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博士論文

Doctoral Thesis

晚明《成唯識論》註釋傳統的重新建構  
How Did Late-Ming Commentators Rebuild the  
Interrupted Commentarial Tradition of the *Cheng  
Weishi Lun*?

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**Dedicated to**

My parents, and my wife



## Abstract

One of most influential religious traditions in Eastern Asia is the Buddhist Consciousness-only School that was built by the eminent monk Xuanzang (602-664) and his disciple Kuiji (632-682) in the 7th century. As probably the most sophisticated scholastic school in Buddhism, the consciousness-only tradition in Eastern Asia was defined and reinforced by the core text *Cheng Weishi Lun* (CWSL) that was compiled by Xuanzang and its key commentaries that were composed by Kuiji and his disciples then. What is interesting is that those key commentaries were gradually losing their circulation in China. When there occurred the so-called renaissance of consciousness-only study in around 16th -17th centuries, those key CWSL commentaries and the lineage were already totally lost in China. Thus, those who aimed to rebuild the lost Consciousness-only School in China at that time had to figure out ways to decode the CWSL which in itself was extremely difficult to understand without those key commentaries. This dissertation intends to investigate how a lost commentarial tradition of the *Cheng weishi lun* was rebuilt and/or reinvented by five key late-Ming commentators— Gaoyuan Mingyu (circa 1544-1633), Yiyu Tongrun (1565-1624), Wang Kentang (1549-1613), Lingyuan Dahui (1564-1636) and Ouyi Zhixu (1599-1655). The project scope is limited to the contents regarding Chinese *Trimśikā* (*The Thirty Verses*) stanza #2cd, #3, and #4 in the *Cheng weishi lun*, and in the five late-Ming commentaries *Cheng Weishi lun suquan*, *Cheng weishi lun jijie*, *Cheng weishi lun zhengyi*, *Cheng weishi lun zikao*, and *Cheng weishi lun guanxin fayao* and in Kuiji's commentary *Cheng weishi lun shuji*.

The analysis of this study is conducted at two levels: the quantitative analysis at the macro level and the qualitative analysis at the micro level. The methods at the macro level include the analysis of citation sources, citation types, quotation frequency and quotation counts. The methods at the micro level of analysis comprise the English translation of *Cheng weishi lun* as a basis for analysis and the English translations of relevant late-Ming commentaries and their related citations for comparison. Both levels involve synchronic analysis within the late-Ming group and/or diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and Kuiji's *Cheng weishi lun shuji* when it is appropriate.

The macro level of analysis indicates that the tradition rebuilding takes times and stages. Mingyu, Tongrun, and Wang Kentang formed the exploration stage which features steep citation increases whereas Dahui and Zhixu formed the internalization stage which features fewer citations. The fact that approximately three fourths of Wang Kentang's commentary and one third of the total information of Tongrun are citations seems to reflect the authors' anxiety to establish the connection with the

tradition past in the exploration stage to a certain degree. Moreover, the analysis of within-group citations show that the tradition rebuilding is a community work in the late-Ming as well. For example, *Cheng weishi lun jijie* by Tongrun and *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* by Mingyu are No. 2 and No. 4 most quoted citation sources, respectively. In contrast, the citations that pass through indirect sources from *Cheng weishi lun shuji* to the late-Ming group account for only twelve percent of total citation count. That implies that the late-Ming group had much more exposure to non-*Cheng weishi lun shuji*'s perspective which accounts for eighty-eight percent of total citation count.

The micro level of analysis includes detailed discussions of forty-eight related topics in total in the framework of Twelve Aspects. The focus is to unfold the diverse ways in which a lost commentarial tradition could be rebuilt by different late-Ming commentators. Some key interesting findings include a blind test for “five seed-nature”, many faces of syncretism, and Wang Kentang’s unique way of reusing texts. Overall, what the late-Ming group accomplished is not “nature-characteristics synthesis” but “nature-characteristics syncretism”. The former means that the blending of School of Nature and School of Characteristics results in new Buddhist school or a new religion. However, this did not happen. What happened is that, in the contrast to Kuiji’s drive for reducing diverse voices in making a “compiled translation” of CWSL in Tang, the late-Ming commentators rebuilt the lost CWSL commentarial tradition in the opposite way. They not only restored the diversity connected with the “*weishi gu xue*” (the early consciousness-only doctrine), which Kuiji tried to get rid of. But they also added their contemporary diversity in both “*weishi gu xue*” and “*weishi jin xue*” (the later consciousness-only doctrine). As a result, the liberation of diversity, i.e. the release of the growing diversity, is both the cause and the effect of the rebuilding of CWSL commentarial tradition in late-Ming.

Keywords: *Cheng weishi lun*, Interrupted commentarial tradition, Commentarial tradition rebuilding, Late-Ming Buddhism

東亞唯識學主流的法相宗，主要是建立在七世紀玄奘所糅譯的《成唯識論》，以及玄奘弟子窺基等所作該論的註釋書。可惜，中國法相宗的傳承和《成唯識論》的註釋傳統歷時不長，約七十多年。然後，窺基等所建立的《成唯識論》註釋傳統，就隨著時間漸漸地在中國遺失。到了十六、十七世紀所謂的晚明唯識復興之時，晚明的唯識註釋家，只能在沒有窺基等所著註釋書可以參考的情況下，試圖重新建立一個已經中斷的《成唯識論》註釋傳統。

由於法相宗的唯識學是相當複雜且煩瑣的佛教經院哲學，一般研究《成唯識論》以及其註釋書的研究取向，無論是局外人或者是局內人，經常是以哲學思辯、思想史或者是何為唯識正見的探討為主軸。雖然，本研究也是以《成唯識論》，以及其十七世紀的註釋書為主要材料，本研究所關心的議題是：晚明的唯識註釋家如何重新建構一個已經中斷的《成唯識論》註釋傳統。探討的重心將在於一個註釋傳統如何被建構，特別是一個中斷的傳統的重新建構。

《成唯識論》有十卷，《成唯識論述記》有二十卷，晚明的《成唯識論》註釋書至少有八家，每家也各有十卷(廣承未竟的八卷除外)。面對如此大量且議題豐富的資料，一般的研究者經常是以唯識哲學的重要議題，如識變、所緣緣和三性說等，來作選擇性的取捨和判斷。如此的研究方法有好處也有限制。可能的限制是，不同研究者可能有迥然不同的斷章和取義。由於本研究的重點在於註釋傳統的建構，不在於哲學議題的價值判斷，所以本研究將採取的方法是，在限定範圍內，對於註釋傳統可能如何地被重新建構，作比較分析。

本研究的文本限定範圍是：《成唯識論》、《成唯識論述記》、《成唯識論俗詮》、《成唯識論集解》、《成唯識論證義》、《成唯識論自攷》和《成唯識論觀心法要》中，有關阿賴耶識的註釋。也就是漢譯唯識三十頌中，第二頌第三、第四句、第三頌和第四頌的《成唯識論》註釋，但不包括《成唯識論》中五教十理證有本識的部份。研究的主軸在於，晚明註釋家明昱、通潤、王肯堂、大惠和智旭，如何在此限定範圍內，重新建構《成唯識論》的註釋傳統。研究方法有兩個層次：宏觀的量化分析與微觀的質化分析。量化分析是有關晚明註釋的引用來源、引用型式、引用頻率和引用字數的分析。質化分析是在十二門(自相門、果相門、因相門等門)的架構下，在各種不同主題的討論中，晚明註釋家們是如何利用他們能夠取得的資料的借用、詮釋和再定義，來重新建構一個遺失的《成唯識論》註釋傳統。

藉由探討和分析一個重新建構傳統的實際案例，本研究希望一個「註釋傳統」的「建構性」能夠被更加地了解和注意。進而一個累積傳統的「可塑性」和「時代性」，與其「延續性」和「正統性」一樣，能夠至少受到相同的正視和省思。

論文各章組織和簡要重點整理如下：

第一章是論文寫作動機。首先，簡要敘述論文所要處理的歷史現象——一個中斷的《成唯識論》註釋傳統，以及了解這個千載難逢的歷史現象的重要性。接著，提出研究問題：晚明的唯識註釋家如何重新建構一個已經中斷的《成唯識論》註釋傳統？進一步，簡要地文獻回顧中國唯識傳統的發展、晚明唯識復興的研究和宗教綜攝的意涵。最後，定義研究範圍、研究方法和研究假說。

第二章是明朝相關脈絡的簡要回顧。本章分為兩大節：第一節是外部相關脈絡，包括明朝有關的佛教政策、王陽明心學的影響、智識主義與反智識主義的鐘擺和明朝仕紳和僧侶的相互定義。第二節是內部相關脈絡，以重要人物的相關影響的簡要介紹為主。先簡要介紹晚明唯識復興倡導的重要人物有關生平；再簡要介紹所研究的晚明註釋家明显、通潤、王肯堂、大惠和智旭的相關生平。

第三章是宏觀的量化分析。利用晚明註釋的引用來源、引用型式、引用頻率和引用字數的分析，以量化數據來具體呈現一個中斷的傳統如何被重新建構的「建構階段性」、「建構社群性」和「註釋家相對影響性」等。例如，從晚明各家註釋的出版時間、註釋的總字數、引用的字數和引用的型式分析，可以大略地將五家註釋分成二個階段：探索的階段和內化的階段。為了建構與過去歷史和傳統的聯結正當性，探索階段呈現出顯著的大量文獻引用的成長趨勢。一旦聯結正當性建構完成，內化階段不再強調文獻引用的數量，而且引用型式也由逐字引用型式轉移到改述的引用型式的趨勢，註釋家的主體性似乎相對地被重視。又例如，第二章的內部相關脈絡回顧只能約略地捕捉到，晚明註釋家與其重要影響人物間的大概的社群網絡。本章晚明註釋的組內引用分析，可以讓我們有機會更具體化地了解晚明註釋家間的可能相對位置，譬如：相對於明显和通潤，王肯堂似乎比較接近於通潤。

第四章是微觀的質化分析。在十二門的架構下，首先，進行《成唯識論》文本的英文翻譯，以作為進一步主題分析的依據。翻譯有參照比對 Cook (1999) 和 Poussin/Leonhard (2017) 的相對應英文翻譯，並在 footnote 註記相對應頁碼。接著，針對有關的晚明註釋五家的註釋和引用文獻作英文翻譯和比較分析。其中，包括相對應的《成唯識論述記》的英文翻譯和比較分析。所以，比較分析可能同時涉及晚明註釋家間的共時性分析和晚明註釋家和窺基間的跨時性分析。質化分析總共有四十八個主題分析。在文本限定範圍內，作如此大量的不同的主題分析的目的，主要是要呈現晚明註釋重建的多樣性，以及此多樣性的不同可能來源。並且盡量地避免以單一或是少數的案例來對任何一家晚明註釋家作出價值判斷。

第五章是結論。主要是扼要重述量化分析和質化分析的主要發現，包括研究假說結果的列表呈現。特別重述幾個深具晚明特色的個案研究，如：五種性各別的盲測、晚明重建的多種臉像和王肯堂獨特的文本再使用。最後的結論是：多樣性的解放。不同於唐代時代有國家朝廷支持的集中譯經場、有功德顯赫的

高僧玄奘和百部論主的窺基大師，晚明有的是王陽明心學解放後的時代精神、蓬勃發展的居士佛教和仕紳和僧侶間相互定義的社會氛圍。所以，當晚明註釋家重新建構一個已經中斷的《成唯識論》註釋傳統時，不僅僅意外地把窺基當時試圖利用糶譯所去除的不同聲音加了回來，同時也將當時時代的多樣性挹注到唯識古學和唯識今學中。結果，多樣性的解放不僅是晚明唯識傳統重建的因，也是晚明唯識傳統重建的果。

關鍵詞：《成唯識論》、中斷的註釋傳統、註釋傳統的重新建構、晚明佛教





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
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## Abbreviations and Convention

- CWSL: T31n1585 *Cheng weishi lun* 成唯識論 translated by Xuanzang  
CWSLS: T43n1830 *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 composed by Kuiji  
LMC#1: X50n0820 *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 composed by Mingyu  
LMC#2: X50n0821 *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解 composed by Tongrun  
LMC#3: X50n0822 *Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi* 成唯識論證義 composed by Wang Kentang  
LMC#4: X51n0823 *Cheng Weishi lun zikao* 成唯識論自攷 composed by Dahui  
LMC#5: X51n0824 *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要 composed by Zhixu  
ZJL: T48n2016 *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 composed by Yangshou  
WKWD: X55n888 *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 composed by Yun Feng  
HJSC: T36n1736 *Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 composed by Chengguan
- Ch. : terms in Chinese  
Skt.: terms in Sanskrit
- [] Brackets in English translation: insertion by the author.  
( ) Parenthesis in English translation: paraphrase, explanations, etc.
- T: Taishō Tripitaka 大正新脩大藏經  
X: Manji Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzōkyō 卅新纂大日本續藏經  
J: Jiaxing Canon 嘉興大藏經  
P: Northern Yongle Edition of the Canon 永樂北藏  
CBETA: Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association

## Chapter 1. Introduction

### 1-1 Motivation

Traditions might tend to be considered as something starting from the very far past and/or something going to last very long into the future. However, traditions might be more vulnerable than people thought. For example, the late-Ming observed that the key Tang commentaries for *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論 were totally lost<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, traditions might be more malleable than people supposed when the late-Ming commentators tried to re-build up their *Weishi* (consciousness-only) commentaries tradition. Smith said, "...'The cumulative tradition' as a concept, therefore, is not inflexible or final, either in content or in form. It is not given by the world, but is a human construct offered to order what is given..."<sup>2</sup> Hobsbawm maintained that "...'Traditions' which appear or claim to be old are often quite recent in origin and sometimes invented..."<sup>3</sup> Why is there such a gap between the general impression and scholars' observations and suggestions? I guess one of reasons is that people seldom experience in person the interruption of traditions and/or even participate in rebuilding the tradition so they tend to take it for granted the tradition that they live in. The interruption of consciousness-only commentarial tradition occurred in China in the late-Ming period offers a great opportunity to figure out how a lost commentarial tradition was rebuilt and/or reinvented by several key late-Ming commentators. In the following subsection, I will detail how the history of consciousness-only tradition open to us the window of such a golden opportunity.

Furthermore, scholars might tend to ignore the study of the post-Tang Buddhism because they consider it in a state of decline due to no new scriptures translated, no new doctrines formulated, and no quality monastic community<sup>4</sup>. However, Yu whose first book is about the renewal Buddhism in China in late-Ming questions whether or not new scriptures, new doctrines and quality monastic community are the only criteria to evaluate the post-Tang Buddhism. She advocates that "Ming Buddhism ought to be studied not because it was better or worse than its predecessors, but because it differed from them."<sup>5</sup>

In addition, religious syncretism might tend to be thought to be either betrayal of principle, or compromise of truth, or corruption of orthodox teaching. However, Berling who specialized in Chinese religious syncretism in Ming questions the

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<sup>1</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 503, a10-14 // Z 1:81, p. 1, d10-14 // R81, p. 2, b10-14.

<sup>2</sup> Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *The Meaning and End of Religion* (Harper & Row, 1963), pp.168-69.

<sup>3</sup> Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press, 1983), p.1.

<sup>4</sup> Chun-fang Yu, *The Renewal of Buddhism in China: Chu-Hung and the Late Ming Synthesis* (Columbia University Press, 1981), p.4.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

assumption that religions groups in China have clear doctrinal boundaries and mutually exclusive membership. Without clear boundaries and exclusive memberships, where would betrayal, compromise and corruption come from? Moreover, who are supposed to define the so-called orthodox? The extreme view of “orthodox” denies the fact that religions change whereas the syncretism recognizes the process of religious interactions and changes.<sup>6</sup> My study is also about how the interaction and changing processes among different Buddhist schools might have an influence on the rebuilding of the late-Ming consciousness-only commentaries tradition in the hope to better appreciate how the rebuilding of commentaries tradition navigates in the religious syncretism-oriented context of the late-Ming.

## **1-2 Weishi Tradition Initiation, Division and Interruption in China**

### **1-2-1 Old translations vs. New translations**

Buddhist canon started diffusing into China as early as Emperor Ming of Han dynasty 漢明帝 (r. 58-75). Since then until early Yuan dynasty (1271–1368) the translations of Buddhist canon into Chinese can be roughly divided into two periods: the period of old translations and the period of new translations. The watershed moment was triggered by translations that done by Xuanzang 玄奘 (circa 602-664). Before Xuanzang is the period of old translations which were mainly led by foreign translators like An Shigao 安世高 (arrived China around 148), Lokakṣema 支婁迦讖 (arrived China around 168), Kumārajīva 鳩摩羅什 (344–413), Dharmakṣema 曇無讖 (385-433), Guṇabhadra 求那跋陀羅 (394-468), Bodhiruci 菩提流支 (arrived China 508- 537), Ratnamati 勒那摩提 (arrived China 508), Paramārtha 真諦 (499-569) and etc. The period of new translations were most headed by local translators like Xuanzang, Yijing 義淨 (635-713) and etc.<sup>7</sup>

The diffusion of Yogācāra philosophy into China is through the translations of Buddhist canon into Chinese as well. Thus, corresponding to old translations and new translations, there are two main streams of Yogācāra philosophy in China.<sup>8</sup> The old translations of Yogācāra canon is called “*weishi gu xue*” (唯識古學, the early consciousness-only doctrine) while the new translations is called “*weishi jin xue*” (唯識今學, the later consciousness-only doctrine). The former refers to the stream of Yogācāra philosophy that taught by Bodhiruci, Ratnamati, Paramārtha and etc during

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<sup>6</sup> Judith A Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-En* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp.1-6.

<sup>7</sup> Cheng Lu, "'Fo Jiao Yan Jiu Fa" 佛教研究法," in *"Xian Dai Fo Jiao Xue Shu Cong Kan" 現代佛教學術叢刊*, ed. Man-tau Chang (Taipei, Taiwan: Dacheng wenhua, 1978), p.207.

<sup>8</sup> Yoshifumi Ueda, "Two Main Streams of Thought in Yogācāra Philosophy," *Philosophy East and West* 17, no. 1/4 (1967).

Northern and Southern dynasties 南北朝 (420 to 589). The latter is the other stream of Yogācāra philosophy that coming down from Xuanzang and his disciples.<sup>9</sup> There are many differences between these two main streams.<sup>10</sup> It could be either due to differences of translations or different teachings of Yogācāra lineages in India in different times.<sup>11</sup>

### 1-2-2 “Weishi gu xue” (唯識古學, the early consciousness-only doctrine)

The study of *Shi di jing lun* 十地經論 that composed by Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Bodhiruci, Ratnamati, and Buddhaśānta 佛陀扇多 marked the start of consciousness-only doctrine study in China.<sup>12</sup> Those who studied and promoted the teaching of *Shi di jing lun* 十地經論 were called *dilun shi* (地論師). At the very beginning during the translation period, Bodhiruci and Ratnamati did not see eye to eye. Thus, *dilun shi* were divided into two groups. One group under Bodhiruci is called “Northern Path” (Ch. *bei dao* 北道). The other group under Ratnamati is called “Southern Path” (Ch. *nan dao* 南道). Southern Path argued that “nature of dharmas/phenomena” (法性) produces all dharmas whereas Northern Path argued that “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *li ye* 黎耶; i.e. 阿賴耶; Skt. *ālaya*) produces all dharmas/phenomena.<sup>13</sup> Southern Path argued that “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) is the “base” (依持) whereas Northern Path argued that “storehouse consciousness” 黎耶 (Ch. *li ye* 黎耶; Skt. *ālaya*) is the “base” (依持).<sup>14</sup> In terms of Buddha nature, Southern Path advocated the theory of “permanence in the present” (現常). In other words, Buddha nature is “originally existent” (本有). On the other hand, Northern Path advocated the theory of “permanence in the future” (當常). In other words, Buddha nature is nurtured.<sup>15</sup> All these differences seem because *Shi di jing lun* is ambiguous about the orientation of “storehouse consciousness”.<sup>16</sup>

In the later development of *dilun shi*, for at least two reasons, it might be safe to

<sup>9</sup> Wei-zhong Yang, “*Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi*” 中國唯識宗通史 (Nanjing, China: Feng huang chu ban she, 2008), p.10.

<sup>10</sup> Guang-xi Mei, “Xiang Zong Xin Jiu Liang Yi Bu Tong Lun” 相宗新舊兩譯不同論, in “*Xian Dai Fo Jiao Xue Shu Cong Kan*” 現代佛教學術叢刊, ed. Man-tau Chang (Taipei, Taiwan: Dacheng wenhua, 1978).

<sup>11</sup> Cheng Lu, “*Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun*” 中國佛學源流略論 (Taipei, Taiwan: Darchen Publishing, 2003), pp. 288-30.

<sup>12</sup> Yang, “*Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi*” 中國唯識宗通史, p.15.

<sup>13</sup> See T34, no. 1719, p. 285, a1-6.

<sup>14</sup> See T33, no. 1717, p. 942, c17-22.

<sup>15</sup> See T50, no. 2053, p. 225, c15-18 and Yang, “*Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi*” 中國唯識宗通史, pp.173-74.

<sup>16</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.49-50. And Zong-san Mou, “*Fo Xing Yu Ban Ruo Shang*” 佛性與般若 上 vol. 3, “*Mou Zong San Xian Sheng Quan Ji*” 牟宗三先生全集 (Linking Publishing, 2003), p.283. And Ren-you Shi, “Diun Zong Nan Dao Pai Chuqi Xin Yi Shi Si Xiang Chu Tan- Yi Fashang Shi Di Lun Yi Shu Wei Zhong Xin” 地論宗南道派初期心意識思想初探-以法上十地論義疏為中心 (Yuan Kuang Buddhist Institute, 1998), p. 109.

say that Huayan school span off from *dilun shi*. First because we could trace Fazang 法藏 (643-712) who is the actual founder of Huayan school in the lineage map of “southern path” of *dilun shi* from Zhiyan 智儼 (602-668), to Zhizheng 智正, to Lingyu 靈裕 (518-605), to Daoping 道憑 (488-559), to Huikuang 慧光 (468 – 537), up to Ratnamati.<sup>17</sup> Secondly because Huayan’s theory of “perfect interfusion of six characteristics of phenomena” (Ch. *liu xiang yuan rong* 六相圓融) is developed from six characteristics of *Shi di jing lun*.<sup>18</sup> Thus Huayan school has been part of Consciousness-only family in China since its beginning. On the other hand, probably because the followers of Northern Path diversified into other areas or the theories of Northern Path were highly overlapping with theories of “*she lun shi*” (攝論師), Northern Path seemed in decline or absorbed into *she lun shi*.<sup>19</sup>

*She lun shi* are those who studied and promoted the teaching of *She dacheng lun shi* 攝大乘論釋 (Skt. *Mahāyāna-samgraha*; Commentary on the Summary of the Great Vehicle) that composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha. Among all his translations, Paramārtha not only was most satisfied with his translation quality of *She dacheng lun shi* but also most favored promoting teaching of *She dacheng lun shi*.<sup>20</sup> Paramārtha posited nine consciousnesses in total. The ninth consciousness is “undefiled consciousness” (Ch. *wu gou shi* 無垢識; Skt. *amala-vijñāna*) which having thusness as its substance. The eighth consciousness- “storehouse consciousness (Ch. *a li ye shi* 阿梨耶識)- has three implications: 1) “storehouse consciousness of liberation nature” (Ch. *jie xing li ye* 解性梨耶); 2) “storehouse consciousness of retribution” (Ch. *guo bao li ye* 果報梨耶); 3) “defiled storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *ran wu a li ye* 染汙阿梨耶).<sup>21</sup> The implication of “storehouse consciousness of liberation nature” (Ch. *jie xing li ye* 解性梨耶) seems playing the role of bridge between the ninth consciousness and the eighth consciousness. Moreover, in *Jue ding zang lun* 決定藏論 which is Paramārtha’s partial translation of the *Viniścaya* 攝抉擇分 of *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice), Paramārtha separately treated the ninth consciousness as the base of “path of sages” (聖道) and the eighth consciousness as the base of all afflictions. This might be mainly what distinguishes *she lun shi* under Paramārtha from Southern Path of *dilun shi* who argued thusness is the base of all dharmas.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>17</sup> ""Diun Zong Nan Dao Pai Chuqi Xin Yi Shi Si Xiang Chu Tan- Yi Fashang Shi Di Lun Yi Shu Wei Zhong Xin" 地論宗南道派初期心意識思想初探-以法上十地論義疏為中心," p.42.

<sup>18</sup> See Lu, "Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun" 中國佛學源流略論, p.304-06. And Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, pp.181-87.

<sup>19</sup> See Shi, ""Diun Zong Nan Dao Pai Chuqi Xin Yi Shi Si Xiang Chu Tan- Yi Fashang Shi Di Lun Yi Shu Wei Zhong Xin" 地論宗南道派初期心意識思想初探-以法上十地論義疏為中心," p.42-43.

<sup>20</sup> Lu, "Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun" 中國佛學源流略論, pp.230-31.

<sup>21</sup> See X21, no. 369, p. 240, b20-c7 // Z 1:34, p. 360, b18-c11 // R34, p. 719, b18-p. 720, a11.

<sup>22</sup> See T30, no. 1584, p. 1020, b10-19. And see Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識

There are also two groups of *she lun shi* following Paramārtha. One is Paramārtha's direct disciples like Fatai 法泰 and Daoni 道尼. The other is indirect disciples like Tanqian 曇遷 (542-607) and Jingsong 靖嵩 (537-614). Paramārtha's teachings and works almost died out together with his direct disciples. It is the latter group like Tanqian 曇遷 (542-607) and Jingsong 靖嵩 (537-614) who happened to indirectly learned Paramārtha's teachings when they fled to the south to escape Buddhist Persecution in the north and then successfully promoted Paramārtha's *She lun* when they were back to the north.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, Keng argues that the group of direct disciples better preserved Paramārtha's original teachings of *She dacheng lun shi* whereas the group of indirect disciples with strong background of *dilun shi* tended to interpret key concept of "liberation nature" (Ch. *jie xing* 解性)<sup>24</sup> from the perspective of *Dacheng qi xin lun* 大乘起信論 (the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna).<sup>25</sup> Probably because this dominant and surviving group of *she lun shi* promoted hybrid teachings rather than Paramārtha's original teachings, they invited many critiques that were based on those new translations done by Xuanzang and eventually faded away.

### 1-2-3 "Weishi jin xue" (唯識今學, the later consciousness-only doctrine)

Xuanzang had exposure to Buddhism in his early life and renounced the secular life at age of thirteen<sup>26</sup> and received full ordination in 622 CE. Since then, he learned many Buddhist teachings by travelling domestically and attending whatever Buddhist lectures available. However, Xuanzang had a hard time in consolidating different Buddhist teachings. One significant example was the arguments between northern and southern *dilun shi*. Probably also being inspired by the visiting Indian Buddhist scholar Prabhākaramitra 波頗蜜多羅 (565-633) then, Xuanzang decided to get the first hand material and teachings by traveling to India himself.<sup>27</sup> He departed for

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宗通史, pp.344-45.

<sup>23</sup> Ching Keng, *Yogācāra Buddhism Transmitted or Transformed? Paramārtha (499–569) and His Chinese Interpreters* (Harvard University, 2009), pp. 317-19.

<sup>24</sup> There are many possible ways to interpret *jie xing* 解性. See *ibid.*, pp.398-400.

<sup>25</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.345-46. In addition, *Dacheng qi xin lun* 大乘起信論 (the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna) was attributed to Aśvaghōṣa and translated by Paramārtha in 550. However, many modern scholars were skeptical. So far there seems no consensus. See Yoshito S Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith: Attributed to Aśvaghōṣa* (Columbia University Press, 1967), pp.1-7. And Akira Hirakawa and Kun-Mu Zhuang, "Yin Du Fo Jiao Shi" 印度佛教史 (Shang zhou chu ban she, 2002), pp. 369-72. And Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, pp.228-48.

<sup>26</sup> Regarding when exactly Xuanzang was born, there are many arguments. Here I assume Xuanzang was born in 602. See different arguments in "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, pp.372-80.

<sup>27</sup> Cheng Lu, "Xuanzang Fashi Lue Chuan" 玄奘法師略傳, in "Xian Dai Fo Jiao Xue Shu Cong Kan" 現代佛教學術叢刊 (Taipei, Taiwan: Dacheng wenhua, 1980), p.1.

India in 629 CE<sup>28</sup> and back to China in 645 CE. During his stay in India, he studied for five years with Śīlabhadra 戒賢 (529–645) who was the abbot of Nālandā monastery then and known as a Yogācāra expert in the direct line from Dharmapāla 護法 (530-561) and for another two year with Jayasena 勝軍 who were good at Buddhist logic and inherited the Yogācāra teachings from both Sthiramati 安慧 (circa 510-570) and Nanda 難陀.<sup>29</sup> When Xuanzang was back to China, he brought back six hundred fifty and seven books of Buddhist Sanskrit texts. With strong sponsorship of Emperor Taizong (598- 649) and Emperor Gaozong (628-683) of Tang, he spent nineteen years in translating seventy and five books of Buddhist Sanskrit texts into Chinese in one thousand three hundred thirty and five fascicles.<sup>30</sup> The translation of *Cheng Weishi Lun* was done in 659 CE.<sup>31</sup>

Kuiji 窺基 (632-682) was amanuensis (Ch. *bis hou* 筆受) of *Cheng Weishi Lun* (*Treatise that establishes the consciousness-only*, hereinafter referred as CWSL) that is a commentary on Vasubandhu's *Weishi sanshi lun song* 唯識三十論頌 (*Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā*, Thirty Verses on Consciousness, hereinafter referred as *Triṃśikā*). CWSL is an exceptional "compiled translation" (Ch. *rou yi* 糅譯) that was ever done by Xuanzang. Xuanzang's original plan was to assign Shenfang 神昉, Jiashang 嘉尚, Puguang 普光 and Kuiji to translate each of ten Indian commentators' treatises on *Triṃśikā*. However, by taking into account the possible confusion due to the multiple voices, Kuiji pleaded with Xuanzang for reconsideration and highly suggested doing the "compiled translation" selectively. Xuanzang lastly agreed and delegated Kuiji be solely in charge.<sup>32</sup> Thus the "compiled translation" ends up being primarily based on the view of Dharmapāla.<sup>33</sup> Different from those senior and experienced scholar monks who assisted Xuanzang in translation, Kuiji started up being novice monk as a gatekeeper of Xuanzang at seventeen.<sup>34</sup> Without the background of old translations, he was like an empty vessel that open and ready to accept any new teachings inputs from Xuanzang. Moreover, Xuanzang was too busy in leading the scriptural translations to work on his own works. Kuiji worked diligently in taking notes of Xuanzang's oral discourses on every the scriptural translations. After Xuanzang passed away, based on these notes, Kuiji focused doing commentaries for those new translations done by Xuanzang. His commentaries and

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<sup>28</sup> Regarding when exactly Xuanzong departed for India, there are many arguments as well. Here I assume 629 and so called 17 years in total means to include both start year and end year. See Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, pp.400-11.

<sup>29</sup> Ibid., p.535.

<sup>30</sup> Lu, "Xuanzang Fashi Lue Chuan" 玄奘法師略傳, p.3.

<sup>31</sup> Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, p.447.

<sup>32</sup> See T43, no. 1831, p. 608, b29-c14.

<sup>33</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 232, a8-12.

<sup>34</sup> See T43, no. 1831, p. 608, b26-27.

works were mainly based on Dharmapāla's new teaching that Xuanzang introduced. Kuiji was very prolific. There are about forty-eight works that attributed to his name. Twenty-eight work are still extant. For CWSL alone, he came out four commentaries in total. *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 in twenty fascicles, *Cheng weishi lun zhangzhong shuyao* 成唯識論掌中樞要 in four fascicles, *Cheng weishi lun liao jian* 成唯識論料簡 in two fascicles, and *Cheng weishi lun bie chao* 成唯識論別抄 in ten fascicles but extant in only four fascicles.<sup>35</sup> As Kuiji's direct disciple, Huizhao 慧沼 (650-714) wrote *Cheng Weishi lun liaoyi deng* 成唯識論了義燈 to exalt Kuiji's teachings and critique other competing teachings coming from Yuance 圓測 and etc. Following the direct line from Kuiji and Huizhao, Zhizhou 智周 (668-723) wrote *Cheng Weishi lun yanmi* 成唯識論演秘 as a commentary on both *Cheng Weishi Lun* 成唯識論 and *Cheng weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記. All of these works formed an enterprise that was later on recognized as the establishment of Faxiang school (Ch. *faxiang zong* 法相宗) and represents the core of Consciousness-only school in Eastern Asia.

#### 1-2-4 CWSL Weishi Tradition Interruption

Unfortunately, the lineage of the Faxiang School in China only survived for approximately seventy years.<sup>36</sup> Furthermore, those important Consciousness-only commentaries that Kuiji, Huizhao and Zhizhou built up were eventually lost in circulation in China for a long period of time. Between the seventh century when Consciousness-only School in Tang dynasty (618- 907) reached its hegemony and the sixteenth century when the renaissance of Consciousness-only in late-Ming started, according to Sheng Yen's study, there were few Consciousness-only studies done in China except some Consciousness-only discussions that mentioned in *Huayan jing shuchao* 華嚴經疏鈔 (An Informal Collection of Discourses and Commentaries on the Flower Ornament Scripture; hereafter referred as HJSC) composed by Chengguan 澄觀 (738-839), in *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 (Record of the Thesis [of One Mind Revealing Everything like a] Mirror ; hereafter referred as ZJL)<sup>37</sup> compiled by

<sup>35</sup> Yang, "Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi" 中國唯識宗通史, pp.579-82.

<sup>36</sup> Yi-biao Chen, "A Comparative Study of Chinese and Japanese Fa-Xing School's Lineage and Characteristics 中日法相宗傳承與宗風之比較," *Hsuan Chuang Journal of Buddhism* 玄奘佛學研究, no. 3 (2005): p.107.

<sup>37</sup> Welter translates *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 as "Records of the Source-Mirror". In his translation of the preface of *Zongjing lu*, Welter translates "舉一心為宗，照萬法如鏡" as "I advance that universal mind is the implicit truth [zong], revealing the myriad dharmas like a mirror [jing]". Thus Welter seems to understand mind and zong as either source of the truth or the truth itself. I am not sure about such interpretation. I would rather read "zong" as "thesis" and understand Yanshou as upholding the thesis of one mind revealing everything like a mirror. So I come out my own translation of *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 here. See Albert Welter, *Yongming Yanshou's Conception of Chan in the Zongjing Lu: A Special Transmission within the Scriptures* (Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 3 & pp. 48-51 & p. 240.



Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904-975), and in *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 (Questions and answers intended to inspire the Consciousness-only study; hereafter referred as WKWD) composed by Yun feng 雲峰 in Yuan Dynasty (1271-1378).<sup>38</sup> So far we do not know when exactly those Tang Consciousness-only commentaries were lost in the circulation in China for what reasons. At least some of them seemed still in circulation when ZJL was compiled because their quotations were found in ZJL. However, they were already totally lost in the late-Ming as we saw the reports in the prefaces of several late-Ming commentaries.<sup>39</sup> Fortunately, since Tang dynasty when Chinese Consciousness-only School were transmitted to Japan, Japanese Faxiang school have never experienced any interruption for over one thousand three hundred years. Those lost Tang commentaries were re-introduced back to China from Japan in the end of the nineteenth century when Yang Wenhui 楊文會 (1837-1911) requested his Japanese friend Nanjō Bunyū 南條文雄 (1849-1927) for help in searching and sending back two hundred thirty-five Buddhist texts that including those important Consciousness-only commentaries.<sup>40</sup>

### 1-2-5 The Window of Golden Opportunity

The so-called renaissance of Consciousness-only in the late-Ming, based on the study of Sheng Yen, are referring to at least thirty-five Consciousness-only commentaries that were produced in the period between 1511 and 1647 CE in China.<sup>41</sup> However, does the quantity of Consciousness-only commentaries make “renaissance of Consciousness-only”? When those late-Ming Consciousness-only commentaries were produced without access to those Tang Consciousness-only commentaries, would their qualities be reliable and should their contributions be appreciated? Indeed, there are some people who considering most of the late-Ming Consciousness-only texts redundant after those lost Tang Consciousness-only commentaries are reintroduced from Japan back to China.<sup>42</sup> Moreover, in Japanese Edo period there were some Japanese Consciousness-only experts who did plainly criticize some late-Ming Consciousness-only commentators for producing valueless and incorrect Consciousness-only commentaries. To address such challenge, in my previous study, I've compared the late-Ming Consciousness-only commentaries to the

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<sup>38</sup> Sheng-yen Shi, "'Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Journal* 中華佛學學報, no. 1 (1987): pp.3-4.

<sup>39</sup> See *ibid.*, pp.17-18. And X50, no. 820, p. 503, a10-22 // Z 1:81, p. 1, d10-p. 2, a4 // R81, p. 2, b10-p. 3, a4.

<sup>40</sup> Chen, "A Comparative Study of Chinese and Japanese Fa-Xing School's Lineage and Characteristics 中日法相宗傳承與宗風之比較," p.108.

<sup>41</sup> Shi, "'Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," pp.21-23.

<sup>42</sup> John Makeham, *Transforming Consciousness: Yogācāra Thought in Modern China* (Oxford University Press (UK), 2014), p.11.

Japanese Edo consciousness-only commentaries on Xuanzang's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun* 觀所緣緣論 and showed that the access to the key Tang Consciousness-only commentaries does significantly impact late-Ming commentators' capacity to identify controversial issues, to distinguish different realists' views, and to address some Consciousness-only school's internal arguments. Nevertheless, we do not know why the late-Ming commentators seemed choosing not to use all the sources that available to them.<sup>43</sup> In addition, the sampled base text, *Guan suoyuanyuan lun*, is definitely not as significant as CWSL that is the core root text of Consciousness-only School in Eastern Asia. Of thirty-five late-Ming commentaries that comprise 107 fascicles, there are eight late-Ming commentaries on CWSL whereas there are only two late-Ming commentaries on Xuanzang's *Guan suoyuanyuan lun*. The former consists of seventy-eight fascicles in total while the latter comprises two fascicles only.<sup>44</sup> Thus, in order to assess the quality and the significance of the late-Ming commentaries, a better understanding of how the late-Ming commentators worked together and/or competed with each other in decoding the CWSL without access to the key Tang commentaries is critical and essential. This is the purpose that I would like to accomplish in this study as well. Before further laying out the project scope and the methodology, I like to go through the brief literature review of couple of key late-Ming Consciousness-only studies first.

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<sup>43</sup> Chih-chang Yang, "The Contrast of Late Ming Weishi Commentaries and Edo Weishi Commentaries on Xuanzang's *Guan Suoyuanyuan Lun*," *Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies* 臺大佛學研究, no. 34 (2017).

<sup>44</sup> Shi, ""Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," pp. 21-23.

### 1-3 Brief Review of Late-Ming Consciousness-Only Studies

There have not been many researches done on the subject of late-Ming Consciousness-only study. In 1987 Sheng Yen was the first scholar who published a paper regarding who studied Consciousness-only in the late-Ming and their Consciousness-only thinking.<sup>45</sup> Then a decade later in 1997 Zhang Zhi-qiang completed his PhD dissertation regarding Consciousness-only thinking and late-Ming Consciousness-only study and published it in 2001.<sup>46</sup> Up to date these two works cover most macro discussion associated with Consciousness-only study in late-Ming and early Qing period.<sup>47</sup>

#### 1-3-1 General difference between Kuiji-led *Weishi* study and late-Ming *Weishi* study

According to Sheng Yen, the consciousness-only study that led by Kuiji is intended to elucidate the entire Buddhist teachings from the one single doctrine of consciousness-only. On the other hand, late-Ming consciousness-only study aims for the inter-communications among all Buddhist teachings and attempts to utilize consciousness-only doctrine as a complement to the contemporary Buddhist teachings. There is a common emphasis on the propensity of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (Ch. *xing xiang rong hui* 性相融會). The rationale behind such propensity is that, since Kuiji-led consciousness-only commentaries were lost, the late-Ming consciousness-only study had to rely on unorthodox Consciousness-only material like HJSC by Chengguan and ZJL by Yongming Yanshou and be influenced accordingly.<sup>48</sup>

In addition, Zhang’s study is trying to assess the differences between the late-Ming consciousness-only study and Kuiji-led consciousness-only doctrine through three main topics: 1) how to interpret the “real objects” (Ch. *xing jing* 性境, objects which arise from seeds); 2) how to understand the “objects of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣緣, *ālambanam-pratyaya*); 3) how to understand the relationship between “four aspects of consciousness” (四分) and “eight consciousnesses” (八識). With Kuiji-led consciousness-only doctrine as a correct view, Zhang reports that late-Ming commentators made mistakes in understanding and interpreting consciousness-only doctrine. Zhang attributes those mistakes to two reasons: 1) Due to the

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<sup>45</sup> Ibid.

<sup>46</sup> Zhi-qiang Zhang, “Weishi Si Xiang Yu Wan Ming Weishi Xue Yan Jiu” 唯識思想與晚明唯識學研究, in “Zhong Guo Fo Jiao Xue Shu Lun Dian” 中國佛教學術論典 (Fo Guang Shan Foundation for Buddhist Culture & Education 2001).

<sup>47</sup> Kai-ting Chien, “A Forgotten Tradition: The Lesser Known Late-Ming and Early-Qing Annotations of the Cheng Weishi Lun 被忘卻的傳統-明末清初《成唯識論》相關珍稀注釋書考論,” *Chinese Studies 漢學研究* 35, no. 1 (2017).

<sup>48</sup> Shi, “Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang” 明末的唯識學者及其思想, pp.1-4.

interruption of consciousness-only lineage and the lost key consciousness-only texts, the late-Ming consciousness-only study was not a natural development that following the logic of consciousness-only doctrine. 2) The late-Ming study was conducted under the idea of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (Ch. *xing xiang rong tong* 性相通融). What the late-Ming consciousness-only study reflects is how “School of Nature” (Ch. *xing zong* 性宗) makes sense of “School of Characteristics” (Ch. *xiang zong* 相宗) and how School of Nature interprets School of Characteristics. Furthermore, for the purpose of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (性相通融), on one hand, late-Ming consciousness-only scholars modified the theory of School of Characteristics such as “theory of “characteristics and nature disparity” (Ch. *xiang xing bu tong lun* 相性不同論) in order to avoid the impression that characteristics and nature are conflicting to each other and to make it less too scholastic. On the other hand, late-Ming consciousness-only scholars tried to make up for School of Nature theory’s deficiency by learning from School of Characteristics.<sup>49</sup>

Thus both Sheng Yen and Zhang share the same observation that there is difference between Kuiji-led consciousness-only study and the late-Ming consciousness-only study. The rationale are two folded: the lost Tang consciousness-only commentaries and late-Ming consciousness-only scholars’ dependence on the unorthodox consciousness-only material that has strong propensity of nature-characteristics syncretism.

### 1-3-2 Origin and development of the notion of “nature-characteristics syncretism”(性相通融)

Zhang’s study shows that the notion of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (Ch. *xing xiang tong rong* 性相通融) was first brought up by Fazang 法藏 (643-712) who is the third patriarchs of Huayan school when he elucidates his theory of “the unity of the three natures” (Ch. *san xing yi ji* 三性一際) in *Huayan yicheng jiao yi fenqi zhang* 華嚴一乘教義分齊章 (Paragraphs on the Doctrine of Difference and Identity of the One Vehicle of Huayan) as below.

Three natures (三性, Skt. *trisvabhāva*) each have two meanings. For the Perfect Nature (真中, Skt. *pariniṣpanna*), one is the meaning of “being immutable” (Ch. *bu bian* 不變). The other is of “responding to the conditions” (Ch. *sui yuan* 隨緣). For the Dependent Nature (依他; Skt. *paratantra*), one is the meaning of “semblances of existence” (Ch. *shi you* 似有). The other is of “without self-nature” (Ch. *wu xing* 無性). For the Imaginary Nature (所執; Skt. *parikalpita*),

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<sup>49</sup> Zhang, ""Weishi Si Xiang Yu Wan Ming Weishi Xue Yan Jiu" 唯識思想與晚明唯識學研究," pp.408-32.

one is the meaning of “appearing to be existent to the senses (Ch. *qing you* 情有). The other is of “being inexistent in reality” (Ch. *li wu* 理無). Due to three meanings of “being immutable” of the Perfect Nature, “without self-nature” of the Dependent Nature and “being inexistent in reality” of the Imaginary Nature, the Three Natures are unitary, not different from each other. This is what it means by not negating the phenomenal “derivatives” (Ch. *mo* 末) while keeping the permanent “base” (Ch. *ben* 本) eternal. Sūtra says, “All sentient beings are nirvāṇa, there are no more need to enter into the nirvāṇa.” Furthermore, in terms of “responding to the conditions” of the Perfect Nature, “semblances of existence” of the Dependent Nature, and “appearing to be existent to the senses” of the Imaginary Nature, the meanings are not different, either. This is what it means by not affecting the base while keeping the phenomenal “derivatives” constant. Sūtra says, “When the dharmakāya transmigrates in the five paths, it is called all sentient beings.” Since the latter three meanings and the former three meanings are not one perspective, the true base embraces the false derivatives, and the false derivatives penetrate the true base. Therefore, “nature and characteristics syncretize each other” (Ch. *xing xiang tong rong* 性相通融) without obstacles<sup>50</sup>

Zhang maintains that Fazang’s theory of three natures belongs to the “old translations” of consciousness-only doctrine. Because Zhang thinks that in “*weishi gu xue*” (唯識古學, the early consciousness-only doctrine) that led by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu there is no clear distinction between the Dependent Nature and the Imaginary Nature. All dependent arising dharmas look like existent but are viewed as not real. In contrast, in “*weishi jin xue*” (唯識今學, the later consciousness doctrine) that led by Xuanzang the Dependent Nature not only is distinguished from the Imaginary Nature but also is given a certain degree of reality. Moreover, in terms of the Perfect Nature, Zhang points out that Fazang accepts the theory of “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) in *Dacheng qixin lun* (大乘起信論, *the Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna*) that defines thusness having two meanings. One is the meaning of “being immutable” (不變). The other is of “responding to the conditions”

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<sup>50</sup> 「三性各有二義，真中二義者：一、不變義；二、隨緣義。依他二義者：一、似有義；二、無性義。所執中二義者：一、情有義；二、理無義。由真中不變、依他無性、所執理無，由此三義故，三性一際同無異也。此則不壞末而常本也，經云『眾生即涅槃，不復更滅』也。又約真如隨緣、依他似有、所執情有，由此三義亦無異也。此則不動本而常末也，經云『法身流轉五道，名曰眾生也』，即由此三義與前三義是不一門也，是故真該妄末，妄徹真源，性相通融，無障無礙。」 (T45, no. 1866, p. 499, a13-23) My translation is based on original Chinese text and reference to Ming-wood Liu, "The Three-Nature Doctrine and Its Interpretation in Hua-Yen Buddhism," *T'oung Pao 通報* 68, no. 4 (1982): pp.200-04. And Antonio S Cua, *Encyclopedia of Chinese Philosophy* (Routledge, 2003), pp.254-55.

(隨緣). Fazang criticizes School of Characteristics for “the idea that thusness is frozen without change” (Ch. *zhen ru ning ran guan* 真如凝然觀). Instead, Fazang utilizes the meaning of “being immutable” to interpret “frozen thusness” while using “the incomprehensible” (Ch. *bu ke si yi* 不可思議) to mediate the permanent and the impermanent. Thus in terms of the relationship between the Perfect Nature and the Dependent Nature, Xuanzang and Kuiji advocates the theory of “characteristics and nature disparity” (Ch. *xiang xing bu tong lun* 相性不同) while Fazang maintains “nature-characteristics syncretism” (Ch. *xing xiang tong rong* 性相通融). Zhang thinks that the difference of these two theories could well represent the key distinction between School of Nature and School of Characteristics at the very beginning.<sup>51</sup>

However, the above confront between School of Nature and School of Characteristics only features the first stage of three stages that Zhang summarizes for the development of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (性相通融) in China. Due to the short life of Chinese Faxiang school (法相宗) and many other reasons, School of Nature becomes the dominant Buddhist school very shortly. In the second stage Zhang features Zongmi (宗密, 780-841) who is the fifth patriarch of the Huayan school and Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904-975) who is well known in trying to syncretize various Buddhist schools and in compiling ZJL. At this stage “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性) and “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相) tend to be treated by School of Nature in more equal than conflicting stance for the syncretizing purpose. The third stage refers to “nature-characteristics syncretism” occurring in the late-Ming Buddhist renaissance. At this stage, the values of “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性) and “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相) were revisited by School of Nature with the purpose for better learning and utilizing the theory of School of Characteristics. Thus, Zhang concludes that the development of these three stages are in fact the process for School of Nature to be merged into School of Nature.<sup>52</sup>

### 1-3-3 Possible impact of Yongming Yanshou on late-Ming *Weishi* study

In Sheng Yen opinion's, Yongming Yanshou who is the third patriarch of Fayuan school (法眼宗) of Chan school (禪宗) is the person who influences the late-Ming consciousness-only scholars the most.<sup>53</sup> Because Yanshou inherits Huayan Zong's thinking and attempts to syncretize “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性) and “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相) and to unite Chan practice (禪) and teaching of scriptures (教) through compiling views of various Buddhist schools into ZJL. In the preface of ZJL, Yanshou

<sup>51</sup> Zhang, ""Weishi Si Xiang Yu Wan Ming Weishi Xue Yan Jiu" 唯識思想與晚明唯識學研究," pp.383-86.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., pp.381-82.

<sup>53</sup> Shi, ""Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," p. 4.

makes it clear his intention and his methodology as below.

Now having analyzed the general intention of Buddha, and orthodox views of scriptures and treatises. Having gotten rid of minute and complicated texts in search of only key points. Having simulated questions and answers and cited extensively for proof purpose. I would like to uphold one mind as what all respect and as a way to reveal the myriad dharmas like a mirror through compiling the profound meaning in the old time and abstracting the perfect interpretation in the treasure canon. All would be presented here in this book called “record”<sup>54</sup>

On the other hand, Jan Yun-hua points out that, although Yanshou quoted consciousness-only theories intensively in his discussion associated with mind and consciousness, he immediately went back to School of Nature position whenever touching the ontological issues. The position of School of Nature here refers to those interpretative framework and theories that Yanshou well recognizes in *Dacheng qixin lun* and Huayan school.<sup>55</sup> Jan mentions two examples that are worthy attention as below.

The first example is about the discussion of the “problem of truth and falsity” (Ch. *zhen wang wen ti* 真妄問題) in ZJLas below. Here Jan draws attention to the fact that Yanshou adopted Zongmi’s classification of Faxiang, Poxiang, and Faxing and made it clear that he is fully aligned with the position of Zongmi who represents Huayan School.

Question: If arguing that there are truth and falsity, those are Faxiang school (法相宗). If arguing that there is neither truth nor falsity, those are Poxiang school (破相宗, those who refuting Faxiang) . Now speaking of Faxing school (法性宗, i.e. “School of Nature” (性宗)), why setting up truth and falsity while talking about being not true and being not false? Answer: Now the argument in *Zongjing[lu]* is not for existence (有) like Faxiang school. Neither for emptiness like Poxiang [school]. Instead, in terms of “School of Nature” (性宗) that is classified as “perfect teaching” (Ch. *luan jiao* 圓教), in order to clarify the correct view, that “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) is “immutable” (Ch. *bu bian* 不變) while “responding to the conditions” (Ch. *sui yuan* 隨緣)

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<sup>54</sup> 「今詳祖佛大意。經論正宗。削去繁文。唯搜要旨。假申問答。廣引證明。舉一心為宗。照萬法如鏡。編聯古製之深義。撮略寶藏之圓詮。同此顯揚。稱之曰錄。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 417, a19-22)

<sup>55</sup> Yun-hua Jan, “*Yongming Yanshou*” 永明延壽 (Dong da tu shu, 1999), p.4.

without problem is the meaning of perfect teaching.<sup>56</sup>

One more important thing to note is that Yanshou adopted Fazang's *panjiao* system of five teachings that are: 1) "the Hīnayāna teaching" (小乘教); 2) "the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna" (大乘始教); 3) "the final teaching of Mahāyāna" (大乘終教), 4) "the sudden teaching" (頓教), 5) "the perfect teaching" (圓教) in the order of ascending superiority.<sup>57</sup> The *panjiao* (判教) system in China is a system of doctrinal classification that is used as a critical tool to justify and judge the values of the teachings of various traditions and schools. According to Fazang's *panjiao* of five teachings, consciousness-only doctrine falls into the category of "the elementary teaching of Mahāyāna" in the second place from the bottom. School of Nature belongs to the category of "the final teaching of Mahāyāna" in the middle. The ultimate superior is the perfect teaching of Huayan School. This is how Fazang dealt with the teaching conflicts between School of Nature and School of Characteristics.<sup>58</sup> Here we see that Yanshou and Fazang were aligned to this regard.

The second example is about whether or not "thusness" (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) is permeable (可熏). In the arguments between Faxiang school's "theory of thusness is impermeable" (真如不可熏說) and the "theory of thusness is permeable" (真如受熏說) in *Dacheng qixin lun*, Jan highlights that Yanshou was fully aware of where the argument coming from and why Faxiang school insisting no mixing up between "conditioned dharmas" (Ch. *you wei fa* 有為法, Skt. *samskr̥ta-dharma*) and "unconditioned dharmas" (Ch. *wu weifa* 無為法; Skt. *asamskr̥ta-dharma*). Nevertheless, as we see the following message in ZJL, Yanshou clearly adopted again the position of Faxiang school (法性宗) who trying to syncretize by combining the "womb of the *Tathāgata*" (Ch. *ru lai zang* 如來藏; Skt. *tathāgatagarbha*) and the eighth consciousness and by saying both permeability and change are incomprehensible.<sup>59</sup>

Regarding of what permeates and what is permeated, there are two perspectives: one is Faxiang school. The other is Faxing school (法性宗). The previous challenge from Dharmapāla was from the perspective of Faxiang school while

<sup>56</sup> 「問：若言有真有妄，是法相宗。若言無真無妄，是破相宗。今論法性宗，云何立真立妄，又說非真非妄？答：今宗鏡所論，非是法相立有，亦非破相歸空。但約性宗圓教，以明正理，即以真如不變、不礙隨緣，是其圓義。」 (T48, no. 2016, p. 440, a22-26)

<sup>57</sup> See T45, no. 1866, p. 481, b5-8. And Chan-ju Mun, *The History of Doctrinal Classification in Chinese Buddhism: A Study of the Panjiao System* (University Press of America, 2006), pp.315-84.

<sup>58</sup> Shi, "Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想, p. 24.

<sup>59</sup> Jan, "Yongming Yanshou" 永明延壽, pp.242-44.



Aśvaghoṣa [argument] was based on Faxing school. Now Faxing school also views the first seven consciousness and etc as what permeates and the eighth consciousness as what is permeated. The eighth consciousness is established by responding to the conditions based on the “womb of the *Tathāgata*” (如來藏). It implies the meanings of “arising and ceasing” (生滅) and of “neither arising nor ceasing” (不生滅). Now the permeability that I refer to is the permeability of the non-permeable and the mutability of the immutability. Namely the permeability is the characteristics of thusness that responding to the conditions in “the aspect of arising and ceasing” (生滅門). If within “the aspect of thusness” (真如門), there would be no permeability. The meaning of permeability and of mutability are both incomprehensible because the non-defilement (不染) are defiled.<sup>60</sup>

### 1-3-4 Classification of Late-Ming Scholars

Sheng Yen classified the late-Ming consciousness-only scholars in his study into two groups. The first group is dedicated to the consciousness-only doctrine without involving other Buddhist schools. Only Mingyu 明昱 (1527-1616) and Wang Kentang 王肯堂 (1549-1613) fall into the group. The second group is comprised of scholars who belonging to other schools and doing consciousness-only study as well. The rest scholars belong to this group. In Sheng Yen’s opinion, the former group have done their best to do their commentaries from the perspective of consciousness-only even though they were still under the influence of ZJL. Especially the *Cheng Weishi lun zheng yi* 成唯識論證義 composed by Wang Kentang deserves the further academic study the most.<sup>61</sup> Nevertheless, a recent study indicates that Mingyu belongs to a special hybrid school called *Xianshou-jian-cien Zong* 賢首兼慈恩宗 which is a kind of combination of Huayan Zong and Faxiang school. Thus the first group ends up with only one member left who is Wang Kentang.<sup>62</sup>

In addition, Sheng Yen further breaks down the second group into four *sub-groups*: 1) Tiantai school 天台宗 based scholars including Shaojue Guangcheng 紹覺廣承 (1560-1609), Lingyuan Dahui 靈源大惠 (1564-1636), Xinyi Dazhen 新伊大真 (1580-1650), Ouyi Zhixu 藕益智旭 (1599-1655) and etc. 2) *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經 based scholars including Xuelang Hongen 雪浪洪恩 (1545-1608), Yiyu Tongrun 一雨通潤 (1565-1624), Ouyi Zhixu and etc. 3) *Qixin lun* 起信論 based

<sup>60</sup> 「夫能所之熏，約有二宗：一法相宗，二法性宗。前，護法是依法相宗所難。今，馬鳴是依法性宗。今法性宗，亦七識等而為能熏，八為所熏。其第八中，以如來藏隨緣成立，含有生滅、不生滅義故。今言熏者，是不熏之熏，不變之變。即熏生滅門中，真如隨緣之相。若真如門中，即不熏。此熏變義，俱不可思議，以不染而染故。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 701, a3-10)

<sup>61</sup> Shi, "Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想, p. 26.

<sup>62</sup> Kai-ting Chien, "A Preliminary Study on Spread and Acceptance of Late Ming Yogācāra Works During the Edo Period 晚明唯識學作品在江戶時代的流傳與接受初探," *Chung-Hwa Buddhist Studies* 中華佛學研究, no. 16 (2015): p.49.

scholars including Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623), Ouyi Zhixu and etc. 4) Chan school 禪宗 based scholars including most late-Ming scholars as they all have more or less background of Chan school. Among them, the most outstanding are Hanshan Deqing and Zibo Zhenke 紫柏真可 (1544-1604).<sup>63</sup> Obviously, the above sub-groups are not exclusive classifications. This indicates the key feature of syncretism in late-Ming.

On the other hand, Zhang Zhi-qiang roughly mentions there were two study groups in the renaissance of late-Ming consciousness-only without very clear classification. The cut point seems at the publishing of *Cheng Weishi lun zikao lu* 成唯識論自考錄 by Lingyuan Dahui. The major contributions of first group include *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 by Mingyu, the *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解 by Yiyu Tongrun, *Cheng Weishi lun zheng yi* 成唯識論證義 by Wang Kentang and *Cheng Weishi lun yinyi* by Shaojue. The major contributions of the second group are mainly referring to *Cheng Weishi lun zikao lu* 成唯識論自考錄 by Lingyuan Dahui and *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要 by Zhixu. Furthermore, Zhang thinks the works of the second group are “more profound” (深化) than of the first one.<sup>64</sup> Zhang’s grouping seems implying the later the better.

Thus, Sheng Yen and Zhang are different not only in terms of how to classify the late-Ming consciousness-only scholars but also in terms of how to evaluate the contributions of late-Ming scholars.

### 1-3-5 Syncretism, not Synthesis

The term “syncretism” could mean different things to different persons over time. Back to the early 17<sup>th</sup> century, western scholars tended to think of this term very negatively. From the Christian perspective of orthodox, they defended the pure essence of the religion against “syncretism” that they viewed it as lack of truth and loyalty. Such a conservative perspective of orthodox continued until the early 20<sup>th</sup> century when the study of religions was no longer limited to Christianity and valued rationality and scientific methodology. Some scholars who specialized in phenomenology of religion started to recognize the inevitable fact of “syncretism”. There was no such a thing as a “pure religion” because all religions had prehistory and continued to grow over time through “syncretism”.<sup>65</sup>

<sup>63</sup> Shi, ""Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," pp. 27-30.

<sup>64</sup> Zhang, ""Weishi Si Xiang Yu Wan Ming Weishi Xue Yan Jiu" 唯識思想與晚明唯識學研究," pp.406-07.

<sup>65</sup> Yen-zen Tsai, "The Theory of Practice of Religious Sycrretism: The Case of Early Christianity 宗教融合的理論與實踐：以早期基督教為例," *Taiwan Journal of Religious Studies* 臺灣宗教研究 4, no. 2 (2005): pp.159-60.; Shu-wei Hsieh, "Syncretism and Interaction: A Review of Scholarship on the Relationship between Medieval Buddhism and Daoism 融合與交涉：中古時期的佛道關係研究回顧," *Tsinghua Journal of Chinese Literature* 清華中文學報, no. 8 (2012): p. 271.

Nevertheless, there are still modern scholars who questioned “syncretism” as a valid concept to use. The extreme example is Baird who proposed not to use the term at all. He maintained that “...the term does not always communicate anything definite, and the meaning that is intended could often be more clearly expressed if another term were used...”<sup>66</sup> The rationales he argued include: 1) the meaning of the term varies from one writer to another, even within the works by one writer; 2) it is no point to search for historical origin because there is no room for a first cause. 3) it says nothing specific because historically borrowing, blending and influencing happened to all regions. 4) Theologically “syncretism” means retaining conflicting elements without successful reconciliation. “Synthesis” should be used when different elements are united into a harmonious unit. 5) “Syncretism” is irrelevant to insiders because it does not correspond to insider’s understanding of his/her faith. Moreover, it denotes the distinction between insider and outsider.<sup>67</sup>

However, Berling tried to address Baird’s concerns one by one. 1) She does not think a clear definition of syncretism is impossible so she provides her version of religious syncretism as below.

Syncretism may be tentatively defined as the borrowing, affirmation, or integration of concepts, symbols, or practices of one religious tradition into another by a process of selection and reconciliation... I will adopt Streng's definition of religion as a "means of ultimate transformation," with his qualification that religion has transcendent or ultimate dimensions, personal or experiential dimensions, and traditional or cultural dimensions.<sup>68</sup>

2) It is not a search for a first cause but it would be antihistorical for scholars to ignore the forces and influences that shape the articulation of religious thought at specific time. 3) What is or is not borrowed or blended and what influences or not specific religious thinkers at specific times are neither trivial nor too general. The selectivity and intention of borrowing does enhance a better understanding of religious thought. 4) A synthesis of all elements of two traditions are too ideal to be conceivable. The reason that Baird viewed syncretism as unreconciled conflicts is that observers might see the conflicts whereas syncretists do not. If observers see conflicts, that is because they fail to recognize how syncretists reconcile the borrowed elements by redefinition. 5) It is not true that syncretism is not relevant to insiders because they are asked to defend or justify their position whenever the borrowing, integration and

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<sup>66</sup> Robert D Baird, "Syncretism and the History of Religions," *Syncretism in religion: A reader* (2004): p.48.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.53-56.

<sup>68</sup> Berling, *The Syncretic Religion of Lin Chao-En*, p.9.

influence get attentions.<sup>69</sup>

Timothy was not convinced and criticized Berling's emphasis on "reconciliation" because in his opinion reconciliation is hard to achieve and rarely happens.<sup>70</sup> Timothy first defined "...syncretism is the process by which elements of distinct religions are merged into a unitary world view..."<sup>71</sup> and suggested not to allow the concept of syncretism to monopolize all possible mixings that could happen between religions. Then, he listed what he thought are not syncretism: 1) It is not ecumenicism that is universal and can be advocated without combining separate traditions. 2) It is not inclusivism that tries explaining one religion through the lens of another religion in order to reduce one religion to another religion. 3) It is not compartmentalism that recognizes each religion's special functions. One religion complements the others without overlapping, without need to reduce one to the others and without effort to reconcile. 4) It is not eclecticism that adopts whatever useful in a religiously plural environment with less or no concern with the purity and coherence of the traditions.

Moreover, Timothy argued that Three Teachings (i.e. Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism) in late-Imperial China existed as independent entities. Chinese thinkers were eclectic in borrowing gestures and languages of other teachings, ecumenical in tolerating other teachings, but inclusivist in upholding their own teaching as the highest teaching.<sup>72</sup> Therefore, he concluded that the interaction among Three Teachings from Yuan dynasty onward was not syncretism but "condominium". Which implies that different religions live together "with a considerable degree of harmony: equal in principle, equally available to worshippers, and free to associate and interact in a multitude of ways."<sup>73</sup>

As Baird pointed out, different authors understand "syncretism" differently. Here we see Timothy's definition of "syncretism" happens to be Baird's definition of "synthesis."<sup>74</sup> Then, are syncretism and synthesis the same thing? If not, what is the difference between syncretism and synthesis?

According to Pye, syncretism is not the same as synthesis. The pattern of syncretism has three characteristics: 1) It is coherent for insiders at the time. 2) It is ambiguous due to latency of divergent meanings. 3) It is temporary because inherent ambiguity tend to find resolutions. Moreover, a syncretistic pattern might take three

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<sup>69</sup> Ibid., pp.7-8.

<sup>70</sup> Timothy Brook, "Rethinking Syncretism: The Unity of the Three Teachings and Their Joint Worship in Late-Imperial China," *Journal of Chinese Religions* 21, no. 1 (1993): p.14.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid., p.13.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p.34.

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p.15.

<sup>74</sup> "...When elements which have come from differing sources are united into a harmonious unit then the term synthesis might be used to describe the phenomenon. This term indicates the unity achieved without implying the logically impossible statement that the harmony is produced by the union of two contradictory practices or ideas..." See Baird, "Syncretism and the History of Religions," p.52.

possible courses: 1) Assimilation in which a dominant tradition take in weaker elements and drive for a particular direction. 2) Dissolution in which separate identities are reasserted and divergent meaning of disparate elements are set apart. 3) Synthesis in which a new religion is irreversibly formed with its own distinctive identity.<sup>75</sup> I think Baird and Pye are at least aligned on what synthesis is. Since Timothy's definition of "syncretism" is actually "synthesis", Timothy's critique about "syncretism" turns out to be toward "synthesis" rather than the "syncretism" that in the mind of Berling and Pye. Timothy is right about that synthesis is hard to find.

My study would adopt how Pye distinguishes syncretism from synthesis. First because no new Buddhist sect would be found in my research. Secondly, the course of assimilation and the course of dissolution better describe the dynamic found in my study. When Fazang said, "...“nature and characteristics syncretize each other” (Ch. *xing xiang tong rong* 性相通融) without obstacles...", he sounds like he aimed for synthesis. In fact, it was not synthesis but only the syncretism in the course of assimilation. When Sheng Yen and Zhang argued that late-Ming consciousness-only study had the strong propensity of nature-characteristics syncretism, they tended to focus on the course of assimilation and emphasized the dominance of School of Nature like most traditional Buddhist scholars did. What they neglected, however, is the fact that the study and the exegesis of the very classical commentaries of School of Characteristics like CWSL itself is inevitably on the course of dissolution to certain degree to School of Nature. It would be unavoidable that the separate identity of School of Characteristics would be reasserted and the divergent meaning of teachings of School of Characteristics would be separated out. It is this syncretistic dynamic between assimilation and dissolution that my study would like to draw attention to.

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<sup>75</sup> Michael Pye, "Syncretism Versus Synthesis," *Method & Theory in the Study of Religion* 6, no. 1-4 (1994): p.222.

## 1-4 Scope and Methodology

### 1-4-1 Scope

Since CWSL is the root text of consciousness-only doctrine in Eastern Asia, this study would target CWSL as root text. There are many commentaries on CWSL not only at the very beginning in Tang dynasty but also in later times like late-Ming. Since Kuiji's *Cheng Weishi lun shuji* 成唯識論述記 (hereafter referred as CWSLS) is recognized as the most authoritative and orthodox CWSL commentary, this study would use it as Tang CWSL root commentary for later cross time comparison analysis between Tang and late-Ming. During the late-Ming period, there are eight versions of CWSL commentaries in total that are collected in Chinese Buddhist canon. This study decides to select only five collected and complete versions of CWSL commentaries that were composed by Mingyu, Tongrun, Wang Kentang, Dahui and Zhixu in late-Ming. Table 1 is a brief summary of the scope by texts and authors.

There are other canon collected and non-collected CWSL commentaries in late-Ming and the beginning of the Qing. The collected works are Zhisu's 智素 *Cheng weishi lun yin xiang bu yi* 成唯識論音響補遺 that comprises Guangcheng's incomplete version of *Yin yi* 音義, Dazhen's *He xiang* 合響 and Zhisu's 智素 *Bu yi* 補遺.<sup>76</sup> Non-collected works include Bianyin Daji's 辯音大基 *Cheng weishi lun shu* 成唯識論疏, Yuan Zhengui's 玉菴真貴(1558-?) *Cheng weishi lun zhi zhi* 成唯識論直指, Sikong Guangshen's 似空廣伸 *Cheng weishi lun ding zheng* 成唯識論訂正, Neiheng Zhiqua's 內衡智銓 (1609-1669) *Cheng weishi lun yin xiang shu yi* 成唯識論音響述義 and etc.<sup>77</sup> Dahui, Daji, Dazhen, Zhisu, and Zhiqua are all under the umbrella of Guangcheng lineage. I only scope in Dahui's work because it is a complete and separated version of CWSL commentary collected in Chinese Buddhist canon. Nevertheless, it would be worthy of having another project dedicated to the comparison of all CWSL commentaries within the same lineage of Guangcheng or to the study of other non-collected works in the late-Ming. Due to the limitation of the scope, those potential endeavors with different study focus would be out of my project scope. Accordingly, findings in my study might not be necessarily applied to those works out of scope.

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<sup>76</sup> See X51, no. 826.

<sup>77</sup> Chien, "A Forgotten Tradition: The Lesser Known Late-Ming and Early-Qing Annotations of the Cheng Weishi Lun 被忘卻的傳統-明末清初《成唯識論》相關珍稀注釋書考論," pp. 232-50.

**Table 1 Scope by Text and Author**

Tang <i>Weishi</i> root texts	Finish Date	Commentators	Sectarian/ Specialty
<i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	659	Xuanzang 玄奘 (circa 602-664)	Faxiang School; Eminent monk, pilgrim, translator and exegete
Tang CWSL root Commentary	Finish Date	Commentators	Sectarian/ Specialty
<i>Cheng weishi lun shuji</i> 成唯識論述記	?	Kuiji 窺基 (632-682)	Faxiang School; Successor disciple of Xuanzang, exegete of consciousness-only root commentaries
Late-Ming CWSL Commentary	Finish Date	Commentators	Sectarian/ Specialty
<i>Cheng weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	1611	Mingyu 明昱 (circa 1544-1633)	Huayan School & Faxiang School; Specialized in <i>Weishi</i>
<i>Cheng weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	1612	Tongrun 通潤 (1565-1624)	Specialized in <i>Leng yan jing</i> 楞嚴經、 <i>Qixin lun</i> 起信論、 <i>Lengqie jing</i> 楞伽經
<i>Cheng weishi lun zhengyi</i> 成唯識論證義	1613	Wang Kentang 王肯堂 (1549-1613)	<i>Jinshi</i> (進士, highest degree of Chinese imperial examinations); Specialized in Medicine and <i>Weishi</i>
<i>Cheng weishi lun zikao</i> 成唯識論自攷	1626	Dahui 大惠 (1564-1636)	Tiantai School and Consciousness-only School
<i>Cheng weishi lun guanxin fayao</i> 成唯識論觀心法要	1647	Zhixu 智旭 (1599-1655)	Versatile & productive authors specialized in Tiantai, Faxiang, Pure land, Chan, Vinaya, etc.

As a compiled translation, CWSL is an enormous commentary work that is comprised of ten fascicles. Recognized as most comprehensive root commentary of CWSL, CWSLS is double sized by containing twenty fascicles. Moreover, because five late-Ming commentaries are included in the scope, there is no way for one study to conduct the cross time and within-group comparison study in such formidably huge amount of contents. Thus, this study would limit the scope to the commentaries' content regarding the *Trīṃśikā* stanza #2cd, #3, and #4<sup>78</sup> and exclude CWSL's extra portion that tries to prove existence of "storehouse consciousness" (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*). Put in Kuiji's words in CWSLS, the target content is about "Ten Aspects" (Ch. *shi men* 十門)" or "Eight Sections containing Ten Meanings" (Ch. *ba duan shi yi* 八段十義) of the "storehouse consciousness".<sup>79</sup> The following Table 2 is the brief.

**Table 2 Ten Aspects 十門 by Kuiji**

<sup>78</sup> T31, no. 1585, p. 7, c13-19.

<sup>79</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 300, b25-c14 and Yun-sang Lee, "*Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian*" 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, vol. 1 (Taipei, Taiwan: BuddhAll Cultural Enterprise Co.,Ltd., 2010), p.97.

	Ten Aspects 十門	Stanza (2cd + 3abcd + 4abcd)	Eight Sections 八段
1	Aspect of "Self-characteristics" 自相門	Firstly ālayavijñāna 初阿賴耶識	Three Aspects of Three Characteristics 三相門
2	Aspect of "Characteristics as an Effect" 果相門	Maturation 異熟	
3	Aspect of "Characteristics as a Cause" 因相門	Seeds of all 一切種	
4	Aspect of "Object of Perception" 所緣門	[Incomprehensible] Clinging and dwelling [不可知] 執受、處	Aspects of Object of Perception & Mental Activity to Perceive 所緣行相門
5	Aspect of "Mental Activity To Perceive" 行相門	[Incomprehensible] Perceiving [不可知] 了	
6	Aspect of "Association" 相應門	Always associated with contact (sparśa), attention (manasikāra), feeling (vedanā), ideation (saṃjñā), and intention (cetanā); 常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應	Aspect of "Association" 相應門
7	Aspect of "Five Sensations" 五受門	Only associated with indifferent sensation 相應唯捨受	Aspect of "Five Sensations" 五受門
8	Aspect of "Three Natures" 三性門	It is neither obstructed nor determinate. 是無覆無記	Aspect of "Three Natures" 三性門
	Aspect of "Mental factors Same as Mind" 心所例王門	The same is true of touch and etc. (觸等亦如是)	Aspect of "Mental factors as Mind" 心所例王門
9	Aspect of "Cause-Effect Metaphor" 因果譬喻門	It is constantly changing like the violent streams. 恒轉如暴流	Aspect of "Cause-Effect Metaphor" 因果譬喻門
10	Aspect of "Suppression-Extinction Stages" 伏斷位次門	It is discarded in the stage of arhat. 阿羅漢位捨	Aspect of "Suppression-Extinction Stages" 伏斷位次門

Interestingly, *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 (*Questions and answers intended to inspire the Consciousness-only study*, hereafter referred as WKWD) uses "Twelve Aspects" (Ch. *shi er men* 十二門)<sup>80</sup> as Table 3<sup>81</sup> shows rather than Ten Aspects (十門). Moreover, four late-Ming commentators followed suit except Mingyu who used neither. In CWSLS Kuiji noted two things: 1) "What it means by being "incomprehensible" is the meaning which already included in the "Aspect of Object of Perception and Mental Activity to Perceive" (所緣、行相門). Since it is not for other purpose, there is no need to single it out as a separate aspect."<sup>82</sup> 2) "What it means by "the same is true of contact and etc." (觸等亦如是) is that some characteristics of the [mind] king are applied to concurrent mental factors. But [those mental factors] are not used to distinguish the eighth consciousness."<sup>83</sup> That is why Kuiji noted that seven out of eight sections are good enough to cover the ten aspects

<sup>80</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 349, b5-9 // Z 2:3, p. 220, b5-9 // R98, p. 439, b5-9.

<sup>81</sup> Three column is added based on Hartmut Buescher, *Sthiramati's Trīṃśikāvijñāptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation* (Austria: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, ÖAW, 2007).

<sup>82</sup> 「不可知者，即於所緣、行相之內差別之義。既無別用，故非別門。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 300, b28-29)

<sup>83</sup> 「觸等亦如是者，俱時心所，例同於王，非是分別第八識也。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 300, c5-7)



while another section is set up to cover “touch and etc” separately. Thus there is no significant difference between Twelve Aspects and Ten Aspects in terms of target content coverage.

**Table 3 Twelve Aspects by WKWD**

	Twelve Aspects 十二門	Ch. <i>Triṃśikā</i> Stanza (#2cd + #3 + #4)	Skt. <i>Triṃśikā</i> Stanza (#2cd + #3 + #4 + #5a)
1	Aspect of "Self-characteristics" 自相門	Firstly <i>ālayavijñāna</i> 初阿賴耶識	<i>tatrālayākhyam vijñānam</i>
2	Aspect of "Characteristics as an Effect" 果相門	Maturation 異熟	<i>vipākaḥ</i>
3	Aspect of "Characteristics as a Cause" 因相門	Seeds of all 一切種	<i>sarvabījakam</i>
4	Aspect of "Incomprehensible" 不可知門	Incomprehensible 不可知	<i>asamviditaka</i>
5	Aspect of "Object of Perception" 所緣門	Clinging and dwelling [不可知] 執受、處	<i>upādi-sthāna</i>
6	Aspect of "Mental activity to perceive" 行相門	Perception 了	<i>vijñaptikam</i>
7	Aspect of "Association" 相應門	Always associated with "touch" (觸; Skt. <i>sparsa</i> ), "attention" (作意; Skt. <i>manaskāra</i> ), "sensation" (受; Skt. <i>vedanā</i> ), "ideation" (想; Skt. <i>saṃjñā</i> ), and "volition" ( <i>cetanā</i> ). 常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應	<i>sadā sparśa-manaskāra-vit-saṃjñā-cetanā-anvitam</i>
8	Aspect of "Indifferent Sensation" 受俱門	The only sensation is indifferent. 唯捨受	<i>upekṣā vedanā tatra</i>
9	Aspect of "Three Natures" 三性門	It is neither obstructed nor determinate	<i>anivṛtta-avyākṛtam ca tat</i>
10	Aspect of "Mental factors Same as Mind" 心所例王門	The same is true of touch and etc. 觸等亦如是	<i>tathā sparśa-ādayas tat ca</i>
11	Aspect of "Cause-Effect Metaphor" 因果法喻門	It is constantly changing like the violent streams. 恒轉如暴流	<i>varṭate srotasaughavat</i>
12	Aspect of "Suppression-Extinction Stages" 伏斷位次門	It is discarded in the stage of arhat. 阿羅漢位捨	<i>tasya vyāvṛtīḥ arhatve</i>

For the purpose of later comparison, this study would adopt the classification of Twelve Aspects because it has the advantage of a clean and comprehensive coverage.

### 1-4-2 Methodology

This study would divide the contents of CWSL, CWSLS, *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮<sup>84</sup> (hereafter referred as LMC#1), *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解<sup>85</sup> (hereafter referred as LMC#2), *Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi* 成唯識論證義<sup>86</sup> (hereafter referred as LMC#3), *Cheng Weishi lun zikao* 成唯識論自攷<sup>87</sup> (hereafter referred as LMC#4), and *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao* 成唯識論觀心

<sup>84</sup> X50n0820 *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 by Mingyu

<sup>85</sup> X50n0821 *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解 by Tongrun

<sup>86</sup> X50n0822 *Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi* 成唯識論證義 by Wang Kentang

<sup>87</sup> X51n0823 *Cheng Weishi lun zikao* 成唯識論自攷 by Dahui

法要<sup>88</sup> (hereafter referred as LMC#5) by Twelve Aspects 十二門. Furthermore, to divide the texts into three groups: 1) The root text CWSL; 2) Tang reference commentary CWSLS; 3) Late-Ming group which including LMC#1, LMC#2, LMC#3, LMC#4, and LMC#5.

To investigate how the late-Ming commentators rebuilt the interrupted CWSL commentarial tradition in China, methodologically this study conducts the analysis at two levels: the quantitative analysis at the macro level and the qualitative analysis at the micro level. The former methods include the analysis of citation sources, citation types, quotation frequency and quotation count. The results are presented in Chapter 3. The latter methods include the English translation of the CWSL as a basis and detailed thematic discussions together with the English translations of relevant late-Ming commentaries and their related citations. The findings are presented in Chapter 4.

Both levels of analysis would involve the synchronic analysis within the late-Ming group and/or the diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and CWSLS as appropriate. The focus of the analysis within the late-Ming group is to better understand how late-Ming group maneuver their accessible sources, leverage each other's works and/or compete with each other in decoding the puzzle of CWSL. The diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and CWSLS is to address whether and how the available indirect citations from CWSLS through the texts like *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄, *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 and *Huayan jing shuchao* 華嚴經疏鈔 and etc might influence the late-Ming CWSL commentaries in what way and to what degree.

### 1-4-3 Hypotheses

Based on previous scope, methodology and research questions, I would like to develop some preliminary hypotheses for the synchronic analysis within the late-Ming group and for the diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and Tang reference commentary.

#### 1-4-3-1 Hypotheses for Synchronic Analysis within Late-Ming Group

With regard to the “late-Ming commentators”, people might tend to have some general impressions. For example, they all had strong propensity of “nature-characteristics syncretism” (Ch. *xing xiang tong rong* 性相通融). They were all under strong influence of ZJL. Whether such impressions are valid is subject for further discussion. However, one immediate side effect is that such impressions seems to imply that the “late-Ming commentators” is a homogeneous group. Is such

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<sup>88</sup> X51n0824 Cheng Weishi lun guanxin fayao 成唯識論觀心法要 by Zhixu

implication fair enough?

First of all, I like to draw readers' attentions to following two quotations. One is from Wang Kentang. The other is from Dahui.

Some might be questioning [me], "When *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* was published, you wrote the preface. When *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* was published, you wrote the preface again. If you really approved these works, then your work *zheng yi* would be no need... When *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* were being pull together, I tried to discuss some modification with the author in advance. Since it was published, my agreement and disagreement were approximately half-and-half. As for the perspectives of *Cheng Weishi lun jijie*, they were more aligned with mine. Nevertheless, there remained disagreements. For what I am not sure about, I have no choice but to follow them. However, for what I am absolutely certain about, I am afraid I have to responsibly disagree with them. That is the reason why *Cheng Weishi lun zheng yi* has to be published.<sup>89</sup>

The contemporary is not short of commentaries but there is no standard version among the commentators... My past master pulled together eight fascicles of *Yinyi* which was unfortunately not completely done. One of his disciples Bianyin made a complete edition based on that and printed it at Haichang. Initially I was happy to receive a copy as if I were able to go to the lecture of my master again. However, I could not finish reading it because it missed points and... with a lot of mistakes... In fact, Bianyin's edited version of commentary was not completely based on what my past master wrote. Alas! Those who went to the same lecture still ended up walking away with different understandings. What to expect of those who with different talents would share the same purport?<sup>90</sup>

In the first quotation above, Wang tried to justify his work by telling us that the works by Mingyu, by Tongrun and by himself are not homogenous. In the second quotation above, Dahui highlighted that there was no standard version of CWSL commentary at that time, not even among the commentators who under the same master. Accordingly, I come out the first hypothesis as below.

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<sup>89</sup> 「或曰俗詮之刻也，子序之。集解之刻也，子又序。而若深許之，則證義可以無刻矣。... 俗論之作，吾嘗預商訂焉，及其刻，則從與不從，蓋參半也。集解之見，與吾合處為多，而不合處亦時有之。吾見之未定者，不敢不捨己而從，而吾見之已定者，亦不敢以苟同也，此證義之所以刻也...」(X50, no. 822, p. 829, c13-23 // Z 1:81, p. 323, d4-14 // R81, p. 646, b4-14)

<sup>90</sup> 「近代即有註釋，諸家同異，初無準的...吾先師音義八卷，惜乎不獲全璧。門人辯音，補輯成疏，刻之海昌。始余獲本喜，若復聆師說，讀未卒業，義或缺如...其謬稍多...此疏實非字字出先師筆也。嗚呼! 同聽者尚自異聞，異稟者豈能共旨。」(X51, no. 823, p. 147, b7-22 // Z 1:82, p. 47, a10-b7 // R82, p. 93, a10-b7)

### **H1-A: There are some differences among late-Ming commentaries.**

If **H1-A** was established, the question that follows would be where those differences are coming from. One possibility could be found in the following two quotations from Zhixu.

The works by many masters are good in that they are supported with citations. However, the complex compiled text are not for those beginners. Since I understand intents of all works, I attempt to write something that is easy to follow. Hopefully the readers would bear with me.<sup>91</sup>

Written words are viewed as a mean for meditation practice. If every single sentence was not fully absorbed by oneself, then what would the benefit of either reading the menu without tasting or counting others' treasures be? Thus I set the title saying: "the essential to meditation on mind" (Ch. *Guan xin fa yao* 觀心法要).<sup>92</sup>

Here Zhixu tried to make it clear to his audience at the very beginning that he would adopt a commentary approach that was totally different from other late-Ming commentators' and provided his justification for why he had to do in this way. Thus I come out with another hypothesis as below.

#### **H1-A1: The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to different approaches.**

Another possible source of differences could be inferred from the following two quotations. One from Tongrun. The other from Wang Kentang.

When it came to easy part, appreciating one sentence is like drinking water when thirsty. It was a great relish. When it came to difficult part, it like chewing wax. So reading again and stopping again. Later on, by reading *Zongjing lu*, I started managing to break it through and to get to the key points. Furthermore, by searching through all available sutras like *Leng qie*、*Shen mi* and so on and

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<sup>91</sup> 「諸家著述，貴在引證，以明可據。未免文義雜糅，不便初機。今領會諸家之旨，自抒淺顯之文，不令句讀艱澁，觀者恕之。」(X51, no. 824, p. 297, b5-7 // Z 1:82, p. 197, b5-7 // R82, p. 393, b5-7)

<sup>92</sup> 「文字為觀照之門，若不句句消歸自己，則說食數寶，究竟何益？故標題曰：觀心法要。」(X51, no. 824, p. 297, b18-19 // Z 1:82, p. 197, b18-c1 // R82, p. 393, b18-p. 394, a1)

commentaries like *Yu qie*、*Xian yang*、*Guang bai*、*Zaji*、*Ju she*、*Yin ming* and etc, I noted down whatever are associated with CWSL. Whatever I did not see and understand, I would consult with the subject experts first before I wrote. This work comprises the solutions that I had collected for years. I really do not want to mislead anyone so I name it as “collected solutions” (Ch. *ji jie* 集解).<sup>93</sup>

Why do I name my work as “*zheng yi*” (to prove the meaning)? I would say that, in order to correctly explicate the text of consciousness-only and to prove the meaning of CWSL, I don't dare to do it by my own interpretation but based on the scriptures and commentaries in the Buddhist Canon, *Huayan jing shuchao*, *Zongjing lu* and etc. The rationale is that the eight consciousnesses and four wisdoms are too subtle to comprehend. They are supposed to be comprehended only by sages, not by the ordinary people. Thus without the sacred teachings the forced interpretations were inevitable.<sup>94</sup>

Here we see both Tongrun and Wang resorted to the authority of Buddhist canon by emphasizing that their works had sacred teachings as supports. In particular, Tongrun gave a long examples list. Since different commentators might selectively choose to refer to certain sacred teachings in the Buddhist Canon. Accordingly, I propose another hypothesis as below.

### **H1-A2: The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to different selected citations from different authoritative texts.**

Other possible sources of difference might be expected from the following quotation from Wang about a letter that Tongrun sent to him.

His letter said: recently most people interpreted the Buddhist canon in their own opinions. Since the theory of “School of Nature” (性宗) is more flexible, it is not a big problem to make a convenient interpretation in such a way. But the theory of “School of Characteristics” (相宗) is more strict. A slight discrepancy by one

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<sup>93</sup> 「於易了處，一句入心，如渴沾甘露，津津有味。忽遇聾牙詰曲，則喻如嚼蠟，故旋閱旋止。後披宗鏡，始得斬其疑關，抽其暗鑰。從是徧探楞伽、深密等經，瑜伽、顯揚、廣百、雜集、俱舍、因明等論，及大經疏鈔，其中凡與此論相應者，輒手錄之。間有眼力未及者，必參之有識，方始搦管，積有數年，彙成此解。實不欲以臆說誤人，故命之曰集解。」(X50, no. 821, p. 659, b20-c2 // Z 1:81, p. 153, c2-8 // R81, p. 306, a2-8)

<sup>94</sup> 「其名證義何也? 曰: 取大藏中大小乘經論，及華嚴疏鈔、宗鏡錄諸典，正釋唯識之文，以證成論之義，而非敢以己意為之註也。所以然者，為八識四智，行相微細。難可了知，乃聖智所知之境，非凡夫心量可測，故不以至教量定之，未有不罪書而燕說者。」(X50, no. 822, p. 829, a9-14 // Z 1:81, p. 323, a6-11 // R81, p. 645, a6-11)

word will make great differences. Although I did have my own opinions, I did not dare to put them into my work without further verification and consultation.

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Here we see two messages: 1) both Tongrun and Wang tried their best not to make personal interpretations. 2) Tongrun admitted that his personal opinion might be inevitable some times. Even though, he assured Wang that he had done his diligent checks. Based on the second message, I come out the following hypothesis.

**H1-A3: The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to commentators' personal interpretations.**

In addition to differences, there might be some occasions and/or some topics that late-Ming commentators are fully aligned and/or think alike. As a result, H1-B would be applied.

**H1-B: There are no difference among late-Ming commentaries**

**1-4-3-2 Hypotheses for Diachronic Analysis between Late-Ming Group and Tang Control Group.**

Since the key Tang consciousness-only commentaries were lost, some differences between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS seem a destiny. Therefore, the question is not about whether there are some differences. Instead, the more meaningful question would be whether the differences between the late-Ming group and Tang reference commentary are “significant”. In order to answer this question, how to define or judge whether a difference is “significant” seems have to be answered or agreed first. However, since nobody seems in the authoritative position for such definition and judgement, I am proposing to bracket it first and see if we could work it backward by identifying possible sources/reasons of differences first in the later developed hypotheses. First, let us take a look at the following quotation from Wang.

Why do I write *Cheng Weishi lun zheng yi*? Because Kuiji's commentaries were

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<sup>95</sup> 「其書曰：近世解內典，各出已見者多。第性宗理圓，作聰明註釋，亦無大礙。相宗理方，一字出入，便謬以千里矣。不佞雖有臆見，目未曾經考證，口未曾經商確者，皆不敢入解。」 ( X50, no. 821, p. 658, b4-8 // Z 1:81, p. 152, b7-11 // R81, p. 303, b7-11)

lost, those who are studying the consciousness-only doctrine have been frustrated and do not know what to follow. However, why don't I call my work as "substitute commentary" (補疏)? How dare am I? Do I have any confidence that no any single word in my work is in conflict with what Kuiji said? If any, how dare am I to call my work as "substitute commentary"? Moreover, I still hope that those old commentaries would appear again one day.<sup>96</sup>

Here is a typical example demonstrating that the late-Ming commentators were concerned about that they were doing commentaries on CWSL without reference to those key Tang consciousness-only commentaries. At least at the bottom of Wang's heart, he expected some inevitable differences even though he had tried to do everything he could to reduce it just in case that CWSLS might be found one day. Thus, depending how one reads Wang message and defines what differences are significant, there are two possible competing hypotheses as below.

**H2-A: There are some significant differences between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS.**

**H2-B: There are no significant differences between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS.**

To do the further development of hypotheses, I would assume there were some significant differences as **H2-A** first. Next, I will review the possible reasons/sources of those significant differences for more hypotheses. The following quotation is from Zhixu.

Sorry for losing old commentaries and for different interpretations by different masters. When the mistakes of text meaning remain, what to count on for reasoning and meditation... Fortunately the outline survives in *Weishi kaimeng wenda*. There are quotations found in *Huayan jing shuchao* and *Zongjing lu* for reference. Moreover, if tracing back to the very sources, there are *Yuqie shidi lun* (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice), *Xiayang shengjiao lun* (Skt. *Prakaraṇyāryavācā-śāstra*; Treatise on Acclamation of the Scriptural Teaching) and other commentaries as the sources which is like the

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<sup>96</sup> 「唯識證義何為而作也? 為慈恩之疏亡失無存, 學唯識者俛俛乎莫知所從而作也。然則, 不名補疏何也? 曰: 補疏則惡乎敢? 吾敢自信無一語之與慈恩抵牾乎哉? 有一語與慈恩牴牾, 而謂之補疏烏乎敢? 且吾猶冀, 古疏之萬一復出云爾。」(X50, no. 822, p. 829, a5-9 // Z 1:81, p. 323, a2-6 // R81, p. 645, a2-6)

Yellow River has its origin.<sup>97</sup>

Here we see how the late-Ming commentators were desperately dependent upon the indirect sources in order to reduce any possible discrepancy. The question is how about there were no available indirect sources to pass down CWSLS's commentary to the late-Ming group. This is definitely one of reasons that could lead to some significant differences. Thus I come out with one hypothesis as below.

**H2-A1: When some significant differences occurred, they were due to no indirect sources available.**

What if there were indirect sources available for specific topics but the indirect sources that had readings different from CWSLS and/or had modified the message from CWSLS and then passed down to the late-Ming group? It might have a chance of causing some significant differences as well.

**H2-A2: When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the indirect sources that had readings different from CWSLS and/or had modified the message from CWSLS.**

What if there were indirect sources available for specific topics but the late-Ming commentators chose to ignore them and presented their own insights. Since the messages from CWSLS were passed down to late-Ming commentators blindly, the Ming commentators did not have the traditional pressure and/or lineage burden that they had to take it. Thus they very likely would choose to ignore it if they were not convinced by what CWSLS passed down.

**H2-A3: When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the fact that the late-Ming commentators chose to ignore the indirect sources available to them and presented their own insights.**

Moreover, the version of CWSL text that Kuiji used and the version CWSL text that the late-Ming commentators accessed to might be different. For many reasons, there might be text discrepancy in different versions of CWSL. For example, there might be one or two characters missed or different. As a result, the corresponding

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
<sup>97</sup> 「慨自古疏失傳，人師異解，文義尚訛，理觀奚賴... 賴有開蒙問答。梗概僅存，大鈔宗鏡，援引可據。而溯流窮源，則瑜伽、顯揚諸論，尤似黃河之有宿海。」(X51, no. 824, p. 297, a15-20 // Z 1:82, p. 197, a9-14 // R82, p. 393, a9-14)



commentaries would be different as well.

**H2-A4: When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the text discrepancy in different versions of CWSL.**

Nevertheless, the main purpose of this research is not about what differences between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS might be. Moreover, there is no intention for this study to use CWSLS as a standard or orthodoxical answer to judge the late-Ming CWSL commentaries. Instead, the hypotheses for diachronic analysis between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS is to focus on how the indirect sources like ZJL, WKWD, HJSC and etc might mediate the differences between the late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS. After all, the indirect sources are the material that were not only available to but also relevant to the project of the late-Ming commentators to rebuild the CWSL commentarial tradition.



## Chapter 2. Brief Review of related Ming Dynasty Contexts

### 2-1 External Related Contexts

#### 2-1-1 Tension between “Meditation”(禪) and “Lecture”(講)

Ming’s Buddhist policies, especially those that were enacted by Ming’s founding Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang (1328 -1398), have been viewed as the foundation of Ming official Buddhist control and management.<sup>98</sup> One relevant policy is that in 1382 Zhu Yuanzhang ordered all temples be classified into three kinds: “Meditation” (Ch. *chan* 禪) monks should practice to see enlightened nature “without use of written words” (Ch. *bu li wen zi* 不立文字). “Lecture” (Ch. *jiang* 講) monks should understand all scriptures thoroughly and give lectures. “Ritual” (Ch. *jiao* 教) monks are ritual specialists for prayers, repentances and funerals. Monks were required to wear different colors of robes so they could be easily identified as which kind.<sup>99</sup>

The official division between Meditation and Lecture inevitably reinforced the tension between Meditation monks who were required to throw away all written words and Lecture monks who were required to master all written scriptures. The tension is not only because their different orientations in terms of written words, but also because the former were officially expected to get the enlightenment and the enlightenment of the former was arbitrarily determined by direct transmission from mind to mind. Is the enlightenment the privilege of Meditation monks only? If not, how could Lecture monks prove and justify their enlightenments without direct transmission from mind to mind? They seemed not to have any other better alternative than resorting to the authority of scriptures that they were specialized in decoding and explicating. Moreover, the more abstruse and profound the scriptures the higher and superior the commentators. This might be one of reasons that late-Ming commentators who were either Lecture monks and/or inspired by those late-Ming eminent monks whose “direct dharma transmission were unknown” (法嗣不詳)<sup>100</sup> like Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祿宏 (1535-1615), Zibo Zhenke 紫柏真可 (1544-1604), and Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623) decided to work on decoding CWSL.

#### 2-1-2 The Thrust to Go Out of Box from Wang Yangming

De Bary maintains that Wang Yangming School gave a strong stimulus to

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<sup>98</sup> Yuh-neu Chen, “Mingdai Fomen Nei Wai Seng Su Jiao She De Chang Yu” 明代佛門內外僧俗交涉的場域 (Daoxiang chu ban she, 2009), p.9.

<sup>99</sup> Sheng-yen Shi and Shih-chien Guan, “Ming Mo Zhong Guo Fo Jiao Zhi Yan Jiu” 明末中國佛教之研究 (Dharma Drum Publishing, 2009), pp.93-96. Timothy Brook, *The Chinese State in Ming Society* (Routledge, 2005), pp.143-44. See T49, no. 2038, p. 932, a7-11.

<sup>100</sup> Sheng-yen Shi, “Ming Mo Zhong Guo De Chan Zong Ren Wu Ji Qi Te Se” 明末中國的禪宗人物及其特色, *Hwakang Buddhist Journal* 華岡佛學學報, no. 7 (1984): p.26.

Buddhism in the late-Ming so to bring the Buddhist revival in the late-Ming.<sup>101</sup> However, what kind of stimulus is it? What is the connection between Wang Yangming and Buddhism in the late-Ming? In order to better answer those questions, Araki suggests that it is necessary to be clear about the relationship among the “School of Principle” (Ch. *li xue* 理學) in Confucianism, the “School of Mind” (Ch. *xin xue* 心學) in Chan Buddhism and the “School of Mind” (Ch. *xin xue* 心學) in Confucianism.

The School of Principle in Confucianism represents the teaching of Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200) in Song dynasty (960-1279). The “principle” (Ch. *li* 理) is the universal law inherent in the objective world. It is the highest law that tells what is right from what is wrong. The mind has two qualities. One is an invariably stable quality called “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性) in that the mind could act upon the principle. The other is an instable quality called “feeling” (Ch. *qing* 情) in that the mind could act against the principle. Thus human’s obligation is to safeguard the nature because “the nature is identical the principle” (Ch. *xing ji li* 性即理).

On other hand, the School of Mind in Chan Buddhism views the mind as unifying both subject and object, spirit and body, internal and external words, and would like to discard all scriptures and traditional norms. The focus is to resume the original root rather than investigating any phenomenal laws. Because once the original root is resumed, the phenomena will take care themselves naturally. To distinguish the good from the evil is just false duality. Due to this reason, Zhu Xi attacked Chan Buddhism for ignoring the principle inherent in mind. Somewhere between Zhu Xi and Chan Buddhism is the teaching of Lu Xiang-shan 陸象山 (1139-1192) who also upheld the principle but subjected the principle under the mind because the mind itself was endowed with principle. Such view is called “the mind is identical to the principle” (Ch. *xin ji li* 心即理). Because Lu still upheld the principle, Araki did not classify his teaching as School of Mind.

Araki referred the School of Mind in Confucianism to the teaching of Wang Yangming 王陽明 (1472-1529) in Ming dynasty. Which is based on his theory of “innate knowledge” (Ch. *liang zhi* 良知). In Wang’s opinion, the orthodox and the heterodoxy should not be judged based on teachings but by self-awareness of the inner mind that is called “innate knowledge”. Innate knowledge is not subject to any established norms in that it comes out its own rule according to situations. The difference between Wang’s School of Mind in Confucianism and the School of Mind in Chan Buddhism is the latter might have a danger of being dissolved into emptiness. The difference with the School of Principle is that the principle that was constructed

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<sup>101</sup> See the preface in William Theodore De Bary, *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

in mind might have a danger of strangling the vitality of mind. With the above background, Araki argues that:

This revival of Buddhism in the late-Ming, as we have seen, owed much to Wang Yang-ming's theory of innate knowledge, which undermined the basis of the School of Principle and which went beyond the framework of traditional doctrines. Ch'an Buddhism attained its zenith in the early part of the Southern Sung and then gradually declined. In the Chia-ching (1522-67) and Lung-ch'ing (1567-72) eras of the Ming period it had fallen into extreme decadence without producing any eminent man of ability. The sudden rise of Buddhism, centering around the activities of the so-called three eminent monks in the Wan li era, is thought to have owed much to developments in the School of Wang Yang-ming rather than to any internal development in Buddhism itself.<sup>102</sup>

In other words, when Wang liberated the people in the Ming from the School of Principle, Buddhists were also liberated from the framework of Buddhist sects and traditions and became free to pursue as many syncretized forms of faiths as they wished. The specific examples that Araki gave is the three eminent monks in the late-Ming like Yunqi Zhuhong who taught the unity of Chan and Pure Land Buddhism, Hanshan Deqing who advocated the unity of doctrinal Buddhism and Chan, and Ouyi Zhixu who syncretized the Chan and Tiantai Buddhism.<sup>103</sup>

### **2-1-3 Pendulum between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism**

The significance of Wang Yangming's central position in the Ming thought has been traditionally well recognized without doubt. Nonetheless, Wang was not the only representative of Ming intellectual history. Because Wang's critics and revisionists developed many new theories from the sixteenth century toward the end of Ming dynasty.<sup>104</sup> Thus Yu maintains that:

In the history of Neo-Confucianism, however, the Ming period is characteristically an age of *tsun te-hsing* with a clear subordination of knowledge to moral cultivation. In the early Ming even the Ch'eng-Chu school also showed a tendency toward anti-intellectualism. Not until late sixteenth and early

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<sup>102</sup> Kengo Araki, "Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming," in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, ed. William Theodore De Bary (1975), p.54.

<sup>103</sup> *Ibid.*, p.55.

<sup>104</sup> Ying-shih Yu, "Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of of Qing Confucian Intellectualism," in *Chinese History and Culture: Seventeenth Century through Twentieth Century*, ed. Ying-shih Yu (Columbia University Press, 2016), p.21.

seventeenth centuries did the Neo-Confucian pendulum gradually but steadily swing back to the intellectualistic side.<sup>105</sup>

According to Yu, Neo-Confucianism in the Song observed the polarity between knowledge and morality. "Honoring the moral nature" (Ch. *zun de xing* or *tsun te-hsing* 尊德性) implies understanding one's own nature in order to attain the awakening of the moral nature. As a result, one attains the moral knowledge of *dao* 道 which is more or less like Christian's truth. "Following the path of inquiry and study" (Ch. *dao wen xue* 道問學) deals with the entire scope of the objective knowledge ranging from Confucian canon to a blade of grass. From the perspective of Zhu Xi, those who know everything must know something about *dao* 道. The knowledge that gained through "following the path of inquiry and study" has the built-in moral nature. Moreover, the awakening of the moral nature can only be attained through long term painstaking process of inquiry and study. On the other hand, in Lu Xiang-shan's opinion, the knowledge that accumulated through "following the path of inquiry and study" would not lead to the awakening of the moral nature in that the awakening requires a leap which is non-intellectual in character. He insisted that the inquiry and study should come after the experience of a leap of the moral nature. Without "honoring the moral nature", "following the path of inquiry and study" is like a ship without rudders.<sup>106</sup> Since Chen Xianzhang 陳獻章 (1428-1500) and Wang Yangming advocated "honoring the moral nature", anti-intellectualism became dominant in early and mid-Ming.

By "anti-intellectualism", Yu means an attitude that tends to view *dao* 道 as a something higher and out of reach of intellectual knowledge. In contrast, "intellectualism" refers to a practical attitude toward intellectual knowledge. In particular, the importance of understanding sages' words through texts is highly emphasized. In theory Buddhism looks like an anti-intellectualistic system in that it depends on the dialectics rather than normal logic. It insists that truth or reality is only knowable through intuition or "transcendental wisdom" (Skt: *prajñā*) rather than reason. However, the intuitive philosophy could also develop into sophisticated scholasticism like the teaching of the consciousness-only school in Tang in which the subtle analysis of the eight consciousness and mind turned out to be intellectualism philosophy.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>105</sup> "Toward an Interpretation of the Intellectual Transition in Seventeenth-Century China," *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 100, no. 2 (1980): p.121.; William Theodore De Bary, *Self and Society in Ming Thought*, vol. 4 (Columbia Univ Pr, 1970), p.1-26.

<sup>106</sup> Yu, "Some Preliminary Observations on the Rise of of Qing Confucian Intellectualism," p.4-6.

<sup>107</sup> "Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism in Chinese Intellectual History " in *Chinese History and Culture: Seventeenth Century through Twentieth Century*, ed. Yu-Ying-shih (Columbia University Press, 2016), pp.25-28.

In addition, Yu specifically gave his assessment on intellectual orientation of Jiao Hong 焦竑 (1540-1620) [or Chiao Hung in Wade–Giles transcription] as below.

My original suggestion was that Chiao Hung may be fruitfully viewed as a transitional figure whose intellectual life is highly symbolic of the Neo-Confucian transition from *tsun te-hsing* to *tao wen-hstieh*, or, if properly understood, from "anti-intellectualism" to "intellectualism."<sup>108</sup>

It is worthy drawing attention to the fact that Jiao Hong and Wang Kentang both passed the imperial examination and attained the highest degree *jin shi* 進士 in the same year 1589. Moreover, the study of Wang Kentang's notes *Yu gang zhai bi chen* 鬱岡齋筆塵 indicates that Wang Kentang was interested in "philological scholarship" (Ch. *kaoju xue* 考據學) like Jiao Hong.<sup>109</sup> Such orientation will be reflected in the unique quotation style of Wang Kentang's CWSL commentary in my following study. If Jiao Hong could be viewed as a transitional figure from "honoring the moral nature" to "following the path of inquiry and study", or from "anti-intellectualism" to "intellectualism", I would argue that Wang Kentang was situated in the same transition and played the transition role in his CWSL commentary from "anti-intellectualism" to "intellectualism" in a sense. If not, Wang Kentang would at least be in the dynamic between "anti-intellectualism" to "intellectualism" as Chen summarized the dynamic well as below.

Toward the end of Ming, the philological scholarship started as a result of the popularity of Mind school. The "doctrinal study" (Ch. *yi xue* 義學) initiated as a result of the flourishing of "Chan shool" (Ch. *zong men* 宗門). It was a common understanding that empty talks and meditation in front of wall without the use of written words were not enough to convince others. Therefore, both Confucianism and Buddhism made drastic changes at the same time. The doctrinal study and the moral nature were given equal priority. "Ultimate reality" (Ch. *shi xiang* 實相) was then better attained by emphasizing both the doctrinal study and the moral nature that contrast with each other.<sup>110</sup>

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<sup>108</sup> "Toward an Interpretation of the Intellectual Transition in Seventeenth-Century China," p.121.

<sup>109</sup> Zhi-gang Pan, "The Research of Wang Kentang's Yu Gang Zhai Bi Chen 王肯堂郁岡齋筆塵研究" (Central China Normal University, 2016), pp.54-56.

<sup>110</sup> 「明季心學盛而考證興，宗門昌而義學起，人皆知空言面壁，不立語文，不足以相攝也，故儒釋之學，同時丕變。問學與德性並重，相反而實相成焉。」 Yuan Chen, "Ming Ji Dian Qian Fo Jiao Kao" 明季滇黔佛教考 (Zhong hua shu ju, 1987), p.86.

#### 2-1-4 Mutual Redefinition between the Gentry and the Buddhist Monks

In order to picture the enthusiastic interactions between the late-Ming gentry and Buddhist monks, Timothy quoted a letter from Wang Yuanhan 王元翰 (1565-1633) who attained his title of *jin shi* 進士 in 1601 to a monk in 1620 as below.

At that time great numbers in the capital were studying the Way. Among the "good men of wisdom" [monks] were Dagan Zhenke, Langmu, Hanshan Deqing, Yuechuan, Xuelang, Yin'an Rujin, Qingxu, and Yu'an. Among the "presiding officials" [gentry] were Huang Shenxuan, Li Zhi, Yuan Hongdao and Zhongdao, Wang Xinghai, Duan Youran, Tao Wangling, Cai Wuyue, Tao Ting, and Cai Chengzhi. Each group sought out the other, fitting together like a lid to a box.<sup>111</sup>

As we will see later, Dagan Zhenke, Hanshan Deqing, and Xuelang were all the key players in the revival of the consciousness-only study in the late-Ming. This quote seems a good evidence that the revival of Buddhism was embedded in the social network between the prestigious gentry and the eminent monks.

How about the situation outside of the capital? Yu's case study of Yunqi Zhuhong provided some clues. Based on *Jushi chuan* (居士傳, Biographies of Buddhist Lay Devotees) and about one hundred correspondences between Zhuhong and his lay devotees, Yu found that there were twenty Zhuhong's followers whose biography were found in *Jushi chuan*. Nine out of those twenty attained the title of *jin shi*. There were approximately one fourth of correspondences that coming from those who were having official positions. Moreover, seventy-two out of one hundred and seven Buddhist devotees in *Jushi chuan* came from Kiangsu and Chekiang which centered around the lower Yangtze River delta.<sup>112</sup> As we will see later, most late-Ming commentators were also born in this area except Mingyu who was from southwest China but also active in this area while drafting his CWSL commentary. In addition, Sheng Yen also reviewed *Jushi chuan* and found the number of the biographies increased dramatically from only four in the period of early to mid-Ming to over one hundred in late-Ming. It indicates the vigor of Buddhist lay community in late-Ming.<sup>113</sup>

However, what brought together those Confucian-trained gentry and Buddhist monks who seemed to have very different life orientations at the first sight? Timothy

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<sup>111</sup> Timothy Brook, *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China*, vol. 38 (Harvard Univ Asia Center, 1993), pp.55-56.

<sup>112</sup> Chun-fang Yu, "Chu-Hung and Lay Buddhism in the Late Ming," in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, ed. William Theodore De Bary (1975), p.121-22.

<sup>113</sup> Shi and Guan, "Ming Mo Zhong Guo Fo Jiao Zhi Yan Jiu" 明末中國佛教之研究, p.119.

argues as below that the motivation behind the gentry's patronage in the late-Ming was for their redefinition of public authority.

Having been banished to the margin of public authority, Buddhism became available as a site for alternative constructions of public authority, in which the gentry could figure for themselves a prominent position... Unlike most other local institutions, the Buddhist monastery was hostage neither to the state's interests nor to the particular interests of corporate groups. It was not public in the sense of being a component in the structure of state authority; nor was it private in the sense of being closed to all but the members of a restricted collectivity. It existed between these arenas, constituting a limited but valuable space within which the local gentry could convert private wealth into public status and construct an identity at some distance from state mechanisms of status-conferral. Through their patronage of Buddhist monasteries, the late-Ming gentry were quietly reconstituting public authority in their favour.<sup>114</sup>

The reality facing the gentry was that the number of *sheng yuan* 生員 who was the first rung on the ladder to imperial office increased twenty times between 1400 and 1600 whereas the increase of office positions could not catch up in the same pace. As a result, most gentry had to lead an economic life rather than a political one. However, to differentiate themselves from normal businessmen, the gentry needed to have more legitimacy than what the unadorned economic capital could provide. Thus they needed to invest in symbolic capital through special projects like the patronage of Buddhist monasteries.<sup>115</sup> Here the Buddhist patronage could extend to include the sponsorship of CWSL commentary in the late-Ming. Take the prefaces of *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* in my study as example. As Sheng Yen pointed out, there were eight prefaces in total. None was written by monks but by prestigious gentry like Wang Kentang, Gu Qi-yuan 顧起元(1565-1628), Huang Ru-ting 黃汝亭 (1558-1626), Wu Yong-xian 吳用先 and etc.<sup>116</sup> Even though Timothy only argued for the gentry's redefinition of public authority through their patronage of Buddhism in the late-Ming, I would argue that the monks in the late-Ming also tried to redefine their public authority through their close association with the prestigious gentry, their public oral lectures, their poems and their written commentaries on the scriptures as well.

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<sup>114</sup> Brook, *The Chinese State in Ming Society*, p.156.

<sup>115</sup> *Praying for Power: Buddhism and the Formation of Gentry Society in Late-Ming China* (Cambridge, MA, US: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University and Harvard-Yenching Institute, 1993), pp.18-19.

<sup>116</sup> Shi, "'Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," p.8.



## 2-2 Internal Related Contexts

### 2-2-1 Significant Others

#### 2-2-1-1 Luan Putai

Due to the interruption of Tang's CWSL commentaries tradition, the initiation to rebuild the tradition in Ming started from Luan Putai's 魯菴普泰 myth like encounter that Wang Kentang heard from Zibo Zhenke as below.

Master Luan Putai travelled around and stopped by a family to take shelter from rain one day. He heard somebody teaching dharma internally. Listening to the teaching, he realized it was the teaching of "School of Characteristics" (相宗). He eagerly got inside and found that an old man was preaching to an old woman. Thus Master paid homage and requested for teaching. Then he stayed for over months to learn everything before leaving. It is suspected that the old man and woman were not ordinary humans but the manifestation of sages.<sup>117</sup>

Probably after this encounter, Luan Putai started promoting School of Characteristics as well. In 1511 he came out with *Bashi gui ju buzhu* 八識規矩補註 (Commentary on the Mechanism of the Eight Consciousnesses) and *Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie* 大乘百法明門論解 (Commentary on lucid introduction to the one hundred dharmas of Great Vehicle Teaching). Moreover, Luan Putai worked as *you chan jiao* 右闡教 (Right Explicator of the Teachings) which was a religious official title and was an active lecturer in the capital who promoting both Huayan school and Consciousness-only school and attracting many Buddhist scholars from the south.<sup>118</sup>

Recent study of the lineage of Huayan school shows that there are at least five branches spun off from Luan Putai: *Bao tong xi* 寶通系 (Yuechuan Zhencheng 月川鎮澄 (1547-1617) as a representative), *Yun qi xi* 雲棲系 (Yunqi Zhuhong as a representative), *Nan fang xi* 南方系 (Xuelang Hongen as a representative), *Ci en xi* 慈恩系 (Gaoyuan Mingyu as a representative) and *Ci hui xi* 慈慧系 whose lineage is not clear so far. The first three branches are more flourishing. *Yun qi xi* are more complicated in that it promoted more than one school of teaching, including Pure

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<sup>117</sup> 「魯庵泰法師，行脚避雨，止人家簷下。聞其內說法聲，聽之則相宗也。亟入見，乃一翁為一嫗說，師遂拜請教。因留月餘，盡傳其學而去。疑此翁嫗非凡人，蓋聖賢應化而現者。」 (X50, no. 821, p. 658, b18-22 // Z 1:81, p. 152, c3-7 // R81, p. 304, a3-7)

<sup>118</sup> Chao-heng Liao, "From the "Cool Holy Land" to "Remembering Jinling's Past": From the Custom of Cherishing Poetry to Examining the Spiritual Scene of the Southern Huayan School in the Late Ming and Early Qing Dynasties 從「清涼聖境」到「金陵懷古」：從尚詩風習側探晚明清初華嚴學南方系之精神圖景," *Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy 中國文哲研究集刊*, no. 37 (2010): p.53.; Wei-zhong Yang, ""Mingdai Putai Xi Gaoyuan Mingyu Xi Weishi Xue Chuan Cheng Kao" 明代普泰系、高原明显系唯識學傳承考," in "*Jue Qun Fo Xue*" 覺群佛學, ed. Jue-Xing Shi (Beijing: Zong jiao wen hua, 2012), p.281.

Land school, Tiantai school, and etc.<sup>119</sup> In this lineage map, we could at least identify three late-Ming commentators: Mingyu from *Ci en xi*, Tongrun from *Nan fang xi* in that he is the disciple of Xuelang Hongen, and Dahui from *Yun qi xi* in that his master Shaojue Guangcheng is under Yunqi Zhuhong. For the rest two late-Ming commentators, as we will see later, Wang Kentang could be connected to Putai through Bianrong Zhenyuan 遍融真圓 (1506-1584) and Zibo Zhenke. Ouyi Zhixu could be related to Putai through Wuji Wuqin 無極悟勤(1506-1584) and Hanshan Deqing.

### 2-2-1-2 Wuji Wuqin and Bianrong Zhenyuan

Wuji Wuqin 無極悟勤 (1500-1584) and Bianrong Zhenyuan 遍融真圓 (1506-1584) are both disciples of Luan Putai.

Bianrong Zhenyuan came from Sichuan in southwest China and became an eminent monk in the capital with the support from the high ranking officials Zhao Zhenji 趙貞吉 (1508-1576) and Chen Yiqin 陳以勤 (1511-1586) who also came from Sichuan. Bianrong was viewed as an influential Buddhist leader of Huayan school in the north. Yunqi Zhuhong, Hanshan Deqing and Zibo Zhenke all travelled to the north to consult with Bianrong Zhenyuan. In particular, Zibo Zhenke admired Bianrong Zhenyuan the most.<sup>120</sup>

Different from Bianrong Zhenyuan stationing and lecturing only in the north, Wuji Wuqin started lecturing in the south when he finished his study in the teachings of School of Nature and School of Characteristics from Huayan school (or Xianshou school 賢首宗) and Faxiang school (or Cien school 慈恩宗) respectively in the north and back to the south. Hanshan Deqing and Xuelang Hongen were both his disciples.<sup>121</sup>

### 2-2-1-3 Xuelang Hongen

Xuelang Hongen 雪浪洪恩 (1545-1608) renounced the secular life at age of twelve when he was enlightened by listening to the lecture of *Bashi guiju buzhu* 八識

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<sup>119</sup> Kai-ting Chien and Chao-heng Liao, "Ming Qing Huayan Chuan Cheng Shi Liao Liang Zhong-Xianshou Zong Cheng Yu Xianshou Chuan Deng Lu" 明清華嚴傳承史料兩種-賢首宗乘與賢首傳燈錄 (Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of History and Philology Academia Sinica 2017), p.27.

<sup>120</sup> Yuh-neu Chen, "About the Imprisonment of Hua-Yan-Tsung P'ien Jung in the Ming Dynasty 明華嚴宗派遍融和尚入獄考-兼述隆、萬年間佛教與京師權貴的往來," *Bulletin of History Department National Ch'eng Kung University 成大歷史學報*, no. 24 (1998): p.256.

<sup>121</sup> See X73, no. 1456, p. 831, c20-p. 832, a4 // Z 2:32, p. 474, c14-d4 // R127, p. 948, a14-b4; Qian-yi Qian, "Qian Mu Zhai Quan Ji" 錢牧齋全集 (Shanghai guji chu ban she, 2003).

規矩頌 (Verses on the Mechanism of the Eight Consciousnesses).<sup>122</sup> Later on, Xuelang extracted and compiled *Xiang zong ba yao* 相宗八要 (Eight Essential Texts for School of Characteristics) from the Buddhist canon. The eight texts as Table 4 shows provide a direction for the study of consciousness-only in late Mng. Mingyu and Zhixu both made commentaries on *Xiang zong ba yao* 相宗八要.<sup>123</sup>

**Table 4 *Xiang zong ba yao* 相宗八要**

Item	<i>Xiang zong ba yao</i> 相宗八要 (Eight Essential Texts for School of Characteristics)
1	<i>Dasheng baifa mingmen lun</i> 大乘百法明門論 (Introduction to One Hundred Dharmas in Mahāyāna) by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang.
2	<i>Weishi sanshi lun song</i> 唯識三十論頌 (Skt. <i>Triṃśikāvijñaptikārikā</i> , Thirty Verses on Consciousness) by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang.
3	<i>Guansuo yuanyuan lun</i> 觀所緣緣論 (Investigation of the Percept) by Dignāga and translated by Xuanzang
4	<i>Guansuo yuanyuan lunshi</i> 觀所緣論釋 (Commentary on the Investigation of the Percept) by Dharmapāla and translated by Yijing
5	<i>Yinming ruzheng lilun</i> 因明入正理論 (Skt. <i>Nyāyapraveśa</i> ; Primer on Logic ) by Śaṅkarasvāmin and translated by Xuanzang.
6	<i>Liu lihoshi</i> 六離合釋 (Skt. <i>sat-samāsāh</i> , Xix analyses of compounds). Which is excerpted from <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 (An Informal Collection of Discourses and Commentaries on the Flower Ornament Scripture)
7	<i>Zhen weishi liang</i> 真唯識量 (Proof of Consciousness-only by Xuanzang ) Which is excerpted from <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄 (Record of the Thesis [of One Mind Revealing Everything like a] Mirror.)
8	<i>Bashi guiju song</i> 八識規矩頌 (Verses on the Mechanism of the Eight Consciousnesses). Which has been claimed to written by Xuanzang.

Xuelang Hongen spent thirty years in conducting Buddhist lectures at *da bao en si* 大報恩寺 (The great temple of repaying kindness) in Nanjing. The temple was the southern center of “doctrinal study” (義學) at that time. When he was on the podium, Xuelang gave the audience a refreshing experience by throwing away exegesis and directly getting to the texts. He was also good at poetry that his poems were collected by the locals as treasures. Moreover, Xuelang had a wide social network and activities including socializing with the gentry, entertainers and debating with Matteo Ricci (1552-1610) in person.<sup>124</sup> Xuelang had many disciples. Among them, Chaosong Huijin 巢松慧浸 (1566-1621) was good at lecture while Yiyu Tongrun were well known for his commentaries.<sup>125</sup> *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* in the scope of this study was Tongrun’s commentary on CWSL.

<sup>122</sup> See X73, no. 1456, p. 677, b2-12 // Z 2:32, p. 320, c5-15 // R127, p. 640, a5-15.

<sup>123</sup> Shi, ""Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," p.10.

<sup>124</sup> Jun-yu Liu and Yu-chuan Wang, "*Li Ma Dou Zhong Guo Chuan Jiao Shi*" 利瑪竇中國傳教史, vol. 2, "*Li Ma Dou Quan Ji*" 利瑪竇全集 (Kuangchi Cultural Group, 1986), pp.313-17.

<sup>125</sup> Chao-heng Liao, ""Xue Lang Hong En Chu Tan" 雪浪洪恩初探," in "*Zhongbian Shichan Mengxi*" 中邊、詩禪、夢戲 (Taipei, Taiwan: Yunchen chuban she, 1996), pp.202-04.; "*Ju Lang Hui Lan*" 巨浪迴瀾 (Dharma Drum Culture, 2014), pp.36-45.

## 2-2-1-4 Hanshan Deqing

With the support of his pious mother, Hanshan Deqing 憨山德清 (1546-1623) turned down the betrothal that arranged by his father and joined Xuelang Hongen at *Bao en si* 報恩寺 at age of twelve. Hongen was one year older than Deqing so they were very close. One day Zhao Zhenji visited the temple and was impressed by Deqing. Zhao asked Deqing whether he would like to be a high ranking official or a Buddha. Deqing replied he would like to be Buddha without hesitation. However, at age of nineteen Deqing became not so sure. Yungu Fahui 雲谷法會(1500-1579) who was the first Chan master teaching meditation training in the south asked Deqing why he changed his mind. Deqing said he was disgusted with the vulgar monks. Then, Fahui suggested Deqing should learn to be eminent monks like those who were recorded in *Jingde chuandeng lu* 景德傳燈錄 (The Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp). After reading *Zhong feng guang lu* 中峰廣錄 (Comprehensive Record of Master Zhongfeng Mingben (1263-1323) who was an advocate of “critical phrase” (Ch. *huatou* 話頭) meditation), Deqing was determined to be tonsured.<sup>126</sup>

The following year Deqing attended the meditation retreat that was hosted by Yungu Fahui in *Tianjie* Temple 天界寺. Deqing was fortunate to learn the meditation technique of critical phrase like reciting the name of the Buddha first and then questioning “who is reciting the name of Buddha?”<sup>127</sup> Having hands-on experience of meditation, Deqing went down with the path that was very different from the one that Xuelang Hongen took. He travelled to Mount Wutai and focused on ascetic and meditative practice until he attained enlightenment at age of thirty. How did Deqing prove his enlightenment? He consulted nobody but verified himself by reading *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經.<sup>128</sup> Without hearing any lecture on this scripture, Deqing could not understand it at all in earlier time. Now after enlightenment he tried to read it through “direct perception” (Ch. *xian liang* 現量; Skt. *pratyakṣa*) without thinking mind for eight months. Then he fully understood the scripture without any problem. It is a very interesting cross-checking process between enlightenment and scriptures. We might not know exactly how it worked. What Deqing had to say seems that

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<sup>126</sup> Pei-yi Wu, "The Spiritual Autobiography of Te-Ch'ing," in *The Unfolding of Neo-Confucianism*, ed. Theodore De Bary W.M.et al. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975), pp.72-73.

<sup>127</sup> Jiang Wu, *Enlightenment in Dispute: The Reinvention of Chan Buddhism in Seventeenth-Century China* (Oxford University Press, 2008), p.40.

<sup>128</sup> According to X73n1456, it read *Lengqie jing* 楞伽經. See X73, no. 1456, p. 835, c6-9 // Z 2:32, p. 478, b18-c3 // R127, p. 955, b18-p. 956, a3. However, Pei-yi Wu modified it as *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經. See Wu, "The Spiritual Autobiography of Te-Ch'ing," p.79. I guess the reason is that Deqing did mention using *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經 to verify his enlightenment in his preface of *Shou leng yan jing tong yi* 首楞嚴經通議. See X12, no. 279, p. 532, a15-17 // Z 1:19, p. 43, c12-14 // R19, p. 86, a12-14. Thus I follow Wu's modification here.

enlightenment and scriptures were correlated to some degree.

### 2-2-1-5 Zibo Zhenke

Zibo Zhenke 紫柏真可 (1544-1604) used to be a wild teenager carrying a sword around. At age of seventeen one day when Zhenke stayed over in a temple and heard monks reciting the names of eighty-eight Buddhas at night, he felt the bliss and requested being tonsured and then sat in the meditation until morning.<sup>129</sup> At age of twenty Zhenker received full ordination. Seeing monks writing Huayan Sutra, he shut the door for three years of study. Then he started travelling around for learning. One day when Zhenke heard monks reciting Zhang zhuo's 張拙 "verses on enlightenment" (見道偈)- "The elimination of delusions made illness even worse. Toward the thusness are also on the evil track" (至斷除妄想重增病，趨向真如亦是邪), he felt so confused that he wrote it down on the wall and examined it day in day out until he finally attained his enlightenment. Then Zhenke went studying the teachings of School of Characteristics at Mountain Kuang 匡山.<sup>130</sup>

The concept of "meditation through words" (Ch. *wen zi chan* 文字禪) was first brought up by Huihong Juefan 惠洪覺範 (1071-1128) in his work *Shi men wen zi chan* 石門文字禪. In the history of Chan school, the status of Huihong Juefan is not as high as of Dahui Zonggao 大慧宗杲 (1089-1163) who first introduced the practice of "inspecting the critical phrase" (Ch. *can hua tou* 參話頭).<sup>131</sup> However, Zibo Zhenke did everything he could to search for the works of Huihong Juefan, reprinted and promoted "meditation through words" (Ch. *wen zi chan* 文字禪)<sup>132</sup>. Why? Here is what Zhenke had to say in the his preface for the reprinting of *Shi men wen zi chan* 石門文字禪.

Therefore if Chan is like the spring, then words are like the flowers. If spring is in the flowers, all flowers are spring. If flowers are in spring, entire spring is flowers. Thus said, are Chan and words separate as two things? So the alternation of Deshan Xuanjian's 德山宣鑑 (782-865) staff and Linji Yixuan's 臨濟義玄 (?-867) shout is not necessarily not words while the commentaries and treatises by Qingliang Chengguan 清涼澄觀 (738-839) and Tiantai are not necessarily not Chan. Thus said, are Chan and words separate as two things?

<sup>129</sup> See X73, no. 1456, p. 652, c4-9 // Z 2:32, p. 295, d6-11 // R127, p. 590, b6-11.

<sup>130</sup> See X73, no. 1456, p. 652, c20-p. 653, a1 // Z 2:32, p. 296, a4-9 // R127, p. 591, a4-9.

<sup>131</sup> Chao-heng Liao, "Rewriting Huihong Juefan in the Ming Dynasty 惠洪覺範在明代-宋代禪學在晚明的書寫、衍異與反響," *Bulletin of the Institute of History and Philology Academia Sinica 中央研究院歷史語言研究所集刊* 75, no. 4 (2004): p.816.

<sup>132</sup> See X73, no. 1452, p. 142, a7-9 // Z 2:31, p. 316, d5-7 // R126, p. 632, b5-7). *Ibid.*, p.801.

Until recently [Chan school and Doctrinal study school] laughed at and criticized each other more seriously than water versus fire. Huihong Juefan worried about it so he named his work as “meditation through words” (Ch. *wen zi chan* 文字禪).<sup>133</sup>

Here we see that Zhenke could not make his intention much clearer. The reason that he promoted “meditation through words” (Ch. *wen zi chan* 文字禪) was to mediate between Chan School and Doctrinal study school. In particular, to correct the root cause of most Buddhist malpractices at that time. Which was mainly related to the fact that Chan School had been neglecting scriptures.<sup>134</sup>

In addition, Zibo Zhenke was the champion of the project to print *Jiaying Cang* 嘉興藏 (Jiaying version of the Buddhist Canon) in late-Ming. It is a monk-lay collaborative project without any sponsorship from the Ming State. Zibo Zhenke’s disciples Micang (密藏) and Huanyu (幻余) worked as key organizers. Besides four monks Zibo Zhenke, Micang, Huanyu and Hanshan Deqing, there are more than twenty lay names listed as project sponsors and supporters. Due to budget concern and the consideration of easier circulation, *Jiaying Cang* featured as thread-bound books. Another valuable feature is that *Xubian* (續編, the sequel) of *Jiaying Cang* contained over three hundred Buddhist books which were not reserved in other Buddhist Canon.<sup>135</sup> If one is wondering what is Zhenke’s motivation to take over such a huge private project, the following letter from Zhenke to a donator of printing the Buddhist canon may speak well for himself and his influence on the revival of consciousness-only study as well.

So called Buddhist canon is “words of Buddha” (Ch. *fo yu* 佛語; Skt. *buddhavacana*). What Buddhist canon interprets is Buddha’s mind. Words of Buddha is like firewood while Buddha’s mind is like fire. The more the firewood the more flaming the fire. If firewood is run out, the fire will not be passed down. If no fire is passed down, the function to turn the raw into the cooked and to break the dark into the light would cease. Therefore, to pass down the fire has to

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<sup>133</sup> 「蓋禪如春也，文字則花也。春在於花，全花是春。花在於春，全春是花。而曰：禪與文字有二乎哉？故德山、臨濟棒喝交馳，未嘗非文字也。清涼、天台疏經造論，未嘗非禪也。而曰：禪與文字有二乎哉？逮於晚近，更相笑而更相非，嚴於水火矣。宋寂音尊者憂之，因名其所著，曰文字禪。」 (X73, no. 1452, p. 262, b21-c2 // Z 2:31, p. 437, a11-16 // R126, p. 873, a11-16)

<sup>134</sup> Ki-Cheng Dai, “Zibo Dashi De Wen Zi Chan Li Lun Ji Qi Shi Jian” 紫柏大師的“文字禪”理論及其實踐, *Chuanshan Journal* 船山學刊, no. 2 (2005): p.89.

<sup>135</sup> Chi-fu Lan, “Jiaying Dacang Jing Yan Jiu” 嘉興大藏經研究, *Satyabhisamays* 諦觀, no. 70 (1992). And “Jiaying Dacang Jing De Te Se Ji Qi Shi Liao Jia Zhi” 嘉興大藏經的特色及其史料價值, in *Yin Shun Daoshi Ba Zhi Jin Liu Shou Qing Lun Wen Ji* 佛教的思想與文化--印順導師八秩晉六壽慶論文集 (1991).

rely on the firewood so the fire could work. To transmit Buddha's mind has to be aligned with words of Buddha so the mind would not be in doubt.<sup>136</sup>

### 2-2-1-6 Yunqi Zhuhong

Yunqi Zhuhong 雲棲祿宏 (1535-1615) was born in a family of an educated businessman. He received Confucian education and performed well but took his father's advice for not going down the path as an official. He got married at age of twenty and had a family life until 1566 when he finally was able to renounce the secular life as he had wished. In 1571 he built up his *yun qi* temple 雲棲寺 that later expanded into the biggest "associations for reciting Buddha's name" (Ch. *nian fo jie she* 念佛結社) in the late-Ming.<sup>137</sup> Zhuhong was successful in leading the lay Buddhist movement by advocating "no killing" (Ch. *pu sa* 不殺), "release of animals" (Ch. *fang sheng* 放生) and ethics through Record of Self-Knowledge which is a system of merit and demerit.<sup>138</sup> As previous discussion in the external context, he had many lay devotees followers.

The primary base of Zhuhong's teaching is Pure Land School. He spent his entire life in promoting "reciting Buddha's name". In the meantime, Zhuhong diligently encouraged people to study the doctrines. Why? If the theory of reciting Buddha's name was not clearly recorded in the scriptures, there was no way for sentient beings to know there is a *Amitābha* Buddha out there. Moreover, those who practicing Chan/meditation and making an excuse that "individual transmission is outside of teachings" (教外別傳) did not know that those mediation and enlightenment that were outside of teachings were evil cause and effect. Zhuhong maintained that enlightenment that attained by mediation had to be verified by doctrinal teachings.<sup>139</sup>

Among the doctrinal teachings, Zhuhong uphold *Huayan jing* 華嚴經 (Skt. *Avatamsaka-sūtra*; Flower Ornament Scripture) as the King scripture.<sup>140</sup> However, the most popular commentary of Huayan Sutra in Ming was *Huayan jing he lun* 華嚴經合論 that composed by Li Tongxuan 李通玄 (635-730). In which Li Tongxuan treated all pure lands as "provisional pure lands" (權淨土) for those who could not

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<sup>136</sup> 「夫大藏，佛語也。而大藏之所詮者，佛心也。佛語如薪，佛心如火。薪多則火熾，薪盡則火不可傳。火不可傳，則變生為熟、破暗張明之用，幾乎息矣。故傳火必待於薪，而火始有用。傳心必合於佛語，而心始無疑。」(X73, no. 1452, p. 277, c16-19 // Z 2:31, p. 452, b10-13 // R126, p. 903, b10-13)

<sup>137</sup> Kengo Araki and Xian-bo Zhou, "Jinshi Zhongguo Fojiao De Shuguang--Yunqi Zhuhong Zhi Yanjiu" 近世中國佛教的曙光--雲棲祿宏之研究 (Hui ming wen hua, 2001), pp.91-104.

<sup>138</sup> Yu, "Chu-Hung and Lay Buddhism in the Late Ming," p.95.

<sup>139</sup> See J33, no. B277, p. 32, a8-15.

<sup>140</sup> See J33, no. B277, p. 52, a25-b2.

understand the principle that all dharmas are empty. That became the best excuse for Chan School to show contempt for Pure Land School.<sup>141</sup> Araki's case study of the debating correspondences between Zhuhong and Cao Luchuan 曹魯川 who suggested not to mix up two different teachings and different audiences indicates there was a tension between the teaching of Pure Land and the teaching of Huayan School.<sup>142</sup> Whether or not Zhuhong managed to remove the tension was not in the scope of this study. Here suffice it to say what Zhuhong liked to achieve were two-fold: one was to bring the malpractices of wild Chan down to the earth. The other was to syncretize Pure Land and Chan.

## 2-2-2 Authors of the Late-Ming Group

### 2-2-2-1 Forerunner: Gaoyuan Mingyu

Gaoyuan Mingyu 高原明显 (circa 1544-1633) is the author of *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 (hereafter referred as LMC#1).

Mingyu came from Sichuan in southwest China. At age of twenty, he looked still weak and incompetent. Encouraged by a friend, Mingyu went visiting Zhongnan Mountain (終南山) looking for specially talented persons. When he stayed in the place where Kuiji 窺基 visited before, Mingyu did come across a specially talented person with whom he studied the theory of consciousness-only for nine years. Then Mingyu travelled to Beijing where he had a discussion with Wang Kentang on the teaching of consciousness-only.<sup>143</sup>

In 1603 Wang Kentang invited Mingyu to be abbot of *Dong chan* temple 東禪寺 which located in Jiangsu China and to give lectures on CWSL.<sup>144</sup> Since then Mingyu had been giving lectures and doing commentary on CWSL at the same time. He gave CWSL lectures around Nanking area for about three years and then was invited to give a lecture in Beijing in 1609 winter. In 1610 summer Mingyu paid a visit to Yuechuan Zhencheng 月川鎮澄 (1547-1617) in Wutai Mountain who was known in giving lectures on CWSL in the north. However, the meeting seemed not going well. Then Mingyu was back to the south. Finally in 1611 Mingyu finally published *Cheng Weishi lun suquan* 成唯識論俗詮 that was the first commentary on

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<sup>141</sup> Araki and Zhou, "Jinshi Zhongguo Fo jiao De Shuguang--Yunqi Zhuhong Zhi Yanjiu" 近世中國佛教的曙光--雲棲祿宏之研究, pp.157-58.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid., pp.163-76.

<sup>143</sup> See X85, no. 1590, p. 225, b13-c4 // Z 2B:18, p. 368, a9-b6 // R145, p. 735, a9-b6; Wei-zhong Yang, "'Mingdai Weishi Xue Huayan Zong Dashi Gaoyuan Mingyu Xingli Ji Qi Gong Xian Kao Shu'" 明代唯識學、華嚴宗大師高原明显行歷及其貢獻考述, *Studies in World Religions* 世界宗教研究, no. 2 (2017): p.54.

<sup>144</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 505, c14-17 // Z 1:81, p. 4, a13-16 // R81, p. 7, a13-16.



CWSL in Ming.<sup>145</sup>

In addition, recent studies of the lineage history of Huayan school and many sources all indicates that Mingyu was “primarily Huayan school and secondarily Cien/Faxiang school” (賢首兼慈恩宗).<sup>146</sup> Nevertheless, according to these studies and sources, I try to pull together all the works by Mingyu as Table 5 shows. If we did not miss any work that ever done by Mingyu, the following list which including no any work related with Huayan school would make Mingyu look more like “primarily Faxiang school and secondarily Huayan school” if not dedicated to Faxiang school only as Sheng Yen thought.<sup>147</sup>

**Table 5 The List of Works by Gaoyuan Mingyu 高原明昱**

1. <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮 (Commentary on CWSL)
2. <i>Xiang zong bayao jie</i> 相宗八要解 (Commentary on Eight Essential Texts for School of Characteristics) (The Entire Set Print)
1) <i>Bai fa ming men lun zhui yan</i> 百法明門論贅言
2) <i>Weishi sanshi lun yue yi</i> 唯識三十論約意
3) <i>Guan suo yuan yuan lun hui shi</i> 觀所緣緣論會釋
4) <i>Guan suo yuan yuan lun shi ji</i> 觀所緣緣論釋記
5) <i>Liu li he shi fa shi tong guan</i> 六離合釋法式通關
6) <i>Yin ming ru zheng li lun zhi shu</i> 因明入正理論直疏
7) <i>San zhi bi liang yi chao</i> 三支比量義鈔
8) <i>Ba shi gui ju bu zhu zheng yi</i> 八識規矩補注證義
3. <i>Ming yu shi ji</i> 明昱詩集 (Collection of Poems by Mingyu)

### 2-2-2-2 Specialist: Yiyu Tongrun

Yiyu Tongrun 一雨通潤 (1565-1624) is the author of *Cheng Weishi lun jijie* 成唯識論集解 (hereafter referred as LMC#2)

Tongrun was born in Jiangsu China and renounced the secular life after his parents passed away. In temple, he found a quiet room and studied Mahāyāna scriptures and treatises and non-Buddhist classical books for ten years without

<sup>145</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 503, b3-14 // Z 1:81, p. 2, a9-b2 // R81, p. 3, a9-b2; Yang, "'Mingdai Putai Xi Gaoyuan Mingyu Xi Weishi Xue Chuan Cheng Kao" 明代普泰系、高原明昱系唯識學傳承考," p.291.

<sup>146</sup> See Shu-jia Zhou, "'Zhong Guo Fo Xue Shi" 中國佛學史," in "Zhou Shu Jia Fo Xue Lun Zhu Quan Ji" 周叔迦佛學論著全集, ed. Sen Li (Beijing, China: Zhonghua Book Company, 2006), p.352 & p.434.; DaHuayanSi, "*Xian Shou Zong Fu Fa Shi Zi Ji*" 賢首宗付法師資記 (Taipei, Taiwan: Da Huayan Si, 2008), p.340 & p.60.; Chien and Liao, "*Ming Qing Huayan Chuan Cheng Shi Liao Liang Zhong- Xianshou Zong Cheng Yu Xianshou Chuan Deng Lu*" 明清華嚴傳承史料兩種-賢首宗乘與賢首傳燈錄, p.27 & p.85.; Yang, "'Mingdai Weishi Xue Huayan Zong Dashi Gaoyuan Mingyu Xingli Ji Qi Gong Xian Kao Shu" 明代唯識學、華嚴宗大師高原明昱行历及其贡献考述," pp.60-63.; Chuan-huai Hu, "'Ming Mo Gao Seng Weishi Da Shi Gaoyuan Mingyu" 明末高僧唯識大師高原明昱," *"Peng xi wen shi zi liao"* 蓬溪文史資料 34 (2012): pp.46-49.

<sup>147</sup> Shi, "'Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," p.26.

teachers. At age of twenty-two, Tongrun was so proud of self-learning that he did not think it was worthy going to the lecture of Xuelang Hongen on *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經 in the first place. However, once Tongrun went to Hongen's lecture, he was totally overwhelmed by the refreshing experience that Hongen brought to the audience—throwing away exegesis and directly getting to the texts. Since then Tongrun served Hongen as a direct disciple for more than ten years.<sup>148</sup>

Among Hongen's disciples, Tongrun was very close to Xueshan Gaogong 雪山杲公 (1566-1608) who well known for poems and Chaosong Huijin 巢松慧浸 (1566-1621) who famous for lecture. Since Hongen and Xueshan Gaogong passed away in 1608, Tongrun and Chaosong Huijin continued promoting Hongen's teachings by commentary and by lecture, respectively. Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664) listed Tongrun's commentaries by "School of Nature" (性宗) and "School of Characteristics" (相宗) as Table 6 shows.<sup>149</sup>

**Table 6 The List of Works by Yiyu Tongrun 一雨通潤**

Works for "School of Nature"	
1.	<i>Fahua jing da kuan</i> 法華經大竅
2.	<i>Lengqie jing he che</i> 楞伽經合轍
3.	<i>Lengyan jing he che</i> 楞嚴經合轍
4.	<i>Yuanjue jing jin shi</i> 圓覺經近釋
5.	<i>Qixin lun xu shu</i> 起信論續疏
6.	<i>Wei mojie suo shuo jing zhi shu</i> 維摩詰所說經直疏
7.	<i>Siyi fantian jing zhi shu</i> 思益梵天經直疏
8.	<i>Jin gang jing jie</i> 金剛經解
9.	<i>Xin jing jie</i> 心經解
10.	<i>Fan wang jing chu shi</i> 梵網經初釋
11.	<i>Liu li pin bo</i> 琉璃品駁
12.	<i>Du wang shuo bian miu</i> 杜妄說辯謬
Works for "School of Characteristics"	
1.	<i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解
2.	<i>Guan suo yuan yuan lun shi fa xing</i> 觀所緣緣論釋發研 (Inc. <i>Guan suo yuan yuan lun fa xing</i> 觀所緣緣論發研)
3.	<i>Yin ming ji shi</i> 因明集釋
4.	<i>San zhi bi liang shi</i> 三支比量釋
5.	<i>Liu li he shi shi</i> 六離合釋釋

Since Tongrun did commentary on scriptures and treatises from both sides—School of Nature and School of Characteristics, one might be wondering how he managed the tension between these two different teachings. In his preface of *Lengqie jing he che* 楞伽經合轍 (Alignment on the Scripture on the Buddha's Entering the Country of Lanka), Tongrun made it clear about his position as below:

<sup>148</sup> Kai-ting Chien, "A Study on Yiyu Tongrun's Life and Rarely Known Works 晚明義學僧一雨通潤及其稀見著作考述," *Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies* 臺大佛學研究, no. 28 (2014): pp.146-49.

<sup>149</sup> Qian-yi Qian, ""Yiyu Fashi Taming" 一雨法師塔銘," *Muzhai chuxue ji* 牧齋初學集 (Wiki Library, 1643).

When previous commentators explicated this scripture, they either “explicated the characteristics by nature” (依性以解相) or “explicated nature by the characteristics” (依相以解性). The former was challenged by those who advocated characteristics whereas the latter was challenged by those who advocated nature... Therefore, whenever it coming to the cross road between nature and characteristics, I would draw both theory of nature and of characteristics to do the commentary. Like stars and moon each have their own directions, I would make sure that School of Nature and School of Characteristics would work like two wheels of a cart, fully aligned and never against to each other. This is my profound intention so I named this commentary “alignment” (Ch. *he che* 合轍).<sup>150</sup>

The good intention is one thing whereas the implementation is another. Besides the possible mixing up between School of Nature and School of Characteristics, the mixing up could also happen between “meditation” (禪) and “lecture” (講) too. For Tongrun’s another work *Lengyan jing he che* 楞嚴經合轍 (Alignment on the Scripture of the Heroic Progress), Qian Qianyi who was also specialized in the scripture could not help criticize Tongrun for arbitrarily borrowing Chan’s teachings and cases (公案) to comment on scriptures and doctrine study. Tongrun seemed to have the tendency to transplant his master Xuelang Hongen’s style in oral lectures to his written commentaries.<sup>151</sup> This study is not intended to judge whether such tendency is good or bad but we will see the similar style in his commentary on CWSL in 12-2 discussion of Chapter 4.

### 2-2-2-3 Facilitator: Wang Kentang

Wang Kentang 王肯堂 (1549-1613) is the author *Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi* 成唯識論證義 (hereafter referred as LMC#3)

Wang Kentang was born in a family of scholar-bureaucrat in Jiangsu China. His grandfather Wang Nie 王梟 (1477-1553), father Wang Qiao 王樵 (1521-1599) and himself all attained the title of *jin shi* 進士 which is the highest degree in the imperial examination. After Wang attained the title in 1589, he studied in Han Lin Academy

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<sup>150</sup> 「從上諸師解此經者，或依性以解相，而宗相者則執相以難性，或依相以解性，而宗性者，則執性以破相... 故凡值經之性、相分途處，雙引性、相併釋之，皎如星、月各有指歸，務令性、相二宗，如車兩輪，並行不悖，此余之深意也，故命名合轍」(X17, no. 331, p. 802, b10-16 // Z 1:26, p. 367, c6-12 // R26, p. 734, a6-12)

<sup>151</sup> See Chao-heng Liao, "*Zhongbian Shichan Mengxi*" 中邊·詩禪·夢戲 (Taipei, Taiwan: Yunchen chuban she, 2008), p.221. & See Chien, "A Study on Yiyu Tongrun's Life and Rarely Known Works 晚明義學僧一雨通潤及其稀見著作考述," pp.174-76.

Department for three years and then was assigned a position in Han Lin Academy Department for being in charge of writing Dynasty history. However, his career as an official did not go smoothly due to being involved in power struggle, his personality and his poor physical condition.<sup>152</sup>

In contrast to his bumpy career as an official, Wang Kentang was later on well recognized as being very erudite in many areas including Chinese medicine, Law, Buddhism, and etc.<sup>153</sup> Wang started learning Chinese medicine at age of 17 because of his bad experience with the doctors of his ill mother. Then he cured his very ill younger sister in 1570.<sup>154</sup> In 1602 Wang finished *Zheng zhi zhun sheng* 證治準繩 (Standards for Syndrome Identification and Treatment) which became a very important references for later Chinese medicine doctors and scholars.

*Yu gang zhai bi chen* 鬱岡齋筆塵 is the notes book of Wang Kentang. A detailed citation analysis of this notes by Pan indicates that among 135 sources in total 17 sources fall in the section of “Classics” (Ch. *jing* 經; Chinese classic texts), 9 in the section of “Histories” (Ch. *shi* 史; histories and geographies), 97 in the section of “Masters” (Ch. *zi* 子; philosophy, arts, and sciences), and 12 in the section of “Collections” (Ch. *ji* 集; literatures). Thus, the section of Masters is the section that Wang favored the most. There are 14 sub-sections under the section of Masters. In the top three subsections of Masters there are 26 sources falling in “Mixed School” (Ch. *za jia* 雜家), 20 sources in “Buddhist School” (Ch. *shi jia* 釋家) and 17 sources in “Medicine School” (Ch. *yi jia* 醫家). To further breakdown Mixed School, there are 8 sources are related to “philological investigation” (Ch. *za kao* 雜考) and another 8 sources related to “miscellaneous talks” (Ch. *za shuo* 雜說). The former is like the case that Wang noted two implications of the term “鄭重” and their relationships while the latter is like the case that Wang noted different versions of talks about “tulip” and offered his correct version. All these notes might look trivial if we don’t try to understand Wang Kentang as a kind of philological scholar who had the tendency to collect and read a huge amount of materials.<sup>155</sup> In addition, we might suspect him of plagiarism when we find Wang Kentang had the inclination to use long and word-by-word quotations in LMC#3 very frequently. However, such a suspect

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<sup>152</sup> Wen-ping Lien, "Wang Ken Tang's Scholarly Honors and Public Morals in Wan Li Imperical and Examination 王肯堂的科名與萬曆科舉世風," *Bulletin of History Department National Ch'eng Kung University* 成大歷史學報, no. 58 (2017).; Pan, "The Research of Wang Kentang's Yu Gang Zhai Bi Chen 王肯堂郁岡齋筆塵研究," pp.5-24.

<sup>153</sup> Liang-Kang Ni, ""Wang Ken Tang Ji Qi Bashi Guiju Jijie" 王肯堂及其八识规矩集解," *Zhong shan daxue xuebao (shehui kexue ban)* 中山大学学报 (社会科学版), no. 2 (2015): pp.96-98.

<sup>154</sup> Pan, "The Research of Wang Kentang's Yu Gang Zhai Bi Chen 王肯堂郁岡齋筆塵研究," p.22.

<sup>155</sup> Ibid., pp.36-67.; Qing-zhang Lin, "*Ming Dai Kao Ju Xue Yan Jiu*" 明代考據學研究 (Taipei, Taiwan: Taiwan xue sheng shu ju, 1983), pp.22-28.

might have a risk of anachronism as this was common practice at the time.<sup>156</sup> As we will see late in Chapter 3, all late-Ming commentators who living in the pre-modern world tended to reuse the available texts as their own materials without too much concern on authorships.

According to Wang Kentang, the first time he heard about the intent of consciousness-only was from Zibo Zhenke who inspired Wang to study CWSL thoroughly.<sup>157</sup> Since then Wang started working on how to decode CWSL without key Tang commentaries. On one hand, Wang took the approach of philological investigation on his own. He went through WKWD, ZJLand HJSC and tried to note down whatever related to CWSL. On the other hand, Wang tried to use the approach of a group workshop. He invited Yiyu Tongrun, Chaosong Huijin, and Yuan Du 緣督 to work out a commentary together at one place. However, only Chaosong Huijin, and Yuan Du showed up but insisted that they could not do the commentary without Tongrun. Thus, a collaborative commentary did not happen.<sup>158</sup> Even though, Wang at least obtained a copy of CWSL with critical punctuation from Chaosong Huijin and Yuan Du. Then Wang invited Gaoyuan Mingyu to host *Dong chan* temple 東禪寺 and requested Mingyu for a brief commentary on CWSL. Mingyu came out a preliminary draft of LMC#1 within one year. Thus, Wang started working on his LMC#3 based on the draft and his notes.<sup>159</sup>

We don't know why *Yiyu Tongrun* did not accept and fulfill Wang's invitation for a group workshop to work out CWSL commentary together. The following quote from Qian Qianyi's epitaph for Tongrun seemed to imply some kind of competition between Tongrun and Wang and how desperate Wang might be in figuring out a way to decode CWSL. Regardless one thing for sure is that Wang did play an significant role in facilitating the production of LMC#1 and LMC#2.

[Tongrun] first had this treatise (i.e. CWSL) marked with meanings and stored it in the box. Wang Kentang requested it but Tongrun was sparing in giving. Wang Kentang managed to buy a copy and added on his own side note like Yuance 圓測 (613 – 696) eavesdropped to compete with Kuiji 窺基 (632-682). Wang really had made painstaking efforts to learn dharmas (i.e. CWSL).<sup>160</sup>

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<sup>156</sup> See Elisa Freschi, "The Reuse of Texts in Indian Philosophy: Introduction," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 43, no. 2-3 (2015): p.99. And Elisa Freschi and Cathy Cantwell, "Introduction: Reuse and Intertextuality in the Context of Buddhist Texts," *Buddhist Studies Review* 33, no. 1-2 (2016): p.2.

<sup>157</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 503, a15-16 // Z 1:81, p. 1, d15-16 // R81, p. 2, b15-16.

<sup>158</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 658, a22-b2 // Z 1:81, p. 152, b1-5 // R81, p. 303, b1-5.

<sup>159</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 503, a18-b3 // Z 1:81, p. 1, d18-p. 2, a9 // R81, p. 2, b18-p. 3, a9).

<sup>160</sup> 「先有此論標義，藏棄篋衍，王翰林宇泰求之，靳而弗與。翰林購得副本，箋為旁註，如西明圓測，隱形盜聽，以敵窺基，其為法良苦矣」 Qian, ""Yiyu Fashi Taming" 一雨法師塔銘."

#### 2-2-2-4 Outliner: Lingyuan Dahui

Lingyuan Dahui 靈源大惠 (1564-1636) is author of *Cheng Weishi lun zikao* 成唯識論自攷 (hereafter referred as LMC#4).

Lingyuan Dahui was born in Hangzhou China. At age of thirty and as a lay devotee, he went to the lecture of Shaojue Guangcheng 紹覺廣承 (1560-1609) for his first time exposure to Buddhist teachings. Since then Dahui continued going to Guangcheng's lectures for more than 10 years without interruption. Following Guangcheng's advice, Dahui focused studying Tiantai School and Faxiang School. When Dahui visited Beijing, he came across Yuan Zhengui 愚菴真貴 who was specialized in the study of consciousness-only in the north. Zhengui was so impressed by his discussion with Dahui that he invited Dahui to give a lecture on consciousness-only teachings as a lay devotee. Dahui did not renounce the secular life and receive full ordination until he was fifty-seven.<sup>161</sup>

Shaojue Guangcheng was well known for his doctrinal study and lecture under Yunqi Zhuhong. Guangcheng had tried to do commentary on CWSL but only made it to eight fascicles before he passed away. His disciple Bianyin Daji 辯音大基 completed what Guangcheng left behind and printed it at Haichang 海昌 in 1612.<sup>162</sup> However, Dahui was not happy with the discrepancy between what he heard from Guangcheng and what he read from Haichang version of commentary. Therefore, Dahui came out his own LMC#4 in order to rectify the discrepancy. Interestingly, following Dahui, Guangcheng's another direct disciple Xinyi Dazhen 新伊大真 (1580-1650) came out his own CWSL commentary as well- *Cheng weishi lun he xiang* 成唯識論合響. Moreover, Dazhen's disciples Tiaosheng Zhisu 苕聖智素 and Neiheng Zhiquan 內衡智銓 also added on their commentaries *Cheng weishi lun yin xiang bu yi* 成唯識論音響補遺 and *Cheng weishi lun yin xiang shu yi* 成唯識論音響述義 respectively. More research might need to be done in order to figure out what differences among those CWSL commentaries which all coming down from the same lineage.<sup>163</sup> Suffice it to say that in late-Ming even under the same lineage it was impossible to have one single voice. Not to mention one single voice across different lineages.

#### 2-2-2-5 Betweenner: Ouyi Zhixu

Ouyi Zhixu 蕩益智旭 (1599-1655) is the author of *Cheng Weishi lun guanxin*

<sup>161</sup> See B27, no. 151, p. 82, b15-p. 83, a2; X51, no. 823, p. 147, a19-b3 // Z 1:82, p. 46, d16-p. 47, a6 // R82, p. 92, b16-p. 93, a6.

<sup>162</sup> Kai-ting Chien, "Ming Mo Qing Chu Weishi Xue Zai Hangzhou De Chuan Yan" 明末清初唯識學在杭州的傳衍——以紹覺廣承法系為主的考察, "Xin guo xue" 新國學, no. 1 (2015): p.228.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.230-34.

*fayao* 成唯識論觀心法要 (hereafter referred as LMC#5).

Ouyi Zhixu was born in Suzhou. At seven, he was vegetarian. At twelve, he learned about Confucianism, and then vowed to eliminate Taoism and Buddhism and started eating meat and drinking. At seventeen, he read Yunqi Zhuhong's works and then stopped criticizing Buddhism. At twenty-three, hearing *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經, he was determined to renounce the secular life in order to investigate the important matter of birth and death. At twenty-four, he dreamed of Hanshan Deqing three times within one month. So he decided to be tonsured by Master Xueling 雪嶺 who was Deqing's disciple. The same year he went to Master Gude's 古德 lecture on CWSL. When Gude maintained that School of Nature and School of Characteristics were not allowed to be syncretized, Zhixu was wondering how Buddhism could have two conflicting paths. Zhixu was so confused that he went to Jing Mountain 徑山 for meditation. Next year (1622) summer Zhixu reported experiencing sudden disappearance of his physical and mental world in mediation and no longer seeing the conflicts between School of Nature and School of Characteristics. Nevertheless, it was not until 1647 Zhixu finished LMC#5 and *Xiang zong bayao zhi jie* 相宗八要直解.<sup>164</sup>

Zhixu was a very prolific writer with approximately 51 works in 228 fascicles to his credit. Among them, there are nine works in 18 fascicles that are related with consciousness-only school.<sup>165</sup> Other than consciousness-only school, his works includes Chan School, Pure Land School, Discipline School, Tiantai School, Huayan School and etc. The coverage is so comprehensive that people might be wondering how to position Zhixu. Most scholars tend to position Zhixu as the representative of Tiantai School. On the other hand, Sheng Yen suggests to view Zhixu as a Chan practitioner who advocating *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經. The possible challenges here are at least two-fold: 1) One single scripture is not necessarily equivalent to any single school or teaching or position. For example, *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經 is adopted by many different Buddhist sects. 2) Zhixu was against the division between Chan School and doctrinal school. He might not be happy to be forced into an either-or situation.<sup>166</sup>

In his autobiography, Zhixu called himself "a religious practitioner who is not those eight types" (Ch. *ba bu dao ren* 八不道人). He seemed too versatile to be defined as whatever he was. Thus, he preferred to be defined in terms of what he was not. His self-assessment was neither catching up to be those religious practitioners of

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<sup>164</sup> See J36, no. B348, p. 253, a12-c20.

<sup>165</sup> Shi, "'Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," p.14.

<sup>166</sup> Shi and Guan, "*Ming Mo Zhong Guo Fo Jiao Zhi Yan Jiu*" 明末中國佛教之研究, p.16.; Ying-shan Chen, "The Characteristics of Ou-Yi Zhi-Xu's Thought and an Appraisal of His Status 蕩益智旭思想的特質及其定位問題," *Bulletin of the Institute of Chinese Literature and Philosophy* 中國文哲研究集刊, no. 8 (1996): pp.244-53.

Confucianism, of Chan, of Discipline (Skt. *vinaya*), and of Doctrine in the ancient times nor sinking down to be those religious practitioners of Confucianism, of Chan, of Discipline, and of Doctrine in contemporary times.<sup>167</sup> It sounds like a syncretism in between and in the form of negation.



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<sup>167</sup> See J36, no. B348, p. 253, a13-15.



## Chapter 3. Macro Analysis- Overview Analysis

### 3-1 Overview of Total Information Amount by CWSL, CWSLS, and Late-Ming Commentaries

In order to measure the information amount that texts contains, I first count the number of Chinese characters by commentaries and by Twelve Aspects and tabulate it as Table 7 shows below. We can easily notice that the “Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause” (因相門) is what the commentators have the most to say.

Then, if we draw the line chart by the total information amount (i.e. the total number of Chinese characters). As Figure 1 shows, we can see two peaks. The former is CWSLS by Kuiji while the latter is LMC#3 by Wang Kentang. Moreover, the trend for the Late-Ming group looks like a convex upward curve. There is a rationale behind such pattern. If we define the period from Mingyu starting working on LMC#1 to Wang Keng Tang publishing his LMC#3 as the exploration stage of late-Ming CWSL commentarial tradition while the period from the release of LMC#3 onwards as the internalization stage. The rationale is that the exploration stage features more citations while the internalization stage features fewer citations. I will provide the data to support this observation in later citation analysis discussion.

Figure 1 Total Information Amount





Table 7 Overview of Total Information Amount

Item	Twelve Aspects 十二門	CWSL		CWSLS		LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		LMC#4		LMC#5	
1	Aspect of "Self-characteristics" 自相門	15	2%	1,688	3%	517	3%	965	4%	792	3%	343	2%	586	3%
2	Aspect of "Characteristics as an Effect" 果相門	70	1%	774	1%	118	1%	174	1%	176	1%	141	1%	195	1%
3	Aspect of "Characteristics as a Cause" 因相門	2,964	35%	16,808	28%	6,305	35%	8,034	34%	11,296	37%	5,819	32%	6,211	32%
4	Aspect of "Mental activity to Perceive" 行相門	880	10%	7,996	13%	2,248	12%	2,768	12%	3,799	12%	2,079	11%	2,710	14%
5	Aspect of "Object of Perception" 所緣門	782	9%	8,529	14%	1,850	10%	2,365	10%	2,848	9%	1,987	11%	1,736	9%
6	Aspect of "Incomprehensible" 不可知門	88	1%	454	1%	225	1%	723	3%	276	1%	186	1%	250	1%
7	Aspect of "Association" 相應門	684	8%	6,005	10%	1,640	9%	1,986	8%	2,721	9%	2,037	11%	2,074	11%
8	Aspect of "Indifferent Sensation" 受俱門	298	3%	1,620	3%	524	3%	877	4%	1,025	3%	632	3%	548	3%
9	Aspect of "Three Natures" 三性門	166	2%	1,035	2%	336	2%	423	2%	845	3%	398	2%	223	1%
10	Aspect of "Mental factors Same as Mind" 心所例王門	428	5%	3,185	5%	886	5%	741	3%	823	3%	885	5%	827	4%
11	Aspect of "Cause-Effect Metaphor" 因果法喻門	786	9%	4,447	7%	1,299	7%	2,194	9%	2,389	8%	2,005	11%	1,556	8%
12	Aspect of "Suppression-Extinction Stages" 伏斷位次門	1,232	14%	7,330	12%	2,125	12%	2,550	11%	3,741	12%	1,738	10%	2,220	12%
	<b>Total Amt/ %</b>	<b>8,534</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>59,871</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>18,073</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>23,800</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>30,731</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>18,250</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>19,136</b>	<b>100%</b>
	<b>Total % vs. CWSL</b>	<b>100%</b>		<b>702%</b>		<b>212%</b>		<b>279%</b>		<b>360%</b>		<b>214%</b>		<b>224%</b>	

Furthermore, if we draw the line chart by the information amount % (i.e. the percentage of Chinese characters by aspects vs. total Chinese characters by commentaries) as Figure 2 shows, we can easily identify A#3 (Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause 因相門), and A#4 (Aspect of Mental activity to Perceive 行相門) and A#12 (Aspect of Suppression-Extinction Stages 伏斷位次門) as top three aspects across CWSL and its commentaries.

Figure 2 Information Amount % by Twelve Aspects



Nevertheless, any impression that the information amounts by different commentaries follow the similar pattern may not necessarily hold true. If we break down the top 1 A#3 (Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause 因相門) further by different topics, Table 8 indicates that different commentaries have different focus on different areas. For example, LMC#2 and LMC#3 are different from other commentators by focusing more on the subsection 3-5 (Implications of Permeations 薰習義) instead of 3-3-3 (Theory of Seeds being both Innate and Newly Permeated 種子本新合說). In terms of subsection 3-3 (Where do Seeds come from? 種子來源理論), LMC#1 and CWSL are one group which spending around 55% of information amount while CWSLS and LMC#2 are another group which spending 37% only. The rest group is LMC#3, LMC#4 and LMC#5 whose information amounts range between 43% and 48%.

Table 8 Breakdown of Information Amount of A#3

		CWSL		CWSLS		LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		LMC#4		LMC#5		
3	Aspect of "Characteristics as a Cause" 因相門	3-1 Brief of "Characteristics as a Cause"	76	3%	638	4%	116	2%	81	1%	220	2%	116	2%	232	4%
		3-2 What is Seed?	260	9%	2,320	14%	875	14%	729	9%	894	8%	651	11%	665	11%
		3-3-1 Theory of Seeds being Originally Existent Only =A	238	8%	1,046	6%	465	7%	420	5%	674	6%	366	6%	379	6%
		3-3-2 Theory of Seeds being New Permeations Only =B	276	9%	888	5%	689	11%	450	6%	851	8%	454	8%	459	7%
		3-3-3 Theory of Seeds being both Innate and Newly Permeated =C	1,122	38%	4,356	26%	2,248	36%	2,124	26%	3,334	30%	1,998	34%	1,962	32%
		3-4 Implications of Seeds	440	15%	4,158	25%	1,002	16%	1,645	20%	1,656	15%	1,168	20%	1,260	20%
		3-5 Implications of Permeations	552	19%	3,402	20%	910	14%	2,585	32%	3,667	32%	1,066	18%	1,254	20%
<b>Total</b>		2,964	100%	16,808	100%	6,305	100%	8,034	100%	11,296	100%	5,819	100%	6,211	100%	
3-3 Where do Seeds come from? =A+B+C		1,636	55%	6,290	37%	3,402	54%	2,994	37%	4,859	43%	2,818	48%	2,800	45%	

The above tables and figures are just to have an overview of the total information amount by CWSL and different commentaries. We see both the pattern and the variances. To better understand the pattern and the variances, we would need to move to the next step- more detailed citation sources and type analysis.



## 3-2 Analysis by Citation Sources, Frequency, Content Volume by Late-Ming Commentaries

### 3-2-1 The Citation Types Definition and Examples of Late-Ming Commentaries

Like other Buddhist commentators, the late-Ming commentators have to rely on citing different sources to either help their explication or support their interpretations. In particular, when the Tang commentaries were lost, in order to better understand and explicate CWSL, the late-Ming commentators were more cautious in avoiding making their personal interpretations and trying to justify their commentaries by referring to the authoritative materials available to them. For instance, *Huayan jing shuchao* 華嚴經疏鈔 (An Informal Collection of Discourses and Commentaries on the Flower Ornament Scripture), *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄 (Record of the Thesis [of One Mind Revealing Everything like a] Mirror), *Weishi kaimeng wenda* 唯識開蒙問答 (Questions and answers intended to inspire the Consciousness-only study) and etc.<sup>168</sup> This is understandable and expected. What is interesting to look at for this research is how they referring to those materials. In other words, how they cited these materials in their commentaries.

Basically, the citations by late-Ming commentators could be first divided into two kinds: 1) Explicit Citation Type; 2) Implicit Citation Type. By “explicit”, it means that the late-Ming commentators explicitly identified the sources of citations. On the contrast, the “implicit” refers to the scenarios that the late-Ming commentators did not explicitly mention the sources of citations but this research managed to check it up from the CBETA data base. Overall, the frequency of the implicit citations is found to be much more than of the explicit citations. The explicit types account for about 15% while the implicit types account for about 85%. The variances depends on different late-Ming commentators. More detailed data and analysis will be provided after the categories of citations are defined.

Both Explicit Citations and Implicit Citations could be further broken down into at least three types 1) Complete/Quasi-Complete Citation Type; 2) Selected Citation Type; 3) Paraphrasing Citation Type. Implicit Citations are not only used heavily but also more complex. It has another special type called Implicit Combination Type. I will define those citation categories one by one by examples as below.

#### 3-2-1-1 Explicit Citation Types

Explicit citations are the most straightforward citation types because the late-Ming commentators already specifically identified the names of sources. There are

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<sup>168</sup> See (X50, no. 820, p. 503, a11-18 // Z 1:81, p. 1, d11-18 // R81, p. 2, b11-18), (X50, no. 821, p. 658, b4-7 // Z 1:81, p. 152, b7-10 // R81, p. 303, b7-10) and (X50, no. 822, p. 829, a9-11 // Z 1:81, p. 323, a6-8 // R81, p. 645, a6-8).

three kinds of explicit citations: 1) Explicit Complete/Quasi-Complete Citation Type [ECQC]; 2) Explicit Selected Citation Type [ESC]; 3) Explicit Paraphrasing Citation Type [EPC]. ECQC, ESC, and EPC are the abbreviated codes to be used for the following the citation statistics and analysis.

### 3-2-1-1-1 Explicit Complete/ Quasi-Complete Citation Type

Explicit complete/ quasi-complete citations [ECQC] are almost word-by-word quotations although there might be couple of words different due to different versions of texts and/or accidental hand writing discrepancies. The following two examples are ECQC. They all explicitly quoted ZJL. As we will see later, the late-Ming commentators also implicitly cited ZJL.

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
「宗鏡云：唯識為宗，不以本質為所緣，亦非影像為行相。」 <sup>169</sup>	《宗鏡錄》卷 47：「唯識為宗，不約本質名為所緣，亦非影像名為行相。」 <sup>170</sup> [ECQC]=21 <sup>171</sup>
「宗鏡云：見分外緣虛疎，通比、非二量故，即不取見分為自證量果。內二分唯現量故，互為果無失。夫為量果者，須是現量，方為量果。比、非定非量果，喻如作保證人，須是敦直者方為證。若略虛人，不能堪為保證。」 <sup>172</sup>	《宗鏡錄》卷 60：「見分外緣虛疎，通比、非二量故，即不取見分為自證量果。內二分唯現量，故互為果無失。夫為量果者，須是現量，方為量果。比、非定非量果，喻如作保證人，須是敦直者方為證。若略虛人，不能堪為保證。」 <sup>173</sup> [ECQC]-80

### 3-2-1-1-2 Explicit Selected Citation Type

Explicit selected citations [ESC] refer to those explicit citations that the late-Ming commentators made it clear about the sources but only selectively quote some portion of sources. There are two possible reasons for such selective quotes: 1) the late-Ming commentators wants to make the explicit quote short by doing selected citations. 2) the late-Ming commentators selectively replace some key words of the original quote due to their own different readings. The following example from LMC#2 is for the first reason while the example from LMC#1 is for both reasons.

#### Example from LMC#2

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
故宗鏡云：「此體不可說，微妙最難知。周徧法界而無住心，任持一切而不現相，如空中飛鳥，雖往來騫翥而跡不可尋。似眼裏瞳人，任照矚森羅，而眼終不見。若月含一色，徧分萬像之形。等日曜千光，普照四天之下，類摩尼無思而雨寶。廣濟群生，猶磁石無覺而轉移，周迴六趣。」	《宗鏡錄》卷 47：「此體不可說，微妙最難知。周徧法界而無住心，任持一切而不現相，如空中飛鳥，雖往來騫翥而跡不可尋。似眼裏童人，任照矚森羅而眼終不見。若月含一色，徧分萬像之形。等日曜千光，普照四天之下。類摩尼無思而雨寶，廣濟群生。猶磁石無覺而轉移，周迴六趣。密嚴經偈云：藏識持於世，猶如線穿珠，亦如

<sup>169</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 546, a7-8 // Z 1:81, p. 39, b10-11 // R81, p. 77, b10-11

<sup>170</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 696, a25-26)

<sup>171</sup> The number followed the coded like [ECQC]=21 are the count of Chinese characters in the quote.

<sup>172</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 873, b21-c1 // Z 1:81, p. 367, c13-17 // R81, p. 734, a13-17

<sup>173</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 760, c18-22





sources instead of quoting word for word. In the following two examples, both LMC#5 and LMC#1 identified the source ZJL first, and then paraphrased it.

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
<p>LMC#5: 按宗鏡解，根四義獨勝，一由主故；二由近生心心所故；三由徧故，不惟心所亦能生心；四由常相續故。識雖為主，近生心所，不自生心故，不徧。有間斷故，不續。境非主故，亦非近故，雖徧能生心及心所，亦不相續。以識生則境生，識滅則境滅故。<sup>178</sup></p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷47：「問：何故三和唯根獨勝？答：一由主故，有殊勝能，名之為主；二由近故，能近生心及心所故；三由徧故，不唯心所亦能生心故；四由續故，常相續有，境識不爾故。境體雖能生心、心所，以非主故，又非近故，徧闕二義，不名為勝。心雖是主，近生心所，不能生心，不自在故，非徧也，徧闕一義，故非勝。境識皆不續，識有境生故，俱闕續義，非得勝名，唯根獨勝。」<sup>179</sup> [EPC]-82</p>
<p>LMC#1: 宗鏡云：無色界，即無色可扶託，故無疎所緣，是顯第八親所緣義。<sup>180</sup></p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷70：「若無色界，即無色可扶託，故即無疎所緣義也。若自第八識緣自三境，唯有親所緣也。」<sup>181</sup> [EPC]-25</p>

### 3-2-1-2 Implicit Citation Types

Compared with explicit citations, implicit citations are much more challenging to identify and manage. The first challenge is how to identify implicit citations. It needs a lot of cross readings back and forth first among the late-Ming commentaries and secondly between Tang reference commentary and the Ming commentaries. The second challenge is how to judge whether they are indeed implicit citations. Besides the cross readings, how to classify different implicit citations is the key. Thus, I like to illustrate different implicit citation types with examples as below.

#### 3-2-1-2-1 Implicit Complete/ Quasi-Complete Citation Type

The easiest type of implicit citations to identify is implicit complete/ quasi-complete citation [ICQC]. It is relatively similar to explicit complete/ quasi-complete citations [ECQC] except the sources were not identified by commentators in the first place. However, once it is identified, there would be no problem to judge whether it is a citation because it is almost quoted word for word and phase by phase. Without taking it into account the big variance among the late-Ming commentators, ICQC accounts for 38% of total quote frequency by the late-Ming commentators as the top one citation type. Just to list a few examples as below.

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
<p>LMC#3: 「一切唯有覺者，即唯識也。所覺義皆無者，即心外妄執實境是無。能覺所覺分者，能覺是依他實見分，所覺是依他實相</p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷60：「一切唯有覺者，即唯識也。所覺義皆無者，即心外妄執實境是無。能覺所覺分者，能覺是依他實見分，所覺是</p>

<sup>178</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 329, a12-17 // Z 1:82, p. 229, a7-12 // R82, p. 457, a7-12

<sup>179</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 695, c17-25.

<sup>180</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 551, a3-4 // Z 1:81, p. 44, b4-5 // R81, p. 87, b4-5

<sup>181</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 810, a17-19.

分。各自然而轉者，見分從心種子生，相分從相分種子生起，故知須立二分，唯識方成。」 <sup>182</sup>	依他實相分。各自然而轉者，見分從心種子生，相分從相分種子生起，故知須立二分，唯識方成。」 <sup>183</sup> [ICQC]-82
LMC#1：「言相分者，通有四種：一實相名相，體即真如，真實相故；二境相名相，能與心根而為境故；三相狀名相，唯有為法有相狀故，通影及質，識所變故；四義相名相，即能詮下所詮義故。於上四種唯取後三為相分相。」 <sup>184</sup>	《宗鏡錄》卷60：「相分有四：一實相名相，體即真如，是真實相故；二境相名相，為能與心根而為境故；三相狀名相，此唯有為法有相狀故，通影及質，唯是識之所變；四義相名相，即能詮下所詮義相分。是於上四種相中唯取後三相而為相分相。」 <sup>185</sup> [ICQC]-75
LMC#2：「第八自證分上一分生現功能，謂之種子。」 <sup>186</sup>	《唯識開蒙問答》卷1：「第八自證分上一分生現功能，謂之種子。」 <sup>187</sup> [ICQC]-16
LMC#5 《成唯識論觀心法要》卷2：「執有二義：一攝為自體；二持令不散。受有二義：一領以為境；二令生覺受。」 <sup>188</sup>	《唯識開蒙問答》卷1：「執有二義：一攝為自體；二持令不散。受有二義：一領以為境；二令生覺受。」 <sup>189</sup> [ICQC]-27
LMC#4 《成唯識論自攷》卷2：「執中二義：一攝為自體，二持令不散。受中二義：一領以為境，二令生覺受。」 <sup>190</sup>	《唯識開蒙問答》卷1：「執有二義：一攝為自體；二持令不散。受有二義：一領以為境；二令生覺受。」 <sup>191</sup> [ICQC]-28

### 3-2-1-2-2 Implicit Selected Citations Type

Implicit selected citations [ISC] refer to those citations that the late-Ming commentators did not identify the sources but selectively quote some portions of sources in their commentaries.

One typical example to show how challenging it might be to identify such type citation is the first example. We see that LMC#2 first quoted a paragraph, and then jumped couples of sentences to one small sentence, last jumped far to another paragraph. Although a lot of leaving out in between, the selected citations are quoted quite complete so there seems no problem to judge they were selected citations indeed.

Why selected citations? The first reason is that the citing authors might be trying to make it short and fit into the commentators' own context as the first example shows. The second important reason is that the citing author only agree with the cited author partially. In the second example, we see that LMC#3 only agreed with LMC#1 partially. LMC#3 disagreed with LMC#1 on whether the last three aspects of consciousness belong to "subject of perception" (Ch. *neng yuan* 能緣) or both "subject of perception" and "object of perception" (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*). LMC#1 maintained both whereas LMC#3 argued for "subject of perception". The same reason occurred to the third sample. LMC#4 only agreed with the author of ZJL partially. We will review this disagreement in details later in

<sup>182</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 872, c9-13 // Z 1:81, p. 366, d7-11 // R81, p. 732, b7-11.

<sup>183</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 760, b5-10.

<sup>184</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 545, c2-6 // Z 1:81, p. 38, d17-p. 39, a3 // R81, p. 76, b17-p. 77, a3.

<sup>185</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 759, b19-24.

<sup>186</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 690, b18-19 // Z 1:81, p. 184, a16-17 // R81, p. 367, a16-17.

<sup>187</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 348, b15-16 // Z 2:3, p. 219, b15-16 // R98, p. 437, b15-16.

<sup>188</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 325, b4-5 // Z 1:82, p. 225, b3-4 // R82, p. 449, b3-4.

<sup>189</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 348, c8-9 // Z 2:3, p. 219, c14-15 // R98, p. 438, a14-15.

<sup>190</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 175, a13-15 // Z 1:82, p. 74, c9-11 // R82, p. 148, a9-11.

<sup>191</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 348, c8-9 // Z 2:3, p. 219, c14-15 // R98, p. 438, a14-15.

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Last but not least important reason is to borrow some concepts from other sources to help with interpretation. In the fifth example, LMC#4 borrowed the concept of “three [cognitive] objects” (三境) from *Bashi guiju buzhu zhengyi* 八識規矩補註證義 in order to explain “seen aspect” (Ch. *xiang fen* 相分; Skt. *grāhya-ākāra, or viṣaya-abhāsa*; Eng. “aspect of what is seen or grasped”).

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
<p>LMC#2: 「安慧據論云:此自證分,從緣所生,是依他起,故說為有。見、相二分,不從緣生,因遍計心妄執而有,如是二分,情有理無。更變起我、法二執,又是無故,密嚴偈云:愚夫所分別,外境實皆無,習氣擾濁心,故似彼而轉。故知但是依實自證分上,起遍計妄情變似二分。其實二分無有實體,但是愚夫不了,妄執為實。」<sup>192</sup></p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷 60:「此自證分,從緣所生,是依他起故,故說為有。見、相二分,不從緣生,因遍計心妄執而有,如是二分,情有理無。唯自證分,是依他起性,有種子生,是實有故。見、相二分是無,更變起我、法二執,又是無,以無似無。若准護法菩薩,即是以有似無,見、相二分是有體變起,我、法二執是無體故。安慧引楞伽經云:三界有漏心、心所,皆是虛妄分別,為自性故,故知八識見、相二分,皆是遍計妄執有,故唯有自證一分,是依他起性,是實有故。密嚴經偈云:愚夫所分別,外境實皆無,習氣擾濁心,故似彼而轉。故知但是愚夫依實自證分上,起遍計妄情變似無體二分現故。理實二分無其實體,但是愚夫不了,妄執為實故。」<sup>193</sup> [ISC]-116</p>
<p>LMC#3: 「此四分中,下申上義。相分見分,於外門轉,名為外性。自證分證自證分,唯是內證。名為內性,故下頌云,眾生心二性。初一分是所緣,後三分是能緣,故曰通一。」<sup>194</sup></p>	<p>《成唯識論俗詮》卷 2:「相分見分,於外門轉,名為外性。自證真如,唯是內證,名為內性。故下頌云,眾生心二性。初唯所緣者。相分非心分,無有能緣用故,唯是所緣。後三屬心分,通所、能緣義。」<sup>195</sup> [ISC]-36</p>
<p>LMC#4: 「根、身具四義:一攝為自體,同無記性故;二持令不散,第八任持不爛壞故;三領以為境,第八親相分故;四令生覺受,同安危故。若器世間,唯得領以為境、持令不散二義,故但緣而不執受。」<sup>196</sup></p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷 49:「根身具執受四義。一攝為自體。同是無記性故。二持令不散。第八能任持此身。令不爛壞。三領已為境。此根身是。第八親相分。四令生覺受。安危共同。若第八。五根危。第八安。五根安。若器世間量。但緣非執受。即受二義。領已為境。又言非執受者。而無攝為自體。持令不散。令生覺受三義。不似他根身。名非執受。即無受。四義中領已為境一義。」<sup>197</sup> [ISC]-54</p>
<p>LMC#4: 所緣相分境既有三:謂性、獨影、帶質。<sup>198</sup></p>	<p>《八識規矩補註證義》卷 1:「境則有三:謂性境、獨影境、帶質境。」<sup>199</sup> [ISC]-9</p>

### 3-2-1-2-3 Implicit Paraphrasing Citations Type

Implication paraphrasing citation [IPC] is probably the most difficult citation type to identify and judge.

First, it is because the paraphrasing might involve more wording condense.

<sup>192</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 691, a2-8 // Z 1:81, p. 184, c12-18 // R81, p. 368, a12-18

<sup>193</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 759, c9-23)

<sup>194</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 873, b15-19 // Z 1:81, p. 367, c7-11 // R81, p. 734, a7-11

<sup>195</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 546, b14-17 // Z 1:81, p. 39, d5-8 // R81, p. 78, b5-8

<sup>196</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 175, a17-21 // Z 1:82, p. 74, c13-17 // R82, p. 148, a13-17

<sup>197</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 702, b16-24)

<sup>198</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 176, b8-9 // Z 1:82, p. 75, d10-11 // R82, p. 150, b10-11

<sup>199</sup> X55, no. 890, p. 396, c4 // Z 2:3, p. 267, d10 // R98, p. 534, b10

Which makes the similarity more fragmented than implicit selected citations. Take the following first two examples. We see that both LMC#1 and LMC#5 were intended to condense the source as much as they could. Even though, we could still see where their paraphrases come from.

The second reason that might make IPC difficult to judge is that the authors might take out words and/or change the sequence and/or replace some words. In the following third example, LMC4# not only took out the names known for theories of four aspects in the original source but also changed the sequence. Moreover, replacing “one aspect” (一分) with “one mind” (一心). Nevertheless, we can still see where his paraphrase possibly origins. The only question is that whether or not his replacing words change the original meaning.

The third reason that might make IPC not easy to identify and judge is that the authors mainly change the original text style of sources and could take out some words as well. Take the following fourth example. The original text style of the source is questions and answers (Q&A). LMC#2 changed the Q&A style and paraphrased in his own definition style. Such kind of implicit paraphrasing citations are quite common in particular when the late-Ming commentators cited WKWD that is written in Q&A style. Nevertheless, it not necessarily means that the late-Ming commentators did not prefer citing or writing in Q&A style. In some occasions that they not only kept citations in Q&A style but also writing their own commentaries in Q&A style as well.

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
<p><b>LMC#1:</b> 「執受」，各具二義。「執」二義者，以為自體，持令不散。「受」二義者，領以為境，令生覺受。同安危故，第八望根、身四義皆具。同是無記性故，第八任持此身，令不爛壞。故此根、身是第八識親相分故，或安或危，皆同第八。若望器界，但為所緣，非是執受，即「領以為境」一義，無餘三義。<sup>200</sup></p>	<p>《宗鏡錄》卷 49：「執受各具二義，且執二義者：一攝義，二持義。言攝者，即攝為自體。言持者，即持令不散。受二義者：一領義，二覺義。且領者，即領以為境。言覺者，即令生覺受。安危共同，根、身具執受四義：一攝為自體，同是無記性故；二持令不散，第八能任持此身，令不爛壞；三領已為境，此根、身是第八親相分；四令生覺受，安危共同。若第八危，五根危；第八安，五根安。若器世間量，但緣非執受，即受二義中，領已為境。又言非執受者，而無攝為自體、持令不散、令生覺受三義。不似他根身，名非執受，即無受，四義中領已為境一義。」<sup>201</sup> [IPC]-93</p>
<p><b>LMC#5:</b> 第八緣種子，具持令不散、領以為境二義。<sup>202</sup></p>	<p>《成唯識論集解》卷 2：「第八緣種子時，具執一義，持令不散，具受一義，領以為境。」<sup>203</sup> [IPC]-16</p>
<p><b>LMC#4:</b> 「四分，約量果門；三分，約體用門；二分，約心境門；一心，約唯識門。」<sup>204</sup></p>	<p>《唯識開蒙問答》卷 1：「安慧一分，約唯識門；難陀二分，約心境門；陳那三分，約體用門；護法四分，約量果門。」<sup>205</sup> [IPC]-24</p>

<sup>200</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 545, b3-8 // Z 1:81, p. 38, c12-17 // R81, p. 76, a12-17

<sup>201</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 702, b12-24

<sup>202</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 325, b5-6 // Z 1:82, p. 225, b4-5 // R82, p. 449, b4-5

<sup>203</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 690, c4-5 // Z 1:81, p. 184, b8-9 // R81, p. 367, b8-9

<sup>204</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 176, b21-22 // Z 1:82, p. 76, a5-6 // R82, p. 151, a5-6

<sup>205</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 347, a4-6 // Z 2:3, p. 217, d16-18 // R98, p. 434, b16-18

<p><b>LMC#2:</b> 「有根之身，名為根身；根身所依世界如器，名器世間。」<sup>206</sup></p>	<p><b>《唯識開蒙問答》卷1:</b> 「問：何名根身？答：有根之身，名為根身。問：器世間？答：有情所依世界如器，名器世間。」<sup>207</sup> <b>[IPC]-18</b></p>
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### 3-2-1-2-4 Implicit Combination Citations Type

Implicit combination citation [ICC] type is intended to highlight at least two scenarios as the following examples show. The first scenario is that LMC#3 seemed to have a long implicit compiled citation that pieces together three sources that are LMC#2, LMC#1 and ZJL. The second scenario is that LMC#3 implicitly cited a paragraph that could have two possible sources. As LMC#3 implicitly cited both sources in other places, I am not sure so I categorize it as another type that is ICC.

Late-Ming Citations	Sources
<p><b>LMC#3:</b> 有三釋：先約行相以定捨受。捨受五相，與此第八行相皆同，故為相應。一、不明了；二、不能分別違順境相；三、微細；四、一類；五、相續轉。不明了者，是捨受相，若苦樂受，必明了故。「不能分別違順境相」者，取中容境，是捨受相，若是餘受，取順違境故。微細者，相不顯故，若是餘受，行相必麤。一類者，無易脫故，若是餘受，必是易脫。此行相定，故成一類。相續轉者，無間斷故，若是餘受，必有間斷，此恒相續，故唯捨受。若能分別違順境相，非真異熟。異熟者，取境定故。若麤動者，如餘心，非異熟主，顯行相難知，異餘識也。由此五義必有故，便能受熏持種相續。又解，此識極不明了，曾無慧念，慧念行相，極明了故。不能分別違順境相，顯唯捨受，非苦樂俱，及簡不與善染等，並相續而轉，顯無有欲。今有希望，方有欲起，此相續故，無有欲也。由此五義，第二義正顯唯捨受義，所餘四義，因簡別境等，故唯與捨受俱。<sup>208</sup></p>	<p><b>LMC#2:</b> 「有三釋：先約行相以定捨受」<sup>209</sup> <b>[ICC]-11</b></p> <p><b>LMC#1:</b> 「捨受五相，與此第八行相皆同，故宜相應。五相者。一不明了。無慧念故。二不分別。緣中境故。三者微細，相不顯故。四者一類。無易脫故。五相續轉，無間斷故。」<sup>210</sup> <b>[ICC]-61</b></p> <p><b>《宗鏡錄》卷47:</b> 「唯與捨受相應者，此有五義：一、「極不明了」，是捨受相。若苦樂受，必明了故。受總有五：一憂、二喜、三苦、四樂、五捨。此中憂喜入苦樂中，依三受門分別，不言憂喜。二、「不能分別違順境相」，取中容境，是捨受相。若是餘受，取違順境故。三、由「微細」，若是餘受，行相必麤。四、由「一類」，若是餘受，必是易脫。此行相定，故成一類。五、相續而轉。若是餘受，必有間斷，此恒相續，故唯捨受。若能分別違順境相，非真異熟。異熟者，取境定故。若麤動者，如餘心，非異熟主，顯行相難知，異餘識也。由此五義，必其有故，便能受熏持種相續。又解：此識「極不明了」，曾無慧念，慧念行相極明了故。「不能分別違順境相」，顯唯捨受，非苦樂俱，及簡不與善染等並相續而轉。顯無有欲，今有希望，方有欲起，此相續故，無有欲也。由此五義，第二義正顯唯捨受所由。所餘四義，因簡別境等故，唯與捨受俱。」<sup>211</sup> <b>[ICC]-233</b></p>

<sup>206</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 690, b19-20 // Z 1:81, p. 184, a17-18 // R81, p. 367, a17-18  
<sup>207</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 348, c5-6 // Z 2:3, p. 219, c11-12 // R98, p. 438, a11-12  
<sup>208</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 878, b10-c2 // Z 1:81, p. 372, b18-c16 // R81, p. 743, b18-p. 744, a16  
<sup>209</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 696, b21 // Z 1:81, p. 190, c6 // R81, p. 380, a6  
<sup>210</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 549, c20-23 // Z 1:81, p. 43, a15-18 // R81, p. 85, a15-18  
<sup>211</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 696, a27-b15

<p><b>LMC#3:</b>「第三、四分既是現量，故得相證，無窮失。意云：若以見分為所量，必須第四為量果。若通作喻者，絹如所量，尺如能為量，智為量果，即自證分。若尺為所使，智為能使人，故能更證。亦如明鏡，鏡像為相，鏡明為見，鏡面如自證，鏡背如證自證。面依於背，背復依面，故得互證，亦可以銅為證自證，鏡依於銅，銅依於鏡也。」<sup>212</sup></p>	<p>《大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔》卷33〈光明覺品9〉：「第三、四分既是現量，故得相證。無窮失矣。意云：若以見分為所量，必須第四為量果。若通作喻者，絹如所量，尺如能為量，智為量果，即自證分。若尺為所使，智為能使人，故能更證。亦如明鏡，鏡像為相，鏡明為見，鏡面如自證，鏡背如證自證。面依於背，背復依面，故得互證，亦可以銅為證自證，鏡依於銅，銅依於鏡。」<sup>213</sup></p> <p>《宗鏡錄》卷60：「第三、四分既是現量，故得相證，無窮失。意云：若以見分為所量，必須第四為量果。若通作喻者，絹如所量，尺如能為量，智為量果，即自證分。若尺為所使，智為能使人，故能更證。亦如明鏡，鏡像為相，鏡明為見，鏡面如自證，鏡背如證自證。面依於背，背復依面，故得互證，亦可以銅為證自證，鏡依於銅，銅依於鏡。」<sup>214</sup></p> <p>[ICC]-153</p>
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### 3-2-2 Analysis of Citation Sources, Quote Frequency and Quote Count

By using citation types that were defined in previous discussion, this study conduct a comprehensive coding of citations sources, types, quote frequency and quote count<sup>215</sup> by Twelve Aspects and by late-Ming commentaries. The derived statistics is provided in the Appendix 1. All the following further analysis is based on those statistics.

#### 3-2-2-1 Citations Analysis by LMCs

First, let us review citations sources, quote frequency and quote count by late commentators one by one in chronological order.

##### 3-2-2-1-1 Citation Analysis of LMC#1

LMC#1 is a forerunner of the late-Ming CWSL commentaries. Table 9 indicates that LMC#1 used only ten sources and had no luxury to refer to other late-Ming commentaries that were released later. These ten sources were commonly used by other late-Ming CWSL commentaries so Mingyu is the only late-Ming commentator who did not have his own unique sources. One thing deserving attention is that LMC#1 did not have any reference to WKWD, either. Which is No. 2 most frequently quoted sources by other late-Ming commentators. I am not certain about the reason but suspect it might be related to WKWD's position regarding theory of "five seed-

<sup>212</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 873, c1-9 // Z 1:81, p. 367, c17-d7 // R81, p. 734, a17-b7

<sup>213</sup> T36, no. 1736, p. 252, b1-11

<sup>214</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 761, a26-b6

<sup>215</sup> i.e. the numbers of Chinese characters that late Ming commenators quote from the sources.

nature” (Ch. *wu zhong xing* 五種性). We will have detailed discussion in Chapter 4 Section 4-3-3-1-2-1. Instead, besides ZJL, LMC#1 relied more on *She dacheng lun shi* 攝大乘論釋 that is composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang.

**Table 9 LMC#1 Citation Sources Summary**

Item	LMC#1 Sources	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	19	41%	876	48%
2	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang	10	22%	603	33%
3	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	5	11%	43	2%
4	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	4	9%	46	3%
5	T31n1587 <i>Zhuanshi lun</i> 轉識論	2	4%	94	5%
6	T35n1735 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經疏	2	4%	24	1%
7	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	1	2%	28	2%
8	T31n1594 <i>She dacheng lun ben</i> 攝大乘論本 composed by Asaṅga and translated by Xuanzang	1	2%	34	2%
9	T32n1657 <i>Shou zhang lun</i> 手杖論	1	2%	40	2%
10	T45n1865 <i>Bashi guiju buzhu</i> 八識規矩補註	1	2%	23	1%
<b>Total</b>		<b>46</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,811</b>	<b>100%</b>

If we calculate LMC#1’s total citation rate (i.e. total quote count 1,811 divided by total Chinese characters count 18,073 of LMC#1 in Table 7), it is ten percent. As we will see later, such rate is much less than LMC#2 and LMC#3 but close to LMC#4 and LMC#5.

### 3-2-2-1-2 Citation Analysis of LMC#2

LMC#2 is the most frequented quoted CWSL commentary within the late-Ming group. Table 10 shows that LMC#2 uses thirty-one sources in total. That is the biggest quantity of sources among the late-Ming commentators. In terms of quote frequency, ZJL and WKWD are the two dominant sources that accounts for thirty-one percent and twenty-one percent, respectively. No one of the rest of sources accounts for more than five percent including *Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 that used to be thought as one of important sources like ZJL and WKWD. In addition, we do see that LMC#2 did quote LMC#1.

**Table 10 LMC#2 Citation Sources Summary**

Item	LMC#2 Sources	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	40	31%	3,215	42.8%
2	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	27	21%	1,398	18.6%
3	T31n1602 <i>Xianyang shengjiao lun</i> 顯揚聖教論	3	2%	514	6.8%
4	T16n670 <i>Lengqie aba duoluo bao jing</i> 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經	6	5%	373	5.0%
5	T31n1597 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang 世親菩薩造 玄奘譯	7	5%	352	4.7%
6	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	7	5%	285	3.8%

Item	LMC#2 Sources	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
7	T53n2122 <i>Fa yuan zhu lin</i> 法苑珠林	1	1%	252	3.4%
8	T09n262 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing</i> 妙法蓮華經	1	1%	200	2.7%
9	T26n1540 <i>Apidamo jie shen zu lun</i> 阿毘達磨界身足論	1	1%	107	1.4%
10	LMC#1 <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	4	3%	95	1.3%
11	T30n1579 <i>Yugie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	3	2%	95	1.3%
12	T45n1865 <i>Bashi gui ju buzhu</i> 八識規矩補註	2	2%	92	1.2%
13	T29n1559 <i>Apidamo jushe shi lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論	1	1%	78	1.0%
14	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang 無性造 玄奘譯	2	2%	65	0.9%
15	T17n842 <i>Da fang guang yuan jue xiu duo luo le yi jing</i> 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經	1	1%	51	0.7%
16	T35n1735 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經疏	3	2%	37	0.5%
17	T10n279 <i>Da fang guang fo huayan jing</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經	1	1%	36	0.5%
18	T16n676 <i>Jie shen mi jing</i> 解深密經	1	1%	35	0.5%
19	T44n1836 <i>Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie</i> 大乘百法明門論解	3	2%	33	0.4%
20	T31n1594 <i>She dacheng lun ben</i> 攝大乘論本 composed by Asaṅga and translated by Xuanzang 無著造 玄奘譯	1	1%	33	0.4%
21	T19n945 <i>Dafo ding rulai miyin xiuzheng leyi zhu pusa wanxing shou lengyan jing</i> 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經	2	2%	31	0.4%
22	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	4	3%	28	0.4%
23	T31n1587 <i>Zhuanshi lun</i> 轉識論	1	1%	24	0.3%
24	X11n267 <i>Lengyan jing yi shu shi yao chao</i> 楞嚴經義疏釋要鈔	1	1%	20	0.3%
25	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	2	2%	16	0.2%
26	P189n1629 <i>Tiantai si jiaoyi ji zhu</i> 天台四教儀集註	1	1%	12	0.2%
27	T31n1595 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha 世親釋 真諦譯	1	1%	11	0.1%
28	T46n1925 <i>Fajie cidi chu men</i> 法界次第初門	1	1%	9	0.1%
29	T51n2076-006 <i>Jingde chuandeng lu</i> 景德傳燈錄	1	1%	8	0.1%
30	T36n1739 <i>Xin huayan jing lun</i> 新華嚴經論	1	1%	7	0.1%
31	T33n1706 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo po luo mi jing shu shen bao ji</i> 仁王護國般若波羅蜜經疏神寶記	1	1%	4	0.1%
<b>Total</b>		<b>131</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>7,516</b>	<b>100%</b>

If we consider the total number of Chinese characters of LMC#2 as the total information count base in the following Table 11, we come out with LMC#2 total citation rate of thirty-two percent in terms of quote count. In other words, close to one third of LMC#2 total information are citations regardless they are explicit or implicit citations. Moreover, less than one percent of the total information of LMC#2 is within-group citation that comes from LMC#1.

If we further take it into account the twelve unique sources out of thirty-one sources that LMC#2 used, as Table 12 shows, we probably could expect that the way that LMC#2 interpreted CWSL will not be the same as the way that LMC#1 did, wouldn't it? This may support H1-A2.



**Table 11 LMC#2 Citation Rates Summary**

LMC#2	Quote Count
Citation Total=A	7,516
Within-Group Citation=B	95
Total Info Count=C	23,800
Total Citation Rate= A/C	32%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C	0.4%

In addition, couple of unique sources that used by LMC#2 might deserve attention. For example, *Fa yuan zhu lin* 法苑珠林 (Forest of Gems in the Garden of the Dharma) was compiled by Daoshi 道世 in Tang and has been traditionally viewed as a Buddhist encyclopedia. We will see Tongrun used it in Chapter 4 Section 4-5-2-2 for his discussion of Buddhist cosmology. *Jingde chuandeng lu* 景德傳燈錄 consists of biographies of Chan masters. We will have more discussions on whether it is appropriate for Tongrun to use Chan master's teaching in his CWSL commentary in Chapter 4 Section 4-12-2-5.

**Table 12 LMC#2 Unique Citation Sources**

Item	Unique Source used by LMC#2	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count
1	T53n2122 <i>Fa yuan zhu lin</i> 法苑珠林	1	252
2	T26n1540 <i>Apidamo jie shen zu lun</i> 阿毘達磨界身足論	1	107
3	T29n1559 <i>Apidamo jushe shi lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論	1	78
4	T17n842 <i>Da fang guang yuan jue xiu duo luo le yi jing</i> 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經	1	51
5	T10n279 <i>Da fang guang fo huayan jing</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經	1	36
6	T16n676 <i>Jie shen mi jing</i> 解深密經	1	35
7	T44n1836 <i>Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie</i> 大乘百法明門論解	3	33
8	X11n267 <i>Lengyan jing yi shu shi yao chao</i> 楞嚴經義疏釋要鈔	1	20
9	T46n1925 <i>Fajie cidu chu men</i> 法界次第初門	1	9
10	T51n2076-006 <i>Jingde chuandeng lu</i> 景德傳燈錄	1	8
11	T36n1739 <i>Xin huayan jing lun</i> 新華嚴經論	1	7
12	T33n1706 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo po luo mi jing shu shen bao ji</i> 仁王護國般若波羅蜜經疏神寶記	1	4

### 3-2-2-1-3 Citation Analysis of LMC#3

In previous hypotheses discussion, we see that Wang Kentang admitted that some people questioned him on whether LMC#3 was justified to publish. Besides Wang's own justification, the following Table 13 indicates that LMC#3 quoted two hundred seventy and three times. The most quote frequency among the late-Ming CWSL commentators. Twenty-eight percent and sixteen percent of times come from LMC#2 and LMC#1 respectively while twenty-six percent and nine percent of times are from ZJL and WKWD respectively. In terms of quote count, ZJL accounts for over forty percent as top one source. LMC#2 is ranked as No. 2 source with the percentage of more than twenty-five. In terms of both quote frequency and quote

count, Table 13 seems clear to show that Wang Kentang tended to be more aligned with Tongrun than Mingyu.

Table 13 LMC#3 Citation Sources Summary

Item	LMC#3 Source	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	LMC#2 <i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	77	28.2%	5,919	25.6%
2	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	72	26.4%	9,796	42.4%
3	LMC#1 <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	45	16.5%	1,925	8.3%
4	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	25	9.2%	1,996	8.6%
5	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	16	5.9%	1,054	4.6%
6	T31n1597 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang	9	3.3%	447	1.9%
7	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang	7	2.6%	394	1.7%
8	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	5	1.8%	110	0.5%
9	T31n1595 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha	3	1.1%	205	0.9%
10	T30n1579 <i>Yuqie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	2	0.7%	160	0.7%
11	T31n1602 <i>Xianyang shengjiao lun</i> 顯揚聖教論	2	0.7%	114	0.5%
12	T31n1605 <i>Dacheng apidamo ji lun</i> 大乘阿毘達磨集論	2	0.7%	110	0.5%
13	P182n1615 <i>Da ming san cang fa shu</i> 大明三藏法數	1	0.4%	379	1.6%
14	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	1	0.4%	36	0.2%
15	T31n1587 <i>Zhuanshi lun</i> 轉識論	1	0.4%	69	0.3%
16	T32n1657 <i>Shou zhang lun</i> 手杖論	1	0.4%	207	0.9%
17	T33n1705 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo jing shu</i> 仁王護國般若經疏	1	0.4%	57	0.2%
18	T34n1718 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing wen ju</i> 妙法蓮華經文句	1	0.4%	8	0.0%
19	X55n890 <i>Bashi guiju buzhu zhengyi</i> 八識規矩補註證義	1	0.4%	22	0.1%
20	X57n972 <i>Fajie anli tu</i> 法界安立圖	1	0.4%	93	0.4%
<b>Total</b>		<b>273</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>23,101</b>	<b>100%</b>

Moreover, if we consider the total number of Chinese characters of LMC#3 as the total information count base in the following Table 14, we find that LMC#3 has the highest total citation rate and the highest within-group citation rate of quote count. Three fourths of LMC#3 total information are citations regardless explicit or implicit citations. Over one fourth are within-group citations that comes from LMC#2 and LMC#1. In other words, less than one fourth of LMC#3 is Wang Kentang's own words. This is the maximum amount of information that Wang Keng Tang could be different from LMC#2 and LMC#1. Table 15 shows that the longest citation is from ZJL-fascicles # 48 with the quote count over 900 Chinese characters. We will have more detailed review on this quote in Chapter 4 Section 3-3-3-4-1. Moreover, the longest within-group citation is from LMC#2 and it is over 300 Chinese characters long. That is the most amazing feature that makes LMC#3 so unique among late-Ming CWSL commentaries. As previous discussion in Chapter 2, we might better understand such feature as reflecting Wang Kentang's interest and behavior associated with "philological scholarship" (Ch. *kaoju xue* 考據學) than as anachronistic suspect of plagiarism.

**Table 14 LMC#3 Citation Rates Summary**

LMC#3	Quote Count
Citation Total=A	23,101
Within-Group Citation=B	7,844
Total Info Count=C	30,731
Total Citation Rate= A/C	75%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C	26%

**Table 15 LMC#3 Top Three Citations Summary**

Top three Citation by LMC#3	Quote Type	Quote Count	Aspect
T48n2016-048	ICQC	907	Aspect #3
T48n2016-050	ICQC	743	Aspect #12
T48n2016-049	ICQC	457	Aspect #4

Top three Within-Group Citation by LMC#3	Quote Type	Quote Count	Aspect
LMC#2-003	ISC	309	Aspect #11
LMC#2-002	ICQC	279	Aspect #4
LMC#2-002	ICQC	235	Aspect #5

In addition, Table 16 lists four unique sources out of twenty sources that used by LMC#3. If any, this is some area where LMC#3 might be different from other late-Ming commentators. For example, *Fa jie an li tu* 法界安立圖 (Graphs to establish dharma-realms) was compiled by Renchao 仁潮 in 1584. We will see Wang Kentang quoted this more contemporary and dedicated Buddhist cosmology work for his discussion in Chapter 4 Section 4-5-2-2

**Table 16 LMC#3 Unique Citation Sources**

Item	Unique Source used by LMC#3	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count
1	P182n1615 <i>Da ming san cang fa shu</i> 大明三藏法數	1	207
2	T31n1605 <i>Dacheng apidamo ji lun</i> 大乘阿毘達磨集論	2	110
3	X57n972 <i>Fajie anli tu</i> 法界安立圖	1	93
4	T33n1705 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo jing shu</i> 仁王護國般若經疏	1	57

### 3-2-2-1-4 Citation Analysis of LMC#4

LMC#4 was published more than a decade later than LMC#1, LMC#2 and LMC#3. Nevertheless, Table 17 indicates that LMC#1, LMC#2, and LMC#3 together still account for a significant portion of LCM#4's citations. In fact, total within-group citations (i.e. total citations from LMC#1, LMC2 and LMC#3 are added together) is bigger than the top one source ZJL.

**Table 17 LMC#4 Citation Sources Summary**

Item	LMC#4 Sources	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	14	22%	407	25.7%
2	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	14	22%	313	19.8%
3	LMC#2 <i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	9	14%	258	16.3%
4	LMC#1 <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	6	9%	88	5.6%
5	LMC#3 <i>Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi</i> 成唯識論證義	4	6%	87	5.5%
6	P189n1629 <i>Tiantai si jiaoyi ji zhu</i> 天台四教儀集註	2	3%	32	2.0%
7	T16n670 <i>Lengqie aba duoluo bao jing</i> 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經	2	3%	26	1.6%
8	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	3	5%	47	3.0%
9	T30n1579 <i>Yuqie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	2	3%	92	5.8%
10	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang 無性造 玄奘譯	2	3%	69	4.4%
11	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	1	2%	8	0.5%
12	T11n310 <i>Da bao ji jing</i> 大寶積經	1	2%	7	0.4%
13	T31n1602 <i>Xiayang shengjiao lun</i> 顯揚聖教論	1	2%	102	6.4%
14	T31n1606 <i>Dacheng apidamo za ji lun</i> 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論	1	2%	22	1.4%
15	T33n1702 <i>Jingang jing zuanyao kanding ji</i> 金剛經纂要刊定記	1	2%	16	1.0%
16	T34n1718 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing wen ju</i> 妙法蓮華經文句	1	2%	8	0.5%
<b>Total</b>		<b>64</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>1,582</b>	<b>100%</b>

However, very different from LMC#2 and LMC#3, Dahui seems no longer trying to quote as many sources as Wang Kentang and Tongrun did. Instead, Table 18 shows that Dahui seemed intended to have a strategy of using the least citations that ended up at nine percent. Although within-group citation still plays important role as his No. 3 to No. 5 citation sources, in total they account for less than three percent of LMC#4 total information.

**Table 18 LMC#4 Citation Rates Summary**

LMC#4	Quote Count
Citation Total=A	1,582
Within-Group Citation=B	433
Total Info Count=C	18,250
Total Citation Rate= A/C	9%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C	2.4%

### 3-2-2-1-5 Citation Analysis of LMC#5

LMC#5 is the latest printed late-Ming CWSL commentary in the scope which was over two decades later than LMC#4 and approximately over three and half decades than LMC#2 and LMC#3. Even though, Table 19 shows that LMC2, LMC#3 and LMC#4 still influenced LMC#5 more than WKWD. One interesting thing to notice here is that LMC#5 did not have any direct citation from LMC#1 whereas LMC#2, LMC#3, and LMC#4 all cited LMC#1. The reason is unknown so far. However, since LMC#1 and LMC#2 were just about one year apart, the print time difference should not make a good reason.

Another thing to note is that Zhixu is different from all other late-Ming commentators in his commentary style. Other late-Ming commentators all identified from which sentence to which sentence in CWSL root text where they would like to explicate first and then provided their comments. Their comments were clearly separated from CWSL root text. Zhixu did not only provide his own separate comments as needed. In LMC#5, we also observed that Zhixu repeated the original CWSL root text together with his “interlinear notes” (Ch. *jia zhu* 夾注 or *wen zhong zhu* 文中注) that were put in brackets and inserted inside the text. This makes LMC#5 citations more complex than other late-Ming commentaries.

**Table 19 LMC#5 Citation Sources Summary**

Item	LCM#5 Source	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	24	34%	1,345	58.5%
2	LMC#2 <i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	11	16%	164	7.1%
3	LMC#4 <i>Cheng Weishi lun zikao</i> 成唯識論自攷	11	16%	159	6.9%
4	LMC#3 <i>Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi</i> 成唯識論證義	6	9%	140	6.1%
5	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	4	6%	156	6.8%
6	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	2	3%	40	1.7%
7	T30n1579 <i>Yuqie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	2	3%	76	3.3%
8	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	2	3%	100	4.3%
9	T09n262 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing</i> 妙法蓮華經	1	1%	39	1.7%
10	T37n1750-001 <i>Guan wu liang shou fo jing shu</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏	1	1%	19	0.8%
11	T19n945 <i>Dafo ding rulai miyin xiuzheng leyi zhu pusa wanxing shou lengyan jing</i> 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經	1	1%	11	0.5%
12	T24n1485 <i>Pusa yingluo benye jing</i> 菩薩瓔珞本業經	1	1%	4	0.2%
13	T34n1718 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing wen ju</i> 妙法蓮華經文句	1	1%	7	0.3%
14	T37n1751 <i>Guan wuliang shou fo jing shu miao zong chao</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏妙宗鈔	1	1%	5	0.2%
15	X08n236 <i>Huayan xuantan hui xuan ji</i> 華嚴懸談會玄記	1	1%	23	1.0%
16	X09n240 <i>Huayan gangyao</i> 華嚴綱要	1	1%	11	0.5%
<b>Total</b>		<b>70</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>2,299</b>	<b>100%</b>

Table 20 takes into the account the total number of Chinese characters of LMC#5 as the total information count base- 19,136 Chinese characters. Then we come out with the total citation rate of twelve percent and within-group citation rate of less than three percent. These two rates are close to LMC#4.

**Table 20 LMC#5 Citation Rates Summary**

LMC#5	Quote Count
<b>Citation Total=A</b>	<b>2,299</b>
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>	<b>463</b>
<b>Total Info Count=C</b>	<b>19,136</b>
<b>Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>	<b>12%</b>
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>	<b>2.4%</b>


Table 21 is a list of unique sources that used by LMC#5. As the latest late-Ming commentator, Zhixu had the opportunity to leverage the work of LMC#4. In terms of quote frequency and quote count, Table 19 already showed that such a leverage is as important as the leverage of LMC#2. In addition, *Guan wuliang shou fo jing shu miao zong chao* 觀無量壽佛經疏妙宗鈔 is the work by Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960-1028) who is Tiantai Patriarch in Song and tried to syncretize teaching of Tiantai school and the practice of Pure Land school in this work. We will discuss later in Chapter 4 Section 4-4-2-2 about in what occasion Zhixu needed to quote this source to interpret what concept in CWSL.

**Table 21 LMC#5 Unique Citation Sources**

Item	Unique Source used by LMC#5	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count
1	LMC#4 <i>Cheng Weishi lun zikao</i> 成唯識論自攷	11	159
2	X08n236 <i>Huayan xuantan hui xuan ji</i> 華嚴懸談會玄記	1	23
3	X09n240 <i>Huayan gangyao</i> 華嚴綱要	1	11
4	T33n1716-001 <i>Miao fa lian hua jing xuan yi</i> 妙法蓮華經玄義	1	8
5	T37n1750-001 <i>Guan wu liang shou fo jing shu</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏	1	19
6	T24n1485 <i>Pusa yingluo benye jing</i> 菩薩瓔珞本業經	1	7
7	T37n1751 <i>Guan wuliang shou fo jing shu miao zong chao</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏妙宗鈔	1	5

In 3.1 Overview of Total Information Amount, Diagram 1 shows that the total information amounts of the Late-Ming commentaries have the trend looks like a convex upward curve. The rationale behind the trend could further be explained by the following Figure 3. It indicates that, in terms of both quote frequency and quote count, the exploration stage from LMC#1 to LMC#3 features steep citation increases whereas the internalization stage from LCM#4 to LMC#5 features less citations.

**Figure 3 Citations Rates by LMCs**



### 3-2-2-2 Citation Types Analysis

To focus on Citation Types analysis, the detailed sources information is taken out. The matrix of Quote frequency and Quote count is produced by Citation Types and by LMCs as Table 22. Table 22 indicates that implicit citations are much more than explicit citations. All implicit citations account for approximately 85% of citations. This is one of key features of the late-Ming CWSL commentarial tradition. In particular, implicit complete/quasi-complete citation [ICQC] is the most dominant citation type. It can even reach almost fifty percent in term of quote count. I am wondering whether or not other commentarial traditions would have such high implicit citation rate as I see in the late-Ming CWSL commentarial tradition. If yes, for those researchers who work on comparing philosophical ideas between commentators, I would highly suggest that they need to be able to identify those implicit citations and their sources first prior to their main analysis. Otherwise, the integrity of their comparison results might be in jeopardy.

To further investigate if there is any citation type difference between the exploration stage and the internalization stage, Table 22 is broken into Table 23 that comprises LMC#1, LMC#2 and LMC#3 and Table 24 that comprises LMC#4 and LMC#5. Table 23 shows that ICQC still the most dominant citation types, followed by implicit selected citation [ISC]. On other hand, Table 24 indicates a clear citation type shift from ICQC to Implicit Paraphrasing Citation [IPC]. This seems making sense because the later commentators LMC#4 and LMC#5 seemed no longer satisfied with straightforward citations types and moved to more internalized type of citation like IPC. As Zhixu made it clear in his preface "...If every single sentence was not fully absorbed by oneself, then what would the benefit of either reading the menu without tasting or counting others' treasures be?..."<sup>216</sup>, that seemed a kind of disclaimer of using implicit paraphrasing citations more often.

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<sup>216</sup> 「若不句句消歸自己，則說食數寶，究竟何益？」( X51, no. 824, p. 297, b18-19 // Z 1:82, p. 197, b18-c1 // R82, p. 393, b18-p. 394, a1)

Table 22 Citation Types Summary for All LMCs

	LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		LMC#4		LMC#5		Quote F. Sub-Total	%	Quote C. Sub-Total	%
	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count				
[ECQC]	12	546	19	937	23	1,790	1	23	7	652	62	11%	3,948	11%
[ESC]	2	180	7	966	2	160	1	26	5	324	17	3%	1,656	5%
[EPC]	2	49	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	82	3	1%	131	0%
[ICQC]	3	178	25	1,377	154	15,343	15	367	13	225	210	36%	17,490	48%
[ISC]	18	437	49	2,763	45	2,665	18	462	15	296	145	25%	6,623	18%
[IPC]	7	407	17	1,046	24	1,700	25	652	22	623	95	16%	4,428	12%
[ICC]	2	14	14	427	25	1,443	4	52	7	97	52	9%	2,033	6%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1,811</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>7,516</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>23,101</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1,582</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>2,299</b>	<b>584</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>36,309</b>	<b>100%</b>


Table 23 Citation Types Summary for LMC#1, LMC#2, LMC#3

	LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		Quote F. Sub-Total	%	Quote C. Sub-Total	%
	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count				
[ECQC]	12	546	19	937	23	1,790	54	12%	3,273	10%
[ESC]	2	180	7	966	2	160	11	2%	1,306	4%
[EPC]	2	49	-	-	-	-	2	0%	49	0%
[ICQC]	3	178	25	1,377	154	15,343	182	40%	16,898	52%
[ISC]	18	437	49	2,763	45	2,665	112	25%	5,865	18%
[IPC]	7	407	17	1,046	24	1,700	48	11%	3,153	10%
[ICC]	2	14	14	427	25	1,443	41	9%	1,884	6%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>1,811</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>7,516</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>23,101</b>	<b>450</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>32,428</b>	<b>100%</b>



Table 24 Citation Types Summary for LMC#4 and LMC#5

	LMC#4		LMC#5		Quote F. Sub-Total	%	Quote C. Sub-Total	%
	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count				
[ECQC]	1	23	7	652	8	6%	675	17%
[ESC]	1	26	5	324	6	4%	350	9%
[EPC]	-	-	1	82	1	1%	82	2%
[ICQC]	15	367	13	225	28	21%	592	15%
[ISC]	18	462	15	296	33	25%	758	20%
[IPC]	25	652	22	623	47	35%	1,275	33%
[ICC]	4	52	7	97	11	8%	149	4%
<b>Sub-total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1,582</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>2,299</b>	<b>134</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3,881</b>	<b>100%</b>



### 3-2-2-3 Citation Analysis of Top sources

As previous discussions indicate, ZJL is the top one source in terms of both quote frequency and quote count. Moreover, ZJL have 100 fascicles in total. One interesting question might be which fascicles the late-Ming commentators cited more in the scope of this study. Table 25 shows that both fascicle No. 48 and No. 47 were quoted most frequently. In the order of quote count, however, fascicle No. 48 provides the most information support to the late-Ming commentators, followed by fascicle No. 49, No. 47 and No. 60.

In addition, one might be interested in knowing in which aspect the late-Ming commentators cited more ZJL. Table 26 indicates that thirty percent of ZJL citations occurred in Aspect #3 (Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause 因相門), followed by eighteen percent in Aspect #4 (Aspect of Mental activity to Perceive 行相門), fourteen percent in Aspect#7 (Aspect of Association 相應門), and thirteen percent in Aspect#5 (Aspect of Object of Perception 所緣門). A further check would find that 41 out of 51 times of quotes in Aspect #3 are from fascicle No. 48, 21 out of 29 times in Aspect#4 from fascicle No. 60, 19 out of 23 times in Aspect#7 from fascicle No. 47, and 19 out of 22 times in Aspect#5 from fascicle No. 49. This means that all citations from fascicle No. 48 and from fascicle No 60 are dedicated to Aspect #3 and Aspect#4, respectively.

**Table 25 ZJL Citations Breakdown by Fascicles**

Item	Source	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	T48n2016-048	41	24%	4,346	27.8%
2	T48n2016-047	40	24%	3,109	19.9%
3	T48n2016-049	34	20%	3,324	21.3%
4	T48n2016-060	21	13%	2,267	14.5%
5	T48n2016-050	7	4%	1,359	8.7%
6	T48n2016-071	7	4%	152	1.0%
7	T48n2016-057	5	3%	513	3.3%
8	T48n2016-051	3	2%	283	1.8%
9	T48n2016-070	3	2%	81	0.5%
10	T48n2016-062	1	1%	93	0.6%
11	T48n2016-061	1	1%	38	0.2%
12	T48n2016-068	1	1%	23	0.1%
13	T48n2016-090	1	1%	17	0.1%
14	T48n2016-088	1	1%	11	0.1%
15	T48n2016-077	1	1%	8	0.1%
16	T48n2016-029	1	1%	7	0.0%
Total		168	100%	15,631	100.0%

**Table 26 ZJL Citation Breakdown by Aspects**

Item	Aspects	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	Aspect #3	51	30%	5,032	32.2%
2	Aspect #4	29	17%	3,258	20.8%
3	Aspect #7	23	14%	1,367	8.7%
4	Aspect #5	22	13%	1,524	9.7%
5	Aspect #8	12	7%	932	6.0%
6	Aspect #12	9	5%	1,384	8.9%

Item	Aspects	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
7	Aspect #11	7	4%	481	3.1%
8	Aspect #9	5	3%	664	4.2%
9	Aspect #1	5	3%	450	2.9%
10	Aspect #6	2	1%	437	2.8%
11	Aspect #10	2	1%	49	0.3%
12	Aspect #2	1	1%	53	0.3%
<b>Total</b>		<b>168</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>15,631</b>	<b>100%</b>

Compared to Table 26 for ZJL, Table 27 shows that the citations of WKWD that is No. 3 three source are centered around Aspect #3. Besides Aspect#3, only Aspect#12 (Aspect of Suppression-Extinction Stages 伏斷位次門) accounts for over ten percent of Quote Frequency and Quote count.

**Table 27 WKWD Citation Breakdown by Aspects**

Item	Aspects	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	Aspect #3	41	60.3%	2,677	69.8%
2	Aspect #12	9	13.2%	436	11.4%
3	Aspect #4	5	7.4%	113	2.9%
4	Aspect #1	4	5.9%	429	11.2%
5	Aspect #5	5	7.4%	68	1.8%
6	Aspect #11	2	2.9%	92	2.4%
7	Aspect #2	1	1.5%	9	0.2%
8	Aspect #7	1	1.5%	12	0.3%
<b>Total</b>		<b>68</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>3,836</b>	<b>100%</b>

In addition, refer to Appendix 2, there are fifty sources in total used by late-Ming commentators. If we make a table of shared sources which used by at least two late-Ming commentators as Table 28 shows, we see couple things deserving attention. 1) all late-Ming commentators use CWSL to interpret CWSL. 2) WKWD was not cited by LMC#1 while HJSC was not cited by LMC#4. 3) In particular, there are more than one version of *She dacheng lun* being used.

Furthermore, if we make a table of all *She dacheng lun* related citations, as Table 29 shows, we find that there are four versions of *She dacheng lun* that LMCs used. The combined Quote Frequency and Quote Count of *She dacheng lun* are much higher than HJSC. More interesting is that *She dacheng lun shi* that composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang was most cited. *She dacheng lun shi* that composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang and that composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha were both cited. We will see a case study in Chapter 4 Section 4-3-4-2-3 showing that citing different versions of *She dacheng lun* might lead to different interpretations in the late-Mng commentaries.

**Table 28 List of Shared Sources**

Item	Shared Sources by LMCs	Used by How Many LMCs	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	5	168	15,631
2	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	5	14	256
3	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	4	68	3,836
4	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	4	27	1,225
5	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang	4	21	1,094
6	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	4	12	739
7	T30n1579 <i>Yuqie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	4	9	321
8	LMC#2 <i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	3	97	6,341
9	LMC#1 <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	3	55	2,108
10	T31n1602 <i>Xianyang shengjiao lun</i> 顯揚聖教論	3	6	635
11	T31n1587 <i>Zhuanshi lun</i> 轉識論	3	4	154
12	T34n1718 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing wen ju</i> 妙法蓮華經文句	3	3	149
13	T31n1597 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang	2	16	799
14	T16n670 <i>Lengqie aba duoluo bao jing</i> 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經	2	8	465
15	LMC#3 <i>Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi</i> 成唯識論證義	2	10	227
16	T31n1595 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha	2	4	216
17	T09n262 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing</i> 妙法蓮華經	2	2	204
18	T45n1865 <i>Bashi gui ju buzhu</i> 八識規矩補註	2	3	115
19	T32n1657 <i>Shou zhang lun</i> 手杖論	2	2	109
20	P189n1629 <i>Tiantai si jiaoyi ji zhu</i> 天台四教儀集註	2	3	81
21	T31n1594 <i>She dacheng lun ben</i> 攝大乘論本 composed by Asaṅga and translated by Xuanzang	2	2	67
22	T35n1735 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經疏	2	5	61
23	X55n890 <i>Bashi gui ju buzhu zhengyi</i> 八識規矩補註證義	2	3	49
24	T19n945 <i>Dafo ding rulai miyin xiuzheng leyi zhu pusa wanxing shou lengyan jing</i> 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經	2	3	42

Table 29 *Shen Lun* Citation Summary

Item	Shared Sources by LMCs	Used by How Many LMCs	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count
1	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang	4	21	1,094
2	T31n1597 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang	2	16	799
3	T31n1595 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha	2	4	216
4	T31n1594 <i>She dacheng lun ben</i> 攝大乘論本 composed by Asaṅga and translated by Xuanzang	2	2	67

**Total** **43** **2,176**

### 3-2-2-4 Analysis of Within-Group Citations

Refer to Appendix 2 Citation Sources Summary by LMCs, we will see that LMC#2 and LMC#1 are listed as No. 2 and No. 4 citation sources. Thus the within-group citations among the late-Ming commentators are very important. It indicates that rebuilding a tradition takes the late-Ming group work.

If we zoom in the comparison within the category of within-group citation, we will find, as Table 30 shows, that LMC#2 and LMC#1 together accounts for 88% of quote frequency and 95% of quote count. However, according to previous citations analysis by LMCs, we find that LMC#3 is a kind of outlier who having abnormally high total citation rate and within-group citation rate. In order to see within-group citation rate that represents the majority of the late-Ming group, Table 31 removes LMC#3's within-group citation and shows a more even picture. LMC#2 is still the top one source for within-group citation by accounting for about forty percent of quote frequency and quote count. LMC#4, LCM#1 and LMC#3 are all cited at around twenty percent of times.

**Table 30 Within-Group Citation Comparison**

Item	Within-Group Citation	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	LMC#2	97	56.1%	6,341	71.8%
2	LMC#1	55	31.8%	2,108	23.9%
3	LMC#4	11	6.4%	159	1.8%
4	LMC#3	10	5.8%	227	2.6%
<b>Total</b>		<b>173</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>8,835</b>	<b>100%</b>

**Table 31 Within-Group Citation Comparison (w/o LMC#3)**

Item	Within-Group Citation w/o LMC#3	Quote FREQ.	%	Quote Count	%
1	LMC#2	20	39.2%	422	42.6%
2	LMC#4	11	21.6%	159	16.0%
3	LMC#1	10	19.6%	183	18.5%
4	LMC#3	10	19.6%	227	22.9%
<b>Total</b>		<b>51</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>991</b>	<b>100%</b>

If within-group citation rate could be an index of significance, except LMC#5 that had no chance to be quoted within the group, it seems that LMC#2 is the most significant CWSL commentary among the late-Ming group regardless the outlier LMC#3 is removed or not.

### 3-2-2-5 Analysis of Pass Through Citations

Since CWSLS was not available to late-Ming commentators, so-called “pass-through citation” in this study refers to those citations that other sources indirectly pass down CWSLS comments to the late-Ming commentators. Most of occasions is

that ZJL implicitly quoted CWSLS while the late-Ming commentators happened to use those comments as well.

Table 32 shows that, when the late-Ming commentators quoted, nine percent of times falls into the category of pass-through citations. In terms of Quote Count, four percent of the total information count belongs to pass-through citations. Pass-through citation only accounts for about twelve percent of total citations. In other words, almost eighty-eight percent of citations are not pass-through citations from CWSLS.

**Table 32 Pass-Through Citation Rate**

	Quote Freq.	Quote Count
Pass-Through Citations =A	54	4,439
Total Citations= B	584	36,309
Total LMCs Info Count= C		109,990
Pass-Through Rate of Total Citation (=A/B)	9%	12%
Pass-Through Rate of Total Info Count (=A/C)		4%
Tota Citation Rate of Total Info Count (=B/C)		33%

Table 33 shows that over ninety percent of times the pass-through citations go through ZJL. In particular, most passed through ZJL fascicle No. 47, No 49 and No. 48. Other than ZJL, there are only two indirect sources. WKWD was only quoted four times whereas *Tiantai si jiaoyi ji zhu* 天台四教儀集註 was cited one time.

**Table 33 Pass-Through Citation Rate by Sources**

Indirect sources for pass-through citations	Quote Freq.	%	Quote Count	%
T48n2016-047	26	48%	1,744	39.3%
T48n2016-049	12	22%	1,561	35.2%
T48n2016-048	7	13%	588	13.2%
X55n888-001	4	7%	429	9.7%
T48n2016-050	2	4%	58	1.3%
P189n1629-006	1	2%	7	0.2%
T48n2016-029	1	2%	7	0.2%
T48n2016-060	1	2%	45	1.0%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>4,439</b>	<b>100%</b>

If we like to know in which aspects those pass-through citations happen more frequently, Table 34 indicates that Aspect #7 (Aspect of Association 相應門) and Aspect#3 (Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause 因相門) are the top two. As previous Table 7 shows, Aspect#3 is the biggest aspect so it is not surprising to see more pass-through citations occurring there. However, Aspect #7 is a relatively smaller than Aspect#3 in terms of the total information amount. It is interesting that most often the pass-through citations happened in Aspect#7. Why? A further investigation shows that most pass-through citations in Aspect#7 are related to explication of “Touch” (Ch. *chu* 觸; Skt. *sparsā*) that passed through ZJL fascicle No. 47. It appears that mental factors

are so difficult topics to address that ZJL had to rely on CWSLS. So did the late-Ming commentators did indirectly.

**Table 34 Pass-Through Citation Rate by Aspects**

Pass-Through Citations by Aspect	Quote Freq.	%	Quote Count	%
Aspect #7	17	31%	806	18%
Aspect #3	10	19%	940	21%
Aspect #5	6	11%	713	16%
Aspect #8	6	11%	586	13%
Aspect #9	4	7%	609	14%
Aspect #1	4	7%	429	10%
Aspect #12	4	7%	72	2%
Aspect #11	2	4%	239	5%
Aspect #4	1	2%	45	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>4,439</b>	<b>100%</b>



## Chapter 4. Micro Analysis- Translation & Detailed Analysis of CWSL & Commentaries

In this chapter I will do the qualitative analysis at micro level. Methodologically I will first do English translation of the CWSL in the framework of Twelve Aspects as a base. Then I will do the thematic discussions in each aspect together with English translations of related late-Ming commentaries and their citations as needed. As the following discussions will unfold, this level of study is not intended to suggest and/or judge what is the “correct” or “orthodox” way to rebuild CWLS commentarial tradition but to shed the light on the diverse ways in which a lost commentarial tradition could be rebuilt by different late-Ming commentators.

Moreover, as the following micro analysis will indicate, there are at least four possible sources of diversity among the late-Ming commentators. When indirect citation sources were not available, the Ming commentators could come out their own different interpretations. When indirect citation sources were available, they might refer to different sources that had different readings. When indirect citation sources are available, they might refer to one source but read one source differently. When indirect citation sources are available, they might choose to ignore and presented their own insights.

### 4-1 Aspect of Self-characteristics 自相門

#### 4-1-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>217</sup>- Scope and Structure of *Triṃśikā*

Although the names of three kinds of [consciousness as] “transformer” (Ch. *neng bian* 能變; Skt. *pariṇāma*) have been briefly explained, the characteristics of three kinds of [consciousness as] “transformer” (能變) are not analyzed in detail yet. Then,

<sup>217</sup> 「雖已略說能變三名，而未廣辯能變三相。且初能變其相云何？頌曰：

初阿賴耶識	異熟一切種	不可知執受	處了常與觸
作意受想思	相應唯捨受	是無覆無記	觸等亦如是
恒轉如瀑流	阿羅漢位捨	」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 7, c12-19)	

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā* (Delhi Motilal Banarsidass Publishers Private Limited, 2017), pp. 215-16. Or Francis Harold Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only* (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 1999), p. 47.



what are the “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相; Skt. \**svarūpa*<sup>218</sup> or \**svalakṣaṇa*<sup>219</sup>) of the first [consciousness as] “transformer”? The verses say:

The first [consciousness as transformer] is named “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*), “maturing [consciousness]” (Ch. *yi shou* [shi] 異熟[識]; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*), and “all seeds” (Ch. *yi qie zhong* 一切種; Skt. *sarva-bījaka*).

[It] is of “incomprehensible” (Ch. *bu ke zhi* 不可知; Skt. *asamviditaka*) “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*), “dwelling” (Ch. *chu* 處; Skt. *sthāna*) and “perceiving” (Ch. *le* 了; Skt. *vijñapti*). It is always associated with “touch” (Ch. *chu* 觸; Skt. *sparsā*), “attention” (CH. *zuo yi* 作意; Skt. *manaskāra*), “sensation” (Ch. *shou* 受; Skt. *vedanā*), “ideation” (Ch. *xiang* 想; Skt. *saṃjñā*), and “volition” (Ch. *si* 思; Skt. *cetanā*). [It’s of] only “indifferent sensation” (Ch. *she shou* 捨受; Skt. *upekṣā vedanā*).

[It’s] “neither obstructed nor determinate” (Ch. *wu fu wu ji* 無覆無記; Skt. *anivṛtta-avyākṛta*). The same is true of “touch” (觸) and etc.

It is “constantly turning” (恒轉) like “the torrent of a stream” (Ch. *pu liu* 瀑流; Skt. *srotasaughavat*). [Not until] the “state of liberated sage” (Ch. *a luo han wei* 阿羅漢位; Skt. *arhatva*) [its name of “storehouse consciousness”] is discarded (Ch. *she* 捨; Skt. *vyāvṛtti*).

#### 4-1-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### Ten Aspects vs. Twelve Aspects

In the previous discussion of the scope that limited to Chinese *Triṃśikā* stanza #2cd, #3, and #4 (or Sanskrit *Triṃśikā* stanza #2cd, #3, #4, and #5a), we see that Kuiji explicated CWSL commentary on the scoped verses in the framework of “Ten Aspects” (Ch. *shi men* 十門). (Please refer to Table 2) Kuiji did not separate out “Aspect of “Incomprehensible” (不可知門) and “Aspect of Mental factors Same as Mind” (心所例王門) because he specifically noted that the former is already included in “Aspect of Object of Perception and of Mental Activity to Perceive” (所緣、行相門) while the latter are not used to distinguish the eighth consciousness. Nevertheless,

<sup>218</sup> According to TrBh Sanskrit, the question is about “self-characteristics” (Ch. *zi xiang* 自相; Skt. *svarūpa*) of the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness. But CWSL seems purposely leaves out “self” here because CWSL would use three kinds of “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相) to explicate the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness later. I am with Huo that the three kinds of “characteristics” can be consolidated into “self-characteristics”. Thus I use Skt. *svarūpa* here. Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.50. Tao-hui Huo, *Sthiramati's Commentary on Triṃśikāvijñapti: A Chinese Translation with Notes and Interpretations* 安慧三十唯識釋原典譯註 (Hong Kong, China: The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1980), p.40.

<sup>219</sup> See Poussin's comment in Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 216.

WKWD seemed to selectively ignore Kuiji's sophisticated note and passed down the more straightforward "Twelve Aspects" (Ch. *shi ermen* 十二門). (Please refer to Table 3) Thus most late-Ming commentators accepted the framework of "Twelve Aspects" except of LMC#1 who, as the previous citation analysis shows, never quoted WKWD.

Refer to Table 7, we can see that "Aspect of Incomprehensible" (不可知門) and "Aspect of Mental factors Same as Mind" (心所例王門) account for one percent and five percent of CWSL, respectively. They might not be big aspects but still stand as separate sections. In my opinion, the framework of "Twelve Aspects" might have an advantage of a clean and comprehensive coverage.

#### 4-1-3 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>220</sup>

The treatise says: The first "consciousness as transformer" (Ch. *neng bian shi* 能變識) is named "storehouse [consciousness]" (Ch. *a lai ye [shi]* 阿賴耶[識]; Skt. *ālaya[vijñāna]*) in the teachings of Mahāyāna (Ch. *da cheng* 大乘, the Great Vehicle Teaching) and Hīnayāna (Ch. *xiao cheng* 小乘, the Small Vehicle Teaching). Because this consciousness has implications of "storer" (Ch. *neng cang* 能藏), "that which is stored" (Ch. *suo cang* 所藏) and "appropriated store" (Ch. *zhi cang* 執藏)<sup>221</sup>. Which means because this consciousness and "the defiled" (Ch. *za ran* 雜染; Skt. *saṃkleśa* or *sāṃkleśika*)<sup>222</sup> [seeds and phenomena] are mutual conditions to each other. Because sentient beings treat this consciousness as their "innate self" (自內我). These indicate all "self-characteristics" (Ch. *zi xiang* 自相; Skt. *\*svarūpa* or *\*svalakṣaṇa*) of the first "consciousness as transformer" (Ch. *neng bian shi* 能變識) because it includes and keeps both "[characteristics as a ] cause" (Ch. *yin [xiang]* 因[相]; Skt. *\*hetu-[lakṣaṇa]*) and "[characteristics as an] effect" (Ch. *guo [xiang]* 果[相]; Skt. *\*phala-[lakṣaṇa]*) as its own self-characteristics. Although these self-characteristics has many "states" (Ch. *fen wei* 分位; Skt. *\*avasthā*), the faults associated with the "storehouse consciousness" (Ch. *cang shi* 藏識) are so heavy that [the name of

<sup>220</sup> 「論曰：初能變識，大、小乘教，名阿賴耶。此識具有能藏、所藏、執藏義故。謂與雜染互為緣故，有情執為自內我故。此即顯示，初能變識，所有自相，攝持因果，為自相故。此識自相，分位雖多，藏識過重，是故偏說。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 7, c20-24)

For alternative English translations, see *ibid.*, p. 218-20. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 47-48. However, please note that both translations regarding "偏說" seemed a little bit problematic. "偏說" shall mean "being said/emphasized more and/or on purpose. In addition, Poussin's translation regarding "過重" seems missing the meaning of heavy fault.

<sup>221</sup> A. Charles Muller, ed., "Digital Dictionary of Buddhism," (<http://www.buddhism-dict.net/ddb/2019>).

<sup>222</sup> According to CWSLS and Lee's reading, Ch. *za ran* 雜染 is the translation of Skt. *saṃkleśa*. (T43, no. 1830, p. 301, a6-8) & Lee, "Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian" 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 1, pp.102.

Or see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 218.

“storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) is said/emphasized more and/or on purpose.

#### 4-1-4 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-1-4-1 The impact of one single character difference between “cang shi” and “cang chu”

Instead of “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *cang shi* 藏識), all late-Ming commentators’ CWSL root text sources read “storehouse [consciousness] first” (Ch. *cang chu* 藏初). Due to one single Chinese character difference, most late-Ming commentators<sup>223</sup> except LMC#3 interpreted “storehouse consciousness first” by using CWSL’s argument in later text that “because the name of *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] (Ch. *a lai ye* [*shi*] 阿賴耶[識], the storehouse [consciousness]) is heavily faulted and first discarded, [the name of *ālayavijñāna*] is used/emphasized more and/or on purpose here.”<sup>224</sup> Here the association is between “first discarded” and “storehouse [consciousness] first”.

LMC#3 has different reading and interpretation that “...But if there was no "storer", there would be no "that which is stored" and "appropriated store". Compared to [these latter] two kinds, the implication of "storer" is the most heavily faulted so [the name of *ālayavijñāna*] is used/emphasized more and/or on purpose ...”<sup>225</sup>

On the other hand, according to CWSLS, Kuiji provided two reasons to emphasize the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] more: 1) The consciousness has three states: a) the state of “manifesting attachment & appropriation of the self” (Ch. *wo ai zhi cang xian xing* 我愛執藏現行), which is called *ālayavijñāna* or “appropriated store”; b) the state of “effects due to virtuous and unvirtuous activities” (Ch. *shan e ye guo* 善、惡業果), which is called “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou shi* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) and c) the state of “holding the continuity of consciousness” (Ch. *xiang xu zhichi* 相續執持), which is also called “the consciousness that holding” (Ch. *a tuo na* [*shi*] 阿陀那[識] (Skt. *ādāna*[*vijñāna*])).<sup>226</sup> The “appropriated store” is discarded first. 2) Because the first state is also named as “attachment to self” (Ch. *wo zhi* 我執) and “that which is attached” so it is heavily faulted.<sup>227</sup>

In short, most late-Ming commentators and Kuiji are relatively aligned on that

<sup>223</sup> (X50, no. 820, p. 540, a17-18 // Z 1:81, p. 33, c2-3 // R81, p. 66, a2-3); (X50, no. 821, p. 684, a18-20 // Z 1:81, p. 177, d10-12 // R81, p. 354, b10-12); (X51, no. 823, p. 170, a12 // Z 1:82, p. 69, c8 // R82, p. 138, a8); (X51, no. 824, p. 319, c24 // Z 1:82, p. 219, d11 // R82, p. 438, b11)

<sup>224</sup> 「阿賴耶名，過失重故，最初捨故，此中偏說。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 13, c25)

<sup>225</sup> 「然無能藏，亦無所藏、執藏，二種唯能藏義過失最重，是故偏說。」(X50, no. 822, p. 862, b20-21 // Z 1:81, p. 356, c12-13 // R81, p. 712, a12-13)

<sup>226</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 298, a13-23.

<sup>227</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 301, b10-15.

the name of *ālaya* should be first discarded. As to which one of three implications of *ālayavijñāna* is most faulted, LMC#3 argued for the "storer" while Kuiji argued for the "appropriated store". Here LMC#3 thought that the storer not only stores but also determines what to be stored. Thus, he seemed mixing up the "storer" and "appropriator" (Ch. *neng zhi* 能執).

Referring to *Bashi guiju buzhu* 八識規矩補註 (Commentary on the Structure of the Eight Consciousnesses) by Luan Putai 魯庵普泰<sup>228</sup>, LMC#1 commented that "...on one hand, the implication of "being permeated" (Ch. *shou xun* 受熏) is named "that which is stored". On the other hand, the implication of "holding the seeds" (Ch. *chi zhong* 持種) is named the "storer". That the seventh [consciousness] appropriating [*ālayavijñāna*] as the self is named "appropriated store"..."<sup>229</sup> For the "appropriated store", the seventh [consciousness] is the "appropriator" while the the eight consciousness/*ālayavijñāna* is "that which is attached or appropriated". Their relationships can be summarized as the tables show below.

#### Three Implications of *ālayavijñāna* (The 8th consciousness)

1. "Storer" ( <i>neng cang</i> 能藏)	The 8th consciousness is "holding the seeds" ( <i>chi zhong</i> 持種)
2. "That which is stored" ( <i>suo cang</i> 所藏)	The 8th consciousness is "being permeated" ( <i>shou xun</i> 受熏)
3. "Appropriated store" ( <i>zhi cang</i> 執藏)	1) The 8th consciousness is holding the seeds that manifest the 7th consciousness. 2) The 8th consciousness is "being permeated" ( <i>shouxun</i> 受熏) by the manifestation of the 7th consciousness.

#### The stakeholders of the "appropriated store" (*zhi cang* 執藏)

1. The 7th consciousness	"Appropriator" ( <i>neng zhi</i> 能執)
2. The 8th consciousness	"That which is attached or appropriated" ( <i>suo zhi</i> 所執)

Another reason that LMC#3 did not give as much priority to "appropriated store" as Kuiji might be because LMC#3 was the only late-Ming commentator who consistently quoted *She dacheng lun shi* composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang for the definition of "self-characteristics" (Ch. *zi xiang* 自相), of "characteristics as an effect" (Ch. *guo xiang* 果相), and of "characteristics as a cause" (Ch. *yin xiang* 因相), respectively. According to *She dacheng lun shi*, the definition of "self-characteristics" seems only covering the implications of "storer" and of "that

<sup>228</sup> See T45, no. 1865, p. 475, b6-8.

<sup>229</sup> 「受熏義邊，名為所藏。持種義邊，名為能藏。七執為我，名為執藏。」(X50, no. 820, p. 540, a14-15 // Z 1:81, p. 33, b17-18 // R81, p. 65, b17-18)

which is stored" without "appropriated store".<sup>230</sup> In Yin-shun's opinion, the focus shifting to "appropriated store" happens only in the later consciousness-only study of the *ālayavijñāna*.<sup>231</sup> If that was the case, LMC#3's reference of *She dacheng lun shi* seemed to prevent him from catching up the later development. This supports H1-A2.

#### 4-1-4-2 Why does "self-characteristics" have many "states"?

Why does "self-characteristics" (Ch. *zi xiang* 自相) have many "states" (Ch. *fen wei* 分位)? As previous discussion, according to CWSLS, there are three states in total and each state is applied to sentient beings in different stages of the liberation.<sup>232</sup>

On the other hand, LMC#4 says that "...That self-characteristics have many states means that self-characteristics have "characteristics as a cause" and "characteristics as an effect" ...".<sup>233</sup> LMC#5 even refers to those eight characteristics<sup>234</sup> which are listed in *Yuqie shidi lun* (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice) in order to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna* and says that the eighth consciousness (i.e. *ālayavijñāna*) has eight kinds of "self-characteristics". Here CWSL picks up the first one- the characteristics of basis and appropriation (*yizhi zhi shou* 依止執受)- for explanation.<sup>235</sup>

Later on in Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause, LMC#3 also refers to *She dacheng lun shi* composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha and says that "... in *Jue ding zang lun*<sup>236</sup> there are eight characteristics that were mentioned to elucidate the root consciousness. To be different from that extensive explanation so three kinds are briefly discussed..."<sup>237</sup> Here these eight characteristics should be the same as those eight ones that LMC#5 quotes from the *Yuqie shidi lun*. I suspect that LMC#5 might follow the clue that left by LMC#3.

This is a typical case when CWSL is ambiguous about term- here is what it means by "states" (*fen wei* 分位) of "self-characteristics", and when the pass-down citations are not available either. Here we see that the late-Ming commentators could have three possible strategies. 1) No further explanation as LMC#1 or providing ambiguous explanation as LMC#2. 2) Providing conservative explanation by

<sup>230</sup> See T31, no. 1597, p. 327, c12-17.

<sup>231</sup> Yin-shun Shi, "*She Dasheng Lun Jiangji*" 攝大乘論講記 (Taipei: Zhengwen chubanshe, 2000), p.40.

<sup>232</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 301, b10-12) & ( T43, no. 1830, p. 298, a13-24.

<sup>233</sup> 「自相分位多者，具因相、果相也。」(X51, no. 823, p. 170, a11 // Z 1:82, p. 69, c7 // R82, p. 138, a7)

<sup>234</sup> ( T30, no. 1579, p. 579, a20-25)

<sup>235</sup> ( X51, no. 824, p. 320, a6-10 // Z 1:82, p. 219, d17-p. 220, a3 // R82, p. 438, b17-p. 439, a3)

<sup>236</sup> This is Paramārtha's partial translation of the *Viniścaya* 攝抉擇分 of *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice). DDB.

<sup>237</sup> 「決定藏論中，明本識有八相，異彼廣說，故言略說三種。」( T31, no. 1595, p. 162, b7-8)

associating with close terms in the same context like LMC#4. 3) Providing aggressive explanation by associating with term in remote texts as LMC#5. Different strategies in such situation lead to the inevitable variance among the late-Ming commentaries.

## 4-2 Aspect of Characteristics as an Effect 果相門

### 4-2-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>238</sup>

Because this [i.e. *ālayavijñāna* or the eighth consciousness] is able to draw all kinds of realms, destinies, and births as “effects of maturation” (Ch. *yi shou guo* 異熟果), it is named “maturing [consciousness]” (Ch. *yi shou [shi]* 異熟[識]; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*). Thus, without this [consciousness], the constantly continuous, excellent “effects of maturation” (異熟果) like “life force” (Ch. *ming gen* 命根; Skt. *jīvita-indriya*) and “commonality of sentient beings” (Ch. *zhong tong fen* 眾同分; Skt. *nikāya-sabhāga*)<sup>239</sup> and etc are not attainable. This [i.e. “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou shi* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*)] indicates all “characteristics as an effect” (Ch. *guo xiang* 果相; Skt. *\*phala-lakṣaṇa*) of the first “consciousness as transformer” (Ch. *neng bian shi* 能變識). Although “characteristics as an effect” (Ch. *guo xiang* 果相) of this consciousness have many states and many kinds of [effects], the [effect of] “maturation” (異熟) has a wide (Ch. *kuan* 寬) [coverage of states] and is unshared so [the name of “*vipāka-vijñāna*” (異熟識)] is said/emphasized more and/or on purpose.

### 4-2-2 Discussions of Commentaries

#### The impact of one single character difference between “wide” and “real”

Instead of the single Chinese character “寬” which means “wide” as an adjective, all late-Ming commentators’ CWSL text have another Chinese character “實” (*shi*) which means “real”. All late-Ming commentators read it as adverb like “really” or “in fact” for the adjective “unshared” (Ch. *bu gong* 不共). Thus they would not explain what “寬” means as Kuiji did. In CWSLS, however, Kuiji noted that it is “wide” (Ch. *kuan* 寬) because this consciousness covers either two out of three states or four out of five stages for liberations. It is “unshared” because three out of the five effects (Ch. *wu guo* 五果; Skt. *pañca phalāni*) are shared with other dharmas [i.e. other seven

<sup>238</sup> 「此是能引諸界、趣、生善不善業，異熟果故，說名異熟。離此，命根、眾同分等，恆時相續，勝異熟果，不可得故。此即顯示，初能變識，所有果相。此識果相，雖多位多種，異熟寬、不共，故偏說之。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 7, c24-29) 寬=實【明】。

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 220-21. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 48. Please note that both translation regarding “異熟寬不共，故偏說之” seem problematic. See 2-2 discussion.

<sup>239</sup> Muller, "Digital Dictionary of Buddhism."

consciousnesses]. Only the effect of maturation is unshared [i.e. it is dedicated to the eighth consciousness only] so [the name of *vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識] is said/emphasized more here.<sup>240</sup>

Due to the difference of one single Chinese character, LMC#4 and LMC#5 have different readings regarding “many states and man kinds of [effects]” (多位多種). LMC#4 interpreted “many states” as differences due to the virtuous & the unvirtuous, the ordinary man & the sage and so on. “Many kinds” refers to the distinction that the eighth consciousness is named either mind or “the base of the knowable” (Ch. *suo zhiyi* 所知依; Skt. *\*jñeyāśraya*) or etc. Furthermore, now that it is named as an effect of maturation, it really has nothing in common with the remaining “self-characteristics” and “characteristics as a cause”. It is also unshared with the stage of *tathāgata* because it is contaminated (Ch. *you lou* 有漏; Skt. *āsrava*). Thus it is emphasized especially.<sup>241</sup>

On the other hand, in order to explain “many states and many kinds”, LMC#5 lists “five effects” (Ch. *wu guo* 五果; Skt. *pañca phalāni*) by referring to ZJL. They are the “cessational effect” (Ch. *li ji guo* 離繫果; Skt. *visajyoga-phala*), the “homogenous effect” (Ch. *deng liu guo* 等流果; Skt. *nisyanda-phala*), the “operative effect” (Ch. *shi yong guo* 士用果; Skt. *purusakāra-phala*), the “effect of contributory factors” (Ch. *zeng shang guo* 增上果; Skt. *adhipati-phala*) and the “effect of maturation” (Ch. *yi shou guo* 異熟果; Skt. *vipāka-phala*). The eighth consciousness has four effects except “cessational effect”.<sup>242</sup> Furthermore, the LMC#5 concludes that only the “effect of maturation” is unshared with the first seven consciousnesses so [the name of *vipāka-vijñāna* 異熟識] is emphasized here.<sup>243</sup>

In addition, both LMC#2 and LMC#3 conclude by quoting *She dacheng lun shi* composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang for the definition of “characteristics as an effect”. The quote basically defines “characteristics as an effect” by the fact that this consciousness is able to continually keep what have been being permeated by those defiled kinds of dharmas since beginningless time.<sup>244</sup> Such

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<sup>240</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 301, c25-p. 302, a1. Three states (Ch. *san wei* 三位): 1) the state of “manifesting attachment & appropriation of the self” (Ch. *wo ai zhi cang xian xing* 我愛執藏現行); 2) the state of “effects due to virtuous and unvirtuous activities” (Ch. *shan e ye guo* 善惡業果); 3) the state of “holding the continuity of consciousness” (Ch. *xiang xu zhichi* 相續執持). Five stages (Ch. *wu wei* 五位): 1) stage of “ordinary unenlightened persons” (Ch. *yi sheng* 異生); 2) stage of “two vehicles of learner” (Ch. *er cheng you xue* 二乘有學); 3) stage of “two vehicle of no more learning” (Ch. *er cheng wu xue* 二乘無學); 4) stage of “ten-stage bodhisattva” (Ch. *shidi pusa* 十地菩薩); 5) stage of “*Tathāgat* [Buddha]” (Ch. *ru lai* 如來). Please refer to the following paragraph for the list of five effects. Lee, “*Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian*” 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 1, pp.124-26.

<sup>241</sup> See X51, no. 823, p. 170, a17-20 // Z 1:82, p. 69, c13-16 // R82, p. 138, a13-16.

<sup>242</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 320, a17-20 // Z 1:82, p. 220, a10-13 // R82, p. 439, a10-13.

<sup>243</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 320, a14-15 // Z 1:82, p. 220, a7-8 // R82, p. 439, a7-8.

<sup>244</sup> See T31, no. 1597, p. 327, c21-22.

definition emphasizes that the eighth consciousness has unshared capability to “be permeated” (*shou xun* 受熏) and to be “that which is stored”.

Here we don’t know how the difference of one single Chinese character happened in the version of CWSL that the late-Ming commentators accessed to. In other words, we don’t know whether the late-Ming commentators missed the reading of “wide” (Ch. *kuan* 寬) due to one Chinese character that was replaced or the late-Ming commentators replaced it with another Chinese character because they had a hard time in understanding *kuan*. One interesting coincidence with what’s similar in 1-2-1 discussion is that in these two cases all late-Ming commentaries missed the reading of “three states” - the state of “manifesting attachment & appropriation of the self” (Ch. *wo ai zhi cang xian xing* 我愛執藏現行); the state of “effects due to virtuous and unvirtuous activities” (Ch. *shan e ye guo* 善、惡業果), and the state of “holding the continuity of consciousness” (Ch. *xiang xu zhichi* 相續執持).





### 4-3 Aspect of Characteristics as a Cause 因相門

#### 4-3-1 Brief of “Characteristics as a Cause”

##### 4-3-1-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>245</sup>

This consciousness is able to hold all seeds of dharmas without losing it, so it is named "all seeds" (Ch. *yi qie zhong* 一切種; Skt. *sarva-bījaka*). Without this consciousness, there would be no other dharmas that are able to universally hold all seeds of dharmas. This indicates all “characteristics as a cause” (Ch. *yin xiang* 因相; Skt. *\*hetu-lakṣaṇa*) of the first “consciousness as transformer” (Ch. *neng bian shi* 能變識). Although this consciousness has many kinds of characteristics as a cause, the holding of seeds are unshared so [the name of "all seeds"] is said/addressed more and/or on purpose.

Even though there are many kinds of substances and characteristics of the “consciousness as transformer”, briefly speaking, there are only three kinds of characteristics as such.”

##### 4-3-1-2 Discussions of Commentaries

###### 4-3-1-2-1 "All Seeds" as *bahuvrīhi* compound

First of all, both LMC#1 and LMC#3 note that the "All Seeds" (Ch. *yi qie zhong* 一切種; Skt. *sarva-bījaka*) is a *bahuvrīhi* compound (Ch. *you cai shi* 有財釋; Skt. *bahuvrīhi samāsa*)<sup>246</sup>. Since LCM#3 just quotes LMC#1 to this regard, we only need to know why LMC#1 recognizes “All Seeds” as a *bahuvrīhi* compound. The criteria that LMC#1 gives is short and simple: “It is completely used for other name/meaning” (全取他名) so it is a *bahuvrīhi* compound.”<sup>247</sup> Like *mahā-yāna* originally meaning a great vehicle liberally, now the term “*Mahāyāna*” (Ch. *da cheng*

<sup>245</sup> 「此能執持，諸法種子，令不失故，名一切種。離此，餘法能遍執持諸法種子，不可得故。此即顯示初能變識所有因相。此識因相雖有多種，持種不共是故偏說。初能變識體相雖多，略說唯有如是三相。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 7, c29-p. 8, a4)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 221. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 48.

<sup>246</sup> Although CWSL is written in Chinese, there are many reasons and occasions that some Chinese exegesists would use Sanskrit grammar rule to analyze Chinese terms which may or may not translated from Sanskrit. For more detailed discussions, please refer to Wei-jen Teng, "Medieval Chinese Buddhist Exegesis and Chinese Grammatical Studies 漢傳佛教注疏與中古漢語文法學," *Taiwan Journal of Buddhist Studies 臺大佛學研究*, no. 28 (2014).

<sup>247</sup> 「全取他名。即有財釋。」(X50, no. 820, p. 540, b4 // Z 1:81, p. 33, c13 // R81, p. 66, a13).

If one is interested in knowing where Mingyu got such criteria, the possible two sources are either *Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanyi chao* 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔 (Commentary on Eliciting the True Meaning of the Flower Garland Sutra) by Chengguan (738-839) or *Bashi guiju buzhu* 八識規矩補註 (Commentary on the Structure of the Eight Consciousnesses) by Luan Putai. Since the latter seemed to quote the former, one might further refer to the former's note in T36, no. 1736, p. 288, a27-b2.

大乘) has nothing to do with any great vehicle but is the name of a special Buddhist teaching. Thus, as a *bahuvrīhi* compound, the term “All Seeds” also has nothing to do with any seeds but is used only to refer to the eighth consciousness.

Alternatively, in order to explain where the name of "All Seeds" comes, LMC#4 seemed referring to WKWD and chose to focus on the capability of “holding” all seeds. According to WKWD, the eighth consciousness has three names. One is “holding” (Ch. *a tuo na* 阿陀那; Skt. *ādāna*).<sup>248</sup>

#### 4-3-1-2-2 Why many kinds of *yin xiang*?

As to why there are many kinds of “characteristics as a cause” (Ch. *yin xiang* 因相), LMC#5 quotes ZJL<sup>249</sup> which says that the eighth consciousness has four out of “six kinds of causes” (Ch. *liu yin* 六因; Skt. *sad-hetavah*)<sup>250</sup> as its *yin xiang* 因相. The seed related causes are among the four causes and are unshared with other dharmas.<sup>251</sup> In the CWSLS, Kuiji also mentioned the same four causes out of “six kinds of causes”. He also mentioned “ten kinds of causes” (十因) but did not go into the details because what the most important thing to know is that the seed-related cause is unshared.<sup>252</sup>

Besides quoting *She dacheng lun shi* composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang for the definition of *yin xiang* 因相, LMC#3 also quotes another version of *She dacheng lun shi* composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha. The quote says that in *Jue ding zang lun*<sup>253</sup> there are eight characteristics that were mentioned to elucidate the root consciousness. To be different from that extensive explanation so three kinds<sup>254</sup> are briefly discussed here.<sup>255</sup> These eight characteristics should be the same as those eight ones that LMC#5 quotes *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 in the previous discussion regarding how many "states" (*fen wei* 分位) of self-

<sup>248</sup> See X55, no. 888, p. 347, c1-3 // Z 2:3, p. 218, c7-9 // R98, p. 436, a7-9.

<sup>249</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 715, c18-23.

<sup>250</sup> According to DDB (Digital Dictionary of Buddhism), “six kinds of causes”(Ch. *liu yin* 六因) are: "effective causes" (Ch. *neng zuo yin* 能作因; Skt. *kāraṇa-hetu*), "co-operative causes" (Ch. *ju you yin* 俱有因; Skt. *sahabhū-hetu*), "homogeneous cause" (Ch. *tong lei yin* 同類因; Skt. *sabhāga-hetu*), "associated causes" (Ch. *xiang ying yin* 相應因; Skt. *saṃprayukta-hetu*), "universal cause" (Ch. *bian xing yin* 遍行因; Skt. *sarvatraḡa-hetu*) and "ripening cause" (Ch. *yi shou yin* 異熟因; Skt. *vipāka-hetu*). In the quotation from *Zongjing lu* 宗鏡錄, however, LMC#5 mentions “seed causes” “種子因” instead of "effective causes". It seems to LMC#5 that “seed causes” falls into the category of “effective causes”. Thus four out of the six kinds are "seed causes", "co-operative causes", "homogeneous cause" and "associated causes".

<sup>251</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 320, b1-6 // Z 1:82, p. 220, a18-b5 // R82, p. 439, a18-b5.

<sup>252</sup> T43, no. 1830, p. 302, b6-14.

<sup>253</sup> See Paramārtha's partial translation of the *Viniścaya* 攝抉擇分 of *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice) translated by Xuanzang.

<sup>254</sup> i.e. “self-characteristics” 自相, “characteristics as an effect” 果相 and “characteristics as a cause” 因相。

<sup>255</sup> See T31, no. 1595, p. 162, b7-8.

characteristics.

### 4-3-2 What is Seed?

#### 4-3-2-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>256</sup>

The characteristics of all seeds should be further investigated. Herein what are those dharmas that are named “seeds”? They refer to the “special capabilities or powers” (Ch. *gong neng cha bie* 功能差別; Skt. *śaktibheda*) in the root consciousness (Ch. *ben shi* 本識; i.e. the eighth consciousness) that could directly produce their own effects. These [seeds] are “neither the same nor different” (Ch. *bu yi bu yi* 不一不異) from the root consciousness and “derived effects” (Ch. *suo sheng guo* 所生果). Because that is the way how “substance” (Ch. *ti* 體; Skt. *\*dravya* or *\*svabhāva*), “function” (Ch. *yong*; Skt. *kāritra*; alternative Eng. activity), “cause” (Ch. *yin* 因; Skt. *hetu*), and “effect” (Ch. *guo* 果; Skt. *phala*) should work. Although being neither the same nor different, [the seeds] are substantially existent (Ch. *shi you* 實有; Skt. *dravyasat*). The “nominal dharmas” (Ch. *jia fa* 假法; Skt. *prajñaptisat*) is like something nonexistent because it is not “direct cause” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*)

[Opponent:] Now that these [seeds] are neither the same nor different from all dharmas, they should be nominal (Ch. *jia* 假), not substantial (Ch. *shi* 實) like “pot” etc.

[Proponent:] If that was the case, “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) should be “nominally existent” (假有). If [such argument was] allowed, there would be no real “ultimate truth” (Ch. *sheng yi di* 勝義諦; Skt. *paramārtha-satya*). Nevertheless, all seeds are said to be substantially existent in terms of “conventional [truth]” (Ch. *shi su di* 世俗[諦]; Skt. *saṃvṛti-[satya]*) only. They are not the same as “thusness”.

Although depending on the substance of the eighth consciousness, seeds are this consciousness’s “seen aspect” (Ch. *xiang fen* 相分; Skt. *grāhya-ākāra, or viṣaya-abhāsa*; alternative Eng. “aspect of what is seen or grasped”), not remaining aspects.

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<sup>256</sup> 「一切種相，應更分別，此中何法，名為種子。謂本識中，親生自果，功能差別。此與本識，及所生果，不一不異，體、用、因、果，理應爾故。雖非一異，而是實有。假法如無，非因緣故。此與諸法，既非一異，應如瓶等，是假非實。若爾，真如應是假有，許，則便無真勝義諦。然諸種子，唯依世俗，說為實有，不同真如。種子雖依第八識體，而是此識相分，非餘，見分恒取此為境故。諸有漏種，與異熟識，體無別故，無記性攝。因果俱有善等性故，亦名善等。諸無漏種，非異熟識性所攝故，因果俱是善性攝故，唯名為善。若爾，何故決擇分說，二十二根一切皆有異熟種子，皆異熟生。雖名異熟，而非無記，依異熟故，名異熟種。異性相依，如眼等識。或無漏種，由熏習力，轉變成熟，立異熟名，非無記性所攝異熟。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 8, a5-20)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 224-26. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 48-49.

Because [its] “seeing aspect” (Ch. *jian fen* 見分; Skt. *grāhaka-ākāra*; alternative Eng. “aspect of what sees or grasps”) always takes this [seen aspect] as “[cognitive] objects” (Ch. *jing* 境; Skt. *viṣaya*).

All “contaminated seeds” (Ch. *you lou zhong* 有漏種; Skt. *āsrava-bīja*) are not different from the “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou shi* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) in terms of “substance” (Ch. *ti* 體) so they are of “indeterminate” (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*) quality. [On the other hand,] since both the causes [that producing those seeds] and the effects [that were produced by those seeds] are of “virtuous” (Ch. *shan* 善; Skt. *kuśala*) and etc qualities [like unvirtuous and indeterminate qualities], the seeds are also named virtuous and etc [accordingly].

All “uncontaminated seeds” (Ch. *wu lou zhong* 無漏種; Skt. *anāsrava-bīja*) are only named as “virtuous” (Ch. *shan* 善; Skt. *kuśala*) because they are not of the quality of “maturing consciousness” (異熟識) and because both the causes [that producing those seeds] and the effects [that were produced by those seeds] are of “virtuous” (善) quality.

[Question:] If that was the case, why would the “doctrinal exegesis section” ([攝] 決擇分; Skt. *vinīścaya-[saṃgraha]*) say that all “twenty-two faculties” (Ch. *er shi er gen* 二十二根; Skt. *dvāvīṃśatīndriyāni*) have “maturing seeds” (異熟種子) and are all produced by the “maturing [consciousness]” (*yi shou [shi]* 異熟[識])? <sup>257</sup>

[Response:] Although being named as “maturing [seeds]” (異熟[種子]), [these “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種)] are not indeterminate (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*). Just because they are depending on the “maturing [consciousness]” (異熟[識]), they are named as maturing seeds. [That uncontaminated seeds depending on the maturing consciousness is ] that different qualities depend on each other just like that the [determinate] visual consciousness [depending on the indeterminate faculty of eyes] and etc. Or uncontaminated seeds become mature due to the “power of permeation” (熏習力) so they have the name of “maturing seeds”. Which is not that kind of maturation that is of “indeterminate” (無記) quality.”

#### 4-3-2-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-2-2-1 What does “*gong neng cha bie*” mean?

Most late-Ming commentators understood *gong neng* as the capability/function

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<sup>257</sup> See T30, no. 1579, p. 614, c29-p. 615, a3. And according to *Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論 (Skt. *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, Abhidharma Storehouse Treatise), the “twenty-two faculties” are faculties of eye 眼, ear 耳, nose 鼻, tongue 舌, body 身, mind 意, male 男, female 女, life 命, joy 喜, suffering 苦, pleasure 樂, anxiety 憂, detachment 捨, faith 信, effort 勤, mindfulness 念, concentration 定, wisdom 慧, that which is to be known 未知當知, that which is already known 已知, and knowledge of both 具知. The last three faculties are uncontaminated ones. (T29, no. 1558, p. 13, a20-23. & T29, no. 1558, p. 15, a13-20.)

to produce or to manifest and read *cha bi* as more than one kind of seeds or different kinds of effect/manifestation produced by seeds. For examples:

LMC#1 notes "...so called "*gong neng cha bie*" (功能差別) indicates that these seeds are not one kind ..."<sup>258</sup>

LMC#3 notes "...Vasubandhu says, "so called holding seeds are "*gong neng cha bie*" (功能差別). Being able to hold [seeds] is the capability/function (*gong neng* 功能) of consciousness. Being able to produce manifestations is the capability/function of seeds. All defiled [manifestations] are different kinds of dharmas so they are different (*cha bi* 差別)..."<sup>259</sup>

LMC#4 notes "... *gong neng* is the capability to produce functions (作用) and is seed's own substance. So called *cha bi* means that forms, minds, the defiled and the pure are different kinds..."<sup>260</sup>

LMC#5 notes "...The seed have the function to produce effect so it is named *gong neng* 功能. The seeds of forms, minds and etc are not one kind so it named *cha bi* 差別..."<sup>261</sup>

In other words, late-Ming commentators' reading of *gong neng cha bie* is that different kinds of capabilities mean different kinds of seeds and/or that different kinds of dharmas/manifestations imply different kinds of seeds.

On the other hand, in CWSLS Kuiji's reading is the difference of capability. It is about the difference of the capability or a special capability. He notes "... *gong neng cha bie* is to discriminate [the seeds] from the seven manifested "transforming consciousness" (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*). [Seven manifested transforming consciousness], in relation to their derived seeds, are direct causes and are capable to directly produce effects as well. Nevertheless, they are not named *gong neng* because they are manifestations. Therefore, [such a special] *gong neng* is to reveal "characteristics of seeds" (種子相)..."<sup>262</sup> However, such kind of reading was not passed down to the late-Ming through any available indirect source.

#### 4-3-2-2 "Neither the same nor different"

Regarding why the seeds are "neither the same nor different" (Ch. *bu yi bu yi* 不

<sup>258</sup> 「功能差別者，顯此種子非一種故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 540, b15 // Z 1:81, p. 33, d6 // R81, p. 66, b6).

<sup>259</sup> 「世親云：攝持種子者，功能差別也。能攝持是識功能，能生現是種子功能，一切雜染，品法不同，故言差別。」(X50, no. 822, p. 863, a7-9 // Z 1:81, p. 357, a11-13 // R81, p. 713, a11-13)

<sup>260</sup> 「功能，即能生作用，即種子自體。差別者，謂色、心、染、淨，種種異故。」(X51, no. 823, p. 170, b7-8 // Z 1:82, p. 69, d9-10 // R82, p. 138, b9-10)

<sup>261</sup> 「此種有生果之作用，故名功能。色、心等種，其類非一，故名差別」(X51, no. 824, p. 320, b17-18 // Z 1:82, p. 220, b16-17 // R82, p. 439, b16-17)

<sup>262</sup> 「功能差別，簡現行七轉識等，望所生種，雖是因緣，亦親生果，是現法故，非名功能，故以功能顯種子相。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 302, c2-5)

一不異) from the root consciousness and from the derived effects, CWSL only briefly mentions the substance (Ch. *ti* 體), the function (Ch. *yong* 用), the cause (Ch. *yin* 因), and the effect (Ch. *guo* 果) but does not further elaborate on these four elements. Thus LMC#1 explicitly quotes ZJL saying:

The root consciousness is the substance (*ti* 體), the seed is the function (*yong* 用); the seed is the cause (*yin* 因), what produced [from the seed] is the effect (*guo* 果). These **three** dharmas should be neither the same nor different in this way. If they were just the same, it should not be said that “there are dharmas of cause and effect” (有因、果法) “because there is substance and there is dharma” (有體、有法故). If they were always different, the granola and etc should have been able to produce beans and etc because the cause and the effect are allowed to be always different. If it were not [neither the same nor different], the [substance of] dharma should cease before the function could rise because the substance and the function are allowed to be always different. Thus when the function and the substance are similar, their “material force” (Ch. *qi shi* 氣勢) must be the same. When the effect and the cause are similar, their powers and characteristics are OK to accord with each other, not have to be always different.

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By cross checking with ZJL and CWSLS, it comes to my attention that:

1) ZJL quotes CWSLS almost character by character except only two characters. In particular, one character exchange leads to the difference between “there is substance and there is dharma” (有體、有法) and “there are dharmas of substance and function” (有體、用法). The former reading forces LMC#1 to add one character “because” (Ch. *gu* 故) after “有體有法” to make it as “有體有法故” which means “because there is substance and there is dharma.” However, the original reading of CWSLS is “If they were just the same, it should not be said that “there are dharmas of cause and effect” (有因、果法), that “there are dharmas of substance and function” (有體、用法).”<sup>264</sup> This is a case that supporting the hypothesis H2-A2: when some significant differences occurred, they were due to the indirect citations that had reading different from CWSLS.

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<sup>263</sup> 「宗鏡云：本識是體，種子是用，種子是因，所生是果，此之三法，理應如是，不一不異。若即是一，不可說為有因果法，有體有法故。若一向異，應穀麥等能生豆等，以許因果一向異故。不爾，法滅方應有用，以許體、用一向異故。體、用相似，氣勢必同，因果相似，功能狀貌，可相隨順，非一向異。」(X50, no. 820, p. 540, b18-24 // Z 1:81, p. 33, d9-15 // R81, p. 66, b9-15)

<sup>264</sup> 「若即是一，不可說為有因、果法，有體、用法。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 302, c14-15)

2) LMC#1 explicitly quotes ZJL but skips one complex paragraph.<sup>265</sup> Then, LMC#1 replaces “these two dharmas” (此之二法) with “these three dharmas” (此之三法). By “three dharmas”, LMC#1 refers to those three subjects —“the root consciousness”, “the seeds”, and “manifestation (i.e. what produced by the seeds)” — which are used in the quote to define the substance, the function, the cause, and the effect. However, CWSLS seems to refer to “two dharmas” in pair which is either the substance and the function or the cause and the effect. Here we see a case that seems to support the hypothesis H2-A3 except that I don’t think LMC#1’s different reading lead to any significantly different explanation on CWSL. LMC#1 and CWSLS just have different focus.

3) LMC#2 seems trying to selectively quote ZJL and add his own interpretations in the meantime. For example, LMC#2 adds “...Now substance, function, cause and effect are different to each other so they are not the same. If they were different, the seeds of “seeing aspect” should have been able to produce “seen aspect” like the granola and etc would be able to produce beans etc...”<sup>266</sup> To put aside the argument that whether the seeing aspect and the seen aspect share the same seed or not. The original quote has a metaphor that the granola should produce beans as *reductio ad absurdum*. There seem no need to bring up another example except for the purpose of showing off. For another instance, LMC#2 adds “...Now that the substance and the function are similar, the cause and the effect must be the same. Thus they are not different...”<sup>267</sup> Here LMC#2 replaces “the cause and the effect are similar” (因果相似) in the last paragraph of the original quote with “the cause and the effect must be the same” (因果必同). I am afraid this is problematic because the substance & the function and the cause & the effect are two dharmas in pair. It seems not making sense that the former pair is similar whereas the latter pair must be the same. So this is a case that supporting H2-A3.

4) Different from LMC#1 and LMC#2, LMC#3 implicitly cited ZJL character by character. In terms of pass-down citation, LMC#3 faithfully copy and paste indirect source, neither being critical reading as LMC#1, nor being showing off and making mistake as LMC#2.

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<sup>265</sup> “From the perspective of the root consciousness looking at the seeds, in explicating the essence, by “taking [the seeds] as characteristics and attributing it back to [the root consciousness] as essence” (攝相歸性), both the root consciousness and the seeds are indeterminate 無記. On the other hand, from the perspective of the seeds following the manifestation 現行 and looking at the root consciousness, by “the theory that characteristics and the function are different” (相用別論), the seeds could be either of three qualities (i.e. virtuous, unvirtuous and indeterminate) ( T48, no. 2016, p. 695, b26-28).

<sup>266</sup> 「今體用因果，各各不同，故非是一。若是異者，應見分種能生相分，如穀種能生豆等。」 ( X50, no. 821, p. 684, b17-19 // Z 1:81, p. 178, a15-17 // R81, p. 355, a15-17)

<sup>267</sup> 「今體用相似，因果必同，故非是異。」 X50, no. 821, p. 684, b20-21 // Z 1:81, p. 178, a18-b1 // R81, p. 355, a18-b1.

#### 4-3-2-2-3 Where does the concern of “neither the same nor different” come?

Right after argument of being “neither the same nor different” (Ch. *bu yi bu yi* 不一不異), CWSL emphasizes that the seeds are “substantially existent” (Ch. *shi you* 實有). Because there are opponents arguing that being neither the same nor different implies “nominal dharmas” (Ch. *jia fa* 假法). Then, where did the challenge come from? According to CWSLS, “the challenge came from Sthiramati and etc.”<sup>268</sup> In *Cangyao* 藏要 one critical edition of CWSL, however, Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 (1871-1943) specifically notes that, since no corresponding text was found in Sthiramati's commentary on *Trīṃśīkāvijñapti*, we were not sure where such CWSLS claim came from.<sup>269</sup> On the other hand, Lee provides no sources but notes that it has been told that Sthiramati advocated that seeing aspect and seen aspect of all consciousness are nominal dharmas of “pervasive imagination” (Ch. *bian ji suo zhi* 遍計所執; Skt. *parikalpita*). Their substances are not real. Now that seeds are seen aspects of the eighth consciousness, they belong to the dharmas of “pervasive imagination”. They are nominal, not real.<sup>270</sup>

Most relevant to this study is that LMC#1, LMC#2, and LMC#3 all mentioned the theory of Jñāniputra (菩提子/若提子). For example, LMC#1 notes that “...To explain the challenge. Saying that “neither the same nor different” as above, CWSL is afraid that [it sounds] equivalent to Jñāniputra's argument that the quality of the subject (有法) and of its existence and etc are “neither the same nor different”. Thus CWSL explains itself by saying that [the seeds] are substantially existent because they are what one's own mind transforms into...”<sup>271</sup> Most likely late-Ming commentators' sources are from either *Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu* 大方廣佛華嚴經疏<sup>272</sup> or ZJI<sup>273</sup>. Regardless, different from CWSLS, the late-Ming commentators' notes are more about not confusing “being neither the same nor different” with the theory from non-Buddhist rather than different theories among the Buddhists themselves like Sthiramati's.

#### 4-3-2-2-4 Critique from LMC#4 toward LMC#1 and LMC#3

In explicating the second response regarding that “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種) are not indeterminate (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*), LCM#1 notes that “because

<sup>268</sup> 「此安惠等難」(T43, no. 1830, p. 303, a4-5)

<sup>269</sup> Jing-wu Ouyang, *Cheng Weishi Lun-Cangyao Critical Edition* 成唯識論-藏要校正本 (Taipei: Fang guang wen hua, 2011), p.66.

<sup>270</sup> Lee, “Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian” 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 1, p.168.

<sup>271</sup> 「釋難: 上言不一不異, 恐同菩提子計, 有法與有等性, 非一非異, 故自釋云: 而是實有, 以從自心變故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 540, b24-c3 // Z 1:81, p. 33, d15-18 // R81, p. 66, b15-18)

<sup>272</sup> See T35, no. 1735, p. 521, a25-27.

<sup>273</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 685, a23-b2.



the twenty and two dharmas (i.e. faculties) are all virtuous.”<sup>274</sup> I think what LCM#1 should have noted is that “because uncontaminated seeds are all virtuous”. Unfortunately, LMC#3 repeats the same mistake by implicitly quoting LCM#1.<sup>275</sup> Thus, LCM#4 seems trying to correct such mistake by noting that “why saying [the twenty and two dharmas] are only virtuous?”<sup>276</sup> According to *Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論, only the last eight faculties are virtuous.<sup>277</sup> This is one of cases showing that the later late-Ming commentators did critically read the commentaries of the earlier late-Ming commentators.



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<sup>274</sup> 「二十二法皆善性故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, a3-4 // Z 1:81, p. 34, b6-7 // R81, p. 67, b6-7)

<sup>275</sup> See X50, no. 822, p. 863, b20-21 // Z 1:81, p. 357, c12-13 // R81, p. 714, a12-13.

<sup>276</sup> 「何言唯善性耶」(X51, no. 823, p. 170, c13-14 // Z 1:82, p. 70, b3-4 // R82, p. 139, b3-4)

<sup>277</sup> See T29, no. 1558, p. 16, b15-21.

### 4-3-3 Where do Seeds come from?

#### 4-3-3-1 Theory of Seeds being Originally Existent Only

##### 4-3-3-1-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>278</sup>

Herein there is an argument saying: all seeds are originally existent as nature, not produced by “permeation” (Ch. *xun* 熏; Skt. *vāsana*). Nevertheless, the seeds could grow due to “power of permeation” (Ch. *xun xi li* 熏習力).

According to a scriptural teaching<sup>279</sup>, “All sentient beings, since beginningless time, have “a variety of causal factors” (Ch. *zhong zhong jie* 種種界; Skt. *nānā-dhātu*) like [bunched seeds] of Rudraksha (Ch. *e cha* 惡叉; Skt. *rudrākṣa*) gathering. They are existent inherently.” Because *jie* 界 (Skt. *dhātu*) is a different name of seeds.

Moreover, according to another scriptural teaching<sup>280</sup>, “Since beginningless time *jie* 界 (Skt. *dhātu*) is the base of all dharmas and etc.”

Also, according to *Yuqie* 瑜伽<sup>281</sup>, “Although “substances” (體) of all seeds are originally existent by nature since beginningless time, it is newly permeated and activated by defiled and pure [dharmas]. If “those who have the dharma of *parinirvāṇa*” [i.e. those who are able to attain liberation] (Ch. *ban nie pan fa zhe* 般涅槃法者; Skt. *parinirvāṇa-dharmaka*) are endowed with all seeds, then those who are without dharma of *parinirvāṇa* are short of three kinds of “enlightenment seeds” (Ch. *pu ti zhong zi* 菩提種子; Skt. *bodhi-bīja*.” The similar teachings as such are indeed not a few.

Furthermore, since it is told that all sentient beings originally have differences in terms of “five lineage names/five seed-nature” (Ch. *wu zhong xing* 五種姓/五種性; Skt. *pañca-gotrāni*)<sup>282</sup>, there must be “seeds that are inherently existent” (法爾種子)

<sup>278</sup> 「此中有義，一切種子皆本性有，不從熏生，由熏習力但可增長。如契經說：「一切有情，無始時來，有種種界，如惡叉聚，法爾而有。」界即種子差別名故。又契經說：「無始時來界，一切法等依。」界是因義。《瑜伽》亦說：「諸種子體，無始時來，性雖本有，而由染淨，新所熏發。諸有情類，無始時來，若般涅槃法者，一切種子皆悉具足，不般涅槃法者，便闕三種菩提種子。」如是等文，誠證非一。又諸有情，既說本有五種性別故，應定有法爾種，不由熏生。又《瑜伽》說：「地獄成就三無漏根，是種非現。又從無始，展轉傳來，法爾所得，本性住性。」由此等證，無漏種子，法爾本有，不從熏生。有漏亦應法爾有種，由熏增長，不別熏生。如是建立，因果不亂。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 8, a20-b6)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 226-29. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>279</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Wu jin yi jing* 無盡意經 (Scripture of *Akṣayamati*). (T43, no. 1830, p. 304, b19-20)

<sup>280</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Dacheng api damo jing* 大乘阿毘達磨經 (Skt. *Abhidharma-sūtra*; Scripture on the higher teachings in Mahāyāna) which is lost. See T43, no. 1830, p. 304, b26-27.

<sup>281</sup> *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice)

<sup>282</sup> The Sanskrit term *gotra* might be translated either as “lineage name” (Ch. *zhong xing* 種姓) or “seed-nature” (Ch. *zhong xing* 種性) in Chinese Buddhist canon. Different versions of CWSL might

and not produced by permeations.

In addition, according to *Yuqie*, “[those sentient beings who are in ] the hells attain “uncontaminated faculties” (Ch. *wu lou gen* 無漏根; Skt. *anāsrava-indriya*). [What are attained] are only seeds, not “manifestations” (現[行]). Also, they are “innate seeds” (Ch. *benxing zhuxing* 本性住性; Skt. *prakṛtistha gotra*) which are obtained inherently and are passed down in order since beginningless time.” Supported by these [teachings], “uncontaminated seeds” (Ch. *wu lou zhong* 無漏種; Skt. *anāsrava-bīja*) are originally existent by nature and not “produced by permeations” (熏生). The contaminated [seeds] should also be inherently existent seeds that are grew by permeations but not produced by permeations. [If the theory of seeds] are established in such a way, then “cause and effect” (因果) would not be in chaos.”

#### 4-3-3-1-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-3-1-2-1 What are “five seed-natures” ?

LMC#1 notes that “...So called “five seed-nature” (Ch. *wu zhong xing* 五種性) are [seed-nature of] “ordinary unenlightened persons” (Ch. *yi sheng* 異生; Skt. *prthagjana*), “direct disciples” (Ch. *sheng wen* 聲聞; Skt. *śrāvaka*), “Bodhisattva” (Ch. *pu sa* 菩薩; Skt. *bodhisattva*), “Buddha” (Ch. *ru lai* 如來; Skt. *tathāgat*) and non-Buddhists (Ch. *wai dao* 外道)...”.<sup>283</sup> I am not sure where such LMC#1 definition comes from. As we will see, such classification seems neither inclusive nor exclusive. Not inclusive because of lack of “solitary enlightened persons” (Ch. *du jue* 獨覺). Not exclusive because the overlapping between seed-nature of Buddha and of Bodhisattva.

LMC#2 notes “...So called “five seed-nature” (Ch. *wu zhong xing* 五種性) are [seed-nature of] “direct disciples”, “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising” (Ch. *yuan jue* 緣覺; Skt. *pratyeka-buddha*), “Buddha”, “the indeterminate” (Ch. *bu ding* 不定), and “the incorrigible” (Ch. *chan ti* 闍提; Skt. *icchantika*)...”.<sup>284</sup> The source of such definition is *Lengqie aba duoluo bao jing* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 because LMC#2 explicitly quotes this sutra for further elaboration

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show either or. Although *Cangyao* critical edition by Ouyang Jingwu 歐陽竟無 chose the former whereas the late Ming commentators saw the latter. Since the late Ming commentators seemed not familiar with the lineage of Indian caste system, for the purpose of this study, I will treat *gotra* and *bīja* as synonymous terms and use “seed” and “seed nature” as translation of Chinese term 種姓 or 種性. In addition, according to Noriaki, Japanese translation all adopt “種性” (seed nature). See Note # 81 in HAKAMAYA Noriaki and ARAI Hiroaki, “*Daijō Shōgon Kyōron*” 大乘莊嚴經論, vol. Daizō shuppan (Tōkyō1993), p. 61.

<sup>283</sup> 「五種性者，謂異生、聲聞、菩薩、如來、外道。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, a24-b1 // Z 1:81, p. 34, c9-10 // R81, p. 68, a9-10)

<sup>284</sup> 「五種性者，聲聞、緣覺、如來、不定、闍提種性也」(X50, no. 821, p. 685, a8-9 // Z 1:81, p. 178, c18-d1 // R81, p. 356, a18-b1)

and adds that “the other seed-nature” (各別種性) means “the incorrigible” (一闡提).<sup>285</sup>

LMC#3 formally follows the definition of LMC#1<sup>286</sup> while at the same time LMC#3 also informally adopts LMC#2’s definition in his implicit quote of LMC#2. Interestingly, LMC#3 seemed not to feel any conflict. This is one of key features of LMC#3’s commentary style.

LMC#4 also defines “five seed-nature” in the same way as LMC#2.<sup>287</sup> So does LMC#5 except that LCM#5 uses the term “solitary enlightened persons” (Ch. *du jue* 獨覺) instead of “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising”.<sup>288</sup>

On the other hand, how does CWSLS define “five seed-nature”? In the very beginning of CWSLS when Kuiji explicated the target audience of CWSL, he noted that

Based on *Yuqie* 瑜伽 and etc, there are five seed-nature. 1) “Bodhisattva”; 2) “solitary enlightened persons”; 3) “direct disciples”; 4) “the indeterminate”; 5) no seeds [of enlightenment] (Ch. *wu xing* 無[種]姓)... To those sentient beings who have no seeds are not able to reach the bottom line of [CWSL] so CWSL is said to be too deep. To those sentient beings who prefer going to the extinction are not able to see through [CWSL] so CWSL is named being too delicate. Due to these reasons, the intention of CWSL is only to target those who follows Mahāyāna and those indeterminate sentient beings who would go down the path of Bodhisattva, not cover three kinds of audience who are solitary enlightened persons, direct disciples and persons without seed of enlightenment.<sup>289</sup>

Furthermore, WKWD almost faithfully passed down CWSLS commentary by noting that:

Question: About the target audience. Based on *Yuqie lun*, there are five seed-nature. They are “Bodhisattva”, “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising”, “direct disciples”, “the indeterminate”; and no seeds [of enlightenment]. Which ones of these is this treatise intended to cover? Answer: Only cover Bodhisattva and those indeterminate sentient beings who would go

<sup>285</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 685, a9-20 // Z 1:81, p. 178, d1-12 // R81, p. 356, b1-12.

<sup>286</sup> 「五種性者，謂異生種性、聲聞種性、菩薩種性、如來種性、外道種性。」(X50, no. 822, p. 863, c15-17 // Z 1:81, p. 357, d13-15 // R81, p. 714, b13-15)

<sup>287</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 171, a7-8 // Z 1:82, p. 70, c3-4 // R82, p. 140, a3-4.

<sup>288</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 321, a14-15 // Z 1:82, p. 221, a7-8 // R82, p. 441, a7-8.

<sup>289</sup> 「依瑜伽等有五種姓：一菩薩、二獨覺、三聲聞、四不定、五無姓... 無姓有情不能窮底，故說甚深。趣寂種姓不能通達，故名甚細。由此論旨，唯被大乘及不定姓趣菩薩者，非被獨覺、聲聞、無姓三種機也。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 230, a14-21)

toward the result of Buddha.<sup>290</sup>

Since “solitary enlightened persons” and “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising” are synonymous terms, the definition of “five seed-nature” of WKWD is the same as CWSLS. In addition, the seed-nature of Buddha and the seed-nature of Bodhisattva are equivalent. Then, the only distinction between the definition of LMC#2 & LMC#4 & LMC#5 and of CWSLS & WKWD is the distinction between “the incorrigible” and “no seeds of enlightenment”. Now the question is that is there any difference between “the incorrigible” and “no seeds [of enlightenment]”? Why did the late-Ming commentators choose not to quote WKWD that available to them? The possible answer is that most likely the late-Ming commentators did think there was a significant difference between “the incorrigible” and “no seeds of enlightenment”. What significant difference did they see? I would guess that whether or not “the incorrigible” is able to achieve Buddhahood is open to discussion whereas “no seeds of enlightenment” has no way to become Buddha for sure. This might explain why LMC#1 did not mention either “the incorrigible” or “no seeds of enlightenment” in his definition at all. It seems to me that LMC#1 would like to exclude any category that might have any chance to be viewed as no way to achieve Buddhahood.

Here we see a relatively strong case to support the hypothesis H2-A3 that when some significant differences occurred, they were due to the fact that the late-Ming commentators chose to ignore the indirect source available to them and presented their own insights. I could not help wonder that, if the late-Ming commentators had a chance to directly read CWSLS to this regard, would they agree to Kuiji’s position? Would they change their minds and force themselves to accept that CWLS has selected audience and that some sentient beings have no way to attain Buddhahood? One thing for sure is that the blind test through WKWD tells that at least in some occasions the late-Ming commentators were lucky not to have access to the traditionally so-called most authoritative and orthodox source that they might totally disagree with to some regards.

#### **4-3-3-1-2-2 What are three kinds of “enlightenment seeds”?**

LMC#1 notes that “...so called three kinds of enlightenment are “enlightenment of true nature” (真性菩提), “enlightenment of real wisdom” (實智菩提), “enlightenment of skillful means” (方便菩提). Or named “direct disciples” (聲聞), “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising” (緣覺), and “the

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<sup>290</sup> 「問：所被之機。依瑜伽論有五種性，謂菩薩、緣覺、聲聞、不定、無種。此論被何？答：唯被菩薩及不定中趣佛果者。」(X55, no. 888, p. 343, b1-3 // Z 2:3, p. 214, b1-3 // R98, p. 427, b1-3)

unsurpassed” (無上)...”<sup>291</sup> The source of the first part of definition is likely to be from ZJL.

LMC#2 seems to follow LMC#1 partially by noting “...so called three kinds of enlightenment are 1) true nature 真性, 2) real wisdom 實智, and 3) skillful means 方便...”<sup>292</sup>

LMC#5 seems to have reference on *Yuqie shidi lun* and notes that “...so called three kinds of enlightenment are “enlightenment of direct disciples” (聲聞菩提), “enlightenment of solitary enlightened persons” (獨覺菩提), “enlightenment of the unsurpassed” (無上菩提)...”<sup>293</sup>

In the context of CWSL, it is about those who are “without dharma of *parinirvāṇa*” (i.e. not being able to obtain the liberation) are short of three kinds of “enlightenment seeds” (Ch. *pu ti zhong zi* 菩提種子; Skt. *bodhi-bīja*). If we refer to previous discussion, those who short of three kinds of “enlightenment seeds” happens to be “no seeds of enlightenment” (Ch. *wu xing* 無姓). I am not sure if that is the reason that LMC#1 and LMC#2 tries to offer another alternative in that LMC#1 seemed not to accept the category of “no seeds of enlightenment”. However, since LMC#5 already defined “three kinds of enlightenment seeds” (三種菩提種子) in that way, I am wondering why he did not list “no seeds of enlightenment” as one of “five seed-nature”. One possibility is that LMC#5 had a difficulty in accepting such a category as previous discussion indicates.

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<sup>291</sup> 「三菩提者，謂真性菩提，實智菩提，方便菩提。或名聲聞、緣覺、無上。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, a17-18 // Z 1:81, p. 34, c2-3 // R81, p. 68, a2-3)

<sup>292</sup> 「三種菩提者，一真性，二實智，三方便」(X50, no. 822, p. 863, c10 // Z 1:81, p. 357, d8 // R81, p. 714, b8)

<sup>293</sup> 「三種菩提，謂聲聞菩提、獨覺菩提、無上菩提也。」(X51, no. 824, p. 321, a13-14 // Z 1:82, p. 221, a6-7 // R82, p. 441, a6-7)

### 4-3-3-2 Theory of Seeds being New Permeations Only

#### 4-3-3-2-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>294</sup>

There is an argument saying: seeds are all produced by “permeation” (Ch. *xun* 熏; Skt. *vāsana*). “What is permeated” (所熏) and “what permeates” (能熏) are both existent since beginningless time. Thus, all seeds are established since beginningless time. In that seeds are different names of “karmic impressions” (Ch. *xi qi* 習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*), the karmic impressions must be existent due to permeation like the perfume of sesame is produced by permeation of flowers.

According to the scriptural teaching<sup>295</sup>, “the minds of all sentient beings, due to permeation of defiled and pure dharmas, are the places where the immeasurable seeds are accumulated.” According to the treatise<sup>296</sup>, “inner seeds must have permeation whereas the external seeds may or may not have permeation.”

In addition, the three permeations like linguistic [karmic impressions] 名言 [習氣] and etc entirely include seeds of all contaminated dharmas. Since these three are existent due to permeations so “contaminated seeds” (Ch. *you lou zhong* 有漏種; Skt. *āsrava-bīja*) must be produced through permeations. The “uncontaminated seeds” (Ch. *wu lou zhong* 無漏種; Skt. *anāsrava-bīja*) are also produced by permeations. Speaking of “permeation of hearing” (Ch. *wen xun xi* 聞熏習; Skt. *śrutavāsanā*), it is because the permeation is activated through hearing the true dharma that equivalently flowing from the “pure dharma realm” (淨法界) and because it is of nature of “supermundane mind seeds” (出世心種子).

The differences of “innate seeds” (Ch. *ben lai zhong xing* 本來種姓; Skt. *prakṛistha gotra*) of sentient beings are not due to whether or not there are uncontaminated seeds but are established depending whether or not there are [seeds of] “[afflictive and cognitive] hindrances” ([煩惱、所知]障).

According to *Yuqie*, “in terms of “thusness as object” (真如境), if [sentient

<sup>294</sup> 「有義：種子皆熏故生。所熏、能熏俱無始有，故諸種子無始成就。種子既是習氣異名，習氣必由熏習而有，如麻香氣，花熏故生。如契經說：「諸有情心，染淨諸法，所熏習故，無量種子之所積集。」論說：「內種定有熏習，外種熏習或有或無。」又名言等，三種熏習，總攝一切有漏法種。彼三既由熏習而有，故有漏種必藉熏生，無漏種生亦由熏習。說聞熏習，聞淨法界等流正法而熏起故，是出世心種子性故。有情本來種姓差別，不由無漏種子有無，但依有障無障建立。如《瑜伽》說：「於真如境，若有畢竟二障種者，立為不般涅槃法姓。若有畢竟所知障種，非煩惱者，一分立為聲聞種姓，一分立為獨覺種姓。若無畢竟二障種者，即立彼為如來種姓。」故知本來種姓差別，依障建立，非無漏種。所說成就無漏種言，依當可生，非已有體。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 8, b6-23)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 229-33. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 50-51.

<sup>295</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Duo jie jing* 多界經 (Pāli: *Bahu Dhātuka Suttam*; Scripture of Many Types of Elements). (T43, no. 1830, p. 305, b8-10.)

<sup>296</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *She dacheng lun shi* 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang. (T43, no. 1830, p. 305, b11-13.)

beings] have “seeds of two hindrances” (二障種) after all, they are defined as “the seeds/nature that are lacking the dharma of *parinirvāṇa*” (不般涅槃法姓; Skt. *aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka gotra*. i.e. those who are not able to attain liberation ). If [sentient beings] have seeds of “cognitive hindrances” (Ch. *suo zhi zhang* 所知障; Skt. *jñeya-āvaraṇa*) but no seeds of “afflictive hindrances” (Ch. *fan nao zhang* 煩惱障; Skt. *kleśa-āvaraṇa*) “ after all, they are partially defined as “seed-nature of the direct disciples” (聲聞種姓; Skt. *śrāvaka-gotra*) and partially defined as “seed-nature of solitary enlightened persons” (獨覺種姓; Skt. *pratyeka-buddha-gotra*). If [sentient beings] do not have “seeds of two hindrances” (二障種) after all, they are defined as “seed-nature of *tathāgata*” (如來種姓; Skt. *tathāgata-gotra*).”

Therefore, the differences of the “innate seeds” (本來種姓) are established depending on [the seeds of two] hindrances instead of “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種).

[Regarding what *Yuqie*] taught that the uncontaminated seeds are established [in the hell, what it means is that] the potential to produce [uncontaminated seeds through permeations] in the future is possible, not [meant to say] there is already substance [of uncontaminated seeds].

#### 4-3-3-2-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-3-2-2-1 Why inner seeds must have permeation whereas the external seeds may or may not have permeation?

LMC#1 notes that “...Treatise’s so called inner seeds is consciousness-seeds which must have permeation. External seeds are [like] granola that are nominal seeds. [Those external seeds which ] may have permeation are like that the perfume of flowers permeates sesame. [Those external seeds which] may not have permeation are like that charcoal produces sesame, and that cow dung, hairs, and etc produce blue lotuses. Because they are not produced by permeation in the first place...”<sup>297</sup> We can see that LMC#1’s commentary here is aligned with CWSL’s later definitions of inner seeds and external seeds<sup>298</sup> and with his corresponding note and explicit citation of *She dacheng lun shi* that was composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang there.  
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On the other hand, LMC#2 notes that “...Those external seeds which may have permeation are [like] all sentient beings’ “circumstantial retribution” (依報)<sup>300</sup> which

<sup>297</sup> 「論說內種，即是識種，定有熏習。外種即穀麥，假名為種子。或有熏習者，如以花香熏苴藤故。或無熏習者，如炭生苴藤，牛糞毛等生青蓮等，本非熏習而得生故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, b19-22 // Z 1:81, p. 34, d10-13 // R81, p. 68, b10-13)

<sup>298</sup> See Section 3-4-1.

<sup>299</sup> Ssee X50, no. 820, p. 544, b2-8 // Z 1:81, p. 37, c11-17 // R81, p. 74, a11-17.

<sup>300</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.



is “caused by shared actions” (共業所感) of all sentient beings and are also named permeation. [Those external seeds which ] may not have permeation are because their own seeds of faculties are passed down in order...<sup>301</sup> I have no idea about where such note came from and exactly what LMC#2 was talking about here. One very interesting thing to pay attention is that, when it came to CWSL’s later discussion of inner seeds and external seeds, LMC#2 explicitly quoted *She dacheng lun shi* <sup>302</sup> almost character by character and noted that

Asvabhāva also said, “for example, charcoal, cow dung, hairs, and etc gradually produces the sesame, blue lotuses, flower roots, bulrush and etc. It is not that sesame and etc are produced from those charcoal and etc [because] they are rising and ceasing at the same time and permeate each other. As such, external seeds may not have permeation. For example, sesame and etc and garland are rising and ceasing at the same time. Due to permeation [of garland], the perfume [of sesame] is produced. As such, external seeds may have permeation.<sup>303</sup>

Such note is fully aligned with LMC#1’s. The confusion is that why would LMC#2 have two answers for one same question?

Since LMC#3 had reference to both LMC#1 and LMC#2, what would LMC#3 have to say? LMC#3 first defines what internal seeds and external seeds are by implicitly quoting ZJL as below:

*She lun* 攝論 said, “there are two kinds of seeds. 1) external seeds are only nominal because all dharmas are consciousness-only. 2) internal seeds are real because all dharmas are based on consciousness. These two seeds are rising and ceasing thought by thought and moment by moment because there is no interruption between preceding rising and following ceasing. Why would such dharmas become seeds? Permanently abiding dharmas cannot be seeds because there is no change all the times. Moreover, how about external seeds? For example, granola do not have permeation but become seeds. Due to internal [seeds], external [seeds] become possible. Thus, that internal [seeds] have permeation means that if external [seeds] become seeds, it is not due to their ability. It must be because internal permeations that makes external become

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<sup>301</sup> 「外種熏習或有者，是眾生依報，乃是眾生共業所感，亦名熏習。或無者，以自有根種展轉相傳故。」(X50, no. 821, p. 685, b6-8 // Z 1:81, p. 179, a4-6 // R81, p. 357, a4-6)

<sup>302</sup> T31, no. 1598, p. 390, a16-21

<sup>303</sup> 「無性又云：如炭糞牛毛等次第生彼苴勝青蓮華根及以蒲等，非苴勝等與彼炭等俱生俱滅、互相熏習而從彼生，如是外種或無熏習。如苴勝等與華鬘等俱生俱滅，由熏習故生香氣等，如是外種或有熏習。」(X50, no. 821, p. 688, b9-13 // Z 1:81, p. 182, a7-11 // R81, p. 363, a7-11).

seeds. Why? All dharmas are not possible without internal [seeds]. Thus, externally permeation is not possible. All due to internal permeation, seeds become established.<sup>304</sup>

With such long quotation, LMC#3 seems trying to explain why LMC#1 notes "...Treatise's so called inner seeds is consciousness-seeds which must have permeation. External seeds are [like] granola which are nominal seeds..." However, LMC#3 still not explains why external seeds may or may not have permeation. So he continues noting "...here so called [those external seeds which] "may have permeation" is that external seeds are "circumstantial retribution" (依報) which is felt as result of shared actions (共業) of all sentient beings and are also named permeation. [Those external seeds which] may not have permeation are because their own seeds of faculties are passed down in order..."<sup>305</sup> This is obviously an implicit citation of LMC#2 as just shown above. More interesting is that when it came to CWSL's later discussion of inner seeds and external seeds, LMC#3 implicitly quoted *She dacheng lun shi*<sup>306</sup> almost character by character as LMC#2 did. This is a typical case showing that LMC#3 is more aligned with LMC#2 even when LMC#2 position is problematic.

In addition, LMC#4 notes that "...Internal seeds are "differences of capabilities" (功能差別) in the root consciousness. These are unshared seeds. External seeds are "container world" (器界), granola and etc. These are shared seeds. "What are self-enjoyed" (自受用者) have permeation. "What are other-enjoyed" (他受用者) do not have permeation..."<sup>307</sup> Here LMC#4 seems trying to divide what are produced by shared seeds into "what are self-enjoyed" and "what are other-enjoyed. Then arguing that the former have permeation whereas the latter do not. As we will see later, I am afraid this is kind of mixing up with the combination scheme of shared and unshared that is used to analyze the "Aspect of Object of Perception" (所緣門).

Refer to the footnote of 3-3-2-1 English translation, according to CWSLS, the

<sup>304</sup> 「攝論云：種子有二：一外種子但是假名，以一切法唯有識故。二內種子則是真實，以一切法以識為本。此二種子，念念生滅。剎那剎那，先生後滅無有間故。此法得成種子何以故？常住法不成種子，一切時無差別故。復次，云何外種子？如穀麥等無熏習得成種子。由內，外得成，是故內有熏者，外若成種子，不由自能，必由內熏習感外故成種子。何以故？一切外法離內則不成，是故於外不成熏習。一由內有熏習得成種子。」(X50, no. 822, p. 864, a20-b4 // Z 1:81, p. 358, b6-14 // R81, p. 715, b6-14)

<sup>305</sup> 「此云或有者，外種是依報，乃眾生共相業種所感，亦名熏習。或無者，以自有根種展轉相傳故。」(X50, no. 822, p. 864, b4-6 // Z 1:81, p. 358, b14-16 // R81, p. 715, b14-16)

<sup>306</sup> 「如以炭與牛糞毛等次第生彼苳藤青蓮華根及以蒲等，非苳藤等與彼炭等俱生俱滅，互相熏習而從彼生，如是外種或無熏習。如巨勝與華鬘等俱生俱滅，由熏習故生香氣等，如是外種或有熏習。」(X50, no. 822, p. 868, b3-7 // Z 1:81, p. 362, b13-17 // R81, p. 723, b13-17)

<sup>307</sup> 「內種謂本識中功能差別，此即不共種。外種謂器界穀麥等，此即共種。自受用者有熏，他受用者無熏。」(X51, no. 823, p. 171, a23-b1 // Z 1:82, p. 70, d1-3 // R82, p. 140, b1-3)

argument that “inner seeds must have permeation whereas the external seeds may or may not have permeation” is from *She dacheng lun* that composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang. In addition, LMC#1, LMC#2, and LMC#3 also quoted the same source in their commentaries in section 3-4 regarding inner seeds versus external seeds. Thus, it seems safe to say that *She dacheng lun* is right source to answer the question. LMC#1 uses the same source consistently to explain the same question whereas LMC#2 and LMC#3 do not use the same sources in answering the same question. Thus their notes seem problematic.

#### 4-3-3-2-2-2 How are “uncontaminated seeds” also produced by permeations?

LMC#1 notes “[CWSL text] following “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種) is intended to use the fact that contaminated seeds have to be produced through permeation as an example to show that uncontaminated seeds are also produced from permeations. Thus, all scriptural teachings talk about permeations. “Pure dharma”(淨法) is dharma-body (法身; Skt. *dharmakāya*). “Realm”(界) has the “implication of cause”(因義). “Same flow”(等流) is “same kind”(同類). “Correct dharma”(正法) is to distinguish from the evil one. [Text] means that when hearing uncontaminated and pure dharma as a cause, the same kind of correct dharmas are rising due to the permeation. It is because of nature of “supermundane mind seeds”(出世心種子)...”<sup>308</sup> Then LMC#1 explicitly quotes *She dacheng lun shi* as below for support.

*She lun shi* 攝論釋 says, “So called “pure dharma realm”(淨法界)<sup>309</sup> is the dharma realm of all Buddhas because it is forever free from all “adventitious hindrances”(客塵障). So called “same flow”(等流) is the teachings that arising from the dharma realm. “Undistortly hearing such teachings is named “same flow”<sup>310</sup>. The permeation that rising from this correct hearing is named “permeation”. It is this permeation that is able to produce the supermundane and uncontaminated minds which are named seeds.”<sup>311</sup>

<sup>308</sup> 「無漏種下，意牒有漏種必藉熏生，例顯無漏亦從熏起，故諸聖教說聞熏習。淨法即法身；界是因義；等流即同類；正法簡於邪。謂聞無漏清淨法因，同類正法而熏起者，是出世心種子性故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, b23-c3 // Z 1:81, p. 34, d14-18 // R81, p. 68, b14-18)

<sup>309</sup> The original and correct quote from *She dacheng lun shi* should “The most pure dharm realm”(最清淨法界者) instead of “pure dharma realm”(淨法界).

<sup>310</sup> The original and correct quote from *She dacheng lun shi* should be “named correct hearing”(名正聞) instead of “named “same flow”(名等流).

<sup>311</sup> LMC#1: 「攝論釋云：淨法界者，諸佛法界，永離一切客塵障故。言等流者，謂從法界所起教法。無倒聽聞如是教法，故名等流。依此正聞所起熏習，說名熏習。即此熏習能生出世無漏之心，名為種子...」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, c3-7 // Z 1:81, p. 34, d18-p. 35, a4 // R81, p. 68, b18-p. 69, a4); *She dacheng lun shi*: 「最清淨法界者，諸佛法界永離一切客塵障故。言等流者，謂從法界所起教法。無倒聽聞如是教法，故名正聞。依此正聞所起熏習，是名熏習。即此熏習能生出世無漏之心，名為種子。」(T31, no. 1598, p. 394, c1-5)

It seems that LMC#1 is afraid that the above quote is not clear enough. LMC#1 further implicitly quotes *Shou zhang lun* 手杖論 for further explanation.

For example, there is a saying. All Bodhisattvas who first initiate intention toward the enlightenment have seeds that are produced by permeation of correct hearing. Although [the permeation occurring in] mundane world, the [permeation] should be understood as being included in the dharma-body and being able to directly produce “supermundane mind seeds” (出世心種子).<sup>312</sup>

Maybe LMC#3 thinks the above quote is still not clear enough so he explicitly makes a longer quote from *Shou zhang lun* as below.

Even though the supermundane wisdom has not been attained due to falling into the self-continuity, it is mutually agreed that the permeations that coming from all “similar teachings” (似說) about “wisdoms of two non-nature” (二無性智) are “generative causes” (生因) of [supermundane wisdom]. Because such permeation of hearing have the same kind of nature as extremely pure dharma realm. Dharma realm is dharma-body of Buddha. The understanding of two non-natures of self and dharmas is the resultant dharma flowing from dharma realm. Which is dharma-body. Realm is the cause. [Permeation of hearing] is the cause of the dharma in the supermundane world. It is named “extremely pure” (極清淨) because it can hold the nature of the permeation and eliminate all karmic impressions of two hindrances- the afflictive and cognitive hindrances. The permeation of hearing is similar to the result because [the permeation] is rising as a “contributory cause” (增上緣) and it has nature same as [dharma-body]. For example, there is a saying. All Bodhisattvas who first initiate intention toward the enlightenment have seeds that are produced by the permeation of correct hearing. Although [the permeation occurring in] mundane world, the [permeation] should be understood as being included in the dharma-body and being able to directly produce the “supermundane mind seeds” (出世心種子).

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<sup>312</sup> 「如有說云：諸初發心菩提薩埵，所有正聞熏習種子，雖曰世間，應知即是法身所攝，而能親作出世心種。」(X50, no. 820, p. 541, c7-9 // Z 1:81, p. 35, a4-6 // R81, p. 69, a4-6)

<sup>313</sup> 「出世之智雖不曾得，但以墮在自相續中。所有似說二無性智，共許從此熏習之處而作生因。此聞之熏是極清淨法界等流之體性故。法界即是如來法身。我、法二無性解，是法界所流果法，謂法身。界即因也。是出世間諸法之界。謂能持彼熏習性故，及斷煩惱、所知二障所有餘習，名極清淨。其聞熏習是似彼果，彼為增上緣而得生起故，同彼體性故，如有說云，諸初發心菩提薩埵，所有正聞熏習種子，雖曰世間，應知即是法身所攝」(X50, no. 822, p. 864, b11-20 // Z 1:81, p. 358, c3-12 // R81, p. 716, a3-12)

Since LMC#3 does not follow LMC#1 in quoting *She dacheng lun shi* but only follow LMC#1 in quoting longer *Shou zhang lun*, I am wondering if this indicates that most late-Ming commentators do not accept the position and explanation of *She dacheng lun shi* regarding that uncontaminated seeds are also produced by permeations. Actually, LMC#2, and LMC#4 and LMC#5 don't quote either *She dacheng lun shi* or *Shou zhang lun*. LMC#5 notes as below

So called correct dharmas that same as pure dharma realm are that all Buddhas and bodhisattvas attain the wonderful principle of pure dharma realm by “fundamental wisdom” (根本智). Then, in order to let sentient beings to get enlightenment by names, they interpret and show the principle of pure dharma realm by “post-concentration wisdom” (後得智) that according with sentient beings and flowing in the forms of languages. The correct dharmas that flowing out [from the pure dharma realm] are corresponding with the pure dharma realm so they are named “same flow” (等流).<sup>314</sup>

Such explanation might invite several questions. For example, is “post-concentration wisdom” contaminated permeation or uncontaminated permeations? Is “post-concentration wisdom” produced by contaminated seeds or uncontaminated seeds? If “post-concentration wisdom” was contaminated permeation, could such contaminated permeation produce uncontaminated seeds for “fundamental wisdom” (根本智)? If “post-concentration wisdom” was uncontaminated permeation and was produced by uncontaminated seeds, what is the difference between “fundamental wisdom” and “post-concentration wisdom”?

In order to explain the “nature of supermundane mind seeds” (出世心種子性), CWSLS notes as below. If Kuiji read *She lun* correctly, *She lun* is saying that “uncontaminated seeds” are produced by “contaminated permeation”.

Furthermore, *She lun* says, since that the permeation of hearing prior to the ten grounds of bodhisattvas is contaminated and is of nature of supermundane mind seeds. Thus, it is realized that there is no inherently uncontaminated seeds because the contaminated [permeation] is the cause of “stage of insight” (Ch. *jian dao* 見道; Skt. *darśana-mārga*).<sup>315</sup>

<sup>314</sup> 「淨法界等流正法者，謂諸佛菩薩，以根本智證清淨法界妙理。以後得智隨順眾生，流出語言文字，證顯淨法界理，令諸眾生尋名取悟。此所流出正法與淨法界相應，故名等流」(X51, no. 824, p. 321, b8-12 // Z 1:82, p. 221, b7-11 // R82, p. 441, b7-11)

<sup>315</sup> 「又攝論說：聞熏地前既有漏，為出世法之種子性。故知無有法爾無漏種，唯以有漏為見道因故。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 305, c1-3)

### 4-3-3-3 Theory of Seeds being both Innate and Newly Permeated

#### 4-3-3-3-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text- Dharmapāla's Proposition<sup>316</sup>

“There is an argument saying that there are two kinds of seeds.

1) “Originally existent” (Ch. *ben you* 本有) [seeds]. Which refers to the “special capability or power” (Ch. *gong neng cha bie* 功能差別; Skt. *śakti-bheda*) that “are existent inherently” (法爾而有) in the “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) since beginningless time and can produce “aggregates, fields, and realms” (Ch. *yun chu jie* 蘊、處、界; Skt. *skandha-āyatana-dhātu*). Based on this, the “World Honored” (世尊) taught that all sentient beings, since beginningless time, have “a variety of causal factors” (Ch. *zhong zhong jie* 種種界; Skt. *nānā-dhātu*) like [bunched seeds] of Rudraksha (Ch. *e cha* 惡叉; Skt. *rudrākṣa*) gathering. They are existent inherently.<sup>317</sup> The remaining supports have been extensively explained as previous discussions. This is named “innate seeds” (Ch. *ben xing zhu zhong* 本性住種; Skt. *prakṛtistha bīja*).

2) “Newly started” (Ch. *shi qi* 始起) [seeds]. Which are existent by “repeatedly manifesting” (Ch. *shu shu xian xing* 數數現行; Skt. *abhīkṣṇa-samudācāra*) permeations since beginningless time. Based on this, the World Honored taught that the minds of all sentient beings, due to permeation of defiled and pure dharmas, are the places where the immeasurable seeds are accumulated.<sup>318</sup> Many treatises also say that the defiled and pure seeds are produced by permeations of defiled and pure dharmas. This is named “habituation-made seeds” (Ch. *xi suo cheng zhong* 習所成種; Skt. *samudānīta bīja*).

#### 4-3-3-3-2 English Translation of CWSL Root Text- Refuting Theory of Seeds being Originally Existent Only<sup>319</sup>

If seeds were originally existent only, [the first seven] “transforming

<sup>316</sup> 「有義：種子各有二類：一者本有，謂無始來，異熟識中，法爾而有，生蘊、處、界，功能差別。世尊依此說：「諸有情，無始時來，有種種界，如惡叉聚，法爾而有。」餘所引證，廣說如初。此即名為本性住種。二者始起，謂無始來，數數現行熏習而有。世尊依此說：「有心情，染淨諸法所熏習故，無量種子之所積集。」諸論亦說：「染淨種子，由染淨法熏習故生。」此即名為習所成種。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 8, b23-c3)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñapati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 233-34. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 51-52.

<sup>317</sup> See previous note. According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Wu jin yi jing* 無盡意經 (Scripture of *Akṣayamati*)

<sup>318</sup> See previous note. According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Duo jie jing* 多界經 (Pāli: *Bahu Dhātuka Sutta*; Scripture of Many Types of Elements)

<sup>319</sup> 「若唯本有，轉識不應與阿賴耶為因緣性。如契經說：諸法於識藏 識於法亦爾 更互為果性 亦常為因性。此頌意言，阿賴耶識，與諸轉識，於一切時，展轉相生，互為因果。攝大乘說：「阿賴耶識，與雜染法，互為因緣。如炷與焰，展轉生燒，又如束蘆，互相依住。唯

consciousness “ (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*) should not be “direct causes” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*) of the “storehouse [consciousness]” (阿賴耶[識], Skt. *ālaya*[*vijñāna*]).

According to the scriptural teaching<sup>320</sup>, “all dharmas relative to “consciousness as storehouse” (Ch. *shi cang* 識藏), also “consciousness [as storehouse]” relative to [all] dharmas, they are always “being as an effect” (Ch. *guo xing* 果性; Skt. *phala-bhāva*) and “being as a cause” (Ch. *yin xing* 因性; Skt. *hetu-bhāva*) to each other.” The verse is intended to say that the storehouse consciousness and all transforming consciousness are producing each other in series and are cause and effect to each other all the times.

According to *She dacheng [lun]* 攝大乘[論] (Skt. *Mahāyāna-saṃgraha*; the Compendium or Summary of the Great Vehicle), the storehouse consciousness and the defiled dharma are “direct causes” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*) to each other. It’s like wicks and flames producing the burning in series. It’s also like a bundle of reeds supporting each other. “Direct causes” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣) are established only depending on these two [i.e. the seeds of the eighth consciousness and the manifestations of seven transforming consciousness]. Thus there would be no other “direct causes” available.

If all seeds were not produced by permeations, how could the transforming consciousness and the storehouse consciousness have the meaning of “direct causes” [to each other]? It is NOT that the fact that permeations make something grow can be named “direct causes”. Because it is NOT that [the manifestations] of “virtuous and unvirtuous actions” (善、惡業) are “direct causes” of “maturing effects” (異熟果). Furthermore, all scriptural teachings say that there are seeds that are produced by permeations. Against what they taught, thus, the theory that seeds being originally existent only is conflicting with reasons and teachings.

#### 4-3-3-3 English Translation of CWSL Root Text- Refuting Theory of Seeds being New Permeations Only [Refuting Opponent’s Proposition]<sup>321</sup>

依此二，建立因緣，所餘因緣，不可得故。」若諸種子不由熏生，如何轉識與阿賴耶有因緣義？非熏令長，可名因緣。勿善惡業與異熟果為因緣故。又諸聖教說有種子由熏習生，皆違彼義，故唯本有，理教相違。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 8, c3-15)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 234-35. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 52-53.

<sup>320</sup> According to CWSLS and *She dacheng lun* 攝大乘論, the quote is from *Dacheng api damo jing* 大乘阿毘達磨經 (Skt. *Abhidharma-sūtra*; Scripture on the higher teachings in Mahāyāna). (T43, no. 1830, p. 306, a16-17) & (T31, no. 1594, p. 135, b13-16)

<sup>321</sup> 「若唯始起，有為無漏，無因緣故，應不得生。有漏不應為無漏種，勿無漏種生有漏故。許，應諸佛有漏復生，善等應為不善等種。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 8, c15-18)

If seeds were newly started only, “conditioned” (Ch. *you wei* 有為; Skt. *saṃskṛta*) and “uncontaminated” (Ch. *wu lou* 無漏; Skt. *anāsrava*) dharmas should not happen because of no [innate seeds as] “direct causes” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*). “Contaminated” (有漏) [dharmas] should not become “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種) because it is not that “uncontaminated seeds” (無漏種) could produce contaminated [dharmas]. If it was allowed [that uncontaminated seeds could produce the contaminated dharmas], all Buddhas should have produced contaminated [dharmas] again, virtuous dharmas should have become seeds of unvirtuous dharmas.

### **[Refuting Advocates of Discrimination]<sup>322</sup>**

Although “advocates of discrimination” (Ch. *fen bie lun zhe* 分別論者; Skt. *vibhajya-vādin*)<sup>323</sup> say that the nature of mind is originally pure. Because being defiled by “adventitious afflictions” (客塵煩惱; Skt. *āgantuka-kleśa*), it is named “the defiled”. When they are free from afflictions, they turn into the uncontaminated [dharmas]. Thus uncontaminated dharmas are not produced without causes.”

However, what does it mean by “nature of mind” (Ch. *xin xing* 心性; Skt. *\*citta-prakṛti*)? If it refers to the “principle of emptiness” (空理), “emptiness” (Ch. *kong* 空; Skt. *śūnyatā*) cannot be the cause of mind. “Permanent dharmas” (常法) must not be seeds of all dharmas because the substances [of permanent dharmas] do not change before and after. .

If it just refers to the mind, it should be the same as *Sāṃkhya* 數論 [having the view that] although “characteristics” (相) are changing whereas “substance” (體) remains permanent and one. [If this was the case,] “unvirtuous and indeterminate minds” (惡、無記心) should be virtuous [because substance of whatever minds remains pure.] [If this was] allowed, then [unvirtuous and indeterminate minds]

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For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 235-36. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 53.

<sup>322</sup> 「分別論者雖作是說：「心性本淨，客塵煩惱所染污故，名為雜染；離煩惱時，轉成無漏，故無漏法非無因生。」而心性言，彼說何義？若說空理，空非心因，常法定非諸法種子，以體前後無轉變故。若即說心，應同數論，相雖轉變，而體常一。惡、無記心，又應是善，許，則應與信等相應。不許，便應非善心體，尚不名善，況是無漏。有漏善心既稱雜染，如惡心等性非無漏，故不應與無漏為因，勿善惡等互為因故。若有漏心性是無漏，應無漏心性是有漏，差別因緣不可得故。又異生心若是無漏，則異生位無漏現行，應名聖者。若異生心性雖無漏，而相有染不名無漏，無斯過者，則心種子亦非無漏，何故汝論說有異生唯得成就無漏種子？種子、現行，性、相同故。然契經說心性淨者，說心空理所顯真如，真如是心真實性故。或說心體非煩惱，故名性本淨，非有漏心性是有漏，故名本淨。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 8, c18-p. 9, a7)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 238-40. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 53-54.

<sup>323</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 307, a13-15. And Lee, “Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian” 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 1, p.302.



should be associated (Ch. *xiang ying* 相應; Skt. *saṃyukta*) with [virtuous mental factors] like faith etc. [If] NOT allowed, [nature of unvirtuous and indeterminate minds] should not be the substance of virtuous minds. Not even being called virtuous. Not to mention being [called] uncontaminated. Since the contaminated virtuous minds are called the defiled, like the natures of unvirtuous minds etc are not uncontaminated, they should not be the direct causes of uncontaminated [dharmas]. Because it is not that the virtuous and the unvirtuous could be direct causes to each other.

If nature of contaminated minds was uncontaminated, then nature of uncontaminated minds should be contaminated because “different [mechanisms] of direct causes” (差別因緣) are not possible to get.

Furthermore, if “minds of ordinary unenlightened persons” (Ch. *yi sheng xin* 異生心) were uncontaminated, the uncontaminated [minds] would be manifested in the “stage of ordinary unenlightened persons” (Ch. *yi sheng wei* 異生位). Then [ordinary unenlightened persons] would be named sages. If [you said that] nature of ordinary unenlightened persons’ mind was uncontaminated whereas appearing characteristics of their minds were defiled and not named uncontaminated [manifestations], there would be no such mistake [that ordinary unenlightened persons should be named sages], then [since that the manifestation of mind was not uncontaminated] the seed of mind should also not be uncontaminated. Then why would your treatise say that there are ordinary unenlightened persons who could only attain uncontaminated seeds? [Your argument does not make any sense] because seed and its manifestation- nature and its characteristics- should be the same.

In addition, when the scripture says that nature of mind is pure, it describes mind as “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) that is manifested through the “principle of emptiness” (Ch. *kong li* 空理). Because “thusness” is the real nature of mind. Alternatively, it says that “substance of mind” (Ch. *xin ti* 心體) is not afflictions so it is named “originally pure nature” (Ch. *xing ben jing* 性本淨; Skt. *prakṛti-viśuddha*). It is not that nature of contaminated mind is uncontaminated so it is named “originally pure” (本淨).

### [State the Right View]<sup>324</sup>

Therefore, it should be believed that there are sentient beings who, since beginningless time, have uncontaminated seeds that are not produced by permeations but are attained inherently. Later in “the stage of one’s practice where one is ready to

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<sup>324</sup> 「由此應信，有諸有情，無始時來，有無漏種，不由熏習，法爾成就。後勝進位，熏令增長。無漏法起，以此為因。無漏起時，復熏成種。有漏法種，類此應知。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 9, a7-11)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 241-42. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 54.

advance to the next stage” (Ch. *sheng jin wei* 勝進位), [uncontaminated seeds] are grown by permeations. The uncontaminated dharmas arise depending on these [uncontaminated seeds] as direct causes. When uncontaminated dharmas arise, they would be permeated into [new uncontaminated] seeds again.<sup>325</sup> One should know that contaminated seeds work in the similar way.

### [Explaining What Seems Conflicting]<sup>326</sup>

Although the scriptures taught that “inner seeds” (Ch. *nei zhong* 內種) must have permeations, it does not necessarily mean that all seeds are produced by permeations. How could one completely deny “innate seeds” (Ch. *ben you zhong zi* 本有種子)? Nevertheless, “innate seeds” (本有種[子]) are also made to grow by permeations in order to get effects. Thus said that “inner seeds” (內種) must have permeations.

The “permeations of hearing” (Ch. *wen xun xi* 聞熏習; Skt. *śrutavāsanā*) are not contaminated only. When hearing the correct teachings, “innate uncontaminated seeds” (本有無漏種子) are also permeated and made to grow gradually until “supramundane minds” (Ch. *chu shi xin* 出世心) are produced. Thus also said that this is named “permeations of hearing”.

During “permeations of hearing”, the contaminated [virtuous seeds] are “what to be eliminated in the path of cultivation” (Ch. *xiu suo duan* 修所斷; Skt. *bhāvanā-heyā*) but they could bring about “excellent maturing effects” (Ch. *sheng yi shou* 勝異熟) which are excellent “contributory conditions” (Ch. *zeng shang yuan* 增上緣; Skt. *adhipati-pratyaya*) of “supramundane dharmas” (Ch. *chu shi fa* 出世法). The uncontaminated [virtuous seeds] are not “what to be eliminated” (所斷) and just direct causes of supramundane dharmas. These direct causes are so obscure and so incomprehensible that those [contaminated virtuous seeds which] are apparent as “excellent contributory conditions” (勝增上緣) are entrusted and provisionally said to

<sup>325</sup> According to CWSLS, when uncontaminated dharmas arise and again are permeated into uncontaminated seeds, it means entering into the “stage of insight” (Ch. *jian dao* 見道; Skt. *darśana-mārga*). T43, no. 1830, p. 308, a22-23)

<sup>326</sup> 「諸聖教中，雖說內種定有熏習，而不定說一切種子皆熏故生，寧全撥無本有種子。然本有種，亦由熏習，令其增盛，方能得果，故說內種定有熏習。其聞熏習非唯有漏。聞正法時，亦熏本有無漏種子，令漸增盛展轉乃至生出世心，故亦說此名聞熏習。聞熏習中，有漏性者是修所斷，感勝異熟，為出世法勝增上緣。無漏性者，非所斷攝，與出世法正為因緣。此正因緣微隱、難了，有寄顯勝增上緣，方便說為出世心種。依障建立種姓別者，意顯無漏種子有無。謂若全無無漏種者，彼二障種永不可害，即立彼為非涅槃法。若唯有二乘無漏種者，彼所知障種永不可害，一分立為聲聞種姓，一分立為獨覺種姓。若亦有佛無漏種者，彼二障種俱可永害，即立彼為如來種姓。故由無漏種子有無，障有可斷不可斷義。然無漏種微隱難知，故約彼障顯性差別。不爾，彼障有何別因，而有可害不可害者。若謂法爾有此障別，無漏法種寧不許然？若本全無無漏法種，則諸聖道永不得生。誰當能害二障種子，而說依障立種姓別？既彼聖道必無生義，說當可生，亦定非理。然諸聖教處處說有本有種子，皆違彼義，故唯始起理教相違。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 9, a11-b6)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 242-45. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 54-56.

be “seeds of supramundane mind” (Ch. *chu shi xin zhong* 出世心種).

To establish “differences of seed-nature” (Ch. *zhong xing bie* 種姓別) by “hindrances” (Ch. *zhang* 障; Skt. *āvaraṇa*), the intention is to show whether or not there are any uncontaminated seeds. If ones don’t have any uncontaminated seeds at all, their “seeds of two hindrances” (Ch. *er zhang zhong* 二障種) will never be destroyed so they would be defined as ones “who are not able to attain liberation” (Ch. *fei nie pan fa* 非涅槃法; Skt. *aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka*). If ones only have uncontaminated seeds of “two vehicles” (二乘), their seeds of “cognitive hindrances” (Ch. *suo zhi zhang* 所知障; Skt. *jñeya-āvaraṇa*) will never be destroyed so they would be partially defined as “seed-nature of the direct disciples” (Ch. *sheng wen zhong xing* 聲聞種姓; Skt. *śrāvaka-gotra*) and partially defined as “seed-nature of the solitary buddhas” (Ch. *du jue zhong xing* 獨覺種姓; Skt. *pratyeka-buddha-gotra*). Furthermore, if ones have Buddha’s uncontaminated seeds, their “seed-nature of two hindrances” (二障種) will be both destroyed forever so they would be defined as “seed-nature of *tathāgat*” (如來種性; Skt. *tathāgata-gotra*).

Thus depending on whether or not there are any uncontaminated seeds, the hindrances are defined as “either being able to be eliminated or not” (Ch. *ke duan bu ke duan* 可斷不可斷). However, the uncontaminated seeds are so obscure and incomprehensible that “reduction by the hindrances” (Ch. *yue bi zhang* 約彼障) is used to show the differences of seed-natures. Otherwise, are there any other reasons that the hindrances “either being able to be eliminated or not”? If admitted that inherently there are such “differences of hindrances” (Ch. *zhang bie* 障別) [in terms of “either being able to be eliminated or not”], why not allowed that [either there are or not] “seeds of uncontaminated dharmas” (無漏法種)?

If originally there were no any seeds of uncontaminated dharmas at all, then all noble paths would never happen. [If that was the case], who would be able to destroy the seeds of two hindrances and to define “differences of seed-nature” by hindrances? Since that the noble paths had no way to arise for sure, it would be absolutely nonsense for you to say that [the uncontaminated faculties of sentient beings in the hell] would arise in the future. However, all scriptural teachings taking about “innate seeds” (本有種子) everywhere. Against what they taught, thus, the theory that seeds being newly started only is conflicting with reasons and teachings.

#### [Short Summary]<sup>327</sup>

Therefore, one should know that seeds of all dharmas [, no matter contaminate

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<sup>327</sup> 「由此應知，諸法種子，各有本有、始起二類。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 9, b6-7)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpātī-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 245. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 56. Please note that both translation missing “各” which means “each”. Please refer to my translation and following footnote.

seeds and uncontaminated seeds,]<sup>328</sup> each have two kinds- innate [seeds] and newly started [seeds].

#### 4-3-3-3-4 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-3-3-4-1 Why LMC#3 made such a longest citation?

The English translation of CWSL root text in 3-3-3-1 is about Dharmapāla's (護法) proposition. CWSL uses only 136 Chinese characters in total to brief the proposition. Moreover, CWSL repeats the scriptural teachings that already mentioned in 3-3-1 and 3-3-2. Thus most late-Ming commentators did not have much to say here except Wang Kentang who had two quotations. One quote from *Yuqie shidi lun* is to explain where the two terms- “innate seeds” (本性住種) & “habituation-made seeds” (習所成種)- come from. The other is the longest quotation that ever seen in this study. It is 907 Chinese characters long. Why would Wang Kentang have to implicitly make such long quote from ZJL? It is not an easy question. In order to try to answer the question, I first translate the long quote as below.

Dharmapāla intends to say: contaminated seeds and uncontaminated seeds both have newly permeated [seeds] and innate [seeds]. The way they together produce the manifestations is not in disorder, either. If newly permeated [seeds] meet conditions, [manifestations] are produced from newly permeated [seeds]. If innate [seeds] meet conditions, [manifestations] are produce from innate [seeds]. If one stubbornly insisting that [manifestations] are produced only from new permeated [seeds] or that [manifestations] are produced only from innate [seeds], these two positions are both against teachings. If two implications are both taken, that would well conform to teachings and reasons. One venerable elder asked, when one has not ever had any permeation of hearing before, where do innate [seeds] come from? Answer: since the beginningless time, this body and seeds are both existent at the same time like external grasses, trees, etc [and their] seeds. Furthermore, one venerable elder explained the implication of permeated seeds. Although all dharmas have two kinds of seeds- new ones and old ones. When manifestation is produced, it either from a new seed or from an old seed. It is not that “during one thought” (於一念中) two kinds of seeds together produce one manifestation. If that were the case, there would be the fault that multiple seeds produce one sprout. Due to this reason, one just know that “seen aspect seeds” (相分種) of forms and etc are working in the same way.

Asking again: Among eight consciousnesses there are implications of innate

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<sup>328</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 309, a25-26.

[seeds] and newly permeation [seeds]. Which consciousness is the “cause as what permeates” (能熏因)? Which is the “effect as what is permeated” (所熏果)? Answer: according to the correct teachings of scriptures and treatises, first seven manifesting consciousnesses are the “causes as what permeates” to produce newly permeated seeds. The eighth consciousness is the “effect as what is permeated” of the first seven manifesting consciousnesses.

Asking again: although the root consciousness is not able to permeate its own seed, it is able to produce its own seeds. Thus, manifesting root consciousness etc could produce its own seed. Being direct cause, [the root consciousness] cannot permeate its own seed. How could it produce its own seed? Furthermore, what is the difference between permeating [seeds] and producing [seeds]?

Answer: So-called permeation has the implication of supporting permeation and triggering. So-called production is arising. Which means being produced from cause. Although the root consciousness is not able to support permeations and triggering its own seed, it can directly produce its own seeds. For example, although those who inherently have innate uncontaminated seeds are able to produce effects, they could not produce any manifestation if in “two stages of preparation and application” (資、加二位; 資糧位、加行位) they did not have contaminated virtuous [actions] to support permeation and triggering. Must through contaminated virtuous [actions], the production of manifestation is possible. For another example, in the root consciousness virtuous and contaminated seeds are able to draw the following seeds of their own kind. Although such case has the implication of production, there is no implication of self-permeation. As seeds like granola and etc are able to produce sprouts, if no water and soil to support permeation and triggering, they are still not able to produce their manifestation. Although being able to produce seeds, the root consciousness is so weak itself that it have to rely on the permeation of sixth and seventh consciousness to produce [seeds]. Due to this reason, although not being able to permeate, root consciousness is able to produce seeds. Thus it can be the direct cause of its direct seeds. Five cognitive faculties and their objects are the same. This explanation is based on “manifestations in causal stage” (因位現行). In terms of seeds that are permeated directly, there could be two conditions. They are “direct causes” (因緣) and “contributory conditions” (增上緣). Only exceptions are [those] extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] in the eighth and sixth consciousness because they are not able to permeate. Now based on this text, the manifestation could be direct cause to its own seeds except that [those] extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] in the eighth and sixth consciousness because they are not able to permeate. They cannot be direct

causes in terms of their own seeds. If one said that [those] extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] in the eighth and sixth consciousness can produce their own seeds and become direct causes, one would commit the fault that maturing [consciousness] is able to permeate. That would be against the scriptural teachings.

Asking again: if “seen aspects of five objects” (五塵相分) into which first six consciousnesses transform are not able to permeate new seeds by themselves, they must rely on “perception of minds as transformer” (能變心緣) in order to be able to permeate their own seeds. Thus “seen aspects of five objects” (五塵相分) can be what permeates. Then [if] those extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] also rely on “perception of minds as transformer” (能變心緣), why cannot they be what permeates like “seen aspects of five objects” (五塵相分)? Answer: now based on that “conditioned dharmas” (Ch. *you wei fa* 有為法; Skt. *saṃskṛta-dharmas*) could be divided into three levels. 1) the higher level like seven “transforming consciousness” (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*) and their associated [mental factors etc]. They are partially able to “bring perceptual objects into thought” (緣慮)<sup>329</sup> so their power are the most strong. They all have power to do self-permeations. 2) the middle level like “seen aspects of five objects” (五塵相分) although they have power of permeation but the power is weaker. They need to rely the power of mind in order to do self-permeations. 3) the lower level that is extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] like very sick and weak persons. They are not able to get up by themselves. Even with other’s help, they could not get up either. The root consciousness is also like that. It has no power of permeation. It cannot permeate even with power of minds. Due to this reason, those extremely weak and indeterminate [manifestations] are always without power so they are not able to permeate. “Seen aspects of five objects” are different. They have their own power. However, the power is too weak to be able to permeate alone. Relying on the help of mind together with their own half power, they are able to permeate. Due to this reason, now the correct view is that, the eighth “consciousness group” (識聚; Skt. *vijñāna-kāya*), and “what it transforms into” (所變) – “maturing seen aspects of five faculties” (異熟五根相分), and “maturing physical faculties” (異熟浮根)- and “maturation of first six consciousnesses” do not have new seeds because they are extremely weak and are not able to permeate. They are produced from old seeds that originally existent. They nourish seen aspects of five [sense] faculties, physical faculties and five objects. As for what the first six consciousnesses transform into, each could have two

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<sup>329</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

seeds- newly [permeated seeds] and originally [existent seeds].<sup>330</sup>

Secondly, I like to draw attention to high-level structure of this long quote. It starts with Dharmapāla's proposition, followed by the first round question and answer (Q&A) regarding where originally existent seeds origin if no permeation plus further explanation on how the permeation of new and old seeds work. Next, followed by the second round of Q&A regarding which ones of eight consciousness permeates and which one is permeated. Then, followed by the third round of Q&A regarding why the root consciousness could produce its own seed but not permeate and what is difference between permeation and production. Last, followed by the fourth round of Q&A regarding why the root consciousness cannot permeate its own seed through the help of mind like "seen aspects of five objects".

Thirdly, it is interesting to notice that LMC#2 also selectively and paraphrasing quoted ZJL for the portions of Dharmapāla's proposition and the first round Q&A plus further explanation.<sup>331</sup> However, LMC#2 stopped there and did not go as far as LMC#3. On the other hand, for the short summary of 3-3-3-3, we see that LMC#5

<sup>330</sup> 「護法意云：有漏、無漏種子皆有新熏、本有，合生現行亦不雜亂。若新熏遇緣即從新熏生。若本有遇緣即從本有生。若偏執唯從新熏，或偏執但是本有，二俱違教。若二義俱取，善符教理。古德問：此總未聞熏時，此本有從何而生？答：謂從無始時來，此身與種子俱時而有，如外草木等種。又古德解熏種義，諸法雖有新、舊二種，當生現時，或從新生，或從舊生，名為二種。非謂二種於一念中，同生一現。若爾，即有多種共生一芽之過，以此唯知，色等相分種，並同於此。又問：八識之中既具本有、新熏之義。何識是能熏因？所熏果？答：依經論正義，即是前七現行識為能熏因緣之因，熏生新熏種子。第八識是前七現行識所熏生因緣之果。又問：本識等雖無力能熏自種，而能親生自種，故現行本識等得自生種。為因緣者，既不熏自種，如何能生自種？又熏與生何別？答：熏者，資熏擊發之義。生者，生起，從因生出之義。謂本識等，雖無力資熏擊發自種之義，而有親生自種之義。如有種性者，法爾本有無漏種子，雖有生果之能，若不得資、加二位有漏諸善資熏、擊發，即不能生現。須假有漏諸善資熏，方能生現。又如本識中，善染等種能引次後自類種子，雖有生義，無自熏義，如穀麥等種雖有生芽之能，若不得水土等資熏擊發，亦不能生其現行。本識雖有生種之能，然自力劣，須假六、七與熏方生。由是義故，本識等雖非能熏而能生種，故與親種得為因緣。五根塵等諸根分亦應然。此解，今依因位現行，望自親所熏種，能為二緣，即是因緣、增上緣。唯除第八及六識中，極劣無記，非能熏故。今按此文，現於親種得為因緣中，既除第八及六識中極劣無記，非能熏故，望自親種無因緣義。若言本識及六識中極劣無記，能生自種得為因緣者，便犯異熟有能熏過，違聖教失。又問：如前六識所變五塵相分，不能自熏新種，須假能變心緣，方能熏自種，故五塵相分得為能熏。其極劣無記，亦假能變心緣，何故不同五塵相分得為能熏？答：今按有為法分為三品：一者上品，如七轉識及相應等，一分能緣慮，故力最強，悉有力自熏；二者中品，如五塵相分等，雖有熏力而力稍微，假心與力，彼方自熏；三者下品，即極劣無記如極羸病無力之人，不能自起，縱人與力扶持，亦不能起。本識等類亦復如是，本無熏力，謂心與力亦不能熏。由是義故，極劣無記，一向無力，故非能熏。與五塵相分不同，彼自有力，但力相劣，不能獨熏，假心相助，自有半力，故是能熏。由是義故，今正解者，第八識聚，及此所變異熟五根相分，并異熟浮根等，及異熟前六識等，並無新種，以其極劣非能熏故。從本有舊種所生，其長養五根及此浮根，及等流五塵等相分。前六識所變者，皆可各有新、本二種。」  
(X50, no. 822, p. 865, a3-c3 // Z 1:81, p. 359, a7-d1 // R81, p. 717, a7-p. 718, b1) or (T48, no. 2016, p. 698, a27-c23)

<sup>331</sup> (X50, no. 821, p. 685, c4-12 // Z 1:81, p. 179, b8-16 // R81, p. 357, b8-16)

explicitly quotes ZJL for the correct view portion of the four round of Q&A.<sup>332</sup>

Four rounds of Q&A indicate that so called the correct view of Dharmapāla still invites many questions and discussions. LMC#2 only briefly touches the first chicken or egg question while LMC#5 jumps into a qualified correct view- only what the first six consciousnesses transform into have both newly permeated seeds and originally existent seeds. Without LMC#3's long quotation, we might not see another side of the story that is much more complicated than what CWSL, LMC#2 and LMC#5 shows. Is it such complicated story that LMC#3 intends to disclose by making such long quotation?

#### 4-3-3-3-4-2 What does it mean by “nature of mind is pure”?

When CWSL refuting "advocates of discrimination" (分別論者), first in negative way CWSL excludes what is not “nature of mind”: 1) “principle of emptiness” (空理) and/or “permanent dharmas” (常法); 2) “mind” itself that could have different qualities like virtuous minds, unvirtuous minds, indeterminate minds, contaminated minds and uncontaminated minds. Then in positive way CWSL explain how scriptures might define “nature of mind is pure”. 1) the real nature of mind is thusness that is manifested through the “principle of emptiness” so it is pure; 2) the substance of dependent arising mind is not afflictions so it is pure. The main purpose of CWSL is to state the right view - there must be uncontaminated seeds which are originally existent. Nevertheless, the negative way and the positive way seem not exclusive but overlapping. Thus, it is interesting to investigate how the late-Ming commentators read and interpret what it means by “nature of mind is pure”.

LMC#1 reads the right view as “... According to the scripture, thusness is mind. One should believe thusness is uncontaminated seeds which are inherently attained. Why insist on newly permeated [seeds] and no originally existent seeds? ...”<sup>333</sup>

LMC#2 notes that “...so called “ nature of mind is pure” means that “mind” (Ch. *xin* 心; Skt. *citta*) where seeds are accumulated is thusness that is manifested through emptiness. This thusness is the real, frozen and invariable nature of this mind. This real nature is non-constructed (無作), unconditioned (無為; Skt. *asamskrta*), undefiled (無染), and non-polluted (無汙) so it named originally pure nature.... Thus, in “stage of insight” (見道位) when “mental disturbances produced by discrimination” (分別惑)<sup>334</sup> is eliminated and uncontaminated [dharmas] are arising, the manifestation have to subject to pure and uncontaminated seeds of this thusness as

<sup>332</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 323, a4-8 // Z 1:82, p. 222, d15-p. 223, a1 // R82, p. 444, b15-p. 445, a1.

<sup>333</sup> 「謂由經說，真如是心。應信真如是無漏種，法爾成就。何執熏生、無本有種？」(X50, no. 820, p. 543, a11-12 // Z 1:81, p. 36, b14-15 // R81, p. 71, b14-15)

<sup>334</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.



cause...<sup>335</sup>

Here we see both LMC#1 and LMC#2 understand thusness as uncontaminated seeds and cause.

What is confusing is that LMC#3 not only implicitly quotes LMC#2's above reading that thusness is uncontaminated seeds<sup>336</sup>, but also implicitly quotes ZJL's reading that refutes thusness either cause of mind or seeds as below.

Thusness is unconditioned. It is neither cause of mind nor seeds that can lead to dharmas as effects. It is like empty space. Thus, it is not that nature of contaminated mind is uncontaminated so it is named "originally pure" (本淨).<sup>337</sup>

Moreover, ZJL also quotes CWSLS character by character. In other words, the above quote is CWSLS's commentary passed down to the late-Ming commentators through ZJL. The position is two folded: One is that nature of mind is thusness. The other is that thusness is not uncontaminated seeds.<sup>338</sup> The former is no problem. The latter is conflicting with LMC#1 and LMC#2's readings that "thusness" as uncontaminated seeds. In addition, LMC#4 notes as below

However, the substance of thusness is permanent. It is neither cause of mind nor seeds. The sentence starting from "非有" (i.e. It is not that nature of contaminated mind is uncontaminated so it is named "originally pure") is to conclude by criticizing wrong scriptural quotations.<sup>339</sup>

Here we see that LMC#4 is not only aligned with the position that thusness is neither cause of mind nor seeds, but also reads the scriptural teachings in CWSL as wrong quotation. However, what does "wrong quotations" mean? Does it mean the scriptural teaching that nature of mind is thusness is wrong? Since thusness is uncontaminated and CWSL says that nature of contaminated mind cannot be uncontaminated, the theory that nature of mind is thusness seems not established at least for contaminated mind. On the other hand, if "nature of mind is originally pure"

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<sup>335</sup> 「心性淨者，是說集起心空所顯真如。此真如者，即是此心凝然不變之實性。此之實性無作、無為、無染、無汙，名性本淨。...故見道位，斷分別惑，無漏現起，必伏此真如清淨無漏種子為因而成現行...」(X50, no. 821, p. 686, c8-16 // Z 1:81, p. 180, b12-c2 // R81, p. 359, b12-p. 360, a2)

<sup>336</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 866, c8-10 // Z 1:81, p. 360, d6-8 // R81, p. 720, b6-8.

<sup>337</sup> 「真如無為，非心之因，亦非種子能有果法，如虛空等。故非有漏心性無漏，名本性淨也。」(X50, no. 822, p. 866, c4-6 // Z 1:81, p. 360, d2-4 // R81, p. 720, b2-4)

<sup>338</sup> (T48, no. 2016, p. 698, a16-19) & (T43, no. 1830, p. 308, a16-19).

<sup>339</sup> 「然真如體常，非心之因，亦非種子。「非有」下，結責謬引。」(X51, no. 823, p. 172, b21-22 // Z 1:82, p. 72, a5-6 // R82, p. 143, a5-6)

means that the pure minds are only manifested or produced by uncontaminated seeds that are originally existent, that would be applied to pure minds and/or uncontaminated minds only. As for minds that are produced by contaminated seeds, we still cannot say their nature are originally pure. In particular, if there are some contaminated seeds that are originally existent as 3-3-3-3 short summary concludes, we can say that nature of some minds is originally impure, isn't it?

#### 4-3-4 Implications of Seeds

##### 4-3-4-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

##### [Six Implications of Seeds 種子六義]<sup>340</sup>

Furthermore, there are approximately six kinds of implications of seeds:

- 1) “Momentariness” (Ch. *cha na mie* 剎那滅; Skt. *kṣaṇika*) which means that “substance” (體) which just arises must cease immediately without interruption and has “excellent capability or power” (勝功力) in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates “permanent dharmas” (常法) because permanent [dharmas] which do not change at all should not be able to have any capability or power to produce any function.
- 2) “Co-existent with effect” (Ch. *guo ju you* 果俱有) which means that [a seed] and its derived “manifesting effect dharma” (現行果法) both have to come together at the same time in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates [the scenario that a seeds as a] former [direct cause] and latter [manifestation] [as an effect] must be separated. The manifestation [as an effect] and a seed [as a direct cause] are different kinds so they are not conflicting to each other. They are co-existent within one body and are able to produce function. It NOT like that a seed producing another seed of the same kind. The former [seed] and the latter [seed] are conflicting to each other so they must not be co-existent. Although

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<sup>340</sup> 「然種子義，略有六種：一剎那滅，謂體纔生，無間必滅，有勝功力，方成種子。此遮常法，常無轉變，不可說有能生用故。二果俱有，謂與所生現行果法，俱現和合，方成種子。此遮前後及定相離，現種異類，互不相違。一身俱時，有能生用，非如種子自類相生，前後相違，必不俱有。雖因與果，有俱、不俱，而現在時，可有因用，未生已滅，無自體故。依生現果，立種子名，不依引生自類名種，故但應說與果俱有。三恒隨轉，謂要長時一類相續，至究竟位，方成種子。此遮轉識轉易間斷，與種子法不相應故。此顯種子，自類相生。四性決定，謂隨因力，生善惡等功能決定，方成種子。此遮餘部，執異性因生異性果，有因緣義。五待眾緣，謂此要待自眾緣合，功能殊勝，方成種子。此遮外道執自然因不待眾緣，恒頓生果。或遮餘部緣恒非無。顯所待緣非恒有性，故種於果非恒頓生。六引自果，謂於別別色心等果，各各引生，方成種子。此遮外道，執唯一因，生一切果。或遮餘部，執色心等，互為因緣。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 9, b7-28)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 245-47. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 56-57.

causes and effects could exist either at the same time or not at the same time, [it is only] at the same time [that seeds] have “function of direct causes” (因用). Because [either when a seed] not yet arises [or when a seed] has ceased [the seed] do not have its own substance [to produce function]. Based on that [seeds] producing “manifesting effects” (現果), the name of seeds is established. Not based on that [seeds] producing [seeds] of its own kind. Thus it should be said that [seeds are] co-existent with effects.

3) “Constantly and continuously arising” (Ch. *heng sui zhuan* 恒隨轉) which means that [a seed as] “a continuity of one kind” (一類相續) must stay for a long time until “ultimate state” (究竟位) in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates [seven] “transforming consciousness” (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*) because they are changing and interrupted. Which are not associated with the dharmas of seeds. This indicates that “seeds are produced in their own kind” (種子自類相生) [in a continuity].

4) “Nature being determinate” (Ch. *xing jue ding* 性決定) which means that, following power of direct causes, the capability to produce the virtuous, or the unvirtuous or etc are determinate in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates other [Buddhist] sects’ insistence that the fact that “a cause of different nature” (異性因) produces “an effect of different nature” (異性果) has the implication of “direct causes” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*).

5) “Depending on multiple conditions” (Ch. *dai zhong yuan* 待眾緣) which means that [a seed] relies on the coming together of multiple conditions that it requires to produce excellent capability in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates non-Buddhists’ insistency that “natural cause” (自然因) does not depend on conditions and can constantly and suddenly produce effects. Alternatively, to negate other sects’ insistence that there are always conditions. [This implication] indicates that the conditions on which seeds are dependent are not constantly existent. Thus seeds cannot constantly and suddenly produce effects.

6) “Inducing own effect” (Ch. *yin zi guo* 引自果) which means effects of respective form, mind, and etc are induced by [seeds of] respective [form, mind, and etc] in order to become a seed. This [implication] negates non-Buddhists’ insistency that there is only one cause which producing all effects. Alternatively, to negate other sects’ insistence that forms [i.e. materials], minds and etc could be “direct causes” (因緣) to one another.

### [Inner seeds versus external seeds]<sup>341</sup>

<sup>341</sup> 「唯本識中，功能差別，具斯六義，成種非餘。外穀麥等，識所變故，假立種名，非實種

Only in “root consciousness” (Ch. *ben shi* 本識; i.e. the eighth consciousness) there are “special capabilities or differences of capabilities” (Ch. *gong neng cha bie* 功能差別; i.e. inner seeds) which have these six implications to make them seeds. No others [having these six implications]. Because external [seeds like] granola and so on are what [the eighth] consciousness is transferred into, they are named nominally as seeds, not “real seeds” (實種子).

The power [of these seeds] is able to produce “near and direct effects” (近、正果). Which is named “generative causes” (Ch. *sheng yin* 生因). The power is able to induce “distant and residual effects” (遠、殘果). Which is named “inductive causes” (Ch. *yin yin* 引因).

“Inner seeds” (Ch. *nei zhong* 內種) must be produced and grown by “permeations” (Ch. *xun xi* 熏習; Skt. *vāsanā*). They are able to produce effects directly and are of direct causes. “External seeds” (Ch. *wai zhong* 外種) either have permeations or not. They are “contributory conditions” (Ch. *zeng shang yuan* 增上緣; Skt. *adhipati-pratyaya*) for making “derived effects” (所生果). [External seeds and derived effects] have to use “inner seeds” (內種) as their “direct causes” (因緣) because [external seeds and their derived effects] are “derived effects” of [inner] “seeds that share the similar characteristics” (共相種子).<sup>342</sup>

#### 4-3-4-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-4-2-1 *She dacheng lun* vs. *Weishi kaimeng wenda*

Before detailed discussion, it might be good to have a quick look at Table 3-4 in Appendix 1. I like to draw attention to two main interesting things. 1) LMC#1 have citation rate of over 30% in this section and the main source is *She dacheng lun shi* that was composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang; 2) Starting from LMC#2, the quote frequency and quote count from WKWD are getting very important. Moreover, other versions of *She dacheng lun shi* are used as well.

LMC#1 quotation behavior is easier to understand. As LMC#1 noted at the very beginning of this section<sup>343</sup>, the verse of *She dacheng lun* is where six implications of

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子。此種勢力，生近、正果，名曰生因，引遠、殘果，令不頓絕，即名引因。內種必由熏習生長，親能生果，是因緣性。外種熏習或有或無，為增上緣，辦所生果，必以內種為彼因緣，是共相種所生果故。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 9, b28-c5)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 248-50. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 57-58.

<sup>342</sup> See Lee, “*Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian*” 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 1, p.457. Lee further interprets “共相種子” as seeds of seen aspects that are similar. I am not sure if 相 means “相分” (seen aspect).

<sup>343</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 543, c8-10 // Z 1:81, p. 37, a5-7 // R81, p. 73, a5-7.

seeds in CWSL comes from. Thus, it is understandable that LMC#1 uses *She dacheng lun shi* to support his commentary. On the other hand, from LMC#2 onwards, we see that other late-Ming commentators, especially LMC#2 and LMC#3, quote WKWD very often to help with their commentaries. It seems indicating that WKWD contributes in explicating six implications of seeds in certain way that could not be done by *She dacheng lun shi*. We will see if the following two case studies could shed some lights on the contribution of WKWD and how different versions of *She dacheng lun shi* are used to explain one topic.

#### 4-3-4-2-2 How to understand “Co-existent with effect” ?

LMC#1 notes “...*She lun* says, “It does not make sense that [those causes which] have ceased are able to produce effect like a dead rooster crowing. Thus it should be agreed that seeds and effects abide at the same time.” Although manifestations and seeds are different in kinds, they are not conflicting to each other. One body is manifestation while what produces [the body] is seed. So called “function of one body” (一身作用) is that seed and manifestation are simultaneous. Thus it is called “existent at the same time” (俱有). Which is different from that a seed producing another seed. [Because] the preceding [seed] and following [seed] are conflicting to each other, they must not exist at the same time...”<sup>344</sup> Here we see that LMC#1 quotes *She dacheng lun shi*<sup>345</sup> first, then followed by his own explanation.

Different from LMC#1, both LMC#2<sup>346</sup> and LMC#3 start by question and answer like WKWD. Since LMC#3’s note is easier to be recognized as a quotation from WKWD, I would translate LMC#3 quote as below.

Challenging question says, if “momentariness” (Ch. *cha na mie* 剎那滅) was qualified as seeds, then the seed of preceding thought [that ceasing immediately] relative to manifestation of following thought or [the seed of] one own thought [that ceasing immediately] relative to other thought should be qualified as a seed. Answer: The second implication [of seeds] screen them out because of the requirement of “Co-existent with effect” (Ch. *guo ju you* 果俱有).<sup>347</sup>

<sup>344</sup> 「攝論釋云：「已滅生果，不應理故，如死鷄鳴。是故應許，種子與果，俱時而住。」現行、種子雖是類別，互不相違。一身即現行，能生即種子。謂一身作用，是種、現同時，故云俱有。不同從種生種，前後相違，必不俱有也。」(X50, no. 820, p. 543, c17-21 // Z 1:81, p. 37, a14-18 // R81, p. 73, a14-18)

<sup>345</sup> T31, no. 1598, p. 389, b1-2.

<sup>346</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 687, b5-6 // Z 1:81, p. 181, a3-4 // R81, p. 361, a3-4

<sup>347</sup> 「難云：若剎那滅為種子者，應前念種望後念現，或因一念自、他相望，皆與為種。答：第二義揀，要果俱有。」(X50, no. 822, p. 867, b2-4 // Z 1:81, p. 361, b12-14 // R81, p. 721, b12-14) and 「難：若剎那滅為種子者，應前念種望後念現，或曰一念自、他相望，皆與為種。答：第二義揀，要果俱有。」(X55, no. 888, p. 353, c24-p. 354, a2 // Z 2:3, p. 224, d12-14 // R98, p. 448, b12-14.)

Here we clearly see that WKWD did not only explicate the second implication of seeds alone. It also emphasizes that each individual implications of seeds alone could not make it a seed and elaborates why so. Such kind of elaborations do provide the insights that was absent in either *She dacheng lun shi* or CWSL. Therefore, the late-Ming commentators like LMC2, LMC#3 and LMC#5<sup>348</sup> appreciate that and pick it up.

In addition, WKWD is at good at providing the metaphor for explanation. The following is an example that LMC#3 borrows a metaphor from WKWD to explain what it means by that manifestation and seed are different kinds so they are not conflicting to each other and can be existent at the same time.

Question: why are different kinds not conflicting? Why are same kinds conflicting? Answer: It is like a son relative to a mother. Because a son and a mother are different kinds so they can be existent at the same time. A mother relative to herself as a mother are the same kind so there are no two bodies [of a mother] at one time.<sup>349</sup>

Incidentally, LMC#3 selectively quotes ZJL to explain what it could mean by “*xian*” (現).

Commentary say, the seeds, in relation to their derived manifesting effect dharmas, have to be *xian* at the same time. So called “*xian*” have three implications which are “appearing” (顯現), “present” (現在) and “existent” (現有). In other words, “appearing” is to screen out the seventh consciousness. The seventh consciousness is not named as seed because its effect is not appearing. “Present” is to screen out preceding [dharmas] versus following [dharmas]. “Existent” is to screen out nominal dharmas. Those whose substances are really existent are seeds. “[Cause and effect] coming together” (和合) is to screen out separation.<sup>350</sup>

<sup>348</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 323, b1-2 // Z 1:82, p. 223, a18-b1 // R82, p. 445, a18-b1.

<sup>349</sup> 「問：何故異類不違？同類便相違耶？答：如子望母，子不是母，是異類故，同時俱有。母自望母，名為同類，故於一時無二身並。」(X50, no. 821, p. 687, b18-20 // Z 1:81, p. 181, a16-18 // R81, p. 361, a16-18) & 「問：何理同類便說相違？異類不違耶？答：如子望母，子不是母，是異類故，同時俱有。母自望母，名為同類，故於一時無二身並。」(X55, no. 888, p. 354, b7-9 // Z 2:3, p. 225, b7-9 // R98, p. 449, b7-9)

<sup>350</sup> 「釋云：謂此種子要望所生現行果法，俱時現有。現者，謂顯現、現在、現有，三義名現。即顯現言簡彼第七，第七不名種子，果不顯現故。現在簡前、後。現有簡假法。體是實有，方成種子。和合簡相離。」(X50, no. 822, p. 867, b8-12 // Z 1:81, p. 361, b18-c4 // R81, p. 721, b18-p. 722, a4)

If we cross check with CWSLS, we would see that, in fact, ZJL also quotes CWSLS<sup>351</sup>. Thus, the commentary was passed down to the late-Ming commentators through ZJL. Interestingly it seems not well acceptable among other late-Ming commentators to explain “Co-existent with effect” (Ch. *guo ju you* 果俱有). But, I found that the three implications — “appearing”, “present” and “existent” — are used by LMC#4 to explain “manifestations” (現行)<sup>352</sup> and by Mingyu to explain “direct perception” (現量)<sup>353</sup>.

#### 4-3-4-2-3 How to understand “generative causes” and “inductive causes”?

“Generative causes” (生因) and “inductive causes” (引因) are not easy terms to follow. To explain these two terms, LMC#1 basically refers to *She dacheng lun shi* that was composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang and noted as below.

Inner seeds and external seeds both have “generative causes” and “inductive causes”. External seeds, in relation to sprouts, are “causes that generate” (能生因) whereas [external seeds], in relation to stems, are “causes that induce” (能引因). “Storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) is inner seeds. Inner seeds, in direct relation to “psycho-physical existence” (Ch. *ming se* 名色; Skt. *nāma-rūpa*)<sup>354</sup>, are “causes that generate” whereas [inner seeds], in relation to “six internal sense bases” (Ch. *liu chu* 六處; Skt. *ṣaḍ-āyatana*) until “old age and death” (Ch. *lao si* 老死; Skt. *jarā-marāṇa*)<sup>355</sup>, are “causes that induce”. For example, in archery the force to [pull] and release the bowstring is “generative cause”. Since the bowstring released, [the arrow which] not fall into the ground immediately is “inductive cause”.<sup>356</sup>

On other hand, besides paraphrasing portion of what the same source and/or what LMC#1 says<sup>357</sup>, LMC#2 quotes another two different versions of *She dacheng lun shi* as below. The following upper quote is composed by Vasubandhu and

<sup>351</sup> (T48, no. 2016, p. 697, c24-p. 698, a1) & (T43, no. 1830, p. 309, c14-20)

<sup>352</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 171, c4-5 // Z 1:82, p. 71, a12-13 // R82, p. 141, a12-13.

<sup>353</sup> X55, no. 890, p. 396, c9-11 // Z 2:3, p. 267, d15-17 // R98, p. 534, b15-17.

<sup>354</sup> Reference Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>355</sup> Reference Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>356</sup> 「內外種子俱有生、引二因。外種望芽，為能生因，傳望莖等，為能引因。阿賴耶識是內種子，親望名色，為能生因，傳望六處乃至老死，為能引因。譬如射箭，放絃行力，為生因。自絃以往，不即墮地，為引因。」(X50, no. 820, p. 544, a20-24 // Z 1:81, p. 37, c5-9 // R81, p. 74, a5-9). Which is implicit paraphrasing quote from *She dacheng lun shi* (T31, no. 1598, p. 389, c20-p. 390, a4).

<sup>357</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 688, a16-20 // Z 1:81, p. 181, d8-12 // R81, p. 362, b8-12.

translated by Xuanzang. The lower quote is composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha.

*She lun* says, herein inner seeds which lasting until the limit of longevity are “causes that generate” (能生因). External seeds which lasting until the maturation of fruit are “[causes] that generate” (能生[因]). Inner seeds can induce postmortem dead bodies. External seeds can induce post-wither continuity. Because of “inductive causes”, [post-death] continuity stays longer. If [these] two seeds only had “generative cause”, then the effect should cease when the cause was destroy. There should be no implication of temporary continuity. If said that continuity of changes in series occurring momentarily like that the preceding thought being cause, the following thought turning accordingly, then what follows should not all cease. Due to this reason, it is determined that there should be “inductive causes”. These two seeds, for example, [are like that] releasing bowstring and drawing bow being causes, the arrow which not fall [to ground immediately] is able to reach the target in the long distance.<sup>358</sup>

Releasing the arrow is “generative cause”. Drawing the bow is “inductive causes”. The arrow that is released from bowstring is able to travel in long distance. However, if only with cause of releasing the arrow but without drawing the bow, the arrow is not able to travel in long distance. If said that the arrow in the preceding moment producing the arrow in the following moment so the arrow can travel in long distance, then it implies that the arrow would never fall. External seeds and inner seeds are also the same. Because “generative cause” is exhausted, wither and death occur. Because “inductive causes” is exhausted, [continuity] is completely extinct.<sup>359</sup>

There might be two interesting questions deserving attentions here. One question is that why LMC#2 had to pull together two different versions of *She dacheng lun shi*.

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<sup>358</sup> 「攝論云：此中，內種乃至壽量邊際，為能生因。外種乃至果熟，為能生。內種能引喪後尸骸，外種能引枯後相續，由引因故，多時續住。若二種子唯有生因，此因既壞，果即應滅，應無少時相續住義。若謂剎那展轉相續，前念為因，後念隨轉，是則後邊不應都滅，由此決定應有引因。此二種子，譬如放弦、彎弓為因，箭不墮落，遠有所至。」(X50, no. 821, p. 688, a20-b2 // Z 1:81, p. 181, d12-18 // R81, p. 362, b12-18). Which is the quote from (T31, no. 1597, p. 330, a19-27).

<sup>359</sup> 「放箭為生因，彎弓為引因。放箭得離弦，遠有所至。若但以放箭為因，不以彎弓為因，則箭不得遠。若言前剎那箭生後剎那箭故箭得遠，則箭無落義。外、內種子亦爾。由生因盡，故枯喪。由引因盡，故滅盡也。」(X50, no. 821, p. 688, b2-7 // Z 1:81, p. 181, d18-p. 182, a5 // R81, p. 362, b18-p. 363, a5). Which is the quote from (T31, no. 1595, p. 166, b28-c3).



By referring back to the source of the upper quote, we will see that the commentary is not only ambiguous about the relation between the preceding thought and the following thought, but also not elaborate clearly enough on the relationship between releasing the bowstring and drawing the bow. The lower quote happens to address these two shortcomings well.

The other question is that why LMC#2 had to explicitly add another two versions of *She dacheng lun shi*. There might be several possible reasons. I guess one of reasons seems that LMC#1's quote ignores the postmortem continuity which might be explained by "inductive causes" although the version of Asvabhāva does cover this issue. It might also be due to personal preference or implicit opinion. For example, like LMC#1, LMC#4 also uses the same version of *She dacheng lun shi* and ignores postmortem continuity as well.<sup>360</sup> By personal implicit opinion, I mean that both LMC#1 and LMC#4 might think the postmortem continuity might be better explained in "Aspect of Object of Perception" (所緣門). We will have detailed discussion there. Here suffices it to say that the postmortem leftover might be something shared that transformed by others consciousness.

In addition, like LMC#2, LMC#3 also uses the same three versions of *She dacheng lun shi* as reference.<sup>361</sup> Thus, I don't see LMC#3 notes add anything new. As for LMC#5, I think it deserves translation as below and further discussions.

[In terms of] inner seeds, that consciousness is the condition of "psycho-physical existence" (Ch. *ming se* 名色; Skt. *nāma-rūpa*), that psycho-physical existence is the condition of "six internal sense bases" (Ch. *liu ru* 六入; Skt. *ṣaḍ-āyatana*) and etc are named "generative causes". What are generated are "near and direct effects" (近、正果). [What induces] that the postmortem dead bodies does not cease are named "inductive causes". What are induced are "distant and residual effects" (遠、殘果). [In terms of] external seeds, that seeds produce sprouts, that sprouts produce stems, and etc are named "near and direct effects". The post-wither grains which does cease are named "distant and residual effects". Since that external seeds are not real seeds, they can only be used as a metaphor of inner seeds.<sup>362</sup>

<sup>360</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 173, c23-p. 174, a2 // Z 1:82, p. 73, b13-16 // R82, p. 145, b13-16.

<sup>361</sup> X50, no. 822, p. 868, a15-b1 // Z 1:81, p. 362, b1-11 // R81, p. 723, b1-11.

Three versions are : 1) the version that composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang. See X50, no. 822, p. 868, a15-16 // Z 1:81, p. 362, b1-2 // R81, p. 723, b1-2. 2) the version that composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang. See T31, no. 1598, p. 389, c25-27. 3) the version that composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha. See T31, no. 1595, p. 166, b24-c3.

<sup>362</sup> 「內種，則識緣名色、名色緣六入等，名生因，所生近、正果。喪後屍骸不滅，名引因，所引遠、殘果。外種，則種生芽、芽生莖等，名近、正果，穀等枯後不滅，名遠、殘果。然外種既云非實種子，但可借之以喻內種而已。」(X51, no. 824, p. 323, c23-p. 324, a3 // Z 1:82, p. 223, d10-14 // R82, p. 446, b10-14)

It is interesting to note that LMC#5 comes back to CWSL text note and use the criteria of either “near and direct effects” or “distant and residual effects” to decide whether it is either “generative causes” or “inductive causes”, respectively. That is very different from other late-Ming commentaries. Nevertheless, LMC#5 seems not be able to further tell if there is any difference between near effects and direct effects and/or consolidate the difference between LMC#1 & LMC#4 camp and LMC#2 & LMC#3 camp.

Refer to CWSLS note as below, we see where “near and direct effects” or “distant and residual effects” might come from and that LMC#1 & LMC#4 camp and LMC#2 & LMC#3 camp might be consolidated in some way. Unfortunately, such note was not passed down to the late-Ming commentators.

Asvabhāva says, that inner consciousness seeds produce manifesting consciousness is named “near effect” (近果). [The inner consciousness seeds] are “generative causes”. In relation to “psycho-physical existence”, they are “inductive causes”. In relation to sprouts that are near effects, external seeds are “generative causes”. In relation to stems that are “distant effects”, they are “inductive causes”.

Vasubandhu says, inner seeds that produce “direct effects” (正果) are named “generative causes”. [Inner seeds] that produce “residual effects” (殘果) are named “inductive causes”. Those present seeds that produce present bodies are named “generative causes”. [Those present seeds that produce] “six internal sense bases” (六處) and etc are all named “generative causes”. [What induces residual postmortem bodies etc are named “inductive causes”].

If all of “four kinds of birth” (四生) are of two causes (i.e. generative cause and inductive cause), the theory of Asvabhāva wins because “miraculous births” (化生) die without dead bodies... But Vasubandhu’s brief commentary and Asvabhāva’s extensive commentary are not against to each other.<sup>363</sup>

### 4-3-5 Implications of Permeations

#### 4-3-5-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

Based on what implications is the name of “permeation” (Ch. *xun xi* 熏習; Skt.

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<sup>363</sup> 「無性云: 如內識種生現識等名近果, 是生因, 望名色等是遠果, 是引因。外種望芽是近果, 是生因。望莖等是遠果, 是引因。天親云: 如內種子生正果, 名生因; 生殘果, 名引因。即現在種生現在身, 名生因; 生六處等, 皆名生因; 引餘枯喪屍骸等名引因 ...若遍四生具二因者, 無性理勝, 以化生死無屍骸故... 但是天親解略, 無性釋廣, 亦不相違。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 312, a14-b4)

*vāsanā*) established? “What is permeated” (Ch. *suo xun* 所熏) and “what permeates” (Ch. *neng xun* 能熏) each have four implications, respectively. Which are making seeds to produce and to grow so they are named “permeation” (熏習).<sup>364</sup>

**[What is permeated 所熏? ]<sup>365</sup>**

What are those four implications which are named “what is permeated” (所熏)?

- 1) “Attribute of enduring” (Ch. *jian zhu xing* 堅住性). If dharmas continue in one kind all along and are able to hold “permeation” (Ch. *xi qi* 習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*), they are what is permeated. This negates [seven] “transforming consciousness” (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*), sound, wind and etc. Their attribute is not enduring so they are not what is permeated.
- 2) “Attribute of indeterminacy” (Ch. *wu ji xing* 無記性). If dharmas are equally able to accommodate [all] “permeations” without conflicts, they are what is permeated. This negates those virtuous and defiled dharmas whose powers are too strong to accommodate [permeations]. Thus they are not what is permeated. Due to this reason, Buddha’s pure eighth consciousness only carry old seeds that are not newly permeated.
- 3) “Attribute of permeability” (Ch. *ke xun xing* 可熏性). If dharmas that are “autonomous” (自在) and not “firmly sealed” (堅密) in nature are able to accommodate “permeations” (習氣), they are what is permeated. This negates “mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo* 心所; Skt. *caitta*) and unconditioned dharmas (Ch. *wu wei fa* 無為法; Skt. *asaṃskṛta-dharma*) because [mental factors] are depending on others [i.e. minds] and [unconditioned dharmas] are firmly sealed. Thus they are not what is permeated.
- 4) “Attribute of joining together with what permeates” (Ch. *yu neng xun gong he he xing* 與能熏共和合性). If [dharmas joining together] with “what permeates” (能熏) at the same time in the same place and [the dharmas and what permeates] are neither the same nor separated apart, [the dharmas] are what is permeated. This negates other bodies’ [eighth consciousness as what

<sup>364</sup> 「依何等義立熏習名? 所熏、能熏, 各具四義, 令種生長, 故名熏習。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 9, c5-7)

<sup>365</sup> 「何等名為所熏四義? 一、堅住性, 若法始終一類相續, 能持習氣, 乃是所熏。此遮轉識, 及聲風等, 性不堅住, 故非所熏。二、無記性, 若法平等, 無所違逆, 能容習氣, 乃是所熏。此遮善染, 勢力強盛, 無所容納, 故非所熏。由此, 如來第八淨識, 唯帶舊種, 非新受熏。三、可熏性, 若法自在, 性非堅密, 能受習氣, 乃是所熏。此遮心所, 及無為法, 依他堅密, 故非所熏。四、與能熏共和合性, 若與能熏, 同時同處, 不即不離, 乃是所熏。此遮他身、剎那前後, 無和合義, 故非所熏。唯異熟識具此四義, 可是所熏, 非心所等。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 9, c7-19)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 250-52. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 58.

is permeated] and that [what is permeated occurring] a moment before or after [“what permeates”]. Because of no implication of joining together, they are not what is permeated.

Only the "maturing consciousness" (Ch. *yi shou shi* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) that are of these four implications are OK to be what is permeated, not mental factors and etc.

[What permeates 能熏? ]<sup>366</sup>

What are those four implications which are named “what permeates” (能熏)?

- 1) “Attribute of arising and ceasing” (Ch. *you sheng mie* 有生滅). If dharmas are impermanent and have function to produce and grow “permeation” (Ch. *xi qi* 習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*), they are “what permeates”. This negates the unconditioned (Ch. *wu wei* 無為; Skt. *asaṃskṛta*) [dharmas] which do not change before and after and have no function to produce and grow [permeation]. Thus they are not “what permeates”.
- 2) “Attribute of excellent function” (Ch. *you sheng yong* 有勝用). If arising and ceasing [of dharmas] increase powers that are able to induce permeations, [the dharmas] are “what permeates”. This negates "maturing mind and mental factors" (異熟心、心所) and etc. Their powers are so weak that they are not what permeates.
- 3) “Attribute of increasing and decreasing” (Ch. *you zeng jian* 有增減). If [dharmas have “excellent functions” (勝用) which are either increasable or decreasable and which are able to gather permeations, [the dharmas] are what permeates. This negates “Buddhahood” (佛果) which is perfectly virtuous dharma, [Buddhahood] which neither increases nor decreases, so it is not what permeates. If it was what permeates, it would not be perfect because Buddhahood before and after [permeation] would become either better or worse.
- 4) “Attribute of transforming by joining together with what is permeated” (Ch. *yu suo xun he he er zhuan* 與所熏和合而轉). If [dharmas transform by

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<sup>366</sup> 「何等名為能熏四義? 一、有生滅, 若法非常, 能有作用, 生長習氣, 乃是能熏。此遮無為, 前後不變, 無生長用, 故非能熏。二、有勝用, 若有生滅, 勢力增盛, 能引習氣, 乃是能熏。此遮異熟、心、心所等, 勢力羸劣, 故非能熏。三、有增減, 若有勝用, 可增可減, 攝植習氣, 乃是能熏。此遮佛果, 圓滿善法, 無增無減, 故非能熏。彼若能熏, 便非圓滿, 前後佛果, 應有勝劣。四、與所熏和合而轉, 若與所熏, 同時同處, 不即不離, 乃是能熏。此遮他身, 剎那前後, 無和合義, 故非能熏。唯七轉識及彼心所, 有勝勢用而增減者, 具此四義可是能熏。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 9, c19-p. 10, a2)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 252-53. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 59.

joining together] with what is permeated at the same time in the same place and [the dharmas and what is permeated] are neither the same nor separated apart, [the dharmas] are what permeates. This negates other bodies' [seven transforming consciousness as what permeates] and that [what permeates occurring] a moment before or after [what is permeated. Because of no implication of joining together, they are not what permeates.

Only [seven] “transforming consciousness “ (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識 ; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*) and their “mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo* 心所; Skt. *caitta*) which have “excellent power and function” (勝勢用) to increase and decrease are of these four implications and are OK to be what permeates.

### [Implication of Permeation- Simultaneous Cause and Effect]<sup>367</sup>

In such way that “what permeates” (能熏) and “what is permeated” (所熏) arise together and cease together, the “implication of permeation” (熏習義) is established. [What permeates] makes the seeds of what is permeated grow is like [flowers] permeates [seeds of] “sesame” (i.e. 苳藤) so it is named “permeation” (Ch. *xun xi* 熏習; Skt. *vāsanā*). When “consciousness that permeates” (能熏識) grow from a seed [into manifestation], [it] become “direct cause” that would again be permeated into a new seed. Three dharmas [i.e. an old seed, manifestation and a new seed] transform in sequence, “being cause and effect at the same time” (因果同時). It is like that wick producing flame and flame producing burned wick. Also, it is like “a bundle of reeds” (蘆束) supporting each other. The reason of “cause and effect being simultaneous ” (因果俱時) is unwavering.

That “what permeates” [as manifestations] produce seeds and that seeds produce manifestations are like "co-operative causes" (Ch. *ju you yin* 俱有因; Skt. *sahabhū-hetu*) producing the "operative effect" (Ch. *shi yong guo* 士用果; Skt. *purusakāra-phala*). That seeds, before and after [manifestations] “producing each other in own kind” (自類相生) is like that "homogeneous causes" (Ch. *ton glei yin* 同類因; Skt. *sabhāga-hetu*) producing "homogenous effect" (Ch. *deng liu guo* 等流果; Skt. *nisyanda-phala*). These two [kinds of causes]<sup>368</sup>, relative to effects, are of direct

<sup>367</sup> 「如是能熏與所熏識俱生俱滅，熏習義成，令所熏中種子生長，如熏苳藤，故名熏習。能熏識等，從種生時，即能為因，復熏成種。三法展轉，因果同時，如炷生焰，焰生焦炷。亦如蘆束，更互相依。因果俱時，理不傾動。能熏生種，種起現行，如俱有因，得士用果。種子前後，自類相生，如同類因，引等流果。此二於果，是因緣性，除此餘法，皆非因緣。設名因緣，應知假說。是謂略說一切種相。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a2-11)。

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 253-55. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 59-60.

<sup>368</sup> One kind is “cause and effect being simultaneous” (因果俱時). The other is “cause and effect being asynchronous (因果異時). The latter is “a seed producing another seed in one kind” (種子自類相生) Good illustration could be referred to Kōitsu Yokoyama and Yang-Zhu Xu, “*Weishi Si Xiang Ru Men*”

causes. Except these [two dharmas], the rest of dharmas are all not direct causes. If the rest of dharmas were named “direct causes” (因緣), one should understand them as “provisional explanation” (假說) .

[Discussions regarding seeds as above is] the brief of characteristics of all seeds.

#### 4-3-5-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-3-5-2-1 What does “permeation” mean?

First of all, it is brought to my attention that CWSLS’s commentary regarding what “permeation” (Ch. *xun xi* 熏習; Skt. *vāsanā*)” means was passed down through ZJL to the late-Ming commentators. However, LMC#3 is the only late-Ming commentary that picked up the note as below.

So called “*xun*” (熏) is to trigger (Ch. *fa* 發) or to cause (Ch. *you zhi* 猶致/由致). So called “*xi*” (習) is to produce (Ch. *sheng* 生), to be close to (Ch. *jin* 近), to repeat (Ch. *shu* 數). In other words, [“permeation” (Ch. *xun xi* 熏習)] is to trigger and cause effects within the root consciousness because it make seeds to produce and/or being close to [seeds] to make [seeds] to grow.<sup>369</sup>

Why didn’t other late-Ming commentators refer to ZJL for the definition of “permeation” like LMC#3? I guess one of possible reasons is that ZJL’s further note right after the above quote from CWSLS seem not quite matching with CWSL’s further discussion regarding implication of permeations. Here is the partial translation of ZJL’s further note.

There are two kinds of “permeation” (Ch. *xun* 熏): 1) “Habitual permeation” (習熏) which is to permeate the substance of mind so to make the pure, the defiled and etc phenomena happen. 2) “Supporting permeation” (資熏) which mutually supported by manifesting mind, objects and all mental disturbances etc. *Leng jing* 楞經<sup>370</sup> says, “Dahui! “Inconceivable permeation” (不思議熏) and “inconceivable transforms” (不思議變) are causes of “manifesting consciousness” (現識). Taking all kinds of objects and permeations of

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唯識思想入門 (Taipei, Taiwan: Dong da chu ban she, 2002), p.102.

<sup>369</sup> 「熏者，發也，或猶致也。習者，生也，近也，數也。即發致果於本識內，令種子生，近生長故。」 (X50, no. 822, p. 868, b14-16 // Z 1:81, p. 362, c6-8 // R81, p. 724, a6-8) or (T48, no. 2016, p. 699, a7-9) or 「熏者發也，或由致也。習者，生也，近也，數也。即發致果於本識內，令種子生，近令生長故。」 (T43, no. 1830, p. 312, c3-5)

<sup>370</sup> *Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 (Skt. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*; The Scripture on the Buddha's Entering the Country of Lanka) that translated by Guṇabhadra.

beginningless delusions are causes of “phenomena-discriminating consciousness” (分別事識)<sup>371</sup>.”<sup>372</sup> Therefore, “ignorance” (Ch. *wu ming* 無明; Skt. *avidyā*) is able to permeate “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) so to make the defiled dharmas happen. “Original awakening” (Ch. *ben jue* 本覺) is able to permeate “ignorance” (Ch. *wu ming* 無明; Skt. *avidyā*) so to give rise to pure function. These are all where those which are not permeable are permeable. They are named “inconceivable permeation”. [These are all where] those which are not transformable are transformable. They are named “inconceivable transforms”. *Sheng man jing* 勝鬘經<sup>373</sup> says, what is non-defilement (不染) become defiled is difficult to comprehend. What is already defiled become non-defilement (不染) is difficult to understand.<sup>374</sup>

Here I am surprised that how disciplined LMC#3 was. Because LMC#3 seemed very cautious on where to start the quote and where to end the quote. He just happened to quote exactly the message from CWSLS through ZJL but did not go any further like ZJL.

#### 4-3-5-2-2 Is "thusness" “permeable”?

In CWSL the discussion of the third “attribute of permeability” (Ch. *ke xun xing* 可熏性) clearly states that unconditioned dharmas (Ch. *wu wei fa* 無為法; Skt. *asaṃskṛta-dharma*) are not permeable because unconditioned dharmas are “firmly sealed” (堅密). Thus LMC#1<sup>375</sup>, LMC#2<sup>376</sup> and LMC#3 all quoted ZJL to exclude the possibility that thusness is permeable. Since LMC#3’s quotation is almost character by character, I translate it as below.

So called “not firmly sealed in nature” is to screen out Bodhisattva Aśvaghōṣa’s [argument] that thusness is permeable. The proponent says, the substance of unconditioned [dharmas] (無為[法]) is firmly sealed. Like golden stone, it will never be permeable. Those that are permeable must be hollowly coarse in nature

<sup>371</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>372</sup> See T16, no. 670, p. 483, a18-21.

<sup>373</sup> *Sheng man shizi hou yi cheng defang bian fang guang jing* 勝鬘師子吼一乘大方便方廣經 (Skt. Śrīmālā-sūtra or Śrīmālādevī-siṃha-nāda-sūtra; Lion’s Roar of Queen Śrīmālā) (T12, no. 353, p. 222, c2-7).

<sup>374</sup> 「熏有二種：一習熏，謂熏心體成染淨等事。二資熏，謂現行心境及諸惑相資等。楞經云：「大慧！不思議熏及不思議變，是現識因。取種種塵及無始妄想熏，是分別事識因。」是以無明能熏真如，成其染法。本覺能熏無明，起其淨用。此皆不可熏處而能熏，名不思議熏。不可變異而變異，云不思議變。勝鬘經云：不染而染，難可了知，染而不染，難可了知。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 699, a9-17)

<sup>375</sup> X50, no. 820, p. 544, b24-c2 // Z 1:81, p. 37, d15-17 // R81, p. 74, b15-17.

<sup>376</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 689, a9-11 // Z 1:81, p. 182, d1-3 // R81, p. 364, b1-3.

in order to contain seeds. To rescue his argument, Āśvaghoṣa says, when I said that thusness is permeable, [I mean that] thusness is “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性). The eighth consciousness is “phenomenon/characteristic” (Ch. *xiang* 相). The nature and the phenomenon are not separated. When the phenomenon is permeated, the nature is permeated as well. Or to put it another way. “Subsuming the characteristics back into nature” (Ch. *she xiang gui xing* 攝相歸性). Thus what’s wrong with that thusness is permeable? Just like using the gold to make finger rings. To refute the argument, Dharmapāla says, the phenomenon is permeated whereas the nature is not. Which is like that the world is burned whereas the empty space is not burned. Only the eighth consciousness that is hollowly coarse in nature is permeable. Which is like that the clothes that is hollowly coarse is able to be permeated by perfume and etc.<sup>377</sup>

Based on LMC#1, LMC#2, and LMC#3 note, we see that they are fully aware that it is CWSL position that thusness is not permeable. Although LMC#4 and LMC#5 did not specifically mentioned the argument between Āśvaghoṣa and Dharmapāla, they all noted that unconditioned dharmas (無為法) are not permeable.<sup>378</sup>

#### 4-3-5-2-3 Is Buddha able to permeate?

In CWSL the third “attribute of increasing and decreasing” (Ch. *you zeng jian* 有增減) negates “Buddhahood” (佛果) as what permeates because the perfect Buddhahood is not supposed to be either increases or decreases. However, if Buddha is not the most ideal model who permeates, what is “permeations of hearing” (Ch. *wen xun xi* 聞熏習; Skt. *śrutavāsanā*) all about? This seems confusing, doesn’t it? Let’s see how the late-Ming commentators understood this attribute.

LMC#1 notes “...If [Buddhahood] were what permeates, it will either increases or decreases. Because the preceding permeates the following, earlier Buddhas’ virtue would be inferior while latter Buddhas’ virtue would win. Which is against the correct principle...”<sup>379</sup>

<sup>377</sup> 「言性非堅密者，即簡馬鳴菩薩真如受熏。論主云：無為體堅密，如金石等，決不受熏。夫可熏者，且須體性虛疎，能容種子方得。馬鳴救云：我言真如受熏者，以真如是性，第八是相，性相不相離。若熏著相時，兼熏著性，或攝相歸性，故真如受熏何失？如將金石作指環等。護法破云：熏相不熏性，如火燒世界，不燒虛空。今唯是第八心王體性虛疎，方可受熏。如衣服虛疎，方能受香等熏。」(X50, no. 822, p. 869, a10-17 // Z 1:81, p. 363, a14-b3 // R81, p. 725, a14-b3) or (T48, no. 2016, p. 699, c8-17)

<sup>378</sup> (X51, no. 823, p. 174, b10-13 // Z 1:82, p. 73, d12-15 // R82, p. 146, b12-15) & (X51, no. 824, p. 324, b4-6 // Z 1:82, p. 224, b3-5 // R82, p. 447, b3-5).

<sup>379</sup> 「若作能熏，便有增減。以前熏後，前佛德劣，後佛德勝，便違正理。」(X50, no. 820, p. 544, c18-19 // Z 1:81, p. 38, a15-16 // R81, p. 75, a15-16)



LMC#2 notes "...The first seven consciousnesses of Buddhahood are of "equality nature" (平等性). They neither lose nor gain so they are not what permeates. If the first seven consciousnesses in stage of Buddhahood were what permeates, they would not be perfect. Earlier Buddhas and latter Buddhas should have distinction between superior and inferior..."<sup>380</sup>

By quoting HJSC<sup>381</sup>, LMC#3 notes that "... The seventh *manas* [consciousness] still have increase and decrease until the uncontaminated stage except Buddhahood. So called there is distinction of superior and inferior means that earlier Buddhas should be superior while latter Buddhas should be inferior because earlier Buddhas permeated and obtained more uncontaminated seeds..."<sup>382</sup>

It is interesting to note that, different from LMC#1 where the latter Buddhas win, LMC#3's quote says that earlier Buddhas wins because they permeated and attained more uncontaminated seeds. LMC#4<sup>383</sup> and LMC#5<sup>384</sup> seemed to follow LMC#3 or the same source HJSC, they all note that earlier Buddhas would have permeated longer and attained more uncontaminated seeds. Regardless, all the late-Ming commentators agree with CWSL that Buddha is not able to permeate. They did not ask what "permeations of hearing" (Ch. *wen xun xi* 聞熏習; Skt. *śrutavāsanā*) is possible if Buddha was not able to permeate.

Furthermore, if we take into account the fourth "attribute of transforming by joining what is permeated" (與所熏和合而轉) of "what permeates" (能熏), we see that CWSL negates others' first seven consciousnesses as what permeates for one's own eighth consciousness as what is permeated. For example, LMC#2 elaborates by noting that "...Now other persons' first seven [consciousnesses] in relation to this person's eighth consciousness are not at the same time and not in the same place. There is no implication of joining together so they are not what permeates..."<sup>385</sup> LMC#1 also explain by noting that "... There is no way for the eighth consciousness of other bodies to join together with one's first seven consciousnesses. Thus it should be negated..."<sup>386</sup> In short, since in the perfect stage, Buddha's first seven consciousnesses already stop permeating his's own eighth consciousness. As for others, Buddha's seven consciousnesses got no way to permeate the eighth

<sup>380</sup> 「佛果前七是平等性，無損無益，故非能熏。果位前七，若能熏者，便非圓滿，前佛後佛應有勝劣。」(X50, no. 821, p. 689, b16-18 // Z 1:81, p. 183, a14-16 // R81, p. 365, a14-16)

<sup>381</sup> T36, no. 1736, p. 246, a27-b1.

<sup>382</sup> 「第七末那，至無漏位，亦有增減，唯除佛果。言有勝劣者，前佛應勝，後佛應劣，以前佛熏得無漏種子多故。」(X50, no. 822, p. 869, b22-24 // Z 1:81, p. 363, c14-16 // R81, p. 726, a14-16)

<sup>383</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 174, c10-11 // Z 1:82, p. 74, a18-b1 // R82, p. 147, a18-b1.

<sup>384</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 324, c4-6 // Z 1:82, p. 224, c9-11 // R82, p. 448, a9-11.

<sup>385</sup> 「今他人前七，望此人第八，不同時處，無和合義，故非能熏。」(X50, no. 821, p. 689, b23-24 // Z 1:81, p. 183, b3-4 // R81, p. 365, b3-4)

<sup>386</sup> 「他身第八，與己前七，無和合理，故應遮止」(X50, no. 820, p. 544, c20-21 // Z 1:81, p. 38, a17-18 // R81, p. 75, a17-18)

consciousness of any other sentient being, either. At least not directly.



#### 4-4 Aspect of Mental Activity to Perceive 行相門

##### 4-4-1 Brief Introduction of “Mental Activity to Perceive” and “Object of Perception”

###### 4-4-1-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>387</sup>

What are “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*)<sup>388</sup> and “object of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*) of this consciousness [the eighth consciousness, i.e. *ālayavijñāna* or the storehouse consciousness]?

They are “incomprehensible” (Ch. *bu ke zhi* 不可知; Skt. *asamviditaka*) “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*), “dwelling” (Ch. *chu* 處; Skt. *sthāna*) and “perceiving” (Ch. *le* 了; Skt. *vijñapti*)

“Perceiving” (了) is “discerning” (Ch. *le bie* 了別) which is “mental activity to perceive” (行相) because consciousnesses have “discerning” as “mental activity to perceive” (行相). “Dwelling” (處) is where to dwell. Which is the “container world” (Ch. *qi shi jian* 器世間; Skt. *bhājana-loka*) where all sentient beings are dwelling in.

There are two kinds of “clinging” (執受): “all seeds” (諸種子) and “body with sense faculties” (Ch. *you gen shen* 有根身; Skt. *sendriya-kāya*). So called “all seeds” (諸種子) are “karmic impressions” (Ch. *xi qi* 習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*) of “characteristics” (相), “names” (名), and “discriminations” (分別). So called “body with sense faculties” (有根身) is all “material sense faculties” (Ch. *se gen* 色根) together with their basis. These two [i.e. “all seeds” (諸種子) and “body with sense faculties” (有根身)] are what [the eighth] consciousness is clinging to because [the eighth consciousness] takes [these two] as “its own substance” (自體) [sharing] “one common united destiny” (Ch. *tong an wei* 同安危; Skt. *eka-yoga-kṣema*).

“Clinging” (執受) and “dwelling”(處) are both “object of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*) [of the eighth consciousness]. When the storehouse consciousness’s (i.e. *ālayavijñāna* or the eighth consciousness) “own substance” (自體) is arising, due to “power of direct cause” (因緣力), it internally transforms into seeds and “body with sense faculties” (有根身) and externally transforms into the

<sup>387</sup> 「此識行相、所緣云何? 謂不可知執受、處、了。「了」謂了別, 即是行相, 識以了別為行相故。「處」謂處所, 即器世間, 是諸有情所依處故。「執受」有二: 謂諸種子及有根身。「諸種子」者, 謂諸相、名、分別習氣。「有根身者」, 謂諸色根及根依處。此二皆是識所執受, 攝為自體, 同安危故。「執受」及「處」俱是所緣。阿賴耶識, 因緣力故, 自體生時, 內變為種及有根身, 外變為器, 即以所變, 為自所緣。行相仗之而得起故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a11-20) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 256-58. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>388</sup> The Sanskrit word “*ākāra*” could have several different meanings. According to Chen’s study, its meanings could be roughly divided into three kinds: 1) forms of external things; 2) images that represent external things in consciousness; 3) mental function to perceive objects. The 3<sup>rd</sup> one is close to what CWSL means. See Yi-biao Chen, “Weishi Xue “Xing Xiang” (Ākāra) Zhi Yan Jiu” 唯識學「行相」(Ākāra)之研究,” *Satyabhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly* 正觀 no. 43 (2007): p.8. And See T29, no. 1558, p. 137, c3-4.

“container” (器; i.e. “container world” 器世間). In other words, “what it transforms into” (Ch. *suo bian* 所變) become its own “objects of perception” (所緣). Because “mental activity to perceive” (行相) relies on it [i.e. “object of perception” (所緣)] to be able to arise.

#### 4-4-1-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-4-1-2-1 Different understandings of “clinging” by Late-Ming commentators

Reading the brief introduction of both “Aspect of Mental activity to Perceive” (行相門) and “Aspect of Object of Perception (所緣門), I am under an impression that the late-Ming commentators seemed not fully aligned in terms of their understanding of what “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*) means.

LMC#1 notes “...”*zhi*” (執) and “*sho*” (受) each have two implications. Two implications of *zhi* are “holding it as its own substance” (執為自體) and “making it not to scatter by holding” (持令不散). Two implications of *sho* are “taking it as object” (領以為境) and “making it to produce perception/experience” (令生覺受). Because of “one common united destiny” (同安危), the eighth consciousness, in relation to “body with sense faculties” (根身), have all these four implications... If in relation to “container world” (器界) which are only “object of perception” (所緣) and not “clinging”, [the eighth consciousness only have] one implication which is “taking it as object” (領以為境) without the rest of three implications...”<sup>389</sup>

LMC#2 notes “...When the eighth consciousness perceives seeds, it has one implication of *zhi*— “making it not to scatter by holding” (持令不壞), and one implication of *sho* — “taking it as object” (領以為境). When the eighth consciousness perceives “body with sense faculties”, it have four implications of *zhi* and *sho*... If the eighth consciousness perceives “container world”, it only have one implication among [implications of] *zhi sho*— “taking it as object” (領以為境)...”<sup>390</sup>

By quoting ZJL, LMC#3 notes as below.

*Zhi* and *sho* each have two implications. Two implications of *zhi* are: 1) the implication of “*she*” (攝) and 2) the implication of “*chi*” (持). So called *she* is “taking it as its own substance”. So called *chi* is “making it not to scatter by holding”. Two implications of *sho* are: 1) the implication of “*ling*” (領) and 2) the implication of “*jue*” (覺). So called *ling* is “taking it as object”. So called *jue*

<sup>389</sup> 「執受各具二義。執二義者，執為自體、持令不散；受二義者，領以為境、令生覺受。同安危故，第八望根身，四義皆具... 若望器界，但為所緣非是執受，即領以為境一義，無餘三義。」(X50, no. 820, p. 545, b3-8 // Z 1:81, p. 38, c12-17 // R81, p. 76, a12-17)

<sup>390</sup> 「第八緣種子時，具執一義，持令不壞，具受一義，領以為境。第八緣根身時，具執受四義... 若第八緣器世間，於執受中，具受一義，領以為境...」(X50, no. 821, p. 690, c4-12 // Z 1:81, p. 184, b8-16 // R81, p. 367, b8-16)

is “making it to produce perception/experience”. [Because of] sharing one common destiny, “body with sense faculties” have four implications of *zhi* and *sho*... If it is “mean of valid cognition of container world” (器世間量), it is only “object of perception” (所緣) and not “clinging” (執受). i.e. [It] has the implication of “taking it as object” (領以為境) among two implications of “*sho*” (受). So called “non-cling” (非執受) means there are no three implications: of “taking it as its own substance”, of “making it not to scatter by holding”, and of “making it to produce perception”.<sup>391</sup>

LMC#5 notes “... *Zhi* has two implications: 1) “taking it as its own substance”; 2) “making it not to scatter by holding”. *Sho* has two implications: 1) “taking it as object”; 2) “making it to produce perception”. [When] the eighth consciousness perceives seeds, it have two implications-“making it not to scatter by holding” and “taking it as object”. [When the eighth consciousness] perceives “body with sense faculties”, it has four implications.... If [the eighth consciousness] perceives “container world”, there is only one implication-“taking it as object” ...”<sup>392</sup>

LMC#4 notes “...“Body with sense faculties” have four implications... If with “container world”, [it] only got two implications-“taking it as object” and “making it not to scatter by holding”. Thus [it] only perceives but not clinging. If [with] contaminated seeds, among four implications [it] is only short of one implication-“making it to produce perception”. Only holding but no “clinging”. If [with] uncontaminated seeds, among four implications [it] only got “making it not to scatter by holding”. Thus [the eighth consciousness] neither perceive [uncontaminated seeds] nor cling to [uncontaminated seeds]...”<sup>393</sup>

In order to find where the late-Ming commentators agree and where they disagree with each other, I consolidate previous notes by the late-Ming commentators into Table 35 for comparison. Table 35 indicates that they were fully aligned in terms of “body with sense faculties” that being clang by the eighth consciousness. Which means that “body with sense faculties” possess all of the four elements that defining

<sup>391</sup> 「執受各具二義。執二義者，一攝義，二持義。言攝者，即攝為自體。言持者，即持令不散。受二義者，一領義，二覺義。領者，領以為境。覺者，令生覺受。安危共同，根身具執受四義... 若器世間量，但緣非執受，即受二義中，領以為境。又言非執受者，緣無攝為自體、持令不散、令生覺受三義。」(X50, no. 822, p. 871, b7-16 // Z 1:81, p. 365, b17-c8 // R81, p. 729, b17-p. 730, a8) or (T48, no. 2016, p. 702, b12-22)

<sup>392</sup> 「執有二義：一攝為自體；二持令不散。受有二義：一領以為境；二令生覺受。第八緣種子，具持令不散、領以為境二義。緣根身具四義... 若緣器界，但有領以為境一義也。」(X51, no. 824, p. 325, b4-9 // Z 1:82, p. 225, b3-8 // R82, p. 449, b3-8)

<sup>393</sup> 「根身具四義... 若器世間，唯得領以為境、持令不散二義，故但緣而不執受。若有漏種，四義中缺令生覺受一義，但有執持而無執受。若無漏種，四義中唯得持令不散一義，故非緣非執受。」(X51, no. 823, p. 175, a17-23 // Z 1:82, p. 74, c13-d1 // R82, p. 148, a13-b1)

“clinging”. In addition, they were quite aligned that the “container world” only possess one element except LMC#4 who maintained that the world possesses two elements. In terms of seeds, both LMC#1 and LMC#3 were silent whereas LMC#2 and LMC#5 maintain that the seeds possess only two elements. LMC#4 is the only one who further broke down the seeds into “contaminated seeds” (Ch. *you lou zhong* 有漏種; Skt. *āsrava-bīja*) and “uncontaminated seeds” (Ch. *wu lou zhong* 無漏種; Skt. *anāsrava-bīja*) and maintains that contaminated seeds possess three elements whereas uncontaminated seeds possess one element.

#### 4-4-1-2-2 Why different understandings of “clinging” by Late-Ming commentators

Why would the late-Ming commentators have different understandings of the meaning of “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*) in terms of the seeds and container worlds? From the citation study, we see they basically relied on either ZJL or WKWD for the definition of “clinging”. Thus, I come out Table 36<sup>394</sup> to see whether or not their sources were aligned. Unfortunately, they were not aligned in terms of container world and seeds.

ZJL was silent about the seeds. That might explain why both LMC#1 and LMC#3 were silent to this regard, too. ZJL maintained that “container world” possesses only one of four elements. This is the same position that most late-Ming commentators took except LMC#4 who happened to take the same position as WKWD.

However, in terms of seeds, LMC#4 did not just take exactly same position as of WKWD. LMC#4 went further by distinguishing contaminated seeds from uncontaminated seeds. He only agreed with WKWD in terms of contaminated seeds but came out his own position in terms of uncontaminated seeds. On the other hand, both LMC#2 and LMC#5 seemed modifying the position WKWD by removing one element but did not say why. Probably taking it into account that the eighth consciousness is not supposed to take uncontaminated seeds as its own body.

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<sup>394</sup> See *Zongjing Lu* position in previous LMC#3 quote. As for *Weishi kaimeng wenda* position, here is the partial translation. “... The objects of the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness has “*zhi*” (執) and “*sho*”(受). Two implications of “*zhi*” (執) are 1) “taking it as its own substance” (攝為自體); 2) “making it not to scatter by holding” (持令不壞). Two implications of “*sho*” (受) are 1) “taking it as object” (領以為境); 2) “making it to produce perception” (令生覺受). Question: what does that mean? Answer: when the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness perceives seeds, it has two implications of “*zhi*” (執)- “taking it as its own substance” (攝為自體) and “making it not to scatter by holding” (持令不壞). It has one implication of “*sho*” (受)- “taking it as object” (領以為境). When the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness perceives “body with sense faculties”, it got all four implications... [When the 8<sup>th</sup> consciousness] perceives “container world”, it got one implication of each among “*zhi*”(執) and “*sho*” (受). One implication of “*sho*” (受)- only “taking it as object” (領以為境). One implication of “*zhi*”(執)- only “making it not to scatter by holding” (持令不壞)...” (X55, no. 888, p. 348, c8-14 // Z 2:3, p. 219, c14-d2 // R98, p. 438, a14-b2)

Table 35 Four Implications of "Clinging" (執受) by LMCs

Four Implications of "Clinging" (執受)	LMC#1			LMC#2		
	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World
"Taking it as its own substance" (攝為自體)	N/A	v	x	x	v	x
"Making it not to scatter by holding" (持令不散)	N/A	v	x	v	v	x
"Taking it as object" (領以為境)	N/A	v	v	v	v	v
"Making it to produce perception" (令生覺受)	N/A	v	x	x	v	x

Four Implications of "Clinging" (執受)	LMC#3			LMC#5			LMC#4			
	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World	UnC-Seeds	C-Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World
"Taking it as its own substance" (攝為自體)	N/A	v	x	x	v	x	x	v	v	x
"Making it not to scatter by holding" (持令不散)	N/A	v	x	v	v	x	v	v	v	v
"Taking it as object" (領以為境)	N/A	v	v	v	v	v	x	v	v	v
"Making it to produce perception" (令生覺受)	N/A	v	x	x	v	x	x	x	v	x

Table 36 Four Implications of "Clinging" (執受) by ZJL and WKWD

Four Implications of "Clinging" (執受)	Zongjing Lu			Weishi kaimeng wenda		
	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World
"Taking it as its own substance" (攝為自體)	N/A	v	x	v	v	x
"Making it not to scatter by holding" (持令不散)	N/A	v	x	v	v	v
"Taking it as object" (領以為境)	N/A	v	v	v	v	v
"Making it to produce perception" (令生覺受)	N/A	v	x	x	v	x

Furthermore, if we come back to see what CWSL says about “clinging”, the explication of CWSL seems not that complicated at all. There are only two elements that being considered when CWSL defines the meaning and the scope of “clinging” of the eighth consciousness. It is as simple as Table 37 shows.<sup>395</sup>

**Table 37 Two Implications of "Clinging" (執受) by CWSL**

CWSL			
Two Implications of "Clinging" (執受)	Seeds	Body & Faculties	Container World
"Taking it as its own substance" (攝為自體)	v	v	x
"Due to one common united destiny" (同安危故)	v	v	x

#### 4-4-1-2-3 What passed down from CWSLS?

Now the question is that where did ZJL and WKWD get the idea of “those four elements” as the definition of “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*)? Reading the following corresponding paragraph from CWSLS, I suspect that they might get the inspiration from CWSLS.

In general, in terms of implications of *zhi sho*, [implications of of] *zhi* are the implication of “taking” (Ch. *she* 攝) and the implication of “holding” (Ch. *chi* 持). [Implications of] *sho* are the implication of “receiving” (Ch. *ling* 領) and the implication of “perceiving/recognizing” (Ch. *jue* 覺). “Taking it as its own substance”, “making it not to be destroyed by holding”, “sharing one common united destiny” (安危共同) and receiving it so to be able to produce perception/experience. Which is named “clinging” that is received as object.<sup>396</sup>

Nevertheless, Kuiji only talked about it in general. He almost identified the same four elements<sup>397</sup> but did not try to qualify “clinging” element by element in the way that ZJL, WKWD and the late-Ming commentaries did later.

On the other hand, Kuiji spent a long paragraph in discussing several sources that have different opinions about whether or seeds and/or sounds should be viewed as “clinging” even though CWSL’s position is to accept both seeds and manifestation as “clinging”.<sup>398</sup> In CWSLS there are two sets of Q&A being set up to explain why

<sup>395</sup> See 4-0-1 Translation of CWSL position for T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a14-17.

<sup>396</sup> 「總相而言，執受義者，執是攝義、持義。受是領義、覺義。攝為自體、持令不壞、安危共同，而領受之，能生覺受，名為執受，領為境也。」 (T43, no. 1830, p. 315, c10-13)

<sup>397</sup> “Taking it as its own substance” (攝為自體) and “making it not to be destroyed by holding” (持令不壞) are clearly identified whereas “making it to produce perception” (令生覺受) and “taking it as object” (領以為境) are not yet.

<sup>398</sup> T43, no. 1830, p. 315, c14-p. 316, a2.



seeds should be included as “clinging” whereas “unmanifest form” (Ch. *wu biao se* 無表色 Skt. *avijñapti-rūpa*), the mind, mental factor, and container world should be excluded.<sup>399</sup> Here suffices it to say that, since the time earlier than Kuiji, there had been many discussions regarding whether seeds should be viewed as “clinging” and why “container world” not be viewed as something for the eighth consciousness to cling. Thus, it is no surprise that similar discussions were passed down through ZJL and WKWD to the late-Ming commentators.

#### 4-4-2 Extensively Explicating “Mental activity to perceive”

##### 4-4-2-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

###### [State the Proposition]<sup>400</sup>

Herein [the verses] so called “perceiving” (Ch. *le* 了; Skt. *viññapti*) means that the “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yis hou* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-viññāna*) have function of “discerning” (了別) its own “object of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*). This function of discerning is what “seeing aspect” (Ch. *jian fen* 見分; Skt. *\*grāhaka-ākāra*; Eng. “aspect of what sees or grasps”) is in charge of.

###### [Theory of Two Aspects]<sup>401</sup>

Furthermore, when contaminated consciousness’s “own substance” (自體) arises, there are “characteristics” (相) appearing like “object of perception” and “subject of perception” (Ch. *neng yuan* 能緣). Its “associated dharmas” (相應法) should be understood in the same way. The “characteristics” (相) appearing like “object of perception” are named “seen aspect” (Ch. *xiang fen* 相分; Skt. *\*grāhya-ākāra, or viśaya-abhāsa*; alternative Eng. “aspect of what is seen or grasped”). The “characteristics” (相) appearing like “subject of perception” are named “seeing aspect”.

If mind and “mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo* 心所; Skt. *caitta*) did not have characteristics of object of perception, then they should not be able to perceive their

<sup>399</sup> T43, no. 1830, p. 316, a2-7.

<sup>400</sup> 「此中「了者」，謂異熟識，於自所緣，有了別用。此了別用，見分所攝。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a20-21) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 258. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 61.

<sup>401</sup> 「然有漏識，自體生時，皆似所緣、能緣相現。彼相應法，應知亦爾。似所緣相，說名相分。似能緣相，說名見分。若心、心所，無所緣相，應不能緣自所緣境，或應一一能緣一切。自境如餘，餘如自故。若心、心所，無能緣相，應不能緣，如虛空等，或虛空等亦是能緣。故心、心所，必有二相。如契經說：一切唯有覺 所覺義皆無 能覺所覺分 各自然而轉」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, a21-b1) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 258-60. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 61.

own “object that is perceived” (所緣境) or they each should be able to perceive all [objects]. Because [they do not have] their own object like other [minds and mental factors do not have the object] or because other [minds and mental factors can perceive their own object] like themselves [perceiving others’ objects].

If mind and “mental factors” did not have characteristics of subject of perception, then they should not be able to perceive like “empty space” (虛空; Skt. *ākāśa*) and etc or “empty space” and etc should be able to perceive as well.

Thus mind and mental factors must have two kinds of “characteristics” (相). According to the scriptural teaching<sup>402</sup>,

“Everything is only “consciousness” (覺). “Objects that ones are conscious of” (所覺義) are not existent. The “aspect” (分) of “subject of consciousness” (能覺) and of “object of consciousness” (所覺) are each natural transformations [of the consciousness].”

### [Theory of Three Aspects]<sup>403</sup>

Those who insist that there is “object of senses” (Ch. *suo yuan jing* 所緣境; Skt. *viṣaya*) other than “consciousness” (Ch. *shi* 識; Skt. *vijñāna*) say that the “external object” (外境; Skt. *bāhya-artha*) is “object of perception”. “Seen aspect” is named “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*). “Seeing aspect” is named “substance” (事) because it is “self-characteristics of self-substance” (自體相) of mind and mental factors. Mind and mental factors share “the same base and object of perception” (同所依、[所]緣). [Their] “mental activity to perceive are similar” (行相相似). Although “substance” (事) [of mind] and [of] “mental factors” (Ch. *shu* 數<sup>404</sup>) are equal [in terms of being seeing aspect] but their “characteristics” (相) are

<sup>402</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Houyan jing* 厚嚴經 i.e. *Dacheng miyan jing* 大乘密嚴經 (Skt. *Mahāyāna ghana vyūha sūtra*, The Scripture on the Mysterious Array of Consciousness) (T43, no. 1830, p. 318, b3-4)

<sup>403</sup> 「執有離識所緣境者，彼說外境是所緣。相分名行相，見分名事，是心、心所自體相故。心與心所，同所依緣，行相相似，事雖數等而相各異，識、受、想等，相各別故。達無離識所緣境者，則說相分是所緣，見分名行相。相、見所依自體名「事」，即自證分。此若無者，應不自憶。心、心所法，如不曾更境，必不能憶故。心與心所，同所依根，所緣相似，行相各別，了別、領納等作用各異故。事雖數等而相各異，識、受等體有差別故。然心、心所一一生時，以理推徵，各有三分，所量、能量、量果別故，相、見必有所依體故，如《集量論》伽他中說：似境相所量 能取相自證 即能量及果 此三體無別」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b2-16) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 260-66. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 61-62. Please note that both translations got “數” in “事雖數等” problematically. Please see next footnote for details.

<sup>404</sup> Please note that “*shu* 數” here means “*xin shu* 心數” (i.e. mental factors; Skt. *caitta*), NOT number. See (X50, no. 820, p. 546, a2 // Z 1:81, p. 39, b5 // R81, p. 77, b5) & (X50, no. 821, p. 691, b15-16 // Z 1:81, p. 185, a13-14 // R81, p. 369, a13-14) & (X50, no. 822, p. 872, c22 // Z 1:81, p. 367, a2 // R81, p. 733, a2) & (X51, no. 823, p. 175, c19 // Z 1:82, p. 75, b9 // R82, p. 149, b9) & (X51, no. 824, p. 325, c20 // Z 1:82, p. 225, d7 // R82, p. 450, b7)

different because “consciousness” (識; Skt. *viññāna*), “sensation” (受; Skt. *vedanā*), “ideation” (想; Skt. *saṃjñā*) and etc each have their own characteristics.

Those who realize that there is no “object of senses” (Ch. *suo yuan jing* 所緣境; Skt. *viṣaya*) other than “consciousness” (識; Skt. *viññāna*) say that seen aspect is “object of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*). Seeing aspect is “mental activity to perceive”. The basis of “seen aspect” (相分) and “seeing aspect” (見分) is named “substance” (事) which is “self-witnessing aspect” (Ch. *zi zheng fen* 自證分; Skt. *sva-saṃvitti*). If without this [i.e. self-witnessing aspect], one should not be able to remember oneself. If mind and mental factors did not experience objects, they must not be able to remember [the objects]. Mind and mental factors share “the same base of sense faculty” (同所依根). [Their] “objects of perception are similar” (所緣相似). [Their] “mental activities to perceive are each different” (行相各別) because the activities of “discerning” (了別), of feeling (領納; Skt. *anubhava*) and etc are different. Although “substance” (事) [of mind] and [of] mental factors are equal [in terms of being self-witnessing aspect] but their “characteristics” (相) are different because “consciousness” (識), “sensation” (受) and etc have differences in “substance” (體).

Moreover, when mind and mental factors each arise, “inferring by principle” (以理推徵), they each should have “three aspects” (三分). Because “subject of valid means of cognition” (能量; Skt. *pramātr*), “object of valid means of cognition” (所量; Skt. *prameya*) and “result of valid means of cognition” (量果; Skt. *pramāṇa-phala*) are different. Because seen aspect and seeing aspect must have “substance as base” (所依體). Like what the “verses” (Ch. *qie ta* 伽他; Skt. *gāthā*) of *Jiliang lun* 集量論 (Skt. *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*; Compendium of Source of Knowledge)<sup>405</sup> says,

“Whatever that appears like object” (似境相) is “object of valid means of cognition” (所量; Skt. *prameya*). “Whatever is able to take characteristics” (能取相) and “self-witnessing [aspect]” (Ch. *zi zheng [fen]* 自證[分]; Skt. *sva-saṃvitti*) are respectively “subject of valid means of cognition” and “result [of valid means of cognition]” ([量]果; Skt. *pramāṇa-phala*). These three are not separate in terms of “substance” (體).

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<sup>405</sup> Although not quite matching with Chinese quotation here, a similiar version of available Sanskrit text is provided by Hattori as below.

yad-ābhāsam premeyaṃ tat pramāna-phalate punaḥ  
grāhakākāra-saṃvittī trayam nātaḥ pṛthak-kṛtam |

The above Sanskrit text is also translated by Hattori into English as below ” Whatever the form in which it [viz., a cognition] appears, that [form] is [recognized as] the object of cognition (prameya). The means of cognition (pramāṇa) and [the cognition which is] its result (phala) are respectively the form of subject [in the cognition] and the cognition cognizing itself. Therefore, these three [factors of cognition] are not separate from one another.” Masaaki Hattori, *Dignāga, on Perception* (Harvard University Press, 1970), p.29 & p.107.

### [Theory of Four Aspects]<sup>406</sup>

In addition, if further breakdown, mind and mental factors should have “four aspects” (四分) which are “three aspects” as previous discussion plus the fourth “witnessing-self-witnessing aspect” (Ch. *zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分; Skt.\* *svasamvitti-samvitti*). Without this [fourth aspect], who is going to witness the third [aspect]? Since that [seeing aspect and self-witnessing aspect] are same in terms of “aspect of mind” (心分), they both should be witnessed.

Also, [if there was no witnessing-self-witnessing aspect], self-witnessing aspect should not have “result [of valid means of cognition]” ([量]果). Because all “subjects of valid means of cognition” must have “result [of valid means of cognition]” ([量]果). Seeing aspect should not be treated as the result of the third [aspect] because seeing aspect sometimes is not of “valid means of cognition” (量; Skt. *pramāṇa*). Due to this [reason], seeing aspect does not witness third aspect because “that which witnesses its own substance” (證自體者) have to be direct perception.

Among these four aspects, the first two [i.e. “seen aspect” and “seeing aspect”] are external while the last two [i.e. “self-witnessing aspect” and “witnessing-self-witnessing aspect”] are internal. The first one is “object of perception” only whereas the last three could be both [i.e. “object of perception” and “subject of perception”]. Which means that the second aspect only perceive the first one. It could be either “valid means of cognition” (量; Skt. *pramāṇa*) or not. It could be either “direct perception” (現[量]; Skt. *pratyakṣa*) or “inference” (比[量]; Skt. *anumāna*). The third aspect is able to perceive the second aspect and the fourth aspect. Witnessing-self-witnessing aspect is only able to perceive the third [aspect], not the second [aspect] because it is useless [for the four aspect to perceive the second aspect when the second aspect is already perceived by the third aspect]. The third aspect and the fourth aspect are all of direct perception.

Thus mind and mental factors comprise four aspects which consist of “objects of perception” and “subject of perception” and without the “fallacy of infinite regression” (無窮過). [These four aspects] are “neither identical nor apart” (非即非離), so the theory of consciousness-only is established.

<sup>406</sup> 「又心、心所，若細分別，應有四分，三分如前，復有第四證自證分。此若無者，誰證第三？心分既同，應皆證故。又自證分，應無有果，諸能量者，必有果故。不應見分是第三果，見分或時非量攝故。由此，見分不證第三，證自體者必現量故。此四分中，前二是外，後二是內。初唯所緣，後三通二。謂第二分但緣第一，或量、非量，或現或比。第三能緣第二、第四。證自證分唯緣第三，非第二者，以無用故。第三、第四皆現量攝。故心、心所四分合成，具所、能緣，無無窮過。非即非離，唯識理成。是故契經伽他中說：眾生心二性 內外一切分所取能取纏 見種種差別 此頌意說：眾生心性二分合成。若內若外，皆有所取、能取纏縛。見有種種，或量非量，或現或比，多分差別。此中「見」者，是見分故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, b17-c4) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 267-70. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 62-63.

Thus the scriptural “verses” (Ch. *qie ta* 伽他; Skt. *gāthā*) say<sup>407</sup>:

“The mind of all sentient beings is of two natures. Internally and externally all are divided. “What is grasped and what grasps” (所取、能取; Skt. *grāhya-grāhaka*) are fetters (纏). “Seeing” (Ch. *jian* 見) has a variety of differences.”

This verse is intended to say: the nature of all sentient beings’ minds is composed of two aspects. Whether internally or externally they all have fetters of “what is grasped and what grasps”. There is a variety of *jian* which are either “valid means of cognition” or not; which are either direct perception or inference. There are many kinds of differences. Because herein so called *jian* refers to “seeing aspect”.

### [Theory of One Aspect]<sup>408</sup>

Such “four aspects” (四分) are either consolidated into “three [aspects]” (三[分]) because the fourth is absorbed into “self-witnessing aspect” or consolidated into “two [aspects]” (二[分]) because the last three [aspects] are absorbed into seeing aspect due to all being subject of perception. Here so called “seeing” (Ch. *jian* 見) means subject of perception. Or [these “four aspects”(四分) are] consolidated into “one [aspect]” (一[分]) because [their] “substance” (體) is [one] without distinction. Which [i.e. theory of “one aspect” (一分)] is like what the verses of *Ru leng qie jing* 入楞伽經 (Skt. *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*; The Scripture on the Buddha's Entering the Country of Lanka) say:

Due to the attachment of one’s own mind, mind is arising like external objects. That which is seen is not existent. Thus, it is said there is mind only.

As such [all scriptural teachings] say everywhere that there is only “one mind” (一心). Here so called one mind also includes mental factors.

### [Short Summary]<sup>409</sup>

<sup>407</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Houyan jing* 厚嚴經 i.e. *Dacheng miyan jing* 大乘密嚴經 (Skt. *Mahāyāna ghana vyūha sūtra*, The Scripture on the Mysterious Array of Consciousness). See T43, no. 1830, p. 320, b6-7.

<sup>408</sup> 「如是四分，或攝為三，第四攝入自證分故。或攝為二，後三俱是能緣性故，皆見分攝。此言「見」者，是能緣義。或攝為一，體無別故，如《入楞伽》伽他中說：由自心執著 心似外境轉 彼所見非有 是故說唯心 如是處處，說唯一心，此一心言，亦攝心所。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, c4-11) 「如是四分，或攝為三，第四攝入自證分故。或攝為二，後三俱是能緣性故，皆見分攝。此言「見」者，是能緣義。或攝為一，體無別故，如《入楞伽》伽他中說：由自心執著 心似外境轉 彼所見非有 是故說唯心 如是處處，說唯一心，此一心言，亦攝心所。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, c4-11) For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 270-71. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 63-64.

<sup>409</sup> 「故識行相即是了別，了別即是識之見分。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, c12) For alternative

Therefore, “mental activity to perceive” (行相) of consciousness is “discerning” (了別). “Discerning” is the “seeing aspect”.

#### 4-4-2-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-4-2-2-1 How to argue for Two Aspects

Buddhist logic is one of methods that the late-Ming commentators might use to facilitate their explications. As far as this study is concerned, LMC#2 and LMC#4 seem to have the propensity to formulate the argument in the three-membered of syllogism of Buddhist logic whenever possible. In fact, in the preface that Wang Kentang wrote for LMC#2, Wang Kentang specifically highlighted that Tongrun was very good at understanding and explicate the Buddhist logics that appeared in CWSL.<sup>410</sup>

In 4-1-1 Theory of Two Aspects, CWSL uses two *prasaṅga* logics to argue that there must be seen aspect appearing like object of perception and seeing aspect appearing like subject of perception. Let's say the *prasaṅga* argument for “characteristics of object of perception” (所緣相) is Argument A and the argument for “characteristics of subject of perception” (能緣相) is Argument B. We see that LMC#2 and LMC#4 recapped Argument A in the format of the three-membered syllogism as Table 38.

Unfortunately, the argument is not a regular Buddhist three-membered syllogism that Dignāga endorsed but the *prasaṅga* argument that Dignāga excluded from his formal proof.<sup>411</sup> Thus we observed the phenomenon of “cutting the feet to fit the shoes” when LMC#2 and LMC#4 tried to recap *prasaṅga* in the three-membered syllogism. At least we clearly see the discrepancy between LMC#2 and LMC#3 in their formulations in Table 38. Why would such discrepancy happen?

**Table 38 LMCs' Analysis of CWSL's Argument A**

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English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñapati-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 271. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 64.

<sup>410</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 658, b14-16 // Z 1:81, p. 152, b17-c1 // R81, p. 303, b17-p. 304, a1)

<sup>411</sup> See Shoryu Katsura, "The Reductio Ad Absurdum Argument in India with Special Reference to Nagarjuna and Dignaga," *Journal of Ryūkoku University* 466 (2005): p.14. for “...unlike Dharmakīrti who incorporated *prasaṅga* into his system of a formal proof, Dignāga never discussed *prasaṅga* in the context of a formal proof or *parāthānumāna*. As a matter of fact, his system of logic is based on the theory of *trairupya*, according to which a valid reason should belong to a topic/subject of a thesis (*pakṣadharmatā*). Furthermore, according to Dignāga, both parties of a debate should admit that the reason belongs to the topic and that the topic is not an imaginary but rather a real object; otherwise the reason commits the fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhi*. Now, the *reductio ad absurdum* argument normally assumes as the condition of an argument the position of the opponents that the proponents cannot accept. Therefore, it is impossible for Dignāga to incorporate *reductio ad absurdum* in his formal proof...”

Argument A for "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)		
	Syllogism #1 by LMC#2	Syllogism #1 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	If mind and mental factors did not have "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive their own "object that is perceived" (自所緣境)
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	They should not be able to perceive "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Because there is no "object of perception".
<b>Example (喻, dr̥ṣṭānta)</b>	One's Object is like Others'	One's Object is like Others'
	Syllogism #2 by LMC#2	Syllogism #2 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	If mind and mental factors did not have "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Mind and mental factors each should be able to perceive all [objects]
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	They each should be able to perceive all [objects]	Because there is no "object of perception" (所緣) but there is "subject of perception" (能緣)
<b>Example (喻, dr̥ṣṭānta)</b>	Other [mind and mental factors] are like one's own	Other [mind and mental factors] are like one's own

In the regular three-membered syllogism, the reason (Ch. *yin* 因, Skt. *hetu*) is to establish the thesis (Ch. *zong* 宗, Skt. *pakṣa*). Thus, it is very essential that the reason must be mutually agreed. On other hand, as far as I am concerned, the *prasaṅga* argument is not supposed to establish any thesis but refute other's thesis. The way to make such refutation possible is to firstly produce a paradoxical scenario/statement (Ch. *jie nan/yi nan* 詰難/疑難 Skt. *upālabha*) that unacceptable to both parties. The "reason" in the *prasaṅga* is just for setting up that unacceptable scenario. Thus it is not in the same sense as the mutually agreed reason to support the thesis in the regular the three-membered syllogism.

In addition, it would be strange for LMC#2 to put the *prasaṅga*'s unacceptable statement that to be refuted as a reason instead of as refutable thesis upfront as LMC#4. Such misrepresentation had been corrected by LMC#2 himself in following LMC#2's analysis for Argument B.

As for Argument B for "characteristics of subject of perception", LMC#2 and LMC#4 recapped it in the format of the three-membered syllogism as Table 39 shows.

Table 39 LMCs' Analysis of CWSL's Argument B

Argument B for "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相)		
	Syllogism #3 by LMC#2	Syllogism #3 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because there is no "subject of perception"	Because there is no "subject of perception"
<b>Example (喻, dr̥ṣṭānta)</b>	Like "empty space" (虛空) etc.	Like "empty space" (虛空) etc.
	Syllogism #4 by LMC#2	Syllogism #4 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	Empty space etc are also able to perceive	Empty space etc are also able to perceive

<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because there is "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相)	Because there is no "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相) but being able to perceive.
<b>Example (喻, <i>dr̥ṣṭānta</i>)</b>	Like mind and mental factors	Like mind and mental factors

Besides LMC#2 corrected his previous misrepresentation, we still see the slight discrepancy between LMC#2 and LMC#4. As I mentioned before, it kind of “cutting the feet to fit the shoes” to try to put the *prasaṅga* in the formula of the three-membered syllogism. Nevertheless, if we are forced to make a judgement here, whose version would be better? The second “example” (Ch. *yu* 喻, Skt. *dr̥ṣṭānta*) is supposed to be aligned with the reason in regular three-membered syllogism. In addition, the “reason” of the *prasaṅga* is supposed to reinforce the unacceptable *prasaṅga* statement. Based on these two considerations, LMC#2’s formulation seemed better than LMC#4’s. That being said, the probably best choice might be seeing through the incompatibility between the *prasaṅga* formula and the regular three-membered syllogism and choosing not to recap the *prasaṅga* in the three-membered syllogism in the first place. Since LMC#1 and LMC#5 did not do the recap as LMC#2 and LMC#4 did, is it possible that they intentionally made such a choice? I am not sure but I would suggest that we need to keep it mind that LMC#1 and LMC#5 each had a dedicated commentary on *Yin ming ru zheng li lun* 因明入正理論 (Chinese version of *Nyāyapraveśa*)<sup>412</sup>. They were both versed in Buddhist logic for sure. They might have good reason not to use their knowledge about Buddhist logic in this case. Here is how LMC#5 explicated CWSL’s Argument A without using three-membered syllogism. It seems that LMC#5’s following note is a good one if not better one than LMC#2’s and LMC#3’s.

Eye-consciousness perceiving form, ear-consciousness perceiving sound and etc are all named one’s “object of senses” (Ch. *suo yuan jing* 所緣境; Skt. *viśaya*). If eye-consciousness does not have “form of seen aspect” (相分色), it should not be able to perceive forms. If ear-consciousness does not have “sound of seen aspect” (相分聲), it should not be able to perceive sounds. Moreover, if eye-consciousness did not have “form of seen aspect” but could perceive forms, then it could also perceive sounds, perfumes and etc while it did not have sounds, perfumes and etc [of seen aspect]. Furthermore, other consciousnesses could also perceive forms although they do not have forms as seen aspect. So called “one’s object are like other’s object” means that if self-own object that one does not have could be perceived by one, then other’s object that one does not have could

<sup>412</sup> Shi, ""Ming Mo De Weishi Xue Zhe Ji Qi Si Xiang" 明末的唯識學者及其思想," pp. 21-23.



also be perceived by one. So called “other consciousness is like one’s consciousness” means that if one’s consciousness was able to perceive the object of other’s consciousness, then other’s consciousness is also able to perceive one’s object.<sup>413</sup>

Last, if we investigate how CWSLS said about the same paragraph, Kuiji also tried to recap the *prasaṅga* arguments in in the three-membered syllogism<sup>414</sup> as what LMC#2 and LMC#4 did. Table 40 are the comparison.

In Table 40 for CWSL Argument A, we see that Kuiji added one specific word “許” (Ch. *xu*) which means “allowed/approved”. In other words, Kuiji was cautious in making it clear that 1) “characteristics of object of perception” (所緣相) is not mutually agreed concept; 2) The “reason” is just to produce the unacceptable thesis that to be refuted. This is where Kuiji seems more sophisticated than LMC#2 and LMC#4. However, to repeat that similar assumption (i.e. if no “characteristics of object of perception” on mind and mental factors) in the thesis seems redundant.

In Table 41 for the CWSL Argument B, we find that Kuiji, LMC#2 and LMC#4 were fully aligned for their Syllogism#3. But for Syllogism#4, Kuiji repeated same reason with different “examples”. That seems not making any sense. As previous discussion, LMC#2’s reason seems better. In addition, to be more precise, both LMC#2 and LMC#4 should not leave out one character “should” (應) in their thesis (宗) for Syllogism#4 because that character is what makes the arguments as a *prasaṅga*.

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<sup>413</sup> 「眼識緣色，耳識緣聲等，名為自所緣境。若眼識無相分色，則應不能緣色。耳識無相分聲，則應不能緣聲。又設眼識無相分色而能緣色，則亦可無聲香等而能緣聲香等。又餘識雖不以色為相分，亦可以緣色矣。自境如餘境，自境無而可緣，餘境無亦可緣。餘識如自識，自識可緣餘境，餘識亦可緣自境故。」(X51, no. 824, p. 325, b23-c5 // Z 1:82, p. 225, c4-10 // R82, p. 450, a4-10)

<sup>414</sup> See (T43, no. 1830, p. 317, c19-25) and (T43, no. 1830, p. 318, a11-15).

Table 40 Kuiji and LMCs' Analysis of CWSL's Argument A

Argument A for "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)			
	Syllogism #1 by Kuiji	Syllogism #1 by LMC#2	Syllogism #1 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	Like when perceiving blue, if no "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相) on mind and mental factors, [they] should not be able to perceive the object that is perceived by own rising mind.	If mind and mental factors did not have "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive their own "object that is perceived" (自所緣境)
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because it is "allowed" (許) that there is no "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相).	They should not be able to perceive "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Because there is no "object of perception".
<b>Example (喻, dṛṣṭānta)</b>	Like other [mind and mental factors] objects that one does not perceive or like other persons's object that one does not perceive.	One's Object is like Others'	One's Object is like Others'
Syllogism #2 by Kuiji			
	Syllogism #2 by Kuiji	Syllogism #2 by LMC#2	Syllogism #2 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	My mind etc that perceiving sound etc in other times should also be able to perceive current form	If mind and mental factors did not have "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)	Mind and mental factors each should be able to perceive all [objects]
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because it is "allowed" (許) that there is no "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相).	They each should be able to perceive all [objects]	Because there is no "object of perception" (所緣) but there is "subject of perception" (能緣)
<b>Example (喻, dṛṣṭānta)</b>	Like current own mind that perceiving blue etc [without "characteristics of object of perception" (所緣相)], other persons' minds are also able to perceive [without].	Other [mind and mental factors] are like one's own	Other [mind and mental factors] are like one's own

Table 41 Kuiji and LMCs' Analysis of CWSL's Argument B

Argument B for "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相)			
	Syllogism #3 by Kuiji	Syllogism #3 by LMC#2	Syllogism #3 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	Mind and mental factors should not what perceives	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive	Mind and mental factors should not be able to perceive
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because there is no "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相).	Because there is no "subject of perception"	Because there is no "subject of perception"
<b>Example (喻, dṛṣṭānta)</b>	Like "empty space" (虛空) etc.	Like "empty space" (虛空) etc.	Like "empty space" (虛空) etc.
	Syllogism #4 by Kuiji	Syllogism #4 by LMC#2	Syllogism #4 by LCM#4
<b>Thesis (宗, pakṣa)</b>	Your empty spaces etc should be able to perceive	Empty space etc are also able to perceive	Empty space etc are also able to perceive
<b>Reason (因, hetu)</b>	Because there is no "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相).	Because there is "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相)	Because there is no "characteristics of subject of perception" (能緣相) but being able to perceive.
<b>Example (喻, dṛṣṭānta)</b>	Like mind and mental factors	Like mind and mental factors	Like mind and mental factors

#### 4-4-2-2-2 How to syncretize different theories?

In 4-1-1 [Theory of One Aspect], we see that CWSL seems trying to syncretize different theories of one, two, three, and four aspects. Since the late-Ming commentators are traditionally known for trying to “syncretize” (Ch. *rong tong* 融通) “nature” (Ch. *xing* 性) and “characteristics” (Ch. *xiang* 相), it is interesting to investigate how they explicate CWSL in this section. LMC#1 notes as below.

Being consolidated as three [aspects] means that “self-witnessing” (Ch. *zi zheng* 自證; Skt. *sva-saṃvitti*) and “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*)<sup>415</sup> are originally one substance whereas two kinds of names are set up according to the real vs. the false. Question: since that being [consolidated into] three aspects, should it have the same fault as Dignāga? Answer: He (i.e. Dignāga) insisted on three aspects only. Here only [the fourth aspect] being absorbed into [the third aspect] so there is no fault like his... Being consolidated as two [aspects], there is only one set of “subject and object” (能、所) because the last three aspects are same in terms of being subject of perception. They are all included into the category of seeing aspect. Question: since being consolidated as one [aspect] to reveal the principle of consciousness-only, why bother setting up four aspects? Answer: Setting up four aspects is to explicate “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*) in the principle of consciousness-only. Being consolidated as one [aspect] is to establish “theory/teaching of existence” (有宗) of consciousness-only.<sup>416</sup>

Here we see that LMC#1 seemed to let “thusness” equal to “witnessing-self-witnessing aspect” (Ch. *zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分). In fact, he did. In explicating [Theory of Four Aspects], LMC#1 did argue that

So called “witnessing” (證) is “substance” (體). It is to verify the phenomena. “Witnessing-self-witnessing aspect” is “thusness”. Because eight kinds of consciousness are not separate from thusness, thusness as substance is able to witness eight consciousnesses.<sup>417</sup>

<sup>415</sup> Here “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如) is “witnessing-self-witnessing aspect” (Ch. *zheng zi zheng fen* 證自證分). See (X50, no. 820, p. 546, b4-5 // Z 1:81, p. 39, c13-14 // R81, p. 78, a13-14).

<sup>416</sup> 「攝為三者，自證、真如，原為一體，但依真、妄，立二種名。問：既為三分，應同陳那過耶？答：彼執唯三，此但攝入，故無彼過... 攝為二者，唯一能、所。以後三分，同能緣故，皆見分攝。攝為一者，能、所雙忘，顯唯識理。問：既攝為一，顯唯識理，何又立四分耶？答：立四分者，明唯識之行相。攝為一者，成唯識之有宗。」(X50, no. 820, p. 546, c9-15 // Z 1:81, p. 40, a6-12 // R81, p. 79, a6-12)

<sup>417</sup> 「證者，體也，驗其事也。證自證分即是真如。以八種識不離真如，故真如體能證八識。」(X50, no. 820, p. 546, b4-5 // Z 1:81, p. 39, c13-14 // R81, p. 78, a13-14)

LMC#1 is not alone in letting "thusness" equal to "witnessing-self-witnessing aspect". LMC#2 also notes that

If setting up three aspect, the fault is no thusness. Now by setting up four aspect, it possesses subject and object of perception, "self-witnessing aspect", and "substance of thusness" (真如體). It is without the "fallacy of infinite regression" (無窮過).<sup>418</sup>

Thus, LMC#2 reads "witnessing-self-witnessing aspect" as "substance of thusness" as well. Moreover, to explicate CWSL's syncretism of different theories, LMC#2 notes that

This is to syncretize the previous text by "subsuming the characteristics back into nature" (Ch. *she xiang gui xing* 攝相歸性). Speaking of setting up four, three, two, one [aspect], there are different kinds [of theories]. Nevertheless, each ones have intentions. Not only setting up four [aspects] is correct, even setting up one aspect is not necessarily wrong... Thus, one should know that, except for mind, there is no any single dharma that is attainable.<sup>419</sup>

Here we notice that LMC#2 specifically concluded that CWSL's syncretic commentary is about "subsuming the characteristics back into nature" (攝相歸性). Following CWSL's quote of *Ru lengqie jing* 入楞伽經, LMC#2 no longer talked about consciousness-only but one mind that seems to refer to "nature" (性).

On the other hand, based on WKWD<sup>420</sup>, LMC#4's note that

"Four aspect" (四分) is from the perspective of "result of valid means of cognition" (Ch. *liang guo* 量果; Skt. *pramāṇa-phala*). "Three aspects" (三分) is from the perspective of "substance and function" (體用). "Two aspect" (二分) is from the perspective of "mind and object" (心境). "One mind" (一心) is from the perspective of consciousness-only. "Here so called "seeing" (Ch. *jian* 見) means being afraid that subject of perception is mixing up with "seeing [aspect]" (見[分]) of theory of four aspects. So it is mentioned here. Previous discussions

<sup>418</sup> 「若立三分，無真如失。今立四分，具能、所緣，有自證分，有真如體，無無窮過。」 (X50, no. 821, p. 692, b1-2 // Z 1:81, p. 185, d17-18 // R81, p. 370, b17-18)

<sup>419</sup> 「此會通前文，攝相歸性，言雖立四、立三、立二、立一，種種不同，然各有旨趣，不獨立四者為是，即立一分者，亦未嘗非也... 故知離心之外，更無一法可得」 (X50, no. 821, p. 692, b11-15 // Z 1:81, p. 186, a9-13 // R81, p. 371, a9-13)

<sup>420</sup> X55, no. 888, p. 347, a3-10 // Z 2:3, p. 217, d15-p. 218, a4 // R98, p. 434, b15-p. 435, a4.

by [different] perspectives, though being different, are trade off for good reasons. Different theories are for different audiences so each are all appropriate.<sup>421</sup>

It definitely deserves attention that LMC#4 was so open minded that he was talking about neither consciousness-only nor one mind nor “subsuming the characteristics back into nature”. Instead, inspired by WKWD, he seemed to advocate pluralism, at least for different theory of aspects. In addition, LMC#5 concludes the syncretism of different theories as below.

Previous discussions are intended to show the differences of “conventional truth” (Ch. *su di* 俗諦; Skt. *samvṛti-satya*). Thus refuting one [aspect] by two aspects, refuting two [aspects] by three aspects, and refuting three aspects by four aspects. Now in order to show “[ultimate] truth” (真理) are “perfect harmony” (圓融), the fourth [aspect] can be absorbed into the third [aspect] and only talking about three aspects. Inner three aspects can be absorbed into seeing aspect and only talking about two aspects. Since “seen [aspect]” and “seeing [aspect]” are originally not two substances, it is OK to talk about one mind only. Thus the verses of *Ru leng qie* 入楞伽 establish the intention of one mind. Nevertheless, so called “one mind” (一心) is not to NOT that negating eight consciousnesses & fifty-one mental factors and being intended to refer to “mind of thusness” (真如心) as “teaching of all phenomena in their totality” (大總相法門).<sup>422</sup> Just because “substance of four aspects” (四分體) is one without distinctions, it is named “one mind”. Then, one should know that any one mind and any one mind mental factor out of eight minds and fifty-one mental factors each all have four aspects. Due to no distinctions in substance of four aspects, there is only one mind. Thus one knows that each mind and each mental factor are nothing but “realms of reality” (Ch. *fa jie* 法界; Skt. *dharma-dhātu*). Moreover, since that no distinctions in the substance of four aspects, “functions” (用) in which “substance” (體) is fused are also without distinctions. Thus said

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<sup>421</sup> 「四分，約量果門。三分，約體用門。二分，約心境門。一心，約唯識門。「此言見是能緣義」者，恐濫上四分中見，故置此言。上依門雖別，取捨有由，悉檀被機，各皆當理。」 (X51, no. 823, p. 176, b21-24 // Z 1:82, p. 76, a5-8 // R82, p. 151, a5-8)

<sup>422</sup> I guess that Zhixu got this phrase “teaching of all phenomena in their totality”(大總相法門) from *Dacheng qi xin lun* 大乘起信論 (T32, no. 1666, p. 576, a8) although he changed several characters. In addition, I did not use Hakeda’s rendering but his rendering helps me come out my own. See Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith: Attributed to Āśvaghōṣa*, p.39. In addition, This sentence might have another possible rendering like “...Nevertheless, so called “one mind” (一心) is NOT that negating eighth consciousnesses & fifty one mental factors, BUT is intended to refer to “mind of thusness” (真如心) as “teaching of all phenomena in their totality” (大總相法門)...” Reading in this way would equal “mind of thusness” (真如心) and “one mind” (一心). Then it seems no need to further explain what is “one mind” (一心) right after this sentence.

that one single color or one single perfume is nothing but “the middle way” (Ch. *zhong dao* 中道 Skt. *madhyama-pratipad*), and that “color-only” (唯色) or “perfume-only” (唯香) and etc.<sup>423</sup>

Here if I read it correctly, Zhixu seemed trying to interpret “one mind” from the perspective of Tiantai School 天台宗 which was founded by Zhiyi 智顛 (538-597) instead of the perspective of *Dacheng qi xin lun* 大乘起信論 or Huayan School. The main perspective of the former is “being inherent in nature” (Ch. *xing ju* 性具) or “three thousand [world] in a single thought” (Ch. *yi nian san qian* 一念三千) whereas the latter is “arising from nature” (Ch. *xing qi* 性起) or “dependent arising from the *Tathāgatagarbha*” (Ch. *ru lai cang yuan qi* 如來藏緣起).<sup>424</sup> The first evidence is the phrase “one single color or one single perfume is nothing but the middle way” (一色一香，無非中道) which can be tracked back to *Miao fa lian hua jing xuan yi* 妙法蓮華經玄義<sup>425</sup> composed by Zhiyi. The second evidence is the phrase “color-only, perfume-only” (唯色、唯香) which can be traced back to *Guan wuliang shou fo jing shu miao zong chao* 觀無量壽佛經疏妙宗鈔 that was composed by Siming Zhili 四明知禮 (960-1028) who is head of “Mountain Sect” (Ch. *shan jia* 山家)<sup>426</sup> of Tiantai School. For example, Zhili said that “...because “all dharmas each possess all dharmas” (一切法一一皆具一切法), now “Mountain Sect” (山家) is based on implications of “color-only, perfume-only” and etc...”<sup>427</sup> These two phrases are both based on concepts of “three thousand world in a single thought” and “being inherent in nature”.

In other commentary, Zhixu himself also elaborated why Tiantai school had to say “color-only, perfume-only” as below.

Question: Since just mind-only, why does Tiantai school also says “color-only, perfume-only” and etc? Answer: Just because seen aspects of six objects are arising from self-witnessing [aspect], of which substance is mind. Thus “color-only, perfume-only” are still mind. There is no conflict. If “color-only, perfume-

<sup>423</sup> 「上來欲顯俗諦差別，故以二分破一，又以三分破二，又以四分破三。今欲顯真理圓融，故第四可攝入於第三而可但言三分。又內三可攝入於見分而可但言二分。又相、見本無二體而可但言一心也。入楞伽偈即證成一心之旨。然所謂一心，亦非撥無八箇心王、五十一箇心所而別指一真如心以為大總相法門也。但以四分體無別故，名為一心，則知八箇心王、五十一箇心所，隨拈一王一所，皆具四分。隨其所有四分，體皆無別，惟是一心，是知一一王、所無非法界。又四分體既無別，以體融用，用亦無別，故得說云：一色一香，無非中道，及唯色、唯香等也。」 (X51, no. 824, p. 327, a9-20 // Z 1:82, p. 227, a2-13 // R82, p. 453, a2-13)

<sup>424</sup> Zong-san Mou, "Fo Xing Yu Ban Ruo Xia" 佛學與般若 下, vol. 4, "Mou Zong San Xian Sheng Quan Ji" 牟宗三先生全集 (Linking Publishing 2003), pp.1100-01.

<sup>425</sup> T33, no. 1716, p. 690, b10-12.

<sup>426</sup> Lu, "Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun" 中國佛學源流略論, pp.412-14.

<sup>427</sup> 「以一切法一一皆具一切法故，是故今家立於唯色唯香等義。」 (T37, no. 1751, p. 198, a1-3)

only” are something else in substance, how to make “all dharmas toward [all dharmas]” (一切法趣)? Now depending on one mind there are “seen [aspect]” and “seeing [aspect]”. All kinds of “seen [aspect]” and “seeing [aspect]” are mind so they can include each other, penetrate each other, all over each other, and interfuse each other.<sup>428</sup>

Since different people might interpret “middle way” (中道) differently, the phrase of “one single color or one single perfume is nothing but the middle way” (一色一香，無非中道) might give rise to the concern of “exclusive middle” (Ch. *dan zhong* 但中)<sup>429</sup> which represents “true mind” (真心)<sup>430</sup>. In order to make “all dharmas toward all dharmas” possible, I guess that Zhixu here used “color-only, perfume-only” to illustrate Tiantai’s principle of “non-exclusive middle” (Ch. *bu dan zhong* 不但中)<sup>431</sup>. This is fully aligned with what he noted in LMC#5. In short, LMC#5 seems intended to use Tiantai’s “Perfect Teaching” (Ch. *yuan jiao* 圓教) that is one of its *panjiao* (判教)<sup>432</sup> schemes to syncretize the differences.

Last, how does CWSLS interpret the relationship between mind and consciousness? Kuiji notes as below.

It is allowed to have one’s own mind in that [all dharmas/all phenomena] is not separate from mind. It is generally named “one consciousness”. Mental factors are what are associated with mind. Dharmas of form are what mind transforms into. Thusness is the real nature of consciousness. Four aspects are consciousness’s division of functions. These four kinds each have their individual implications. Moreover, they are not separate from consciousness. Thus, they are together named [consciousness]-only. Uncontaminated seeds have only one implication. That means “being not separate from consciousness”. Thus it is named [consciousness]-only.<sup>433</sup>

<sup>428</sup> 「問：既但唯心，何故台宗復云唯色唯香等耶？答：正以六塵相分，依自證起，體即是心。故唯色、唯香，仍即唯心，不相違也。倘計色、香別有自體，如何能使一切法趣？今依一心而有相、見。種種相、見，全體是心，故可互攝、互入、互徧、互融耳。」(X21, no. 371, p. 440, a15-20 // Z 1:35, p. 84, c9-14 // R35, p. 168, a9-14)

<sup>429</sup> Mou, “*Fo Xing Yu Ban Ruo Xia*” 佛學與般若 下, 4, p.618.

<sup>430</sup> Matter of fact, *Zongjing lu* says that “...Herein so called “middle” (中) is “one mind” (一心). Way”(道) is mind. Mind is “way” (道). Because “true mind” (真心) is everywhere, there is saying that “one single color or one single perfume is nothing but the middle way”...” 此之中義，即是一心。道即是心，心即是道。以真心遍一切處故，所以云：一色一香，無非中道。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 887, b23-25)

<sup>431</sup> Mou, “*Fo Xing Yu Ban Ruo Xia*” 佛學與般若 下, 4, p.651.

<sup>432</sup> Buddhist *panjiao* (判教) system in China is a system of doctrinal classification that is used as a critical tool to justify and judge the values of teachings of various traditions and schools.

<sup>433</sup> 「許有自心，不離心故，總名一識。心所與心相應，色法心之所變；真如識之實性。四分識義用分。此上四類，各一別義，又皆不離識，故並名唯。無漏種子，但具一義，謂不離識，故



Here we see Kuiji tried to syncretize mind, mental factors, forms, thusness, and four kinds of theory of aspects all together by the concept of “not separated from consciousness” (Ch. *bu li shi* 不離識). The term “consciousness-only” sounds exclusive and like a replacement model<sup>434</sup> in that it tries to replaces everything with consciousness only. However, if “consciousness-only” was only meant to say everything is “not separated from consciousness”, it would sound more inclusive and like a fulfillment model<sup>435</sup> in that it allows those four kinds of phenomena to have their own places and to fulfill their individual functions as long as “being not separate from the consciousness” as a bottom line is still honored.



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說名唯。」( T43, no. 1830, p. 320, c3-8)

<sup>434</sup> Paul F Knitter, *Introducing Theologies of Religion* (Orbis Books, 2002), pp.19-60.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.63-106.

## 4-5 Aspect of Object of Perception 所緣門

### 4-5-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

#### [Explicating the External Objects]<sup>436</sup>

So called “dwelling” (Ch. *chu* 處; Skt. *sthāna*) is the “characteristics” (相) of “container world” (Ch. *qi shi jian* 器世間; Skt. *bhājana-loka*) into which the “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) transforms due to the maturing power of “seeds that share the same characteristics” (共相種) and which appearing like “form” (色) and etc. They are external [four] “material elements” (Ch. *da zhong* 大種; Skt. *mahābhūta*) and “materials that were made [by those material elements]” (Ch. *suo zao se* 所造色; Skt. *upādāyarūpa*). Although all sentient beings’ transformations are different, their characteristics are similar. Their dwellings are not different like all lamps that each seem lighting up universally as if there was one lamp.

Whose “maturing consciousness” transforms into these “characteristics” [of “container world”]?

There is an argument that all [sentient beings’]. Why? Because, according to the scriptural teaching<sup>437</sup>, [the “container world”] is created together by all sentient beings through their “contributory power of actions” (業增上力).

There is a [second] argument that, if that was case, all Buddhas and Bodhisattvas’ [consciousness] should transform into this defiled land while all “ordinary unenlightened persons’ ” (Ch. *yi sheng* 異生; Skt. *prthagjana*) [consciousness] should transform into pure wonderful lands of other places and of this realm. Furthermore, all sages who dislike and would like to leave “realms that having

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<sup>436</sup> 「所言「處」者，謂異熟識，由共相種成熟力故，變似色等器世間相。即外大種及所造色。雖諸有情所變各別，而相相似，處所無異，如眾燈明，各遍似一。誰異熟識，變為此相？有義：一切。所以者何？如契經說：一切有情業增上力共所起故。有義：若爾，諸佛菩薩，應實變為此雜穢土，諸異生等，應實變為他方此界諸淨妙土。又諸聖者，厭離有色，生無色界，必不下生，變為此土，復何所用？是故現居及當生者，彼異熟識變為此界，經依少分說一切言，諸業同者皆共變故。有義：若爾，器將壞時，既無現居及當生者，誰異熟識變為此界？又諸異生，厭離有色，生無色界，現無色身，預變為土，此復何用？設有色身，與異地器，麤細懸隔，不相依持，此變為彼，亦何所益？然所變土，本為色身依持受用，故若於身可有持用，便變為彼。由是，設生他方自地，彼識亦得變為此土。故器世界將壞、初成，雖無有情，而亦現有。此說一切，共受用者。若別受用，准此應知，鬼人天等所見異故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 10, c12-p. 11, a3). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñapati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 272-74. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 64-65.

<sup>437</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Li shi jing* 立世經 (Scripture of Buddhist cosmology). See T43, no. 1830, p. 322, a17.

In addition, according to Lee, *Li shi jing* 立世經 refers to *Fo shuo li shi apitan lun* 佛說立世阿毘曇論 (What Buddhas said about the higher teaching treatise of the Buddhist cosmology; Skt. *Lokasthānābhīdharma śāstra*) translated by Paramārtha. See Yun-sang Lee, "*Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian*" 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, vol. 2 (Taipei, Taiwan: BuddhAll Cultural Enterprise Co.,Ltd., 2010), p.760.

form” (有色[界]) [i.e. “desire realm” (Ch. *yu jie* 欲界; Skt. *kāma-dhātu*) and ”form realm” (Ch. *se jie* 色界; Skt. *rūpa-dhātu*)] and would be born in “formless realm” (Ch. *wu se jie* 無色界; Skt. *ārūpya-dhātu*) definitely would not be born downwards. What would be the purpose [for those sages’ consciousnesses] to transform into this land? Thus for “those who currently living [in this world]” (現居) and “those who will be born into [this world]” (當生), their "maturing consciousnesses" would transform into this world. Based on those partial sentient beings, the scriptural teaching is describing them as “All” because those who have same actions all share the same transformations.

There is a [third] argument that, if that was the case, when the container [world] was going to be destroyed, since there would be no ones who currently living in this world and no ones who will be born into this world, whose "maturing consciousness" would transform into this world? Furthermore, for those “ordinary unenlightened persons” who dislike and would like to leave “[realms] that having form” (有色[界]), they would be born in “formless realm” by manifesting no “form-body” (色身), what would be the purpose for [their consciousnesses] to transform into this world in advance? If assumed that there was [subtle] “form body” [in “formless realm”] versus [“form” (色; i.e. materials)] in the world of different realms, the coarse [“form” in “desire realm” and ” form realm”] and the subtle [form body] are far different and cannot support each other. What is the benefit for this [consciousness of subtle body-form] to transform into that [world of coarse form]?

In addition, the land which is the transformation [of consciousnesses] is for the support and enjoyment of “form body” . Thus, if bodies can have the support and enjoyment [of that container-world], then [consciousnesses] would transform into that [container world]. Due to this reason, if one is going to be born into one’s “one’s own land of other places” (他方自地), one’s conscious can also transform into this land [i.e. the same realm of this place]. Therefore, [when] a container world is going to be destroyed or to be formed, although there is no sentient beings [on it], the world is still manifested [by sentient beings living in same realm of other places.]

Here is talking about all “those who share the same enjoyment “ (共受用者) . If in terms of “those who have different enjoyments” (別受用[者]), it should be understood in this [similar] way. Because what ghosts, men and gods see respectively are different [even though they all living in the same container world.]

### [Explicating the Internal Objects]<sup>438</sup>

<sup>438</sup> 「諸種子者，謂異熟識所持一切有漏法種，此識性攝，故是所緣。無漏法種，雖依附此識，而非此性攝，故非所緣。雖非所緣，而不相離，如真如性，不違唯識。有根身者，謂異熟識，不共相種成熟力故，變似色根及根依處。即內大種，及所造色。有共相種成熟力故，於他身處

So called “all seeds” (諸種子) are all seeds of “contaminated dharmas/contaminated phenomena” (Ch. *you lou fa* 有漏法; Skt. *āsrava-dharma*) that carried by "maturing consciousness" (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟識 ; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*). They belong to nature of this consciousness so they are “objects of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*) of [this consciousness]. Although seeds of “uncontaminated dharmas/uncontaminated phenomena” (Ch. *wu lou fa* 無漏法; Skt. *anāsrava-dharmas*) are attached to this consciousness, they do not belong to nature of this consciousness so they are not “objects of perception” of [this consciousness]. Although not being “objects of perception”, [uncontaminated seeds] are not separated from [this consciousness] like the nature of "thusness" (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*) [not separated from this consciousness]. Thus, it is not against [the theory of] “consciousness-only” (Ch. *wei shi* 唯識; Skt. *vijñapti-mātra*).

So called “body with sense faculties” (Ch. *you gen shen* 有根身; Skt. *śendriya-kāya*) is something appearing like the material sense faculties with their basis into which "maturing consciousness" transforms due to the maturing power of “seeds that do not share the same characteristics” (不共相種). They are internal “[four] material elements” ([四]大種) and “materials that were made [by those material element]” (所造色). Due to the maturing power of “seeds that share the same characteristics” (共相種), in other bodies the [maturing consciousness] also transforms into something appearing like that [i.e. the material sense faculties with their basis]. Otherwise, there is no way to experience and enjoy others’ [the material sense faculties with their basis].

Herein there is a [first] argument that [the consciousness] also transforms into something appearing like sense faculties because, according to *Bian zhongbian [lun]* 辯中邊[論] (Skt. *Madhyānta-vibhaṅga-bhāṣya*; Treatise on the Discrimination between Middle and Extremes), [the transformations] that appearing like own and other body have the manifestations of five sense faculties.

There is a [second] argument that [the consciousness] transforms into something appearing like the base only because others’ sense faculties are no use [to oneself]. The quote that “[the transformations] that appearing like own and other body have the manifestation of five sense faculties” is meant to say that one’s consciousness and other’s consciousness each transform into each own [sense faculties]. Thus when one has been born into other places or entered into “liberation after death” (般涅槃; Skt.

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亦變似彼。不爾，應無受用他義。此中有義：亦變似根。辯中邊說：「似自、他身，五根現故。」有義：唯能變似依處。他根於己，非所用故。「似自、他身，五根現者」，說自、他識，各自變義。故生他地，或般涅槃，彼餘尸骸，猶見相續。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, a3-15). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñapti-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 274-76. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 65-66.

*parinirvāṇa*) his or her remaining dead body is still visible continuously [for a while].

### [Clarification and Summary]<sup>439</sup>

The previous discussion is only about external container worlds and internal bodies which are transformations [of the eighth consciousness] due to the “power of actions” (業力) and their “differences by realms and by levels” (界地差別). If the container worlds and bodies are the transformation due to the power of “concentration” (Ch. *ding* 定; Skt. *samādhi*) etc., then “realms, levels, self or others” (界、地、自、他) are “indeterminate” (不決定).

Most of bodies and container worlds which are transformation [of the eighth consciousness] are “continuous existence” (相續) all the time. Most of sounds, lights and etc which are transformation [of the eighth consciousness] are temporary because they are triggered by “power of current conditions” (現緣力).

In short, the objects which are the transformation of this consciousness are contaminated seeds, “ten bases that having form” (十有色處) and “the manifesting real forms” (所現實色)<sup>440</sup> that “belong to” (墮)<sup>441</sup> “mental objects base” (法處; Skt. *dharmā-āyatana*).

For what reason that this consciousness cannot transform into something appearing like mind and mental factors as its object of perception?

There are roughly two kinds of “transformation of contaminated consciousness” (有漏識變): 1) the transformation by the power of “direct cause” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣; Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*). 2) the transformation by the power of “discrimination” (Ch. *fen bie* 分別). The former [transformation] must have “function” (用) whereas the latter [transformation] is only object [of cognition]. The maturing consciousness only transforms by “direct cause” and what it transforms into like form and etc must have “real function” (實用). If it transformed into mind and etc, there would be no real function because it could not perceive the mind and etc as “seen aspect” (相分). As

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<sup>439</sup> 「前來且說，業力所變外器、內身，界、地差別。若定等力所變器、身，界、地、自、他則不決定。所變身、器多恒相續。變聲光等多分暫時，隨現緣力擊發起故。略說此識，所變境者，謂有漏種，十有色處，及墮法處所現實色。何故此識，不能變似心、心所等，為所緣耶？有漏識變，略有二種：一隨因緣勢力故變；二隨分別勢力故變。初必有用，後但為境。異熟識變但隨因緣，所變色等必有實用。若變心等便無實用，相分心等不能緣故。須彼實用，別從此生。變無為等亦無實用。故異熟識不緣心等。至無漏位，勝慧相應，雖無分別而澄淨故，設無實用亦現彼影。不爾，諸佛應非遍知。故有漏位，此異熟識但緣器、身及有漏種。在欲、色界，具三所緣。無色界中，緣有漏種，厭離色故，無業果色，有定果色，於理無違。彼識亦緣此色為境。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 11, a15-b3)

For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 276-79. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 66-67.

<sup>440</sup> i.e. the forms that are induced by power of concentration (定果色)

<sup>441</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 326, a1-2.

long as they have real function [like mind and mental factors of the first seven consciousness], they would arise from this consciousness. If [the eighth consciousness] transformed into “unconditioned [dharma]” (無為[法]; Skt, *asaṃskṛta*-[dharma]), there would be also no real function. Thus the maturing consciousness do not perceive the mind and etc.

Not until the “uncontaminated state” (無漏位) when [the eighth consciousness] is associated with to the excellent wisdom, although without discrimination and assuming no real function of [mind and etc], [the eighth consciousness] also manifest the images [of mind, mental factors, uncontaminated dharmas and etc] because the eighth consciousness is perfectly clear. Otherwise, all Buddhas should not be “omniscient” (遍知).

Thus in the “contaminated state” (有漏位) this maturing consciousness only perceives the container world, bodies and all seeds. In the desire realm and the form realm [this maturing consciousness] has three kinds of object of perception. In the formless realm it perceives contaminated seeds. Because it dislikes and leaves forms, there would be no “form as a result of actions” (業果色). [But] there are “forms that are induced by the power of concentration” (定果色) so it is not against the principle.<sup>442</sup> The consciousness also perceives these forms as its objects.

#### 4-5-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-5-2-1 Four phrases by “shared” and “unshared”

Borrowing “four phrases” (Ch. *si ju* 四句) by “shared” (Ch. *gong* 共) and “unshared” (Ch. *bu gong* 不共) for external objects directly through ZJL<sup>443</sup> from CWSLS<sup>444</sup>, LMC#1 noted as below:

Regarding the root consciousness transforming into those characteristics appearing like body with sense faculties and container world, there are “four phrases” (四句): 1) “transformation of shared among shared” (共中共變) like mountains, rivers and etc because they are not used only by “one destiny” (一趣). 2) “transformation of unshared among shared” (共中不共變) like one’s own farmlands and houses, something that is viewed as wild fire by ghosts but as water by human. 3) “transformation of unshared among unshared” (不共中不共

<sup>442</sup> The principle is that the eighth consciousness have three kinds of “object of perception”: 1) all seeds; 2) the container world. 3) the body with sense faculties. Although in “formless realm” (無色界) there is no container world and body as a result of actions, the forms like world and body are still possible to be produced by the power of concentration and be perceived. Thus, the principle is still valid.

<sup>443</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 705, a7-b7.

<sup>444</sup> T43, no. 1830, p. 321, b19-27.

變) like sense faculties eyes and etc because they are the base of one's own consciousness instead of others'. 4) "transformation of shared among unshared" (不共中共變) like one's own "physical faculties" (浮塵根) because they are also shared by others. Here so called "[all sentient beings'] transformations are each different" refers to "transformation of unshared among shared" like one's own farmlands and houses. So called "like all lamps that each seem lighting up [universally as if there was one lamp] refers to "transformation of shared among shared" like mountains, rivers and etc. <sup>445</sup>

In fact, LMC#1's note given above is very selective and condense citation from ZJL. Some explanations that originally contained in ZJL were left out. For example, what would the "shared" (共) and the "unshared" (不共) refer to, respectively? By quoting ZJL, LMC#3's note below could answer this question in certain degree,

*Weishi yi jing* 唯識義鏡 says, so called "shared among shared" is that many consciousnesses do the same transformations. Which is named "shared". Those transformations which were already done share same "function/enjoyment" (用). Which is repeatedly named "shared". Moreover, *Weishi chao* 唯識鈔 says, the forms into which the consciousnesses of sentient beings of "several destinies" (多趣) transform are at the same place and interpenetrating each other. Their characteristics are similar. They share same "enjoyment". Thus it is named "shared among shared" (共中共). The former "shared" is in terms of "object of perception" (所緣緣). The latter "shared" is in terms of "contributory conditions" (增上緣). Which is like mountains, rivers, and etc that have no owners. If they have owners, they would belong to "unshared among shared" (共中不共). <sup>446</sup>

Here we see that, depending on the sources, the former "shared" could be either whether transformations are shared or whether object of perception are shared. The latter "shared" could be either whether "function/enjoyment" is shared or whether "contributory condition" is shared. However, what does it mean by "transformations

<sup>445</sup> 「從本識變似根身器世間相，而有四句：一共中共變，如山河等，非唯一趣獨能用故。二共中不共變，如己田宅，非鬼見猛火、人見為水等。三不共中不共變，如眼根等，唯自識依，非他依故。四不共中共變，如自浮塵根，他亦受用故。今言所變各別者，是共中不共變，如己田宅。如眾燈明者，喻共中共變，如山河等。」(X50, no. 820, p. 546, c24-p. 547, a6 // Z 1:81, p. 40, b3-9 // R81, p. 79, b3-9)

<sup>446</sup> 「又唯識義鏡云：共中共者，多識同變，名之為共，變已同用，重名為共。又唯識鈔云：謂多趣有情識所變色，同在一處，互相涉入，其相相似，同共受用，名共中共。初之共字，約所緣緣。後之共字，約增上緣，即無主山河等是。若有主者，即共中不共所攝。」(X50, no. 822, p. 874, a12-17 // Z 1:81, p. 368, a16-b3 // R81, p. 735, a16-b3) & (T48, no. 2016, p. 705, a26-b3)

are shared”? LMC#3 quotes ZJL as below.

In total all seeds have two kinds: 1) [seeds that] share the same characteristics. 2) [seeds] that do not share the same characteristics. Why sharing the same characteristics? Because of those which are felt by many persons. Although so called consciousness-only means each persons' transformations are different, it is named “sharing the same characteristics” (共相) if they have the implication of similarly shared “enjoyment” (受用). It is NOT that one's own transformation could be used by others. Because if others could use [one's own transformation], that would be called as “perceiving the dharmas outside of mind” (緣心外法).

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Thus so called “transformations are shared/shared transformations” (共變) is that the seeds of the transformations share the similar characteristics. However, each transformations are still on their own. So called “shared enjoyment” (共受用) is that “sharing the similar characteristics” (共相) implies transformations have similar/same enjoyments. Nevertheless, each enjoyments are still on their own based on each transformations. Because the principle of consciousness-only does not allow one person to enjoy whatever outside of one's mind and its transformations. To reinforce this message, LMC#5 quotes ZJL as below.

“Shared enjoyment” (共受用) is “shared among shared”. “Distinct enjoyment” (別受用) is “unshared among shared” (共中不共). Speaking of ghosts, humans, gods seeing differently, *Zongjing* says, what gods see is “lands adorned with jewels” (寶莊嚴地). What humans see is cool water. What ghosts see is pus river and wild fire. It is because of different seen aspects into which the karmic consciousnesses of these four kinds of sentient beings each transform. There are no four distinct objects outside of mind. There is old saying that one object corresponding to four minds. Which is not correct. If said there was one object, one would not be certain which object would be. Except for “seen aspects” into which these four sentient beings transform, if there was another object, that would be something existing outside of mind. <sup>448</sup>

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<sup>447</sup> 「且諸種子總有二種：一是共相，二不共相。何為共相？多人所感故。雖知人人所變各別，名為唯識。然有相似共受用義，說名共相。實非自變他能用之。若能用者，此即名緣心外法故。」(X50, no. 822, p. 874, a9-12 // Z 1:81, p. 368, a13-16 // R81, p. 735, a13-16) & (T48, no. 2016, p. 705, a13-20)

<sup>448</sup> 「共受用，即共中之共。別受用，即共中不共。言鬼人天所見異者，宗鏡云：天見是寶莊嚴地，魚見是窟宅，人見是清冷水，鬼見是膿河猛火，乃彼四類有情自業識所變相分不同，更無心外別四境。舊云：一境應四心者，不正。若言一境者，未審定是何境？若離四類有情所變相分外，更別有一境者，即是心外有法。」(X51, no. 824, p. 327, c4-10 // Z 1:82, p. 227, c9-15 //



The message here is very clear that there is no dharmas/phenomena outside of one's own mind. However, what might be confusing here is that what is shared and what is unshared in this case. If what is unshared is “distinct enjoyment” (別受用) because ghosts, humans, gods see “one thing” differently, then what is shared is the “one thing”. The confusing part is there should be no any “one thing” outside of their own minds. If that was the case, shouldn't what they see differently be different things? That is the question. WKWD has a different answer to the question as below.

Question: For example, “one object corresponding to four minds” (一境應四心). What gods see is a pool that adorned with jewels. What human see is clean water. What ghosts see is wild fire. What fish see is home. Something like these belong to which one of phrase? Answer: “Unshared among unshared” (不共中不共) like “sense faculties” (勝義根) within one kind [of sentient beings] because induced actions, seeds, transformations and uses/enjoyment are all unshared.<sup>449</sup>

In other words, WKWD argues that so called “one object corresponding to four minds” case is more like “sense faculties” than “one's own farmlands and houses”. Even though, no any late-Ming commentators supported the position of WKWD. Probably because WKWD did not clearly note that so called “one object corresponding to four minds” (一境應四心) is against the principle of consciousness-only.

#### 4-5-2-2 Where does the external world come from?

If we ask “where the external world comes from” in CWSL's words, the question would become “...whose maturing consciousness transforms into “characteristics” (相) of the “container world” (器世間)...” as we see in 5-1. There are three arguments in CWSL. As LMC#5 noted, the first argument for “all” is too wide. The second argument is OK in terms of those who have same actions all sharing the same transformations. But the argument for “those who currently living in this world” (現居) and “those who will be born into this world” (當生) is problematic<sup>450</sup> when a container world is going to be destroyed or to be formed. The third argument is correct. The key is, as LMC#4 highlighted, “one's own land of other places” (他方自地). For example, “desire realm/five-destinies-living-lands” (欲界/五趣雜居地) of

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R82, p. 454, a9-15) & (T48, no. 2016, p. 770, a24-b6)

<sup>449</sup> 「問：如一境應四心，天見寶嚴池，人見為清水，鬼見為猛火，魚見為窟宅，此等之類，當何變句？答：不共中不共，如一類中說勝義根，招、種、變、用，皆不共故。」(X55, no. 888, p. 371, b7-10 // Z 2:3, p. 242, b5-8 // R98, p. 483, b5-8)

<sup>450</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 327, b15-16 // Z 1:82, p. 227, b14-15 // R82, p. 453, b14-15.

other places, relative to “desire realm” of this place, are named “one’s own land”. The consciousnesses that sharing the same actions transform into one’s own land in all different places.<sup>451</sup>

In addition to CWSL’s three arguments, LMC#2 goes further by citing many sources to support that the worlds are caused by shared actions as below.

Question: What is the base to say that “the world” (山河大地) is “caused by shared actions” (共業所感)? Answer: The scripture says, for examples, “thousand-cubed great-thousand worlds/ trichiliocosm” (三千大千世界; Skt. *tri-sāhasra-mahāsāhasro loka-dhātuḥ*; i.e. one billion worlds)<sup>452</sup> are not accomplished by either one condition or one event. They have to be accomplished by immeasurable conditions and events.<sup>453</sup> So called the great land depending on the water circle, the water circle depending on the wind circle, the wind circle depending on the empty circle, and the empty circle having no base.<sup>454</sup> Such are all caused by shared actions of all sentient beings and bodhisattvas’ virtuous roots and making all sentient beings to enjoy appropriately and accordingly. Also said that due to the power of contributory actions and maturation of seeds, “golden treasury clouds” (金藏雲)<sup>455</sup> arise in empty space until the worlds are accomplished in sequence<sup>456</sup>. The defiled, the pure, the coarse and the subtle are different enjoyments depending on the power of shared actions. Also said that the great seeds of “delusions of cutting” (斷截妄想) produce “element of earth” (地界).<sup>457</sup> Also said that “illumination of enlightenment” (覺明) and “obscuration of empty [delusions]” (空昧) are so relative to each other that they make sway. Due to this, there is a wine circle to hold the worlds.<sup>458</sup> Thus one should know that it is all caused of sentient beings’ action. There would be no any other dharmas/phenomena outside of minds.<sup>459</sup>

<sup>451</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 177, b1-3 // Z 1:82, p. 76, d3-5 // R82, p. 152, b3-5.

<sup>452</sup> I borrow the translation from Sadakata. See Akira Sadakata, *Buddhist Cosmology: Philosophy and Origins*, 1st English ed. (Tokyo: Kosei Pub. Co., 1997), p.94.

<sup>453</sup> This seems a quote from *Da fang guang fo huayan jing* 大方廣佛華嚴經. See T10, no. 279, p. 263, b3-5.

<sup>454</sup> This seems a quote from *Fa yuan zhu lin* 法苑珠林. See T53, no. 2122, p. 278, a29-b3.

<sup>455</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>456</sup> This seems a quote from *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論. See T30, no. 1579, p. 286, c18-19.

<sup>457</sup> This seems a quote from *Xin huayan jing lun* 新華嚴經論. See T36, no. 1739, p. 906, c29-p. 907, a2.

<sup>458</sup> This seems a quote from *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經. See T19, no. 945, p. 120, a14-15.

<sup>459</sup> 「問云：山河大地共業所感，亦何所據？答：經云譬如三千大千世界，非以一緣，非以一事而得成就，以無量緣、無量事方得成就。所謂大地依水輪，水輪依風輪，風輪依空輪，空輪無所依，如是皆由眾生共業，及諸菩薩善根所起。令諸有情各隨所宜而得受用。又云：一切有情增上業力種成熟故，大虛空中起金藏雲，乃至世界次第成就。染淨麤妙，隨共業力受用各別。又云：斷截妄想大種，生內外世界等。又云：覺明空昧，相待成搖，故有風輪執持世界等，故知皆是眾生業感。若離心外，無別有法。」(X50, no. 821, p. 692, c11-21 // Z 1:81, p. 186, b15-c7

As my footnotes indicate, LMC#2 note that is shown above cited at least four sources including *Da fang guang fo huayan jing*, *Fa yuan zhu lin*, *Yuqie shidi lun*, *Xin huayan jing lun*, and *Lengyan jing*. Most interestingly, *Fa yuan zhu lin* 法苑珠林 (Forest of Gems in the Garden of the Dharma) that was compiled by Daoshi 道世 in Tang and has been traditionally viewed as a Buddhist encyclopedia was used as well. *Fa yuan zhu lin* has one hundred fascicles in total. The discussion of Buddhist cosmology are mainly located in fascicle #2- #3 “The Chapter about Three Realms” (三界篇).

LMC#3 also quoted another more contemporary and dedicated Buddhist cosmology work—*Fa jie an li tu* 法界安立圖 (Graphs to Establish Dharma-realms) that was compiled by Renchao 仁潮 in 1584 as below.

There are two direct causes that the formation and disintegration of worlds are infinite. 1) Due to the causes of shared actions of all sentient beings. Which means that one deluded mind and afflicted activities of three poisons cause the current “circumstantial retribution” (依報). If afflicted activities were not exhausted, how would “circumstantial retribution” end? If no base, who would be receiving the retribution? Thus [shared actions] make the formation and disintegration of worlds to continue. 2) Due to the cause of the power of vows by all Buddhas. Which means that Buddhas have great vows to liberate all sentient beings. Since all sentient beings are infinite, Buddhas’ vows are also coming to no end. <sup>460</sup>

In CWSL, the situations that a container world either to be destroyed or to be formed were brought up by the third argument in order to challenge the second argument. Nevertheless, there was no intention to further explain the infinite cycle of formations and disintegration. However, here we see that LMC#3 seemed intended to go extra miles by making such explanation through the above quote.

Following suit, LMC#4 tried to talk about how long and how many catastrophes the cycles of the universe would take by quoting *Apidamo jushe lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍論. For example, LMC#4 notes

The container world have the cycle of “creation, duration of created world,

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// R81, p. 371, b15-p. 372, a7)

<sup>460</sup> 「世界成壞無窮有二因緣：一由眾生同業所感，謂同一迷心，三毒惑業，感現依報，惑業未盡，依報何窮？若無所依，何名受報？故令世界成壞連續。二由諸佛願力所感，謂佛有弘願度盡眾生，眾生既無窮，佛願亦無盡。」 (X50, no. 822, p. 874, c4-8 // Z 1:81, p. 368, d2-6 // R81, p. 736, b2-6) or (X57, no. 972, p. 468, b23-c3 // Z 2B:23, p. 483, c11-15 // R150, p. 966, a11-15)

dissolution, and nothingness” (成、住、壞、空) each taking 20 [intermediate] “kalpas” (劫). Because the container world is not permanent and sentient beings are all born and ceased, [one great cycle of destruction] requires seven-fire-one-flood-catastrophes repeating seven times and then followed by wind catastrophe.<sup>461</sup>

However, LMC4’s quote is so condense and so incomplete that I could not help wonder what purpose he liked to achieve here. Because such incomplete details seemed not to help understand CWSL’s third argument better. If not for showing off, LMC#3 and LMC#4 seemed to suggest that a more comprehensive Buddhist cosmology was needed contemporarily.

#### 4-5-2-3 Four phrases by “transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination”

Why can’t the eight consciousness transform into something appearing like mind and mental factors as its object of perception? To address this question, CWSL mentioned two kinds of “transformation of contaminated consciousness” (有漏識變). To explain these two kinds of transformation, late-Ming commentators mainly referred to ZJL except LMC#4 also referred to WKWD a little bit as well. The main differences lie on how much they quote ZJL. Since LMC#3 quoted ZJL more completely, I will divide LCM#3’s note into three sections and translate as below.

The first section is about what “transformation of direct cause” (Ch. *yin yuan bian* 因緣變) and “transformation of discrimination” (Ch. *fen bie bian* 分別變) mean respectively. This is a quotation coming down from CWSLS<sup>462</sup> through ZJL<sup>463</sup>. Started from LMC#1<sup>464</sup>, most late-Ming commentators adopted this commentary. LMC#3 notes as below.

So called “transformation of direct cause” comes from previous actions and real linguistic seeds. The power is required only from “effortless mind” (任運心). It is not that mind arising by “attention” (作意). That is how [first] five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness transform into objects by following contributory maturing cause as condition and linguistic seed as cause.

<sup>461</sup> 「器界有成住壞空各二十劫。然彼器非常。情俱生滅故。要七火一水。七水火後風。」 (X51, no. 823, p. 177, a15-17 // Z 1:82, p. 76, c11-13 // R82, p. 152, a11-13) For more complete details, see Sadakata, *Buddhist Cosmology: Philosophy and Origins*, pp.102-07.

<sup>462</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 326, b10-24.

<sup>463</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 706, a29-b8.

<sup>464</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 548, a2-7 // Z 1:81, p. 41, b5-10 // R81, p. 81, b5-10.

So called “transformation of discrimination” is “attention giving rise to minds” (作意生心) which are “planning minds” (籌度心). These minds are what the sixth and the seventh consciousness give rise to by following one’s own attention of discrimination. Due to this reason, when the sixth and the seventh consciousness perceive, their “seen part as projected image” (影像相分)<sup>465</sup> do not have real substance so they are not necessarily have function. The former following transformation of direct cause must have real substance and function like those objects which are transformations of first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness. The latter following transformation of discrimination can only be objects, not necessarily having function. That is about the seventh consciousness and etc.<sup>466</sup>

The second section is about why objects of “transformation of direct cause” have function whereas objects of “transformation of discrimination” don’t. To this regard, if we refer to LMC#2 note<sup>467</sup>, we would see LMC#2 explained by using concepts of three kind of objects- “real object” (Ch. *xing jing* 性境), “imagined objects without substance” (Ch. *du ying jing* 獨影境) and “imagined objects with substance” (Ch. *dai zhi jing* 帶質境)<sup>468</sup>. Although these terms are not found in LMC#1, from the following LMC#3’s quote of ZJL<sup>469</sup>, it seems that LMC#2’s note is based on reference of ZJL.

Another explanation: The former [transformation] must have function because it is only produced by the eighth maturing [consciousness], because it is what is permeated, and because it can hold seeds. The latter [transformations] by the remaining seven consciousnesses such as form, touch, and etc all do not have real function. They look like having function of substance such as the light in the mirror. Among three kinds of objects, “real objects” are not following minds because they belong to transformations of direct cause. On the other hand, “imagined objects without substance” and “imagined objects with substance” are both transformations of discrimination. Transformations of maturing

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<sup>465</sup> Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>466</sup> 「因緣變者，謂由先業及名言實種，即要有力唯任運心，非由作意其心乃生，即五、八識隨其增上異熟因為緣，名言種為因，故變於境。分別變者，謂作意生心，是籌度心，即六、七識隨自分別作意生故。由此，六、七緣時，影像相分無有實體，未必有用。初隨因緣變，必有實體用，即五、八等所變之境。後隨分別變，但能為境，非必有用，即第七識等。」(X50, no. 822, p. 875, b23-c6 // Z 1:81, p. 369, c15-d4 // R81, p. 738, a15-b4)

<sup>467</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 694, a6-16 // Z 1:81, p. 187, c16-d8 // R81, p. 374, a16-b8.

<sup>468</sup> My translation is based on my reference on Ling-po Yu, "*Ba Shi Gui Ju Song Jiang Ji*" 八識規矩頌講記 (Taipei, Taiwan: Buddha Educational Foundation, 1996), pp.94-96.

<sup>469</sup> T48, no. 2016, p. 706, b8-26.

consciousness indicate that the transformations like forms and etc are produced from real seeds. Thus what it transforms into must have substance and function. If [objects were] mind and mental factors as seen aspect like “transformed mind” (化心), [the eighth consciousness] would not perceive it because the perception is useless. *Jie shen mi jing* 解深密經 (Scripture on the Explication of the Profound Meaning) says, all transformed minds do not have “self-dependent minds” (自依心) but “dependent arising minds” (依他心). *Fo di lun* 佛地論 (Treatise on the Buddha-*bhūmi Sūtra*) says, that is transformations of discrimination if there is no mind that bringing its own real substance into thought but mind that seemed to bring seen aspect that is transformation of seeing aspect into thought like light in the mirror.<sup>470</sup>

Different from LMC#2 and LMC#3, LMC#4's note seemed to have a reference on WKWD which notes “...So called “transformation of direct cause” is direct perception only. It perceives the objects effortlessly. So called “transformation of discrimination” could be either inference or “mistaken perception” (非量; Skt. *apramāṇa*)...”<sup>471</sup> Using both “three kinds of valid means of cognition (三量) and “three kind of objects” (三類境), LMC#4 notes as below.

So called “transformation of direct cause” refers to the fifth, eighth and partial sixth consciousness<sup>472</sup> which are given rise by direct causes. Because they are "direct perception" only and perceive the objects effortlessly. So called “transformation of discrimination” refers to the seventh and partial sixth consciousness which are produced by “conceptual discrimination” (計度分別). They could be either "inference" or “mistaken perception” because they perceive “imagined objects brought up by substance” (帶質[境]) and “imagined objects without substance” (獨影[境]). The former have real substance and function while the latter is only object of perception. Therefore, verses says: “Real objects” (性境) are not subject to minds. “Imagined objects without substance” (獨影境) are subject to seeing aspect. “Imagined objects with substance” (帶質

<sup>470</sup> 「又解：初唯第八異熟生故，所熏處故，能持種故，變必有用。後餘七識所變色觸等，皆無實用，似本質用，如鏡中光。於三境中，性境不隨心，因緣變攝。獨影、帶質皆分別變。異熟識變等顯變色等從實種生，故所變法必有體用。若相分心、心所，如化心等，故不緣之，緣便無用。解深密經說：諸變化心，無自依心，有依他心。佛地論云：無自緣慮實體之心，有隨見分所變相分似慮之心，如鏡中光，此即分別變。」(X50, no. 822, p. 875, c6-14 // Z 1:81, p. 369, d4-12 // R81, p. 738, b4-12)

<sup>471</sup> 「因緣變者，唯是現量，任運緣境。分別變者，通比、非量。」(X55, no. 888, p. 348, b5-6 // Z 2:3, p. 219, b5-6 // R98, p. 437, b5-6)

<sup>472</sup> The sixth consciousness has been traditionally viewed as covering all three kinds of “valid means of cognition (量; Skt. *pramāṇa*).

境) connect false discrimination and real substance. Their differences depends on nature, seeds, and etc.<sup>473</sup>

The third section is about “four phrases” (四句) by “transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination”. LMC#3, LMC4 and LMC#5 all quote these four phrases from ZJL. LMC#4’s quote<sup>474</sup> is less complete while LMC#5<sup>475</sup> and LMC#3’s quote are almost word-by-word. I translate LMC#3’s quote as below.

So called “discrimination by four phrases” (四句分別): 1) It is “transformation of direct cause” but not “transformation of discrimination”. That refers to the fifth consciousnesses, their mental factors and the eighth consciousness. Because seen aspects as object of perception are produced by their own seeds. 2) It is only “transformation of discrimination” but not “transformation of direct cause”. That refers to the contaminated seventh consciousness and the five mental factors of the eighth consciousness. They are seen aspects into which that [seeing aspects] transform because they are produced only by discriminated minds. 3) It is both. That refers to the contaminated sixth consciousness and the uncontaminated eighth consciousness because they are able to perceive both real and nominal dharmas. 4) It is neither. That refers to “volitional formations that associated neither with forms nor with mental functions” (不相應行). Because they do not have real substances. They are not produced by the same seeds that produce subject of perception.<sup>476</sup>

In short, the commentary in the first section regarding what “transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination” mean is accepted by all late-Ming commentators. Then, the commentaries in the second section regarding why objects of “transformation of direct cause” have function whereas objects of “transformation of discrimination” don’t have could be divided into two subgroups. The first subgroup is LMC#2 and LMC#3 who followed ZJL and used three kind of objects as explanatory constructs. The second subgroup is LMC#4 who followed

<sup>473</sup> 「通言因緣變者，謂五八及意識一分，皆伏親疎因緣生，唯是現量，任運緣性境故。通言分別變者，謂第七及意識一分，皆計度分別生，通非比量，緣帶質、獨影故。初有實體用，後但為所緣。故頌云：性境不隨心，獨影唯從見，帶質通情本，性種等隨應。」(X51, no. 823, p. 178, a3-7 // Z 1:82, p. 77, b17-c3 // R82, p. 153, b17-p. 154, a3)

<sup>474</sup> X51, no. 823, p. 178, a7-9 // Z 1:82, p. 77, c3-5 // R82, p. 154, a3-5.

<sup>475</sup> X51, no. 824, p. 328, b6-11 // Z 1:82, p. 228, b5-10 // R82, p. 455, b5-10.

<sup>476</sup> 「四句分別者，一因緣變非分別變，即五識心心所及第八識心王，為所緣相分從自種生故。二唯分別變非因緣變，即有漏第七識及第八五心所，是為所變相分，唯從分別心生故。三俱句，即有漏第六及無漏八識，以能通緣假實法故。四俱非，即不相應行是，以無實體故，不與能緣同種生故。」(X50, no. 822, p. 875, c14-20 // Z 1:81, p. 369, d12-18 // R81, p. 738, b12-18)

WKWD and used both “three kinds of valid means of cognition” and “three kind of objects” as explanatory constructs. Last, the commentaries in the third section is about “four phrases” by “transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination”. Such explanatory framework was adopted only from LMC#3 onwards. This case study indicates that how the late-Ming commentators might have something in common and something selective on their own. Moreover, it shows how LMC#3 plays an important role in bridging such developments. Without LMC#3’s longer and more complete quote, such development would be harder to identify.

In addition, it is interesting to have a side note that, different from “four phrases by shared and unshared” that was passed down to late-Ming commentators through ZJL from CWSLS, the “discrimination by four phrases” (四句分別) by “transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination” is more like a further development after CWSLS. Because CWSL seemed to just stop at either-or two-category solutions that distinguish “transformation of direct cause” from “transformation of discrimination”.<sup>477</sup> More interesting, such further development by ZJL was only picked up by LMC#3, LMC#4 and LMC#5, Not LMC#1 and LMC#2. More dedicated study is needed to address why so.

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<sup>477</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 326, c22-25.



## 4-6 Aspect of Incomprehensible 不可知門

### 4-6-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>478</sup>

So called “incomprehensible” (Ch. *bu ke zhi* 不可知; Skt. *asamviditaka*) means that the “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*) of this consciousness is difficult to comprehend because it is extremely subtle. Or the object of perception of this consciousness is named “incomprehensible” because the internal objects of “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*) are also subtle and because the external “container world” (Ch. *qi shi jian* 器世間; Skt. *bhājana-loka*) (器世間) are difficult to measure.

What is the reason that when this consciousness takes “object of perception” (所緣境) its “mental activity to perceive” is difficult to comprehend?

Like in the “concentration of cessation” (Ch. *mie jin ding* 滅盡定; Skt. *nirodha-samāpatti*) [where most mental functions are extinguished], it should be believed that there is [subtle] consciousness which never leaves the body.

Furthermore, it must be agreed that [when one enters into] the “concentration of cessation” (滅[盡]定) one [still] has [subtle] consciousness because one still belongs to sentient beings [who should always have the subtle consciousness] like when one have most mental functions on. The state of “concentration without thought” (Ch. *wu xiang ding* 無想定; Skt. *asamjñi-samāpatti*) and etc should be understood in the same way as well.

### 4-6-2 Discussions of Commentaries

#### Paradox between being incomprehensible and being existent

The paradox in CWSL text 6-1 is that, if both “mental activity to perceive” and “object of perception” of the eighth consciousness are really incomprehensible, then how do you know they are ever existent? That is the question. In addition to CWSL argument, LMC#1 tried to address this question by quoting *Zhuanshi lun* 轉識論 (Treatise on the Transformation of Consciousness) which was composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha as below.

*Zhuanshi lun* says, “mental activities to perceive” and objects of this consciousness are indistinguishable because they are one substance without

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<sup>478</sup> 「不可知者，謂此行相極微細故，難可了知。或此所緣，內執受境亦微細故，外器世間量難測故，名不可知。云何是識，取所緣境，行相難知？如滅定中，不離身識，應信為有。然必應許，滅定有識，有情攝故，如有心時。無想等位，當知亦爾。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 11, b3-8). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 279-80. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 67-68.

differences. If that was the case, how would you know they are existent?

Answer: Due to events, one knows that this consciousness is existent. This consciousness can host all events as result of all afflictive actions. For example, “mental activities to perceive” and objects of “ignorance” (Ch. *wu ming* 無明; Skt. *avidyā*) are indistinguishable. However, there are events like desire, hatred and etc. Thus one know “ignorance” is existent. The root consciousness is the same. Although [its] “mental activities to perceive” and objects are indistinguishable, one know it is existent through the events.<sup>479</sup>

In other occasion when CWSL formally tried to prove the existence of the eighth consciousness, LMC#2<sup>480</sup> also quoted the same message from *Zhuanshi lun* but not here. Instead, here LMC#2 quotes *Yuqie shidi lun* (Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice) to explain what it mean by “incomprehensible” as below.

“Storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) perceives narrow objects of “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*) in “desire realm” (Ch. *yu jie* 欲界; Skt. *kāma-dhātu*). It perceives vast objects of “clinging” in “form realm” (Ch. *se jie* 色界; Skt. *rūpa-dhātu*). It perceives immeasurable objects of “clinging” in “formless realm” (Ch. *wu se jie* 無色界; Skt. *ārūpya-dhātu*), in “abode of the infinity of space” (Ch. *kong wu bian chu* 空無邊處; Skt. *ākāśa-ānantya-āyatana*), and in “abode of the infinity of consciousness” (Ch. *shi wu bian chu* 識無邊處; Skt. *vijñāna-ānantya-āyatana*). It perceives subtle objects of “clinging” in “abode of nothingness” (Ch. *wu suo you chu* 無所有處; Skt. *ākīncanya-āyatana*). It perceives extremely subtle objects of “clinging” in “abode of neither thought nor non-thought” (Ch. *fei xiang chu* 非非想處; Skt. *naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñā-āyatana*). Because this consciousness perceives subtle objects, even the smart and wise ones in the world are also difficult to comprehend. Thus said “incomprehensible”.<sup>481</sup>

If we refer to *Yuqie shidi lun*, we will see that the above quote is only partial text that *Yuqie shidi lun* used to define “characteristics of object of perception” (所緣轉

<sup>479</sup> 「轉識論云：此識行相及境，不可分別，一體無異。若爾，云何知有？答：由事故知有此識。此識能持一切煩惱業果報事，譬如無明相、境不可分別，亦有欲瞋等事，知有無明。本識亦爾，相、境無差別，但由事故知其有也。」(X50, no. 820, p. 548, b3-7 // Z 1:81, p. 41, c12-16 // R81, p. 82, a12-16). Or see T31, no. 1587, p. 61, c13-p. 62, a3.

<sup>480</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 701, c8-11 // Z 1:81, p. 195, c17-d2 // R81, p. 390, a17-b2

<sup>481</sup> 「謂阿賴耶識，於欲界中，緣狹小執受境。於色界中，緣廣大執受境。於無色界、空無邊處、識無邊處，緣無量執受境。於無所有處，緣微細執受境，於非非想處，緣極微細執受境。由此識緣境微細，世聰慧者亦難了故，故曰不可知也。」(X50, no. 821, p. 694, b7-11 // Z 1:81, p. 188, a5-9 // R81, p. 375, a5-9)

相) of storehouse consciousness.<sup>482</sup> At most it only explains incomprehensible object of perception, not covering “mental activity to perceive”. Nevertheless, LMC#3 followed suit by quoting LMC#2’s above note. More interesting to note is that CWSLS quoted the same portion of *Yuqie shidi lun* to explicate the incomprehensible object of perception. So far I could not find any sources that available to the late-Ming commentators passed down such quote to LMC#2. Is it the case that “great minds think alike”?

In addition, referring to Table 7 and Appendix 1 Table 6, we find that LMC#2 have much longer notes than other commentators in this section and quotes at abnormally high percentage. The longest quote that coming from ZJL is over four hundred Chinese characters.<sup>483</sup> Since the quote is too wordy, I won’t translate here. Instead, I am more interested in translating LMC#2’s short quote of *Lengqie abatuoluo baojing* 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經 that translated by Guṇabhadra as below. Because LMC#2 is well known in being specialized in *Lengqie jing* (The Scripture on the Buddha's Entering the Country of Lanka; Skt. *Lankāvatāra Sūtra*).

Thus, *Lengqie* says, “ For example, when practitioners enter into “meditative concentration” (Ch. *chan san mei* 禪三昧; Skt. *samādhi*), they are not aware of the subtle “karmic impressions” (Ch. *xi qi* 習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*) and have a thought like this: when consciousnesses cease, then entering into “meditative concentration” (Ch. *chan zheng shou* 禪正受, i.e. 禪三昧; Skt. *samādhi*). In fact it is not that when consciousnesses cease, then entering into “meditative concentration”. Because the seeds of karmic impressions do not cease, [the storehouse consciousness] does not cease. Because [the sixth consciousness]<sup>484</sup> does not take in the objects, [the sixth consciousness] ceases.<sup>485</sup>

Here we see that, since CWSL argues that one still has the eighth consciousness in “concentration of cessation” (Ch. *mie jin ding* 滅盡定; Skt. *nirodha-samāpatti*), LMC#2 tried to resort to practitioners’ meditative experience by quoting *Lengqie*. The question is that do all people have a consensus on whether there is still subtle consciousness in the state of concentration of cessation ? LMC#2’s quote assumes that there is still subtle consciousness in the concentration of cessation. What if some people do not agree that there is still subtle consciousness in the state of concentration

<sup>482</sup> See T30, no. 1579, p. 580, a2-28.

<sup>483</sup> X50, no. 821, p. 694, b19-c18 // Z 1:81, p. 188, a17-c4 // R81, p. 375, a17-p. 376, a4.

<sup>484</sup> For source text explanation, see T39, no. 1789, p. 354, a7-15.

<sup>485</sup> 「故楞伽云：如脩行者入禪三昧，微細習氣轉而不覺知，而作是念：『識滅然後入禪正受』。實不識滅而入正受，以習氣種子不滅，故不滅。以境界轉，攝受不具，故滅。」(X50, no. 821, p. 694, b15-18 // Z 1:81, p. 188, a13-16 // R81, p. 375, a13-16)

of cessation? LMC#4 clearly put together two Buddhist three-membered syllogism as below to address the question.

To state a syllogism:

Subject of a thesis (Ch. *you fa* 有法; Skt. *pakṣa-dharmin*): the mental activity to perceive objects.

Thesis (Ch. *zong* 宗, Skt. *pakṣa*): one should believe [“mental activity to perceive” (行相) of the eighth consciousness] is existent.

Reason (Ch. *yin* 因, Skt. *hetu*): because subtle [consciousness] never leaves body.

Example (Ch. *yu* 喻, *drṣṭānta*): like [subtle] consciousness in “concentration of cessation” (滅盡定).

This [syllogism] is to prove there is subtle “mental activity to perceive” by the fact that there is consciousness in concentration of cessation. Nevertheless, how does one know that there is consciousness in concentration of cessation? Thus to prove it by stating another syllogism:

Subject of a thesis: the consciousness in concentration of cessation.

Thesis: one should believe that the [subtle] consciousness in concentration of cessation is existent.

Reason: because one belongs to sentient beings [who must have subtle consciousness activity on].

Example: like sentient beings when they have mental activities on. <sup>486</sup>

If we refer to CWSLS, the first syllogism is to answer Sautrāntikas who agree that there is subtle consciousness in concentration of cessation. The second syllogism is for Sarvāstivāda who does not agree that there is subtle mind/consciousness in concentration of cessation.<sup>487</sup> Although LMC#4 did not identify who agrees and who disagrees, he is the only late-Ming commentator who listed two syllogisms to address to two kinds of audiences separately.

In addition, different from LMC#4, LMC#5 only listed the second syllogism as below.

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<sup>486</sup> 「立量云：緣境行相是有法，應信為有宗，微細不離身故因，喻如滅定中識。此以滅定中識，證成微細行相為有。復如何知滅定中有識耶？復立量證，滅定中識是有法，應信為有宗，有情攝故因，喻如有心時有情。」(X51, no. 823, p. 178, b6-11 // Z 1:82, p. 77, d8-13 // R82, p. 154, b8-13)

<sup>487</sup> See CWSLS note in T43, no. 1830, p. 327, c28-p. 328, a5. In Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*, we only see the argument that is similar to the first syllogism, no second one. And it mentions that vijñānavādin agree but not specifically identifies Sautrāntikas as CWSLS. See Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.54.

To state a syllogism:  
 Subject of a thesis: concentration of cessation.  
 Thesis: there is the eighth consciousness in concentration of cessation.  
 Reason: because one still belongs to sentient beings [who must have the subtle consciousness activity on].  
 Example: like sentient beings when they have mental activities on.<sup>488</sup>

If anyone suspected something wrong (e.g. tautology) with the second syllogism of LMC#4, LMC#5's second syllogism would be easier to identify what might go wrong. In Dignāga's Buddhist logic system, a statement of a thesis is comprised of "a property-possessor" (有法, i.e. the subject of a thesis) and "a inferable property" (Ch. *suo li fa* 所立法; Skt. *sādhya-dharma*, i.e. the predicate). A thesis is supposed to be established (or proved) by another "property as means of proof" (Ch. *neng li fa* 能立法; Skt. *sādhana-dharma/hetu*, i.e. reason) together with examples through similarity and dissimilarity. In order to establish a thesis, what must be mutually agreed by both sides of the argument are not only "property as means of proof" as reason but also "a property-possessor" and "a inferable property". If "a property-possessor" and "a inferable property" are not agreed by both sides, the thesis will commit the "fallacy in which the subject is not mutually agreed to exist" (Ch. *suo bie bu ji cheng* 所別不極成; Skt. *aprasiddha-viśeṣya*) and "fallacy in which the predicate is not mutually admitted to exist" (Ch. *neng bie bu ji cheng* 能別不極成; *aprasiddha-viśeṣaṇa*). Due to no agreement on the subject of thesis, it will commit the "fallacy in which the reason is not recognized because its base is not mutually agreed to exist" (Ch. *suo yi bu cheng* 所依不成; *āśrayāsiddhi*) as well.<sup>489</sup>

In LMC#5's syllogism, the eighth consciousness as "an inferable property" (所立法) is not mutually agreed to exist. So it commits the fallacy in which the predicate is not mutually admitted to exist and the "fallacy in which the reason is not recognized by either the proponent or the opponent" (Ch. *sui yi bu cheng* 隨一不成, Skt. *anyatarāsiddha*). On the other hand, in LMC#4's second syllogism, the subject of a thesis is the consciousness in concentration of cessation. Since "the consciousness" is the eighth consciousness which as "a property-possessor" is not mutually agreed to exist, it commits the fallacy in which the subject is not mutually agreed to exist. Due to no agreement on the subject, the reason also commits the fallacy in which the

<sup>488</sup> 「量云：滅定是有法，有第八識宗，因云有情攝故，喻如有心時。」(X51, no. 824, p. 328, c3-4 // Z 1:82, p. 228, c8-9 // R82, p. 456, a8-9)

<sup>489</sup> See Cheng Lu, "Yin Ming Ru Zheng Li Lun Jiang Jie" 因明入正理論講解 (Taipei, Taiwan: Darchen Publishing, 2003), pp.150-56. And See Musashi Tachikawa, "A Sixth-Century Manual of Indian Logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 1, no. 2 (1971): p.122-23.

reason is not recognized because its base is not mutually agreed to exist.

Furthermore, according to *Yin ming zheng li men lun ben* 因明正理門論本 that is Xuanzang's Chinese translation of the *Nyāyamukha* by Dignāga, only the mutually-agreed property as a reason is allowed to prove another property in question. The other three combinations— either a property-possessor to prove a property or a property to prove a property-possessor or a property-possessor to prove a property-possessor— were all rejected by Dignāga.<sup>490</sup> Thus there is no way for either CWSL or LMC#4 or any commentaries to use Dignāga's Buddhist logic system to establish the existence of any property-possessor.



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<sup>490</sup> See T32, no. 1628, p.1, c11-12.

## 4-7 Aspect of Association 相應門

### 4-7-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

#### [Opening]<sup>491</sup>

[Question:] how many “mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo* 心所; Skt. *caitta*) is this consciousness “associated with/accompanied by” (Ch. *xiang ying* 相應; Skt. *anvita*)?

[Answer:] It is always associated with “touch” (Ch. *chu* 觸; Skt. *sparśa*), “attention” (Ch. *zuo yi* 作意; Skt. *manaskāra*), “sensation” (Ch. *shou* 受; Skt. *vedanā*), “ideation” (Ch. *xiang* 想; Skt. *saṃjñā*), and “volition” (Ch. *si* 思; Skt. *cetanā*).

In all states from beginningless time until “transformation of the basis” (Ch. *zhuan yi* 轉依; Skt. *āśraya-parāvṛtti*) is not done yet, the “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) is always associated with these five mental factors because they are “omnipresent mental factors” (Ch. *bian xing xin suo* 遍行心所; Skt. *sarvatraga-caitasa*).

#### [“Touch” (觸)]<sup>492</sup>

“Touch” (Ch. *chu* 觸; Skt. *sparśa*) means “discrimination transformation” (Ch. *fen bie bian yi* 分別變異; \*Skt. *vikāra-pariccheda*?<sup>493</sup>) is produced when “three things come into contact” (Ch. *san he* 三和; Skt. *trika-saṃnipāte*).<sup>494</sup> It makes mind and mental factors to touch the “object” (Ch. *jing* 境; Skt. *viśaya*) as its “nature” (性). It provides “the support” (Ch. *suo yi* 所依; Skt. *saṃniśraya*<sup>495</sup>) to “sensation”, “ideation” and “volition” and etc as its “business” (Ch. *ye* 業, Skt. *karman*).

<sup>491</sup> 「此識與幾心所相應? 「常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應」。阿賴耶識，無始時來，乃至未轉，於一切位，恒與此五心所相應，以是遍行心所攝故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, b16-19). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 281. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 68.

<sup>492</sup> 「觸謂三和分別變異，令心、心所觸境為性，受想思等所依為業。謂根境識更相隨順，故名三和。觸依彼生，令彼和合，故說為彼。三和合位，皆有順生心所功能，說名變異。觸似彼起，故名分別。根變異力，引觸起時，勝彼識境。故《集論》等，但說分別根之變異。和合一切心及心所，令同觸境，是觸自性。既似順起心所功能，故以受等所依為業。《起盡經》說，受想行蘊，一切皆以觸為緣故。由斯故說，識觸受等因，二、三、四和合而生。《瑜伽》但說，與受、想、思為所依者。思於行蘊為主勝故，舉此攝餘。《集論》等說，為受依者，以觸生受近而勝故。謂觸所取可意等相，與受所取順益等相，極相隣近，引發勝故。然觸自性，是實非假，六六法中心所性故，是食攝故，能為緣故，如受等性，非即三和。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, b19-c5). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 281-85. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 68-69.

<sup>493</sup> Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.54.

<sup>494</sup> See Leslie Kawamura, "A Study of the Trimsika-Vijnapti-Bhasya" (Kyoto 1964), p.50. And Huo, *Sthiramati's Commentary on Triṃśikāvijñapti: A Chinese Translation with Notes and Interpretations 安慧三十唯識釋原典譯註*, p.50 & p.53.

<sup>495</sup> Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.50.

That “sense faculty” (根; Skt. *indriya*), “object” (境; Skt. *viṣaya*) and “consciousness” (識; Skt. *viññāna*) further accord with each other is thus called “three things coming into contact” (三和). “Touch” is produced based on those [three things] and is making those [three things] come into contact. Thus it is named as those [three things coming into contact].

In the state of “three things coming into contact”, [three things] all have the capability to produce mental factors. Which is named “transformation” (Ch. *bian yi* 變異; Skt. *vikāra*). “Touch” is the arising of [the transformation] that similar to the those three things’, so it is named “discrimination” (Ch. *fen bie* 分別; Skt. *pariccheda*). Because the transformation power of “sense faculties” (根) is more excellent than of “object” (境) and of “consciousness” (識), *Ji lun* 集論<sup>496</sup> and etc only mention [it is] discriminating from the transformation of sense faculties (分別根之變異; Skt. *indriya-vikāra-paricchedah*).

In addition, [it] unifies all mind and mental factors and makes them to touch the “object” (境; Skt. *viṣaya*) together as its “nature” (性). Since that it has the similar capability to produce mental factors, it provides “the support” (所依) to sensation and etc as its business.

According to *Qi jin jing* 起盡經 (Scripture on Arising and Ceasing)<sup>497</sup>, “aggregate of sensation” (Ch. *shou yun* 受蘊; Skt. *vedanā-skandha*), “aggregate of ideation” (Ch. *xiang yun* 想蘊; Skt. *saṃjñā-skandha*), and “aggregate of volitional formations” (Ch. *xing yun* 行蘊; Skt. *saṃskāra-skandha*) all have “touch” (觸) as “conditions” (緣). Due to this reason, it is said that consciousness, touch and sensation arise due to “two things coming together”, “three things coming together” and “four things coming together”, respectively. *Yu qie* 瑜伽<sup>498</sup> only says : [“touch” (觸)] provides the support to sensation, ideation, and volition. Because “volition” (思) is the most primary one among “aggregate of volitional formations” (行蘊), volition is exemplified to cover the rest. *Ji lun* 集論 and etc say that [“touch”] provides the support to sensation because “touch” produces sensation in proximity and in excellent way. Which means the “agreeable characteristics etc.” (可意等相) that “touch” (觸) takes and the “beneficial characteristics and etc” (順益等相) that sensation takes are extremely close to each other so [“touch”] can trigger [sensation] in more excellent way.

Moreover, the “self-nature” (自性) of “touch” is “real” (實), not “nominal” (假). [Firstly] because [“touch”] belongs to mental factors among “six-six-dharmas” (六六

<sup>496</sup> *Dasheng apidamo za ji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (Skt. *Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*; Treatise on the Highest Teachings of the Great Vehicle)

<sup>497</sup> According to CWSLS, the scripture is about arising and ceasing. See T43, no. 1830, p. 329, b24-25.

<sup>498</sup> *Yuqie shidi lun* 瑜伽師地論 (Skt. *Yogācārabhūmi-Śāstra*; Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice)



法)<sup>499</sup>. [Secondly] because [“touch”] is included in “four kinds of food” (Ch. *si shi* 四食; Skt. *āhāra-catuṣka*)<sup>500</sup>. [Thirdly] because [“touch”] can be “condition” (緣) [for other mental factors]. Like the nature of sensation and etc [is real], [“touch”] is not [a nominal thing—] “three things coming together”.

### 【“Attention” (作意)]<sup>501</sup>

“Attention” (CH. *zuo yi* 作意; Skt. *manaskāra*) means being able to “alert mind” (Ch. *jing xin* 警心) as its nature and to draw mind toward the object of perception as its business. Which means such “alert” (警覺) should wake “seeds of mind” (心種) up [to the manifesting state] and draw mind toward the “object” (境; Skt. *viṣaya*). Thus it is named “attention”. Although it is also able to draw attention of “mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo* 心所; Skt. *caitta*), only mentioning drawing the attention of mind is because mind is the host. There are explanations that turning mind to different object or keeping mind staying in one object is named “attention”. They are both not right because [the former] should not be “omnipresent [mental factors]” (遍行[心所]; ; Skt. *sarvatraga-* [*caitasa*]) while [the latter] is not different from “concentration” (Ch. *ding* 定; Skt. *samādhi*).

### 【Sensation (受)]<sup>502</sup>

“Sensation” (Ch. *shou* 受; Skt. *vedanā*) means experiencing “characteristics of object” (境相) which are either “delighting” (順; Skt. *āhlādaka*), or “grieving” (違; Skt. *paritāpakata*) or “neither” (俱非) as its nature. Because [different experiences] can cause the desires of either “connection” (合; Skt. *saṃyoga*) or “disconnection” (離; Skt. *viyoga*), or neither, sensation gives rise to “craving” (愛; Skt. *trṣṇā*) as its business.

<sup>499</sup> According to CWSLS, “Six-six-dharmas” are six kinds of consciousness, six kinds of touch, six kinds of sensation, six kind of ideation, six kinds of volitions, six kinds of craving. See 「六識·六觸·六受·六想·六思·六愛」(T43, no. 1830, p. 330, a17-20)

<sup>500</sup> According to *Lengyan jing* 楞嚴經, “four kinds of food” are pieced food” (段食), “touch food” (觸食), “though food” (思食) and “consciousness food” (識食) See T19, no. 945, p. 141, c2.

<sup>501</sup> 「作意謂能警心為性，於所緣境引心為業。謂此警覺應起心種，引令趣境，故名作意。雖此亦能引起心所，心是主故，但說引心。有說：令心迴趣異境，或於一境持心令住，故名作意。彼俱非理，應非遍行，不異定故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c6-11). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 285-86. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 69-70.

<sup>502</sup> 「受謂領納順、違、俱非境相為性，起愛為業，能起合、離、非二欲故。有作是說：受有二種，一境界受，謂領所緣；二自性受，謂領俱觸。唯自性受是受自相，以境界受共餘相故。彼說非理，受定不緣俱生觸故。若似觸生名領觸者，似因之果應皆受性。又既受因應名因受，何名自性？若謂如王食諸國邑，受能領觸所生受體，名自性受，理亦不然，違自所執不自證故。若不捨自性名自性受，應一切法皆是受自性。故彼所說但誘嬰兒。然境界受非共餘相，領順等相定屬己者，名境界受不共餘故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c11-22). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 287-90. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 70.

There is an argument like this: there are two kinds of sensation. 1) “Sensation of object” (境界受) which means experiencing object of perception. 2) “Sensation of self-nature” (自性受) which means experiencing simultaneous “touch”. Only “sensation of self-nature” (自性受) is “self-characteristics of sensation” (受自相) because “sensation of object” is the characteristics that are shared [with the rest of mental factors]. Such explanation is not right because “sensation” definitely is not able to perceive simultaneous “touch” .

If [they changed the argument like this]: it was named “experiencing touch” (領觸) because the arising of “sensation” is similar to “touch”, then “effects that similar to causes” (似因之果) should all be of “nature of sensation” (受性). Furthermore, now that [“touch” ] is the cause of “sensation”, it should be named “sensation of causes” (因受). Why is it named “[sensation of ] self-nature” (自性[受])?

If [they changed the argument like this]: just like saying a king is eating his country and cities, [he is not really eating the country and cities in names but what the country and cities produce.] Similarly sensation is able to experience “ substance of sensation” (受體) that “touch” produces so it is named “sensation of self-nature” (自性受).<sup>503</sup> [The explanation] is not right because it is against their own insistence that there is no “self-witness” (自證).

If [they changed the argument like this]: “self-nature” is not abandoned so it is named “sensation of self-nature”, then all dharma should be “sensation of self-nature”. Thus, what they say is only to coax the infants.

In addition, sensation of object is not characteristics that are shared with the rest [of mental factors]. The characteristics like the delighting and etc that sensation experiences is definitely its own [characteristics]. It is named “sensation of object” because it is not shared with the rest [of mental factors].

#### ["Ideation" (想)]<sup>504</sup>

“Ideation” (Ch. *xiang* 想; Skt. *samjñā*) means taking a “mark” (Ch. *xiang* 像; Skt. *nimitta*) out of “object” (Ch. *jin* 境; Skt. *viṣaya*) as its nature and establishing a variety of “names and words” (名言) as its business. Which is to establish objects’ “characteristics of boundary limits” (分齊相) so a variety of “names and words” (名言) would be able to set up accordingly.

<sup>503</sup> Lee, "Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian" 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, 2, p.1087.

<sup>504</sup> 「想謂於境取像為性，施設種種名言為業，謂要安立境分齊相，方能隨起種種名言。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c22-24). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpātī-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 290-91. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 70-71.

## [“Volition” 思]<sup>505</sup>

“Volition” (Ch. *si* 思; Skt. *cetanā*) means making mind “to do conception” (Ch. *zao zuo* 造作; Skt. *abhisamkāra*) as its nature and ordering mind to do virtuous, [unvirtuous, indeterminate actions and etc] as its business. It is able to take “objects” (境) as “characteristics of right causes and etc” (正因等相) and to order mind to do virtuous [actions] and etc.

## [Short Summary]<sup>506</sup>

These five [mental factors] belong to “omnipresent mental factors” (Ch. *bian xing xin suo* 遍行心所; Skt. *sarvatraga-caitasa*), so they are definitely associated with the “storehouse consciousness” (藏識). Their “characteristics of omnipresence” (遍行相) will be elaborated later. Although these five “omnipresent mental factors” and “maturing consciousness” are different in terms of “mental activity to perceive” (行相), they arise at the same time, with the same base, with “similar object of perception and substance” (所緣、事等)<sup>507</sup>. Thus it is named “association/accompany” (相應).

## 4-7-2 Discussions of Commentaries

### 4-7-2-1 What is “three things come into contact” (三和)?

LMC#1 notes: “...That faculty and object produce consciousness is named “three things coming into contact” (三和) ...”<sup>508</sup>

LMC#2 notes: “...So called “three things coming into contact” means that faculty, object and consciousness are different in substance so they named three [things]. They are not contradictory to each other but conforming to each other. Thus named “three things coming into contact” ...”<sup>509</sup> LMC#4 has the same note as LMC#2.<sup>510</sup>

<sup>505</sup> 「思謂令心造作為性，於善品等役心為業。謂能取境正因等相，驅役自心令造善等。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c24-26). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 291-92. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 71.

<sup>506</sup> 「此五既是遍行所攝，故與藏識決定相應。其遍行相後當廣釋。此觸等五與異熟識，行相雖異，而時、依同，所緣、事等，故名相應。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c26-29). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, p. 292. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 71.

<sup>507</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 332, b27-29.

<sup>508</sup> 「根境生識，故名三和。」 (X50, no. 820, p. 548, c9 // Z 1:81, p. 42, a4 // R81, p. 83, a4)

<sup>509</sup> 「言三和者，謂根境識，體異名三。不相乖反，更相隨順，故名三和。」 (X50, no. 821, p. 695, a14-15 // Z 1:81, p. 189, a11-12 // R81, p. 377, a11-12)

<sup>510</sup> See X51, no. 823, p. 178, c6-7 // Z 1:82, p. 78, a14-15 // R82, p. 155, a14-15.

LMC#3 notes: "...So called "touch" is "three things coming into contact" is that faculty, object and consciousness are different in substance so they named three [things]. They are not contradictory to each other but interpenetrating to each other. Which are named "conforming" (隨順). Faculty can be the base. Object can be what to take. Consciousness that is produced by [these] **two** can be based on faculty and take the object..."<sup>511</sup> Such note is almost character by character quote from ZJL except one word difference- "**three**" being replaced by "**two**" (i.e. 識**三**所生 replaced by 識**二**所生). Just because one word difference, ZJL note might be translated differently as below.

So called "touch" is "three things coming into contact" is that faculty, object and consciousness are different in substance so they named three [things]. They are not contradictory to each other but interpenetrating to each other. Which are named "conforming" (隨順). Faculty can be the base. Object can be what to take. ["Touch" ] is produced by **three** [things]- faculty as the base, object as what to take, and consciousness. ["Touch" ] can be based on based on faculty and take the object.<sup>512</sup>

I suspect that LMC#3 had a reference on LMC#1 note that is shown as above so he might think "two" was either handwriting or wood print cutting error. That is one of possibilities. My above translation of ZJL's note is based on the assumption that no error and the fact that the note starting from "...so called "touch" is "three things coming into contact"" (觸謂三和者) although I do not think it is a correct punctuation. To be precise, "touch" should be something else that is produced based on those three things and making those three things come into contact.<sup>513</sup>

Nevertheless, it is interesting to know that ZJL's note basically came down from CWSLS. CWSLS notes as below.

Correct substances of "three things coming into contact" (三和) is faculty, object and consciousness. They are different in substances so they named three [things]. They are not contradictory to each other but interpenetrating to each other. Which are named "conforming" (隨順). For example, consciousness does not arise whereas either faculty or object arises. Which would be named

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<sup>511</sup> 「觸謂三和者，即根境識，體異名三，不相乖返，更相涉入，名為隨順。根可為依，境可為取，識**二**所生，可依於根，而取於境。」(X50, no. 822, p. 876, b22-24 // Z 1:81, p. 370, c12-14 // R81, p. 740, a12-14)

<sup>512</sup> 「觸謂三和者，即根境識，體異名三，不相乖返，更相交涉，名為隨順。根可為依，境可為取，識**三**所生。可依於根，而取於境。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 695, c10-13)

<sup>513</sup> See 7-1 ["Touch"(觸)] for the last line on the bottom of the second paragraph.

contradiction. For another example, ear-faculty, eye-consciousness and perfume-object. These three dharmas are contradictory to each other. Which is not named “three things coming into contact”.. If [three things] are conforming to each other, three [things] must be all arise. Since they are not contradictory to each other, they are named ‘conforming’. Faculty can be the base. Object can be what to take. Consciousness that is produced by [these] **two** can be based on faculty and take the object.<sup>514</sup>

Here we see that CWSLS read “**two**” instead of “**three**” as ZJL passed down to the late-Ming commentators. Moreover, it seemed amazing that LMC#3 figured it out and correct it blindly. But we need to keep it mind that both LMC#1 and CWSLS’s notes above are only talking about “three things coming into contact” whereas LMC#3 and ZJL’s notes start with “touch” being involved. LMC#3 might be right about reading the last couple of lines but might miss the forest that ZJL set up. The reason I bring up this case here is to suggest neither which note is correct nor CWSLS as a standard answer. What I like to point out is that commentators not only selectively borrow something from sources but also modify what borrowed according to their own selective readings. Such exercises and activities are what commentaries are about if not all about.

#### 4-7-2-2 What is “discrimination transformation” (分別變異)?

LMC#1 notes “...”Transformation” (變異) is the function that mental factors are produced when “three things come into contact”. Similar to “three things coming into contact”, the mental factor “touch” is also able to produce sensation and etc. Thus said that the mental factor “touch” take the partial function of the transformation that are produced when “three things coming into contact” ...”<sup>515</sup> Here LMC#1 defines “*fen bie*” (分別) have the implication of “partially taking” (分取).<sup>516</sup> Such definition seems like translating Sanskrit *pariccheda* as “division”<sup>517</sup>.

On the other hand, LMC#2 notes “...So-called ”transformation” (變異) means that, due to “touch”, these three (i.e. faculty, object and consciousness) are made to

<sup>514</sup> 「正三和體，謂根、境、識，體異名三。不相乖返，更相交涉，名為隨順。如識不生，根境或起，名為乖返。又如耳根、眼識、香境，三法乖返，不名三和。若相順者，三必俱生，既不相違，故名隨順。根可為依，境可為取，識二所生，可依於根，而取於境，如此交涉，名三和體。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 328, b16-22)

<sup>515</sup> 「變異是三和生心所之功能，觸所亦似三和能生受等，故說觸所分別三和中變異功能也。」(X50, no. 820, p. 548, c15-17 // Z 1:81, p. 42, a10-12 // R81, p. 83, a10-12)

<sup>516</sup> See 「分別，是分取之義。」(X50, no. 820, p. 548, c9-10 // Z 1:81, p. 42, a4-5 // R81, p. 83, a4-5)

<sup>517</sup> See Monier Williams Sanskrit-English Dictionary.

have the function to produce all mental factors. Thus named "transformation". "Transformation" is to produce like that minds producing all dharmas. They are all named "transformation". So called "*fen bie*" (分別) means that, "touch" is similar to previous three (i.e. "three things coming into contact" (三和)) in terms of having the function to produce mental factors. Which is named *fen bie*. *Fen bie* is a synonym of "similar" (相似)...<sup>518</sup> Different from LMC#1 reading *fen bie* as "partial taking", LMC#2 understood "*fen bie*" as "similar". In fact, such explanation came down through ZJL from CWSLS<sup>519</sup>. LMC#3 quotes ZJL as below.

*Zongjing* says, onto these three (i.e. faculty, object and consciousness) there is function to produce all mental factors. Which is named "transformation" (變異)... The function of *fen bie* is the function of "touch". Which means that onto "touch" there is function of transformation that is similar to previous three in producing all mental factors. Which is named "*fen bie*". *Fen bie* is a synonym of "similarity" (領似), like a son who looks similar to his father is called *fen bie* father.<sup>520</sup>

The metaphor that "a son who looks similar to his father is called *fen bie* father" is also adopted in LMC#4 note<sup>521</sup>. LMC#5 also noted *fen bie* as a synonym of "similar"<sup>522</sup>. Thus, except LMC#1, all late-Ming commentators seemed aligned in understanding "*fen bie*" as a synonym of "similarity".

Now, back to the question: what is "discrimination transformation" (分別變異)? If "*fen bie*" is a synonym of "similar", "discrimination transformation" would become "similar transformation". So "touch" is a "similar transformation". Then, what is the difference between "transformation" (變異) and "similar transformation" (分別變異)? According to CWSL in 7-1, ".in the state of "three things coming into contact" (三和), [three things] all have the capability to produce mental factors. Which is named "transformation"...". The similarity lies on the capability to produce mental factors. As for the difference, at least "touch" could not produce itself as the three things produce "touch".<sup>523</sup> In other words, "touch" is only able to produce a

<sup>518</sup> 「言變異者，以有觸故，能令此三皆有順生一切心所功能，故名變異。變異，即生也。如心生諸法，皆名變異故。言分別者，謂觸亦似前三順生心所功能，說名分別。分別，即是相似異名。」(X50, no. 821, p. 695, a17-21 // Z 1:81, p. 189, a14-18 // R81, p. 377, a14-18)

<sup>519</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 328, c17-p. 329, a3.

<sup>520</sup> 「宗鏡云：此三之上，皆有順生一切心所功能作用，名為變異... 分別之用，是觸功能，謂觸之上有似前三順生心所變異功能，說名分別，分別即是領似異名，如子似父，名分別父。」(X50, no. 822, p. 876, c4-8 // Z 1:81, p. 370, c18-d4 // R81, p. 740, a18-b4) Or see *Zongjing lu* in T48, no. 2016, p. 695, c13-17.

<sup>521</sup> See X51, no. 823, p. 178, c14-16 // Z 1:82, p. 78, b4-6 // R82, p. 155, b4-6.

<sup>522</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 329, a1-3 // Z 1:82, p. 228, d14-16 // R82, p. 456, b14-16

<sup>523</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 329, a6-7.

portion of mental factors that produced by the three things. From this perspective of difference/dis-similarity, LMC#1 reading would seem to make sense as well, don't it? In particular, literally *fen bie* in Chinese seems more about differences than similarity.

In addition, we are not sure if *fen bie bian yi* is CWSL's Chinese translation of Sanskrit *vikāra-pariccheda*. If yes, Kawamura's translation for the term is "the accurate discrimination of changes". Here we see a term "discrimination" that seems very close to *fen bie* in Chinese. Moreover, his translation of the whole sentence that comprised the term is "...Of there, "touch" is the accurate discrimination of changes in the sense organs when three things come into contact and it has the function of supporting perception..."<sup>524</sup> Such rendering shed a totally different light on what "*fen bie bian yi*" might mean. For the scope of this study, I would not go further but like to draw attention to "in the sense organ" or "*indriya-vikāra-paricchedaḥ*"<sup>525</sup> found in the Sthiramati's *Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya*. Because CWSL's definition of "touch" does not specify sense organ/sense faculties either. However, CWSL does specifically explain why so by noting "...Because the transformation power of "sense faculties" (根) is more excellent than of "object" (境) and "consciousness" (識), *Ji lun* 集論<sup>526</sup> and etc only mention [it is] discriminating from the transformation of sense faculties (分別根之變異; Skt. *indriya-vikāra-paricchedaḥ*)..."

#### 4-7-2-3 Why are sense faculties so unique?

For the reason why sense faculties are so unique, all the late-Ming commentators<sup>527</sup> all quoted ZJL<sup>528</sup> while ZJL also cited CWSL<sup>529</sup>. Since LMC#3 explicitly quoted ZJL word for word, I translate it as below.

*Zongjing* asks, why are only sense faculties so uniquely excellent when three things coming into the contact? Answer: 1) because they are masters. Those who have excellent function are named masters. 2) because they are close. They are able to produce minds and mental factors in proximity. 3) because they are pervasive. They not only produce mental factors but also minds. 4) because they continue. They are always existent on a continuous base. Objects and

<sup>524</sup> Kawamura, "A Study of the Trimsika-Vijnapti-Bhasya," p.50.

<sup>525</sup> Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.54.

<sup>526</sup> *Dasheng apidamo za ji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (Skt. *Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*; Treatise on the Highest Teachings of the Great Vehicle)

<sup>527</sup> See LMC#1 in X50, no. 820, p. 548, c17-20 // Z 1:81, p. 42, a12-15 // R81, p. 83, a12-15. See LMC#2 in X50, no. 821, p. 695, a21-b4 // Z 1:81, p. 189, a18-b7 // R81, p. 377, a18-b7. See LMC#4 in X51, no. 823, p. 178, c19-p. 179, a1 // Z 1:82, p. 78, b9-15 // R82, p. 155, b9-15. See LMC#5 in ( X51, no. 824, p. 329, a12-17 // Z 1:82, p. 229, a7-12 // R82, p. 457, a7-12.

<sup>528</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 695, c17-25.

<sup>529</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 329, a29-b9.

consciousnesses are not like these. Although objects are able to produce mind and mental factors, they are short of two implications because they are neither masters nor in proximity. They are not named excellent. Although minds are masters and can produce mental factors in proximity, they are not able to produce minds because they cannot produce themselves. They are not pervasive. They are short of one implication so they are not excellent. Both objects and consciousnesses are not continuous because the existence of consciousnesses and the arising of objects are depending on each other. They are both short of implication of continuity so they cannot attain the name of the excellent. Only sense faculties are uniquely excellent.<sup>530</sup>

This is one of cases, all late-Ming commentators thought, need further explanations. Moreover, like ZJL, they all adopted the explanation indirectly from CWSLS. When this happened, there would be no significant differences either among the late-Ming commentators or between CWSLS and the late-Ming group.

#### 4-7-2-4 In which state would “attention” alert mind?

When CWSL says “attention” (作意) should wake “seeds of mind” (心種) up to the manifesting state, it does not specify in which state “attention” itself is in. In the state of seeds or the state of manifestation? Is this a question that deserving further elaboration? Among the late-Ming group, LMC#2<sup>531</sup> and LMC#3 do address the question by quoting ZJL<sup>532</sup>. Since LMC#3 quote is more complete, I translate it as below.

Let’s say there is question: Is “attention” able to alert mind in the state of seeds? Or in the state of manifestation? Then answer: In the state of seeds it is able to alert mind. Because “attention” is sharp in nature. Even though in the state of seeds, if there is object coming, ”attention” is able to alert the seeds of mind and mental factors and get them up to the state of manifestation. For example, several persons are sleeping in one room. When one thief comes in from outside, one person who tends to have light sleep would be able to alert the rest of persons.

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<sup>530</sup> 「宗鏡問：何故三和唯根獨勝？答：一由主故，有殊勝能，名之為主。二由近故，能近生心及心所故。三由徧故，不唯心所，亦能生心故。四由續故，常相續有。境識不爾，故境體雖能生心心所，以非主故，又非近故，徧闕二義，不名為勝。心雖是主，近生心所，不能生心，不自生故，非徧也。徧闕一義，故非勝。境識皆不續，識有境生故，俱缺續義，非得勝名。唯根獨勝。」 (X50, no. 822, p. 876, c10-17 // Z 1:81, p. 370, d6-13 // R81, p. 740, b6-13)

<sup>531</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 695, c11-17 // Z 1:81, p. 189, d2-8 // R81, p. 378, b2-8.

<sup>532</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 746, b6-16.



Although this person are not up, he is able to alert other persons and get them up. For another example, although arising together with seeing aspect, seen aspect of inner mind is inherently able to draw the mind. Now "attention" is the same. Since the seed of "attention" has alerted and gotten the seed of all minds and mental factors into manifestations already, "attention" become manifestation. Then it further draws the manifestation of mind toward the previous object.<sup>533</sup>

The above note seems to indicate two steps. Step #1 is about alert. In this step what is alerted and what alerts are all in the state of seeds. Step #2 is about toward the object. In this step what is drawn toward the object and what draws are all in the state of manifestations. Step #2 is no problem. What might have a problem is in Step #1. On one hand, how could "attention" do any function when it was still in the state of seeds? On the other hand, if the "attention" which was in the state of manifestation alerted mind and mental factors which were in the state of seeds, they would be in different states. Will that meet the implication of "association" (Ch. *xiang ying* 相應; Skt. *anvita*)? Unfortunately, all these questions were not further addressed by either ZJL or LMC#2 or LMC#3. If we refer to CWSLS, CWSLS notes as below.

Seeds of "attention" are able to alert seeds of mind. This solution is based on the text (i.e. CWSL). Alternatively, manifesting "attention" and consciousness are [arising] at the same time. Then, the argument is that [manifesting "attention"] alert those seeds of minds which are supposed to arise and make them arise and toward the objects. It is not against the principle. But to alert what have already arisen. It is difficult to see the point of alert so the treatise does not approve [such argument].<sup>534</sup>

CWSLS report that there are two arguments and that CWSL support the argument that what is alerted and what alerts are all in the state of seeds. The only reason given is that it is what alert is all about. Moreover, in CWSL we don't see the two metaphors/examples that are seen in ZJL. These two examples seems later developed by ZJL. Very likely because ZJL was not fully convinced by CWSLS explanation. Another interesting thing to note is that, different from LMC#3, LMC#2

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<sup>533</sup> 「設有問言：作意為在種位能警心？為在現行能警心？即答言：在種位能警心，以作意自性明利，雖在種位，若有境至，而能警心、心所種，令生起現行。喻如多人同一室宿，外邊有賊來時，眾中有一人，為性少睡，便能警覺餘人。此人雖自身未起，而能警覺餘人令起，亦如內心相分，雖與見分同起，法爾有能牽心功能。今作意亦爾。其作意種子，既警彼諸心、心所種生現行已。作意現行，又能引心現行令趣前境。」(X50, no. 822, p. 877, b3-12 // Z 1:81, p. 371, b11-c2 // R81, p. 741, b11-p. 742, a2)

<sup>534</sup> 「作意種子能警心種，此解依文。或現作意與識同時，義說警彼應生心種，令起趣境，理亦無違。起已方警，警理難見，故論不許。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 330, b29-c3)

only quotes the first metaphor in which one person wakes other persons up. LMC#2 decided to skip the second example. Probably LMC#2 had a hard time understanding what the point of that example is.

This is one of cases in which different late-Ming commentators chose what topics to further address and what not in different ways. Then, the commentary from CWSLS through ZJL had been further developed by ZJL. Last, one late-Ming commentator accepted whatever ZJL said whereas the other only selectively quoted. Such a case indicates how complicated differences among the late-Ming commentaries and between the late-Ming group and CWSLS might be.

#### 4-7-2-5 What is “Volition” (思)?

LMC#1 notes “...”*zao zuo*” (造作) is thinking and planning which is the nature of “volition” (思). Ordering mind and mental factors is the business of “volition” (思). Thus other source says that “attention” (作意) is like a horse going whereas “thinking” (思惟) is like a rider...”<sup>535</sup> Based on this simple note, LMC#2 expands it as below.

Being able to take objects of correct causes and of evil causes and carefully considering whether it is good to go or not is its nature. Ordering one’s own mind to create virtuous or unvirtuous [actions] or to attain evil and correct [results] is its business.

Question: What is the difference between attention and volition? Answer: Attention is like a horse going whereas volition is like a rider. A horse just goes straight and is not able to avoid risks and to stay safe. Because the rider orders the horse to avoid risks and to stay safe, volition also does the same things. [It] makes attention not to wander and to be away from the incorrect path and to stay in the right path.

[Analects of Confucius] says, “don’t think in an incorrect way” (思無邪).

[*Zhongyong*] also says, “thinking carefully” (慎思之). [Analects of Confucius] also says, “think three times before doing anything” (三思而行).<sup>536</sup>

<sup>535</sup> 「造作，即思惟籌度，是思體性，役心心所，為思業用。故他處云：作意如馬行，思惟如騎者。」(X50, no. 820, p. 549, c7-9 // Z 1:81, p. 43, a2-4 // R81, p. 85, a2-4)

<sup>536</sup> 「謂能取境正因、邪因，籌量可行、不可行，是其自性。驅役自心造善、造惡、成邪、成正，是其業用。問：作意與思何異？答：作意如馬行，思惟如騎者，馬但直行，不能避險就平。以由騎者，令其避就。思惟亦爾，令彼作意不得漫行，脫邪就正。曰：思無邪。又云：慎思之。又云：三思而行。」(X50, no. 821, p. 696, b9-14 // Z 1:81, p. 190, b12-17 // R81, p. 379, b12-

If we divide LMC#2's note into three sections, the first section is to explain nature and business of volition. We see that LMC#2 expands it by elaborating on what LMC#1 might mean by "thinking and planning" and "ordering mind and mental factors". The second section is to reframe a quote from *Zhuanshi lun* 轉識論 in Q&A style. LMC#1's quote is very short but LMC#2 expands it further. The third section is to quote Analects of Confucius 論語 and *Zhongyong* 中庸. This section is really a surprising expansion because LMC#2 tried to quote Confucian canon to explicate a Buddhist text. What would other late-Ming commentators think of? As *Jinshi* 進士 who is the holder of highest academic degree in Confucianism based imperial examination, Wang Kentang notes as below.

So called "virtuous category" (善品) and etc mean "virtuous category" (善品), "unvirtuous category" (不善品) and "neither virtuous nor unvirtuous category" (非善非惡). So called "correct reason" (正因) and etc mean "correct reason" (正因), "evil reason" (邪因) and "neither correct nor evil reason" (非正非邪因). *Xian yang lun* 顯揚論 says, "so called "volition" means making mind to create intentional actions of "gain" (得), "loss" (失), and neither as its substance..." [Here] gain is "correct reason" (正因), "loss" is "evil reason" (邪因).

Question: What is the difference between attention and volition? Answer: That mind is continuously going on is named attention. Thinking and planning on whether to go or no go and letting mind be evil or right is named volition. Attention is like a horse going whereas volition is like a rider. A horse just goes straight and is not able to avoid mistake and go right. Because the rider orders the horse to avoid mistake and go right, volition also does the same thing. [It] is able to make attention stay away from wander.<sup>537</sup>

LMC#3 note could be divided into two sections. The second section is also a quote from *Zhuanshi lun*. The slight difference is that LMC#3's quote is more complete than LMC#2's. On the other hand, there is no third section as LMC#2's because LMC#3 did not follow suit in quoting any Confucian canon for support. Such contrast seems to indicate that LMC#3 takes it with a grain of salt if not disagree.

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17)

<sup>537</sup> 「善品等者，謂善品、不善品、非善非惡品。正因等者，謂正因、邪因、非正非邪因。顯揚論云：「思者，謂令心造作得、失、俱非意業為體…」得即正因，失即邪因。問：作意與思有何分別？曰：心恒動行，名為作意，思惟籌量可行、不可行，令心成邪、成正，名為思惟。作意如馬行，思惟如騎者，馬但直行，不能避就是非，由騎者故，令其離非就是，思惟亦爾，能令作意離漫行也。」(X50, no. 822, p. 878, a10-20 // Z 1:81, p. 372, a12-b4 // R81, p. 743, a12-b4)

Moreover, the first section highlights two kinds of three-element categories. Since LMC#2's first section listed couple of either-or categories (e.g. either correct reason or evil reason), LMC#3 seemed intended to expand it by adding a third category-neither-nor category. *Xian yang lun* 顯揚論 is even explicitly quoted as support. Is such a expansion significant? Let's investigate the following notes from LMC#4 and LMC#5 to measure the significance that read by late-Ming commentators.

LMC#4 : "...So called "correct reason" (正因) and et cetera. The "et cetera" (等) are "evil reason" (邪因) and "neither correct nor evil reason" (非正非邪因). So called "virtuous" (善) and et cetera. The "et cetera" (等) are "unvirtuous" (惡), "neither virtuous nor unvirtuous" (非善非惡)..."<sup>538</sup>

LMC#5: "...Taking object of correct cause is making mind to create virtuous category [of intentional actions]. Taking object of evil causes is making mind to create unvirtuous category. Taking object of neither virtuous nor unvirtuous is making mind to create "indeterminate" (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*). These are done by power of the mental factor "volition"..."<sup>539</sup>

It is interesting to note that, instead of expanding the explanation as LMC#2 and LMC#3 did, LMC#4 and LMC#5 contracted and converged to the point that the volition has three possible directions to go: positive, negative, and neither positive nor negative. LMC#4 and LMC#5 both seemed to agree with LMC#3 in emphasizing the importance of the third category. In particular, LMC#5 even specified it as an indeterminate category. Why? Not only that LMC#2's quote from Confucian canon emphasized too much on positive direction. It seems to me that the metaphor of horse and horse rider from *Zhuanshi lun* also drives for the positive direction vs. the negative one. Why would both LMC#4 and LMC#5 ended up only emphasizing the three possible directions of volition without quoting *Zhuanshi lun* anymore? Why is it so critical that the third indeterminate category have to be added on? Neither LMC#3, nor LMC#4, nor LMC#5 made this clear. I would argue that the the answer could be found in the discussion of "Aspect of Mental factors Same as Mind" (心所例王門). Here suffice it to say that the five mental factors that always associated with the eighth conscious have to be "unobstructed and indeterminate" (Ch. *wu fu wu ji* 無覆無記; Skt. *anivṛtta-avyākṛta*) as well.

<sup>538</sup> 「正因等，等，邪因、非邪非正因。善等，等，惡、非善非惡。」(X51, no. 823, p. 180, a7-8 // Z 1:82, p. 79, c3-4 // R82, p. 158, a3-4)

<sup>539</sup> 「取正因境相，令心造善品，取邪因境相，令心造不善品，取非正非邪境相，令心造無記品，皆思心所之力也。」(X51, no. 824, p. 330, a21-23 // Z 1:82, p. 230, a16-18 // R82, p. 459, a16-18)

## 4-8 Aspect of Indifferent Sensation 受俱門

### 4-8-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

#### [Why “indifferent sensation” (捨受)?]<sup>540</sup>

The “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*) of this consciousness is extremely “not recognizable” (不明了), is not able to distinguish the painful object from the delighted object, is extremely subtle, and is “arising in one kind of continuity” (一類相續而轉). Thus it is only associated with “indifferent sensation” (Ch. *she shou* 捨受; Skt. *upekṣā vedanā*).

Furthermore, this “associated “ [indifferent] sensation” (相應[捨]受) is only “maturation” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟; Skt. *vipāka*) which is arising according to previously “derived actions” (Ch. *yin ye* 引業), not depending on “current conditions” (Ch. *xian yuan* 現緣). Because arising effortlessly by power of virtuous and unvirtuous actions [of previous lives], it is only indifferent sensation. Two sensations of “suffering” (Ch. *ku* 苦; Skt. *duḥkha*) and “pleasure” (Ch. *le* 樂; Skt. *sukha*) are “produced by maturation” (Ch. *yi shou sheng* 異熟生; Skt. *vipāka-jatvāt*). They are not “real maturation” (真異熟) because they are depending on the current conditions. [They are] not this [consciousness’s] association.

In addition, since this consciousness is constantly without change, sentient beings always take it as “inner Self” (自內我). If it was associated with two sensations of “suffering” (苦) and “pleasure” (樂), there would be changes. How could it be taken as “Self” (我). Thus this consciousness is only associated with indifferent sensation.

[Question:] If that was the case, how could this consciousness also be the maturation of unvirtuous actions?

[Answer:] Since allowing virtuous actions to derive indifferent sensation, this should be allowed as well. Because indifferent sensation is not conflicting with the qualities of suffering and pleasure like “indeterminate dharma” (Ch. *wu ji fa* 無記法; Skt. *avyākṛta-dharma*) which both virtuous and unvirtuous actions can derive.

#### [Why not associated with object-specific mental factors?]<sup>541</sup>

<sup>540</sup> 「此識行相極不明了，不能分別違順境相，微細，一類相續而轉，是故唯與捨受相應。又此相應受唯是異熟，隨先引業轉，不待現緣。任善、惡業勢力轉故，唯是捨受。苦、樂二受是異熟生，非真異熟，待現緣故，非此相應。又由此識常無轉變，有情恒執為自內我。若與苦樂二受相應，便有轉變，寧執為我？故此但與捨受相應。若爾，如何此識亦是惡業異熟？既許善業能招捨受，此亦應然。捨受不違苦、樂品故，如無記法，善、惡俱招。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 11, c29-p. 12, a10). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi : A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 293-94. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 71-72.

<sup>541</sup> 「如何此識非別境等心所相應？互相違故。謂「欲」，希望所樂事轉，此識任運無所希望。「勝解」印持決定事轉，此識瞢昧無所印持。「念」唯明記曾習事轉，此識昧劣不能明記。「定」能令心專注一境，此識任運剎那別緣。「慧」唯簡擇德等事轉，此識微昧不能簡擇。故此

[Question:] Why is this consciousness not associated with “object-specific mental factors” (Ch. *bie jing xin suo* 別境心所; Skt. *viniyata-caitanya*) and etc?

[Answer:] Because they are against to each other. Which means: “Desire” (Ch. *yu* 欲; Skt. *chanda*) is arising in the hope of pleasant things whereas this consciousness is arising naturally and effortless without any hope. “Firm conviction” (Ch. *sheng jie* 勝解; Skt. *adhimokṣa*) is arising by “holding determined things with assurance” (印持決定事) whereas this consciousness is too obscure to hold anything with assurance. “Recollection” (Ch. *nian* 念; Skt. *smṛti*) is arising by clearly recollecting experienced things whereas this consciousness is too vague to recall clearly. “Concentration” (Ch. *ding* 定; Skt. *samādhi*) is able to keep mind focusing on one object whereas this consciousness naturally and effortlessly moves to another “object of perception” momentarily. “Wisdom” (Ch. *hui* 慧; Skt. *prajñā* or *dhī*) is arising by selecting the virtuous and etc things whereas this consciousness is too uncertain to make any selection. Thus this consciousness is not associated with “object-specific [mental factors]” (別境[心所]).

Since this consciousness is only of “maturation” (異熟), it is not associated with the virtuous and defiled [mental factors] too. Because the four indeterminate [mental factors] like “repentance” (Ch. *e zuo* 惡作 or *hui* 悔; Skt. *kaukrīya*) and etc are with interruption, they are definitely not “maturation”.

#### 4-8-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### How could “maturation” of unvirtuous action be associated with “indifferent sensation” (捨受)?

Toward the end of 8-1 [Why “indifferent sensation” (捨受)], CWSL have a question and an answer to clarify a possible confusion regarding the eighth consciousness could only have indifferent sensation. Most of late-Ming commentators chose to further elaborate on this possible confusion as well. Since all late-Ming commentaries seemed more or less influenced by ZJL, I like to use this case to show how LMC#4 and LMC#2 develop their own notes from the same reference. I start by translating ZJL note as below

Question: Since this consciousness is associated with indifferent sensation, how could it also be the maturation of unvirtuous actions? Answer: The Treatise says: Because indifferent sensation is not conflicting with the qualities of suffering and

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不與別境相應。此識唯是異熟性故，善染污等亦不相應。惡作等四無記性者，有間斷故定非異熟。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 12, a10-19). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 294-95. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, p. 72.

pleasure like “indeterminate dharma” (Ch. *wu ji fa* 無記法; Skt. *avyākṛta-dharma*) which both virtuous and unvirtuous actions can derive.

Commentary says: since indeterminate [dharma] is “tranquil” (寂靜), why is it the [maturing] result of unvirtuous actions? Although “indifferent sensation” is tranquil, it is not conflicting with two (i.e. suffering and pleasure) so it can be the [maturing] result of unvirtuous actions. It is different from the tranquility of “meditative concentration” (禪定). This [consciousness] cannot do anything about [unvirtuous actions] so it can live with what are caused by unvirtuous actions. If other seven transforming consciousnesses cause suffering and pleasures, this consciousness accommodate both because “indifferent sensation” is not conflicting with the qualities of suffering and pleasure. If either suffering or pleasure are not accommodated, in the destinies of humans and gods [sentient beings] should not take suffering result. Which is contradictory to the reality. In three evil destinies, [sentient beings] should not take pleasant result. Which is also contradictory to the reality. Herein suffering and pleasure are both “particular derivatives” (別招) so they are not conflicting with indifferent sensation.<sup>542</sup>

If we refer to CWSLS, we will see that the above ZJL note actually came from CWSLS. However, ZJL only quoted partial commentary of CWSLS that addressing only why the tranquil result could be result of unvirtuous actions.<sup>543</sup> ZJL did not quote the first part of CWSLS answer. For this part, CWSLS noted as below.

Sarvāstivāda and etc made such a challenge. Their challenge says, indifferent sensation is tranquil. Virtuous actions that are obedient might be able to derive it. How could terrorized actions be able to derive the tranquil? ... Answer by challenging back: Since that you allow virtuous actions to be able to derive indifferent sensation. These unvirtuous actions should be able to derive indifferent sensation.<sup>544</sup>

From CWSLS note above, we come to realize that the statement that indifferent

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<sup>542</sup> 「問：此識既與捨受相應，如何亦是惡業異熟？答：論云：捨受不違善惡品故，如無記法善惡俱招。釋云：無記既寂靜，何為惡業果？捨雖寂靜，不違二故，得為惡果。不同禪定寂靜。此無所能為，故通惡業感。餘七轉識設起苦樂，此識皆俱，以捨不違苦樂品故。若或苦樂不俱，於人天中，應不受苦果，以相違故。三惡趣中，應不受樂果，亦相違故。此中苦樂，皆是別招，故捨不違。」 (T48, no. 2016, p. 696, b15-24)

<sup>543</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 333, b23-c2.

<sup>544</sup> 「薩婆多等為此難也。彼部難云：捨受寂靜，善業調順，可能招之。如何逼迫業亦招寂靜果？... 即返質答：既許善業能招捨受，此不善業，亦應然，能招捨受。」 (T43, no. 1830, p. 333, b9-15)

sensation is tranquil actually came from those opponents who argued that virtuous action might derive the tranquil indifferent sensation. Thus the first part of CWSL answer is attacking an opponent by using his own devices. Having only reference on ZJL, LMC#4 notes as below.

Firstly ask: since this consciousness is only associated with indifferent sensation, it should be “maturation of humans and gods” (人天異熟) that virtuous actions derive. How could it also be the maturation that unvirtuous actions derive?

How could the [maturation] that unvirtuous actions derive be without suffering sensation? If no suffering sensation, it should not be what unvirtuous actions should derive. This is a question in terms of maturations of three evil destinies...

Firstly to answer it in terms of the example of “maturation of humans and gods”: since virtuous actions are allowed to derive indifferent sensation of humans and gods, the unvirtuous actions should be allowed to derive indifferent sensation of three evil destinies.

How could both virtuous and unvirtuous actions derive indifferent sensation?

Secondly to state a syllogism:

Subject of a thesis (Ch. *you fa* 有法; Skt. *pakṣa-dharmin*): indifferent sensation.

Thesis (Ch. *zong* 宗, Skt. *pakṣa*): both virtuous and unvirtuous actions derive [indifferent sensation].

Reason (Ch. *yin* 因, Skt. *hetu*): Because [indifferent sensation] is not conflicting with suffering and pleasant quality.

Example (Ch. *yu* 喻, *dr̥ṣṭānta*): like “indeterminate dharma” (無記法).

So called “suffering and pleasant quality”. Suffering of three evil destinies is suffering quality. Pleasure of humans and gods is pleasant quality.<sup>545</sup>

LMC#4 seemed aware that CWSL’s answer have two parts. However, ZJL did not address the first part. Probably he had a hard time in figuring out where the statement that indifferent sensation is tranquil came from. Thus, he left it out and only borrowed the example about destinies of humans, gods and three evil from ZJL and tried to explain CWSL’s answer in two steps. Unfortunately, he also left out seven transforming consciousnesses part in ZJL note. Thus, he failed to answer his own question: “How could [maturation] that unvirtuous actions derive be without suffering

<sup>545</sup> 「先問云：此識既唯捨受相應，則應是善業所招人天異熟，如何亦是惡業所招異熟？惡業所招寧無苦受？若無苦受，應非惡招。此約三塗異熟為問... 先約人天異熟例答，既許善業能招人天捨受，亦應許惡業招三塗捨受。何以善惡皆能招捨受耶？次立量釋：捨受是有法，善惡俱招宗。不違苦樂品故因，喻如無記法。苦樂品者，二塗惡是苦品，人天善是樂品。」(X51, no. 823, p. 180, b13-22 // Z 1:82, p. 79, d15-p. 80, a6 // R82, p. 158, b15-p. 159, a6)



sensation? If no suffering sensation, it should not be what unvirtuous actions should derive.”<sup>546</sup> Because he did not make it clear that suffering and pleasure are “what is produced by maturation” (異熟生) in the level of first six consciousnesses.

On the other hand, like LMC#4, LMC#2 also left out the explanation by tranquility and only leveraged example of destinies from ZJL. LMC#2 firstly notes as below.

Question: Since that this consciousness is associated with “indifferent sensation” (捨受), how could it also be the maturation of unvirtuous actions? Answer: Because indifferent sensation is not conflicting with the virtuous and the unvirtuous. Since the virtuous action could derive [indifferent sensation], the unvirtuous could do the same. If suffering [sensation] and pleasant sensation were both not existent, there would be no pleasant result in [destinies of ] human and God. There would be no suffering result in three [evil] destinies. To state a syllogism: This maturing consciousness is what both the virtuous and the unvirtuous can derive. [Because it] is not conflicting with suffering and pleasure. For example, “indeterminate dharma” (無記法).<sup>547</sup>

Compared to ZJL and LMC#4, LMC#2’s above note seem more simplistic. For example, ZJL emphasized that suffering and pleasure are both “particular derivatives” (別招), and that sentient beings in destinies of humans and gods should take suffering results while sentient beings in three evil destinies also take pleasant results. Instead, LMC#2 did not mention “particular derivatives” (別招) but emphasized that sentient beings in destinies of humans and gods should have pleasant results while sentient beings in three evil destinies also take have suffering results. For another instance, LMC#2 also set up a syllogism. However, LMC#2 syllogism is not as strict as LMC#4’s in format and content. indifferent sensation as subject of a thesis (有法) seems better than the eighth consciousness. Nevertheless, it interesting to note that LMC#2 did not stop here. He went extra miles by having another much longer and more complete quote from ZJL as below:

Thus one should know that “the eighth true consciousness “ (第八真識) is always like “characteristics of indifference” (捨相), is similar to effortless

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<sup>546</sup> 「惡業所招寧無苦受? 若無苦受, 應非惡招。」(X51, no. 823, p. 180, b14-15 // Z 1:82, p. 79, d16-17 // R82, p. 158, b16-17)

<sup>547</sup> 「問: 此識既與捨受相應, 如何亦是惡業異熟? 答: 以捨受不違善惡故, 既許善業能招, 惡業亦爾。若苦樂不俱, 於人天中應無樂果, 於三途中應無苦果。立量云: 此異熟識, 善惡俱招, 苦樂不違, 如無記法。」(X50, no. 821, p. 696, c11-15 // Z 1:81, p. 190, d2-6 // R81, p. 380, b2-6)

conditions, and complies to the path of permanence. It is not polluted by the defiled dharmas. How could it be corrected by the pure dharmas? It is not confined by birth and death. How can it be extinct by “liberation” (涅槃; Skt. *nirvāṇa*)? Thus it is called “master of consciousness” (識主). Thus it is named “king of mind” (心王). Just because one thought of ignorance, the waves of seven consciousness are arising. Since that mental factors arising, King of mind is lost. That is all because one forces enlightenment with “enlightenment illumination” (覺明), and distinguishes and establishes the subject and the object. When clear understanding arising, mind and object are clear cut. When discrimination is conducted, self and other are distinct. Because sentient beings going after hatred and love within minds, they end up having enemies and intimates. In non-sentient environment, material obstructions is made up according to their ideations and thoughts. Which externally causes mulberry fields turn into sea and sea turns into mulberry fields. Internally making intimates become the causes of enemies and enemies become seeds of intimates. Up and down to each other. Responding to each other over and over. Due to these, action and results are constantly updated. Suffering conditions never stop. If one is intended to return to the truth and back to the base, to turn delusion to be implicitly compatible with truth, just not to arise any single thought. When the connection between preceding thought and following thought breaks, discriminating mind ceases and actions of cyclic existence die. When retributions ends, the root [of cyclic existence] withers. When causes become empty, effects would die out. Then the emotional dust and consciousness filth since the beginningless time would be totally disappear as one wishes. One’s original Buddha-eye and permanent body would appear suddenly according to the truth.<sup>548</sup>

It is the term “the eighth true consciousness” in the above note that draws my attention. Because I am wondering what the difference between the eighth consciousness and “the eighth true consciousness” would be. In addition, I don’t know what LMC#2 is really intended to achieve by having such extensive long quote.

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<sup>548</sup> 「故知，第八真識，常如捨相，似任運之緣，合恒常之道。不為垢法之所染，寧為淨法之所治？非生死之所羈，豈涅槃之能寂？是以，稱為識主，故號心王。祇因一念無明，遂起七識波浪。既生心所，遂失心王，皆因強覺覺明，分能立所。起明了之解，心境歷然。運分別之情，自他宛爾。因茲，有情心內逐憎愛而結冤親。無情境中，隨想念而標形礙。遂使外則桑田變海，海變桑田。內則親作怨由，怨為親種。互為高下，反覆相訓。從茲，業果恒新，苦緣不斷。若欲還真反本，旋妄冥真，但一念不生，前後際斷，分別心滅，輪迴業亡。報盡根枯，因空果喪。無始之情塵識垢，應念全消。本來之佛眼常身，隨真頓現。」(X50, no. 821, p. 696, c15-p. 697, a3 // Z 1:81, p. 190, d6-18 // R81, p. 380, b6-18)  
Or see Zongjing lu in T48, no. 2016, p. 696, c12-21.

Because no any other late-Ming commentaries used the same quote here. I suspect whether LMC#2 would like to use the above quote to make up the portion of previous ZJL's note — "...if the rest of seven transforming consciousness cause suffering and pleasures, this consciousness accommodates both because indifferent sensation is not conflicting with the qualities of suffering and pleasure..."<sup>549</sup> Because in the above note I notice that "... just because of "one thought of ignorance" (一念無明), the waves of seven consciousnesses are arising..."<sup>550</sup> In other words, it seems to me that LMC#2 thought very highly of the eighth consciousness and its associated indifferent sensation. In particular, indifferent sensation is neither suffering nor pleasures but can accommodate these two. Did LMC#2 associate such indifferent characteristics with what Fazang 法藏 says in *Huayan jing tan xuan ji* 華嚴經探玄記 (Note of Exploring the Profundities of Huayan Sutra) as below?

*Sheng man jing* 勝鬘經 says, that the "intrinsically pure mind" (自性清淨心) which is non-defilement (不染) becomes defiled is difficult to comprehend. Which is already defiled becomes non-defilement is difficult to understand. Commentary says, that what is non-defilement becomes defiled is to express that intrinsically pure [mind] becomes conventional entirely according to defilement. Namely "aspect of arising and ceasing" (生滅門). The aspect that what is already defiled becomes non-defilement is that the originally ultimate truth is that the defilement is permanently pure. Namely "aspect of thusness" (真如門).<sup>551</sup>

However, can the eighth consciousness and its associated indifferent sensation be just the answer — the ultimate truth or thusness? Or put it another way. Can sentient beings really be enlightened by just returning back to the eighth consciousness if any?

At the very beginning of 8-1, in order to explain why indifferent sensation, CWSL highlights the five implications of "mental activity to perceive" of this consciousness: 1) extremely "not recognizable" (不明了); 2) not being able to distinguish the painful object from the delighted object; 3) extremely subtle, 4) arising in one kind and 5) arising in continuous base. Based on these features, can any sentient beings return to something that is extremely "not recognizable" and subtle? Moreover, CWSL in 8-1 also emphasizes that the real maturation is only arising according to previously "derived actions" (引業), not depending on "current


<sup>549</sup> 「餘七轉識設起苦樂，此識皆俱，以捨不違苦樂品故。」(T48, no. 2016, p. 696, b20-21)

<sup>550</sup> 「祇因一念無明，遂起七識波浪。」(X50, no. 821, p. 696, c18-19 // Z 1:81, p. 190, d9-10 // R81, p. 380, b9-10)

<sup>551</sup> 「勝鬘經云：自性清淨心，不染而染，難可了知。染而不染，亦難可了知。解云：不染而染，明性淨隨染舉體成俗，即生滅門也。染而不染門，即染常淨本來真諦，即真如門也。」(T35, no. 1733, p. 347, b3-7)

conditions” (現緣). Since that the eighth consciousness is arising effortlessly by power of virtuous and unvirtuous actions of previous lives, is there anything that sentient beings can do with it on their wills?

On the other hand, toward the end of 8-1 section CWSL explains why the eighth consciousness is not associated with object-specific mental factors but indifferent sensation only . CWSL describes the eighth consciousness in such way: 1) this consciousness is too obscure to holds onto anything; 2) this consciousness is too vague to recall anything clearly; 3) this consciousness naturally and effortless moves to another “object of perception” momentarily; 4) this consciousness is too uncertain to make any selection. All of these features sound negative and reactive, don't they? Could they be the features of thusness? Maybe LMC#2 should think twice on how Buddha-eye can be achieved only with indifferent sensation but without appropriate “concentration” (Ch. *ding* 定; Skt. *samādhi*) and “wisdom” (Ch. *hui* 慧; Skt. *prajñā* or *dhī*).



## 4-9 Aspect of Three Natures 三性門

### 4-9-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>552</sup>

There are four kinds of dharmas: “virtuous” (Ch. *shan* 善; Skt. *kuśala*) , unvirtuous (Ch. *bu shan* 不善; Skt. *akuśala*), “obstructed and indeterminate” (Ch. *you fu wu ji* 有覆無記; Skt. *nivṛtta-avyākṛta*) , “unobstructed and indeterminate”/“neither obstructed nor determinate” (Ch. *wu fu wu ji* 無覆無記; Skt. *anivṛtta-avyākṛta*). Which dharma does “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) belong to? This consciousness is only unobstructed and indeterminate because it is of “maturation” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟; Skt. *vipāka*). If the “maturing consciousness” (異熟[識]) was either virtuous or defiled, [its] “transmigration” (流轉) and “returning to cessation (還滅) should not be possible.

Furthermore, since this consciousness is the base of virtuous and defiled [dharmas], if it was either virtuous or defiled, it should not be the “base” (Ch. *suo yi* 所依; Skt. *āśraya*) of these two [dharmas] because [these two] are against to each other.

In addition, since this consciousness is of “what is permeated” (所熏), if it was either virtuous or defiled, it should not be permeated like something extremely fragrant or smelly. Without permeation, the pure, “causes and effects” (因果) would not be possible. Thus this consciousness is only unobstructed and indeterminate. “Obstructed” (Ch. *fu* 覆; Skt. *nivṛtta*) means defiled dharmas because they block the “path of sages” (聖道) and can conceal mind to make it impure. This consciousness is not defiled [dharma] so it is named “unobstructed” (Ch. *wu fu* 無覆; Skt. *anivṛtta*). “Determinate” (Ch. *ji* 記; Skt. *vyākṛta*) means being either virtuous [dharmas] or unvirtuous [dharmas] which have “desired effects” [可]愛果 or “undesired effects” (非[可]愛果) respectively and each have excellent self-substances because they can be distinguished. However, this consciousness is neither virtuous nor unvirtuous so it is named “indeterminate” (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*).

## 4-9-2 Discussions of Commentaries

### 4-9-2-1 How many classification of “indeterminate dharma”?

Regarding the classification of “indeterminate dharma” (Ch. *wu ji fa* 無記法;

<sup>552</sup> 「法有四種，謂善、不善、有覆無記、無覆無記。阿賴耶識何法攝耶？此識唯是無覆無記，異熟性故。異熟若是善、染污者，流轉還滅應不得成。又此識是善、染依故，若善、染者，互相違故，應不與二俱作所依。又此識是所熏性故。若善、染者如極香臭，應不受熏。無熏習故，染淨因果俱不成立。故此唯是無覆無記。「覆」謂染法，障聖道故，又能蔽心，令不淨故。此識非染，故名「無覆」。「記」謂善惡有愛、非愛果及殊勝自體，可記別故。此非善惡，故名「無記」。」 (T31, no. 1585, p. 12, a19-29). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 296-97. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 72-73.

Skt. *avyākṛta-dharma*), CWSLS, ZJL, LMC#2, and LMC#3 all have further elaboration whereas LMC#1, LMC#4 and LMC#5 don't. Although ZJL basically adopts two kinds of classifications from CWSLS, it further develops the third level of classification together with more extensive explanations. LMC#3 quotes ZJL almost word for word whereas LMC#1 only pick up two kinds of classification. In order to catch and evaluate all three kinds of classification, I translate partial LMC#3 note as below.

There are three kinds of “indeterminate [dharma]” (Ch. *wu ji fa* 無記[法]; Skt. *avyākṛta-[dharma]*): 1) “Indeterminate [dharma] that concomitant with mind” (相應無記). Which refers to all indeterminate minds, and mental factors. 2) “Indeterminate [dharma] that not concomitant with mind” (不相應無記). Which refers to indeterminate forms and dharma that not concomitant with mind. 3) “Really indeterminate dharma” (真實無記) which are empty space and “cessation without decision” (非擇滅).

Further elaboration on four kinds of “indeterminate [dharma]” (無記[法]): 1) “Indeterminate [dharma] as transformer” (能變無記). Which refers to all indeterminate minds, and mental factors. 2) “Indeterminate [dharma] that is what it transforms into” (所變無記). Namely all forms, seeds and etc. 3) “Indeterminate [dharma] that are states” (分位無記). Namely those nominal indeterminate states which set up among those twenty-four mental factors that not concomitant with mind. 4) “Indeterminate [dharma] that are ultimate” (勝義無記). Which are empty space and unconditioned dharmas of “cessation without decision” (非擇滅).

Moreover, of the first “Indeterminate [dharma] as transformer” (能變無記), there are four kinds of “indeterminate [dharma]” (無記[法]): 1) maturation; 2) “deportment” (威儀); 3) “technique” (工巧); 4) “transformation” (變化). So called “Indeterminate [dharma] that is maturation” (Ch. *yi shou wu ji* 異熟無記). “*yi*” (異) means being different. Namely, causes and effects are different in nature. Causes could be either virtuous or unvirtuous while effects could only be indeterminate. “*shou*” (熟) means “maturation” that only belongs to effects. Speaking of causes and effects together, they are named “maturation” (異熟).<sup>553</sup>

<sup>553</sup> 「無記有三：一相應無記，謂諸無記心、心所法。二不相應無記，謂無記色、不相應法。三真實無記，謂虛空非擇滅。又廣辯四種無記：一能變無記，即無記心心所法是。二所變無記，即諸色法及諸種子等是。三分位無記，即二十四不相應行中，有假無記法分位立者是。四勝義無記，即虛空、非擇滅無為是。又就第一能變無記中，更有四種無記：一異熟，二威儀，三工巧，四變化。異熟無記者，異者別異，即因果性別，因通善惡，果唯無記。熟者成熟，此唯屬

In the first two classifications, regardless three categories or four categories, we can see they are all organized in the framework of “hundred dharmas in five categories” (Ch. *wu wei bai fa* 五位百法) that Yogācāra uses to classify all phenomena. The five categories are: 1) “dharma of minds” (Ch. *xin fa* 心法); 2) “dharma of mental factors” (Ch. *xin suo fa* 心所法); 3) “dharma of forms” (Ch. *se fa* 色法); 4) “dharma that neither concomitant with mind nor with forms” (Ch. *bu xiang ying xing fa* 不相應行法); 5) “unconditional dharma” (Ch. *wu wei fa* 無為法; Skt, *asamskṛta-dharma*). In the first classification “dharma of minds” and “dharma of mental factors” are combined into one while “dharma of forms” and “dharmas that neither concomitant with mind nor with forms” are combined into one. In the second classification only “dharma of minds” and “dharma of mental factors” are combined into one.

In the third classification ZJL further broke down “indeterminate [dharma] as transformer” (能變無記) in the second classification into four categories and have a long elaboration on indeterminate maturation<sup>554</sup>. The third classification is not found in CWSLS that only passed down the first and the second classification<sup>555</sup>. Different from LMC#3, LMC#2 only selectively quoted the second classification and the third classification without the long elaboration on the third classification.<sup>556</sup> Regardless, are those classifications really essential to the understanding of CWSL text about why the eighth consciousness is only “unobstructed and indeterminate” (無覆無記)? Since LMC#1, LMC#4 and LMC#5 did not quote anything to this regard, is it safe to say that that they did not think it is relevant at all? LMC#5 concludes as below.

1) Because it is of maturation; 2) Because it is the “base” (Ch. *suo yi* 所依; Skt. *āśraya*) of the virtuous and the defiled; 3) Because it is of what is permeated. Thus it is only neither obstructed nor determinate. The rest of all are knowable.<sup>557</sup>

Making such conclusion, LMC#5 seemed to say that there are only three reasons that are critical and required for further explanation. In my opinion, those other classifications of “indeterminate [dharma]” (Ch. *wu ji fa* 無記[法]; Skt. *avyākṛta-dharma*) might be just nice to have but not required.

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果。因果合說，名為異熟。」( X50, no. 822, p. 879, b14-23 // Z 1:81, p. 373, c4-13 // R81, p. 746, a4-13)

<sup>554</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 706, c19-p. 707, a15.

<sup>555</sup> See ( T43, no. 1830, p. 334, b3-6) and ( T43, no. 1830, p. 334, b14-19).

<sup>556</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 697, a21-b3 // Z 1:81, p. 191, a18-b6 // R81, p. 381, a18-b6.

<sup>557</sup> 「一是異熟性故，二是善染依故，三是所熏性故，所以唯是無覆無記，餘皆可知。」( X51, no. 824, p. 330, c24-p. 331, a1 // Z 1:82, p. 230, d13-14 // R82, p. 460, b13-14)

#### 4-9-2-2 What does it mean by “unobstructed”?

In Section 9-1 CWSL defines “obstructed” (Ch. *fu* 覆; Skt. *nivṛtta*) as defiled dharmas which would block the “path of sages” (聖道) and can conceal mind to make it impure. The eighth consciousness is not defiled so it is named “unobstructed” (Ch. *wu fu* 無覆; Skt. *anivṛtta*). CWSL’s note seems quite straightforward that most late-Ming commentators just reiterate it except that LMC#1 notes as below.

Which means that the eighth consciousness are holding uncontaminated seeds so it does not block the path of sages. Being the “base” (Ch. *suo yi* 所依; Skt. *āśraya*) of “thusness” (Ch. *zhen ru* 真如, Skt. *tathatā*), it does not conceal minds either so it is named “unobstructed”.<sup>558</sup>

Different from other late-Ming commentators, ZJL and CWSL, LMC#1 is creative in using “holding uncontaminated seeds” to explain why it is not blocking the holy path and using “the base of thusness” to explain why it is not concealing mind. No matter if we agree with LMC#1 or not, we might appreciate his insight. Although CWSL text does say that the eighth consciousness is not defiled [dharma], CWSL does not say the eighth consciousness is pure dharma, either. Here LMC#1 seems to point it out that the eighth consciousness is not pure dharma either. Because the pure dharma and/or the pure causes are something else like uncontaminated seeds and thusness. In other words, to be precise, being unobstructed is neither defiled nor pure. Moreover, the unobstructed eighth consciousness should be open to be either defiled or purified. Like being indeterminate, the eighth consciousness have the potential to be either virtuous or unvirtuous.

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<sup>558</sup> 「謂此第八，持無漏種，故不障道。真如所依，又不蔽心，故名無覆。」(X50, no. 820, p. 550, b14-15 // Z 1:81, p. 43, d3-4 // R81, p. 86, b3-4)



#### 4-10 Aspect of Mental factors Same as Mind 心所例王門

##### 4-10-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text<sup>559</sup>

So-called “the same is true of touch and etc.” (觸等亦如是; Skt. *tathā sparśa-ādayas tat ca*) means that, like “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) which is only of “unobstructed and indeterminate” (Ch. *wu fu wu ji* 無覆無記; Skt. *anivṛtta-avyākṛta*), “touch” (觸; Skt. *sparsa*), “attention” (作意; Skt. *manaskāra*), “sensation” (受; Skt. *vedanā*), “ideation” (想; Skt. *saṃjñā*), and “volition” (思; Skt. *cetanā*) are of [“unobstructed and indeterminate”] as well. Because “all associated dharmas” (相應法) must be the same in nature.

Furthermore, like “storehouse consciousness”, five [“omnipresent mental factors” (遍行心所)] like touch and etc are “maturation” (異熟). [Their] “object of perception” (Ch. *suo yuan* 所緣; Skt. *ālambana*) and “mental activity to perceive” (Ch. *xing xiang* 行相; Skt. *ākāra*) are both “incomprehensible” (Ch. *bu ke zhi* 不可知; Skt. *asamviditaka*). They perceive three kinds of “objects” (Ch. *jin* 境; Skt. *viśaya*). They are associated with five dharmas. They are unobstructed and indeterminate. Thus it is said that “the same is true of touch and etc.”

There is an argument that, like “storehouse consciousness”, touch and etc are also “maturation” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟; Skt. *vipāka*) and “all seeds” (Ch. *yi qie zhong* 一切種; Skt. *sarva-bījaka*). Such argument is even extensively extended to being unobstructed and indeterminate. Because so called “the same is true of” (亦如是) is “without any qualifier/discrimination” (Ch. *wu jian bie* 無簡別; Skt. *niyama-avacana*). This explanation is not right. Why? Because touch and etc which depending on the [eighth] consciousness are not “autonomous” (自在). Like “vehement desire” (Ch. *tan* 貪; Skt. *rāga*), “faith” (Ch. *xin* 信; Skt. *śraddhā*) and etc which cannot be permeated, how could they hold seeds like the [eighth] consciousness?

<sup>559</sup> 「觸等亦如是」者，謂如阿賴耶識，唯是無覆無記性攝，觸、作意、受、想、思亦爾。諸相應法必同性故。又觸等五，如阿賴耶，亦是異熟，所緣、行相俱不可知，緣三種境，五法相應，無覆無記，故說「觸等亦如是」言。有義：觸等，如阿賴耶，亦是異熟及一切種，廣說乃至無覆無記，「亦如是」言無簡別故。彼說非理。所以者何？觸等依識不自在故，如貪、信等不能受熏，如何同識能持種子？又若觸等亦能受熏，應一有情有六種體。若爾，果起從何種生？理不應言從六種起，未見多種生一芽故。若說果生唯從一種，則餘五種便為無用。亦不可說次第生果，熏習同時勢力等故。又不可說六果頓生，勿一有情，一剎那頃，六眼識等俱時生故。誰言觸等亦能受熏、持諸種子？不爾，如何觸等如識名一切種？謂觸等五有似種相，名一切種，觸等與識所緣等故。無色觸等有所緣故，親所緣緣定應有故。此似種相不為因緣生現識等，如觸等上似眼根等非識所依，亦如火無能燒用。彼救非理。觸等所緣似種等相，後執受、處方應與識而相例故。由此，前說一切種言，定目受熏、能持種義。不爾，本頌有重言失。又彼所說「亦如是」言，無簡別故，咸相例者定不成證。勿觸等五亦能了別，觸等亦與觸等相應。由此故知，「亦如是」者，隨所應說，非謂一切。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 12, b1-28). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 297-300. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 73-74.

In addition, if touch and etc could also be permeated, then one sentient being should have six “substances of seeds” (種體). If that was the case, from which seeds would the effect arise? In principle, it should not be said that [one dharma] arises from six seeds because it never be observed that multiple seeds produce one sprout. If said that the effect was produced only from one seed, then the rest of five seeds would be useless. Also it should not be said that [six seeds] produce effects in sequence because their permeations are simultaneous and have the same power. Neither should it be said that six effects were produced instantly because it is not that one sentient being could simultaneously produce six “eyes-consciousness” (眼識) and etc in one moment.

[Rescue Question:] Who said that touch and etc could be permeated and could hold all seeds?

[Questioning:] If that was not that case, why [would you argue that ] touch and etc are named “all seeds” like the [eighth] consciousness?

[Rescue argument:] [I] mean that touch and etc have “characteristics that similar to characteristics of seeds” (似種相) so they are named “all seeds”. Because object of perception of “touch” (觸) and etc and object of perception of [the eighth ] consciousness are equivalent. In “formless [realm]” (無色[界]) touch and etc have “object of perception” (所緣) because there must be “direct object of perception” (親所緣緣). These “characteristics that similar to characteristics of seeds” (似種相) are not “direct causes” (因緣) that can produce manifested consciousness and etc, like that “similar eyes faculty” (似眼根) and etc which are on touch and etc are not the base of consciousness. Also like that “something similar to fire” (似火) do not have the function of burning.

[Refutation:] Such rescue argument is not right. That the object of perception of touch and etc have “characteristics that similar to characteristics of seeds” (似種相) should be same as [the eighth ] consciousness only when it comes to later part of root verses about “clinging and dwelling” (執受、處; Skt. *upādi-sthāna*). Due to this [reason], the previous discussion regarding “all seeds” should indicate the implications of “permeation” (受熏) and “holding seeds” (持種). Otherwise, the root verses would have the flaw in repeating.

Moreover, because his so called “the same is true of” (亦如是) is “without any qualifier/discrimination” (無簡別), [the argument that] “all are the same” (咸相例) must not be established. It is NOT that touch and etc are also capable of “discerning” (了別) and NOT that touch and etc are associated with touch and etc. Therefore, it should be known that so called “the same is true of” (亦如是) shall depend on situations, not meant to apply to all.

## 4-10-2 Discussions of Commentaries

### How many arguments and which one is the correct one?

When the verse says “the same is true of touch and etc.” (觸等亦如是; Skt. *tathā sparśa-ādayas tat ca*), in what aspects does the verse mean that those five “omnipresent mental factors” (Ch. *bian xing xin suo* 遍行心所; Skt. *sarvatraga-caitasa*) are the same as the eighth consciousness? Among the late-Ming commentators, there are three kinds of readings.

For LMC#1, there are two arguments. One is that they are the same in terms of being “unobstructed and indeterminate” (Ch. *wu fu wu ji* 無覆無記; Skt. *anivṛtta-avyākṛta*) only. The other is that they are the same “without any qualifier/discrimination” (Ch. *wu jian bie* 無簡別; Skt. *niyama-avacana*) including “all seeds” (Ch. *yi qie zhong* 一切種; Skt. *sarva-bījaka*). The former argument is correct one. LMC#1 read the terms “maturation” (異熟) and “incomprehensible” (不可知) in the second paragraph in 10-1 just as interpretations of “indeterminate” (Ch. *wu ji* 無記; Skt. *avyākṛta*) nature.<sup>560</sup>

For LMC#2 and LMC#3, there are three arguments. The first argument is that they are the same in terms of being unobstructed and indeterminate only. For LMC#2, the second argument is that they are the same in terms of “maturation”, that “object of perception” and “mental activity to perceive” are both incomprehensible, perceiving three kinds of objects, being associated with five dharmas and being unobstructed and indeterminate.<sup>561</sup> For LMC#3, they are the same in terms of “aspect of object of perception” (所緣門), “aspect of mental activity to perceive” (行相門), “aspect of incomprehensible” (不可知), being associated with five mental factors like “touch” (觸) etc in addition to being unobstructed and indeterminate.<sup>562</sup> The third argument is that they are the same “without any qualifier/discrimination” (無簡別) including “all seeds”. Both LMC#2 and LMC#3 made it clear that the first argument is correct one whereas the other two are to be refuted.

For LMC#4 and LMC#5, there are two arguments. The first argument is correct one whereas the second one is what to be refuted. The second argument is that they are the same without any qualifier/discrimination including “all seeds”. Furthermore, LMC#4 divided the first argument into two parts. One part is to briefly express that king mind and mental factors must be the same in terms of being unobstructed and indeterminate. The other part is to extensively indicate that “five implications” (五義) are all the same. Although LMC#4 did not identify five implications individually, they should be “maturation”, that “object of perception” and “mental activity to perceive”

<sup>560</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 550, b21-c3 // Z 1:81, p. 43, d10-16 // R81, p. 86, b10-16.

<sup>561</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 697, b22-24 // Z 1:81, p. 191, c7-9 // R81, p. 382, a7-9.

<sup>562</sup> See X50, no. 822, p. 879, c17-19 // Z 1:81, p. 373, d13-15 // R81, p. 746, b13-15.

are both incomprehensible, perceiving three kinds of objects, being associated with five dharmas and being unobstructed and indeterminate as LMC#2 identified. However, LMC#4 did elaborate on one of five implications which is “being associated with five dharmas” (五法相應) as below.

So called “being associated with five dharmas” is that the storehouse consciousness is associated with five dharmas —touch and etc. Same as King mind, five mental factors each all are also associated with five dharmas. For example, “touch” is associated with five dharmas which are storehouse consciousness, and four dharmas —attention and etc. Attention is also associated with five dharmas which are storehouse consciousness and and four dharmas — touch and etc. The rest of three mental factors are the same in the same way.<sup>563</sup>

Such note indicates that LMC#4 understood that those five implications are all correct. However, “being associated with five dharmas” might have some concern. Because, toward the end of 10-1, CWSL says that “...It is NOT that touch and etc are associated with touch and etc...” It seems that both LMC#2 and LMC#3 rejected their second argument just because they read “being associated with five dharmas” in this way. Thus it is imperative that LMC#4 had to make a proactive explanation here. Matter of fact, the similar commentary is found in the LMC#5, too.<sup>564</sup> Since Section 10-1 from the third paragraph onward is mainly to refute “all seeds”, there is no refutation of “five implications” except the concern that “...It is NOT that touch and etc are associated with touch and etc...” In my opinion, this is probably the reason that both LMC#4 and LMC#5 decided to defuse the concern instead of throwing the baby out with the bathwater like LMC#2 and LMC#3.

In addition, without any evidence of pass-down quotation, I find that CWSLS have the same position as LMC#4 and LMC#5. According to CWSLS, there are four masters who are corresponding to LMC#4 note’s the brief part of the first argument, the extensive part of the first argument, the second argument, and the refutation of the second arguments, respectively. The first, second and fourth masters share the same position as Dharmapāla.<sup>565</sup> In other words, their arguments are all correct. Moreover, CWSLS also identified “five implications” and argued that they are the same as LMC#4 did.<sup>566</sup> Furthermore, CWSLS seemed trying to classify the possible

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<sup>563</sup> 「五法相應者，阿賴耶與觸等五法相應。五所例王，一一皆亦與五法相應，如觸望賴耶及作意等四，是五法相應。作意望賴耶及觸等四，亦是五法。餘三例知。」(X51, no. 823, p. 181, a9-12 // Z 1:82, p. 80, c5-8 // R82, p. 160, a5-8)

<sup>564</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 331, a7 // Z 1:82, p. 231, a2 // R82, p. 461, a2.

<sup>565</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 335, a2-3)

<sup>566</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 335, a9-12.

confusion of “being associated with five dharmas” as LMC#4 did.<sup>567</sup> Unfortunately, it is not as clear as LMC#4’s note. Nevertheless, CWSLS admitted that CWSL’s conclusions about “... it is NOT that touch and etc are also capable of “discerning” (了別) and NOT that touch and etc are associated with touch and etc...” are not clear enough.<sup>568</sup> This might explain the confusion of LMC#2 and LMC#3.



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<sup>567</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 335, a23-24.

<sup>568</sup> See ( T43, no. 1830, p. 335, a27-28) and Yun-sang Lee, "Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Jiedu- Laiye Pian" 成唯識論述記解讀-賴耶篇, vol. 3 (Taipei, Taiwan: BuddhAll Cultural Enterprise Co.,Ltd., 2010), pp.1221-23.

## 4-11 Aspect of Cause-Effect Metaphor 因果法喻門

### 4-11-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

#### [Explicating Metaphor]<sup>569</sup>

Is “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) “annihilation” (Ch. *duan* 斷; Skt. *uccheda* or *nāśa*) or “permanence” (Ch. *chang* 常; Skt. *śāśvata* or *nitya*)? It is neither annihilation nor permanence because it is “constantly turning” (恒轉).

“Constantly” (Ch. *heng* 恒) means that this consciousness, since beginningless time, is always a “continuity” (Ch. *xiang xu* 相續; Skt. *prabandha*) of one kind “without interruption” (Ch. *wu jian duan* 無間斷; Skt. *nair-antarya*). Because it is the basis to set up realms (Ch. *jie* 界; Skt. *dhātu*), destinies (Ch. *qu* 趣; Skt. *gati*), and births (Ch. *sheng* 生; Skt. *yonī*). Because it has an attribute of firmly abiding and holds the seeds without losing.

“Turning” (Ch. *zhuan* 轉; Skt. *varṭate*) means that this consciousness, since beginningless time, keep “arising and ceasing from thought to thought” (念念生滅). Preceding [thought] and following [thought] are changing as “cause ceasing and effect arising” (因滅果生) because they are not “permanent and unitary” (常、一). Because it can be permeated into seeds by [seven] “transforming consciousnesses” (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*).

So called “constantly” negates “annihilation” while “turning” indicates impermanence. Which is “like the torrent of a stream” (如瀑流; Skt. *srotasaughavāt*). Cause and effect works inherently as such.

Like that the torrent of a stream which is neither annihilation nor permanence have some things to float and to drown during its long time of “continuity”, this consciousness is the same too. Since beginningless, [this consciousness] arises and ceases on a continuous basis which neither annihilation nor permanence. It floats and drowns sentient beings and makes them no way to get out.

Furthermore, like that the torrent of a stream never stops while being struck by winds and etc to bring up all waves, this consciousness is also the same. While it

<sup>569</sup> 「阿賴耶識，為斷？為常？非斷、非常，以「恒轉」故。「恒」謂此識，無始時來，一類相續，常無間斷，是界、趣、生施設本故，性堅、持種，令不失故。「轉」謂此識，無始時來，念念生滅，前後變異，因滅果生，非常、一故，可為轉識熏成種故。「恒」言遮斷，「轉」表非常，猶如瀑流，因果法爾。如瀑流水，非斷非常，相續長時，有所漂溺，此識亦爾。從無始來，生滅相續，非常、非斷，漂溺有情，令不出離。又如瀑流，雖風等擊起諸波浪而流不斷，此識亦爾。雖遇眾緣起眼識等，而恒相續。又如瀑流，漂水下、上，魚、草等物，隨流不捨，此識亦爾。與內習氣、外觸等法恒相隨轉。如是法喻，意顯此識，無始因果，非斷常義。謂此識性，無始時來，剎那剎那，果生因滅。果生故，非斷。因滅故，非常。非斷、非常，是緣起理。故說此識恒轉如流。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 12, b28-c15). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 301-03. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 75-76.

encounters multiple conditions and gives rise to eye-consciousness and etc, this consciousness is a constant continuity.

In addition, like in the torrent of a stream fish and grasses and etc which are either under or up the water are going with the flow without being abandoned. This consciousness is also the same. Internal “karmic impressions” (習氣; Skt. *vāsanā*) and external “touch” (觸) dharma and etc are constantly turning together with [this consciousness].

The teaching and example as such are intended to show that this consciousness’s “cause and effect” have the implication of being neither annihilation nor permanence since beginningless time. Which means the nature of this consciousness is “effect arising and cause ceasing” (果生因滅) “from moment to moment” (剎那剎那) since beginningless time. It is not annihilation because effect is arising. It is not permanence because cause is ceasing. Being neither annihilation nor permanence is the principle of “dependent arising” (Ch. *yuan qi* 緣起; Skt. *pratītya-samutpāda*). Thus, it is said that this consciousness is constantly turning like the current.

#### [Refuting Opponents’ Arguments]<sup>570</sup>

[Opponent:] Since the past and the future are not “substantially existent” (Ch. *shi you* 實有), they are OK to be not permanence. How could they be not annihilation? How could annihilation establish the principle of dependent arising?

[Proponent:] If the past and the future were substantially existent, they are OK to be not annihilation. How could they not be permanence? Permanence is not able to establish the principle of dependent arising, either.

<sup>570</sup> 「過去、未來既非實有，非常可爾，非斷如何？斷豈得成緣起正理？過去、未來，若是實有，可許非斷，如何非常？常亦不成緣起正理。豈斥他過，己義便成？若不摧邪，難以顯正。前因滅位，後果即生，如秤兩頭，低昂時等。如是因果，相續如流，何假去、來，方成非斷？因現有位，後果未生，因是誰因？果現有時，前因已滅，果是誰果？既無因果，誰離斷常？若有因時，已有後果，果既本有，何待前因？因義既無，果義寧有？無因無果豈離斷常？因果義成，依法作用，故所詰難，非預我宗。體既本有，用亦應然，所待因緣亦本有故。由斯，汝義因果定無，應信大乘緣起正理。謂此正理深妙離言，因、果等言皆假施設。觀現在法有引後用，假立當果，對說現因。觀現在法有酬前相，假立曾因，對說現果。「假」，謂現識似彼相現，如是因果，理趣顯然遠離二邊，契會中道，諸有智者應順修學。有餘部說：雖無去來而有因果，恒相續義。謂現在法極迅速者，猶有初、後，生、滅二時。生時酬因，滅時引果，時雖有二，而體是一。前因正滅，後果正生，體相雖殊而俱是有。如是因果，非假施設，然離斷常，又無前難。誰有智者捨此信餘？彼有虛言都無實義，何容一念而有二時？生滅相違，寧同現在？滅若現在，生應未來。有故名生，既是現在，無故名滅，寧非過去？滅若非無，生應非有；生既現有，滅應現無。又二相違，如何體一？非苦樂等見有是事。生滅若一，時應無二；生滅若異，寧說體同？故生滅時，俱現在有，同依一體，理必不成。經部師等因果相續，理亦不成，彼不許有阿賴耶識能持種故。由此應信大乘所說，因果相續、緣起正理。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 12, c15-p. 13, a18). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 303-07. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 76-78.

[Opponent:] Is it possible to establish your own theory by just refuting others' fault?

[Proponent:] If the mistaken view was not destroyed, it would be hard to show the right view. The preceding cause is entering into the ceasing state while the following effect is arising immediately. Which is like that two ends of steelyard (稱) are up and down at the same time. As such, cause and effect is a continuity like the current. Why by means of past and future in order to establish being not annihilation?

[Opponent:] When the cause is existent in the state of manifestation, the following effect is not arising yet. Whose cause is the cause? When the effect is existent in the state of manifestation, the preceding cause has ceased. Whose effect is the effect? Now that there is no cause and effect, whose [continuity] is neither annihilation nor permanence?

[Proponent:] If there is already the following effect when there is cause, why bother depending on the preceding cause now that the effect is existent already? Since that there is no implication of cause, could there be the implication of effect? Without cause and effect, how could it be neither annihilation nor permanence?

[Opponent:] [In our theory] the establishment of implications of cause and effect is based on “function of dharmas” (法作用). Thus what you are questioning is nothing to do with our theory/teaching.

[Proponent:] Since that [you are saying that] “substance” (體) is existent originally, then its “function” (用) should be existent originally as well because the dependent “direct cause” (因緣) is also existent originally. Due to this [reason], there must be no cause and effect in your teaching. You should believe in the right theory of dependent arising of Mahāyāna. Which means this right theory is too profound to be effable. So called “cause, effect and etc” are all “nominal setup” (Ch. *jia shi she* 假施設; Skt.\**prajñapti*). Observing the present dharma that would lead to “future function” (後用), one nominally sets up “future effect” (Ch. *dang guo* 當果) and relatively says the present [dharma as] cause. Observing the present dharma that thanks to “previous characteristics” (前相), one nominally sets up [the previous characteristics as] “past cause” (曾因) and relatively says the present [dharma as] effect. “Nominal” (Ch. *jia* 假) means that the present consciousness appears like the characteristics [of future effect and past cause]. With cause and effect as such, the “aim of principle” (理趣) is apparently far away from two sides and conforming to the middle way. All wise people should practice and study accordingly.

[Another Opponent:] There are other Buddhist schools arguing that although there is no “past and future” (「過」去、「未」來), there is “cause and effect” (因果) which implies “constant continuity” (恒相續). Which means that the present dharma



that arise and cease extremely rapidly still have two times: the beginning time of arising and the ending time of ceasing. When the dharma arising, it is due to the cause. When the dharma ceasing, it leads to the effect. Although there are two times, the substance [of the dharma] is one. The preceding cause is ceasing while the following effect is arising. Although the characteristics of substances are different, they are both existent. Such cause and effect are not “nominal setup” (假施設). Moreover, they are neither annihilation nor permanence and without the previous fault. Whoever has the wisdom would believe in other [theories] than this [theory]?

[Proponent:] Their empty talks have no real meaning. How is it possible to allow “one thought in two times” (一念而有二時)? Arising and ceasing are conflicting to each other. How could [they occur] at the same present time? If ceasing [occurring] at present time, arising should [occur] in the future. Since the existence that is named arising is in the present, shouldn't the non-existence that is named ceasing be in the past? If ceasing was not non-existent, then arising should not be existent. Since that arising is existent in the present, ceasing should be non-existent. Moreover, the two dharmas [i.e. existence and non-existence] are conflicting with each other, how could [their] substances be one? It is NOT that there is such a thing like suffering and pleasure are seen [as sharing one substance]. If arising and ceasing were the same one, then the time [of arising and of ceasing] should not be two [different times]. If arising and ceasing were different, how is it possible to say [their] substances are the same? Thus the principle that [the dharmas] in arising time and in ceasing time are both existent in the present and depending on one same substance is not established.

In addition, Sautrāntika and etc commentators' continuity theory of cause and effect is not established either. Because they do not agree that there is storehouse consciousness that is able to hold seeds. Due to this reason, one should believe in what Mahāyāna says about the right theory of “cause and effect as continuity” (因果相續) and of dependent arising.

## **4-11-2 Discussions of Commentaries**

### **4-11-2-1 How to interpret the metaphor?**

LMC#1 interprets several metaphors as below. In particular, I like to draw attention to his quote of ZJL to explain what “dependent arising” means. Because CWSL concludes in 11-1 [Explicating Metaphor] that neither annihilation nor permanence is the principle of dependent arising.

Following “like the torrent of a stream”, [the text] is to explicate “the tenor of the metaphor” (喻體) and to express the implication of neither annihilation nor

permanence. “During the long time of continuity” indicates “non-annihilation” (非斷). “Having some things to float and to drown” indicates “non-permanence” (非常)... “Winds” is the metaphor of “all conditions”. “Waves” is a metaphor for “transforming consciousnesses”... “Grasses flowing up the water” is a metaphor for “destinies of humans and gods”. “Fish flowing under the water is a metaphor for “three evil destinies”... In summary, the “metaphor of teaching” (法喻) is to indicate neither annihilation nor permanence.... It is to reveal that causes and effects are neither annihilation nor permanence. Which is the principle of dependent arising.

*Zongjing lu* says: so called “dependent arising” is [arising] according to nature without discrimination. Namely “mutual identity and mutual interfusion” (相即相融). Revealing “implication of equality” (平等義) which correctly conforms with the substance of the ultimate truth.<sup>571</sup>

If we refer back to ZJL, the above quote is not located in where ZJL interpreted the metaphor<sup>572</sup> but in where ZJL explains what difference between “causes and conditions” (Ch. *yin yuan* 因緣); Skt. *hetu-pratyaya*) and “dependent arising” is. Regarding “causes and conditions”, ZJL notes as below:

So called “causes and conditions” is discrimination according to the conventional. Namely, causes and conditions are relative to each other. Which indicates “implication of no self-nature” (無自性義) which is exactly the substance of the conventional truth.<sup>573</sup>

Thus if we put LMC#1 note back to this original context, I am afraid it seems that LMC#1 was talking about “dependent arising from the *tathāgatagarbha*” (Ch. *ru lai cang yuan qi* 如來藏緣起) instead of “dependent arising from the storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye yuan qi* 阿賴耶緣起). Because the storehouse consciousness could not be the substance of the ultimate truth. Alternatively, if LMC#1 did not have “*tathāgatagarbha*” (如來藏) in his mind, I suspect that he might equal “implication of equality” (平等義) of the ultimate truth to “attribute of indeterminacy” (無記性) of the eighth consciousness. Otherwise, why would LMC#1

<sup>571</sup> 「如暴流下，釋喻體，明非斷常義，謂相續長時，明非斷。有所漂溺，明非常... 風等喻眾緣，波浪喻轉識... 漂水上草，喻人天善趣。漂水下魚，喻三途惡趣... 總結法喻顯非斷常... 以顯因果非斷非常，是緣起理。宗鏡云：緣起者，順性無分別，即是相即相融，顯平等義，正順第一義諦體也。」(X50, no. 820, p. 551, b7-15 // Z 1:81, p. 44, c14-d4 // R81, p. 88, a14-b4)

<sup>572</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 453, c15-21.

<sup>573</sup> 「因緣者，隨俗差別，即是因緣相望，顯無自性義，正是俗諦體也」(T48, no. 2016, p. 814, a2-3)

use ZJL's special definition of "dependent arising" to describe that the eighth consciousness is neither annihilation nor permanence?

Moreover, if we investigate what LMC#2's interpretation of the metaphor as below, we will see that LMC#2 explicitly brought up "*tathāgatagarbha*" by quoting *Lengqie jing*.

"Firstly "the torrent of a stream" is a metaphor for that this consciousness is the basis of "realms" (界), "destinies" (趣), and "births" (生). Due to this consciousness, it floats and drowns sentient beings and makes them no way to get out. Thus *Lengqie* says: "*Tathāgatagarbha*" is the cause of the virtuous and the unvirtuous. It can universally create all destinies and births like entertainers conjure all destinies out".

Secondly "the torrent of a stream" is a metaphor for "what is permeated" (受熏). Thus *Lengqie* 楞伽 says: the winds from external objects blow the sea of mind to produce the continuous waves of consciousness.

Thirdly "the torrent of a stream" is a metaphor for "holding seeds" (持種). Due to this consciousness, [sentient beings] either are born in the heaven or in the human world...

In terms of present time, this "metaphor of teaching" (法喻) defines the eighth consciousness as cause and as effect within one moment. Negating annihilation and permanence to establish the implication of dependent arising. Thus said this consciousness is constantly turning like current. Not in terms of "three times" (三世; i.e. past, present, and future)...<sup>574</sup>

Here we see that LMC#2 seemed to equal the eight consciousness to the "*tathāgatagarbha*" in terms of being the base of realms, destinies, and births. Most of time LMC#3 would either follow LMC#2 or LMC#1. In terms of interpreting metaphor, LMC#3 seemed to choose to mainly follow LMC#1. Thus I would not repeat the LMC#3 note. Nevertheless, I like to highlight that, without citing any *Lengqie* here, LMC#3 only quoted ZJL to explain what "dependent arising" means

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<sup>574</sup> 「先以暴流喻此識為三界趣生之本。由此識故，令諸有情漂溺生死海中，不能出離。故楞伽云：「如來藏是善、不善因，能徧興造一切趣生，譬如伎兒變現諸趣。」次以暴流喻受熏，故楞伽云：「外境界風，飄動心海，識浪不斷。」三以暴流喻持種，由此識故，或生天上，或生人間...此法喻正約現在第八一剎那間為因為果。遮斷遮常。成緣起義。故說此識恒轉如流。非約三世。」(X50, no. 821, p. 698, b3-13 // Z 1:81, p. 192, b6-16 // R81, p. 383, b6-16)

like LMC#1.<sup>575</sup> I am not sure if this could indicate that LMC#3 refused to equal the eight consciousness to the *tathāgatagarbha*. On the other hand, we also see the following LMC#4's note which did quote *Lengqie* but not in the same way as LMC#2 did.

“ Firstly [the torrent of a stream] is a metaphor for “it floats and drowns sentient beings and makes them no way to get out” (漂溺有情不出離) which is a metaphor for previous text “it is the basis to set up realms, destinies, and births” (是界趣生施設本). As long as the storehouse consciousness is not discarded, [sentient beings] are constantly drown in the suffering sea of two kinds of death due to this consciousness.

Next, [the torrent of a stream”] is a metaphor for “dependently arising consciousness waves” which is a metaphor for previous text “it can be permeated into seeds by [seven] “transforming consciousnesses “(可為轉識熏成種) and substance always continues, like *Lengqie* says: the sea of storehouse consciousness constantly stays. Due to the movement by the winds of objects, there are many kinds of consciousness waves jump arising.

Last, [the torrent of a stream] is a metaphor for “internal karmic impressions and external characteristics should be constantly turning together” (內習氣外相應恒相隨轉) which is a metaphor for previous text “being up and down according to actions and holding the seeds without losing” (隨業昇沉持種不失). Karmic impressions...like fish are under the water. Touch and etc... like grasses are up the water. So called up and down [the water] is to express that this consciousness are turning up and down according to actions. These internal and external dharmas are accompanying constantly this consciousness.<sup>576</sup>

Like LMC#2, LMC#4 also explained the metaphors in three subsections. If we mapping their corresponding subsections, we would find that in the first section LMC#4 did not quote *Lengqie jing* as LMC#2 whereas in the second section LMC#4 quoted the similar in *Lengqie jing* as LMC#2. This seemed clear to show that LMC#4

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<sup>575</sup> See X50, no. 822, p. 880, c6-16 // Z 1:81, p. 374, d2-12 // R81, p. 748, b2-12.

<sup>576</sup> 「初喻，「漂溺有情不出離」喻前「是界趣生施設本」，未捨阿賴耶識以來，恒溺二死苦海，由此有諸趣故。次喻，「隨緣起識浪」喻前「可為轉識熏成種」，而體恒相續，如楞伽云：「藏識海常住，境界風所動，種種諸識浪，騰躍而轉生」。後喻，「內習氣外相應恒相隨轉」喻前「隨業昇沉持種不失」。習氣...如水內魚。觸等...如水外草。上下者，意明此識隨業昇沉流轉，此內外法恒隨不離。」(X51, no. 823, p. 182, a2-11 // Z 1:82, p. 81, b16-c7 // R82, p. 161, b16-p. 162, a7)

hesitated to equal the eight consciousness to the *tathāgatagarbha* if not refused to. Because LMC#4 not only skipped LMC#2's first *Lengqie jing* quote, but also emphasized in the first subsection that the storehouse consciousness would be discarded eventually. I am wondering if this might be one of reasons that LMC#4 seemed hesitating to equal the the eight consciousness to the *tathāgatagarbha*. After all the *tathāgatagarbha* is definitely not something to discard, isn't it?

In addition, CWSLS interprets “float” (漂) as a metaphor for being born in the destinies of humans and gods, “drown” (溺) as a metaphor for being born in the evil destinies, “fish under the water” as a metaphor for internal karmic impressions, and “grasses up the water” as a metaphor for external dharmas like touch and etc. LMC#4 is aligned with CWSLS in terms of fish and grasses metaphors.<sup>577</sup> However, LMC#1 is different in treating “grasses flowing up the water” as a metaphor for “destinies of humans and gods”, and “fish flowing under the water” as a metaphor for “three evil destinies”. Although different people might have different metaphor readings, by taking into account the context of CWSL, CWSLS and LMC#4's interpretation seems more fit for the context.

#### 4-11-2-2 Who says what?

First of all, in 11-1 [Refuting Opponents' Argument] Section, CWSL's text does not make it clear which statements are by opponents and which statements are by proponents. Since it is a long discussion in which several different viewpoints exchanges are involved, it is easy to have confusions about where the statements by which sides to start and to end. For example, for the very first round of exchanges, LMC#1 seemed to have a hard time in identifying two sides but attributed two different arguments all to one outsider.<sup>578</sup>

On the other hand, LMC#2 seemed doing a better job in identifying two sides. LMC#2 labelled the opponent side as Hīnayāna (Ch. *xiao cheng* 小乘, the Small Vehicle Teaching) while the proponent side as Mahāyāna (Ch. *da cheng* 大乘, the Great Vehicle Teaching). Moreover, in a bigger framework LMC#2 divided all Hīnayāna opponents that he identified in CWSL text into three subgroups that to be refuted. For each subgroup, LMC#2 noted as below.

This is to refute “the teaching that the dharmas/phenomena exists but without self” (Ch. *fa you wo wu zong* 法有我無宗) which was advocated by Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部/一切有部), Haimavata (雪山部) and etc. They insisted that “three

<sup>577</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 338, a5-24

<sup>578</sup> See X50, no. 820, p. 551, b18-22 // Z 1:81, p. 44, d7-11 // R81, p. 88, b7-11)

times” (Ch. *san shi* 三世; Skt. *traiya-dhvika*) and “unconditioned dharmas” (Ch. *wu wei fa* 無為法; Skt. *asaṃskṛta-dharma*) are all “substantially existent” (Ch. *shi you* 實有) and without Self.<sup>579</sup>

This is to refute “the teaching that the dharmas/phenomena are without past and future” (Ch. *fa wu qu lai zong* 法無去來宗) which was advocated by Mahāsaṃghika (大眾), Kaukutika (鷄胤) and etc. They thought that the present dharmas/phenomena and unconditioned dharmas are substantially existent. The past and the future dharmas are not existent in terms of both substance and function. Although there is no past and future, there are characteristics of two times -arising time and ceasing time on the present dharmas. Thus there is the implication that causes and effects would continue constantly.<sup>580</sup>

This is to refute “the teaching that the present dharmas/phenomena could be either nominal or real” (Ch. *xian tong jia shi zong* 現通假實宗) which was advocated by Sautrāntika and Prajñaptivāda (說假部). They argue that the present dharmas/phenomena are real in terms of “aggregates” (Ch. *yun* 蘊; Skt. *skandha*) but nominal in terms of “realm and fields” (Ch. *jie chu* 界、處; Skt. *dhātu-āyatana*). Because they did not agree that the storehouse consciousness holding seeds, they set up [their theories regarding ] the defiled, the pure, causes, effects and continuity according to six consciousnesses and “three poisons” (三毒).<sup>581</sup>

I guess LMC#2 picked up these three classifications by having a reference on *Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie* 大乘百法明門論解 (Commentary on lucid introduction to the one hundred dharmas of Great Vehicle Teaching)<sup>582</sup> and other commentaries of *Huayan jing* 華嚴經. The origin of these three classifications is Kuiji’s “doctrinal classification” (Ch. *pan jiao* 判教) system of “eight teachings” (八宗) which could be found in *Amituo jing tong zan shu* 阿彌陀經通贊疏, *Shuo wugoucheng jing shu* 說無垢稱經疏, and *Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie* 大乘百法明門論解. Later on, Fazang 法藏 expanded “eight teachings” to “ten teachings” (十

<sup>579</sup> 「此破薩婆多部/一切有部，雪山部等所立法有我無宗也。彼執三世及無為法皆是實有，悉無有我。」(X50, no. 821, p. 698, b15-16 // Z 1:81, p. 192, b18-c1 // R81, p. 383, b18-p. 384, a1)

<sup>580</sup> 「此破大眾、鷄胤等七部所執法無去來宗也。彼計實有現在法及無為法，其過、未法體用俱無。雖無去、來，就於現在一法體上有生滅二時之相，故有因果恒相續義。」(X50, no. 821, p. 699, a21-24 // Z 1:81, p. 193, a18-b3 // R81, p. 385, a18-b3)

<sup>581</sup> 「此破經部、說假部所立現通假實宗也。彼立現在之法，在蘊為實，在界、處為假。但依六識三毒，建立染淨因果，相續不斷，以彼不許阿賴耶識執持種子故。」(X50, no. 821, p. 699, c4-7 // Z 1:81, p. 193, c13-16 // R81, p. 386, a13-16)

<sup>582</sup> See T44, no. 1836, p. 46, c15-p. 47, a1

宗) and incorporated it into Huayan school's system of doctrinal classification.<sup>583</sup>

Particularly in *Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie* that compiled by influential Luan Putai 魯庵普泰 and accessible to the late-Ming commentators the first four teachings are classified as Hīnayāna teaching. This seems the reason why LMC#2 labelled opponents as Hīnayāna. Moreover, probably with the help of such a framework of doctrinal classification system, LMC#2 was able to understand better the different positions of each sides and figured out which statements were from which sides. Nevertheless, there are still two discrepancies between LMC#2's reading and CWSLS's reading.

The first discrepancy is minor one. LMC#2 did not identify a question from the opponent first as seen in the second round of exchanges in 11-1 [Refuting Opponent's Argument".<sup>584</sup> In other words, without a question from an opponent first, LMC#2 noted as below.

The proponent says again: I am not for argument and trying to establish my own theory by just refuting others' fault. But when the mistaken view is not destroyed, the right principle will not be revealed. I have no choice.<sup>585</sup>

Even though, no matter if there is a question from the opponent first or not, it would not change the meaning of what the proponent has to say next. Thus it is only a minor discrepancy. However, the second discrepancy would be different.

Refer to the fourth round of exchanges in 11-1 [Refuting Opponent's Argument", CWSL says "Thus what you are questioning is nothing to do with our theory" (故所詰難，非預我宗). Now the question is which side is challenging whose theory? LMC#2 reading is as below.

If you like "implication of causes and effect" (因果義) be established, it must be based on that in the present there is "function of dharmas" (法作用) which is being shown. So as I said before: arising effect and ceasing cause is a continuity like the current. It is like that two ends of steelyard (稱) are up and down at the same time. Now you are questing by resorting to causes and effect in "three times" (三世). This is nothing to do with our right Mahāyāna theory of dependent arising and consciousness-only.<sup>586</sup>

<sup>583</sup> Mun, *The History of Doctrinal Classification in Chinese Buddhism: A Study of the Panjiao System*, p.309 & p. 33.

<sup>584</sup> According to CWSLS, there is a question from opponent first. See ( T43, no. 1830, p. 338, b11-13).

<sup>585</sup> 「論主復云：我非好為辯說，斥他過以成己義。但邪說不摧，正理不顯，不得已耳。」

( X50, no. 821, p. 698, b23-c1 // Z 1:81, p. 192, c8-10 // R81, p. 384, a8-10)

<sup>586</sup> 「若欲因果義成，必依現在有法作用而得顯示，故我前云：果生因滅，相續如流，如秤兩頭，低昂時等。今汝以三世因果而生詰難，此非預我大乘緣起唯識正宗。」( X50, no. 821, p.

LMC#2's above note indicates that it is the opponent who is challenging the proponent's Mahāyāna theory. Moreover, in order to justify that the opponent's challenge had nothing to do with Mahāyāna theory, LMC#2 had to read "the establishment of implication of cause and effect is based on function of dharmas" (因果義成，依法作用) as the proponent's theory. Thus LMC#2 emphasized that in the present time there is "function of dharma" (法作用) and added that opponent's question is based on his own three times theory. On the contrary, in CWSLS Kuiji's reading is as below.

The outsiders responded to the challenge [from the proponent]. Although causes and effects in the future have substances in advance, when they are named causes and effects, it is based on functions (Ch. *zuo yong* 作用; Skt. *kāritra*; Alternative Eng. activities)<sup>587</sup> instead of substances. It is named "future" when the function does not happen yet. It is name "present" when the function is going on. It is named "past" when the function was gone. In the present, the function of cause is going on while the function of effect does not happen yet. Since the implication of cause is accomplished, the implication of effect is established as well. Thus what you are challenging is nothing to do with our theory/teaching.<sup>588</sup>

According to CWSLS, it is the proponent side who challenged opponent's theory. So the opponent clarified what his theory really means first and then pushed back by saying that the proponent's questioning had nothing to do with his theory. However, LMC#2 made a mistake in attributing the theory of functions to Mahāyāna and did not realize that it is consistent with the opponent's theory of three times. I suspect that one of reasons that LMC#2 read it differently is that LMC#2 seemed not familiar with the theory that decouples functions from substances in the way as CWSLS describes. Matter of fact, the late-Ming commentators all seemed not familiar such kind of theory because the above two discrepancies happened to all late-Ming commentaries across the board.

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698, c24-p. 699, a3 // Z 1:81, p. 192, d15-18 // R81, p. 384, b15-18)

<sup>587</sup> See Gelong Lodrö Sangpo, *Abhidharmakośa Bhāṣya of Vasubandhu Vol. I* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass publishers, 2012), p.22. And Collett Cox, *Disputed Dharmas: Early Buddhist Theories on Existence: An Annotated Translation of the Section of Factors Dissociated from Thought from Saṅghabhadra's NyāyāNusāRa* (International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1995), p.140.

<sup>588</sup> 「外人解質。未來因果，雖先有體，名因果時，要依作用，不依於體。未有作用，名未來。正有作用，名現在。作用已息，名過去。現有因用，果用未生。因義既成，果義便立。故所詰難，非預我宗。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 338, c18-22)



#### 4-11-2-3 How to interpret causes and effect?

Late-Ming commentators might have a hard time in identifying which statements were by opponents and which statements were by proponent. As for which is the right view of cause and effect from the perspective of consciousness-only, they all got it right. The differences lie on how they interpret the right view. LMC#1 notes as below.

Explaining the nominal designation of effect. Because the effect still not appears yet, one talk about “future effect” (當果) relative to “present cause” (現因)...

Explaining the nominal designation of cause. Because the cause already disappeared, one talk about “past cause” (曾因) relative to “present effect”. So called “nominal” (假) means that the discriminating consciousness transforms into those characteristics which appearing like causes and effect. Thus one knows that cause and effect originally has no real substances.<sup>589</sup>

LMC#1 did not expand his explanation much but only added that cause and effect do not have substances. Different from LMC#1, in addition to paraphrasing CWSL text, LMC#2 notes as below.

Question: based on what are these nominal cause and effect established? Answer: Based on arising and ceasing of the present consciousness, there are characteristics which appearing like cause and effect. Nevertheless, it is not that there are real dharmas of cause and effect outside of mind...

Thus *Lengqie* says, “It is like that a clear mirror reveals images of all forms. What are revealed in the present consciousness are the same as well.” As such, the reason and intent of cause and effect is obvious...

Generally, there are two theories: Hīnayāna’s theory of cause and effect at different times in terms of three times as one cycle. Mahāyāna’s theory of simultaneous cause and effect in terms of one thought in the present time... Nevertheless, both of these two theories should not be abolished. If in terms of mind and mental factors, causes and effects are determined simultaneously. If in terms of forms and etc, cause and effect in three times are not necessarily wrong.<sup>590</sup>

<sup>589</sup> 「釋假立果名也。以彼果未現前，對現因而說當果... 釋假立因名也。以彼因已謝滅，對現果而說曾因。假者，謂從現起分別識上，變似因果相現。是知因果原無實體...」(X50, no. 820, p. 551, c17-21 // Z 1:81, p. 45, a12-16 // R81, p. 89, a12-16)

<sup>590</sup> 「問：此假因果依何建立？答：謂依生滅現識，似有因果相現，然非心外實有因果法也... 故楞伽云：「譬如明鏡現諸色像，現識處現亦復如是。」如斯因果，理趣昭然... 大都二義：小乘約三世一期因果異時說；大乘約現在一念因果同時說... 然此二義，俱不可廢。若約心、心所法，因果決定同時。若約色等諸法，三世因果，未為不是。」(X50, no. 821, p. 699, a10-19 // Z 1:81, p. 193, a7-16 // R81, p. 385, a7-16)

LMC#2 started by adding that cause and effect is only the creation of mind. Then, LMC#2 quoted *Lengqie* and seemed trying to argue that no matter how real it might be the images on the mirror are not real. So are cause and effect that revealed in the present consciousness. Last but not least important, LMC#2 tried to accommodate both theories. Because LMC#2 seemed arguing that the theory of simultaneous cause and effect is good to apply to mental activities while the theory of three times might not necessarily be bad to apply to forms.<sup>591</sup> Why would LMC#2 like to accommodate two competing theories? Would any other late-Ming commentators agree to such approach? At least LMC#3 did not adopt LMC#2 approach although LMC#3 quoted LMC#2 frequently before this paragraph. LMC#3 had his own interpretation noted as below.

Both cause and effect are nominal designation. Since the beginning of the beginningless until the end of the endless, there is either past nor future but only “one thought in the present time” (現在一念).

Observing the present dharma that thanks to “previous characteristics” (前相), one nominally says the present [dharma] as the effect of previous cause. Observing the present dharma that would lead to “future function” (後用), one nominally says the present [dharma] as the cause of future effect. Thus “one thought in the present time” is used to describe the connection between cause and effect without interruption.

How to lead to “future function”? Answer: there is a function that could lead to future effect. Although there is no future effect, there is a present dharma that lead to future function. So called “*yong*” (用) is function. When practioners find such a function in the present dharma, relative to this effect of dharma, their minds transform into the characteristics of the future. These [characteristics] which appearing like future are in fact [what happening in] the present. Namely, one nominally says what is being transformed as future. It is named “future

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<sup>591</sup> As far as I am concerned, consciousness-only could mean at least two different kinds of idealism. One is epistemological idealism that does not deny extra-mental object but only emphasizes that all we perceive is mental representation only. The other is ontological idealism that claims no any extra-mental object and that everything is produced from consciousness including the world that appears as it is independently and apart from consciousness. In my opinion, theory of simultaneous cause and effect and theory of three times in LMC#2 note could only coexist when LMC#2 read consciousness-only theory as epistemological idealism. However, CWSL’s consciousness-only has been traditionally understood as ontological idealism. See related discussion in my other study. Chih-chang Yang, “Is “Vijñaptimātra” Ontological or Epistemological Idealism?,” *Satyabhisamaya: A Buddhist Studies Quarterly* 正觀, no. 77 (2016).

effect”. Relative to this nominal future effect, one says the present dharma as cause. This future effect is “nominal transformation” (假變) relative to the function of the present dharma. So is the cause... Matter of fact, what is observed is “neither cause nor non-cause” (Ch. *fei yin fei bu yin* 非因非不因), “neither effect nor non-effect” (Ch. *fei guo fei bu guo* 非果非不果). Because self-nature is ineffable, it is not really a cause. Because there is function, it must not necessarily be the same [the typo of non-cause]. So is the effect.<sup>592</sup>

LMC#3’s note above could be divided into three parts. The opening part is his own words and emphasizes that “one thought in the present time” is the reason that cause and effect are nominal. The second part is borrowing a quote from WKWD in order to paraphrase CWSL text in a way that is easier to understand. The third part is a long quote from ZJL in order to elaborate on how to lead to “future function”. In fact, this is a passed-down quotation from CWSLS because ZJL also quoted CWSLS.

Why is the question “how to lead to future function” so important to LMC#3? I guess that both LMC#2 and LMC#3 seemed facing a dilemma. After negating cause and effect, how to explain “function” that is too real to deny. Thus LMC#2 chose to accommodate two theories in his note. On the other hand, LMC#3 tried to borrow a long quote from ZJL (i.e. indirectly from CWSLS) to address this question with equivocal rhetoric— “neither cause nor non-cause” and “neither effect nor non-effect”. Unfortunately, LMC#3 changed couple of key words when he quoted ZJL while ZJL did not quoted CWSLS word for word, either. Which makes that equivocal rhetoric more difficult to follow. Thus, I translate the related portion of CWSLS note as below.

Which one is nominal? When consciousness perceiving the present dharma, it looks for where [the present dharma] comes from and says [where it comes from] as cause and the present dharma as effect. [Consciousness] looks for the present dharma and for what dharma [the present dharma] will produce. Then it transforms into characteristics that appearing like future. The present dharma is named cause while the future one as effect. Thus it said “nominal” (假). Matter of fact, the dharma that is observed is “neither cause nor non-cause”, and

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<sup>592</sup> 「因之與果皆是假說。自無始之始，至無終之終，無去無來，唯有現在一念。觀現在法，有酬前相，假說現在為前因之果。觀現在法，有引後用，假說現在為後果之因。故將現在一念，說成因果相續不斷耳。云何引後用？曰：有能引生當果之用。當果雖無，而現在法，有引後用。用者功能，行者尋見現法之上有此功用，觀此法果，遂心變作未來之相，此似未來，實是現在，即假說此所變未來，名為當果。對此假當有之果，而說現在法為因。此未來果，即觀現在法功能而假變也。其因亦爾…而實所觀，非因非不因，非果非不果。且如於自性離言故，非實是因，有功能故，非定不同，果亦如是。」(X50, no. 822, p. 881, b8-23 // Z 1:81, p. 375, b16-c13 // R81, p. 749, b16-p. 750, a13)

“neither effect nor non-effect” . In terms of cause, because its nature is ineffable, it must not necessarily be cause. Because it has function, it must not necessarily be non-cause. So is the effect.<sup>593</sup>

Refer back to original CWSLS’s interpretation, the rhetoric like “neither cause nor non-cause” and “neither effect nor non-effect” may be still equivocal. However, it seemed solving the dilemma in a certain degree. After all, saying that causes and effects are not existent at all is one thing. Saying that cause and effects are ineffable is another thing. The former is ontological question and/or problem whereas the latter is epistemological problem. If “function” (功能) is something so real that is hard to be denied, then could the problem just be taken as epistemologically technical limitation? Can one live with that limitation? LMC#4 note as below.

So called “the present consciousness appears like those characteristics”. “*bi*” (彼; i.e. those) refers to cause and effect. Namely, in the present consciousness of one thought the past relative to the future is nominally named cause and effect. Other Vehicles taught that causes and effect are substantially existent in two times. The Great Vehicle’s cause and effect were nominally set up and based on the present [consciousness]. The Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle are different in terms of nominal vs. real.<sup>594</sup>

LMC#4’s explanation looks like nothing really new. If there was any insight at all here, that might be that: Small Vehicle are not aware of any epistemological limitation with so called causes and effects whereas the Great Vehicle fully recognize the epistemologically technical limitation of cause and effect and choose to live with that. However, does consciousness/mind have to be epistemological limitation only? Let’s see LMC#5 note as below.

Just one moment dharma in the present. Looking forward is named effect.

Looking backward is named cause. In terms of the present effect, speaking of the past cause, [what happened] eons ago is like today. This is because the present consciousness transforms into the characteristics of the past, not really

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<sup>593</sup> 「何者為假? 識緣於此現法之時, 尋所從生, 說之為因, 說現為果; 尋現世法, 及所生法, 變似未來之相, 現名為因, 未來為果。故言「假」也。而實所觀之法, 非因, 非不因; 非果, 非不果。且如於因, 性離言故, 非定是因。有功能故, 非定不因, 果亦如是。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 339, b14-20)

<sup>594</sup> 「現識似彼相現者, 彼指因果, 即於現在一念識上, 觀待過未, 假名因果。餘乘因果, 二世實有。大乘因果, 依現假立。此大小、假實之有別也。」(X51, no. 823, p. 182, c12-15 // Z 1:82, p. 82, b2-5 // R82, p. 163, b2-5)

perceiving things in the past. Since the past already ceased, it is not perceivable. In terms of the present cause, predicting the future effect. Then [what will happen in] immeasurable times later is like seeing one's fingers and palms [now]. This is because the present consciousness transforms into the characteristics of the future, not really perceiving things in the future. Since the future still not arise yet, it is not perceivable. Thus said, "from ten generations ago to now nothing is different from current thought all the time" (十世古今，始終不離於當念).

Moreover, *Zongjing* says: The past and the future do not have substances. Permeation in one moment only belong to the present time. When a "deluded thought" (妄念) is arising in the present time, the deluded thought which is not real is named "first consciousness" (初識). It is not that a consciousness that was created in the past is named "first consciousness". Thus, one should know that horizontally everywhere and vertically across immeasurable times are all one mind in the present time, no any other principle.<sup>595</sup>

LMC#5's note could be also divided into two parts. In the first part, LMC#5 tried to explicate CWSL text in his own words. He reiterated that both the past and the future were the transformation of present consciousness. So far so good. What might be very confusing is that he concluded the first part by a saying that "from ten generations ago to now nothing is different from current thought all the time" (十世古今，始終不離於當念). This saying has a special meaning that could be tracked back to *Huayan gangyao* 華嚴綱要 or its very origin *Xin hua yan jing lun* 新華嚴經論<sup>596</sup>. To demonstrate the context where this saying coming from, I translate one paragraph from *Huayan gangyao* as below.

Intended to let ambitious practitioners enlighten mind by touching objects and tacitly understood the state of perfect interpenetration without obstruction that is beyond the words. To show that within "limitless realms" (無邊剎境) self and other are not separated by a hair. From ten generations ago to now nothing is different from current thought all the time. Therefore, Buddha suddenly manifests his casual practices that done in innumerable kalpas only in one

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<sup>595</sup> 「祇是現前一剎那法，望前即名為果，望後即名為因。約現在果，談過去因，則塵點劫前，猶若今日，乃于現識變似過去因相，而非實緣過去事也。以過去已滅，無可緣故。約現在因，記未來果，則無量劫後，猶如指掌，乃於現識變似未來果相，而非實緣未來事也。以未來未生，無可緣故。故曰：十世古今，始終不離於當念。又宗鏡云：過去、未來無體，剎那熏習，唯屬現在，現在正起妄念之時，妄念違真，名為初識。非是過去有識創起，名為初識也。故知橫該一切處，豎通無量時，皆是即今現在一心，更無別理。」 (X51, no. 824, p. 332, a19-b5 // Z 1:82, p. 232, a14-b6 // R82, p. 463, a14-b6).

<sup>596</sup> See T36, no. 1739, p. 721, a20-23.

thought in the state of concentration. So to prove the inconceivable state. The entire "realms of reality" (法界) including causes, effects, principles and phenomena are all within this state of concentration.<sup>597</sup>

Thus the context is about Buddha who in "state of realization" (果位) performs the mighty supernormal power of his one thought. How could LMC#5 associate such special case with the normal case in "state of non-realization" (因位) that described in CWSL text? This is why it might be very confusing. The similar confusion repeats in the second part of LMC#5's note that quoted ZJL. There would be nothing wrong if LMC#5 only tried to highlight that "one mind in the present time" (現在一心). The possible concern is how to understand the conclusion that "one mind in the present time, no any other principle" (現在一心，更無別理). Is there any chance that the quote tried to distinguish consciousness as "deluded thought" (妄念) from true mind? Or to equal one mind to the principle? We might not speak for LMC#5 to this regard. However, one thing for sure is that LMC#5 probably did not think the dilemma that LMC#2 and LMC#3 tried to deal with was ever a problem. Moreover, LMC#5 seemed trying to ignore and downplay the consciousness's epistemological problem but highlight whatever our mind might achieve in the mediation. Could this be a way how LMC#5 was driving for the combination of scriptural study and meditation practice?

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<sup>597</sup> 「欲令大心行者，觸境明心，默契乎無礙圓融之境於言外，以顯無邊剎境，自他不隔於毫端，十世古今，始終不離於當念。是以如來曠劫所修之因行，只在三昧中一念之頃頓現，此正證不思議之境界也。法界全體，因果理事，盡在此三昧中耳。」(X09, no. 240, p. 133, c18-23 // Z 1:13, p. 439, b4-9 // R13, p. 877, b4-9

## 4-12 Aspect of Suppression-Extinction Stages 伏斷位次門

### 4-12-1 English Translation of CWSL Root Text

#### [Explicating the implication of “a luo han” (阿羅漢)]<sup>598</sup>

[Question:] Since beginningless time this consciousness has been constantly turning like the current, until which state is this consciousness ultimately discarded?

[Answer:] The ultimate discard of [this consciousness] occurs in “the state of liberated sage” (Ch. *a luo han wei* 阿羅漢位; Skt. *arhatva*; the highest stage of Hearing path in Hīnayāna). Which means those sages who ultimately break off “afflictive hindrances” (Ch. *fan nao zhang* 煩惱障; Skt. *kleśa-āvaraṇa*) are named *arhat* (Ch. *a luo han* 阿羅漢; Skt. *arhat*; a liberated sage). At that moment, because this consciousness’s “coarse and heavy [seeds]” (Ch. *cu zhong* 麤重; Skt. *dauṣṭhulya*)<sup>599</sup> of afflictions are away forever, it is described as “discard” (Ch. *she* 捨; Skt. *vyāvṛtti*).

Herein so called *arhat* comprises all [sages] in the state of “no more learning” (Ch. *wu xue guo* 無學果; Skt. *aśaikṣa-phala*) of “Three Vehicles” (三乘). Because [they] have forever destroyed “afflictions [which are like] foes” (Ch. *fan nao zei* 煩惱賊). Because [they] deserve “being made wonderful offerings” (妙供養) by the world.

<sup>598</sup> 「此識無始恒轉如流，乃至何位當究竟捨？阿羅漢位，方究竟捨。謂諸聖者斷煩惱障究竟盡時，名「阿羅漢」。爾時，此識煩惱麤重永遠離故，說之為「捨」。此中所說阿羅漢者，通攝三乘無學果位，皆已永害煩惱賊故，應受世間妙供養故，永不復受分段生故。云何知然？《決擇分》說：「諸阿羅漢、獨覺、如來，皆不成就阿賴耶識。」《集論》復說：「若諸菩薩得菩提時，頓斷煩惱及所知障，成阿羅漢及如來故。」若爾，菩薩煩惱種子未永斷盡，非阿羅漢，應皆成就阿賴耶識。何故？即彼《決擇分》說：不退菩薩亦不成就阿賴耶識？彼說二乘無學果位，迴心趣向大菩提者，必不退起煩惱障故，趣菩提故，即復轉名不退菩薩。彼不成就阿賴耶識，即攝在此阿羅漢中，故彼論文不違此義。又不動地已上菩薩，一切煩惱永不行故，法駛流中任運轉故，能諸行中起諸行故，剎那剎那轉增進故，此位方名不退菩薩。然此菩薩，雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子，而緣此識我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我。由斯，永捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。有義：初地已上菩薩，已證二空所顯理故，已得二種殊勝智故，已斷分別二重障故，能一行中起諸行故，雖為利益起諸煩惱，而彼不作煩惱過失，故此亦名不退菩薩。然此菩薩雖未斷盡俱生煩惱，而緣此識所有分別我見、愛等，不復執藏為自內我。由斯，亦捨阿賴耶名，故說不成阿賴耶識，此亦說彼名阿羅漢。故《集論》中作如是說：「十地菩薩，雖未永斷一切煩惱，然此煩惱猶如呪藥所伏諸毒，不起一切煩惱過失。一切地中，如阿羅漢已斷煩惱，故亦說彼名阿羅漢。」彼說非理，七地已前猶有俱生我見、愛等，執藏此識為自內我，如何已捨阿賴耶名？若彼分別我見、愛等不復執藏，說名為「捨」，則預流等諸有學位，亦應已捨阿賴耶名。許，便違害諸論所說。地上菩薩所起煩惱皆由正知，不為過失。非預流等得有斯事，寧可以彼例此菩薩？彼六識中所起煩惱，雖由正知不為過失，而第七識有漏心位，任運現行，執藏此識，寧不與彼預流等同？由此故知，彼說非理。然阿羅漢斷此識中煩惱麤重究竟盡故，不復執藏阿賴耶識為自內我，由斯，永失阿賴耶名，說之為「捨」，非捨一切第八識體。勿阿羅漢無識持種，爾時，便入無餘涅槃。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 13, a19-c7). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātratā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Triṃśikā*, pp. 308-14. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 78-81.

<sup>599</sup> According to CWSLS, “*cu zhong*” (麤重) have three meanings. Here it means the seeds of afflictions. See T43, no. 1830, p. 341, a25-28.

In addition, for Sanskrit *dauṣṭhulya*, see Buescher, *Sthiramati's Triṃśikāvijñāptibhāṣya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan Translation*, p.60.

Because they no longer suffer “segmentary births” (Ch. *fen duan sheng* 分段生) forever.

[Question:] How shall we know that?

[Answer:] According to "doctrinal exegesis section" ([攝]決擇分; Skt. *vinīścaya-saṃgraha*), *arhat*, “solitary [buddha]” (Ch. *du jue* 獨覺; Skt. *pratyeka-[buddha]*) and “Tathāgata [Buddha]” (Ch. *ru lai* 如來; Skt. *tathāgata-buddha*) all do not attain storehouse consciousness. Also, according to *Ji lun* 集論<sup>600</sup>, if all bodhisattvas immediately eliminate “afflictive hindrances” (Ch. *fan nao zhang* 煩惱障; Skt. *kleśa-āvaraṇa*) and “the cognitive hindrances” (Ch. *suo zhi zhang* 所知障; Skt. *jñeya-āvaraṇa*) when they attain “enlightenment” (Ch. *pu ti* 菩提; Skt. *bodhi*), then they become *arhat* and “Tathāgata [Buddha]” (如來; Skt. *tathāgata-buddha*).

[Question:] If that was the case, those bodhisattvas who have not completely eliminated seeds of affliction should not be *arhat* and should all attain storehouse consciousness. Then, for what reason that the "doctrinal exegesis section" ([攝]決擇分) saying “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” (Ch. *bu tui pu sa* 不退菩薩; Skt. *avaivartika bodhisattvas*) also do not attain storehouse consciousness?

[Answer:] What it refers to here are [those sages who] are already in the state of “no more learning” (無學) of “Two Vehicles” (二乘) and now convert to “the great enlightenment” (大菩提). Because they must not retrogress and give rise to afflictive hindrances and because they are heading toward “enlightenment” (Ch. *pu ti* 菩提; Skt. *bodhi*), they also change name as “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” (Ch. *bu tui pu sa* 不退菩薩; Skt. *avaivartika bodhisattvas*). They do not attain storehouse consciousness since they already are *arhat*. Thus the treatise is not against the teaching/principle here.

In addition, those bodhisattvas who are in the “ground of immovability” (Ch. *bu dong di* 不動地; Skt. *acalā-bhūmi*) or above are exactly named “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas”. Because all of their afflictions are never manifested; because they are effortlessly turning in the stream of dharmas; because they are able to give rise to all practices in all practices; because they are advancing progress moment by moment. Although they have not completely eliminated seeds of affliction, these bodhisattvas perceive this consciousness’s “self-view” (Ch. *wo jian* 我見; Skt. *ātma-dr̥ṣṭi*), “self-attachment” (Ch. *wo ai* 我愛; Skt. *ātmasneha*) and etc but no longer appropriate the storehouse consciousness as “inner self” (自內我). Due to this reason, [they] forever discard the name of *ālaya* (Ch. *a lai ye* 阿賴耶; Skt. *ālaya*). Thus it is said that [they] don’t attain storehouse consciousness. Here also said that they are named *arhat*.

There is another argument that those bodhisattvas who are in “first ground and

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<sup>600</sup> *Dasheng apidamo za ji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (Skt. *Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*; Treatise on the Higert Teachings of the Great Vehicle)



above” (初地已上) are also named “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” because they have witnessed the principle of two emptiness, because they have attained the two kinds of excellent wisdom, because they have eliminated two heavy hindrances of discrimination, because they are able to give rise all practices in one practice and they won’t make any afflictive fault even though they give rise to afflictions for the benefits of [all sentient beings]. Moreover, although they have not completely eliminated “inborn afflictions” (俱生煩惱), these bodhisattvas perceive this consciousness’s all “discrimination [afflictions]” (分別[煩惱]) of “self-view”, “self-attachment” and etc but no longer appropriate the storehouse consciousness as “inner self”. Due to this reason, [they] also discard the name of *ālaya*. Thus said that [they] don’t attain storehouse consciousness. Here also said that they are named *arhat*. Thus in *Ji lun*<sup>601</sup> there is explanation as such: although not completely eliminating all afflictions yet, the bodhisattvas of ten grounds do not give rise to faults of all afflictions because these afflictions are like poisons being subdued by incantation and medicine. Thus, like *arhat* who already eliminate afflictions, the bodhisattvas in all grounds are also named *arhat*.

[Refutation:] The argument is not right. [Those bodhisattvas who] are in the seventh ground and below still have “inborn” (Ch. *ju sheng* 俱生; Skt. *sahaja*) “self-view”, “self-attachment” and etc and appropriate this consciousness as “inner self” (自內我). How could it possible that they have discarded the name of *ālaya*? If their [acquired] discrimination of “self-view”, “self-attachment” and etc are no longer “appropriated” (執藏), that is named as “discard” (Ch. *she* 捨; Skt. *vyāvṛtti*), then those who are in the state of “learner” (Ch. *you xue* 有學; Skt. *śaikṣa*) [like] “stream-enterer” (Ch. *yu liu* 預流; Skt. *srota-āpanna*) and etc should also discard the name of *ālaya*. [If such argument] was allowed, it would against what all treatises say [to this regard].

[Rescue argument:] The afflictions of those bodhisattvas who are in “[the first] ground [and] above” ([初]地[已]上) are all due to “correct understanding” (正知), so they would not become faults. It is NOT that “stream-enterer” and etc could have such things. How can they be compared with those bodhisattvas?

[Further refutation:] The afflictions of their six consciousnesses that due to “correct understanding” (正知) would not become faults. However, their seventh consciousnesses which in “state of contaminated mind” (有漏心位) are effortlessly manifesting and appropriating this consciousness [as inner self]. How could they not be the same as “stream-enterer” and etc? Due to this reason, the argument is not right.

In addition, because *arhat* ultimately eliminate “coarse and heavy [seeds] of

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<sup>601</sup> *Dasheng apidamo za ji lun* 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論 (Skt. *Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā*; Treatise on the Higert Teachings of the Great Vehicle)

affliction” (煩惱龐重), they no longer appropriate storehouse consciousness as “inner self”. Due to this reason, [their eighth consciousness] forever lose the name of *ālaya*. Which is described as “discard” (Ch. *she* 捨; Skt. *vyāvṛttiḥ*), but not to discard all “substance of the eighth consciousness” (第八識體). It is NOT that *arhat* have no any consciousness to hold seeds. When that happened, they would enter the “extinction without remainder” (Ch. *wu yu nie pan* 無餘涅槃; Skt. *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*).

### [Explicating Various Names and Implications of “Discard” (捨)]<sup>602</sup>

Moreover, the eighth consciousness, which even though sentient beings all attain, is given a variety of names depending on different implications.

Or it is named “mind” (Ch. *xin* 心; Skt. *citta*) because it is where the seeds that are permeated by various dharmas are “accumulated and gathered” (積集).

Or it is named “holding” (Ch. *a tuo na* 阿陀那; Skt. *ādāna*) because it is holding seeds and all material sense faculties and making them not to decay.

Or it is named “base of the knowable” (Ch. *suo zhi yi* 所知依; Skt. \**jñeyāśraya*) because it provides the base to all defiled and pure dharmas which are to be known.

Or it is named “seed consciousness” (Ch. *zhong zi shi* 種子識; Skt. *bīja-vijñāna*) because it can universally holding all seeds of the mundane world and of the supermundane world.

All these names are applied to all states.

Or it is named “storehouse [consciousness]” (Ch. *a lai ye [shi]* 阿賴耶[識]; Skt. *ālaya[vijñāna]*) because it keeps all defiled dharmas and makes them not to lose, and because “self-view”, “self-attachment” and etc are appropriated as “inner self”. Due to the implications of defiled dharmas and appropriation, this name is only applied to the state of “ordinary unenlightened persons” (Ch. *yi sheng* 異生; Skt. *prthagjana*)

<sup>602</sup> 「然第八識，雖諸有情皆悉成就，而隨義別立種種名。謂或名心，由種種法熏習種子，所積集故。或名阿陀那，執持種子及諸色根，令不壞故。或名所知依，能與染、淨所知諸法為依止故。或名種子識，能遍任持世出、世間諸種子故。此等諸名，通一切位。或名阿賴耶，攝藏一切雜染品法，令不失故，我見、愛等執藏以為自內我故。此名唯在異生、有學、非無學位、不退菩薩，有雜染法、執藏義故。或名異熟識，能引生死，善不善業異熟果故。此名唯在異生、二乘諸菩薩位，非如來地，猶有異熟無記法故。或名無垢識，最極清淨，諸無漏法所依止故，此名唯在如來地有。菩薩、二乘及異生位，持有漏種，可受熏習，未得善淨第八識故，如契經說：如來無垢識 是淨無漏界 解脫一切障 圓鏡智相應 阿賴耶名，過失重故，最初捨故，此中偏說。異熟識體，菩薩將得菩提時，捨，聲聞、獨覺入無餘依涅槃時，捨。無垢識體無有捨時，利樂有情無盡時故。心等通故，隨義應說。然第八識總有二位：一、有漏位，無記性攝，唯與觸等五法相應，但緣前說執受、處境。二、無漏位，唯善性攝，與二十一心所相應，謂遍行、別境各五，善十一，與一切心恒相應故，常樂證智所觀境故，於所觀境恒印持故，於曾受境恒明記故，世尊無有不定心故，於一切法常決擇故，極淨信等常相應故，無染污故，無散動故。此亦唯與捨受相應，任運恒時平等轉故。以一切法為所緣境，鏡智遍緣一切法故。」(T31, no. 1585, p. 13, c7-p. 14, a9). For alternative English translations, see Xuanzang et al., *Vijñāpati-Mātrātā-Siddhi: A Commentary (Cheng Weishi Lun) on Vasubandhu's Trīṃśikā*, pp. 314-17. Or Cook, *Three Texts on Consciousness-Only*, pp. 81-82.

and of “learner” (Ch. *you xue* 有學; Skt. *śaikṣa*) but not to the state of “no more learning” (Ch. *wu xue* 無學; Skt. *asaikṣa*) and of “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” (Ch. *bu tui pu sa* 不退菩薩; Skt. *avaivartika bodhisattvas*).

Or it is named “maturing consciousness” (Ch. *yi shou* 異熟識; Skt. *vipāka-vijñāna*) because it can draw births and deaths as “effect of maturation” (Ch. *yi shou guo* 異熟果; Skt. *vipāka-phala*) of virtuous and unvirtuous actions. This name is applied to state of “ordinary unenlightened persons”, of two-vehicles and of all bodhisattvas, but not to the “ground of *tathāgata*” (如來地). Because [they] still have “maturation and indeterminate dharmas” (異熟無記法).

Or it is named “undefiled consciousness” (Ch. *wu gou shi* 無垢識; Skt. *amala-vijñāna*) because it is the most pure and the base of all uncontaminated dharmas. This name is only applied to the ground of *tathāgata* because in the stage of bodhisattvas, of two-vehicles, of “ordinary unenlightened persons” [the eighth consciousness] is holding the contaminated seeds and is able to be permeated. [They] do not attain the virtuous and pure eighth consciousness. According to the scriptural teaching<sup>603</sup>, *Tathāgata*’s undefiled consciousness is of pure and uncontaminated “nature” (界)<sup>604</sup>. It is free from all hindrances and associated with “perfect mirror-like wisdom” (Ch. *yuan jing zhi* 圓鏡智; Skt. *ādarśa-jñāna*).

The name of *ālaya* (Ch. *a lai ye* 阿賴耶) is said/emphasized more and on purpose here because its heavy fault and because it is firstly discarded. The “substance” (體) of “maturing consciousness” is discarded when bodhisattvas are going to attain enlightenment and when “direct disciples” (Ch. *sheng wen* 聲聞; Skt. *śrāvaka*) and “solitary buddhas” (Ch. *du jue* 獨覺; Skt. *pratyeka-buddha*) enter “extinction without remainder” ((Ch. *wu yu nie pan* 無餘涅槃; Skt. *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*). The substance of undefiled consciousness is never discarded because bringing benefits and joy to sentient beings never comes to an end. Because [the names like] “mind” (Ch. *xin* 心; Skt. *citta*) and etc are applied to all states, they should be taught depending on situational implications.

In addition, the eighth consciousness overall has two states. 1) The “contaminated state” (Ch. *you lou wei* 有漏位; Skt. *\*āsrava-avasthā*) in which [the eighth consciousness] is of “indeterminate quality” (無記性). It is only associated with the five dharmas- “touch” and etc. It only perceives objects of “clinging and dwelling” (執受、處; Skt. *upādi-sthāna*) that previously discussed. 2) The “uncontaminated state” (Ch. *wu lou wei* 無漏位; Skt. *\*anāsrava-avasthā*) in which [the eighth consciousness] is only of “virtuous quality” (善性). It is associated with

<sup>603</sup> According to CWSLS, the quote is from *Rulai gongde Zhuang yan jing* 如來功德莊嚴經. See T43, no. 1830, p. 344, c21-22.

<sup>604</sup> According to CWSLS, “界” here means “性” (nature). (T43, no. 1830, p. 344, c23) Thus I translate it as nature.

twenty-one mental factors which are five “omnipresent [mental factors]” (Ch. *bian xing* [xin suo] 遍行[心所]; Skt. *sarvatraga-* [caitasa]), five “object-specific [mental factors]” (Ch. *bie jing* [xin suo] 別境[心所]; Skt. *viniyata-* [caitasa]), and eleven “virtuous [mental factors]” (Ch. *shan* [xin suo] 善[心所]; Skt. *kuśala-* [caitasa]). Because all minds are always associated with [five “omnipresent mental factors”]. Because it always desires to witness the knowledge of “object that is observed” (所觀境). Because it always holds onto the objects that are observed. Because it always clearly recollects experienced things. Because “World Honored” (世尊) never has mind which is not in concentration. Because it always makes selections among all dharmas. Because it is always associated with extremely pure “faith” (Ch. *xin* 信; Skt. *śraddhā*) and etc. Because there is no defilement. Because there is no distraction. It is also only associated with “indifferent sensation” (Ch. *she shou* 捨受; Skt. *upekṣā vedanā*) because it is always “turning effortlessly” (任運) and equally. All dharmas are its objects of perception because the “[perfect] mirror-like wisdom” ([圓]鏡智) universally perceive all dharmas.

#### 4-12-2 Discussions of Commentaries

##### 4-12-2-1 Which quote is relevant?

In the discussion of 12-1 [Explicating the implication of “*a luo han*” (阿羅漢)] Section, there are three arguments regarding whose eighth consciousness is ultimately discarded. 1) *arhat* (Ch. *a luo han* 阿羅漢; Skt. *arhat*; a liberated sage) including “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” (不退菩薩) who are already *arhat* and convert to “the great enlightenment” (大菩提); 2) Bodhisattvas who are in the “ground of immovability” (不動地; Skt. *acalā-bhūmi*) or above; 3) Bodhisattvas who are in “first ground and above” (初地已上). CWSL endorses the first two arguments and refutes the third one.

Since CWSL spends more paragraphs in refuting the third argument and clarifying the right view, one might expect the late-Ming commentaries would focus explaining the third argument. However, LMC#2 started with a long note detailing what the “five stages” (五位) of Hīnayāna practice are.<sup>605</sup> Based on my citation study, LMC#2 pulled together such detailed discussion by having reference on WKWD, *Apidamo jushe shi lun* 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論, and *Fajie cidi chu men* 法界次第初門 which is composed by Zhiyi for the beginners learning Abhidharma’s teaching and terms. Probably being misled by WKWD, LMC#2 used the terms of “five stages” of Yogācāra practice to detail the content of “five stages” of Hīnayāna

<sup>605</sup> See X50, no. 821, p. 699, c11-p. 700, b14 // Z 1:81, p. 193, d2-p. 194, b17 // R81, p. 386, b2-p. 387, b17.

practice.<sup>606</sup> LMC#3 seemed to notice the mistake so LMC#3 chose to have a long quote from *Da ming san cang fa shu* 大明三藏法數 (Ming Glossary of Buddhist Terms from Three Baskets) that is compiled by Yiru 一如 (1352-1425) with correct terms and brief explanations for five stages of Hīnayāna practice.<sup>607</sup> Nevertheless, I still could not help wonder why both LMC#2 and LMC#3 bothered having such a long note in detailing five stages of Hīnayāna practice while the controversial point lies on in which stages/grounds of ten stages/grounds of bodhisattva practice the eighth consciousness is discarded. Does it imply that their contemporary audience were so unfamiliar with Hīnayāna practice while being too familiar with Yogācāra practice? In addition, since this case only happened to LMC#2 and LMC#3, I also suspect some competition between LMC#2 and LMC#3 to some degree.

In contrast to LMC#2 and LMC#3 who seemed never hesitant to have long quotes, LMC#4 used to be stingier with both quotes and his own words.<sup>608</sup> Thus it brings to my attention when LMC#4 have following quote from *Xianyang shengjiao lun* 顯揚聖教論<sup>609</sup>.

Whether or the eighth consciousness is attained should be discriminated by “four phrases” (四句):

[1] Or “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*) is attained while “transforming consciousness” (Ch. *zhuan shi* 轉識; Skt. *pravṛtti-vijñāna*) is not. Which refers to “thoughtless sleep” (無心睡眠), “thoughtless fainting” (無心悶絕), “entering into no-thought concentration” (入無想定), entering into “concentration of cessation” (Ch. *mie jin ding* 滅盡定; Skt. *nirodha-samāpatti*) and being born in “heaven of no thought” (Ch. *wu xiang tian* 無想天; Skt. *asāmjñika-deva*).

[2] Or “transforming consciousness” (轉識) is attained while “storehouse consciousness” is not. Which refers to those *arhat*, “solitary buddhas” (Ch. *du jue* 獨覺; Skt. *pratyeka-buddha*), “non-retrogressive bodhisattvas” and all “*Tathāgata* Buddhas” (Ch. *ru lai* 如來; Skt. *tathāgata-buddha*) who are in “state with mental activities on” (有心位).

[3] Or both are attained. Which refers to the rest of sentient beings who are in

<sup>606</sup> “Five stages” (五位) of Yogācāra practice are: 1) the stage of preparation (資糧位), 2) the stage of application (加行位), 3) the stage of proficiency (通達位), 4) the stage of practice (修習位) and 5) the stage of completion (究竟位). On the other hand, “five stages” (五位) of Hīnayāna practice are: 1) the stage of accumulation (資糧位), 2) the stage of preparation (加行位), 3) the stage of seeing the Way (見道位), 4) the stage of cultivating the way (修道位), 5) and the stage of no more learning (無學位). Here I borrow English translation from Digital Dictionary of Buddhism.

<sup>607</sup> See LMC#3 note in X50, no. 822, p. 882, a17-b8 // Z 1:81, p. 376, b1-16 // R81, p. 751, b1-16. Or See the original of quote in P182, no. 1615, p. 81, b1-p. 82, a9.

<sup>608</sup> See Figure 3 and Citation Analysis Chapter 3 3-2-2-1.

<sup>609</sup> See T31, no. 1602, p. 567, c23-p. 568, a2.

state with mental activities on.

[4] Or neither is attained. Which refers to those *arhat*, solitary buddhas, non-retrogressive bodhisattvas and all “*Tathāgata* Buddhas” (如來) who entering into concentration of cessation or going into “liberation without remainder” (無餘依般涅槃; Skt. *nirupadhiṣa-nirvāṇa*).<sup>610</sup>

Since toward to the end of 12-1 [Explicating the implication of “*a Luo Han*” (阿羅漢)] Section, CWSL emphasizes that *arhat* only discard the name of *ālaya*, not the substance of the eighth consciousness when they still live. Thus LMC#4 note seems doing a good job in reinforcing the message by making a relevant quote.

#### 4-12-2-2 What is the difference between mind and seed consciousness?

LMC#1 notes what mind is and what seed consciousness is as below.

So called “or it is named “mind” (心)”. Because the substance of this consciousness is permeated into seeds by defiled and pure dharmas and then gives rise to manifestations.<sup>611</sup>

In the text following “Or it is named “seed consciousness” (種子識)”. “During the period of the cause (or during the period of practice)” (因中), this consciousness is holding new and old seeds which are permeated from thought to thought. So it is named “mundane world” (世間). “During the stage of realization” (果上), it is only holding old and uncontaminated seeds which are no longer permeated. It is named “supermundane world” (出世).<sup>612</sup>

LMC#1 defines “seed consciousness” as something holding seeds and “mind” as something that can be permeated and can give rise to the manifestation. However, LMC#1 does not say anything about mind in terms of “accumulating and gathering” (積集). Different from LMC#1, LMC#2 does mention “accumulating and gathering” in his note as below.

<sup>610</sup> 「八識成不成，應有四句：或成就阿賴耶識非轉識，謂無心睡眠、無心悶絕、入無想定、入滅盡定、生無想天。或有成就轉識非阿賴耶識，謂阿羅漢，若諸獨覺、不退菩薩及諸如來，住有心位。或有俱成就，謂餘有情住有心位。或有俱不成就，謂阿羅漢，若諸獨覺、不退菩薩及諸如來，入滅盡定，趣無餘依般涅槃界。」(X51, no. 823, p. 184, b5-12 // Z 1:82, p. 83, d7-14 // R82, p. 166, b7-14)

<sup>611</sup> 「或名心者，以此識體，受染淨法，熏成種子，起現行故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 553, a22-23 // Z 1:81, p. 46, c5-6 // R81, p. 92, a5-6)

<sup>612</sup> 「或名種子識者下，此識因中持新舊種，念念受熏，故名世間。果上唯持舊無漏種，不受新熏，名為出世。」(X50, no. 820, p. 553, b7-9 // Z 1:81, p. 46, c14-16 // R81, p. 92, a14-16)

Or it is named “mind” because it can permeate, accumulate, gather all dharmas seeds.<sup>613</sup>

Or it is named “seed consciousness” because it stores, accumulate and gather all dharmas seeds. Which means it is only holding contaminated and uncontaminated [seeds] “during the period of practice” (因中) and only uncontaminated [seeds] “during the stage of realization” (果上).<sup>614</sup>

It seems obvious that LMC#2 did borrow some note from LMC#1 in his commentary on “seed consciousness”. What is different and what might be confusing is that LMC#2 also uses “accumulating and gathering” in explaining “seed consciousness”. Not to mention that LMC#2 seemed to very loosely use “can permeate” to describe the eighth consciousness. One might be wondering what the difference between “mind” and “seed consciousness” is in terms of the implication of “accumulating and gathering”. LMC#3 seemed trying to address such a question by noting as below.

The implication of accumulating and gathering means “mind”. The implication of “gathering and giving rise to” (集起) means “mind”. Because it can gather and produce many seeds or [various dharmas] can permeate seeds within this consciousness. It can accumulate and gather [seeds] and then give rise all dharmas. Thus said this consciousness is named “mind”.<sup>615</sup>

So called “Or it is named “seed consciousness”. During the period of practice, this consciousness is holding new, old, contaminated and uncontaminated seeds because they are permeated from thought to thought. During the stage of realization, it is only holding old and uncontaminated seeds because they are no longer permeated.

This “seed consciousness” and “mind” mean differently because the eighth consciousness’s manifestation is named seeds. Thus, a venerable elder says, what is named “mind” previously is relative to accumulating and gathering of seeds.

This “seed consciousness” is only relative to “what produces” (能生) so it is not

<sup>613</sup> 「或名為心，能熏積聚諸法種故。」(X50, no. 821, p. 701, a9 // Z 1:81, p. 195, a6 // R81, p. 389, a6)

<sup>614</sup> 「或名種子識，含藏積集諸法種故，謂因中持漏、無漏，果上唯持無漏。」(X50, no. 821, p. 701, a13-14 // Z 1:81, p. 195, a10-11 // R81, p. 389, a10-11)

<sup>615</sup> 「積集義是心義，集起義是心義，以能集生多種子故，或能熏種於此識中，既能積集，復起諸法，故說此識名為心義。」(X50, no. 822, p. 883, a20-22 // Z 1:81, p. 377, b4-6 // R81, p. 753, b4-6)

established [there].<sup>616</sup>

In fact, if we refer to ZJL and CWSLS, we will see that LMC#3 directly quotes ZJL<sup>617</sup> for his commentary on what “mind” is while ZJL cites CWSLS partially.<sup>618</sup> There are two implications of “mind” in the quote. The first implication of “accumulating and gathering” (積集) is found in CWSL text whereas the second implication of “gathering and giving rise to” (集起) is not mentioned in CWSL. This might explain why LMC#1 also mentions “give rise to the manifestation” in his note if we assumed that LMC#1 had reference on ZJL as well. Moreover, in the second part of LMC#3 note regarding “seed consciousness”, LMC#3 tried to explain what the difference between “seed consciousness” and “mind” is by quoting HJSC. The explanation is relatively similar to CWSLS note as below.

Namely being the seeds of all dharmas. Previously the first that named “mind” is to accumulate and gather seeds within the consciousness. Now this [i.e. “seed consciousness”] take the implication that [the eighth consciousness] is able to produce all dharmas. Thus, these two are different.”<sup>619</sup>

Here in order to differentiate “mind” from “seed consciousness”, CWSLS seemed trying to give the implication of “accumulating and gathering” (積集) to “mind” and the second implication of “gathering and giving rise to” (集起) to “seed consciousness”, respectively. However, CWSLS defined “mind” having these two implications all together in the first place. Which let CWSLS and LMC#3 that indirectly quoted CWSLS become confusing.

If we back to CWSL original text in 12-1 [Explicating Various Names and Implications of “discard” (捨)], we see that CWSL quotes *She dacheng lun* to define “mind”.<sup>620</sup> According to Chen’s study<sup>621</sup>, in the system of *She dacheng lun*, storehouse consciousness is only in state of seed. Once “storehouse consciousness” become manifestations, it becomes the first seven consciousness. In other words, storehouse consciousness and first seven consciousnesses are one thing in two

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<sup>616</sup> 「種子識者，此識因中，持新舊漏無漏種子，念念受熏故。果中唯持舊無漏種，不受新熏故。此種子識與心義別，取第八現名種子故，故古德云：前名心者，望種積集。此種子識，唯望能生故不立也。」(X50, no. 822, p. 883, b2-6 // Z 1:81, p. 377, b10-14 // R81, p. 753, b10-14)

<sup>617</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 711, a24-26.

<sup>618</sup> *Zongjin lu* skipped CWSLS’s Chinese transliteration for Sanskrit *citta* and *She lun* 攝論 as source for CWSL’s definition. See T43, no. 1830, p. 343, c22-26.

<sup>619</sup> 「即與諸法為種子義。前第一名心，是積集種在其中義，今此取能生諸法義，故二差別。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 344, a13-15)

<sup>620</sup> See T31, no. 1594, p. 134, a9-10.

<sup>621</sup> Yi-biao Chen, “Laiye Yuanqi Yu Sanxing Sixiang Zhi Yanjiu” 賴耶緣起與三性思想之研究 (Chinese Culture University, 2000), pp.156-58.



different states. Chen calls such a system as “one [pool of ] seeds and seven consciousness manifesting” (一種七現). Thus in such system “storehouse consciousness” is defined as “mind” because it is where seeds are gathered and accumulated. No confusion at all. Unfortunately, CWSL belong to another system in which there are two kinds of “storehouse consciousness”. One is in the state of seeds while the other is in the state of manifestation together with other seven consciousnesses. In other words, there is one “storehouse consciousness” which is in the state of seeds and holding all seeds. There is another “storehouse consciousness” which is in the state of manifestations like other seven consciousness. Chen calls such system as “eight consciousnesses all manifesting” (八識現行). Then, in such system those two kinds of “storehouse consciousness” in different states are obviously having different scopes respectively. The one in state of seeds is supposed to have a bigger scope than the other in state of manifestation. Because the one in state of seeds is holding seeds for all eight consciousnesses. In this case the question would be: which one should be used to define “storehouse consciousness” as “mind”? To avoid confusion and make it simple, CWSL seemed to choose only defining “storehouse consciousness” which in state of seeds as “mind” as *She dacheng lun*. On the other hand, CWSLS, ZJL, LMC#1, LMC#2, and LMC#3 seemed only to make thing complicated and confusing by trying to take it into account another kind of storehouse consciousness which is in state of manifestation together with other seven consciousnesses.

#### 4-12-2-3 What is the scope of "the base of the knowable" ?

Regarding the scope of “the knowable” (所知) of "base of the knowable" (Ch. *suo zhi yi* 所知依; Skt. *\*jñeyāśraya*), LMC#1 notes as below.

So called “or it is named "base of the knowable". The “base” is the eighth consciousness. There are five kinds of “the knowable”. Which are “dharmas of forms” (色法), “dharmas of minds” (心法), “dharmas of mental factors” (心所法), dharmas that neither concomitant with mind nor with forms (不相應法) and all “unconditional dharmas” (無為法). Namely, these five dharmas all depend on the eighth consciousness. Thus the eighth consciousness is named the "base of the knowable".

*She lun* commentary says, “[It is] what should be knowable so it is named “the knowable”. “Base” is what is depended on. This “locative case” (所依聲)<sup>622</sup>

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<sup>622</sup> See Ci-yi Shi, ed. *"Foguang Buddhist Dictionary" 佛光大辭典* (Taipei hsien, Taiwan: Foguang Cultural Enterprise Co., Ltd., 1988), p.315. And See Teng, "Medieval Chinese Buddhist Exegesis and Chinese Grammatical Studies 漢傳佛教注疏與中古漢語文法學," pp. 116-19.

selectively takes those “which depends on the basis” (能依)— all defiled and pure “conditioned dharmas” (Ch. *you wei fa* 有為法; Skt. *saṃskṛta-dharmas*). [This locative case ] does not take “unconditioned [dharmas]” (Ch. *wu wei fa* 無為[法]; Skt, *asaṃskṛta-[dharma]*) because it has no implication of base. The “base” (所依) is storehouse consciousness because “storehouse consciousness” is their cause [i.e. the cause of “conditioned dharmas” and is able to draw them as appropriate.<sup>623</sup>

First of all, LMC#1 uses the framework of “hundred dharmas in five categories” (五位百法) that Yogācāra uses to classify all phenomena to define the possible scope of “the knowable” (所知) including all five categories. Then, LMC#1 narrows down the scope of “the knowable” to “conditioned dharmas” only by quoting *She dacheng lun shi* that was composed by Asvabhāva and translated by Xuanzang as support.<sup>624</sup> On the other hand, LMC#2 notes as below.

Or it is named "base of the knowable" because it is the base where “three self-natures” (Ch. *san zi xing* 三自性; Skt: *tri-svabhāva* ) and etc — all defiled and pure dharmas— depend on. Because it is what those who learn the Great Vehicle Teachings should know.<sup>625</sup>

Instead of “five categories” (五位), LMC#2 is different from LMC#1 in defining the scope of “the knowable” (所知) by “three self-natures”. I guess that LMC#2 learned such a unique way by having reference on ZJL<sup>626</sup> that also quoted CWSLS<sup>627</sup>. Thus LMC#3 followed suit in defining “the knowable” in the same way.<sup>628</sup>

The most interesting things to note are twofold: 1) CWSLS note is based on another version of *She dacheng lun shi* that was composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang. 2) Two versions of *She dacheng lun shi* have competing theories. Asvabhāva version scopes unconditioned dharmas out of “the knowable”

<sup>623</sup> 「或名所知依者，依是第八識，所知有五種，謂色法、心法、心所法、不相應法、諸無為法。即此五法皆依第八，故第八識名所知依。攝論釋云：「所應可知，故名所知。依謂所依，此所依聲，簡取能依雜染清淨諸有為法，不取無為，由彼無有所依義故。所依即是阿賴耶識，是彼因故，能引彼故，如其所應。」 (X50, no. 820, p. 553, b1-7 // Z 1:81, p. 46, c8-14 // R81, p. 92, a8-14)

<sup>624</sup> See T31, no. 1598, p. 381, a20-24.

<sup>625</sup> 「亦名所知依，三自性等染淨諸法所依處故，學大乘者所應知故。」 (X50, no. 821, p. 701, a12-13 // Z 1:81, p. 195, a9-10 // R81, p. 389, a9-10)

<sup>626</sup> See T48, no. 2016, p. 711, a28.

<sup>627</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 344, a8-12.

<sup>628</sup> See X50, no. 822, p. 883, a24-b2 // Z 1:81, p. 377, b8-10 // R81, p. 753, b8-10.

whereas Vasubandhu version<sup>629</sup> scopes in the “perfected nature” (Ch. *yuan cheng shi zi xing* 圓成實自性; Skt. *pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva*) which is one of “three self-natures” (三自性) and happens to be unconditioned dharmas. I am not in the position to judge which version of *She dacheng lun shi* is better. What I like to highlight here is that the late-Ming commentators’ different borrowings help us to identify and pay attention to some different and competing perspectives.

#### 4-12-2-4 To “discard” or not to discard?

Toward the end of 12-1 [Explicating the implication of “*a luo han*” (阿羅漢)] section, CWSL interprets what to discard in Chinese *Triṃśikā* stanza #4d (or Sanskrit *Triṃśikā* stanza #5a)— “[It] is discarded in the stage of *arhat*” (阿羅漢位捨)— as only the name of “storehouse consciousness” (Ch. *a lai ye shi* 阿賴耶識; Skt. *ālayavijñāna*), not the eighth consciousness itself at all. Otherwise, *arhat* would enter into “extinction without remainder” (Ch. *wu yu nie pan* 無餘涅槃; Skt. *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*). Moreover, in 12-1 [Explicating Various Names and Implications of “Discard” (捨)] section, when CWSL maintains that the eighth consciousness as undefiled consciousness is never discarded because the job or the wish to bring benefits and joy to sentient beings never comes to the end. Thus, in this section I like to investigate how late-Ming commentators understood and interpreted the implication of “discard” (Ch. *she* 捨; Skt. *vyāvṛtti*). LMC#1 note as below.

So called “[It] is discarded in the stage of *arhat*” (阿羅漢位捨) is to discard the name of [storehouse consciousness], not to discard “maturing consciousness and all seeds.

In the state of bodhisattva the “maturation effect” (異熟果) is “final body” (最後身) which is associated with five mental factors “touch” (觸) and etc. When the “maturing consciousness” is discarded, the five mental factors are transformed to associate with the “great perfect mirror wisdom” (Ch. *da yuan jing zhi* 大圓鏡智; Skt. *ādarśa-jñāna*). The substance of “undefiled consciousness” (Ch. *wu gou shi* 無垢識; Skt. *amala-vijñāna*) is “attaining perfect enlightenment” (證大菩提). So called “extinction without remainder” (無餘依[涅槃]) is the highest realization of Two Vehicles. When they first eliminate afflictions, their final maturation effects are not exhausted yet. It is named “extinction with remainder” (有餘依[涅槃]) because they still have the base of birth and death. If they discard the maturation, they immediately enter into extinction without

<sup>629</sup> See T31, no. 1597, p. 322, b29-c2.

remainder because their “body and wisdom are both eliminated” (身智俱泯).

Text following “undefiled consciousness” means that what are discarded is just to discard the names because there are many defilements involved in the name. What not to discard is not to discard the substance because the substance is an undefiled dharma.<sup>630</sup>

In the last part of above note, LMC#1 argues that undefiled consciousness is never discarded because its substance is not defiled. However, LMC#1 did not mention bringing benefit and joy to all sentient beings as a reason as CWSL maintains. The major difference is that, according to CWSL’s reasoning, if one does not wish for bringing benefit and joy to all sentient beings or does not think it is necessary or possible to bring benefit and joy to all sentient beings, undefiled consciousness could be discarded. It is not because of something inherent related to undefiled consciousness itself as LMC#1 tried to argue here.

Moreover, in the second part regarding the maturing consciousness, LMC#1 does mention the possibility of “body and wisdom are both eliminated” but limits it to Two Vehicles. On the other hand, the end state of the path of Bodhisattva is the “perfect enlightenment” (大菩提) that is attained by undefiled consciousness. This is aligned with what CWSL maintains that undefiled consciousness is only applied to the ground of *tathāgata*. The possible problem with this reasoning is that it seems OK for the sages of Two Vehicles to discard their bodies and wisdoms because they did not have Buddha’s undefiled consciousness that deserve carrying on, doesn’t it? Other late-Ming commentators did not address this possible problem except LMC#5 notes as below.

Furthermore, herein so called “Two Vehicles entering into extinction without remainder” is still a provisional explanation of “shared teachings” (通教). If, according to the real teaching of Mahāyāna, there are “pure lands” (淨土) outside of “three realms” (三界) where “direct disciples”, “enlightened persons by contemplation on dependent arising” are born in “dharma-nature body” (法性身), then they still not discard the substance of “maturing consciousness”.

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<sup>630</sup> 「阿羅漢位捨者，是捨此名，不捨異熟及一切種。菩薩位中，異熟果者，是最後身，觸等五所相應。捨異熟時，五所即轉大圓鏡智相應。無垢識體，證大菩提。無餘依者，是二乘最上果。初盡煩惱時，最後異熟苦果未盡，名有餘依，有餘生死所依故。若捨異熟，即入無餘依，以彼身智俱泯故。無垢下，謂前所捨者，但捨其名，以彼名中多雜染故。今不捨者，不捨其體，以此體無垢染法故。」(X50, no. 820, p. 553, b21-c4 // Z 1:81, p. 46, d10-17 // R81, p. 92, b10-17)

Therefore, *Fa hua*<sup>631</sup> says, “although those persons who wish to be extinct enter into the extinction, they end up being born in other lands to pursue Buddha’s wisdom. [There in other lands] they hear this scripture and realize that there is no other vehicles except Buddha vehicle that is able to attain the extinction.”<sup>632</sup>

To address the possible problem, LMC#5 borrows the notion of “pure land” to argue that there is just no way for the sages of Two Vehicles to enter into extinction without remainder in which their body and wisdom are both eliminated. No matter if they like it or not, they have to attain undefiled consciousness which is only applied to the ground of *tathāgata* because there is one Buddha Vehicle only. Before becoming Buddha, even though they wished to discard the “maturing consciousness” and enter into extinction without remainder, they would only end up being born into “pure lands” in “dharma-nature body”. I guess the idea that the sages of Two Vehicles will be born into “pure lands” in “dharma-nature body” comes from *Guan wu liang shou fo jing shu* 觀無量壽佛經疏 (*Commentary on the Sutra of the Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life*) that was attributed to Zhiyi. However, Zhiyi did not say that the sages of Two Vehicles still not discard the substance of “maturing consciousness” yet. When LMC#5 said so, LMC#5 might need to explain further what is relationship between the remaining “maturing consciousness” and “dharma-nature body”. Not to mention that CWSL’s seed theory is based on the assumption that there are differences among “five lineage names/five seed-natures” (Ch. wu zhong xing 五種姓/五種性; Skt. *pañca-gotrāni*). This assumption is definitely not to promote One Vehicle. Nevertheless, suffice it to say here that LMC#5 is reading the teaching of “pure lands” and “one vehicle” into CWSL regarding whether and what to discard or not.

On the contrary, what CWSL maintains is just that the wish or job to bring benefits and joy to sentient beings never comes to the end so undefiled consciousness is never discarded. Thus, CWSL makes a straightforward conclusion that “because Mahāyāna followers never enter into extinction”<sup>633</sup> and followed by Q&A confirming no difference between direct disciples and Buddha in terms of entering into extinction without remainder.<sup>634</sup> Therefore, whether or not to discard undefiled consciousness is a matter of choice.

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<sup>631</sup> *Fa hua* is the abbreviation of *Miaofa lianhua jing* 妙法蓮華經 (*Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Dharma*). See the quote in T09, no. 262, p. 25, c17-20.

<sup>632</sup> 「然此中謂二乘入無餘依涅槃捨者，仍帶通教方便說之。若據大乘實義，出三界外有淨土，聲聞緣覺出生其中，受法性身，則仍未捨異熟識體，故法華云：「是人雖生滅度之想，入於涅槃，而於彼土求佛智慧，得聞是經。唯以佛乘而得滅度，更無餘乘。」」(X51, no. 824, p. 334, a13-18 // Z 1:82, p. 234, a8-13 // R82, p. 467, a8-13)

<sup>633</sup> 「以大乘人不入寂滅故。」(T43, no. 1830, p. 345, b7-8)

<sup>634</sup> See T43, no. 1830, p. 345, b8-10.

#### 4-12-2-5 How to interpret the eighth consciousness in different states?

Toward the end of 12-1 [[Explicating Various Names and Implications of “Discard” (捨)] section, CWSL adds that the eighth consciousness has two different states and discusses their differences. I first briefly summarize the differences comparison as Table 42 below.

**Table 42 Eighth Consciousness in Two States**

	The Eighth Consciousness	
	In a "contaminated state" (有漏位)	In an "uncontaminated state" (無漏位)
<b>Three Natures</b>	"Indeterminate quality" (無記性)	Only virtuous quality (唯善性)
<b>Objects of Perception</b>	"Clinging and dwelling" (執受處)	"All dharmas/phenomena" (一切法)
<b>Association</b>	Only associated with five "omnipresent mental factors" (五遍行心所)	Associated with twenty one mental factors: - Five "omnipresent mental factors" (遍行心所); - Five "object-specific mental factors" (別境心所); - Eleven "virtuous mental factors" (善心所).
<b>Sensations</b>	Only associated with "indifferent sensation" (捨受)	

By having a quick look at this table, one might have couple of questions in mind. Thus LMC#2 proactively set up two questions and answers and notes as below:

Question: Being neither virtuous nor unvirtuous in “ the stage of cause/practice” (因中), [the eighth consciousness] can be associated with indifferent sensation. Now that [the eighth consciousness] is associated with virtuous mental factors in “the stage of realization” (果中), for what reason could it be only associated with indifferent sensation?

Answer: Although Buddha in the stage of realization conducts all virtues, [all those virtues] are like “echoes responding in empty valley” (空谷答響) and “spring carving and painting the natural” (春工肖物). They are equally done without attachment so it can be associated with indifferent sensation.

Question: If that was the case, why is [the eighth consciousness which] is only associated with "omnipresent mental factors" (遍行心所) in the stage of cause/practice associated with added-on object-specific mental factors and eleven virtuous mental factors?

Answer: In the stage of cause/practice [the eighth consciousness] only perceives three kinds of real objects so it is associated with five omnipresent mental factors. In the stage of realization [the eighth consciousness] can perceive "all dharmas/phenomena" (一切法) so it is associated with object-specific mental factors and eleven virtuous mental factors. Because by the “great perfect mirror

wisdom” (大圓鏡智) no dharmas/phenomena are not recognized and no dharmas/phenomena are invisible.<sup>635</sup>

For the first question, the answer provided by CWLS is only that the eighth consciousness in an uncontaminated state is always turning effortlessly and equally.<sup>636</sup> However, such answer did not explain how the eighth consciousness that is only associated with virtuous mental factors could turn effortlessly and equally.<sup>637</sup> LMC#2 not only identify the possible problem, but also tried to solve the problem by resorting to Chan poetry-like interpretations such as “echoes responding in empty valley” and “spring carving and painting the natural “. Such special kind of interpretation style is unique to LMC#2, not seen in other late-Ming commentators.

For the second question and answer, LMC#2 seemed trying to use the difference in “aspect of object of perception” (所緣門) to explain away the difference in “aspect of association (相應門). However, the possible problem facing LMC#2 is that these differences seems supposed to be what needs to be explained first respectively. Nevertheless, the above LMC#2 note including two sets of Q&A is fully adopted by LMC#3.<sup>638</sup>

In addition, CWSL does explain why some mental factors are added while other mental factors are not in some degree. For this portion, LMC#2 notes as below.

If [the eighth consciousness] is uncontaminated consciousness, it is of virtuous quality and associated with twenty-one mental factors. Which are five omnipresent mental factors, five object-specific mental factors and eleven virtuous mental factors. Because five omnipresent mental factors are omnipresent in all minds.

Because it desires to observe all dharmas equally, because “myriad phenomena is

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<sup>635</sup> 「問：因中非善非惡，得與捨受相應，今果中既與善所相應，何故相應唯與捨受？答：佛果位中，雖行一切善，若空谷答響，春工肖物，平等轉故，無著心故，得與捨受相應。問：若爾，何故因中唯與徧行相應，果上復加別境、善十一？答：因中唯緣三類性境，故唯五所。果上能緣一切境，故與別境、善十一相應，以大圓鏡智，無法不照，無法不現故。」(X50, no. 821, p. 701, b20-c2 // Z 1:81, p. 195, c5-11 // R81, p. 390, a5-11)

<sup>636</sup> See T31, no. 1585, p. 14, a7-8.

<sup>637</sup> In my opinion, the reason that the eighth consciousness in the stage of cause/practice has to be of indeterminate quality is that the eighth consciousness has to be what is permeated. On the other hand, the eighth consciousness in the stage of realization should not take permeation anymore because Buddha is in the perfect status. It is this perfect status which should be defined as “being only of virtuous quality” (唯善性). As for why the eighth consciousness in the stage of realization has to be “indifferent sensation” (捨受), I guess it is because Buddha’s consciousness should continue in one kind effortlessly and equally forever. The sensations of either pleasure or suffering that with interruptions and changes could not meet this quality.

<sup>638</sup> See X50, no. 822, p. 884, c6-13 // Z 1:81, p. 378, d2-9 // R81, p. 756, b2-9.

the seal of mind” (森羅萬像一法所印), because “meditation on the universe eons ago is like today” (普觀久遠猶若今日), because “Buddha is always in the concentration, never out of concentration” (那伽在定無不定), because “the very reason why pines are straight and brambles are curved is fully understood” (松直棘曲皆了元由故), [the eighth consciousness] is associated with "object-specific mental factors" (別境心所).

Because “being rich in myriad virtues” (富有萬德), it is associated with "virtuous mental factors" (善心所).

Because “sweeping away all fine dust” (蕩無纖塵), it is not associated with “primary and secondary afflictions” (根、隨煩惱; Skt. *mūlakleśa-upakleśa*).

Because there is no distraction, it is not associated with “four indeterminate mental factors” (四不定法; Skt. *aniyatā dharmāḥ*).<sup>639</sup>

If we pay attention to the second paragraph in which LMC#2 explain why it is associated with five object-specific mental factors and eleven virtuous mental factors but not with primary and secondary afflictions, we would see LMC#2 replaces CWSL explanation with several well-known phrases from different sources.

For example, LMC#2 borrows the phrase “the very reason why pines are straight and brambles are curved is fully understood” (松直、棘曲，皆了元由故) from *Lengyan jing* to explain why it is associated with “wisdom-mental factor” (慧心所). However, the phrase’s original context is Buddha says he knows where everything comes from when he is teaching the principle of “when six knots are untied one disappears” (六解一亡)<sup>640</sup> and suggesting choosing one of six faculties to untie first. Is such association a good explanation for the eighth consciousness being associated with wisdom-mental factor?

For another instance, LMC#2 probably borrows the phrase “myriad phenomena is the seal of mind” (森羅萬像，一法所印) from the biography of Mazu Daoyi 馬祖道一 (709–788) of *Jingde chuandeng lu* 景德傳燈錄 (The Jingde Record of the Transmission of the Lamp)<sup>641</sup> to explain why it is associated with “firm conviction-mental factor” (勝解心所). However, the original context is Mazu Daoyi’s famous teaching: “what mind is, what Buddha is” (即心即佛) as what Mazu is quoted in the biography “...Those who pursuing dharmas should pursue nothing because “outside

<sup>639</sup> 「若無漏識，是善性攝，與二十一心所相應。謂徧行五、別境五、善所十一。以五徧行徧一切心故。樂觀一切法平等故，森羅萬像一法所印故，普觀久遠猶若今日故。那伽在定無不定故。松直棘曲皆了元由故，故與別境相應。富有萬德故。與善心所相應。蕩無纖塵故。不與根隨煩惱相應。無散動故，不與四不定相應。」(X50, no. 821, p. 701, b12-18 // Z 1:81, p. 195, b15-c3 // R81, p. 389, b15-p. 390, a3)

<sup>640</sup> Six knots are the metaphor for six sense faculties and cyclic existence. One is the metaphor for extinction. See T19, no. 945, p. 125, a3-c6.

<sup>641</sup> See T51, no. 2076, p. 246, a12-14.



of the mind there is no other Buddha. Except Buddha there is no other mind” (心外無別佛，佛外無別心)...”<sup>642</sup> Can LMC#2 draw the analogy between the firm conviction-mental factor and the true mind of Chan school?

Such style of commentary seemed not even acceptable to LMC#3 who quotes LMC#2 most frequently. Because LMC#3 chose not to quote LMC#2 but only mechanically added each names of object-specific mental factors right after the corresponding CWSL text as his plain explanation as below.

Because it always desires to witness the knowledge of “object that is observed” (所觀境), it is associated with “desire-mental factor” (欲心所). Because it always holds onto the objects that are observed, it is associated with “firm conviction-mental factor” (勝解心所). Because it always clearly recollects experienced things, it is associated with “recollection-mental factor” (念心所). Because “World Honored” (世尊) never has mind which is not concentrated, it is associated with “concentration-mental factors” (定心所). Because it is always making selections among all dharmas, it is associated with “wisdom-mental factor” (慧心所). Because it is always associated with extremely pure “faith” (Ch. *xin* 信; Skt. *śraddhā*) and etc, it is associated with eleven virtuous mental factors. Because there is no defilement, it is not associated with twenty-six of primary and secondary afflictive mental factors. Because there is no distraction, it is not associated with “four indeterminate mental factors” (四不定法).<sup>643</sup>

No any other late-Ming commentators quoted LMC#2’s previous commentary or adopted similar commentary style, either. Moreover, Liao and Chien’s studies<sup>644</sup> indicate that one contemporary Buddhist scholar Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 (1582-1664) did openly criticize LMC#2 for arbitrarily borrowing Chan school’s teachings and cases (公案) to verify scriptures and doctrine study. Both Liao and Chien attribute such style to the influence that Tongrun inherited from his teacher Xuelang Hongen 雪浪洪恩 (1545-1608) who was a very well-known Buddhist lecturer then.

In addition, for this specific case, in order to comment on object-specific mental factors, LMC#2 quoted more than Chan school teaching from *Jingde chuandeng lu* and “School of Nature” (性宗) scripture/commentaries such as *Lengyan jing* and

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
<sup>642</sup> 「夫求法者，應無所求，心外無別佛，佛外無別心。」(T51, no. 2076, p. 246, a9-10)

<sup>643</sup> 「常樂證知所觀境故，與欲相應。於所觀境恒印持故，與勝解相應。於曾習境恒明記故，與念相應。世尊無有不定心故，與定相應。於一切法常決擇故，與慧相應。極淨信等常相應故，與善十一法相應。無染污故，不與根隨二十六所相應。無散動故，不與不定四所相應。」(X50, no. 822, p. 884, b24-c5 // Z 1:81, p. 378, c14-d1 // R81, p. 756, a14-b1)

<sup>644</sup> See Liao, "*Zhongbian Shichan Mengxi*" 中邊·詩禪·夢戲, p.221. & See Chien, "A Study on Yiyu Tongrun's Life and Rarely Known Works 晚明義學僧一雨通潤及其稀見著作考述," pp.174-76.

*Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu*. He also borrowed the phrase “Buddha is always in the concentration, never out of concentration” (那伽在定無不定) from *Apidamo jushe lun* as well. It seemed that Tongrun tried to make best use of whatever available in his toolbox.

LMC#5 noted in similar way as LMC#3 note above by putting the corresponding names of mental factors in parenthesis and inserting into CWSL text without further separate explanations.<sup>645</sup> It is without doubt that LMC#3 and LMC#5's notes are very helpful in clearly associating CWSL reasons with corresponding mental factors. However, for the audience who already knew or could figure out the correspondences themselves, they might not be satisfied with the plain explanation as such, wouldn't they? After all, there is a formidable gap between lacking personal experiences and enough prescriptive manuals of Buddhahood. By taking this gap into account, might some people come to appreciate LMC#2 note more? Because LMC#2 seemed trying to smooth out the gap not by critical analysis but by poetry-like interpretations as a way of knowing.



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<sup>645</sup> 「常樂證知所觀境故(得與善欲相應)。於所觀境恒印持故(與善勝解相應)。於曾受境恒明記故(得與善念相應)。世尊無有不定心故(得與善定相應)。於一切法常決擇故(得與善慧相應)。極淨信等常相應故(與十一善心所相應)。無染汗故(不與根隨煩惱相應)。無散動故(不與四不定相應)。」(X51, no. 824, p. 334, a22-b2 // Z 1:82, p. 234, a17-b3 // R82, p. 467, a17-b3)

## Chapter 5. Summary

### 5-1 Key Findings of Macro Analysis

The overview of the total information amounts by the late-Ming commentaries in Chapter 3 shows a pattern of a convex upward curve. The climax of curve is LMC#3. Since tradition-rebuilding takes time and stages, we could group LMC#1, LMC#2 and LMC#3 together representing the stage of exploration and group LMC#4 and LMC#5 together representing the stage of internalization, as Table 43 shows below. Then the pattern can be firstly explained by the citation rates. The exploration stage observes steep citation increases whereas the internalization stage features fewer citations.

**Table 43 Brief Facts Summary by LMCs**

	LMC#1	LMC#2	LMC#3	LMC#4	LMC#5
<b>Finish Year</b>	<b>1611</b>	<b>1612</b>	<b>1613</b>	<b>1626</b>	<b>1647</b>
<b>Tradition Rebuild Stage</b>	<b>Exploration</b>			<b>Internalization</b>	
<b>Citation Count Total=A</b>	1,811	7,516	23,101	1,582	2,299
<b>Within-Group Citation Count=B</b>	-	95	7,844	433	463
<b>Total Info Count=C</b>	<b>18,073</b>	<b>23,800</b>	<b>30,731</b>	<b>18,250</b>	<b>19,136</b>
<b>Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>	10%	32%	75%	9%	12%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>	0.0%	0.4%	25.9%	2.4%	2.4%

Secondly, the citation types analysis in Chapter 3 3-2-2-2 indicates that there is a clear citation type shift from the exploration stage to the internalization stage. The former stage features more straightforward citation types like complete/quasi-complete citation types whereas the latter stage used more internalized citation types like implicit paraphrasing citation. Thirdly, both authors of LMC#4 and LMC#5 made it clear in their prefaces that they would rather not make too complex citations and adopt different approaches to produce their commentaries.<sup>646</sup>

In the stage of exploration, when the Tang CWSL commentarial tradition was lost, it seems that nothing was more important than building up the references and the continuity with the history past.<sup>647</sup> The anxiety to establish the connection with the traditional past seems to be reflected in the high citations of LMC#2 and LMC#3. In terms of quotation count, three fourths of the total information of LMC#3 and one third of the total information of LMC#2 are citations. Such abnormally high citation rates might be partially explained by an internal context factor such as Wang Kentang's personal interest in philological scholarship and by an external context factor such as the transition from anti-intellectualism to intellectualism as discussed in the review in Chapter 2. However, such high citation rates did not continue to happen

<sup>646</sup> See X51, no. 824, p. 297, b5-19 // Z 1:82, p. 197, b5-c1 // R82, p. 393, b5-p. 394, a1 and X51, no. 823, p. 147, c1-4 // Z 1:82, p. 47, b10-13 // R82, p. 93, b10-13).

<sup>647</sup> Hobsbawm and Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, p.2.

in the stage of internalization. Thus, I would argue that it is a kind of special effort in the stage of exploration for a project of rebuilding an interrupted tradition.

Rebuilding an interrupted tradition takes more than time, stages and effort. It takes late-Ming commentators community work as well. The analysis of within-group citations in Chapter 3 3-2-2-4 shows that LMC#2 and LMC#1 are listed as No. 2 and No. 4 most quoted citation source in Appendix 2. More specifically, LMC#3 quotes LMC#2 more frequently than ZJL and quotes LMC#1 more frequently than WKWD. The analysis of LMC#3's quote frequency and quote count indicates that Wang Kentang tended to be more aligned with Tongrun than Mingyu (See Table 13). Moreover, LMC#4's total within-group citations is more than its No. 1 source ZJL (See Table 17) while LMC#5's total within-group citations is more than its No. 2 source WKWD (See Table 19). This shows that Dahui and Zhixu relied heavily on the earlier works of those late-Ming commentators before them. They worked like an invisible small community. The only exception is that we don't know why Zhixu chose not to have any reference to Mingyu's commentary.

If within-group citation is kind of index of significance, LMC#2 would be the most significant CWSL commentary except that LMC#5 had no opportunity to be quoted. The reason why LMC#2 is the most quoted within the group is probably that LMC#2 used the greatest number of sources and the greatest number of unique sources as Table 44 shows. After all, Tongrun is a scholar monk who was specialized in doctrinal study and was well known for his commentary in the lineage from Xuelang Hongen.

**Table 44 Brief Sources Numbers by LMCs**

	LMC#1	LMC#2	LMC#3	LMC#4	LMC#5
<b>Total Number of Sources used by LMC</b>	10	31	20	16	16
<b>Number of Unique Sources used by LMC</b>	-	12	4	3	7

In addition, in terms of pass-through citations from CWSLS through indirect sources, the analysis in Chapter 3 3-2-2-5 shows that approximately four percent of the total information is pass-through citations. Passing through citation accounts for about twelve percent of total citation count. In other words, almost eighty-eight percent of citations were not messages coming down from CWSLS. Thus, the late-Ming group has an advantage and a disadvantage. The disadvantage is that they could not leverage CWSLS too much in terms of pass-through citations. They had much more exposure to non-CWSLS perspectives. The advantage is that they did not have the same burden and pressure as those who had direct access to CWSLS, either. They were more open to different perspectives and were allowed more room to make their own judgements.

## 5-2 Hypothesis Results

In Chapter 2, I propose two sets of hypotheses to test for the synchronic analysis within the late-Ming group and for the diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and Tang control group. The following Table 45 and Table 46 are the summary tables of test results.

The test is not comprehensive but based on the macro analysis and the micro analysis of some selected themes. Moreover, since there are five late-Ming commentators involved, there might be two results for one hypothesis. For example, in CH4 Section 4-4-1-2-3, the late-Ming commentators either followed ZJL or WKWD for the definition of “clinging” (Ch. *zhi sho* 執受; Skt. *upādi*). Furthermore, some late-Ming commentators further developed their own interpretations. Thus, I list both H1-A2 and H1-A3. For another example, in CH4 Section 4-9-2-2, LMC1 is more creative in his personal interpretation whereas the rest of the commentators shared the same interpretation. Thus, H1-A3 support LMC#1 whereas the H1-B supports the rest of late-Ming commentaries. Similar situations apply to the hypotheses for the diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and Tang control group as well.

In Table 45 for the synchronic analysis within the late-Ming group, we see most of results support H1-A2 and H1-A3. Such results reflect at least three sources of differences among the late-Ming commentators. 1) When indirect sources were not available, the Ming commentators could come out with different interpretations. 2) When indirect sources were available, they might refer to different sources that had different readings. 3) When indirect sources are available, they might refer to one source but interpret that source differently.

**Table 45 Hypotheses Result for Synchronic Analysis within Late-Ming Group**

Hypotheses	Supporting Sections	Count
<b>H1-A:</b> There are some differences among late-Ming commentators		
<b>H1-A1:</b> The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to different approaches.	3-2-2-2;	1
<b>H1-A2:</b> The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to different selected citations from different authoritative texts.	3-2-2-1-2; 4-1-4-1; 4-3-1-2-1; 4-3-3-1-2-2; 4-3-4-2-1; 4-3-4-2-2; 4-3-4-2-3; 4-3-5-2-1; 4-4-2-2-2; 4-4-5-2-2; 4-7-2-2; 4-12-2-3; 4-3-3-1-2-1; 4-4-1-2-1; 4-4-1-2-2; 4-4-1-2-3; 4-4-5-2-3; 4-6-2; 4-7-2-5; 4-8-2; 4-9-2-1; 4-11-2-1; 4-11-2-2; 4-11-2-3; 4-12-2-4; 4-1-2	26
<b>H1-A3:</b> The differences among late-Ming commentaries are due to commentators' personal interpretations.	4-3-3-1-2-1; 4-4-1-2-1; 4-4-1-2-2; 4-4-1-2-3; 4-4-2-2-3; 4-6-2; 4-7-2-5; 4-8-2; 4-9-2-1; 4-11-2-1; 4-11-2-2; 4-11-2-3; 4-12-2-4; 4-1-4-2; 4-2-2; 4-3-1-2-2; 4-3-2-2-1; 4-3-2-2-2; 4-3-2-2-4; 4-3-3-2-2-1; 4-3-3-2-2-2; 4-3-3-3-4-1; 4-3-3-3-4-2; 4-4-2-2-1; 4-4-5-2-1; 4-7-2-1; 4-7-2-4; 4-10-2; 4-12-2-1; 4-12-2-5; 4-9-2-2	31
<b>H1-B:</b> There are no significant	4-1-2; 4-9-2-2; 4-3-5-2-2; 4-3-5-2-3; 4-7-2-3; 4-	7

Hypotheses	Supporting Sections	Count
difference among late-Ming commentaries	12-2-2; 4-3-2-2-3	

Moreover, in Table 46 for the diachronic analysis between the late-Ming group and Tang control group, we see most of the results support H2-A2. As the previous analysis of pass-through citation shows, only twelve percent of citations belong to the pass-through citations from CWSLS. The majority, i.e., eighty-eight percent of citations, came from those non-CWSLS sources, which very likely had different readings from CWSLS. As for the small portion of the pass-through citations from CWSLS, over ninety percent of pass-through citations went through ZJL. However, as we have seen in the micro analysis in Chapter 4, ZJL does not necessarily pass down the message of CWSLS word for word. Most of the time ZJL would modify CWSLS's message in some way and mixed the message together with other messages. This is where the biggest differences occur between CWSLS and the late-Ming commentaries. On the other hand, if the late-Ming commentators accepted indirect sources who shared same reading as CWSLS or if they accepted ZJL and other indirect sources which more faithfully passed down the message from CWSLS, that would support H2-B.

In addition, the late-Ming group had no way to tell which indirect sources passed down the message from CWSLS faithfully. All indirect sources are just like blind tests to them. They might just ignore them and presented their own insights whenever they deemed appropriate. This is what happened to support H2-A3.

**Table 46 Hypotheses Result for Diachronic Analysis b/w Late-Ming Group and Tang Control Group**

Hypotheses	Supporting Sections	Count
<b>H2-A:</b> There are some significant differences between Late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS.		
<b>H2-A1:</b> When some significant differences occurred, they were due to no indirect sources available.	4-3-2-2-1;4-4-2-2-1;4-10-2	3
<b>H2-A2:</b> When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the indirect sources that had readings different from CWSLS and/or had modified the message from CWSLS.	4-3-1-2-1; 4-3-3-1-2-2; 4-3-4-2-1; 4-3-4-2-2; 4-3-4-2-3; 4-4-2-2-2; 4-4-5-2-2; 4-4-1-2-1; 4-4-1-2-2; 4-4-1-2-3; 4-4-5-2-3; 4-6-2; 4-7-2-5; 4-8-2; 4-9-2-1; 4-11-2-1; 4-11-2-2; 4-12-2-4; 4-1-2; 4-1-4-2; 4-3-1-2-2; 4-3-3-3-4-1; 4-7-2-1; 4-7-2-4; 4-12-2-1; 4-3-5-2-2; 4-3-5-2-3; 4-3-2-2-3; 4-3-2-2-2; 4-12-2-3; 4-11-2-3; 4-12-2-5	32
<b>H2-A3:</b> When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the fact that the late-Ming commentators chose to ignore the indirect sources available to them and presented their own insights.	4-3-2-2-2; 4-3-3-1-2-1; 4-3-3-3-4-2; 4-3-3-2-2-1; 4-3-3-2-2-2; 4-3-5-2-1; 4-7-2-2; 4-3-2-2-4	8

Hypotheses	Supporting Sections	Count
<b>H2-A4:</b> When some significant differences occurred, they were due to the text discrepancy in different versions of CWSL.	4-1-4-1; 4-2-2	2
<b>H2-B:</b> There are no significant differences between Late-Ming commentaries and CWSLS.	4-4-5-2-1; 4-9-2-2; 4-7-2-3; 4-12-2-2; 4-10-2; 4-12-2-3; 4-11-2-3; 4-12-2-5; 4-3-5-2-1; 4-7-2-2; 4-3-2-2-4; 4-3-3-2-2-1; 4-3-3-2-2-2	13

### 5-3 Key Findings of Micro Analysis

The qualitative analysis at the micro level in Chapter 4 includes English translation of the CWSL in the framework of Twelve Aspects as a base plus the discussions of forty-eight related topics in total. The purpose is to unfold the diverse ways in which a lost commentarial tradition could be rebuilt by different late-Ming commentators. Before I conclude with the idea of “Liberation of Diversity”, I would like to highlight some interesting findings in Chapter 4 as examples that are unique to the rebuilding of the CWSL commentarial tradition in the late-Ming as below.

#### 5-3-1 Blind Test for “Five Seed-Natures”

Theory of “five seed-nature” (Ch. *wu zhong xing* 五種性) has been a controversial topic before and after Xuanzang’s travel to India. Even though Xuanzang knew it would be difficult for Chinese to accept it, following the advice of Śīlabhadra, Xuanzang still advocated the theory when he came back to China. Kuiji followed up by making it as one of main teachings of Faxiang School. Huizhao 慧沼 also reinforced the teaching by defending the theory against opposition from Fabao 法寶.<sup>648</sup> However, in Chapter 4 Section 4-3-3-1-2-1, we found that the late-Ming commentators chose to ignore available indirect source WKWD which faithfully passed down Kuiji’s definition of “five seed-nature” (五種性) and Kuiji’s position that CWSL’s target audiences only cover Bodhisattva and those indeterminate sentient beings who would go achieve the result of Buddhahood. Instead, Mingyu developed his own five categories which left out both “the indeterminate” (不定) and “no seeds of enlightenment” (無姓). The rest of late-Ming commentators basically followed *Lengqie jing* 楞伽經’s way of defining five categories which mainly replaced “no seeds of enlightenment” with “the incorrigible” (闍提).

The interesting question is that why would the late-Ming commentators choose to ignore their top three most quoted sources WKWD in this discussion? Probably most late-Ming commentators did think there was a significant difference between

<sup>648</sup> Chen-kuo Lin, “Kong Xing Yu Fang Fa: Kua Wen Hua Fo Jiao Zhe Xue Shi Si Lun” 空性與方法-跨文化佛教哲學十四論 (Chengchi University Press, 2012), pp.27-31.; Lu, “Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun” 中國佛學源流略論, pp.293-94.

“the incorrigible” and “no seeds of enlightenment. What significant difference did they see? I would guess that whether or not “the incorrigible” is able to achieve Buddhahood is still open to discussion whereas “no seeds of enlightenment” certainly has no way to become Buddha. Thus, they seemed hesitant to accept “no seeds of enlightenment” as a category confirming that some sentient beings would never become Buddha. This might explain why Mingyu was not willing at all to mention either “the incorrigible” or “no seeds of enlightenment” in his definition. It seems to me that Mingyu had the strongest position against the theory of “five seed-nature” and would like to exclude any category that might in any chance be viewed as not being able to achieve Buddhahood. If my guess is correct, the late-Ming commentators were so fortunate in not having access to CWSLS that they were free to ignore the theory of “five seed-nature” without any tradition or orthodox burden.

### 5-3-2 Many Faces of Syncretism

The richness and the diversity of the syncretism that occurs in the CWSL commentarial tradition rebuilt by the late-Ming commentators is much more than what the over-simplistic cliché “nature-characteristics syncretism” (性相通融) could cover. To highlight many possible faces of the syncretism that were emerging as discussed in Chapter 4, I will just recap five interesting case studies as below. As these case studies reveal, many possible faces of syncretism refer not only to different faces of different commentators. Even the same commentator could have different faces. For example, Zhixu could wear either the face of Tiantai or the face of Pure Lands, or the face of Huayan in different situations. On the other hand, Tongrun could show different faces in one situation.

The first case study is found in the Aspect of Mental Activity to Perceive 行相門 where there are four theories being discussed: theory of one aspect, theory of two aspects, theory of three aspects and theory of four aspects. We find that the late-Ming commentators had different strategies to syncretize different theories.

Both Mingyu and Tongrun understood “thusness” as “witnessing-self-witnessing aspect” (證自證分). Furthermore, Tongrun concluded that CWSL’s syncretic commentary is about “subsuming the characteristics back into nature” (攝相歸性). However, Dahui talked about neither consciousness-only nor one mind nor “subsuming the characteristics back into nature”. Instead, inspired by WKWD, he advocated that different theories are for different audiences so each theories are all appropriate. It seem a kind of mutuality model or pluralism by different audiences.<sup>649</sup> Thus it is not because “subsuming the characteristics back into nature” justified

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<sup>649</sup> Knitter, *Introducing Theologies of Religion*, pp.107-69.



having different theories. It is because different theories are appropriate for certain audiences on their own right.

Furthermore, it seems that Zhixu intended to use Tiantai phrases/concepts to interpret “one mind” and use Tiantai’s Perfect Teaching” (圓教) to syncretize the different theories. The phrase “one single color or one single perfume is nothing but the middle way” (一色一香，無非中道) and the phrase “color-only, perfume-only” (唯色、唯香) are both based on the concept of “three thousand worlds in a single thought” (一念三千) and “being inherent in nature” (性具). In particular, the idea of “color-only, perfume-only” makes it possible that all kinds of “seen aspect” and “seeing aspect” can include each other, penetrate into each other, exist all over each other, and interfuse each other. This is Tiantai’s Perfect Teaching. Thus, in this specific case, Zhixu definitely should be positioned as an advocate of Tiantai school instead of a Chan practitioner who advocates *Lengyan jing* as Sheng Yen suggested. (See discussion in Chapter 2 Internal Related contexts)

In addition, in CWSLS Kuiji tried to syncretize mind, mental factors, forms, thusness, and four kinds of theory of aspects all together by the concept of “Not separated from consciousness” (Ch. *bu li shi* 不離識). Now if the concept of “consciousness-only” sounded like an exclusive replacement model that tends to replace everything with consciousness only, the concept of “not separated from consciousness” would sound like an more inclusive fulfillment model that allows those four kinds of phenomena to have their own places and to fulfill their individual functions as long as “not separated from consciousness” is still honored. (See discussion in Chapter 4 Section 4-4-2-2-2)

The second case study is found in Aspect of Association 相應門 regarding “Volition” (Ch. *si* 思; Skt. *cetanā*). Here we see that Tongrun expanded his explanation by not only quoting *Zhuanshi lun* 轉識論, but also quoting Analects of Confucius 論語 and *Zhongyong* 中庸. The latter quote is really a surprising syncretism because Tongrun tried to quote the Confucian canon to explicate Buddhist text.

However, Wang Kentang, both as the holder of *jin shi* 進士—the highest academic degree in Confucianism based imperial examination, and as the late-Ming commentator who quoted Tongrun the most, did not follow suit but took it with a grain of salt. Why? I suppose that Tongrun’s quotes “don’t think in an incorrect way” (思無邪) and “think three times before doing anything” (三思而行) from the Analects of Confucius and “thinking carefully” (慎思之) from the *Zhongyong* all focus too much on the positive quality of volition. The same is true of the metaphor in *Zhuanshi lun* that volition as a horse rider to keep “attention” (作意) stay in the right

path. Although Wang also quoted *Zhuanshi lun*, Wang first quoted *Xian yang lun* 顯揚論 to emphasize the indeterminate quality of volition. This seemed to remind Dahui and Zhixu that the five mental factors that are always associated with the eighth consciousness have to be “unobstructed and indeterminate” (無覆無記). Thus, they no longer even quoted the metaphor of *Zhuanshi lun* but only tried to draw attention to the fact that volition have three possible directions to go: positive, negative, and neither positive nor negative. This is the case in order to show that the syncretism may not necessarily be a slogan for all but a process of selective borrowings based on commentators’ different understanding and judgements.

The third case study is found in Aspect of Suppression-Extinction Stages 伏斷位次門 regarding whether to discard or not to discard the eighth consciousness. We see that Zhixu tried to read the concepts of “pure land” and “one vehicle” into CWSL.

Zhixu first borrowed the notion of “pure land” to argue that there is no way for the sages of Two Vehicles to enter into “extinction without remainder” (無餘依涅槃) in which their “body and wisdom are both eliminated” (身智俱泯). This is because the sages of Two Vehicles would only end up being born into pure lands in a “dharma-nature body” (法性身) even though they decided to discard maturing consciousness and enter into extinction without remainder. I believe Zhixu borrowed this idea from *Guan wu liang shou fo jing shu* 觀無量壽佛經疏 (*Commentary on the Sutra of the Meditation on the Buddha of Immeasurable Life*) that was attributed to Zhiyi. Furthermore, Zhixu argued that in this way, the sages of Two Vehicle would eventually attain “undefiled consciousness” (無垢識) which applies only to the “ground of *tathāgata*” (如來地) because there is one Buddha Vehicle only. He quoted *Fa hua jing* 法華經 (*Sutra of the Lotus of the Wonderful Dharma*) as support for his position.

On the contrary, CWSL’s seed theory is based on theory of five seed-nature which is definitely not to promote One Vehicle. Moreover, CWSL did mention that the sages of Two Vehicles do have the option that body and wisdom are both eliminated. What CWSL maintains is just that undefiled consciousness is never discarded because the desire or the responsibility to bring benefits and joy to sentient beings never comes to an end. Or because Mahāyāna followers would choose never entering into extinction as CWSLS put it. Thus, whether or not to discard undefiled consciousness is a matter of choice, not of destiny as Zhixu tried to argue. Mingyu also argued that undefiled consciousness is never discarded. However, his reasoning is not a matter of choice but a kind of essentialism- because its substance is undefiled dharmas. Both Mingyu and Zhixu were pro Buddha-nature and against the theory of

five seed-nature. The difference is that Zhixu found a gap and tried to fill the gap by borrowing the concepts of Pure lands and One Vehicle to redefine the concept of undefiled consciousness in CWSL. The gap is that, if one did not accept the option that body and wisdom are both eliminated, where would those sages of Two Vehicles end up after they managed to get out of cyclic existence? No matter if we agree with Zhixu or not, that is one of his syncretic interpretations.

The fourth case study is also found in the in Aspect of Suppression-Extinction Stages. This is regarding how to interpret the eighth consciousness in “the stage of cause/practice” (因中) and “the stage of realization” (果中). Here we see some unique ways that Tongrun answered some formidable questions.

For example, being neither virtuous nor unvirtuous in the stage of cause/practice, the eighth consciousness can be associated with indifferent sensation. When the eighth consciousness is associated with virtuous mental factors in the stage of realization, how could it be only associated with indifferent sensation? The answer provided by CWSL is that the eighth consciousness in an uncontaminated state is always “turning effortlessly” (任運) and equally. However, does such a response really answer the question? Tongrun tried to answer it differently by using Chan poetry-like interpretation: Buddha in the stage of realization conduct all those virtues like “the echoes responding in empty valley” (空谷答響) and “the spring carving and painting the natural” (春工肖物). They are equally done without attachment so it can be associated with indifferent sensation. Was this an adequate answer? At least Wang Kentang accepted and quoted it.

Another question is that why is the eighth consciousness in an uncontaminated state associated with the five "object-specific mental factors" (別境心所) and eleven "virtuous mental factors" (善心所) but not with the “primary and secondary afflictions” (根隨煩惱)? We see Tongrun replaces the CWSL explanation with several well-known phrases from different sources. For instance, Tongrun borrows the phrase “the very reason why pines are straight and brambles are curved is fully understood” (松直、棘曲，皆了元由故) from *Lengyan jing* to explain why it is associated with the “wisdom-mental factor” (慧心所). However, the phrase’s original context is when Buddha says he knows where everything comes from when he is teaching the principle of “when six knots are untied one disappears” (六解一亡) and suggesting choosing one of six faculties to untie first. For another example, Tongrun borrows the phrase “myriad phenomena are the seal of one dharma (i.e. myriad phenomena are mental impressions or intuitive assurances of one mind)” (森羅萬像，一法所印) from the biography of Mazu Daoyi 馬祖道一 to explain why it is associated with the “firm conviction-mental factor” (勝解心所). However, the

original context is Mazu Daoyi's famous teaching: "what the mind is, what the Buddha is" (即心即佛). Is it appropriate for Tongrun to draw the analogy between the original contexts behind these special phrases and mental factors? It seemed not acceptable to the rest of late-Ming commentators because no one quoted this kind of explanation. One contemporary Buddhist scholar Qian Qianyi 錢謙益 even openly criticized Tongrun for arbitrarily borrowing the Chan school's teachings and cases (公案) to verify scriptures and for doctrinal study. But here we see Tongrun borrowed more than the phrases of Chan school and of "School of Nature" (性宗). He also borrowed the phrase from *Apidamo jushe lun* as well. It seems that Tongrun tried to make the best use of whatever that was available in his syncretic toolbox in order to interpret the eighth consciousness in an uncontaminated state.

I do not intend to speak for Tongrun. However, with the formidable gap between lacking personal experiences and enough prescriptive manuals of Buddhahood for situations like the eighth consciousness in the stage of realization, would the audiences be satisfied with prescriptive or normative rhetoric? Might Tongrun's syncretic and poetry-like interpretations be appreciated as a better way of knowing?

The fifth case study is found in Aspect of Cause-Effect Metaphor 因果法喻門 regarding how to interpret normal cause and effect. All late-Ming commentators are fully aware that, from the perspective of consciousness-only, cause and effect are nothing but nominal constructs. However, after negating cause and effect, the possible dilemma is how to explain "function" that is too real to deny.

Tongrun's strategy seemed to accommodate two competing theories. He argued that the theory of simultaneous cause and effect is good to apply to mental activities while the theory of three times might not necessarily be bad to apply to forms. On the other hand, Wang Kentang's strategy is to address the dilemma with equivocal rhetoric—"neither cause nor non-cause" (非因非不因) and "neither effect nor non-effect" (非果非不果)—which he borrowed indirectly from CWSLS through ZJL. Although CWSLS's interpretation sounds equivocal, it seemed to have resolved the dilemma to a certain degree. Saying that cause and effect are not existent at all is one thing whereas saying that cause and effect are ineffable is another thing. The former is an ontological problem while the latter is an epistemological problem.

If "function" is something too real to deny whereas real cause and effect are ineffable, could nominal cause and effect be taken as an epistemological limitation? Dahui's plain explanation seemed to say that Small Vehicle Buddhists are not aware of any epistemological limitation with so called cause and effect whereas Great Vehicle Buddhists fully recognize the epistemological limitation of those nominal cause and effect and choose to live with that.

In addition, it seems that the dilemma that Tongrun and Wang Kentang tried to deal with never came to Zhixu's mind or troubled him. In his commentary, Zhixu seemed to ignore and downplay the consciousness's epistemological problem but highlighted whatever our mind might achieve through mediation. This time he borrowed a phrase "from ten generations ago to now nothing is different from current thought all the time" (十世古今，始終不離於當念) from Huayan school to conclude that there is neither past nor future and that cause and effect are nominal. However, the original text of the phrase is that Buddha, who in the state of realization, manifests his previous practices done in innumerable *kalpas* only in one thought in the state of concentration. Whether Zhixu's association and analogy is appropriate or not is another matter. What is clear in this case may be the way how Zhixu was striving for the combination of doctrinal study and meditation practice.

### 5-3-3 Wang Kentang's Unique Way of Reusing Text

The review of internal related contexts in Chapter 2 shows that Wang Kentang played a key important role of facilitator to make Mingyu's LMC#1, Tongrun's LMC#2 and his own work LMC#3 to publish or publish sooner. Moreover, some unique textual features of LMC#3 also function like a bridge or a focal point to help us better understand the intertextuality among all late-Ming commentaries.

First of all, LMC#3 has both the highest citation rate at 75% and within-group citation rate at 26%. This means that approximately 50% of LMC#3 text is the bridge to assess the external intertextuality while one fourth of LMC#3 is the window to evaluate the internal intertextuality within the late-Ming group.

Second, the citation type analysis indicates that Explicit Complete/ Quasi-Complete Citation Type [ECQC] and Implicit Complete/ Quasi-Complete Citation Type [ICQC] together accounts for almost 75% of total quotation count of LMC3# text (See Table 22). Such a huge amount of complete quotations provide not only valuable clues on where those fragmented quotations of other late-Ming commentators might come from, but also shed light on how their commentaries might have developed over time. (See Chapter 4 4-4-5-2-3).

Third, the case study of LMC#3's longest quotation of ZJL in Chapter 4 Section 4-3-3-3-4-1 shows that even the so called Dharmapāla correct view might invite more follow-up questions and discussions. Both Tongrun and Zhixu selectively quoted only some portions of ZJL while Wang Kentang made an over 900 Chinese characters long quote. I am curious as to why Wang felt the need make such a long quote. However, what I do know is that Wang's long quote showed us a much more complicated story than what Tongrun and Zhixu's short quotes could uncover.

Fourth, the case study in Chapter 4 4-4-5-2-3 regarding four phrases by

“transformation of direct cause” and “transformation of discrimination” indicates how the late-Ming commentators might quote something in common and something selective on their own. Without Wang’s longer and more complete quote, it would be hard for us to identify what the late-Ming commentators share in common, where they are different and how their commentary strategies develop.

Moreover, some people in modern time might tend to suspect Wang Kentang of plagiarism when they find him using frequent, long and word-by-word quotations in LMC#3. I am afraid such suspicion might run the risk of anachronism as this was a common practice at the time.<sup>650</sup> The analysis of citation types in Chapter 3 3-2-2-2 shows that all implicit citations account for approximately 85% of all late-Ming commentators’ citations. (See Table 22). Even taking out Wang Kentang, all implicit citations still account for over 80% in terms of quote frequency and over 70% in terms of quote count for the rest of late-Ming commentators. In other words, all late-Ming commentators who lived in the pre-modern world tended to reuse the available texts as their own materials without too much concern with authorship. What distinguishes Wang Kentang from the rest of late-Ming commentators is that Wang had the tendency of “philological scholarship” (考證學). In other words, he put forth great effort to collect, read and make notes on a huge amount of materials. (See Chapter 2 Internal Related Contexts)

In addition, we don’t know whether or not other commentarial traditions would have such high implicit citation rate as we observe in the late-Ming CWSL commentarial tradition. If yes, for those researchers who work on comparing philosophical ideas between commentators, the implication of high implicit citation rate is that they would need to identify those implicit citations and their sources first prior to their main analysis. Otherwise, the integrity of their comparison results might be in jeopardy.

#### **5-4 Liberation of Diversity**

Since Xuanzang finished his great pilgrim to India and came back to China in 645 CE, his translation project had been fully sponsored by Tang Emperor Taizong and Emperor Gaozong and was centralized under his supervision. Nevertheless, in the early period of translation his translation project did not lack of differing opinions on how to go about translating the materials he brought back. Because those senior and experienced scholar monks who were recruited by imperial state to support Xuanzang’s translation did not necessarily accept the new translation /teaching

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<sup>650</sup> See Freschi, "The Reuse of Texts in Indian Philosophy: Introduction," p.99. And Freschi and Cantwell, "Introduction: Reuse and Intertextuality in the Context of Buddhist Texts," p.2.

introduced by Xuanzang and became his followers.<sup>651</sup> It was not until the later period of translation when his direct and talented disciple Kuiji became capable and solely in charge of some translations. Then, the new Yogācāra teaching that Xuanzang inherited from Śīlabhadra had the chance to form a school. The compiled translation of CWSL that was done in 659 CE marks the convergence toward the formation of Faxiang school. Unfortunately, right after Xuanzang passed away, the imperial sponsorship stopped, the centralized translation organization dissolved and Faxiang School did not last long in China.

When it comes to Buddhist policy in the early Ming, Emperor Zhu Yuanzhang ordered all temples and monks be classified into “meditation” (禪), “lecture” (講) and “ritual” (教). This created divisions and reinforced the tension between “meditation” and “lecture”. Then, in the mid-Ming period, Wang Yangming’s school of mind in Confucianism liberated the Confucian gentry in the Ming from the school of principle and at the same time encouraged other religious followers like Buddhists to pursue as many syncretized forms of faith as they wished. If Wang Yangming had swung the pendulum from “following the path of inquiry and study” (道問學) to the climax of “honoring the moral nature” (尊德性) or from intellectualism to the climax of anti-intellectualism in the mid-Ming, the pendulum would only swung back toward intellectualism in the late-Ming. The sophisticated scholasticism of consciousness-only study turned out to be the Buddhist intellectualism philosophy that was able to revive in this transition period in the late-Ming.

Moreover, the champion this time was no longer one single eminent and authoritative monk like Xuanzang who was leading a centralized monastery that was fully sponsored by the imperial house. The study of Buddhism and the formation of gentry society in the late-Ming, of *Jushi chuan* 居士傳 (Biographies of Buddhist lay devotees), and of the project to print *Jiaying Cang* 嘉興藏 (*Jiaying* version of the Buddhist Canon) all show that the champion and the sponsorship were the collaboration of the gentry and decentralized monks. The gentry and monks relied on each other, competed with each other and redefined their positions and authorities with each other.

Therefore, in contrast to Kuiji’s drive for reducing diverse voices in making “compiled translation” of the CWSL during the Tang Dynasty, the late-Ming commentators rebuilt the lost CWSL commentarial tradition in the opposite way. They not only added back those “*weishi gu xue*” (唯識古學, the early consciousness-only doctrine) related diversity that Kuiji tried to get rid of. But they also added their contemporary diversity in both *weishi gu xue* and “*weishi jin xue*” (唯識今學, the

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<sup>651</sup> See Yang, “*Zhong Guo Wei Shi Zong Tong Shi*” 中國唯識宗通史, p.600. And Lu, “*Zhong Guo Fo Xue Yuan Liu Lue Lun*” 中國佛學源流略論, pp. 503-05.

later consciousness-only doctrine). Nevertheless, there is no such thing as “nature-characteristics **synthesis**” but “nature-characteristics **syncretism**”. The former means that the blending of “School of Nature” (性宗) and “School of Characteristics” (相宗) results in new Buddhist school or a new religion. However, this did not happen. According to my study, when the late-Ming commentators tried to rebuild CWSL commentarial tradition without Tang commentaries, they accidentally reinvented CWSL commentaries by adding back elements of the early consciousness-only doctrine and added on their contemporary diversity (See *Many Faces of Syncretism* for examples). In the meantime, School of Nature in late-Ming was no longer the one before the late-Ming commentators rebuilt the CWSL commentarial tradition, either. Because, in the process of rebuilding a CWSL commentarial tradition, a standalone and systematic teaching of School of Characteristics re-emerged in the late-Ming. The newly rebuilt CWSL commentarial tradition brought back tremendous elements of School of Characteristics and added much more elements of School of Characteristics to the blending of School of Characteristics and School of Nature than the other way around. In addition, there are other elements that were unique to the late-Ming like the diverse Buddhist social network and thinking in which many different versions of the late-Ming CWSL commentaries were embedded.

The liberation of diversity, i.e. the release of the growing diversity, was both the cause and the effect of the reinvention of CWSL commentarial tradition in the late-Ming. The diversity is more than between “honoring the moral nature” and “following the path of inquiry and study”, or between intellectualism and anti-intellectualism, or between the early consciousness-only doctrine and the later consciousness-only doctrine, or between School of Characteristics and School of Nature. What might be more fascinating, or irritating, is that the diversity that is found in the forms of either assimilation or dissolution within each category blurred the boundaries that were originally supposed to be clear. This resulted in an increase in the tension between the early consciousness-only doctrine and the later consciousness-only doctrine, or School of Characteristics and School of Nature and created opportunities to redefine the consciousness-only tradition.



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## Appendix 1: Citations Sources and Types by Aspects and by LMCs

### 1. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of “Self-characteristics” 自相門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T45n1865-002	ICQC	23	X55n888-001	IPC	108	LMC#1-002	ICQC	39	X55n888-001	IPC	90	X55n888-001	IPC	107
2				T48n2016-047	ICC	97	X55n888-001	IPC	124	LMC#2-002	IPC	25	CWSL-003	ICQC	12
3				T45n1865-002	ICC	8	X55 n890-001	ICQC	22	CWSL-003	ICQC	8	T30n1579-051	ESC	59
4				T48n2016-047	IPC	108	T48n2016-047	ICC	106						
5				T48n2016-050	ICQC	17	LMC#2-002	ICC	12						
6				T31n1602-017	ICQC	323	T48n2016-047	ICQC	122						
7				CWSL	ECQC	8	LMC#2-002	ICQC	19						
8							T31n1597-002	ECQC	87						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			23			669			531			123			178
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			70			25			0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>517</b>			<b>965</b>			<b>792</b>			<b>343</b>			<b>586</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			4%			69%			67%			36%			30%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			9%			7%			0%

### 2. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of “Characteristics as an Effect” 果相門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	N/A		0	T31n1597-002	ECQC	31	LMC#2-002	ICQC	118	X55n888-001	IPC	9	T48n2016-051	ECQC	53
2							T31n1597-002	ECQC	35						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			0			31			153			9			53
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			118			0			0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>118</b>			<b>174</b>			<b>176</b>			<b>141</b>			<b>195</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			0%			18%			87%			6%			27%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			67%			0%			0%

### 3. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of “Characteristics as a Cause” 因相門

#### 3-1 Brief of“Characteristics as a Cause”

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T36n1736-038	ISC	8	T31n1597-002	ICQC	32	LMC#1-002	ICQC	54	X55 n888-001	IPC	5	T48n2016-051	ESC	102
2							T31n1597-002	ECQC	47						
3							T31n1595-002	ECQC	25						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			8			32			126			5			102
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			54			0			0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>116</b>			<b>81</b>			<b>220</b>			<b>116</b>			<b>232</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			7%			40%			57%			4%			44%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			25%			0%			0%

#### 3-2 What is Seed?

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T48n2016-047	ESC	108	X55n888-001	IPC	24	X55n888-001	ICQC	18	X55n888-001	IPC	20	LMC#3-002	ICC	27
2	T35n1735-003	ICC	7	T48n2016-047	ISC	109	T31n1597-002	ECQC	13				LMC#2-002	ICC	15
3	CWSL-001	ICC	7	LMC#1-002	ECQC	17	T48n2016-047	ICQC	135						
4	T29n1558-002	IPC	28	T48n2016-048	ECQC	27	LMC#1-002	ICQC	21						
5				T29n1559-002	IPC	35	LMC#1-002	ISC	53						
6							LMC#1-002	ISC	33						
7							LMC#1-002	ISC	40						
8							T48n2016-048	ICQC	133						
9							LMC#1-002	ISC	151						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			150			212			597			20			42
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			17			298			0			42
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>875</b>			<b>729</b>			<b>894</b>			<b>651</b>			<b>665</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			17%			29%			67%			3%			6%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			2%			33%			0%			6%

3-3-1 Theory of Seeds being Originally Existent Only

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T36n1736-041	ISC	8	T36n1736-041	ISC	8	LMC#1-002	ICC	8	LMC#2-002	IPC	14	X08n236-023	ISC	23	
2	T48n2016-090	ISC	17	T16n670-001	ESC	208	LMC#2-002	ICC	18	T11n310-038	ISC	7	T30n1579-013	ICQC	17	
3	T35n1735-43	ISC	17	LMC#1-002	ICQC	25	LMC#2-002	ICQC	13	LMC#2-002	IPC	52	LMC#2-002	ICC	12	
4							LMC#1-002	ICQC	28				LMC#4-002	ICC	12	
5							LMC#2-002	ICQC	32							
6							LMC#1-002	ISC	14							
7							LMC#1-002	ICQC	44							
8							LMC#1-002	ISC	15							
9							LMC#2-002	ICQC	208							
10							T33n1705-001	ISC	57							
11							LMC#1-002	ICQC	23							
12							LMC#2-002	ICQC	72							
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			42				241				532				73	64
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				25				475				66	24
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>465</b>				<b>420</b>				<b>674</b>				<b>366</b>	<b>379</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			9%				57%				79%				20%	17%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				6%				70%				18%	6%

3-3-2 Theory of Seeds being New Permeations Only

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T36n1736-041	ISC	6	T36n1736-041	ISC	8	LMC#2-002	ISC	14	LMC#1-002	IPC	16	CWSL-008	ESC	28	
2	CWSL-008	ISC	12	CWSL-008	ISC	57	T48n2016-048	ICQC	76	T16n670-001	ICC	3	LMC#4-002	ICQC	10	
3	T31n1598-003	ESC	72	T17n 842-001	ESC	200	LMC#2-002	ICQC	13	T30n1579-021	ICC	24				
4	T32n1657-001	ISC	40				T48n2016-048	ICQC	161							
5	CWSL-010	ISC	15				LMC#2-002	ICQC	34							
6							T32n1657-001	ECQC	207							
7							LMC#1-002	ISC	156							
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			145				265				661				43	38
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				217				16	10
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>689</b>				<b>450</b>				<b>851</b>				<b>454</b>	<b>459</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			21%				59%				78%				9%	8%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				25%				4%	2%

3-3-3 Theory of Seeds being both Innate and Newly Permeated

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T36n1736-041	ISC	4	T36n1736-041	ISC	4	LMC#1-002	ISC	4	X55n890-001	ISC	18	T48n2016-048	ECQC	73
2				T48n2016-048	ISC	44	T30n1579-035	ESC	127	LMC#2-002	ICC	14	LMC#2-002	ICQC	10
3				T48n2016-048	IPC	47	T48n2016-048	ICQC	907	T48n2016-088	ICC	11	T48n2016-048	ECQC	82
4				T48n2016-048	ISC	30	T48n2016-048	ICQC	73	T31n1598-003	ESC	26			
5				T31n1597-002	ICQC	52	T31n1598-002	ICQC	135						
6							T31n1597-002	ICC	27						
7							LMC#2-002	ICC	27						
8							T31n1598-002	ICQC	40						
9							T48n2016-048	ICQC	137						
10							LMC#2-002	ICQC	68						
11							LMC#2-002	ICQC	19						
12							LMC#1-002	ISC	46						
13							LMC#2-002	IPC	18						
14							LMC#2-002	ICQC	79						
15							T48n2016-048	ICQC	34						
16							LMC#2-002	ICQC	105						
17							LMC#2-002	ICC	121						
18							T36n1736-041	ICC	8						
19							LMC#1-002	ICC	46						
20							LMC#1-002	ICQC	35						
21							LMC#1-002	ISC	27						
22							LMC#2-002	ICQC	52						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			4			177			2135			69			165
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			647			14			10
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>2248</b>			<b>2124</b>			<b>3334</b>			<b>1998</b>			<b>1962</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			0%			8%			64%			3%			8%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			19%			1%			1%

3-4 Implications of Seeds

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T31n1594-001	ECQC	34	X55n888-001	IPC	43	T31n1598-002	ICQC	12	X55n888-001	ISC	22	X55n888-001	IPC	16	
2	T31n1598-002	ECQC	40	X55n888-001	IPC	32	X55n888-001	ICQC	46	T31n1598-002	IPC	43	X55n888-001	ISC	6	
3	T31n1598-002	ECQC	28	T31n1598-002	ESC	12	X55n888-001	ISC	53	X55n888-001	ISC	24				
4	T31n1598-002	ECQC	20	X55n888-001	ICQC	46	T31n1598-002	ECQC	51							
5	T31n1598-002	IPC	76	T31no1597-002	ECQC	41	T48n2016-048	ISC	73							
6	T31n1598-002	ECQC	108	X55n888-001	ISC	60	CWSL-002	ECQC	21							
7				X55n888-001	ICQC	30	CWSL-002	ECQC	21							
8				X55n888-001	IPC	35	T31n1597-002	ECQC	40							
9				T31n1597-002	ECQC	27	X55n888-001	ISC	56							
10				X55n888-001	ICQC	30	T31n1595-002	ECQC	46							
11				X55n888-001	ISC	63	X55n888-001	ICQC	155							
12				T31n1597-002	ECQC	43	T31n1597-002	ECQC	31							
13				T31n1597-002	ECQC	126	X55n888-001	ISC	127							
14				T31n1595-002	ECQC	78	X55n888-001	ISC	44							
15				T31n1598-002	ECQC	80	X55n888-001	ICQC	57							
16							LMC#2-002	ISC	46							
17							T31n1597-002	ICC	24							
18							T31n1598-002	ICC	43							
19							T31n1595-002	ICC	134							
20							LMC#2-002	ICQC	33							
21							T31n1598-002	ICQC	77							
22							T31n1598-002	ICQC	36							
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			306				746				1226				89	22
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				79				0	0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>1002</b>				<b>1645</b>				<b>1656</b>				<b>1168</b>	<b>1260</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			31%				45%				74%				8%	2%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				5%				0%	0%

### 3-5 Implications of Permeations

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
#1	T48n2016-048	ISC	40	T31n1594-001	ECQC	107	T48n2016-048	ICQC	32	T48n2016-048	ISC	29	LMC#4-002	IPC	10
#2	T48n2016-048	IPC	54	X55n888-001	IPC	87	X55n888-001	IPC	16	T48n2016-048	ISC	9	T48n2016-048	ICQC	24
#3				T48n2016-048	ISC	120	X55n888-001	IPC	16	T48n2016-048	ISC	8	T48n2016-048	IPC	25
#4				T48n2016-048	ISC	170	T48n2016-048	ICQC	47				T48n2016-048	IPC	38
#5				T48n2016-048	ISC	72	T36n1736-032	ICQC	109						
#6				T48n2016-048	ISC	98	T48n2016-048	ICQC	202						
#7				T48n2016-048	ISC	83	T48n2016-048	ICQC	288						
#8				X55n888-001	ISC	37	T48n2016-048	ICQC	237						
#9				X55n888-001	ISC	132	T48n2016-048	ISC	37						
#10				X55n888-001	ISC	87	T48n2016-048	ISC	79						
#11				T48n2016-048	ICQC	109	X55n888-001	IPC	13						
#12				T48n2016-048	ISC	78	T48n2016-048	ICQC	184						
#13				T48n2016-071	ISC	19	X55n888-001	IPC	31						
#14				T48n2016-071	ICQC	21	T36n1736-032	ISC	34						
#15				T48n2016-071	ICQC	36	T48n2016-048	ICQC	51						
#16				X55n888-001	ISC	158	T36n1736-032	IPC	24						
#17				T48n2016-048	ISC	159	T48n2016-048	ICQC	121						
#18							X55n888-001	ICQC	203						
#19							X55n888-001	ICQC	206						
#20							T48n2016-048	ISC	55						
#21							T31n1597-002	ECQC	143						
#22							LMC#2-002	ICQC	17						
#23							LMC#1-002	ICQC	40						
#24							LMC#1-002	ICQC	32						
#25							T48n2016-051	ICQC	128						
#26							X55n888-002	IPC	48						
#27							X55n888-002	IPC	31						
#28							X55n888-001	ECQC	103						
#29							X55n888-001	ICQC	36						
#30							X55n888-001	IPC	85						
#31							X55n888-001	IPC	203						
#32							X55n888-001	IPC	173						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			94			1573			3024			46			97
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			89			0			10
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>910</b>			<b>2585</b>			<b>3667</b>			<b>1066</b>			<b>1254</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			10%			61%			82%			4%			8%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			2%			0%			1%



4. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Mental Activity to Perceive" 行相門  
 4-0 Brief Summary of Mental Activity To Perceive and Object of Perception

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T48n2016-049	IPC	93	X55n 888-001	ICQC	16	T36n1736-042	ICQC	31	X55n 888-001	ICQC	28	LMC#2-002	ISC	4	
2				X55n 888-001	IPC	18	LMC#1-002	ISC	36	T48n2016-049	ISC	54	X55n 888-001	ICQC	27	
3				T48n2016-049	ISC	245	LMC#2-002	ICQC	138				LMC#2-002	IPC	16	
4							T48n2016-049	ICQC	457				T48n2016-049	ISC	51	
5							LMC#2-002	ICQC	47							
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			93				279				709				82	98
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				221				0	20
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>431</b>				<b>620</b>				<b>829</b>				<b>470</b>	<b>346</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			22%				45%				86%				17%	28%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				27%				0%	6%



4-1 Extensively Explicating “Mental activity to perceive”

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T36n1736-033	IPC	17	T48n2016-060	ISC	116	T36n1736-033	ICQC	22	T48n2016-060	IPC	12	T36n1736-033	IPC	38
2	T48n2016-060	ICQC	75	T48n2016-060	ICQC	82	T48n2016-060	ICQC	366	X55n890-001	ISC	9	T48n2016-060	IPC	33
3	T48n2016-060	ICQC	80	T48n2016-060	ISC	81	T48n2016-060	ICQC	64	X55n888-001	IPC	24	LMC#2-002	IPC	32
4	T48n2016-047	ECQC	21				T48n2016-060	ICQC	354				T36n1736-033	IPC	62
5	T48n2016-060	ECQC	25				T48n2016-060	IPC	44				T48n2016-060	ECQC	258
6							T36n1736-033	IPC	315				T48n2016-061	ECQC	38
7							T48n2016-060	ICQC	82				T33n1716-001	ISC	8
8							T36n1736-033	ISC	30				T37n1751-001	ISC	5
9							LMC#2-002	ICQC	279						
10							T36n1736-033	ICQC	151						
11							T48n2016-060	ICQC	188						
12							T36n1736-033	ISC	101						
13							T48n2016-060	ICQC	76						
14							T36n1736-033	ICC	59						
15							T48n2016-060	ICC	58						
16							LMC#1-002	ISC	36						
17							T48n2016-070	ICQC	32						
18							T48n2016-060	ECQC	80						
19							T36n1736-033	ICC	77						
20							T48n2016-060	ICC	76						
21							T48n2016-060	ICQC	72						
22							T48n2016-060	ICQC	45						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			218			279			2607			45			474
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			315						32
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>1817</b>			<b>2148</b>			<b>2970</b>			<b>1609</b>			<b>2364</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			12%			13%			88%			3%			20%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			11%			0%			1%

5. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of “Object of Perception” 所緣門  
 5-1 Explicating the External Objects

Item	LMC#1				LMC#2				LMC#3				LMC#4				LMC#5							
1	T48n2016-049	ISC		83	T48n2016-049	ICQC		44	LMC#1-002	ICQC		6	X55n888-002	ICQC		16	T48n2016-049	IPC		7				
2					T10n279-050	ECQC		33	LMC#1-002	ICQC		73	T29n1558-012	ISC		7	T48n2016-049	IPC		16				
3					T53n2122-002	ISC		20	T48n2016-049	ICQC		112	T29n1558-012	ICQC		20	T48n2016-062	ESC		93				
4					T30n1579-002	ISC		16	T48n2016-049	ICQC		93	T29n1558-011	ICQC		20								
5					T36n1739-027	ISC		9	T48n2016-049	ICQC		10	T31n1606-005	ICQC		22								
6					T19n945-004	ICC		8	T48n2016-049	ICQC		101												
7					T48n2016-077	ICC		8	LMC#2-002	ICQC		14												
8					LMC#1-002	IPC		16	LMC#2-002	ICQC		45												
9									LMC#2-002	ICQC		120												
10									X57n972-002	ECQC		93												
11									LMC#1-002	ICQC		26												
<b>Citation Total=A</b>				83					154					693					85					116
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>				0					16					284					0					0
<b>Section Total=C</b>				<b>640</b>					<b>1079</b>					<b>1153</b>					<b>875</b>					<b>675</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>				13%					14%					60%					7%					17%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>				0%					1%					25%					0%					0%

5-2 Explicating the Internal Objects

Item	LMC#1				LMC#2				LMC#3				LMC#4				LMC#5							
1	T31n1598-002	ECQC		24	X55n888-001	ICQC		8	LMC#1-002	ISC		35	T33n1702-006	IPC		16	LMC#2-002	IPC		7				
2	T31n1598-002	ECQC		140	X55n888-002	ISC		8	LMC#1-002	ICQC		60	T48n2016-049	IPC		15	LMC#2-002	IPC		9				
3	T31n1598-002	ISC		31	T48n2016-049	ISC		23	T48n2016-049	ICQC		102												
4									LMC#2-002	ICQC		57												
5									T48n2016-049	ICQC		59												
6									LMC#2-002	ICQC		90												
7									T48n2016-049	ICQC		70												
8									LMC#2-002	ICQC		28												
<b>Citation Total=A</b>				195					39					501					31					16
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>				0					0					270					0					16
<b>Section Total=C</b>				<b>575</b>					<b>579</b>					<b>762</b>					<b>385</b>					<b>365</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>				34%					7%					66%					8%					4%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>				0%					0%					35%					0%					4%

### 5-3 Clarification and Summary

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T48n2016-049	ISC	80	T48n2016-049	ISC	27	LMC#2-002	ICQC	235	LMC#1-002	IPC	8	LMC#4-002	ISC	10	
2	T48n2016-049	ISC	16				LMC#2-002	ICQC	43	LCM#2-001	IPC	7	LMC#4-002	ICQC	9	
3							T48n2016-049	ICQC	395	X55n888-001	IPC	16	LMC#4-002	ISC	25	
4							LMC#2-002	ICQC	202	X55n888-001	ICQC	20	T48n2016-049	ECQC	109	
5										T48n2016-068	ICQC	23	LMC#4-002	IPC	14	
6										T48n2016-049	ISC	38				
7										T30n1579-051	ICQC	68				
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			96				27				875				180	167
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				480				15	58
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>635</b>				<b>707</b>				<b>933</b>				<b>727</b>	<b>696</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			15%				4%				94%				25%	24%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				51%				2%	8%

### 6. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Incomprehensible" 不可知門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T31n1587-001	IPS	81	T30n1579-051	ICQC	65	LMC#2-002	ICQC	161	N/A	NA	0	N/A	N/A	0	
2				T30n1579-051	ICQC	14										
3				T16n670-001	ECQC	60										
4				T48n2016-047	ESC	425										
5				T48n2016-047	ESC	12										
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			81				576				161				0	0
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				161				0	0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>225</b>				<b>723</b>				<b>276</b>				<b>186</b>	<b>250</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			36%				80%				58%				0%	0%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				58%				0%	0%

7. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Association" 相應門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T48n2016-047	IPS	58	X11n267-003	ISC	4	T48n2016-047	ICQC	31	LMC#3-003	ISC	16	LMC#3-003	ISC	10
2	CWSL-005	ISC	12	T45n1865-001	ICQC	23	T48n2016-057	ISC	138	LCM#2-003	ICQC	45	T48n2016-047	ISC	7
3	T48n2016-047	ISC	5	T48n2016-047	ICQC	19	T48n2016-047	ICQC	45	LMC#3-003	ICQC	28	T48n2016-047	ISC	16
4	T31n1587-001	ECQC	13	T48n2016-047	ISC	25	T48n2016-047	ICQC	67	T48n2016-047	ISC	25	T48n2016-047	ISC	17
5				T48n2016-047	ISC	107	T30n1579-003	ESC	33	T48n2016-047	ISC	90	T48n2016-047	EPC	82
6				LMC#1-003	IPC	37	T48n2016-047	ECQC	134	LCM#2-003	IPC	46	LMC#3-003	IPC	25
7				T29n1558-001	ECQC	36	LMC#2-003	ICQC	88	T48n2016-057	IPC	20	LMC#2-003	IPC	33
8				T29n1558-001	IPC	58	LMC#1-003	ICQC	135	LMC#2-003	IPC	18	T19n945-008	ISC	11
9				T26n1540-001	ESC	36	T29 n1558-001	ECQC	36	X55n888-001	ICQC	12	LMC#2-003	IPC	17
10				T48n2016-047	ISC	17	LMC#2-003	ICQC	75	LCM#2-003	ICQC	37	LMC#3-003	IPC	5
11				T48n2016-057	ISC	109	LMC#1-003	ICQC	25	LMC#1-003	IPC	32	LMC#4-003	IPC	51
12				T16n670-004	ECQC	46	LMC#2-003	ICQC	144				T48n2016-047	ESC	42
13				T31n1587-001	ISC	51	LMC#1-003	ISC	24						
14							T48n2016-057	ICQC	176						
15							LMC#2-003	ISC	66						
16							LMC#2-003	ICQC	175						
17							LMC#2-003	ICQC	15						
18							LMC#2-003	IPC	110						
19							LMC#1-003	IPC	37						
20							T31n1602-001	ECQC	43						
21							T48n2016-047	IPC	44						
22							T31n1602-001	ICQC	71						
23							T31n1587-001	ICQC	69						
24							LCM#2-003	ICQC	64						
25							T48n2016-047	ICQC	93						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			88			568			1938			369			316
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			37			958			222			141
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>1640</b>			<b>1986</b>			<b>2721</b>			<b>2037</b>			<b>2074</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			5%			29%			71%			18%			15%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			2%			35%			11%			7%

8. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for the Aspect of “Indifferent Sensation” 受俱門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T48n2016-047	ISC	35	T48n2016-047	ISC	47	LMC#2-003	ICC	11	T48n2016-047	ISC	66	LMC#4-003	ICQC	4	
2	T48n2016-071	ISC	8	T48n2016-047	ICQC	165	LMC#1-003	ICC	61	T48n2016-071	ISC	7	T48n2016-047	ISC	94	
3				T48n2016-047	ICQC	55	T48n2016-047	ICC	233							
4							T48n2016-047	IPS	38							
5							LMC#2-003	ISC	48							
6							LMC#2-003	ICQC	46							
7							T48n2016-047	IPS	111							
8							LMC#2-003	ICQC	117							
9							T48n2016-047	ICQC	73							
10							LMC#2-003	ICQC	119							
Citation Total=A			43				267				857				73	98
Within-Group Citation=B			0				0				402				0	4
Section Total=C			<b>524</b>				<b>877</b>				<b>1025</b>				<b>632</b>	<b>548</b>
Section Total Citation Rate= A/C			8%				30%				84%				12%	18%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C			0%				0%				39%				0%	1%

9. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Three Natures" 三性門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	N/A	N/A	0	T48n2016-049	ICQC	125	CWSL-005	ISC	24	LMC#3-003	IPC	28	N/A	N/A	0	
2							CWSL-005	ICQC	20							
3							T48n2016-049	ICQC	55							
4							LMC#2-003	ISC	12							
5							T48n2016-049	ICQC	33							
6							LMC#2-003	ICQC	44							
7							T48n2016-049	ICQC	24							
8							LMC#2-003	ICQC	109							
9							T48n2016-049	ICQC	427							
Citation Total=A			0				125				748				28	0
Within-Group Citation=B			0				0				165				28	0
Section Total=C			<b>336</b>				<b>423</b>				<b>845</b>				<b>398</b>	<b>223</b>
Section Total Citation Rate= A/C			0%				30%				89%				7%	0%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C			0%				0%				20%				7%	0%

10. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for the Aspect of "Mental factors Same as Mind" 心所例王門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T48n2016-070	EPC	25	N/A	N/A	0	LMC#2-003	ISC	162	LMC#3-003	ICQC	15	N/A	N/A	0	
2	T48n2016-070	EPC	24				LMC#2-003	ISC	24							
3							LMC#1-003	ISC	30							
4							LMC#2-003	ISC	50							
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			49				0				266				15	0
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0				0				266				15	0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>886</b>				<b>741</b>				<b>823</b>				<b>885</b>	<b>827</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			6%				0%				32%				2%	0%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%				0%				32%				2%	0%



11. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Cause-Effect Metaphor" 因果法喻門

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5		
1	T48n2016-071	ECQC	29	T16n676-001	ISC	12	T48n2016-049	ICQC	24	T16n670-001	ECQC	23	X09n240-060	ICQC	11
2				T16n670-004	ECQC	27	T48n2016-049	ICQC	44				T48n2016-057	ICQC	70
3				T16n670-001	ECQC	14	LMC#2-003	IPC	56						
4				T35n1735-003	ICQC	16	T48n2016-049	ICQC	87						
5				T35n1735-001	ICC	7	LMC#2-003	ICQC	99						
6				T44n1836-001	ICC	7	LMC#1-003	ISC	41						
7				T31n1602-009	ECQC	118	T36n1736-020	ICQC	16						
8				T16n670-001	ECQC	18	LMC#2-003	ISC	29						
9				T44n1836-001	ISC	14	T48n2016-071	ECQC	32						
10				T31n1602-009	ESC	73	LMC#2-003	ICQC	22						
11				T44n1836-001	ISC	12	X55n888-002	IPC	46						
12				T35n1735-003	ICQC	13	LMC#2-003	IPC	49						
13							LMC#2-003	ISC	119						
14							LMC#2-003	ISC	309						
15							X55n888-002	ICQC	46						
16							T48n2016-049	ICQC	195						
17							LMC#2-003	ICQC	82						
18							LMC#2-003	ICQC	62						
19							LMC#2-003	ICQC	104						
20							LMC#2-003	ICQC	203						
21							LMC#2-003	ICQC	59						
22							LMC#1-003	ISC	24						
<b>Citation Total=A</b>			29			331			1748			23			81
<b>Within-Group Citation=B</b>			0			0			1258			0			0
<b>Section Total=C</b>			<b>1299</b>			<b>2194</b>			<b>2389</b>			<b>2005</b>			<b>1556</b>
<b>Section Total Citation Rate= A/C</b>			2%			15%			73%			1%			5%
<b>Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C</b>			0%			0%			53%			0%			0%



12. Citations Sources and Type Analysis for Aspect of "Suppression-Extinction Stages " 伏斷位次門

12-1 Explicating the implication of "a luohan"(阿羅漢)

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	N/A	N/A	0	X55n888-002	IPC	125	P182n1615-016	ECQC	379	LMC#1-003	ICQC	5	LMC#4-003	ISC	9	
2				T29n1558-023	ISC	25	LMC#2-003	ICQC	84	P189n1629-006	IPC	7	LMC#4-003	ICQC	5	
3				X55n888-002	ISC	20	LMC#1-003	ICQC	94	LMC#1-003	IPC	16	T24n1485-001	ICC	4	
4				T46n1925-002	IPC	252	X55n888-002	IPC	60	T34n1718-002	ISC	8	T34n1718-009	ICC	7	
5				T29n1558-023	ICC	24	LMC#1-003	ICQC	22	LMC#1-003	IPC	11	LMC#3-003	ICC	20	
6				X55n888-002	ICC	22	LMC#1-003	ICQC	48	P189n1629-006	ISC	25				
7				T29n1558-023	ICC	93	LMC#2-003	ICQC	19	T31n1602-017	IPC	102				
8				X55n888-002	ICC	26	T34n1718-009	IPC	8							
9				T29n1558-023	ICC	42	LMC#2-003	ICQC	93							
10				X55n888-002	ICC	20	T31n1605-007	ECQC	100							
11				P189n1629-006	ICC	24	LMC#1-003	ICQC	29							
12				X55n888-002	ICC	41	LMC#2-003	ICQC	50							
13				X55n888-002	ISC	101	LMC#1-003	ICQC	12							
14				X55n888-002	ISC	21	LMC#2-003	ICQC	80							
15				T33n1706-002	ICQC	11	LMC#1-003	ICQC	16							
16							LMC#2-003	ICQC	53							
Citation Total=A			0				847				1147				174	45
Within-Group Citation=B			0				0				600				32	34
Section Total=C			1220				1727				1561				1290	1331
Section Total Citation Rate= A/C			0%				49%				73%				13%	3%
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C			0%				0%				38%				2%	3%

12-2 Explicating Various Names and Implications of “discard” (捨)

Item	LMC#1			LMC#2			LMC#3			LMC#4			LMC#5			
1	T31n1598-001	ECQC	64	T48n2016-047	ISC	25	T48n2016-050	ICQC	44	N/A	N/A	0	T48n2016-029	ICQC	7	
2				T48n2016-050	IPC	14	LMC#2-003	ICQC	42				T37n1750-001	ICQC	19	
3				T51n2076-006	ISC	8	LMC#2-003	ISC	19				T09n262-003	ECQC	39	
4				T09 n262-003	ISC	8	LMC#1-003	ISC	28				LMC#3-003	IPC	53	
5				T29n1558-013	IPC	7	T36n1736-066	ECQC	23				LMC#2-003	IPC	9	
6				T19n945-005	ISC	8	LMC#1-003	ICC	52							
7				T36n1736-001	ISC	8	T31n1605-001	ICC	10							
8							T48n2016-050	ICC	168							
9							T36n1736-066	ICC	19							
10							T48n2016-050	ICQC	52							
11							T48n2016-049	ICC	10							
12							T36n1736-079	ICC	35							
13							LMC#2-003	ICQC	36							
14							CWSL-003	ICQC	24							
15							LMC#2-003	ICQC	46							
16							T48n2016-050	ICQC	321							
17							T48n2016-050	ICQC	743							
18							LMC#1-003	ISC	66							
19							LMC#2-003	ICQC	128							
Citation Total=A			64				78	1866						0	127	
Within-Group Citation=B			0				0	417						0	92	
Section Total=C			<b>905</b>				<b>823</b>	<b>2180</b>						<b>448</b>	<b>889</b>	
Section Total Citation Rate= A/C			7%				9%	86%						0%	14%	
Within-Group Citation Rate=B/C			0%				0%	19%						0%	10%	

Appendix 2: Citations Sources Summary by LMCs

Item	Source	LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		LMC#4		LMC#5		Quote F. Sub-Total	%	Quote C. Sub-Total	%
		Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count				
1	T48n2016 <i>Zongjing lu</i> 宗鏡錄	19	876	40	3,215	72	9,796	14	407	23	1,337	168	28.8%	15,631	43.0%
2	LMC#2 <i>Cheng Weishi lun jijie</i> 成唯識論集解	-	-	-	-	77	5,919	9	258	11	164	97	16.6%	6,341	17.5%
3	X55n888 <i>Weishi kaimeng wenda</i> 唯識開蒙問答	-	-	27	1,398	25	1,996	12	286	4	156	68	11.6%	3,836	10.6%
4	LMC#1 <i>Cheng Weishi lun suquan</i> 成唯識論俗詮	-	-	4	95	45	1,925	6	88	-	-	55	9.4%	2,108	5.8%
5	T36n1736 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing suishu yanji chao</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經隨疏演義鈔	5	43	4	28	16	1,054	-	-	2	100	27	4.6%	1,225	3.4%
6	T31n1598 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Asvabhāva translated by Xuanzang 無性造 玄奘譯	10	603	2	65	7	394	2	32	-	-	21	3.6%	1,094	3.0%
7	T31n1597 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Xuanzang 世親菩薩造 玄奘譯	-	-	7	352	9	447	-	-	-	-	16	2.7%	799	2.2%
8	T29n1558 <i>Apidamo jushe lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍論	1	28	7	285	1	379	3	47	-	-	12	2.1%	739	2.0%
9	T31n1602 <i>Xianyang shengjiao lun</i> 顯揚聖教論	-	-	3	514	2	114	1	7	-	-	6	1.0%	635	1.7%
10	T16n670 <i>Lengqie aba duoluo bao jing</i> 楞伽阿跋多羅寶經	-	-	6	373	-	-	2	92	-	-	8	1.4%	465	1.3%
11	T30n1579 <i>Yugie shidi lun</i> 瑜伽師地論	-	-	3	95	2	160	2	26	2	40	9	1.5%	321	0.9%
12	CWSL <i>Cheng weishi lun</i> 成唯識論	4	46	2	16	5	110	1	8	2	76	14	2.4%	256	0.7%
13	T53n2122 <i>Fa yuan zhu lin</i> 法苑珠林	-	-	1	252	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	252	0.7%
14	LMC#3 <i>Cheng Weishi lun Zhengyi</i> 成唯識論證義	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	87	6	140	10	1.7%	227	0.6%
15	T31n1595 <i>She dacheng lun shi</i> 攝大乘論釋 composed by Vasubandhu and translated by Paramārtha 世親釋 真諦譯	-	-	1	11	3	205	-	-	-	-	4	0.7%	216	0.6%
16	P182n1615 <i>Da ming san cang fa shu</i> 大明三藏法數	-	-	-	-	1	207	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	207	0.6%
17	T09n262 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing</i> 妙法蓮華經	-	-	1	200	-	-	-	-	1	4	2	0.3%	204	0.6%
18	LMC#4 <i>Cheng Weishi lun zikao</i> 成唯識論自攷	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	11	159	11	1.9%	159	0.4%
19	T31n1587 <i>Zhuanshi lun</i> 轉識論	2	94	1	24	1	36	-	-	-	-	4	0.7%	154	0.4%
20	T34n1718 <i>Miaofa lianhua jing wen ju</i> 妙法蓮華經文句	-	-	-	-	1	8	1	102	1	39	3	0.5%	149	0.4%
21	T45n1865 <i>Bashi gui ju buzhu</i> 八識規矩補註	1	23	2	92	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	0.5%	115	0.3%
22	T31n1605 <i>Dacheng apidamo ji lun</i> 大乘阿毘達磨集論	-	-	-	-	2	110	-	-	-	-	2	0.3%	110	0.3%
23	T32n1657 <i>Shou zhang lun</i> 手杖論	1	40	-	-	1	69	-	-	-	-	2	0.3%	109	0.3%
24	T26n1540 <i>Apidamo jie shen zu lun</i> 阿毘達磨界身足論	-	-	1	107	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	107	0.3%
25	X57n972 <i>Fajie anli tu</i> 法界安立圖	-	-	-	-	1	93	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	93	0.3%
26	P189n1629 <i>Tiantai si jiaoyi ji zhu</i> 天台四教儀集註	-	-	1	12	-	-	2	69	-	-	3	0.5%	81	0.2%
27	T29n1559 <i>Apidamo jushe shi lun</i> 阿毘達磨俱舍釋論	-	-	1	78	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	78	0.2%
28	T31n1594 <i>She dacheng lun ben</i> 攝大乘論本 composed by Asaṅga and translated by Xuanzang 無著造 玄奘譯	1	34	1	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	0.3%	67	0.2%
29	T35n1735 <i>Dafang guangfo huayanjing shu</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經疏	2	24	3	37	-	-	-	-	-	-	5	0.9%	61	0.2%
30	T33n1705 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo jing shu</i> 仁王護國般若經疏	-	-	-	-	1	57	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	57	0.2%

Item	Source	LMC#1		LMC#2		LMC#3		LMC#4		LMC#5		Quote F. Sub-Total	%	Quote C. Sub-Total	%
		Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count	Quote FREQ.	Quote Count				
31	T17n842 <i>Da fang guang yuan jue xiu duo luo le yi jing</i> 大方廣圓覺修多羅了義經	-	-	1	51	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	51	0.1%
32	X55n890 <i>Bashi gui ju bu zhu zheng yi</i> 八識規矩補註證義	-	-	-	-	1	22	2	27	-	-	3	0.5%	49	0.1%
33	T19n945 <i>Dafo ding rulai miyin xiuzheng leyi zhu pusa wanxing shou lengyan jing</i> 大佛頂如來密因修證了義諸菩薩萬行首楞嚴經	-	-	2	31	-	-	-	-	1	11	3	0.5%	42	0.1%
34	T10n279 <i>Da fang guang fo huayan jing</i> 大方廣佛華嚴經	-	-	1	36	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	36	0.1%
35	T16n676 <i>Jie shen mi jing</i> 解深密經	-	-	1	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	35	0.1%
36	T44n1836 <i>Dacheng baifa mingmen lunjie</i> 大乘百法明門論解	-	-	3	33	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	0.5%	33	0.1%
37	X08n236 <i>Huayan xuantan hui xuan ji</i> 華嚴懸談會玄記	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	23	1	0.2%	23	0.1%
38	T11n310 <i>Da bao ji jing</i> 大寶積經	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	22	-	-	1	0.2%	22	0.1%
39	X11n267 <i>Lengyan jing yi shu shi yao chao</i> 楞嚴經義疏釋要鈔	-	-	1	20	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	20	0.1%
40	T37n1750-001 <i>Guan wu liang shou fo jing shu</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	19	1	0.2%	19	0.1%
41	T31n1606 <i>Dacheng apidamo za ji lun</i> 大乘阿毘達磨雜集論	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	16	-	-	1	0.2%	16	0.0%
42	X09n240 <i>Huayan gangyao</i> 華嚴綱要	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	11	1	0.2%	11	0.0%
43	T46n1925 <i>Fajie cidi chu men</i> 法界次第初門	-	-	1	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	9	0.0%
44	T33n1702 <i>Jingang jing zuanyao kanding ji</i> 金剛經纂要刊定記	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	-	-	1	0.2%	8	0.0%
45	T33n1716-001 <i>Miao fa lian hua jing xuan yi</i> 妙法蓮華經玄義	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8	1	0.2%	8	0.0%
46	T51n2076-006 <i>Jingde chuandeng lu</i> 景德傳燈錄	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	8	0.0%
47	T24n1485 <i>Pusa yingluo benye jing</i> 菩薩瓔珞本業經	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7	1	0.2%	7	0.0%
48	T36n1739 <i>Xin huayan jing lun</i> 新華嚴經論	-	-	1	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	7	0.0%
49	T37n1751 <i>Guan wuliang shou fo jing shu miao zong chao</i> 觀無量壽佛經疏妙宗鈔	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5	1	0.2%	5	0.0%
50	T33n1706 <i>Renwang huguo ban ruo po luo mi jing shu shen bao ji</i> 仁王護國般若波羅蜜經疏神寶記	-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	0.2%	4	0.0%
<b>Total</b>		<b>46</b>	<b>1,811</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>7,516</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>23,101</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>1,582</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>2,299</b>	<b>584</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>36,309</b>	<b>100%</b>