Chapter 3

Identity and Democratic Values in Divided Taiwan

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Introduction

Literature about the consolidation of democratization in Taiwan began to appear in conferences and journals a decade after Taiwan launched its political reform in late 1980s. While national elections are regularly and peacefully held, few people doubt that Taiwan will become a genuine and mature democracy — as for the extent of maturity, only time will tell. However, a variety of political events in the last decade tempered the people's confidence in the future of democratic development in Taiwan.

Not far away from the joy of the first peaceful alternation of power in 2000, the campaign process for the 2004 presidential election and subsequent events in Taipei aroused the voters' doubt on the legitimacy of the result of the election. Soon, the scandals of President Chen Shui-bian and his family members astonished not only his supporters but also the public that the people called democracy in question. Although the second successful party alternation in 2008 indicated that Taiwan passed the two-turnover test and became a consolidated democracy (Huntington 1991: 266–267), President Ma Ying-jeou's approval rating repeatedly hit all-time low in his

second term, which started from 2012. The public seems to be resentful of the government's performance.

These events and development are closely related to the fact that the Taiwanese public is divided between the Pan-green camp and the Pan-blue camp; moreover, the division is regional — the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) dominate the south while in the north, the population leans toward the Pan-blue. What is worrisome is that Taiwan is divided ethnically. The DPP is essentially "a party of Taiwanese" while most Mainlanders support the Pan-blue camp: This is not new. However, the 2004 presidential national election was the first time in two decades that the official result was challenged. Along with this challenge were ethnic-related accusations against the DPP and Chen Shui-bian, of which both were charged with benefiting from running a campaign that was identity-centered or "ethnocentric" in nature. They were also blamed for splitting the vote among Taiwan's public. Politicians from the green-camp say the same thing about Lien Chan and James Song. Furthermore, the current President Ma Ying-jeou, born in a Mainlander family, has been charged with inclining toward China and been seriously criticized by the opposition as a result of his friendly attitude and policies toward China. These events are closely related to the division between the Pan-blue camp and the Pan-green camp. During these highly emotional conflicts, Taiwan's future with democracy is indeed in peril.

Is There a Reasonable Way Out?

This chapter explores the relationship between Taiwanese identity and democratic values relative to the challenge facing Taiwan: Identity among the Taiwanese public has created an ethnic cleavage. This type of split provides political parties a context for electoral mobilization. However, if a substitute for the sentiment of identity — ethnic or otherwise — was to be found perhaps progression toward a consolidated democracy would continue. We believe that emphasizing the value of democracy is politically better than running identity-related campaigns. In short, the future of Taiwan's democracy itself should

be highlighted — not its ethnic divisions. Therefore, the major questions asked and investigated in this chapter are:

1. What are the trends in democratic value among the Taiwanese public?
2. What are the differences between various ethnic groups?
3. What are the differences between various identity groups?

If the differences of democratic values between various identity groups and ethnic groups are becoming smaller over time, we believe that emphasizing democratic values rather than Taiwanese identity or ethnic differences will lead to a healthier democracy in Taiwan.

Data and Measurement

In order to trace the relationships between identity and democratic values in Taiwan, data collected between 1992 and 2012 from a series of national-representative surveys are analyzed in this chapter. Four of the nine nationwide face-to-face interviews were administered by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University in 1992, 1995, 1998, and 2000. Sample sizes for these surveys are 1,523 in 1992, 1,458 in 1995, 1,219 in 1998, and 1,181 in 2000. The last five waves of nationwide survey research was conducted by the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) committee in 2003, 2004, 2008 (two waves: 2008L and 2008P), and 2012. Sample sizes for these surveys were 1,674 in 2003, 1,252 in 2004, 1,238 in 2008L, 1,905 in 2008P, and 1,826 in 2012.

To capture the meaning of identity in this analysis, we use two related but different variables — ethnic group and self-identity. In terms of ethnic groups, people in Taiwan usually fall into four main groups according to their place of origin: Minnan Jen, Hakka Jen, Mainlander, and Aborigine (Wachman 1994: 15–16). Among the Minnan Jen are the descendants and the original immigrants who came to Taiwan from China before the end of Second World War; many Hakka Jen also moved to Taiwan during the same period as the Minnan Jen, but they speak a different dialect — Hakka; Mainlanders

moved to Taiwan with the KMT government after their defeat in the civil war against the Communist Party in Mainland China; Aborigine is an umbrella term for people belonging to the more than 10 aboriginal tribes in Taiwan — each of which usually has its own language. However, because of the small sample size of aborigines in the survey data, aboriginal respondents were dropped from our analysis. The related but distinguishable phenomenon regarding identity is the issue of self-identity. In Taiwan, people are divided into three groups: While some people call themselves Taiwanese; others identify themselves as Chinese; and still others say that they are both Taiwanese and Chinese.

Both ethnic group and self-identity are decisive in forming people's political attitudes and behaviors (Liu 1996, 1999; Wu 1995: Chapter 4). Figure 1 presents the change of people's self-identity in Taiwan from 1992 to 2013. In the last decade, self-identity shifted



Figure 1: Self-identity, 1992–2013

Source: Election Study Center, NCCU, important political attitude trend distribution.

substantially from Chinese identity toward Taiwanese identity. Chinese identity went from approximately 25% in 1992 to approximately 12% in 1999 and 2000; it decreased further to 3.6% in 2013. In contrast, Taiwanese identity rose from approximately 18% in 1992 to approximately 40% between 1990 and 2004, and then climbed up to 57.5% in 2013. Percentages for dual identity — Taiwanese and Chinese — fluctuated between 40 and 50% most of the time. These trends became stable between 2000 and 2008 when the DPP went to power. Since 2008, when the KMT won the presidential election, the proportion of Taiwanese identity has readily increased.

We use four survey questions asked in the nine waves of surveys in order to depict the four democratic values that we examine here: (1) freedom of speech, (2) rule of law, (3) party competition (need for opposition parties), and (4) support for democracy. Respondents were asked whether or not expressing radical political opinions should be restricted; that question is used here to measure respondents' attitudes regarding freedom of speech. A response of "no restriction on political speech" is coded as positive while a response of "restriction on political speech" is coded as negative. Questions on the relative importance of the law versus political leaders are used to measure respondents' attitudes about the rule of law. Choosing the law is coded as positive, but choosing political leaders is coded as negative. The questions concerning the need for opposition parties are used to capture respondents' attitudes about party competition. Supporting the need for opposition parties is coded as positive while "no need" in the response is coded as negative. In the last question on support of democracy, the respondents were asked to express their opinions of democracy. One who chose such a response option as "democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government" is regarded as supportive of democracy.

This longitudinal analysis of democratic values is restricted by change of questionnaires in each survey. Although the first three questions described above were asked in each of the four waves of interviews conducted by the Chengchi University between 1992 and 2000, only the question regarding the rule of law was included in the 2003 interview conducted by the TEDS project. Consequently, we

will not analyze the other two democratic values from 2003. However, these three questions were not included in the recent TEDS surveys, so we are not able to keep tracking the public's attitudes toward these democratic values. Different from these three questions, the question on support for democracy were not included in the survey until 1998. The TEDS committee has continuously embraced this question in the recent surveys, so this question is used to capture the public's up-to-date democratic value.

Traditional Confucianism emphasized the significance of political leaders in order to build and maintain a successful country, so the question regarding the relative importance between the law and political leaders could indicate at least two things: On the one hand, it could suggest the continued influence of traditional Confucianism and on the other hand, it could suggest the acceptance of the concept of the rule of law by the general public in modern democratic Taiwan.

It should be noted that the wording and the response items varied between interviews.[1] For instance, the question regarding freedom of speech was asked in 1995 as: "Some people say that regardless of what a person's political opinions are, he or she can publicly express them without any restriction, whereas others believe that there should be some restriction when political opinions are publicly expressed. Do you think whether or not we need restriction?" In 1998 and 2000, the question was: "Some people say that regardless of how radical a person's political opinions are, he or she can publicly express them. Could you tell me whether you agree or disagree with this statement?" There were 9.8% of respondents in 1995 who said that "it depends," or "it's hard to say," while there were 2.6% and 4.3% of the respondents in 1998 and 2000 respectively whose response was: "depends, hard to say." Because of the different wording in questions on these four democratic values in the nine waves of survey, we cannot adequately make direct comparisons on how respondents answered these questions over that time. For example, 42.9% of the respondents favored of no restriction on freedom of speech in 1995

[1] Please contact the authors for the questionnaires of these surveys.

while 62.1% held the same position in 1998. We are not certain whether the increased difference could be attributed to people's value change or to a difference in the wording. What we do in this chapter is trace the relationships between the two identity questions and the four democratic values from 1992 to 2012 (Chen and Chen 2002; Sheng 2003).

Findings

In this section, we analyze the survey data in order to show the relationships between the four democratic values and the two identity variables: (1) ethnic groups and (2) self-identity. First, we depict the percentages of respondents whose answer was coded positive side on each of the four democratic values among different ethnic groups and different self-identities from 1992 to 2012. After an analysis of those things, we include related variables in logit models in order to estimate the marginal impacts of both ethnic groups and self-identity upon democratic values.

Ethnic Groups and Democratic Values

The percentages of respondents belonging to different ethnic groups who held positive attitudes regarding each of the four democratic values are shown in Figures 2–5. It is evident that in the first three figures, the line indicating the percentage of Mainlanders who held positive democratic values was always higher than those of Minnan Jen and Hakka Jen. That is, the percentages of Mainlanders who favored democratic norms were always higher than those of the other two ethnic groups during the period under examination. However, this pattern was not present in Figure 5, which indicates that the three ethnic groups did not show a constant difference on their support for democracy. The two lines representing Minnan Jen and Hakka Jen intersect on the first three democratic values; hence, we are unable to say that one group is higher than the other in terms of the four democratic values. In sum, these figures suggest that ethnic group was related to the first three democratic values. That is, Mainlanders were



Figure 2: Freedom of Speech and Ethnic Group, 1992–2000



Figure 3: Rule of Law and Ethnic Group, 1992–2003

more supportive of the three democratic values than the Minnan Jen and the Hakka Jen. The plausible relationship between ethnic group and the three democratic values demands caution because different ethnic groups may have different levels of formal education and socio-economic status, which, in turn, may relate to the democratic values under examination. Logit models will be used to address this concern.



Figure 4: Party Competition and Ethnic Group, 1992–2000



Figure 5: Party Support for Democracy and Ethnic Group, 1998–2012

Self-identity and Democratic Values

The relationships between self-identity and each of the four democratic values are examined in this section: Figures 6–9 show the percentages of each of the three self-identity groups — Taiwanese, Chinese, and Dual Identity groups, who held positive attitudes on



Figure 6: Freedom of Speech and Self-identity, 1992–2000

each of the four democratic values. These four figures present a different picture from that of the previous figures concerning ethnic groups. Figure 6 shows that the three lines intersect over time and that the distances between different lines are limited. In other words, respondents with different identities did not obviously differ from others with regard to the issue of freedom of speech from 1992 to 2000. The second democratic value, the rule of law, is presented in Figure 7. While Chinese identifiers were more likely to support the idea of the rule of law between 1992 and 1995, Dual identifiers had the highest level supporting the rule of law between 1998 and 2003. Compared to the two groups, those who identified themselves as Taiwanese were least likely to value the idea of the rule of law from 1992 and 2000. Respondents' attitudes on opposition parties are presented in Figure 8, which shows that the two lines representing Chinese and the Dual identity group crossed each other three times from 1992 to 2000. It is worth noting that if we compare Figure 7 and Figure 8, Taiwanese identifiers were again at the bottom of the three lines over the same period. Compared to the other two identity groups, those who called themselves Taiwanese were least likely to be in favor of the rule of law and were unlikely to take a positive view of



Figure 7: Rule of Law and Self-identity, 1992–2003



Figure 8: Party Competition and Self-identity, 1992–2000

party competition. A different pattern was present in Figure 9, in which the three identity groups had a similar level of support for democracy before 2003, but Taiwanese identifiers showed a higher level of support for democracy than the other two groups since 2004. The effects of self-identity on democratic values will also be further examined in the logit models presented in the next section.



Figure 9: Party Support for Democracy and Ethnic Group, 1998–2012

Logit Models Explaining Democratic Values

As it was mentioned above, the change in wording of the interview questions may alter how people respond to the questions. As noted above, in 1998, the percentage of "depends, hard to say" dropped substantially in response to questions on these democratic values. For that reason, we exclude the "depends, hard to say" response from the analysis in each of the nine sets of survey data. Instead, we recode each of the four variables regarding democratic values into a dichotomous variable, namely, positive view (1) versus negative view (0); further, we use logit models to estimate the partial impacts of both ethnic group and self-identity upon democratic values. In addition to the respondents' partisanship, we include three demographic variables into these logit models: (1) gender, (2) age, and (3) education. The results of these logit models are presented in Tables 1–4 for the four democratic values.

First, we discuss the effects of the three demographic variables as well as the partisan nature on the four democratic values. Second, we turn to the effects of ethnic group and self-identity. Table 1 shows the results of the logit estimates regarding freedom of speech. Overall, the three demographic variables did not have significant effects on respondents' attitudes on freedom of speech. However, females were

Table 1: Logit Model of Freedom of Speech, 1992–2000

	Freedom of Speech							
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Female	–0.132	0.131	–0.036	0.133	0.050	0.142	–0.274*	0.138
Age	0.001	0.006	–0.001	0.006	–0.002	0.006	–0.002	0.006
Education:								
Elementary or below	–0.122	0.212	–0.365	0.208	0.251	0.234	0.082	0.240
High school	–0.073	0.206	–0.471*	0.198	–0.100	0.215	–0.143	0.210
Young College	0.297	0.263	–0.440	0.242	–0.047	0.251	–0.025	0.259
University or above	0.353	0.268	–0.265	0.262	0.234	0.271	0.298	0.250
Ethnic group:								
Minnan Jen	**–0.008**	**0.160**	**0.401***	**0.175**	**0.031**	**0.184**	**–0.008**	**0.200**
Mainlander	**–0.061**	**0.229**	**0.557***	**0.226**	**0.272**	**0.266**	**0.106**	**0.280**
Identity:								
Taiwanese	**0.098**	**0.188**	**0.619*****	**0.159**	**0.198**	**0.155**	**0.087**	**0.154**
Chinese	**–0.301***	**0.147**	**0.004**	**0.167**	**0.087**	**0.227**	**–0.022**	**0.234**

(*Continued*)

Table 1: (*Continued*)

Freedom of Speech								
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Partisanship:								
KMT	–0.084	0.144	–0.386*	0.152	–0.060	0.161	–0.026	0.198
DPP	0.832***	0.223	0.694**	0.210	0.433*	0.203	0.231	0.172
NP			0.064	0.221	0.140	0.381		
PFP							0.325	0.223
Constant	0.354	0.319	0.000	0.331	0.742	0.379	0.604	0.379
N	1,049		1,100		1,061		953	
Log likelihood	–696.177		–714.082		–619.789		–616.852	

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.

Note: All significant levels were computed using two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is coded "1" for favoring no restriction on the freedom of speech and "0" for favoring restriction on freedom of speech.

Male, junior high school, Hakka Jen, dual identity (Taiwanese and Chinese), and non-partisan were used as reference groups in independent variables.

Table 2: Logit Model of Rule of Law, 1992–2003

	Rule of Law									
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000		2003	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Female	–0.309*	0.155	–0.330*	0.146	–0.282*	0.135	–0.580***	0.149	–0.413***	0.105
Age	0.008	0.007	–0.003	0.006	0.008	0.006	0.011	0.006	0.002	0.004
Education:										
Elementary	–0.303	0.237	–0.107	0.217	–0.600**	0.007	–0.363	0.268	–0.311	0.184
High school	0.516*	0.245	0.607**	0.206	0.341	0.206	0.197	0.230	0.511**	0.174
Young College	0.546	0.317	0.515*	0.255	0.548*	0.244	0.406	0.279	0.815***	0.207
University	0.527	0.317	0.931**	0.299	0.518*	0.250	1.102***	0.258	1.078***	0.197
Ethnic group:										
Minnan Jen	**–0.272**	**0.199**	**–0.148**	**0.209**	**0.140**	**0.176**	**–0.080**	**0.212**	**–0.157**	**0.145**
Mainlander	**–0.347**	**0.274**	**–0.036**	**0.264**	**0.432**	**0.256**	**–0.139**	**0.292**	**0.232**	**0.209**
Identity										
Taiwanese	**–0.276**	**0.211**	**–0.149**	**0.168**	**–0.067**	**0.148**	**–0.155**	**0.166**	**–0.041**	**0.118**
Chinese	**–0.228**	**0.175**	**–0.059**	**0.188**	**–0.181**	**0.216**	**–0.312**	**0.244**	**–0.318**	**0.225**

(*Continued*)

Table 2: (*Continued*)

Rule of Law										
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000		2003	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Partisanship:										
KMT	–0.510**	0.177	–0.054	0.171	0.047	0.158	0.110	0.209	0.005	0.145
DPP	–0.144	0.239	0.117	0.216	–0.228	0.181	–0.094	0.184	0.286*	0.133
NP			–0.198	0.252	0.094	0.360				
PFP							–0.244	0.238	0.032	0.185
TSU									0.330	0.391
Constant	1.230**	0.383	0.763*	0.382	–0.177	0.368	–0.982*	0.405	–0.431	0.293
N	911		957		998		938		1641	
Log likelihood	–525.307		–600.224		–656.724		–559.509		–1,063.623	

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.

Note: All significant levels were computed using two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is coded "1" for favoring the relative importance of the rule of law and "0" for favoring the relative importance of leaders.

Male, junior high school, Hakka Jen, dual identity of (Taiwanese and Chinese), and non-partisan were used as reference groups in independent variables.

Table 3: Logit Model of Opposition Party, 1992–2000

Need of Opposition Parties								
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Female	−0.460**	0.165	−0.761***	0.161	−0.580***	0.165	−0.335*	0.148
Age	−0.002	0.007	0.001	0.007	0.001	0.006	−0.003	0.006
Education:								
Elementary or below	−0.513*	0.242	−0.449*	0.227	−0.008	0.250	−0.032	0.249
High school	0.926***	0.252	0.456*	0.226	0.305	0.243	0.289	0.223
Young College	1.414***	0.372	0.781*	0.307	0.378	0.292	0.212	0.271
University or above	2.258***	0.474	1.452***	0.415	0.945**	0.339	0.440	0.263
Ethnic group:								
Minnan Jen	**−0.234**	**0.208**	**0.222**	**0.213**	**0.061**	**0.207**	**−0.489***	**0.233**
Mainlander	**−0.856****	**0.292**	**0.195**	**0.281**	**−0.073**	**0.300**	**−0.615**	**0.314**
Identity:								
Taiwanese	**0.362**	**0.228**	**−0.180**	**0.187**	**−0.146**	**0.178**	**0.008**	**0.162**
Chinese	**0.146**	**0.188**	**−0.569****	**0.203**	**0.251**	**0.272**	**−0.048**	**0.258**

(*Continued*)

Table 3: (*Continued*)

Need of Opposition Parties								
Year	1992		1995		1998		2000	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Partisanship:								
KMT	−0.584**	0.180	−0.643***	0.182	−0.346	0.182	0.138	0.215
DPP	0.787**	0.303	0.390	0.254	0.716**	0.256	0.164	0.178
NP			0.241	0.311	0.189	0.479		
PFP							0.769**	0.254
Constant	1.615***	0.391	1.442***	0.427	1.387**	0.449	1.226**	0.413
N	1,062		1,066		1,033		936	
Log likelihood	−486.030		−528.038		−492.890		−557.630	

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.

Note: All significant levels were computed using two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is coded "1" for favoring the need for opposition parties and "0" for not favoring the need for opposition parties.

Male, junior high school, Hakka Jen, dual identity (Taiwanese and Chinese), and non-partisan were used as reference groups in independent variables.

Table 4: Logit Model of Support for Democracy, 1998–2012

	Support for Democracy													
Year	1998		2000		2003		2004		2008l		2008p		2012	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Female	–0.320*	0.139	–0.026	0.135	–0.521***	0.108	–0.309*	0.128	–0.163	0.129	–0.489***	0.102	–0.016	0.101
Age	0.024***	0.006	0.029***	0.006	0.021***	0.005	0.0187**	0.006	0.033***	0.006	0.022***	0.004	0.022***	0.004
Education:														
Elementary or below	–0.622*	0.231	–0.220	0.229	–0.439*	0.191	–0.678**	0.234	–0.601*	0.244	–0.499*	0.193	–0.319	0.195
High school	0.178	0.259	0.399	0.204	0.266	0.180	0.014	0.207	0.079	0.212	–0.075	0.172	0.143	0.174
Young College	0.178	0.259	0.620*	0.254	0.606**	0.214	0.521*	0.256	0.561*	0.248	0.041	0.197	0.324	0.198
University or above	0.208	0.266	0.323	0.238	0.601**	0.202	0.125	0.227	0.712**	0.225	0.185	0.188	0.267	0.184
Ethnic group:														
Minnan Jen	**–0.080**	**0.185**	**0.408***	**0.195**	**0.306***	**0.151**	**–0.045**	**0.175**	**0.003**	**0.183**	**–0.200**	**0.152**	**0.254**	**0.141**
Mainlander	**0.022**	**0.265**	**–0.175**	**0.270**	**0.174**	**0.213**	**0.194**	**0.254**	**–0.200**	**0.275**	**–0.131**	**0.209**	**0.168**	**0.199**

(*Continued*)

Table 4: (*Continued*)

	Support for Democracy													
Year	1998		2000		2003		2004		2008l		2008p		2012	
Independent Variables	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.	B	S.E.
Identity:														
Taiwanese	**0.289**	**0.153**	**0.178**	**0.150**	**0.164**	**0.122**	**0.504****	**0.147**	**0.375***	**0.145**	**0.471*****	**0.116**	**0.284***	**0.114**
Chinese	**0.005**	**0.217**	**0.034**	**0.222**	**0.191**	**0.231**	**–0.158**	**0.275**	**–0.289**	**0.313**	**–0.398**	**0.240**	**0.069**	**0.264**
Partisanship:														
KMT	0.383*	0.160	–0.105	0.195	–0.045	0.149	–0.030	0.167	–0.178	0.159	0.203	0.128	0.184	0.128
DPP	0.362	0.192	0.337*	0.167	0.482***	0.137	0.145	0.164	0.081	0.174	0.413**	0.133	0.579***	0.137
NP	–0.038	0.355					–0.647	0.629	–0.492	0.554	–0.474	0.599	–0.284	0.578
PFP			–0.120	0.210	0.043	0.187	0.227	0.268			–0.023	0.500	0.191	0.481
TSU					0.997*	0.431	0.076	0.519	–0.007	0.648	0.516	0.593	1.271	0.652
Constant	–0.379	0.388	–1.544***	0.374	–1.422***	0.308	–0.420	0.370	–1.335***	0.363	–0.935**	0.297	–1.443	0.309
N	1,014		989		1,516		1,105		1,072		1,693		1,701	
Log likelihood	–624.291		–651.239		–997.994		–714.154		–698.694		–1,123.561		–1,128.834	

***$p < 0.001$; **$p < 0.01$; *$p < 0.05$.

Note: All significant levels were computed using two-tailed tests. Dependent variable is coded "1" for in favor of need of opposition parties and "0" for not in favor of need of opposition parties.

Male, junior high school, Hakka Jen, dual identity of both Taiwanese and Chinese, and non-partisan were used as reference groups in independent variables.

less likely to favor freedom of speech than males in 2000 and respondents with senior high school education were less likely than those with junior high school education to support freedom of speech in 1995. Partisanship had significant effects on the attitudes regarding freedom of speech. Compared to those without partisan connection, people who identified with the DPP were significantly more likely to be in favor of the freedom of speech between 1992 and 1998 while the KMT identifiers were more likely to take a negative view on freedom of speech in 1995. However, there was no significant effect of partisanship on freedom of speech in 2000.

The results of the logit model regarding the rule of law were presented in Table 2. Gender consistently had significant effects on this democratic norm: Females were less likely than males to favor the "rule of law" from 1992 to 2003. Education also played a role in the idea of rule of law. Overall, compared to those with a junior high school education, people with lower levels of education were more likely to take a negative view on the rule of law; whereas those with a higher level of education were more likely to take a positive view. In all, partisanship did not produce substantive effects on the rule of law, except for the significant effects of KMT partisanship being negative in 1992 and DPP partisanship being positive in 2003.

Table 3 shows the estimates of the logit model of party competition wherein females were consistently more likely to respond negatively on the need for strong opposition parties than males in the four interviews. Education again played a significant role in the respondents' views of party competition before 2000. That is, those with an elementary school education and those without education were less likely to support the need for strong opposition parties while those who are better educated were more likely to favor the need for strong opposition parties. However, the significant effects of education on this attitude gradually disappeared since 1998. Additionally, partisanship had a significant impact on this democratic value — to the extent that the following pattern presented itself. Interestingly, those who identified with the ruling party at the time of interview were less likely to favor the need for strong opposition parties, but those who identified with an opposition party were more likely to support the need for

strong opposition parties. In other words, partisanship affected the respondents' views of the need for opposition parties.

Table 4 presents the results of the model of support for democracy, which shows recent information about the public's opinions toward attitudes. Respondents who indicated that democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government were viewed as supportive of democracy in this analysis. Similar to the previous models, females were more likely to have a negative view on democracy than males. Whereas age was not related to the previous three democratic values, age consistently had significant effects on people's preference for democracy. Older people were more likely to think democracy being the most preferable form of government between 1998 and 2012. In terms of education, people with higher education were more likely to show their support for democracy. Partisanship also had significant effects on the public's attitudes toward democracy. DDP identifiers have been more supportive of democracy most of the time than those without partisanship, no matter whether DPP was in power or not. This is a good sign for Taiwan's democracy.

The main concern of this chapter lies in the effect of ethnic group and self-identity on democratic values. According to the results already presented, the two variables had significantly affected views on freedom of speech, party competition, and support for democracy in a number of cases. However, the two variables did not influence views on the rule of law over the period. In terms of freedom of speech, compared to the Hakka Jen, both the Minnan Jen and the Mainlanders were significantly more likely to have a positive view on the issue of the freedom of speech in 1995. In addition, those who called themselves Chinese in 1992 were more likely to view the freedom of speech negatively while those with a Taiwanese identity in 1995 were more likely to have a positive attitude toward the freedom of speech. Neither ethnic group nor self-identity group significantly changed the respondents' views of the freedom of speech after 1995. With regard to attitudes on the need for opposition parties, the Mainlanders in 1992, the Minnan Jen in 2000, and those identifying themselves as Chinese in 1995 were significantly less likely to agree with the need

for strong opposition parties. With regard to support for democracy, while ethnicity produced significant effects before 2003, self-identity has had significant impact since 2004.

People's attitudes on the rule of law were not altered by their ethnic group or their self-identity. In addition, when ethnic group and self-identity are considered, the mindset of an individual on the democratic values of the freedom of speech and the need for opposition parties was mostly influenced prior to 1998. The last democratic value, support for democracy, provided us with more up-to-date information, which shows that while the effect of ethnicity disappeared since 2004, Taiwanese identity started to produce positive effect at the same time. Since the public has been consistently moving toward Taiwanese identity, the significant relationship between support for democracy and Taiwanese identity indicates that support for democracy has been increasing in the process of democratization in Taiwan. On the one hand, it is found that the influence of ethnic group and self-identity on democratic values has been diminishing after the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the remaining effects of identity on support for democracy imply positive development of Taiwan's democracy.

Conclusion

We began this chapter with concern that the emotion-filled and ethnically charged environment of electoral politics might do damage to the foundation to the healthy development of democracy in Taiwan. Thus, we set out to examine viewpoints surrounding democratic values held by the Taiwanese over the last two decade. Basically, we find strong public support for democracy in Taiwan.

Furthermore, we find that the differences in democratic values among different ethnic and identity groups are decreasing. This finding implies that promoting the value of democracy will increase political consensus among different identity groups. Given that the distribution of identity in Taiwan has kept moving toward Taiwanese identity, which is related to support for democracy, we do not envision difficulty in continuing the process of democratization in Taiwan.

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