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CONTENDING IDENTITIES IN TAIWAN

Implications for Cross-Strait Relations

_____ T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu

Abstract

The majority of Taiwan residents now have Taiwan-centered national identities, viewing the island as separate and independent from the Chinese mainland. Thus, few people on the island support Beijing's "one country, two systems" proposal. China's new leaders need to present fresh plans if they are truly committed to peaceful unification.

Since the Chinese Civil War ended in 1949, the government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) has never abandoned the idea of "reunifying Taiwan with the motherland." Unlike the Korean and the German models of unification in which each side treats the other substantially as an equal, the PRC model, known as "one country, two systems," considers Taiwan only as a local government under Beijing's command, like Hong Kong and Macao, but one that will enjoy a high degree of autonomy.¹ In attempting to force Taipei to accept its unification proposal, Beijing has isolated Taiwan internationally, backing up its claim over the island with the threat of military force.

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1. State Council of the PRC, "The Taiwan Question and Reunification of China," *Beijing Review* 36:36 (September 6–12, 1993), pp. i–viii, and Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) and the Information Office of the State Council, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," *People's Daily* (Renmin Ribao) *Online*, February 21, 2000, <<http://www.peopledaily.com.cn>>.

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Thus, when Lee Teng-hui, as president of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, visited his alma mater, Cornell University, in May 1995, Beijing leaders interpreted Lee's visit to the U.S. as an unacceptable bid to create "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." To show their determination to protect the territorial integrity of the "motherland," Chinese leaders started an eight-month-long series of military exercises and missile tests in the waters close to Taiwan.²

In the aftermath of the crisis, many scholars and officials in the United States have worried that the present cross-Taiwan Strait relationship is not stable and warned that history could easily repeat itself.³ The implicit basis of this concern is that Taipei's recent drive to assert its separate and independent status from China in the international community is propelled by an emerging national identity on the island. This identity rejects the idea that Taiwan and China are one nation and that all ethnic Chinese must be ruled by a single government within the same state. Lee's characterization of contacts across the Taiwan Strait as "special state-to-state relations" (*teshu de guo yu guo de guanxi*),⁴ commonly labeled as the "two states theory" (*liang guo lun*), is seen as a clear manifestation of this identity, which clashes with Beijing's determination to unify the island with the "motherland."

In an attempt to strike a balance between the island residents' demand for autonomy/independence and Beijing's demands for unification, several proposals have been put forth by scholars and officials in the U.S. aimed at reaching agreements that could ease cross-strait tension. These include Harding's "modus vivendi," Nye's "three-part package," and Lieberthal's "50-year plan."⁵ Although there are variations, these proposals share a call for "double renunciation" by both Taipei and Beijing, i.e., Taipei would renounce its intention of seeking Taiwan's *de jure* independence, in exchange for Beijing's consent not to use force against the island country.⁶ Presumably, this continuation of Taiwan's legal limbo would last indefinitely as a "kinder, gentler" version of the status quo.

2. John F. Cooper, "The Origins of Conflict across the Taiwan Strait: The Problem of Differences in Perceptions," *Journal of Contemporary China* 6:15 (1997), pp. 199–227.

3. Richard C. Bush, "The U.S.-Taiwan-PRC Triangle, Mid Year," speech delivered at the Annual Conference of the Taiwan Chamber of Commerce of North America, Chicago, Illinois, June 26, 1999; Harry Harding, "Toward a Modus Vivendi in the Taiwan Strait," paper delivered at the International Conference on United States-Taiwan Relations, Taipei, April 9–10, 1999; Kenneth Lieberthal, "Cross Strait Relations," paper delivered at the International Conference on the PRC After the Fifteenth Party Congress, Taipei, February 19–20, 1998; Joseph S. Nye, "A Taiwan Deal," *Washington Post*, March 8, p. C7; and Stanley Roth, "The Taiwan Relations Act at Twenty—and Beyond," address to the Woodrow Wilson Center and the American Institute in Taiwan, Washington, D.C., March 1999.

4. Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), the Republic of China, "Parity, Peace, and Win-win," August 1, 1999, <<http://www.mac.gov.tw>>.

5. Harding, "Toward a Modus Vivendi"; Lieberthal, "Cross Strait Relations"; and Nye, "A Taiwan Deal."

6. For instance, Harding's "modus vivendi" proposed that Beijing and Taipei establish "[a] set of mutual reassurances, such that the mainland would commit itself not to use force against Taiwan as

Beijing's "one country, two systems" unification formula and the "double renunciation" proposals are thus two competing propositions for resolving the "Taiwan question." Because Taipei's drive to assert its autonomy is considered a natural consequence of an emerging national identity on the island, it is imperative to understand the nature of this collective mentality and its effect on the island citizens' support for any proposal to deal with cross-strait conflicts. As the island has evolved into a full-fledged democracy, gaining and keeping support of Taiwan's citizens is now, more than ever, a necessity, for any proposed solution to the "Taiwan question" to succeed. Indeed, with the election of the pro-independence Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's president in the 2000 election, the urgency of identifying an acceptable solution to cross-strait conflicts has become even more pressing.⁷ Utilizing recently collected survey data,⁸ this article explores the emerging national identity on the island and its association with the islanders' policy preferences regarding Taiwan's future relations with the Chinese mainland.

Democratization and the Issue of National Identity

National identity can be defined as an individual's psychological attachment to a political community united by characteristics that differentiate that com-

long as Taiwan did not declare independence, and that Taiwan would commit itself not to declare independence as long as the mainland did not use force." Lieberthal's "50-year plan" suggested that explicit agreements be established such that "[Taiwan] is a part of China and will not claim *de jure* independence" and that "the PRC [will] not use force against Taiwan." Similarly, Nye's "three-part package" proposed that the U.S. "work hard to discourage other countries from recognizing Taiwan independence. At the same time, we would repeat that we would not accept the use of force . . ."

7. Chen has staunch pro-independence credentials and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is the only major political party on the island that has adopted a plank advocating Taiwan's *de jure* independence. His recent characterization of cross-strait relations as "one country on each side" (*yibian yiguo*), along with his calls for a new Taiwanese constitution, have further deepened the Beijing leadership's profound mistrust and suspicion of Chen, and of the DPP as Taiwan's ruling party. Sandy Huang, "'Pan Blue' Camp Pans Chen's Talk," *Taipei Times*, August 05, 2002, <<http://www.taipeitimes.com>>; "Chen's Pro-independence Remarks, Dangerous Provocation," *People's Daily Online*, August 6, 2002, <<http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/>>; Craig S. Smith and Keith Bradsher, "China Issues New Warning to Taiwan, Just in English," *New York Times*, August 8, 2002, <<http://www.nytimes.com>>; Chang Yun-Ping and Huang Tai-lin, "President Makes DPP Birthday Pledge," *Taipei Times*, October 7, 2003; "Chen Shui-bian's Independence Stance May Trigger War," *People's Daily Online*, November 19, 2003; and John Pomfret, "China Threatens Use of Force If Taiwan Pursues Independence," *Washington Post*, November 19, 2003, <<http://www.washingtonpost.com>>.

8. The telephone polling was conducted at the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in Taipei on May 24–26, 2002. A total of 1,115 respondents were interviewed, which yields sample estimates within $\pm 2.99\%$ of the actual population's parameter with a 95% confidence level. The English version of those survey questions employed in the current study is listed in Appendix 1.

munity from others.⁹ While common culture and ethnic linkages have played important roles in the development of a national identity in Taiwan, the authoritarian rule by the Nationalist (Kuomintang or KMT) government after World War II and the process of democratization set into motion in the late 1980s have provided the most important shared living experiences for the island's populace.¹⁰

The relationship between the island's residents and KMT officials had a rocky start, after the forces of Chiang Kai-shek first arrived on Taiwan in 1945. The mainland troops sent to take control of the island were viewed by the locals as beggars and thieves. KMT officials in turn viewed the islanders with suspicion, owing to Japanese colonial rule of Taiwan for half a century. After all, they had been on different sides during the war. By 1947, the animosity between the KMT government and Taiwan's residents culminated in an island-wide uprising, known as the "2/28 incident,"¹¹ during which thousands of local people were massacred by KMT troops. This outbreak of violence solidified the local perception of the KMT as a new alien occupying force, and the ethnic cleavage between "mainlanders" (*waishengren*) and "Taiwanese" (*ben-shengren*) became the major division within society.¹² (In this study, the term "Taiwanese" does not refer to the island's populace as a whole. Instead, it is used in reference to Taiwan residents whose ancestors had immigrated to the island before 1945.)

After being defeated by the Communist troops in 1949, the KMT government on the mainland, led by Chiang, retreated to Taiwan with two million of its followers. Maintaining their claim that they were the sole legitimate rulers of the "Middle Kingdom," KMT leaders upheld the principle of "one China," of which Taiwan was held to be a part. To build up the island as a base for their ambitious attempt to "recover" the Chinese mainland, Taipei's ruling elites

9. Jack Citrin, Ernst B. Haas, Christopher Muste, and Beth Reingold, "Is American Nationalism Changing? Implications for Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly* 38:1 (March 1994), pp. 1–31; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, "Theories of Nationalism: Alternative Models of Nation Formation," in Michael Leifer, ed., *Asian Nationalism* (London: Routledge, 2000); and Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (Las Vegas, Nev.: University of Nevada Press, 1991).

10. For a review of the recent history of Taiwan, see Christopher Hughes, *Taiwan and Chinese Nationalism: National Identity and Status in International Society* (New York: Routledge, 1997).

11. Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).

12. For studies on national identity along ethnic lines, see, e.g., Stéphane Corcuff, "Taiwan's 'Mainlanders', New Taiwanese?" in Stéphane Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 163–95; and Wu Nai-teh, "Zuqun Yishi yu Ziyou Zhuyi: Souxun Taiwan Minzu Zhuyi de Jichu" [Ethnic identity and liberalism: In search of the basis of Taiwanese nationalism], paper delivered at the First Annual Conference of the Taiwanese Political Science Association, Taipei, December 17–18, 1994.

imposed harsh authoritarian rule, coupled with intense propaganda efforts to “re-Sinicize” local residents. A variety of measures were enforced to foster a “greater China identity,” in an attempt to make local residents accept the view that both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland were parts of China and that China was their motherland. Activities that might promote Taiwan independence were suppressed. These discriminatory measures, including a China-related curriculum in the schools, the prohibition of teaching and speaking of local languages, and restrictions on broadcasting ethnic TV and radio programs, became the rhetorical target of the pro-independence activists.

The rapid democratization that took place in the 1980s and 1990s led to a sea change in Taipei’s policies, including lifting martial law, legalizing political parties, and ending restrictions on public assembly and freedom of speech. Previously restricted topics on Taiwanese literature, languages, and history, including the “2/28 incident,” became popular and widely researched. School curricula deviated from the previously China-centered focus to make room for lessons on Taiwan’s history, a major change after decades of deliberate neglect. When Lee Teng-hui became the first native-born president in 1988 and later the chairman of the KMT, exiled advocates of Taiwanese independence were allowed to return to the island and openly espouse an independent Taiwan. The constitutional changes that occurred during Lee’s tenure further diluted the mainland heritage of the Chiang family. Meanwhile, to maximize electoral votes and mitigate the ethnic tension between mainlanders and Taiwanese, local politicians started to advocate ethnic harmony under such slogans as “collectivity of common fate” (*shengming gongtongti*) and “the rising new nation” (*xinxing minzu*). This discourse integrated all residents on the island into the more ethnically inclusive identity of “the new Taiwanese” (*xin Taiwan ren*).¹³ Externally, the international isolation of Taiwan by Beijing prompted the Taipei government to challenge the notion of “one China” as it had previously been understood. In an attempt to alter the widely received notion that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, the essence of Taipei’s “pragmatic diplomacy” (*wushi waijiao*) is to seek a new framework within which the island can be treated as a state distinct and separate from China.¹⁴

Along with these changes brought by democratization, the island’s residents began reflecting on how their past identities related to China and Taiwan. Among the questions raised were: What is China? Who is Chinese? What are the differences between Chinese and Taiwanese culture? Is it possible to be culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese? Two competing political doctrines,

13. Chang Mau-kuei, “‘Xin Taiwan Ren’ zhi Feilun” [A discussion of ‘new Taiwanese’], *Guoce Zhuankan* [National Policy Dynamic Analysis], vol. 7 (January 5, 1999), pp. 3–8.

14. T. Y. Wang, “Taiwan’s Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-Hui’s Rule: 1988–2000,” *American Asian Review* 20:1 (Spring 2002), pp. 71–106.

one espousing “greater Chinese” nationalism (*da Zhongguo minzu zhuyi*) and the other Taiwanese nationalism (*Taiwan minzu zhuyi*), emerged as a result of this process of reflection. The former view, long held by the KMT government, considers the word “China” a term representing a culture, a nation, and a state. To be Chinese involves not only belonging to Chinese culture but also political inclusion in a Chinese state known as *Zhongguo*. Proponents of greater Chinese nationalism see a distinct Taiwanese culture and an independent Taiwanese state as literally incomprehensible. For them, the Taiwanese are Chinese in both the cultural and political sense, and the island of Taiwan is therefore an integral part of a “greater China.” The eventual unification of Taiwan with the Chinese mainland is thus regarded as desirable. Those who espouse Taiwanese nationalism also believe in political and cultural congruence, but they challenge the idea that Taiwan is a part of China. They argue that the century-long separation of the island from the Chinese mainland has created a distinct Taiwanese culture. They reject the idea that Taiwan and China are one nation and that all Chinese must be ruled by a single government within the same state. Some have even asserted that “the Taiwanese are not Chinese” and have opposed the assertion that Taiwan is a part of China in any sense.¹⁵

The Emergence of Taiwan-centered Identities

The competing conceptions of identity have generated a heated public discourse and also produced a vast empirical literature using survey data to explore the island citizens’ national identities. Two major approaches have been employed in these studies. The first relies on the measurement of respondents’ positions on the unification/independence spectrum.¹⁶ As one author succinctly summarized, “The issue of unification vs. independence can be roughly characterized as an issue of national identity.”¹⁷ Such a measurement scheme is problematic because it confuses a respondent’s policy stand with his/her

15. Shih Ming, *Taiwan Bushi Zhongguo de Yibufen* [Taiwan is not a part of China] (Taipei: Vanguard Publishers, 1992), quoted in Huang Zen-Jei, “Taidu Yundong yu Taihai Liang’an Guojia Tungyi Zhengce zhi Yanjiu” [Study on the Taiwanese independence movement and the reunification policies of both sides of the Taiwan Strait], Master’s thesis (Taipei: East-Asia Institute, National Cheng-chi University, 1993), p. 49.

16. See, e.g., Robert Marsh, “National Identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan: Some Trends in the 1990s,” in Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future*, pp. 144–59; Wu, “Ethnic Identity and Liberalism.” For a discussion of measuring Taiwanese national identity in previous studies, see Liu I-Chou, “National Identity of the Taiwan Public,” paper delivered at the American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Atlanta, September 2–5, 1999.

17. Chiang I-hua, “Dangqian Taiwan Guojia Rentong Lunshu zhi Fanxing” [Reflections on current theories of Taiwan’s national identity], paper delivered at the 1988 Annual Conference of the ROC Political Science Association, Taipei, p. 1.

underlying attitudes toward a political community. Most citizens on the island are well aware of China's threats to use military force, should Taiwan declare independence. Under such pressure it would be quite likely for an individual to oppose Taiwan independence for fear of the possible consequences to one's homeland, while still believing in a separate political and even cultural identity. This "distortion" in the choice of policies, stemming from Beijing's hostility, can effectively disconnect people's political and cultural identities from their policy preferences, and must be taken into account when analyzing survey data on this question. Thus, while a respondent's stand on such policy issues as whether Taiwan should unify with the Chinese mainland or pursue *de jure* independence may be correlated with his/her attitudes toward a political community, these are two separate and distinct concepts, and may not always be consistent.

An alternative approach is to assess Taiwan residents' national identity through their self-identification as being Taiwanese or Chinese or both.¹⁸ This measurement scheme offers a powerful and succinct corrective. Because the objective membership of a community is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the existence of an identity, this treatment correctly measures the subjective realm of sentiment and beliefs that one holds toward a community.¹⁹ It also draws attention to factors shaping national identities, including historical territory and a common history and culture.²⁰

This primordialist mode of measurement nevertheless fails to catch respondents' political beliefs on whether Taiwan should be an independent and separate political community. Indeed, just like some Singaporeans may consider themselves ethnic Chinese but also nationals of the state of Singapore, some Taiwan residents may view themselves as culturally Chinese but politically Taiwanese. It is the intertwining of the cultural and political components that constitutes the very essence of public discourse on national identity in Taiwan.

The investigation of the island residents' national identity therefore calls for an analysis of both cultural orientations and political identifications. The survey conducted by this study asks the respondent three questions: i.e., in your mind, (1) what territory constitutes "my country" (Taiwan only, both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, or the Chinese mainland only)?; (2) who are "my countrymen" (the Taiwanese people only, both the mainland and the Taiwanese

18. See, e.g., Lin Tsong-ji, "The Evolution of National Identity Issues in Democratizing Taiwan: An Investigation of the Elite-Mass Linkage," in Corcuff, ed., *Memories of the Future*, pp. 123-43.

19. Pamela Johnston Conover, "The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation," *Journal of Politics* 46:3 (August 1984), pp. 760-85; and Thomas Hylland Eriksen, "We and Us: Two Modes of Group Identification," *Journal of Peace Research* 32:4 (November 1995), pp. 427-36.

20. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*.

TABLE 1 *Distributions of Responses about “My Country,” “My Countrymen,” and Cultural Orientations (N = 1,115) (%)*

<i>My Country</i>		<i>My Countrymen</i>	<i>Cultural Orientations</i>
Taiwan only	79.8 (890)	Taiwanese people only	Taiwanese culture a part of Chinese culture
Both mainland & Taiwan	14.5 (162)	Both mainland & Taiwanese people	66.1 (737)
Mainland only	0.2 (12)	Mainland people only	Taiwanese culture different from Chinese culture
No responses/other	5.5 (61)	No responses/other	24.8 (277)
			No responses/other
			9.1 (101)

NOTE: Percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

people, or the mainland people only)?; and (3) is Taiwanese culture part of the Chinese culture, or are these two cultures different? The first two questions aim to assess the political aspect of national identity since, as indicated earlier, both greater Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism see a defined territory and a state exercising sovereign rule over a population as constituting the elements of a nation-state. For a sense of national identity to exist, therefore, a respondent must perceive a certain piece of land as his/her own country and perceive a certain group of people as his/her countrymen. The third question attempts to summarize respondents' views on their cultural/ethnic heritage.²¹ Table 1 presents the distributions of responses to these three questions.

Out of 1,115 respondents, about 80% view only the island as their country and only the island's residents as their fellow countrymen. Less than 15% see both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland and the corresponding populations as their country and countrymen. While the data show a substantial number of respondents demonstrating Taiwan-centered political identities, only one-fourth view Taiwanese culture as different from Chinese culture. More than two-thirds of respondents feel that they have roots in Chinese culture. These differences in distributions suggest that political and cultural identities may not be congruent

21. Readers may note that this research did not use the PRC and the ROC as contrasting choices in the survey questions. Instead, territory-specific terms—Taiwan and the Chinese mainland—were employed. This is because (1) it is unlikely for Taiwan residents to identify the PRC as their country, and (2) both greater Chinese nationalism and Taiwanese nationalism consider a defined territory as constituting the basis of a nation. Meanwhile, because of the ambiguity of the word “China,” which could be interpreted as referring only to the PRC, this research used *Zhonghua wenhua* (Chinese culture), instead of *Zhongguo wenhua* (culture of China), in the survey questions.

in the Taiwanese context. Based on the valid responses to the three survey questions, Table 2 displays a typology of the islanders' national identities.

The cell within the upper left-hand corner of the table body, labeled "Taiwanese nationalist identity," corresponds to respondents who consider that (1) the Taiwanese and Chinese cultures are completely different, (2) their fellow countrymen include Taiwanese people only, and (3) only the island is acknowledged as their own country. Consistent with the previous characterization of Taiwanese nationalism, respondents in this category display a psychological attachment to a political community known as Taiwan, which, in their minds, is different from the Chinese mainland in every aspect. As the data show, 24.4% of the respondents are Taiwanese nationalists. The cell in the middle of the table typifies the "pro-Taiwan identity." These respondents share the political identification of the Taiwanese nationalists but differ in that they believe both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a common cultural heritage. More than 50% of the respondents fall in this category.

By contrast, only 6.7% of the respondents display a "greater China identity." Contrary to the Taiwanese nationalists, these respondents believe that Taiwanese culture is part of Chinese culture and both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland and their corresponding people constitute a cohesive political community. The five cells marked by "mixed identity" are for those with assorted cultural orientations, territorial attachments, and views about fellow countrymen. For instance, while some respondents view the two sides of the Taiwan Strait as sharing a common cultural heritage, they either consider the people on both the mainland and the island as their fellow countrymen but have a territorial attachment only to Taiwan, or they solely regard the island's residents as their fellow countrymen but view both the Chinese mainland and the island as constituting their territorial country. Less than 11% of Taiwan residents have a mixed national identity. The remaining 10 cells are "illogical," since it is unlikely for a citizen of Taiwan not to view the island as his/her country or not to include local people as his/her fellow countrymen regardless of cultural orientation. Indeed, these categories are empirically insignificant, as very few respondents (a total of less than 0.5%) fall into them, and they will be omitted in subsequent analysis.

Four types of national identity in Taiwan can thus be distinguished: the Taiwanese nationalist identity, the pro-Taiwan identity, the mixed identity, and the greater China identity. Contrary to the view that there is no broad consensus on national identity on the island,²² the empirical evidence shows that Taiwan-centered national identities, including both Taiwanese nationalist identity and

22. Christopher Hughes, "Post-nationalist Taiwan," in Leifer, ed., *Asian Nationalism*, pp. 63–81, and Alan M. Wachman, "Competing Identities in Taiwan," in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), pp. 17–80.

TABLE 2 Types of National Identity of Taiwan's Residents (N = 954) (%)						
Taiwanese and Chinese Cultures Are Different			Taiwanese Culture Is a Part of Chinese Culture			
My Countrymen	My Country		My Country			
	Taiwan Only	Chinese Mainland and Taiwan	Chinese Mainland only	Taiwan Only	Chinese Mainland and Taiwan	Chinese Mainland Only
Taiwanese people only	Taiwanese nationalist identity 24.4 (233)	Mixed identity 0.3 (3)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Pro-Taiwan identity 54.2 (517)	Mixed identity 5.2 (50)	Illogical identity 0.1 (1)
Mainland people and Taiwanese people	Mixed identity 1.2 (10)	Mixed identity 1.2 (14)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Mixed identity 2.9 (41)	Greater China identity 6.7 (82)	Illogical identity 0.1 (1)
Mainland people only	Illogical identity 0.2 (2)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)	Illogical identity 0.0 (0)

NOTE: Total percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

pro-Taiwan identity, are clearly dominant. Despite intensive efforts to re-Sinicize the island's residents in the 1948–88 period, very few of the island's residents currently subscribe to the idea of greater Chinese nationalism. The majority of the populace now sees the island as an independent political entity from the Chinese mainland. More important, half of the island's residents now carefully distinguish their political identification from their cultural orientation. Acknowledging their Chinese heritage, they identify themselves as Taiwanese politically. As Table 3 shows, this view cuts across different age and ethnic lines. Almost half the islanders in each age group subscribe to a pro-Taiwan identity, as is most apparent in the youngest generation, with 60% deeming themselves Chinese culturally and Taiwanese politically. Even the mainlanders, traditionally staunch believers in greater Chinese nationalism, are now more prone to a pro-Taiwan identity, with 12% holding Taiwanese nationalist identifications. While the "mainlander" vs. "Taiwanese" dichotomy is considered to be the most important ethnic cleavage on the island, a new identity has emerged that bridges the gap between ethnic groups. As will be shown below, the convergence of national identity across age groups and ethnic lines has important implications for the island's future relations with the Chinese mainland.

Options and Preferences on Taiwan's Future Status

As noted, the two competing propositions currently confronting Taiwan residents regarding the island's future status are Beijing's "one country, two systems" unification formula and the "double renunciation" proposal by U.S. scholars and officials. With Taiwan-centered identities now becoming dominant views on the island, how are these identities associated with local residents' policy preferences regarding these two propositions?

The "One Country, Two Systems" Plan

Since the notion was first raised in 1979,²³ the "one country, two systems" unification formula has not changed. Put simply, the proposal prescribes that Taiwan be unified under the principle of "one China," with Beijing as the central government and Taiwan as a local special administrative region (SAR) (hence the "one country"). After unification, the Chinese mainland would continue the practice of socialism, while Taiwan would retain its capitalist system and enjoy a high degree of autonomy (hence the "two systems"). To show their

23. Although the term "one country, two systems" did not appear until 1982, the idea was first raised by China's National People's Congress (NPC) in 1979. See NPC Standing Committee, "Message to Compatriots in Taiwan," *Beijing Review* 1 (January 5, 1979), pp. 16–17, and Wen Qing, "'One Country, Two Systems': The Best Way to Peaceful Reunification," *ibid.* (August 13–19, 1990), pp. 18–20, 25–26.

TABLE 3 *Distributions of National Identities by Age and Ethnicity (%)*

	Age (N = 940)				Ethnicity (N = 940)	
	20–29	30–39	40–49	50–59	Above 60	
Taiwanese nationalist identity	23.9 (50)	24.2 (70)	24.9 (73)	27.0 (20)	24.0 (18)	11.9 (18)
Pro-Taiwan identity	61.2 (128)	52.9 (153)	53.6 (157)	50.0 (37)	46.7 (35)	48.3 (73)
Mixed identity	10.1 (21)	13.5 (39)	14.0 (41)	13.5 (10)	9.3 (7)	20.5 (31)
Greater China identity	4.8 (10)	9.3 (27)	7.5 (22)	9.5 (7)	20.0 (15)	19.2 (29)
Number of cases	209	289	293	74	75	151
						789

NOTE: Column percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

generosity, Chinese leaders further promise that “[o]n the premise of one China, both sides can discuss any subject,”²⁴ including the national flag and the name of the country. They also pledge that they are “prepared to apply a looser form of the ‘one country, two systems’ policy in Taiwan than in Hong Kong and Macao.”²⁵ Specifically, this means that Taiwan, as a Chinese SAR, would not only run its own political and economic affairs and enjoy certain rights in foreign relations but also would be able to retain its own armed forces.

Based on other conditions laid down by the Chinese government and the experiences of “one country, two systems” in Hong Kong (HKSAR) and Macao (MSAR), some qualifications need to be added to Beijing’s generous offer. First of all, the “one country, two systems” unification formula promises that Taiwan will “have its own . . . independent judiciary and the right of adjudication on the island.” But the 1999 *Ng Ka Ling* case and a companion case in Hong Kong have shown that judiciary decisions can easily be struck down by the central government in Beijing, since the power of interpretation of the Basic Law, the HKSAR’s mini-constitution, is vested in the Standing Committee of the NPC.²⁶ Second, the “one country, two systems” formula also assures that Taiwan “may keep its military forces and the mainland will not dispatch troops or administrative personnel to the island.”²⁷ However, Beijing has made it clear that “[n]o country . . . should provide arms to Taiwan or enter into military alliance of any form with Taiwan . . . and [all countries should] refrain from providing arms to Taiwan or helping Taiwan produce arms in any form or under any pretext.”²⁸ That is, should the island accept Beijing’s unification proposal, it will no longer be able to acquire weaponry from other countries. Third, while Beijing is willing to grant Taipei authority to engage in foreign affairs after unification, such activities must be “compatible with [Taiwan’s] status” as a local government and therefore limited to “economic, cultural, and social activities.”²⁹ Under the “one China” principle, Chinese leaders continue to insist that Beijing is the sole government representing the whole of China and that Taiwan therefore has no legal right to establish diplomatic relations or participate in international organizations. Finally, considering the complex

24. State Council, “The Taiwan Question,” pp. v–vi.

25. TAO, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.”

26. The 1999 *Ng Ka Ling* case and a companion case challenged a HKSAR ordinance regulating the right of Chinese nationals to claim resident status in Hong Kong. After the court struck down the ordinance, the Standing Committee of the NPC in Beijing reversed the court’s decision by issuing an interpretation of the Basic Law. See Frank Shihong Hong, “Ng Ka Ling v. Director of Immigration. 2 HKCFAR 4; Lau Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration. 3 HKLRD 778,” *American Journal of International Law* 94:1 (January 2000), pp. 167–71.

27. State Council, “The Taiwan Question,” page v.

28. TAO, “The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.”

29. Ibid.

electoral arrangements for selecting the legislative body and the chief executive in the HKSAR and MSAR,³⁰ changes in Taiwan's existing system of a popularly elected president and legislators are not inconceivable.

To assess the islanders' evaluations regarding the "one country, two systems" unification plan, the survey asks respondents six questions.³¹ The first two questions are intentionally vague about the specific content of Beijing's offer, asking respondents to what extent they are willing to accept a "one country, two systems" proposal if (1) the plan permits "Taiwan's economic system and way of life to remain unchanged for 50 years"; and (2) the plan eliminates the PRC and the ROC but creates a new country called China (*Zhongguo*). The next four questions list the four scenarios discussed above, i.e., limits on rights of adjudication, limits on purchasing arms, limits on conducting foreign affairs, and limits on electing public officials.

Tables 4 and 5 present the data and, collectively, reveal several major findings. First, while close to half the respondents reject the unification plan, about 40% of respondents feel the "one country, two systems" proposal would be acceptable if the plan keeps Taiwan and the Chinese mainland separate for 50 years, or if the plan treats the PRC and the ROC equally and forms a new country called *Zhongguo*.³² Under these two conditions, even 20%–30% of Taiwanese nationalists—and more than 40% of the pro-Taiwan identifiers—are willing to accept Beijing's unification plan. When asked about the limitations likely to accompany the proposal, however, very few Taiwan residents are willing to sacrifice their hard-won political rights and national autonomy under a democratic system. Less than 10% of respondents find the "one country, two systems" formula appealing if it were to limit Taiwan's rights of judicial adjudication, conducting foreign affairs, or electing public officials. Although a limitation on Taipei's ability to acquire arms from foreign countries enjoys a

30. See the Basic Law of the HKSAR of the PRC, <<http://www.constitution.org/cons/hongkong.txt>>, and the Basic Law of the MSAR of the PRC, <http://www.macao.gov.mo/constitution/constitution_en.phtml>.

31. While it is well known that the majority of Taiwan residents reject the "one country, two systems" unification plan, no study has utilized survey data to explore each dimension of Beijing's proposal and the islanders' reactions to them.

32. Note that the percentages in favor of the "one country, two systems" proposal reported here are substantially higher than those given by the MAC, which range between 3.5% and 16.1% for the period 1991–2002. The discrepancy stems from different wordings of the survey question. The MAC question reads "[w]ith regard to future cross-strait development, the Chinese leadership has proposed the 'one country, two systems' model, under which Taiwan would be treated as a local government. Henceforth, Taiwan would be ruled by China and the government of the Republic of China would cease to exist. Are you in favor of this 'one country, two systems' model or not?" See Chen Yih-yan, *Dalu Zhengce yu Liang'an Guanxi* [Mainland policy and cross-strait relations] (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1999), p. 199. For survey results, see the MAC website, <<http://www.mac.gov.tw>>.

TABLE 4 Distributions of Responses about the "One Country, Two Systems" Unification Plan (N = 1,115) (%)						
Are you willing to accept the "One Country, Two Systems" unification proposal, if the plan does the following:						
	Permits Taiwan Unchanged for 50 Years	Creates a New Country Called "Zhongguo"	Limits Taiwan's Rights of Adjudication	Limits Taiwan's Ability of Purchasing Arms	Limits Taiwan's Ability of Conducting Foreign Affairs	Limits Taiwanese Rights of Electing Public Offices
Extremely unacceptable	25.0 (279)	26.2 (292)	56.2 (627)	52.9 (590)	58.9 (657)	66.4 (740)
Unacceptable	22.5 (251)	19.9 (222)	25.0 (279)	23.8 (265)	23.7 (264)	18.8 (210)
Acceptable	29.0 (323)	28.9 (322)	4.4 (49)	9.4 (105)	5.6 (62)	5.8 (65)
Extremely acceptable	9.6 (107)	10.4 (116)	0.4 (5)	4.2 (47)	2.2 (24)	2.1 (23)
No responses	13.9 (155)	14.6 (163)	13.9 (155)	9.7 (108)	9.7 (108)	6.9 (77)
NOTE: Percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.						

TABLE 5 *Responses about the “One Country, Two Systems” Plan and National Identities (%)*

	<i>Taiwanese Nationalist Identity</i>	<i>Pro-Taiwan Identity</i>	<i>Mixed Identity</i>	<i>Greater China Identity</i>
<i>Permitting Taiwan Unchanged for 50 Years</i> (N = 842)				
Extremely unacceptable	40.2 (84)	31.0 (143)	13.7 (14)	11.4 (8)
Unacceptable	29.2 (61)	25.6 (118)	28.4 (29)	15.7 (11)
Acceptable	25.8 (54)	33.6 (155)	44.1 (45)	38.6 (27)
Extremely acceptable	4.8 (10)	9.8 (45)	13.7 (14)	34.3 (24)
Number of cases	209	461	102	70
<i>Creating a New Country called “Zhongguo”</i> (N = 842)				
Extremely unacceptable	44.9 (96)	33.1 (149)	12.6 (13)	10.7 (8)
Unacceptable	31.8 (68)	21.6 (97)	18.4 (19)	9.3 (7)
Acceptable	18.2 (39)	36.0 (162)	48.5 (50)	41.3 (31)
Extremely acceptable	5.1 (11)	9.3 (42)	20.4 (21)	38.7 (29)
Number of cases	214	450	103	75
<i>Limiting Taiwan’s Rights of Adjudication</i> (N = 845)				
Extremely unacceptable	71.9 (156)	67.7 (313)	59.2 (61)	55.6 (35)
Unacceptable	25.8 (56)	27.7 (128)	30.1 (31)	27.0 (17)
Acceptable	2.3 (5)	4.5 (21)	10.7 (11)	11.1 (7)
Extremely acceptable	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)	6.3 (4)
Number of cases	217	462	103	63
<i>Limiting Taiwan’s Ability of Purchasing Arms</i> (N = 882)				
Extremely unacceptable	68.2 (150)	61.1 (294)	50.9 (54)	41.3 (31)
Unacceptable	24.1 (53)	26.0 (125)	30.2 (32)	20.0 (15)
Acceptable	6.4 (14)	10.0 (48)	12.3 (13)	18.7 (14)
Extremely acceptable	1.4 (3)	2.9 (14)	6.6 (7)	20.0 (15)
Number of cases	220	481	106	75
<i>Limiting Taiwan’s Ability of Conducting Foreign Affairs</i> (N = 894)				
Extremely unacceptable	72.2 (161)	69.0 (339)	57.8 (63)	47.9 (34)
Unacceptable	22.9 (51)	24.6 (121)	27.5 (30)	26.8 (19)
Acceptable	4.5 (10)	5.3 (26)	11.0 (12)	9.9 (7)
Extremely acceptable	0.4 (1)	1.0 (5)	3.7 (4)	15.5 (11)
Number of cases	223	491	109	71
<i>Limiting Taiwanese Rights of Electing Public Offices</i> (N = 913)				
Extremely unacceptable	80.3 (184)	73.6 (368)	60.6 (66)	55.4 (41)
Unacceptable	17.5 (40)	19.0 (95)	26.4 (29)	21.6 (16)
Acceptable	2.2 (5)	6.2 (31)	10.0 (11)	9.5 (7)
Extremely acceptable	0.0 (0)	1.2 (6)	3.6 (4)	13.5 (10)
Number of cases	229	500	110	74

NOTE: Column percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

TABLE 6 *Opinion Distribution on Unification/Independence by National Identities (%)*

	<i>All Respondents</i>	<i>Taiwanese Nationalist Identity</i>	<i>Pro- Taiwan Identity</i>	<i>Mixed Identity</i>	<i>Greater China Identity</i>
Unification as soon as possible	3.6 (40)	2.2 (5)	2.4 (12)	7.8 (9)	12.3 (10)
Status quo now, then unification	21.5 (240)	8.8 (20)	21.4 (108)	44.3 (51)	45.7 (37)
Status quo now, future action undetermined	35.5 (396)	28.8 (65)	41.6 (210)	33.9 (39)	28.4 (23)
Status quo indefinitely	16.0 (178)	19.0 (43)	17.0 (86)	9.6 (11)	11.1 (9)
Status quo now, then independence	13.5 (151)	28.8 (65)	13.7 (69)	4.3 (5)	2.5 (2)
Independence as soon as possible	4.8 (53)	12.4 (28)	4.0 (20)	0.0 (0)	0.0 (0)
No response	5.1 (57)	—	—	—	—
Number of cases	1,115	226	505	115	81

NOTE: Column percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

slightly higher acceptance rate (a combined rate of 13.6%), over 70% of respondents oppose this. Without a meaningful military capability of its own, residents of Taiwan understand that they would be vulnerable to Beijing's political moods. Indeed, with these added limitations, two-thirds of the mixed identifiers and greater China identifiers reject Beijing's plan, and they are the ones most likely to support unification.

The "Double Renunciation" Plan

Does the absence of enthusiasm for Beijing's unification proposal imply a strong commitment by island residents to Taiwan independence? Using the traditional six-choice survey question, the data in Table 6 show that islanders' policy preferences vary along different types of national identities. The Taiwanese nationalists are most in favor of the pursuit of independence or the maintenance of the status quo indefinitely, followed by the pro-Taiwan identifiers, whereas the greater China identifiers and the mixed identifiers tend to prefer eventual unification. These findings are consistent with the characteristics of each category of national identity and, therefore, not unexpected, but overall very few Taiwan residents want an immediate political change toward either unification or independence. More than 80% of them prefer maintaining

TABLE 7 *Opinion Distribution on the "Double Renunciation" Proposal by National Identities (%)*

	<i>All Respondents</i>	<i>Taiwanese Nationalist Identity</i>	<i>Pro- Taiwan Identity</i>	<i>Mixed Identity</i>	<i>Greater China Identity</i>
Strongly disagree	12.3 (137)	21.8 (48)	13.7 (64)	5.5 (6)	9.2 (7)
Disagree	10.6 (118)	12.7 (28)	13.3 (62)	9.2 (10)	5.3 (4)
Agree	33.1 (369)	42.3 (93)	38.1 (178)	30.3 (33)	28.9 (22)
Strongly agree	32.0 (357)	23.2 (51)	34.9 (163)	55.0 (60)	56.6 (43)
No response	12.0 (134)	—	—	—	—
Number of cases	1,115	220	467	109	76

NOTE: Column percentages are followed by corresponding frequencies in parentheses.

the status quo now, even though they differ in their views of the island's future relations with China. It is also important to note that one-third of respondents are "undetermined" about their preference over Taiwan's long-term status, including about 40% of the pro-Taiwan identifiers and one-fourth of the Taiwanese nationalists. These "undetermined" islanders can be seen as swing voters, since their tilt in either direction could form a majority that could determine Taipei's course of action regarding future relations with Beijing.³³

Taiwan residents' overwhelming preference for maintaining the status quo has faced immense pressure lately, as Chinese leaders have redefined "Taiwan independence" to include indefinitely prolonging the status quo and have threatened the island with military force.³⁴ Beijing's repeated military threats against Taiwan are serious concerns for many islanders. Table 7 shows that more than 60% of respondents approve of a proposition for "double renunciation" by both Taipei and Beijing. Taipei would renounce its intention of seeking Taiwan's *de jure* independence in exchange for Beijing's promise to eschew force. Such strong support does not come solely from respondents with mixed identity or greater China identity. About 65% and 70% of Taiwanese nationalists and pro-Taiwan identifiers, respectively, approve of the "double renunciation" proposal. Clearly, the majority of islanders, regardless of their national identity, welcome a plan aimed at protecting their way of life and, at the same

33. Using different data, Robert Marsh also reached a similar conclusion about the effect of "swing voters." See Marsh, "National Identity and Ethnicity in Taiwan."

34. In the White Paper issued in 2000, the Beijing government warned that "... if the Taiwan authorities refuse, *sine die*, the peaceful settlement of cross-straits reunification through negotiations, then the Chinese government will only be [*sic*] forced to adopt all drastic measure possible, including the use of force, to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and fulfill the great cause of reunification." See TAO, "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue."

time, relieving them from Beijing's constant military threats. This finding, in conjunction with results in the previous tables, supports the previous assertion that national identity and policy preference are two separate and distinct concepts and not always congruent.

The above evidence shows that Taiwan residents' preferences regarding the island's long-term status vary with national identities. That is, Taiwanese nationalists and pro-Taiwan identifiers are most in favor of independence, while greater China identifiers and mixed identifiers tend to prefer eventual unification. Across the spectrum of different national identities, however, there is a common desire on the part of island residents for a secure and dignified status quo in which both sides of the Taiwan Strait could peacefully coexist. China's claim to Taiwan, in their view, is inconsistent with the political reality that the island has enjoyed *de facto* sovereignty for the past five decades. Most Taiwanese also have no desire to be a part of China as it exists today, under the terms of Beijing's unification plan. They fear that the freedom and political rights they now enjoy would be cut short under Communist rule and ultimately lost. Beijing's insistence on its version of the "one China" principle is simply not acceptable to Taiwanese people. This is why the "one country, two systems" formula lacks appeal, even for those who consider Taiwan to be a part of China, unless the plan can assure the island country's security, equality, political autonomy, and international personality.

Conclusions

Employing an approach that includes both cultural and political dimensions, this research has shown that Taiwan-centered national identities, including both the Taiwanese nationalist identity and the pro-Taiwan identity, are now dominant on the island. While those who hold such identities are divided in views of their cultural heritage, they all exhibit a psychological attachment to a political community known as Taiwan that is separate from the Chinese mainland. More important, a substantial number of island residents now believe they can be both Chinese culturally and Taiwanese politically. The younger generations in Taiwan are more likely to display characteristics of Taiwanese nationalism or a pro-Taiwan identity, but a substantial number of mainlanders, traditionally staunch supporters of greater Chinese nationalism, now also exhibit similar identities. In this context, the term "Chinese" (*Zhongguoren*) is less a political designation traditionally associated with a Chinese polity but rather becomes a term with cultural and ethnic connotations that should be more appropriately understood as "ethnic Chinese" (*Huaren*).

With the emergence of Taiwan-centered national identities, it is not surprising to see that few people on the island support Beijing's "one country, two systems" proposal, with its attached political qualifications. Since most island residents

consider Taiwan to be an independent and separate political entity from the Chinese mainland, they have no desire to be part of China under Beijing's current unification proposal. In their minds, by entering into an agreement like "one country, two systems," they will have nothing to gain but much to lose. They are suspicious of Beijing's real intent and consider its unification proposal simply as an attempt to absorb Taiwan. Even those who consider Taiwan to be a part of China, generally defined, do not find Beijing's formula appealing. However, the absence of enthusiasm for Beijing's unification proposal does not imply a strong commitment by island residents to seek Taiwan independence. They do not want to make an outright bid for *de jure* independence, as they know this would bring a violent response from the mainland and win little sympathy from the international community. An attack from China, even if unsuccessful, would destroy the economic prosperity—and perhaps even the democracy—they now enjoy.

Bazerman and Neale suggest that the status quo is one of the most commonly adopted reference points in decision-making. Most decision makers tend to use the status quo to "evaluate their options in terms of whether they represent a gain or a loss."³⁵ This argument is particularly true for the people of Taiwan, since they are unwilling to give up their current autonomy and democratic lifestyle. The rational preference of citizens of Taiwan is, therefore, continuation of the status quo while claiming the island country's *de facto* independence and sovereignty. Citizens would rather relinquish their rights to *de jure* independence, if necessary institutionalizing the status quo through a "double renunciation" agreement.

Such a strong preference for the status quo by Taiwan residents may explain why incumbent President Chen Shui-bian, who has staunch pro-independence credentials, has refrained from taking radical steps to alter the island's international status. Indeed, Taiwan has become a full-fledged democracy, and any political leader on the island must now pursue policies that will win the majority's support in such an important area—or run the risk of becoming politically irrelevant. Even if the relatively pro-unification Lien Chan and his running mate James Soong, candidates of the Pan-Blue alliance in Taiwan's 2004 presidential election, had been elected, they would find it politically very difficult to deviate from this consensus.

This preference for the status quo is not static but dynamic, because one-third of the islanders are still undetermined swing voters on issues regarding Taiwan's future relations with the Chinese mainland. As indicated earlier, their tilt in either direction could form a majority that would determine Taipei's future course of action, at least in the short run. Despite this evident flexibility, Beijing leaders so far have not offered any new incentives for Taiwan voters to

35. Max Bazerman and Margaret Neale, *Negotiating Rationally* (New York: Free Press, 1992), p. 35.

accept their unification plan. To the contrary, the Chinese government has continued its tactic of isolating Taiwan internationally, as demonstrated by recent attempts to downgrade the island's status in the World Trade Organization and to block Taipei's bid to join the World Health Organization. Both actions prompted great resentment among the island's citizens.³⁶ Beijing leaders probably believe that, with current cross-strait economic interactions, Taiwan will soon be integrated with the mainland economically. The loss of economic independence will eventually force Taipei to come to the negotiating table and accept the unification plan on Beijing's terms. However, the European Union experience³⁷ has demonstrated that economic integration does not necessarily bring political unification; in fact, time may not be on Beijing's side, if the current political stalemate continues. With Taiwan-centered national identities on the rise, the prospect of peaceful unification will become increasingly remote. An unresolved cross-strait impasse will only prolong the dispute over the legal status of the island and encourage the emergence of Taiwan as an independent nation in all but name. If this in turn triggers more aggressive behavior by an increasingly desperate China, Taiwan's citizens may unite around formal independence as the only way to preserve their shared national identity.

Based on the above evidence, it is not difficult to recognize the key features of the islanders' political preferences regarding Taiwan's future relations with the Chinese mainland: security, equality, and autonomy. As a new generation of leaders emerges on the mainland, they will need to be creative in their proposals to Taiwan residents if they are truly committed to resolving the cross-strait conflict peacefully.

Appendix 1

Survey Questions Employed in the Current Study

Questions Employed in Tables 1 and 2

1. We frequently mention "my country" in our daily conversation. To which one of the following are you referring when you say "my country"? (1) Chinese mainland, (2) Taiwan, (3) both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, (4) I do not know/refuse to answer.

36. "Taiwan Condemns Beijing over WTO Title Change Issue," *Asia Pulse*, May 28, 2003, <<http://web.lexis-nexis.com/universe/>>; Frances Williams and Kathrin Hille, "WHO Assembly Again Rejects Taiwan," *Financial Times*, May 19, 2003, <<http://news.ft.com>>.

37. Dorette Corbey, "Dialectical Functionalism: Stagnation as a Booster of European Integration," *International Organization* 49:2 (Spring 1995), pp. 253-84; and John Pinder, "European Community and Nation-State: A Case for a Neo-Federalism?" *International Affairs* 62:1 (Winter, 1985/1986), pp. 41-54.

2. We frequently mention “my countrymen” in our daily conversation. To which one of the following are you referring when you say “my countrymen”? (1) people living on the Chinese mainland, (2) people living on Taiwan, (3) people living on both the Chinese mainland and Taiwan, (4) I do not know/refuse to answer.

3. We frequently mention the “Taiwanese culture” in our daily conversation. Do you think that the Taiwanese culture is a part of the Chinese (*Zhonghua*) culture or is it completely different from the Chinese culture? (1) Taiwanese culture is a part of Chinese culture (2) Taiwanese culture is completely different from Chinese culture (3) I do not know/refuse to answer.

Questions Employed in Tables 4 and 5

4. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if the plan permits Taiwan’s economic system and way of life to remain unchanged for 50 years? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

5. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if the “one country” is not the People’s Republic of China or the Republic of China but refers to a new country called “*Zhongguo*”? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

6. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if under the plan the Beijing government can strike down some of Taiwan’s laws? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

7. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if under the plan Taiwan may keep its own armed forces but cannot acquire weaponry from other countries? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

8. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if under the plan Taiwan cannot establish diplomatic relations with foreign countries? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

9. Are you willing to accept the “One Country, Two Systems” unification proposal, if under the plan Taiwanese people cannot popularly elect the president? (1) extremely unacceptable (2) unacceptable (3) acceptable (4) extremely acceptable (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.

Question Employed in Table 6

10. There are different views on the future relationship between Taiwan and the mainland. Which of the following do you prefer? (1) Taiwan should pursue

unification with the mainland as soon as possible (2) Taiwan should pursue de jure independence as soon as possible (3) Taiwan should maintain the status quo now and then pursue unification with the mainland at a later date (4) Taiwan should maintain the status quo now and then pursue de jure independence at a later date (5) Taiwan should maintain the status quo now and make its final decision later (6) Taiwan should maintain the status quo indefinitely (7) I do not know/refuse to answer.

Question Employed in Table 7

11. Do you agree with the following statement: "Taiwan enters an agreement with the Chinese mainland such that Taiwan renounces its intention of seeking de jure independence in exchange for Beijing's commitment of not using force against Taiwan." (1) strongly disagree (2) disagree (3) agree (4) strongly agree (5) I do not know/refuse to answer.