	6.31(7)	1.80(2)
Probably not	20.72(46)	65.77(146)	11.26(25)	2.25(5)
Probably	13.12(108)	33.78(278)	49.70(409)	3.40(28)
Definitely	13.39(90)	20.39(137)	28.27(190)	37.95(255)

NOTE: Data were weighted to reflect the characteristics of the national population; row percentages are presented and frequencies are given in parentheses; 138 samples are missing.

Taiwan, while only 16.94 percent did not. In contrast, only about a half of the respondents (47.45 percent) agreed that the government should allow foreign laborers to become citizens of Taiwan while half (47.92 percent) did not. The distributions in Table 2 suggest that Taiwanese people welcome foreign professionals over foreign laborers.[7]

Table 3 displays the cross-tabulation of public attitudes toward the two types of immigrants. The distribution implies a positive correlation between public attitudes toward foreign professionals and foreign laborers. More specifically, Spearman's rank correlation coefficient is 0.45 and the polychoric correlation is 0.54, suggesting that the two variables are moderately positively correlated to each other. Therefore, we must take the positive correlation into account when examining the determinants of either variable.

We then provide several figures to show the relationship between economic and cultural factors and attitudes toward immigration. According to the discussion above, one's occupation, income, and general socioeconomic status bear a strong influence on how one views immigration. Regarding the classification of occupations, we regrouped the respondents into four categories based on the international standard classification of occupations (ISCO-08): professionals, skilled workers, low-skilled workers, and employment in the armed forces.[8] Figure 1 displays the distributions of public attitudes toward immigration across occupations. In the left panel of Figure 1, we observe that the attitudes toward professionals do not differ greatly across different types of occupations. More than three-quarters of Taiwanese people agree with the idea of granting citizenship to foreign professionals. In the right panel of Figure 1, however, we see a quite polarized result in which only about half agree with granting citizenship to foreign workers. The results in Figure 1 agree with Table 2 to indicate that Taiwanese people welcome foreign professionals more than foreign workers, regardless of their specific occupations.

The relationship between income and public attitudes toward immigration is presented in Figure 2. In Figure 2, a majority of respondents are in favor of granting citizenship to foreign professionals in each income level overall. People with higher incomes, however, are more

[7]A potential problem in the study of immigration preferences is that people prefer high-skilled immigrants because there are fewer high-skilled immigrants than low-skilled immigrants (Malhotra and Newman, 2017). Like other studies, we cannot rule out this possibility in Taiwan.

[8]Ten major groups in ISCO-08 are provided by the International Labor Organization: (1) managers; (2) professionals; (3) technicians and associate professionals; (4) clerical support workers; (5) services and sales workers; (6) skilled agricultural, forestry, and fishery workers; (7) craft and related trades workers; (8) plant and machine operators and assemblers; (9) elementary occupations; (0) armed forces occupations. The classification of occupations in this article is as follows: professionals include (1) and (2); skilled workers include (3), (6), (7), and (8); low-skilled workers include (4), (5), and (9); armed forces occupations.

FIGURE 1

Attitudes Toward Immigration Across Occupations

NOTE: The left panel shows attitudes toward foreign professionals; the right panel shows attitudes toward foreign workers.

FIGURE 2

Attitudes Toward Immigration Across Income Groups

NOTE: The left panel shows attitudes toward foreign professionals; the right panel shows attitudes toward foreign workers.

willing to allow foreign professionals to become citizens than their poorer counterparts. In contrast, this pattern is not so obvious in public attitudes toward immigrant workers. Specifically, only about half of the respondents are in favor of granting citizenship to foreign workers across each income level. In other words, it seems that income is unrelated to attitudes toward immigrant workers.

FIGURE 3

Attitudes Toward Immigration Across Tolerance Levels

NOTE: The left panel shows attitudes toward foreign professionals; the right panel shows attitudes toward foreign workers.

Other than socioeconomic status, a tolerance for different cultures also determines attitudes toward immigration. Specifically, people with greater cultural tolerance are more willing to allow foreigners to become citizens. To measure tolerance, a question was asked about the attitudes of respondents toward transnational marriage.[9] In Figure 3, we display public attitudes toward transnational marriage and immigration, finding that people who are more accepting of transnational marriage are also generally in favor of granting citizenship to both foreign professionals and foreign workers. People who do not favor transnational marriage, however, are more willing to allow foreign professionals than foreign workers to become citizens. Moreover, we also find that Taiwanese people welcome foreign professionals more than foreign workers.

Empirical Analysis of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigrants

We examined public attitudes toward immigrants in Taiwan by analyzing the survey data displayed above. In the following, we first introduce the statistical model used in the data analysis and then present our results.

[9]An ideal measurement for tolerance toward immigrants is to ask respondents how they feel about immigrants. However, no such measurement exists and this may run the risk of causing a social desirability bias. Although not a perfect measurement, attitudes toward transnational marriage can generally capture the public's feeling toward foreigners. Therefore, we assume that tolerance of intermarriage at least captures the lowest extent of cultural tolerance in Taiwan because marriage immigrants, to some extent, would make people get to know cultural differences.

The Bayesian Bivariate Ordered Probit Model

Public attitudes toward foreign professionals and workers examined in this article are correlated with each other. A BOPM is applied to analyze the survey data, which is useful for modeling the correlation between two ordered response variables (Greene and Hensher, 2010:227).[10] We can derive the BOPM from the latent variable model. Suppose that, for the two response variables $y_{i,1}$ and $y_{i,2}$, respondent $i = 1, \ldots, N$ provides a set of responses $(y_{i,1} = j, y_{i,2} = k)$ for $j = 1, 2, \ldots, J$ and $k = 1, 2, \ldots, K$ based on unobserved, latent traits $y_{i,1}^*$ and $y_{i,2}^*$, and threshold parameters $\tau_{1,j}$ and $\tau_{2,j}$. The two latent variables can be represented by:

$$
\begin{cases}
y_{i,1}^* = x'\beta + \varepsilon_{i,1} & (1) \\
y_{i,2}^* = z'\gamma + \varepsilon_{i,2}, & (2)
\end{cases}
$$

where $x = (x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \ldots, x_{i,M})$ and $z = (z_{i,1}, z_{i,2}, \ldots, z_{i,G})$ are M-variate and G-variate predictors, respectively, $\beta \in R^M$ and $\gamma \in R^G$ are corresponding unknown parameter vectors, and $\varepsilon_i = (\varepsilon_{i,1}, \varepsilon_{i,2})$ is the error term. The predictors in x and z can be the same or different. Given $y_{i,1}^*$, $y_{i,2}^*$, $\tau_{1,j}$, and $\tau_{2,j}$, we observe the responses as follows:

$$
\begin{cases}
y_{i,1} = j & \text{if } \tau_{1,j-1} < y_{i,1}^* \leq \tau_{1,j} & (3) \\
y_{i,2} = k & \text{if } \tau_{2,k-1} < y_{i,2}^* \leq \tau_{2,k}, & (4)
\end{cases}
$$

where it is assumed that $\tau_{1,0} = \tau_{2,0} = -\infty$.

To relax the assumption that the two latent variables are independent, the error term ε_i is assumed to follow a bivariate standard normal distribution as follows:

$$
\begin{pmatrix} \varepsilon_{i,1} \\ \varepsilon_{i,2} \end{pmatrix} \sim N_2 \left[\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \rho \\ \rho & 1 \end{pmatrix} \right]. \tag{5}
$$

The correlation parameter ρ captures the association between the two response variables.

We take a Bayesian approach to constructing the proposed BOPM, so we complete the model specification by defining the prior distributions. We use uninformative prior distributions for the unknown parameters as follows:

$$
\beta_m \sim N(0, 25) \quad \text{for} \quad m = 1, \ldots, M, \tag{6}
$$

$$
\gamma_g \sim N(0, 25) \quad \text{for} \quad g = 1, \ldots, G, \tag{7}
$$

$$
\rho \sim \text{Uniform}(-1, 1). \tag{8}
$$

---

[10] Bivariate ordered probit models can be considered as an extension of bivariate probit models, where the two response variables are binary.

TABLE 4

Determinants of Public Attitudes in 2016

	Attitudes Toward	
Explanatory Variable	Professionals	Workers
Occupation (military = 0)		
Professionals	−0.08	0.01
	[−0.57, 0.37]	[−0.40, 0.45]
Skilled workers	−0.05	−0.02
	[−0.54, 0.39]	[−0.47, 0.36]
Low-skilled workers	−0.05	−0.05
	[−0.48, 0.44]	[−0.47, 0.38]
Country economy (same = 0)		
Better	0.06	0.25
	[−0.15, 0.26]	[0.06, 0.45]
Worse	0.07	0.03
	[−0.04, 0.18]	[−0.07, 0.12]
Household economy (same = 0)		
Better	−0.11	0.01
	[−0.26, 0.05]	[−0.15, 0.15]
Worse	−0.09	−0.19
	[−0.22, 0.04]	[−0.30, −0.06]
Income (below US$1,000 = 0)		
1,000–2,000	0.15	−0.01
	[0.03, 0.28]	[−0.13, 0.12]
2,000–3,000	0.45	0.15
	[0.23, 0.66]	[−0.05, 0.35]
3,000–4,000	0.49	0.18
	[0.17, 0.78]	[−0.11, 0.48]
Above 4,000	0.46	−0.01
	[0.12, 0.87]	[−0.34, 0.32]
Tolerance	0.53	0.41
	[0.42, 0.64]	[0.31, 0.51]
Social status	−0.03	0.02
	[−0.06, 0.01]	[−0.02, 0.04]
Unemployment	0.17	−0.01
	[0.04, 0.29]	[−0.13, 0.11]
Partisanship (neutral = 0)		
Pan-Blue	0.14	0.10
	[0.01, 0.26]	[−0.03, 0.21]
Pan-Green	0.05	−0.07
	[−0.06, 0.17]	[−0.17, 0.05]
Urban	0.14	0.11
	[0.01, 0.28]	[−0.01, 0.26]
Education (illiteracy = 0)		
Junior high	0.32	0.18
	[−0.17, 0.80]	[−0.32, 0.71]
Senior high	0.45	0.20
	[−0.06, 0.95]	[−0.30, 0.74]
College	0.60	0.33
	[0.14, 1.18]	[−0.21, 0.86]
University and above	0.74	0.44
	[0.27, 1.25]	[−0.06, 0.98]

Continued

TABLE 4

Continued

Explanatory Variable	Attitudes Toward	
	Professionals	Workers
Solving problems (unsuccessful = 0)		
Neither	–	−0.17
	–	[−0.31, −0.01]
Successful	–	−0.13
	–	[−0.23, −0.04]
Cutpoint 1	−0.78	−0.36
	[−1.51, −0.11]	[−1.02, 0.40]
Cutpoint 2	0.01	0.55
	[−0.71, 0.70]	[−0.11, 1.31]
Cutpoint 3	1.33	1.65
	[0.64, 2.05]	[0.98, 2.39]
ρ	0.50	
	[0.45, 0.54]	
No. of observations	1,366	

NOTE: Ninety percent of HPD intervals are presented.
SOURCE: 2016 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Round 7, Year 2).

Results

We applied the Bayesian BOPM illustrated above to our analysis of the survey data in Taiwan.[11] As for model specification, attitudes toward immigrants comprised four factors: occupation, income, tolerance, and stereotyping. We have shown the relations between the first three factors and the attitudes toward immigrants in the previous section. However, since there is no direct, reliable measure for public stereotypes of immigrants, we used education as a proxy for stereotypes. Usually, higher education leads to less stereotype thinking. Specifically, we include dummy variables to represent five levels of education with illiteracy as the reference.

In addition to the four main explanatory variables, we also include several control variables in the model. First, we include variables for the evaluations of respondents with respect to both the national economy and the economic conditions of their households. Second, *Social status* measures self-evaluations of social rank ranging from 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest and 10 as the highest. Third, *Unemployment* represents the employment status of respondents. Fourth, we control partisanship by including two dummy variables, *Pan-Blue* and *Pan-Green*, with independent voters as the reference. Fifth, we include a dummy variable to represent urban area with rural area as the reference. Finally, *Solving problems* asks respondents about how successful the administration has been dealing with problems related to foreign laborers.

Results of the analysis are presented in Table 4, and several findings are summarized as follows based on whether the presented 90 percent HPD intervals cover zero. First, we find no evidence that the occupations of natives are associated with their attitudes toward

[11]The model is estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo methods implemented in Stan called from R version 3.5.1 (rstan 2.18.1). The estimation was performed with three parallel chains of 10,000 iterations each to be conservative. The first half of the iterations were discarded as a burn-in period and 1 as thinning and thus 15,000 samples were generated. The tests for the convergence of MCMC chains is conducted and there is no evidence of nonconvergence in these chains.

FIGURE 4

Predicted Attitudes Toward Immigration Across Tolerance Levels

NOTE: The left panel shows attitudes toward foreign professionals; the right panel shows attitudes toward foreign workers. The dots indicate the means and the line segments are 90 percent HPD intervals.

the immigration of either foreign professionals or foreign laborers. Second, we find that people with higher incomes are more likely to support the granting of citizenship to foreign professionals, but this is not the case for foreign workers. These findings support the fiscal impact argument.

Third, people who are more accepting of transnational marriage are more likely to allow foreign professionals and foreign workers to become citizens. These results are consistent with the findings of previous studies in which people who have greater cultural tolerance are more likely to favor a less restrictive immigration policy. Figure 4 shows the effects of tolerance on the predicted attitudes toward immigrants.[12] As can be seen, when the tolerance variable changes from 0 to 1, the probability of answering "probably not" about granting citizenship to immigrants (both professionals and workers) evidently decreases, and the probability of answering "definitely" increases. Fourth, we find that respondents who had received higher education (i.e., a bachelor degree or above) were more likely to favor a less restrictive immigration policy for both professionals and workers.

Fifth, assessments of the economic state of both country and one's individual household are not correlated to attitudes toward foreign professionals, but are partially related to attitudes toward foreign workers. To be specific, people who think that Taiwan's economy has gotten better are more likely to allow foreign workers to become citizens, while people who think that their own financial circumstances have worsened are less likely to allow foreign workers to become citizens. Sixth, the unemployed are more likely to allow foreign professionals to become citizens. This could be because they think immigrant professionals are able to improve economic conditions. Seventh, people are less likely to support the inflow of immigrant workers when they think that the government is succeeding in or at least not failing to deal with foreign labor issues. This result implies that people may think that granting citizenship to foreign workers is not necessary if the government is providing them with a good working environment.

---

[12]Predicted probabilities and 90 percent confidence intervals are calculated via the observed-value approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan, 2013).

FIGURE 5

Estimated Values of Latent Responses

NOTE: y_1^* is the latent trait for attitudes toward immigrant professionals; y_2^* is the latent trait for attitudes toward immigrant workers; 1–4 are the observed responses.

Finally, the two response variables are positively correlated to each other. To see the substantial meaning of the positive correlation, we provide the scatterplot of the estimated latent variables in Figure 5. As can be seen, people who strongly agree with granting citizenship to immigrant professionals are also very likely to allow foreign workers to become citizens. However, only about half of respondents who are slightly in favor of fewer restrictions on immigrant professionals hold the same attitudes toward immigrant workers. The other half holds a negative attitude toward immigrant workers. Specifically, among those who "definitely agree" with granting citizenship to professionals, 98.86 percent are in favor of allowing foreign workers to become citizens. In contrast, among those who "probably agree" with granting citizenship to professionals, only 50.87 percent support allowing foreign workers to become citizens of Taiwan.

The finding that public attitudes toward foreign professionals and foreign workers are positively correlated with each other contributes substantively to our understanding of how natives view immigrants. The finding suggests that to what extent natives favor a less restrictive policy for one group is related to that for the other group. On the one hand, for example, if natives favor the inflow of low-skilled workers, they are definitely in favor of less restrictive policies for skilled ones. On the other hand, if natives favor the inflow of professionals, they are more likely to favor less restrictive policies for low-skilled workers.

Based on our findings, one of the implications for policymakers is that how natives view foreign culture strongly influences their attitudes toward immigration policies. To be specific, if natives view foreign culture as a threat to the receiving country, they are less likely to favor the inflow of immigrants. For countries that need immigrants, policymakers

have to familiarize the public with foreign culture. Once natives learn foreign culture, they will not see the inflow of immigrants as a threat to the receiving country.

Conclusions

Public attitudes toward immigration are important in democratic countries in the sense that public opinion plays a crucial role in shaping public policy. Since anti-immigration attitudes can be observed across receiving countries, scholars are providing economic and cultural explanations for the source of negative sentiments toward immigration, and have found evidence in the United States and the countries of Western Europe. What is missing, however, is that most of these previous studies have focused on economically developed countries and ignored public attitudes toward immigration in transforming ones. People in these countries are ambivalent toward less-skilled foreign workers, as they are needed to handle a shortage of labor, but have generated concerns about the management of undocumented immigrants. At the same time, the same countries want to become a destination for highly skilled professionals but are struggling to adopt an attitude of multiculturalism.

To fill this gap, we have analyzed survey data in Taiwan, a largely monoethnic country where native-born residents have often shown strong stereotypical thinking by making connections between impressions of different ethnicities, countries of origin, and occupations. Our results have shown that, first, natives do have different attitudes toward foreign professionals and foreign laborers. In general, Taiwanese people welcome foreign professionals more than foreign laborers. Second, within political economy approaches, the factor-proportion model is not supported while the fiscal impact argument is. Specifically, a higher income is related to pro-immigration attitudes toward foreign professionals, but a different occupation does not affect attitudes toward immigrants. Third, the natives with greater cultural tolerance are more willing to grant citizenship to both foreign professionals and laborers. Fourth, higher education is associated with pro-immigration attitudes toward both foreign professionals and laborers. Fifth, people with a positive assessment of the national economy are more likely to support citizenship for foreign laborers, while those with a negative assessment of their household economy are less likely. Sixth, the unemployed are more likely to support foreign professionals becoming citizens. Finally, people who think that the government is not failing to deal with the issues of foreign laborers are less likely to support the inflow of immigrant workers.

Our findings in Taiwan can be generalized to Japan and South Korea, both of which are also monoethnic societies. Although economic factors are associated with immigration attitudes in Taiwan, cultural concerns are influential in all of these three countries. In Japan and South Korea, more specifically, public concerns over cultural unity and homogeneity affect attitudes toward immigration. Taiwanese people who have higher cultural tolerance are more likely to support granting citizenship to foreign labors and professionals. It takes time for ordinary people to subscribe to a more inclusive definition of national identity, and elites are also slow in adopting new values. Driven by brain drain, Taiwan may be forced to manage immigration that benefits the economy without breaking cultural unity. At any rate, Taiwan's case is worth paying attention to.

In sum, Taiwan's experience in policy shifts and the management of immigrant professionals and laborers can serve in the accommodation of a global trend in immigration to other export-dependent and aging countries. Our empirical analysis shows that both economy and culture play important roles in attitudes toward the status of immigrant

professionals and workers. These findings contribute to fields such as immigration, transnational citizenship, and transnational identity that are growing in importance. Although we find different economic factors for pro-immigration attitudes toward foreign professionals and laborers, this result is not necessarily generalized to the attitudes toward temporary guest workers. Since getting a permit for temporary work in Taiwan is much easier than getting citizenship, economic factors are probably more crucial to the attitudes toward temporary guest workers. This opens up an avenue for future research. Moreover, Taiwanese people may differentiate between immigrants from Mainland China and those from other countries. This is also an issue for future research.

Appendix: Question Wordings

Next, we provide the prompts and questions that the respondents were asked about immigrants. We also provide the labels used in the main text of the article in parentheses. The choice options provided for questions F3, F4, and F5 are as follows: *Definitely should, Probably should, Probably should not,* and *Definitely should not.*

Next, we are going to ask you some questions about fertility decline and immigration.

TABLE A1

Survey Questions About Immigration

F3. Do you think the Taiwan government should or should not actively encourage Taiwanese to marry foreigners and live in Taiwan? (Transnational marriage)

F4. Do you think the Taiwan government should or should not allow foreign professionals to become citizens of Taiwan, with the same rights and obligations (such as voting rights and paying taxes) as we have? (Professionals being citizens)

F5. Do you think the Taiwan government should or should not allow migrant laborers and care workers to become citizens of Taiwan, with the same rights and obligations (such as voting rights and paying taxes) as we have? (Workers being citizens)

SOURCE: 2016 Taiwan Social Change Survey (Round 7, Year 2): Citizens and the Role of Government.

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