

## I. Theoretical Debate over Balancing-Bandwagoning Concept in the Post-Cold War Era

What causes states to support another country? How do statesmen choose among potential threats when seeking external support? How do the great powers choose which states to protect, and how do weaker states decide whose protection to accept? In short, how do states choose their friends?<sup>1</sup>

These questions open the book which has for quite a long time made significant impact on international relations theories. Though, Stephen Walt wrote his famous book *The Origins of Alliances* in late 1980s in the atmosphere of the Cold War confrontation between two superpowers, these question and answer the author gave to them still retain profound theoretical and practical importance.

Do states tend to balance or to bandwagon? The answer to this question is critical for the formulation of grand strategy and the definition of vital interests of any state. Answering this question in the context of the cross-Strait relation is particularly important to understand the current developments of the Taiwan's mainland policies. The rise of China and its firm determination to achieve unification is the reality Taiwan cannot ignore. China's ascent to the position of a potential superpower has put before Taiwan a difficult question of choosing proper response – response which would guarantee security and wealth of the island.

In order to answer the fundamental question “What is the current response of Taiwan toward the rise of China and what are reasons which determine the development of the Taiwan's mainland policy over the time?” we first need to look at the theoretical debate about alliance formation and responses weak states give to the preponderant powers.

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<sup>1</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987): 1

Therefore, in this chapter is in essence a critical overview of theories and approaches which have provided answer to these questions. First, the basics of the balancing-bandwagoning concept will be introduced. Then the chapter will proceed to an review of the critique of the Walt's concept.<sup>2</sup> Finally, an overview of some main alternative theories will be made.

### **The Formulation of the Concept and its Development**

The term "bandwagoning" as a description of international alliance behavior first appeared as a detailed theoretical concept in Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*. Waltz credits Stephen van Evera for the invention of the term "bandwagoning,"<sup>3</sup> however Randall Schweller finds this reference to be a mistake and suggests that real inventor was Quincy Wright.<sup>4</sup>

In his structural model of balance-of-power theory, Waltz uses "bandwagoning" to serve as the opposite of balancing: bandwagoning refers to joining the stronger coalition, balancing means allying with the weaker side. Waltz put it in this way: "Secondary states, if they are free to choose, flock to the weaker side; for it is the stronger side that threatens them. On the weaker side, they are both more appreciated and safer, provided, of course, that the coalition they join achieves enough defensive or deterrent strength to dissuade adversaries from attacking."<sup>5</sup> Waltz and all structural realists view balancing as a law-like phenomenon in international politics. According to Waltz:

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<sup>2</sup> While making an overview of critique I don't touch upon liberal or constructivist criticism and will stay exclusively within neo-realism paradigm. Therefore I cannot claim that this overview is exhaustive.

<sup>3</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126

<sup>4</sup> Randall L. Schweller, "Rise of Great Power: History and Theory," in *Engaging China. The management of an emerging power*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnson and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 28, note 42

<sup>5</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 126-127

From the theory, one predicts that states will engage in balancing behavior whether or not balanced power is the end of their acts. From the theory, one predicts a strong tendency toward balance in the system. The expectation is not that a balance once achieved will be maintained, but that a balance once disrupted will be restored in one way or another. Balances of power recurrently form.<sup>6</sup>

Kenneth Waltz also made an important distinction between internal and external balancing in his work.<sup>7</sup> By internal balancing he understands relying on state's own capabilities (military buildup). That is more reliable and precise way of balancing. By external balancing Waltz understands relying on capabilities of allies. However, it is easier to misjudge capabilities of allies that can cause uncertainty and lead to wars.

Kenneth Waltz briefly formulated the idea, and that was Stephen Walt who developed this theory. Though his theory was a logical continuation of Waltz's ideas, it has nevertheless significantly reformulated many of basic assumptions of the balance of power theory.

Stephen Walt modifies balance of power theory by emphasizing the role played by threat perceptions in stimulating balancing behavior among states. Walt argues that states tend to balance against threats and not necessarily against power: "When confronted by a significant external threat, states may either balance or bandwagon. Balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger."<sup>8</sup> Weaker actors could therefore perceive the power of an existing or rising state as benign and not to be balanced by countervailing power. In his work on alliance formation in the Middle East, Walt tests his theory and concludes that balancing against power is not common, but balancing against threat is more prevalent in the regional subsystems.<sup>9</sup> The factors that determine

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<sup>6</sup> Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theories of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 128

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 168

<sup>8</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 17

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 5

balancing or bandwagoning are aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and the offensive intentions of a powerful actor. According to Walt's theory, states sometimes bandwagon with a preponderant power especially if that power offers them security and economic advantages. Bandwagoning logic claims that balancing is not a natural behavior of states, that it is indeed joining hands with the powerful that is the dominant pattern of state behavior. Walt has identified two motives for bandwagoning with a threatening state or coalition: to avoid an attack on oneself and to "share the spoils of victory." Walt argues, however, that balancing is more common than bandwagoning because "an alignment that preserves most of a state's freedom of action is preferable to accepting subordination under a potential hegemonic power. Because intentions can change and perceptions are unreliable, it is safer to balance against potential threats than to hope that strong states will remain benevolent."<sup>10</sup>

Walt, like Waltz, intended to put balancing and bandwagoning in polar opposition. And, the literature on alliance behavior in international relations theory has largely accepted Walt's definition of bandwagoning as aligning with the most menacing threat.

Later on Walt expanded his definition of bandwagoning:

Bandwagoning involves *unequal exchange*; the vulnerable state makes asymmetrical concessions to the dominant power and accepts a subordinate role. Bandwagoning is an accommodation to pressure (either latent or manifest). Most important of all, bandwagoning suggests a willingness to support or tolerate illegitimate actions by the dominant ally<sup>11</sup>

Walt's also test the influence of ideology and foreign aid instrument on the alliance choices and finds out that they are not that important in the explaining of states' international behavior.

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<sup>10</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 180

<sup>11</sup> Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition," in *Dominoes and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, ed. Robert Jervis and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 55

Walt theory is a great contribution to the understanding of alliance dynamics in the Cold War era. The author claims that his theory "... improves on balance of power theory by providing greater explanatory power with equal parsimony."<sup>12</sup> The concept of balancing-bandwagoning became a common truth among scholars of international relations. This fixation on balancing, and its counterpart, bandwagoning, appears to lie in the almost unquestioned assumption that these two strategies represent the two main, if not exclusive, approaches to state security in world politics.

### **Critique of Walt's theory**

Though Walt presents his ideas in very comprehensive, critical, and convincing way, his balance-of-threat theory sparked a heated debate among the scholars of the international relations.

Stressing the difference in political regime, Robert Kaufman argued that democracies do not behave as balance-of-threat theory predicts, because various domestic constraints imposed by the democratic process (e.g. checks and balances, democratic legislative procedures etc.) delay balancing behavior and diminish its effectiveness. As an example, Kaufman pointed at the appeasement policy by Western powers and their slow formulation of balancing strategy to counter Hitler. Given the clear threat represented by Nazi Germany in 1930s, Kaufman claimed, that weak response of Western democracies undermines the basic idea of Walt's theory.<sup>13</sup>

Deborah Larson's central charge against Walt's theory is that it cannot explain why similarly situated states behave in opposite ways and contrary to the theory's prediction; why strong states sometimes bandwagon and weak states balance. To explain these empirical anomalies Larson offers an institutionalist approach that measures state strength not only by economic capabilities and political stability but also by the nature of its state-society relations. Presuming that elites' primary concern is to preserve their rule, Larson concludes that bandwagoning can help a weak

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<sup>12</sup> Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 263

<sup>13</sup> Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or to Bandwagon? Alignment Decisions in 1930's Europe," *Security Studies* 1:3 (1992): 419-420

regime retain authority by ending external subversion, undermining domestic rivals, and providing economic assistance.<sup>14</sup>

Jack Levy and Michael Barnett complain about neglect of domestic and ideological factors in the neorealist literature on the alliance formation. They stress the resource-providing function of alliances and the impact of the domestic political economy on Third World alignments and conclude that Third World alliances are formed to secure urgently needed economic and military resources to promote domestic goals, respond to external and internal security threats, and to consolidate their domestic political positions.<sup>15</sup> Similarly, Steven David on the material of the Third World alliances argue that elites often bandwagon with hostile powers to balance more dangerous domestic or foreign threats.<sup>16</sup>

This critique was not very successful. Walt managed to provide comprehensive responses. First of all, his theory predicts most cases of bandwagoning which his critics attribute to the domestic sources. According to neo-realist way of measuring state power states with illegitimate leaders and inefficient institutions are weak states which are likely to bandwagon anyway<sup>17</sup>. The Kaufmann's argument about tendency of democracies to bandwagon was refuted by Walt by pointing out at the ambiguity of Hitler's intentions in 1930s and at the active democratic response after 1939.

Secondly, the claim by David that weak domestic elites often bandwagon with the external adversaries in order to cope with the domestic threats is consistent with Walt's argument that

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<sup>14</sup> Deborah Welch Larson, "Bandwagon Images in American Foreign Policy: Myth or Reality?" in *Dominies and Bandwagons. Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland*, ed. Robert Jervys and Jack Snyder (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 103

<sup>15</sup> Jack S. Levy and Michael N. Barnett, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignment: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," *International Organization* 45:3 (1991): 375-377

<sup>16</sup> Stephen R. David, "Explaining Third World Alignment," *World Politics* 43 (1991): 239-240

<sup>17</sup> Walt defines power as a combination of several different components including economic development and political cohesion and thus views states lacking these elements as weak and prone to bandwagoning. See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), 250, 265

states balance against the most dangerous threat to their survival. Third, Walt had an advantage because unlike his opponents he did an extensive research on alliance formation in Middle East and Southwest Asia and therefore could claim that his theory is free of Europe-centered bias and is equally applicable in different regions of the world. Finally, Walt dismissed the idea of the resource providing function of alliances by actually testing it.

Walt's counter-arguments against these critics were quite convincing and his theory has become a mainstream of thinking in the neorealist analysis of alliance formation.

Some scholars who generally accept Walt premises emphasized the inflexibility of Walt's hypothesis and offered a revision of the meaning of balancing. For instance, T.V. Paul writes: "various means that states adopt, besides increasing their military strength or forming alliances, should be a part of our analysis to better understand today's balancing strategies. Traditional balancing through alliance formation and military buildups is significant, but it seems able to capture only one, albeit the most significant, form of balance of power behavior."<sup>18</sup> The scholar suggests including economic and political relations of states in the analysis of the balancing strategies. T.V. Paul also expands the understanding of balancing by promoting concepts of "hard", "soft", "asymmetric" balancing, of which only one belongs to the traditional neorealist analysis.

All aforementioned critics of Walt accepted his assumption that alliance choices are best examined as a response to threats; consequently, critics didn't challenge the Walt's definition of bandwagoning as giving up to the most menacing threat.

Randall Schweller in his critique of Walt's theory first of all questions the definition of bandwagoning designed by Walt. Schweller claims that that is exactly the definition which, in Walt's research, makes bias in favor of disproportionately finding balancing over bandwagoning

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<sup>18</sup>T.V. Paul, "Introduction: The Enduring Axioms of Balance of Power Theory and Their Contemporary Relevance," in *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004): 3

behavior. “Defining bandwagoning as a form of capitulation Walt not surprisingly finds that balancing is more common than bandwagoning.”<sup>19</sup>

Schweller finds three problems in the way Walt defined “bandwagoning”. First, the scholar reproaches Walt for departing from the conventional usage of “bandwagoning”. Second, in Schweller’s opinion, Walt’s definition excludes common forms of bandwagoning for profit rather than security. And finally, Walt’s definition reflects status-quo bias and doesn’t consider revisionist powers.

As mentioned, Walt associates bandwagoning with giving in to threats, unequal exchanges favoring the dominant power, acceptance of illegitimate actions by the stronger ally, and involuntary compliance. This view of the concept illustrates the tendency among political scientists to ignore the role of positive inducements in the exercise of power. Yet, positive sanctions are the most effective means to induce bandwagoning behavior.<sup>20</sup>

Schweller broadens the causes of alignment. In his opinion:

Alliances choices, however, are often motivated by opportunities for gain as well as danger, by appetite as well as fear. Balance-of-threat theory is designed to consider only cases in which the goal of alignment is security, and so it systematically excludes alliances driven by profit. When profit or rather than security drives alliance formation, there is no reason to expect that states will be threatened or cajoled to enter the alliance; they do so willingly. The bandwagon gains momentum through the promise of rewards, not the threat of punishment.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19:1 (1994): 79

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 88

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 79



Schweller identifies different forms of bandwagoning, however, they are all motivated by the prospect of gains. That is the essential difference between bandwagoning and balancing. As Schweller puts it:

Balancing is an extremely costly activity that most states would rather not engage in, but sometimes must to survive and protect their values, bandwagoning rarely involves cost and is typically done in the expectation of gain, this is why bandwagoning is more common ... than Walt and Waltz suggest.<sup>22</sup>

Instead, Schweller offers the balance-of-interest theory. The most important conclusion of his considerations is that balancing and bandwagoning are not contrary to each other as Waltz and Walt claimed; the opposite to balancing is aggression. Rather than being opposites, bandwagoning and balancing are rather associated with opposite systemic conditions – with revisionism and status-quo respectively.<sup>23</sup>

One of concepts designed to overcome the inflexibility of the Walt's concept and to refer to an alternative strategy distinguishable from balancing and bandwagoning is hedging. The concept is borrowed from the field of finance where it means "Risk management strategy used in limiting or offsetting probability of loss from fluctuations in the prices of commodities, currencies, or securities. In effect, hedging is a transfer of risk without buying insurance policies. It employs various techniques but, basically, involves taking equal and opposite positions in two different markets. Hedging is used also in protecting one's capital against effects of inflation through investing in high-yield financial instruments."<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19:1 (1994): 93

<sup>23</sup> Ibid., 107. Schweller distinguishes four types of actors in the international arena depending on their power and intentions: "lions" (strong *status quo* states willing to maximize their security); "lambs" (weak *status quo* states); "jackals" (weak revisionist states which tend bandwagon in expectation of gains), and "wolves" (strong revisionist states which are bandwagons). See Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," *International Security* 19:1 (1994): 101-102

<sup>24</sup> "Hedging," *BusinessDictionary.com*, <http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/hedging.html>

In the international relations the meaning of hedging has not yet been fundamentally established. Therefore, there are many attempts to define the term. What is similar for all definitions is a desire to overcome the strict dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning and to prove that different strategies which structural neo-realists suppose to be mutually exclusive can easily be implemented simultaneously.<sup>25</sup>

Talking about Sino-American relations Evan Meideros describes hedging as follows: "To hedge, the United States and China are pursuing policies that, on one hand, stress engagement and integration mechanisms and, on the other, emphasize realist-style balancing in the form of external security cooperation with Asian states and national military modernization programs."<sup>26</sup>

Another scholar defines the term "hedging" "as a behavior in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes."<sup>27</sup> Similarly, Robert J. Art writes about post-Cold War Europe: "In their policies toward Germany, Russia, and the United States, the nations of Europe have generally hedged their security bets by utilizing both balancing and integrating mechanisms."<sup>28</sup>

The hedging in essence is a two-pronged approach because it operates by simultaneously pursuing two sets of mutually counteracting policies: one aimed at maximizing security in view of preponderant power and another one aimed at gaining some profits from relation with this power.

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<sup>25</sup> Randall L. Schweller, "Rise of Great Power: History and Theory," in *Engaging China. The management of an emerging power*, ed. Alastair Iain Johnson and Robert S. Ross (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 17

<sup>26</sup> Evan S. Meideros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," *The Washington Quarterly* 29:1 (2005-2006): 145

<sup>27</sup> Cheng-chwee Kuik, "Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Responce to a Rising China," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 30:2 (2008): 163

<sup>28</sup> Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in *Balance of Power. Theory and Practice in the 21st Century*, ed. T. V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 184

Bringing the dispute over Walt's theory down to the level of East Asia region, David Kang argues that China is emerging as a center of gravity on which everyone else are bandwagoning. Similarly to Schweller, David Kang argues that bandwagoning is not that rare as Walt predicted. Kang observes that "Because Europe was so important for so long a period, in seeking to understand international relations, scholars have often simply deployed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia."<sup>29</sup> This observation is equally correct regarding Walt's balancing-bandwagoning concept. Scholars have no reason to think that balancing behavior is homogeneously distributed across all regions, and that because it occurred in Europe, it will in Asia as well.<sup>30</sup>

One of the conclusions of Kang's analysis is that contrary to predictions of realism Asian nations do not appear to balance rising China, rather they tend to bandwagon it. China's rise should be provoking balancing behavior in the region, just because its overall capabilities and growth prospects are so high.<sup>31</sup> That doesn't happen. The reason for this deviation from the realism paradigm is that the whole structure of the interstate relations in East Asia differs drastically from what Europe experienced. Kang suggests that in periods of strong China order in the whole regions was preserved, whereas weak China meant periods of instability and chaos. "East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West."<sup>32</sup> The system was based on military and economic power but was also reinforced through centuries of cultural exchange and diffusion of Chinese institutions, and the units in the system were sovereign states that had political control over recognized geographic areas.<sup>33</sup> East

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<sup>29</sup> David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27: 4 (2003): 58

<sup>30</sup> David C. Kang, "Hierarchy, Balancing, and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations," *International Security* 28:3 (2003-2004): 169

<sup>31</sup> David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27: 4 (Spring 2003): 64

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, 66

<sup>33</sup> David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007): 41-46

Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality. With China as the dominant state and surrounding countries as peripheral or secondary states, as long as hierarchy was observed there was little need for interstate war. Though this order was destroyed in the nineteenth century as a result of Western intrusion and rise of Japan, nowadays China seems to reemerge as a gravitational center for East Asia. Of course, centuries of change and, more important, the U.S. influence in the region mean that Chinese-led system won't look like the tributary states system in the Imperial times. Since, according to Kang, China is not a revisionist power<sup>34</sup>, neither does it harbor any imperial ambitions, the countries of East and Southeast Asia don't find it necessary to balance rising China, even despite strong American military and political presence in the region.

In their paper, Cheng Tun-jen and Philip S. Hsu offered a new concept of political arbitrage. In their opinion neither balancing, nor bandwagoning alone can account for East Asian states behavior adequately, because these states devise their policy deliberately to encompass both elements.<sup>35</sup> Borrowing the conceptualization from Stephen Revere the scholars write:

Political arbitrage ... is not only a balancing act, but also an act with a larger purpose. Arbitrage goes beyond risk diversification. For arbitrage, merely purchasing insurance or keeping a fallback position is not enough. Constant monitoring of market conditions and timely adjustment of one's portfolio, and even some risk-taking, may even be required.<sup>36</sup>

The crucial factor which compels East Asian states to prefer political arbitrage to balancing or bandwagoning is "extraordinary fluidity and uncertainty in terms of capability distribution." Unfortunately, authors don't specify more on their concept. In fact, they recognize that it is akin

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<sup>34</sup> The only case where China is clearly striving to alter the existing *status quo* is Taiwan issue.

<sup>35</sup> Tun-jen Cheng and Philip S. Hsu, "Between Power Balancing and Bandwagoning: Rethinking the Post-Cold War East Asia," in *Rethinking New International Order in East Asia: U.S., China and Taiwan*, ed. I Yuan (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University, 2004), 430

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 431

to dynamic hedge the only difference being is that political arbitrage involves pursuit of opportunities for “higher return” which may require risk taking.<sup>37</sup> Their claim that uncertainty in terms of capability distribution is also highly questionable, and authors themselves admit that despite China’s rapid rise, U.S. and Japan have maintained an overwhelming lead ahead of China in vital dimension of national power.<sup>38</sup>

Chong Ja Ian in his papers published by the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies (Singapore) offers new model for understanding weaker states’ responses to preponderant power (the United States in the papers). Author suggests that historically, balancing and bandwagoning do not have as strong a track record for explaining state behaviour as international relations scholarship sometimes like to claim. Chong Ja Ian argues that second-tier states that are unable to change the distribution of power within a unipolar system, but are strong enough to assert some degree of independence from leading state are likely to adopt strategies that go beyond balancing and bandwagoning. The pattern of their strategic choices, however, may depend on the level of power disparity with the leading state and level of integration in the world system.<sup>39</sup> Depending on these two criteria, the state’s choice might be one of four named below: bonding, binding, buffering, beleaguering. States with less of a power disparity with the system leader tend toward buffering and beleaguering. Those who experience a larger power gap may prefer bonding or binding. Simultaneously, states that enjoy more integration in the world system may lean toward buffering and binding, while those that have less linkage may adopt bonding or beleaguering.

The applicability of Chong’s theory might be very limited. He analyzed states’ response to a hegemonic power of the U.S. Will the pattern would be the same in the responses toward China? Then, the criteria of measuring state’s integration into the world society are questionable. Finally,

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<sup>37</sup> Tun-jen Cheng and Philip S. Hsu, "Between Power Balancing and Bandwagoning: Rethinking the Post-Cold War East Asia," in *Rethinking New International Order in East Asia: U.S., China and Taiwan*, ed. I Yuan (Taipei: Institute of International Relations National Chengchi University, 2004), 453

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 432

<sup>39</sup> Ja Ian Chong, *Revisiting Responses to Power Preponderance: Going Beyond the Balancing-Bandwagoning Dichotomy* (Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2003), 10

the theory doesn't consider domestic factors. In the particular case of Taiwan, neither changes in relative power, nor changes in the level of integration can be viewed as reasons for drastic changes in the mainland policy of Taiwan since Ma's presidency.

Although the literature review above reinforced the main argument here, limited scope and depth of this short overview could be challengeable. Of course, it is impossible to make an overview of all critical works inspired by Walt's concept.<sup>40</sup> Therefore only those critical works were considered which reveal serious weaknesses of Walt's hypothesis and provide some improvement over it.

### **Summary of the Chapter I**

This chapter briefly reviews the balancing and bandwagoning concept. First, the basic idea laid down by Kenneth Waltz in his *Theory of International Politics* are considered. This basic concept which was an organic part of balance-of-power theory was substantively reformulated by Stephen Walt. Walt's main idea is that the most significant determinant of the alliance behavior for states is not solely the power but threat. In Walt's opinion, balancing is far more widely spread than bandwagoning.

The ideas of Walt have become a common truth among scholars researching on alliance formation. However, almost immediately after their formulation Walt's ideas had been severely criticized by many scholars and from different viewpoints. Such scholars as Kaufmann, Larson, Levy, Barnett, and David criticized Walt for the neglect of domestic factors in the process of

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<sup>40</sup> Among works which are not mentioned in this chapter but which shaped my understanding of the problem see: Mark Beeson, "The Declining Theoretical and Practical Utility of 'Bandwagoning': American Hegemony in the Age of Terror," *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9:4 (2007): 618-635; Evelyn Goh, "Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia. Analyzing Regional Security Strategies," *International Security* 32:3 (2008): 113-157; Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," *Foreign Affairs* 81:5 (2002): 110-121; David A. Lake, "Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations," *International Organizations* 50:1 (1996): 1-33; Robert S. Ross, "Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia," in *Balance of Power: theory and practice in the 21st century*, ed. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz and Michel Fortmann (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 267-304; Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-First Century," *International Security* 23:4 (1999): 81-118; Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?" *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 27:2 (2005): 305-322; David Shambaugh, "Return to the Middle Kingdom? China and Asia in the Early Twenty-First Century," in *Power Shift. China and Asia's New Dynamics*, ed. David Shambaugh (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), 23-47 and many others.

alliance formation. Randall Schweller in his turn dismissed the main argument of Walt – namely that states’ alliance choices are predetermined by threats. In Schweller’s opinion states choose their allies in search of gains. Assuming that balancing is costly, Schweller comes to idea that bandwagoning is norm in international relation rather than deviation. Similarly, David Kang observing the post-Cold War era situation in East Asia finds that despite prediction of Walt’s theory states in the region don’t tend to be balancing against rising China. They are not bandwagoning either. Rather, they adopt strategies which lie somewhere between two extremes of balancing and bandwagoning.

It has also been shown that there were numerous attempts to develop alternatives to balancing-bandwagoning dichotomy. One of the most important is the concept of hedging which has found wide application in describing alignment strategies in the South East Asia. There were also some interesting attempts to develop concepts based on the empirical evidences from the East Asian international relations. Particularly, Cheng Tun-jen and Philip S. Hsu offered the idea of “political arbitrage” which they claim was similar to dynamic form of hedging. Another attempt is the concept of Chong Ja Ian who developed strict criteria to measure states’ responses to hegemonic power.

This overview has demonstrated that a number of alternatives exist and that Walt’s balancing-bandwagoning concept is no more taken for granted. As we can see all critical points have something in common. Though they emphasize different flaws in the Walt’s theory of balance-of-threat, they all agree that this theory is too rigid, particularistic, and inflexible. Another common recurrent point in the critique is an obvious discrepancy between Walt’s prediction about relative insignificance of bandwagoning and frequent occurrence of bandwagoning behavior in real practice of international relations.