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孔子學院在莫斯科：國家形象與在地認知

Confucius Institutes in Moscow: National Image and Local  
Perception

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中華民國 104 年 7 月

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孔子學院在莫斯科：國家形象與在地認知

# Confucius Institutes in Moscow: National Image and Local Perception

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
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*Taipei, Taiwan*

Maria Borisova



## Abstract

Confucius Institute (CI) is one of China's soft power policy initiatives. It aims to promote Chinese language and culture all over the globe, enhance the world's understanding of China. Today there are already 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms in the world.

Russia is one China's closest friends and allies, as well as its important political, economic and strategic partner. Due to the continuous development of the bilateral relations, Russian people are more and more interested in Chinese language. To meet their need in studying Mandarin, China is actively promoting the establishment of the Confucius Institute there. Now there are already 18 Confucius Institutes and 5 Confucius Classroom 5 in Russia.

The name of this thesis is: "Confucius Institutes in Moscow: national image and local perception." It aims at understanding what kind of attitude Russians, who teach or study Chinese either at the CI or somewhere else, have towards the Confucius Institute. Besides, it was also important to understand whether Sino-Russian relations play a crucial role in shaping people's attitude towards the CI.

Throughout the research the author used primary data sources (field work, interviews), as well as secondary data sources. Field research was conducted only in Moscow, the rest of the information about the development of the CIs in Russia is observed through the secondary data sources (reports, newspapers, journals).

Results of the analysis indicate that the majority of Russian people, on the example of Moscow, have favorable attitude towards the Confucius Institute. Although in general there are also those who are skeptical about this initiative in Russia, stating that China is using the CIs as a part of its intelligence network, but the overall impression is positive. The PRC managed to create a favorable image of itself in Russia, and the Confucius Institute is one of the tools it uses in order to reach its aim.

## 論文摘要

孔子學院是中國軟實力政策的展現。它創設的目的是為了向世界推廣中國文化與漢語，增進世界各國對中國的瞭解，目前全球已設有 443 所孔子學院與 648 間孔子課堂。

俄羅斯是中國最友好的朋友之一，也是重要的政治、經濟、戰略夥伴。因為兩國的關係不斷地發展，俄羅斯人對漢語的興趣也越來越高。為滿足俄羅斯人的需要，中國遂把在俄羅斯設立孔子學院列為積極推動的項目。俄羅斯目前已經有 18 所孔子學院與 5 間孔子課堂。

本論文的題目是『孔子學院在莫斯科：國家的形象與在地認知』，旨在瞭解在俄羅斯漢語教師與學生對孔子學院的觀感為何。

本論文所採用用的研究方法為面對面訪問跟次級資料分析。

分析的結果顯示，大部分受訪者持正面的看法，並對孔子學院給予高度評價，以及認為孔子學院對中俄關係的發展產生很重要的作用。雖然有一些人認為，孔子學院是中國政府情報機關的部分，但是總的印象是正面的。中國在俄羅斯成功地建立其自身的良好形象，而孔子學院是它以達到其目的使用的工具之一。

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## List of Acronyms

- AF: Alliance Française
- AIIB: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
- APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
- BTC SOL: Scholarship for Students of Bachelor's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages
- CC: Confucius Classroom
- CCTV: China Central Television
- CI: Confucius Institute
- GI: Goethe Institute
- HSK: Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi
- HSKK: Hanyu Shuiping Koyu Kaoshi
- MSU: Moscow State University
- MSLU: Moscow State Linguistic University
- MTCSOL: Master's degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages
- RF: Russian Federation
- RSUH: Russian State University for the Humanities
- PRC: People's Republic of China
- SCO: Shanghai Cooperation Organization
- UK: United Kingdom
- UN: United Nations
- US: United States
- USA: United States of America
- USD: United States Dollar
- USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

## Chapter 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Background and Purpose of the Study

The end of the Cold War marked a new page in history and relations among various nations. The exchanges between various countries started to develop day by day. One of the most significant achievements in the post Cold War era is the exchanges in the cultural field. In the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions among peoples are not ideological, political, or economic. They are cultural (Huntington, 1996). More and more nations feel that it is necessary to introduce their culture to others, to use it as a new tool on the international arena.

In 1990, an American political scientist Joseph Nye introduced a new term – “soft power”. According to Nye (2004), everyone knows what a “hard power” is: military and economic might often get others to change their positions. However, there could be an alternative: a country may obtain what it wants because other countries admire its values and are ready to follow it. So it is very important to attract countries, and not only threaten them. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them (p.5). The soft power of a country rests on three main resources: its culture, its political values and its foreign policy (Nye, 2004: p.12).

When we are speaking about soft power we cannot ignore the mentioning of another term – *cultural diplomacy*. Cultural diplomacy is an integral part of soft power, one of its most powerful means and tools. Cultural diplomacy possesses great influence which might be very helpful to this or that country when it is spreading its soft power to others.

Nowadays, soft power with its cultural diplomacy plays a very important role in building the relationship between different nations.

One of the most important and integral parts of culture is language, human culture cannot exist without it (Panopio, 2002: p. 41). Nowadays more and more countries spread their language and culture by establishing in various countries cultural and language centers. The most famous and successful examples of such activity are: the British Council (the UK), the Alliance Francaise (France), the Goethe Institute (Germany), and the Cervantes Institute (Spain). The main and common purpose of these institutions is to develop the popularity of culture and language.

As China continues to grow rapidly, the value of Chinese language also increases. The PRC wants to promote its language all over the world and tethers its own goals of expanding economic, cultural and diplomatic power to the global popularization of Mandarin Chinese<sup>1</sup>. One of the most significant tools in this arsenal is the Confucius Institute (CI), which was established in 2004 (Ding, 2008: p.118). Since that time the number of Confucius Institutes has grown rapidly. It has been opened on each continent of the world.

This study is focused on the development of this organization in Russia, particularly in Moscow. I decided to focus my research on Confucius Institutes in Moscow because I am interested in the development of Chinese soft power in Russia and the attitude of Russian people towards it. When I was completing my Specialist degree<sup>2</sup> at Moscow State Linguistic University<sup>3</sup> I also took part in some events organized by the CI. And when I came to do my Master's at National Chengchi University (Taiwan), I took a course called "Chinese Foreign Relations: Perception, Power and Policy" taught by Professor Chiu Kun-shuan from the Department of East Asian Studies. That was him who first suggested that I should write a paper about the development of the CIs in Russia. A small paper turned into an idea to dedicate my thesis to this topic.

The research is focused on the CIs in Moscow because it is both interesting and crucial to understand how such organization is operating in the capital city of one of the closest China's friends, to understand how the Chinese soft power works there, and what local people, who are either teaching or studying Chinese language, think about Confucius Institute. Besides, when speaking about the national image, we need to understand how China itself sees soft power and Confucius Institute, what kind of Confucius Institute image is created in the China.

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<sup>1</sup> Mandarin language (官話 guanhua – "officials' language") – is the most widely spoken form of Chinese. Mandarin Chinese is spoken in all of China north of the Yangtze River and in much of the rest of the country and is the native language of two-thirds of the population.

<sup>2</sup> Specialist degree was the only first degree in the former Soviet Union and currently is being phased out by the Bachelor's - Master's degrees.

<sup>3</sup> It is a university in Moscow, Russia. It is the largest and the oldest university in Russia that specializes in linguistics and foreign languages. There are about 10 thousand students and postgraduates in the university. Education is available in 35 languages.

## 1.2 Research Question

The aim of this study is to understand what Russian people who study or teach Chinese think about the Confucius Institutes, and how this organization operates in general in Russia. So the main research question is:

**RQ:** What attitude do Russians, who study or teach Chinese language, have towards the CI?

This particular target group was chosen because these people are to a great extent connected with the sinological circles of Russia. They could have better understanding of Confucius Institute than those who are not studying or teaching Chinese language. That is why I decided to focus my research on them. Through getting answers to this question we could receive more comprehensive vision on the development of the CIs in Russia, on the example of Moscow.

## 1.3 Framework

This study aims at defining the attitude of Russian people (on the example of Moscow) towards the development of the Confucius Institute in Russia. Taking into account the current relations between Russia and China which are described as “the best in history”<sup>4</sup>, the number of Russians who are studying Chinese either at home or in China or Taiwan it could be assumed that general impression of people towards the Confucius Institute is positive. The independent and dependent variables which will bring us to the hypothesis should be defined. The dependent variables for this study are the following:

### 1.3.1. Dependent Variables

#### 1. Attitude towards the People’s Republic of China

It is very important to understand the attitude of people towards China. If they have a positive image of the country, then it might be assumed that they are also positive towards its initiatives, like the Confucius Institute, for example. However, if they do not like China, they might have negative impression about the CI.

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<sup>4</sup> 『中俄美三國博弈 重塑國際格局』，中時電子報，2015年04月14日，  
<http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20150414001052-260310>

If we look closely at the results published in November, 2014, by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)<sup>5</sup>, we will see that the general attitude of Russian people towards China tends to be positive. 49% of the respondents view the PRC as a strategic and economic partner, 36% - as a friend and ally, and only 1% - as a threat. Speaking about future, 43% of people see China as Russia's friend in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and 36% as a close partner. 60% of the respondents state that cooperation between the RF and the PRC is mutually beneficial for both of them<sup>6</sup> (VCIOM, 2014). As we can see, the major part of the respondents has favorable perception towards China and Sino-Russian relation in general. Thus, it might be assumed that they welcome the initiatives that the PRC is offering all over the world, like the Confucius Institute, for example.

## **2. Attitude towards Chinese Language**

Although it might feel natural that people who study or teach Chinese language like it, it does not necessary have to be this way. They might do it out of need or other purposes. Thus, if they like Chinese language, they are likely to feel positive about the well-known institution which provides Chinese courses. However, if they do not like Chinese, it will not necessarily mean that they also have a negative attitude towards the CI.

This dependent variable is an outcome of the first independent variable which the author of this study is going to describe in the next paragraph.

### **1.3.2 Independent Variables**

#### **1. Incentive and Interest**

When people start learning any foreign language, there is always a reason that stands behind their decision. Sometimes they can be very simple: e.g. when child in a non-English speaking country starts to go to school, it is likely that English will be already included into the compulsory curriculum, thus leaving the kid with no other choice than to start learning it. However, in the modern world people decide to learn this or that language or parents want their children to know this or that language due to several reasons. Among the most common reasons are the following: business, education, family, friends, and common interest towards any language. If we take learning any

<sup>5</sup> It is the oldest and the leading marketing and opinion research company in the post-Soviet space.

<sup>6</sup> Россия-Китай: от вражды и конкуренции – к дружбе и сотрудничеству [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115042>. – ВЦИОМ.

foreign language in Russia as an example, we will see that among the most popular reasons for doing it are the following: communication with foreigners, work, going abroad, broaden the background knowledge<sup>7</sup>. Thus, all these factors are the driving motive for people to begin learning any foreign language.

As it has been mentioned before, attitude towards any language is formed by people's interest in this or that language. If someone is interested in learning Chinese for this or that reason, his/her attitude towards it would be positive. If someone is not interested, it is very likely that he/she just would not continue or even start learning it.

## **2. The Degree of Development of Soft Power in Russia**

If people know what soft power is and see their own country's performance in that sphere it might be assumed that they would be more friendly towards other countries' soft power initiatives.

Unfortunately, not many people in Russia are aware of what soft power is. Moscow is a relatively new player in this field. Besides Russian rich cultural heritage, the country does not have something special to offer to the world. On the other hand, even when there is something important and meaningful that Russia wants to share with the others, they are not ready to accept it due to the circumstances. The bright example which could be used here are the Olympics. In 1980, Moscow held the Summer Olympics. These Games were the first to be staged in Eastern Europe and promised to be exciting, a bright instrument of Communist regime's soft power. However, just a year before, in 1979, the USSR deployed its troops in Afghanistan. As a result 65 countries leading by the USA boycotted the Olympics. Pretty much the same happened in 2014. Russia's southern city Sochi hosted the XXII Olympic Winter Games. Though the Games were successful, and Russia had a chance to show the world its spiritual wealth and mightiness, a lot of controversy surrounded the Games: e.g. corruption, LGBT rights etc. The events that happened in Ukraine in February, which were followed by the Russian annexation of Crimea in March, 2014 added to the ruining of Moscow's image on the international arena, thus making the Sochi Olympiad less remarkable event.

To sum it up, even though the concept of soft power is not very developed in Russia yet, it does not necessarily mean that Russian people are unaware of it, or even if

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<sup>7</sup> Uchit inostrannye yazyki: Dlya chego i pochemu (Why to learn foreign languages). (2014, November 13). *Russian Public Opinion Research Center*. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115051>

they are, it does not imply that they will have negative attitude towards other countries' soft power initiatives. Later in this study we will see how the land lies in reality.

### 3. Sino-Russian Relations

This independent variable is closely connected with the first dependent variable of this study (Attitude towards China). As it has been already mentioned, the current state of relations between these two countries is more than good, if both countries' leaders are constantly repeating that their relations now are "the best in history". Such state of things is likely to influence people's attitude towards China. As long as China is a friend of Russia, the majority of people might have a positive influence towards it. However, if this changes, people's attitude is also likely to change. As an example to prove this statement we can use the changes in the Russian-American relations and how these changes influenced the perception of Russians towards the U.S.

In 2014 the relations between Russia and the West have declined due to the Ukrainian crisis. Many countries imposed various sanctions against Moscow, which along with the declining oil prices undermined the country's economic situation. According to VCIOM (2014), the attitude of Russians towards the U.S. during this time has changed towards the worst. In February, 2013 only 2% of the respondents had very negative attitude towards the U.S., in November, 2014 this number increased up to 27%<sup>8</sup>. Thus, we can see that the state of relations between countries cannot but influence people's opinion.


Taking into account all dependent and independent variables described above, the general hypothesis of this study could be formulated. We can see that many Russian people have positive attitude towards China. The bilateral relations between Russia and the PRC are currently at the relatively high level. Thus, it may be assumed that **while Sino-Russian relations are good, the general attitude of people towards China and Chinese initiatives, like Confucius Institute, will remain positive.**

All dependent and independent variables, as well as the hypothesis stated above could be described using the macro, micro, meso level of analysis and summed up with the following scheme:

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<sup>8</sup> Rossiya i SSHA: Otnosheniya v tochke zamerzaniya (Russia and the U.S.: Relations at the freezing point). (2014, December 3). *Russian Public Opinion Research Center*. Retrieved June 26, 2015, from <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115075>

Figure 1



Source: author

In this case the smallest unit of analysis - micro level – is responsible for identifying the reasons why people want to study Chinese, while the largest one – macro level – deals with Sino-Russian relations in general and their influence on the Confucius Institute. The intermediate level between the above mentioned two – meso level – serves as a mediator between micro and macro, and deals with Russian national soft power policy and people's awareness of this concept. The meso level can be regarded as the most important one in this case, as it is closely connected both to the two other levels. In Chapter 2, 4 and 5 we will look closer on three of these levels.

## 1.4 Methodology

The intention of this study is to cover the concrete opinions of a number of people on the CIs in Moscow. The qualitative method of analysis will be used for conducting of this research. It will consist of semi-structured in-depth interviews and second data analysis. The research will follow the next steps:

1. Selection of the methodology: in-depth interviews
2. Preparing the questions
3. Search of the materials
4. Field work
5. Conducting the interviews with the selected subjects
6. Analyzing the material
7. Analyzing the secondary data sources
8. Answering the research question through findings

The following are the characteristics of the semi-structured interviews according to Cohen and Crabtree (2006):

- The interviewer and respondents engage in a formal interview

- The interviewer develops and uses an 'interview guide.' This is a list of questions and topics that needs to be covered during the conversation, usually in a particular order
- The interviewer follows the guide, but is able to follow topical trajectories in the conversation that may stray from the guide when he or she feels this is appropriate

The most part of the interviews was conducted in person, though some of the interviewees asked to send them questions via email due to the lack of time for the meeting face-to-face.

In total, thirteen interviews were conducted with those who either study or teach Chinese in different places in Moscow.

#### **1.4.1 List of interviewees:**

The interviews for this study were conducted with four main groups of people: those who study Chinese at the Confucius Institutes; those who study it somewhere else; those who teach Chinese in the Confucius Institutes; those who teach Chinese somewhere else. In order to keep anonymity, the interviewees are named as **Ia, Ib, Ic** etc. (meaning Interviewee a, Interviewee b, Interviewee c etc.).

#### **Confucius Institute Faculty staff:**

When conducting a research about the organization of the Confucius Institute it is crucial to interview someone who knows the system from inside. Speaking to such person gives better understanding of how everything is operated within the boundaries of the institution.

The selection process for this group of people was not an easy one. First of all, the permissions to come and conduct the interviews were needed. The researcher had to contact the CIs staff via email to ask whether he could come and conduct the interviews. Then, it was important to agree on the most suitable time which would serve the interests of both the interviewer and the interviewee.

In total, four interviews with the members of Confucius Faculty staff in Moscow were conducted. These interviews are with those who work in two out of three CIs in Moscow. Unfortunately, there was no chance to talk to someone from the third CI. Three out of four interviews are conducted with the staff of the CI at Moscow State Linguistic University. One is with the director of the CI at Russian State University for the

Humanities<sup>9</sup>. It is also very important to mention that two of the respondents are of Chinese origin, so their answers cannot represent the opinion of Russian people towards the Confucius Institute. However, it is interesting to observe what Chinese people themselves do think about this initiative, though it is very likely that their attitude expressed in the interviews would be positive due to the obvious reasons, even if they do not truly think so.

- 1) Ia
- 2) Ib
- 3) Ic
- 4) Id

#### **Professors who teach Chinese outside of the CIs:**

The aim of this study is to have the comprehensive understanding of people's perception towards Confucius Institute in Russia, thus, it is necessary to interview not only those who are directly involved into the CI work process, but also those who are engaged in the process of Chinese studying but outside of the CIs. Their point of view might be without bias if to compare with the opinions of those who work in the CIs.

In total, three interviews with those who teach Chinese outside of the CI were conducted. All of the respected professors teach Chinese at different places.

- 1) Ie
- 2) If
- 3) Ig

#### **Students who learn Chinese at the CI:**

Apart from the Confucius Institutes Faculty staff it was also important to understand what do those who picked this institute as a place to study Chinese think about it. Unfortunately, it was not that easy to find someone willing to participate in the interview. Only two persons agreed to take part in this study. Thus, for better understanding the perception of those who learn Chinese in the CIs, the study of secondary data resources is needed.

- 1) Ih
- 2) Ii

---

<sup>9</sup> It is a university in Moscow, Russia with over 14 000 students. It was created in 1991 as the result of the merger of the Moscow Public University (est. 1908) and the Moscow State Institute for History and Archives (est. 1930).

### **Students who learn Chinese outside of the CIs:**

The reason to interview those who study Chinese outside of the CI is pretty much the same as for interviewing those who teach Chinese outside of the CI – to get comprehensive point of view towards the CI without bias. This group of interviewees is the largest. People were willing to participate in the study and share their opinion about the subject.

In total, four interviews were conducted. Two of the interviewees study Chinese in the same place; two other students are from different educational institutions.

- 1) Ij
- 2) Ik
- 3) Il
- 4) Im

Of course it must be pointed out, that the interviewees represent only their own opinion on the topic and are subjective, and they cannot represent the point of view of the whole country. Thus, apart from the interviews, more detailed analysis of secondary data sources about the nature of the development of the Confucius Institute in Russia is needed.

#### **1.4.2 Scope/limit**

The relations between Russia and China are described from the period of first interactions with the Qing dynasty (1600s) and up to the present day (2015). The case of the Confucius Institute is studied since its establishment in 2004 till 2015.

Field research was conducted only in Moscow, Russia. Each interview lasted from half an hour to one hour and a half depending on time the interviewees had. Two of the respondents asked to send them the questions via email due to their limited time.

As the field research took place only in Moscow, the rest of the information about the development of the CIs in Russia is observed through the secondary data resources (reports, newspapers, journals).

#### **1.4.3 Chapter arrangement**

Chapter 1 deals with the Introduction part, where such topics as Background of the study, Framework and Methodology are covered.


This thesis is focused on the development of Confucius Institute in Russia, particularly in Moscow. That is why at first it is necessary to understand the nature of

Sino-Russian relations and the preconditions for their mutual benefit cooperation in various spheres: from economy to education. Then this thesis aims to find out what stands behind such terms as cultural diplomacy and soft power and what point of view China has towards them, whether it is trying to promote these things or not, and if the answer is positive, we will look on the initiatives the PRC is undertaking to expand its cultural influence abroad and find out if there is any possible criticism or concerns towards them. Chapter 2 will be dedicated to the topics mentioned above.

Chapter 3 is dedicated to China's soft power: its means, use, goals and limits. Though in Chapter 2 we already touch upon the subject, Chapter 3 will give the reader more comprehensive view on the topic.

In Chapter 4 we will look closer on China's soft power initiative – Confucius Institute, its goals, means, and limits, and also its development in Russia. The case study of three Confucius Institutes in Moscow will be also presented in this part.

In the last Chapter we will speak about research and theoretical findings, make some suggestions and summarize everything.



## Chapter 2 Literature Review

The literature review presented below can be generally divided into two larger parts – macro and meso levels. The macro one is related to the analysis of Sino-Russian relations in general and their impact on the attitude of people towards the Confucius Institute, which will be discussed in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The meso level deals with national soft power policy. In this particular research we will review two country's soft power policy: China and Russia, with the closer focus on the first one, as the body of interest of the thesis - Confucius Institute – is one of the examples of the PRC' soft power policy. The objective is to analyze how both countries perceive the concept of soft power, develop it, what goals and means they use and what kind of limitations have. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 the author will present the micro level of analysis which is basically her research findings received through the primary data resources and based on the empirical research. The micro level deals with the attitude of people towards the Confucius Institute, their incentives and motivations to learn Chinese. The micro level is closely related to the macro and the meso one, as (all)both of them will to certain extent influence the outcomes of the primary data research. The development of the Sino-Russian relations, presented as the macro level, motivates people to study Chinese and thus might influence their attitude towards the Confucius Institute; while the national soft power policy in Chinese case urges to develop the CI as part of this policy, and in Russian case might influence the attitude of people towards the CI. Let's look closer first on macro and meso levels then.

### 2.1 Sino-Russian Relations (1920s-2015)

The relations between Russia and China have long and rich history. As these two countries are neighbors geographically the interactions between them could not but exist. If to describe their relations prior to the establishment of the Republic of China, it should be noted that in most occasions they were humiliating for the Chinese part, as it had to sign some unequal treaties with Western countries, including Russia, and give away their territories. However, in epy 20<sup>th</sup> century the international order faced crucial changes: e.g. the abolishment of Qing dynasty<sup>10</sup> in China and the House of Romanov<sup>11</sup> in Russia, and

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<sup>10</sup> The last imperial dynasty of China, ruling from 1644 to 1912 with a brief, abortive restoration in 1917. It was preceded by the Ming dynasty and succeeded by the Republic of China. The Qing multi-cultural empire lasted almost three centuries and formed the territorial base for the modern Chinese state.

the creation of the countries: the Republic of China, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Soviet Union. The relations between the USSR and the PRC are one of the favorite topics of discussion for many scholars. These two countries used to be so close, but their friendship has never been an easy one. There were times when Moscow could dictate Beijing what to do and how to behave, because her influence on him was really strong. However, that situation ended and two close friends found themselves on different sides of the trenches for the most part of the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the relations between Russia and China improved, while the balance of power between Moscow and Beijing changed. The demise of the USSR brought Russia to a decade of economic stagnation, social earthquakes, the financial crisis of 1998<sup>12</sup> followed by the default, Chechen wars etc. The country lost almost everything which made the Soviet Union one of the strongest powers in the world. At the same time China was growing rapidly. The so called *Reform and Opening up policy*, announced by Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, showed its tremendous results, putting China far ahead its former advisor and “big brother”.

Today the relations between these two countries are characterized as “Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation”. The treaty with the same name was signed in 2001 by Russian President Vladimir Putin and China's former General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CCP) Jiang Zeming. This treaty has a validity period of 20 years, and will be automatically extended if neither party notifies the other its intention to terminate the treaty one year before its expiration. Its aim is to function as a legal document guiding the steady development of Sino-Russian relations in the new century and to have a deep and far-reaching impact on the long-term steady development of the bilateral ties (People's Daily, 2001).

However, the history of Moscow-Beijing relations is a very complicated issue, with its own ups and down. And it certainly requires a deeper look into it.

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<sup>11</sup> The second imperial dynasty, after the Rurik dynasty, to rule over Russia, which reigned from 1613 until the abdication of Emperor Nicholas II on March 15, 1917, as a result of the February Revolution.

<sup>12</sup> After six years of economic reform in Russia, privatization and macroeconomic stabilization had experienced some limited success. Yet in August 1998, after recording its first year of positive economic growth since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia was forced to default on its sovereign debt, devalue the ruble, and declare a suspension of payments by commercial banks to foreign creditors. Russia ended 1998 with a decrease in real output of 4.9 percent for the year instead of the small growth that was expected. The collapse of the ruble created an increase in Russia's exports while imports remained low. Since then, direct investments into Russia have been inconsistent at best. Summarized best by Shleifer and Treisman (2000), “the crisis of August 1998 did not only undermine Russia's currency and force the last reformers from office...it also seemed to erase any remaining Western hope that Russia could successfully reform its economy.”

### 2.1.1 Sino-Soviet Relations (“honeymoon” – “divorce”)

According to Sutter (2010), Czarist Russia’s expansion into the Far East came largely at the expenses of the declining Qin Empire (1636-1912). According to the 19<sup>th</sup> century treaties (Treaty of Aigun<sup>13</sup>; Convention of Peking<sup>14</sup>) large parts of Chinese territories became parts of Russia. China’s weakness and political chaos during the first half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century provided opportunities for Lenin and Stalin to seek allies and foster revolutionary movements favorable to the Soviet Union (p.271).

On October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong proclaimed the official establishment of the People’s Republic of China. As Nathan and Scobell (2012) state, there were four major motives, why Mao decided to lean to the Soviet side. First was to consolidate his shaky regime. The Soviet Union provided the most obvious model and useful advice for dealing with such a wide range of domestic political challenges, all the more so as the Communist Party of China (CCP) leaders had looked to Moscow for inspiration since the founding of their party in 1921.

Second was the need to defence against an American strategy of “containment and isolation”<sup>15</sup> that had begun to take shape even before the end of the Chinese civil war<sup>16</sup> (1927-1950). China’s mutual defence pact with Moscow called for the USSR to provide “military and other assistance” to China should it be attacked by Japan or “any other state allied with her.”

Third, the Soviet alliance helped China economically. The new regime had to repair an economy devastated by years of invasions and civil war.

Fourth was the need to be on good terms with a potentially threatening neighbor. Russia had a long history of involving itself in Chinese affairs and a leader, Josef Stalin, known for his ruthlessness (p.67-71).

Such things as Soviet aid, advisers and guidelines were crucial for China. They helped it to start changing and growing. Yu (2007) says that this period in the relations between the USSR and China can be characterized as “honeymoon” (1949-1959), which was later followed by the so called “divorce” (p.47).

<sup>13</sup> The Treaty of Aigun was signed in 1858 between the Russian Empire and the empire of the Qing Dynasty. According to this treaty, Russia received over 600,000 square kilometers from China.

<sup>14</sup> The Convention of Peking is an agreement comprising three distinct treaties concluded between the Qing Empire and the United Kingdom, France, and Russia in 1860. The agreement ceded parts of Outer Manchuria to the Russian Empire.

<sup>15</sup> Policy aimed at preventing the spread of communism abroad.

<sup>16</sup> The Chinese civil war was a civil war fought from 1927 to 1950 between the Communist (Chinese Communist Party) and the Nationalist (Kuomintang (KMT)).

Since Stalin's death in 1953 things started changing. The relations between two countries were not as close as before. The new leader the USSR Nikita Khrushchev carried on softer policy than his predecessor. He even started denouncing Stalin's cult of personality as inconsistent with communist and Party ideology. Of course Mao did not appreciate that move. He was afraid that it somehow could also harm his own authority in his country. Among other reasons Sutter (2010) names differences over strategy towards the United States and international affairs, the proper ideological path to development and the appropriate leadership roles of Mao Zedong and Nikita Khrushchev in the world communist movement (p.272). Growing distrust had eventually led to the armed dispute over the Damanskii Island (Zhenbao Island). That was the peak of confrontation between the sides and could have led to the full-scale military conflict. Fortunately, two sides resolved it by agreeing to demarcate the borders.

In 1970s the U.S. started to change its attitude towards China. In 1971, the PRC replaced the Republic of China (Taiwan) in the United Nations. In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon visited China.

In 1976 Mao Zedong died. With his death the Sino-Soviet ideological disputes gradually came to naught. However, there were still problems in the relations. China countered Soviet-backed Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia by launching a military incursion into Vietnam. The U.S.S.R responded with warnings and large-scale military exercises in along China's northern border. China also denounced the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and sided with the U.S.-backed anticommunist guerillas in Afghanistan (Sutter, 2010; p. 272).

The period between 1982 and 1989 can be described as "normalization in relations between Moscow and Beijing". However, the real progress was seen only after Mikhail Gorbachev took office in 1985. In 1989 he met with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing. That meeting was seen as a breakthrough in stabilizing the relations between the two sides. The decades of confrontation between two neighbors finally ended. The ideological illusions about cooperation based on the ideology disappeared. The countries now were ready to continue developing their relations on the basis of neighborhood (Kosyrev, 2009)<sup>17</sup>. For China the visit of Gorbachev was overshadowed because of the Tiananmen

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<sup>17</sup> Косырев, Д. 20 лет назад Горбачев и Дэн изменили мир [Электронный ресурс] / Д. Косырев // РИА Новости. – 2009. – 15 Мая. – Режим доступа: <http://ria.ru/analytics/20090515/171122262.html>

protests<sup>18</sup>. Very soon the whole Europe was covered with a revolutionary wave of protest against communist regimes. On December 25, 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed.

### 2.1.2 1990s (normalization, “strategic partnership”)

The collapse of the Soviet Union removed the long-lasting concerns of the CCP about the potential military threat. However, now Chinese were afraid that the Soviet Union’s today might become their tomorrow. That’s why they had to make some adjustments to prevent the negative outcome. According to Meisels (2012), Those adjustments included China’s replacement of the Soviet model of multinational state-building with its “one nation with diversity” policy, and its institution of the patriotic education campaign to try to shore up CCP legitimacy; increased development of social welfare policies etc. all these measures were intended to strengthen the “socialist” claims of the PRC as an alternative model to the unbridled capitalism of the West.

Speaking about the Sino-Russian relations, as it has already been mentioned they had already started to be improved in Gorbachev's time. In 1992 president of Russia Boris Yeltsin made his first official visit to China. That visit made the bilateral relations much closer to an alliance and further away from the animosity of the 1960s and 1970s. The both sides signed more than 20 documents, among them the Joint Declaration on the Foundation of Relations between the Peoples Republic of China and the Russian Federation. According to this document, both Russia and China would not enter into unions and alliances aimed at harming each other. Both countries also agreed not to permit territories to be used by third parties to undermine the security of the other. This declaration was designed to provide a solid legal framework for bilateral relations, leaving behind the legacy of mutual confrontation (Wang, 1998: p. 271). In September, 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited Russia during which the two countries signed a lot of important documents, among them the Second Sino-Russian Joint Statement, declaring the establishment of constructive partnership featuring good neighborliness and mutually beneficial cooperation; Joint Declaration of the President of the PRC and the President of the Russian Federation on Mutually No-First-Use of Nuclear Weapon and Mutually No-Targeting the Opposite Side with Strategic Nuclear

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<sup>18</sup> Tiananmen protests – a series of student-led popular demonstrations protests which took place in spring 1989 in Beijing .The protests were forcibly suppressed by leaders who ordered the military to enforce martial law in the country's capital. The crackdown that initiated on June 3–4 became known as the Tiananmen Square Massacre as troops with assault rifles and tanks inflicted casualties on unarmed civilians trying to block the military's advance towards Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing.

Weapon; the Agreement between the PRC and the Russian Federation on the Western Sections of the Sino-Russian Border etc (People's Daily, 2000).

China and Russia also started to improve relations in such fields as economic, military and energy cooperation. According to Sutter (2010), China became the largest consumer for Russian arms. Speaking about trade, it grew substantially from a low base. In 1985, Sino-Soviet trade was \$300 million. In 1995, Sino-Russian trade reached \$7 billion. China became Russia's second largest partner after Germany. In 1996, Russia and China proclaimed a "strategic partnership" between both sides, which brought the bilateral relations on the higher step.

Throughout the 1990s, Russia and China held annual meetings between high officials. During these years, President Boris Yeltsin visited China four times. Jiang Zemin also visited Russia four times. On December 31, 1999 Yeltsin resigned. The era of Putin's Russia began.

### **2.1.3 2000- 2015 (“Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation”, new “honeymoon”)**

The relations between China and Russia in the new Millennium continued to strengthen. As Kuhrt (2007) states, under Putin’s administration Russian East policy became more predictable and routine. The relations reached a certain level of maturity, allowing sustaining small setbacks without developing into big troubles (p.137).

In 2001, President Vladimir Putin and President Jiang Zemin signed a twenty-year strategic Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.

After 9/11 the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded<sup>19</sup>, both Russia and China are the permanent members of the organization. The SCO holds annual meetings between its members where they discuss various significant issues.

During Putin’s first and second terms and his successor Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency, both sides not only improved relations in economic, military, energy and security spheres, but also encourage cultural exchange. 2006 was marked as The Year of Russia in China, 2007 was The Year of China in Russia. 2009 and 2010 were the years of Russian language in China and the Chinese language in Russia, respectively. 2012 and

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<sup>19</sup> Before 9/11 this organization existed in the form of so called Shanghai Five (China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, and Tajikistan). Later Uzbekistan also became a member. The main activities of the organization are the cooperation in security, military, economic and cultural fields.

2013 are known as the years of Russian tourism in China and of Chinese tourism in Russia.

Cooperation in the energy field is the significant sector in the Sino-Russian relation. Russia is one of the largest energy-producing countries in the world, so it needs a stable and reliable market for its rich resources. China is one the largest energy-consumers, it has quite a lot of money and needs a reliable and stable energy supplier. Geographical advantages of Russia and China, as well as strong political relations are also good conditions to guarantee large-scale cooperation in the energy sector (Xinhua, 2014)<sup>20</sup>.

Russian President Vladimir Putin sees China as a “reliable partner”. According to him, Moscow sees the “readiness of the Chinese people and the Chinese leadership to build friendly, neighborly relations” with Russia (China Daily, 2011).

There are possible scenarios of future Sino-Russian cooperation. Sutter (2010) argues that two countries might become closer in the event of harder U.S. policy towards them (p.285). The relations between these free powers are not easy. However, one of the core principals of Chinese foreign relations is not to form alliances. To this must be added that Moscow and Beijing already have a bitter experience of their failed alliance. Thus, even though they can continue to cooperate closely, it is very unlikely that they would form a kind of anti-Western military pact (Sutter, 2010).

It is often argued that Russia is strengthening ties with China because it is afraid of the great potential and rapid growing of its neighbor. Russian concerns are more associated with China’s capabilities, rather than any threats. However, some scholars see at least one potential threat that the PRC could pose to the Russian Federation: reclaim of Siberia. Siberia has vast territories and is full of natural resources which Chinese are already exploiting today. There is a concern that one day Beijing could possibly want to take these territories under its own rule, thus leaving Moscow in a very pitiable position. There is a famous saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer”. Russia’s good intentions and interest to develop closer relations with the Eastern world, especially with China might be dictated by fear, rather than interest. However, both of these might be the driven force of Moscow’s new shift to the East policy. Both Russian and China are saying that right now their relations could be described as “the best in history”. For now,

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<sup>20</sup> 『中俄能源合作提速前行』，新華社，2014年10月11日，  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-10/11/c\\_127085658.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2014-10/11/c_127085658.htm)

the second “honeymoon” seems to be more lasting than the previous one. However, it is difficult to predict the future, especially in terms of international relations and order which face various challenges and changes. Right now Moscow and Beijing are close friends and good neighbors who enjoy this win to win cooperation in many fields. Another famous saying states that “One man is no man”. After the Ukrainian crisis<sup>21</sup> the relations between Russia and the European Union and the U.S. worsened, so Moscow had to change its foreign policy dimension. And building strong relations with China seems to be a good alternative. It would be a good thing for Russia if this situation continues for a long period of time if not forever.

## 2.2 Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy

This study deals with the development of the Chinese initiative of the Confucius Institute in Russia, particularly in Moscow. Thus, it is crucial to understand the relations between these two countries in terms of soft power. But first of all a deeper understanding of this term and what stands behind it is needed.

### 2.2.1 Soft Power

As it has already been mentioned in the Introduction part the term “soft power” was introduced by the American scholar Joseph S. Nye in 1990. According to Nye (1990), soft power can be used as a very important political tool, if the power of one state is seen as legitimate by others; they would be less resistant to the wishes of that state. If it can offer attractive ideology and culture, others would be happy to follow its lead. “Soft power arises in large part from our values. These values are expressed in our culture, in the policies we follow inside our country, and in the way we handle ourselves internationally” (Nye, 2002).

In *Soft Power: The means to success in world politics* (2004) Nye explained in greater detail what a term “soft power” is, gave various examples (e.g. described the American, Russian, Chinese soft power etc.), used historical research, and explored the

<sup>21</sup> A prolonged crisis in Ukraine began on 21 November 2013, when then President Viktor Yanukovich suspended preparations for the implementation of an association agreement with the European Union. This decision resulted in mass protests by its opponents, known as the “Euromaidan”. Yanukovich was ousted by the protesters on 22 February 2014, when he fled the Ukrainian capital city of Kiev. Following his ousting, unrest enveloped the largely Russophone eastern and southern regions of Ukraine, from where he had drawn most of his support. An ensuing political crisis in Ukrainian autonomous region of Crimea resulted in the annexation of Crimea by Russia on 18 March. Subsequently, unrest in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts of Ukraine evolved into a war between the post-revolutionary Ukrainian government and pro-Russian insurgents.

implications and limits of soft power. “Soft power is a means of obtaining desired outcomes” (Nye, 2004: p.129). It is a product of culture, domestic values and policies and also of foreign policy (p.142). Nye explained, that “there are three major ways to get someone to do what you want. One is to threaten with sticks; the second is to pay that someone with carrots; the third is to attract with them or co-opt them. If you can get others to be attracted with what you want, it costs you much less than carrots and sticks”. Nye also used the example of the Iraq War to show how fragile the American soft power became.

To briefly sum up things stated above, soft power is an ability of a country to use its attraction rather than force to make others like it. However, Nye (2006) also says, that soft power like any other power has its own disadvantages and limits. No one likes when someone else is trying to make him do something, to manipulate him, even if that someone else is using the soft power tools. Speaking about cons of soft power, Nye gives the following example: “If I want to steal your money, I can threaten you with a gun, or I can persuade you with a false claim that I will save the world. The second means depends upon attraction or soft power, but the result remains theft in both instances”. As we can see here, it is not necessary that someone will use soft power to make good things. It depends on the person and on his/her intentions. Of course, it is always better to be attracted to something than being forced to do something, and here soft power seems to be really appealing, as no one wants to face with others use of hard power. But it should be kept in mind that we are talking here about a very complicated thing: the international relations and the interaction between states. Thus, everyone should try to avoid getting fooled by the other and always remember to deeper analyze what stands behind any attractive offer.

Nye’s works and research about soft power are mostly concentrated on the U.S. However, he also writes about other countries and analyzes the situation there. For example, when speaking about Russia and China he says that there are still many things which both of these countries do not understand when they try to deal with soft power. We are going to speak about it in more detail later in this Chapter.

### **2.2.2 Cultural Diplomacy**

When we are speaking about soft power we cannot ignore the mentioning of another term – *cultural diplomacy*. Cultural diplomacy is an integral part of soft power, one of its most powerful means and tools. Cultural diplomacy possesses great influence

which might be very helpful to this or that country when it is spreading its soft power to others.

Culture has been a part of countries' foreign policies since ancient times. Ancient Greece, Persia, the Roman Empire regarded culture as an important means in wars or in foreign expansions. However, only in the 19<sup>th</sup> century the term "cultural diplomacy" started to being used in the way we understand it now. France was the first country to develop its cultural diplomacy through religion, education and charity. Very soon other European countries followed its lead (Dai, 2013: p.2).

Cultural diplomacy represents creative engagement between various countries and societies, and the ways in which government can use culture as a way of building bridges (Szántó, 2011). Cultural diplomacy can be viewed in two dimensions: one is cultural diplomacy in the strictest sense, meaning the use of arts and culture as a tool of statecraft, specifically deploying cultural exchanges, artists, and art institutions to advance a nation's political agenda on the world stage. The second is a wider array of cultural relationships, not necessarily under the direct control of government agencies, but constantly happening between cultural institutions, which, in turn, can be promoted or supported in various ways by states (ibid.)

According to the report of the Advisory Committee about cultural diplomacy (2005), Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy<sup>22</sup>; for it is in cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented. As Cummings (2003) states, cultural diplomacy has been defined as "the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understandings".

According to Chinese scholar Li Zhi (2005)<sup>23</sup>, cultural diplomacy can be regarded as an activity of a country's foreign policy, which aims to achieve a specific strategic purpose.

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO)<sup>24</sup> Professor Eugene Astakhov (2008)<sup>25</sup> states that dialogue between civilizations cannot be done without

<sup>22</sup> According to Alan K. Henrikson, Professor of Diplomatic History at Tufts University, Massachusetts, public diplomacy can be defined as "the conduct of international relations by governments through public communications media and through dealings with a wide range of nongovernmental entities (political parties, corporations, trade associations, labor unions, educational institutions, religious organizations, ethnic groups, and so on including influential individuals) for the purpose of influencing the politics and actions of other governments."

<sup>23</sup> 李智：《文化外交：一種傳播學的解讀》，北京大学出版社 2005 年版，第 24 頁。

implementing cultural diplomacy in it. All civilized nations, realizing their national targets, make all necessary efforts to promote their cultural diplomacy, and no expense is spared. This direction has already become an important state mission. When most of the states operate with cultural diplomacy, their motives are simple and pragmatic: they want to promote cultural heritage, spread their languages, and popularize their achievements and way of life. However, this form of soft power is also used for achieving more significant goals: for strengthening geopolitical positions, and dealing with challenges in foreign policy and economy.

### 2.3 China's Perception towards Soft Power

Various countries might have different points of views on soft power. Their soft power tools might also differ from one another. Even the models of implementing soft power can vary. In this part of the thesis we are going to speak about China's point of view towards soft power and look how the country is using this tool of building relationship with others.

Since Hu Jintao became the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China in 2002, the idea of Chinese soft power has been heard more and more often. Like any other country the PRC needs to promote its image on the international arena and it is well aware of the fact, that culture could be used as one of the tools of improving its image.

Joseph Nye was the first to create the term called *soft power*. However, according to Ding (2008) and Hunter (2009), the idea of attraction and agenda-setting has been on Chinese mind since ancient times. When ancient Chinese leaders had to deal with some external relations, they preferred to Use diplomatic maneuvering instead of military confrontation (Ding, 2008, p.24). "Generations of Chinese leaders have adopted the stratagems and long-term planning elegantly stated in Sunzi's *Art of War*" (Hunter, 2009: p.378). Sun Zi (孫子) was a Chinese military general, strategist, and philosopher who

<sup>24</sup> MGIMO is a university that belongs to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia. It is the oldest and the most renowned school in Russia for preparing students for careers in international relations and diplomacy. Several of the current professors of MGIMO were ambassadors or ministers.

<sup>25</sup> Астахов, Е.М., «Мировая практика культурной дипломатии», Диалог культур и партнерство цивилизаций. VIII Международные Лихачевские научные чтения, (СПб.: Изд-во СПбГУП, 22-23 мая, 2008), <http://www.mgimo.ru/files/34255/34255.pdf>

lived in the Spring and Autumn period<sup>26</sup> of ancient China. He is very well-known for his strategy of defeating an enemy by attacking the enemy's strategy. The following is Sun Zi's quotation: "To gain a hundred victories in a hundred battles is not the highest excellence; to subjugate the enemy's army without doing battle is the highest of excellence. Therefore, the best warfare strategy is to attack the enemy's plans, next is to attack alliances, next is to attack the army, and the worst is to attack a walled city" (Sun Tzu's the Art of War, translated by Sonshi group). As Ding (2008) states, the sources of Sun Zi's "highest excellence" resemble modern soft power resources – people's rationality, morality, values and aspirations. All these things have been an integral part of Chinese traditions and culture "through which Chinese people defined their own ethnicity" (p.25).

In the late 1970s Deng Xiaoping proclaimed the reform and opening up policy. Great changes began to occur in China. It stopped being an isolated closed country. It was ready to change, to communicate with the rest of the world. From what we see now it is obvious that this policy became a miracle to the country, it helped the PRC to develop from a poor agrarian country with a hostile communist regime led by one of the world's greatest dictators – Mao Zedong – to the today's number one economy in the world (in terms of size), removing the U.S. from this post (Carter, 2014). However, there is still a lot to be done and Chinese leadership clearly understands that. Such rapid growth attracts the attention all over the world. And of course other countries might fear what China could do next, whether it will try to change the U.S.-dominated world into China-dominated world or it will seek a new bipolar international order like it used to be in Soviet times. To reassure all who are concerned, China proclaimed the so called *peaceful rise* ( 和平崛起 heping jueqi ). That means that China's rise "will not come at the cost of any other country, will not stand in the way of any other country, nor pose a threat to any other country," – said Chinese former Premier of the State Council Wen Jiabao in one his 2004 speeches (Pan, 2006). As Kurlantzick (2007) states, Beijing really needed to change its international image and reassure the others that there were no and would not be any Chinese threat. "With this change, Beijing would diminish fears of China's future

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<sup>26</sup> Spring and Autumn period ( 春秋時代 chunqiu shidai ) - (770–476 bc), in Chinese history, the period during the Zhou dynasty (1046–256 BC)—specifically the first portion of the Dong (Eastern) Zhou—when many vassal states fought and competed for supremacy.

military power, or concerns that China's massive economic growth would divert trade and foreign investment from other nations" (p.53).

China has its own tools which it uses in order to build and strengthen the relations with other nations. There are two types of these tools. First, Beijing uses the tools of culture and diplomacy. Second, it uses the tools of business (ibid.). This study is going to deal with the first group.

In the past 15 years, soft power and cultural diplomacy have become a visible aspect of official and popular discourse on foreign policy and politics in China. Since Hu Jintao and his colleague Wen Jiabao came to power, they have been constantly saying that soft power was an important component of China's policy. Li Mingjiang (2008) in his paper called *China Debates Soft Power* has a quote made by President Hu at the Central Foreign Affairs Leadership Group meeting on January 4, 2006: "The increase in our nation's international status. and influence will have to be demonstrated in hard power such as the economy, science and technology, and defence, as well as in soft power such as culture"<sup>27</sup> (p.289).

Wen Jiabao also referred to the importance of culture in his speeches: "We should expand cultural exchanges with other countries. Cultural exchanges are a bridge connecting the hearts and minds of people...an important way to project a country's image. [We should] promote Chinese culture and its appeal overseas."<sup>28</sup>

The new leader of China charismatic Xi Jinping also has his own stance on the country's soft power initiatives. According to Xinhua News Agency (2014), President Xi has vowed to promote China's cultural soft power by disseminating modern Chinese values and showing the charm of Chinese culture to the world. Of course, it takes efforts to build China's national image. China should be portrayed as a civilized country featuring rich history, ethnic unity and cultural diversity, and as an oriental power with good government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity and beautiful mountains and rivers. China should also be marked as a responsible country that advocates peaceful and common development, safeguards international justice, and makes contributions to humanity, and as a socialist country which is "open, amicable, promising and vibrant".

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<sup>27</sup> Ma Lisi, 關於我國加強軟實力建設的初步思考, (*"Preliminary Thoughts on Accelerating China's Soft Power Building"*), 党的威信, (*Literature of Chinese Communist Party*), No. 7, pp. 35-38.

<sup>28</sup> Wen Jiabao, "Our Historical Tasks at the Primary Stage of Socialism and Several Issues Concerning China's Foreign Policy," *Renmin Ribao*, March 7, 2007. According to several Chinese sources, this article was the speech that Wen Jiabao delivered at the August 2006 foreign affairs work conference.

It is worth mentioning that when it comes to soft power both Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping have greater strategy than just using various tools of it, like cultural diplomacy, investments etc. Speaking about Hu Jintao, it is, of course, his “harmonious society” (和諧社會 *hexie shehui*) concept. According to President Hu (2005), a harmonious society is a society that is “democratic and ruled by law, fair and just, trustworthy and fraternal, full of vitality, stable and orderly, and maintains harmony between man and nature”. Zhang and Li (2010) say that the idea of harmonious society is closely connected to the notion of soft power. According to them, China “needs to strengthen soft power in the process of governance in order to construct the harmonious society”. China is facing lots of domestic challenges that prevent it from smoothly developing its soft power: e.g. the corruption of political power, economic division between the rich and the poor, the people lack of the identity with the ruling party's ideological and political values. Once the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can solve them, there will be fewer obstacles for its attractive soft power, and then it can also successfully build the harmonious society.

The next generation of Chinese leadership has gone further and developed a new concept which is heard here and there nowadays: the “Chinese dream” (中國夢 *zhongguo meng*). This idea was proclaimed by Xi Jinping in 2013. The China analyst Bill Bishop describes the Chinese dream with the following words: “The “Chinese Dream” is a concept that the new leadership has been promoting, both domestically and internationally. The domestic version ties together national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods, prosperity, construction of a better society and military strengthening as the common dream of the Chinese people that can be best achieved under one party, Socialist rule...The Chinese Dream will benefit not only the Chinese people, but also people of all countries. The Chinese dream is not a call for revanchism and Chinese nationalism at the expense of its neighbors. It is the dream of China, which once suffered invasions and turmoil, to maintain lasting peace” (Bishop, 2013).

As we can see, Chinese old and new leaders were and are really keen on developing its image in order to look appealing and attractive in the opinion of other countries. The concepts of *harmonious society* and *Chinese dream* are closely connected; one is following the other: to build the harmonious society which shares the common dream. That is a grand strategy, indeed. And the PRC really needs to show the capability to redeem its promises. If it does, it will be more powerful than ever.

### 2.3.1 China's Soft Power Initiatives

It has been already mentioned that China understands what soft power is and how it could be used. Let's look now on what has been already done in the PRC in this dimension.

In nowadays world the Chinese soft power tools can be divided into five following groups (Zheng, 2009):

1. **Investments:** according to data released by the Heritage Foundation<sup>29</sup>, China's investments abroad are massive, amounting to \$870 billion at the end of 2014.
2. **Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Aid:** Zheng (2009) states, that China is the first country after France, that sends more peacekeepers to UN missions than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council (p.4). China is also participating actively in the activities connected to health diplomacy<sup>30</sup>.
3. **Exchange Programmes:** they include academic, language and cultural exchanges; political training for foreign governmental officials; media training for foreign news correspondents.
4. **Diplomacy:** in recent years, China managed to broaden its diplomacy via increasing high-level leadership meetings and training more skillful diplomatic personnel. In 2014, China also successfully hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) annual leadership gathering and in the upcoming 2016 it is going to chair the G20 Summit.
5. **Multilateral Institutions:** in order to boost its status of a "responsible state", China is actively participating in various organizations and also created

<sup>29</sup> The Heritage Foundation is the nation's most broadly supported public policy research institute, with hundreds of thousands of individual, foundation and corporate donors. Heritage, founded in February 1973, has a staff of 275 and an annual expense budget of \$82.4 million. Its mission is to formulate and promote conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and a strong national defense

<sup>30</sup> According to World Health Organization, global health diplomacy brings together the disciplines of public health, international affairs, management, law and economics and focuses on negotiations that shape and manage the global policy environment for health. The relationship between health, foreign policy and trade is at the cutting edge of global health diplomacy. There are two main goals of this unit: 1. To support the development of a more systematic and pro-active approach to identify and understand key current and future changes impacting global public health. 2. To build capacity among Member States to support the necessary collective action to take advantage of opportunities and mitigate the risks for health.

some of them to increase its influence and support its own interest: the East Asia Summit (EAS)<sup>31</sup>, the SCO, and the forum of China-Africa Cooperation<sup>32</sup>.

It is also very important to mention one of the new China's initiatives, which has been really popular in recent days: the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The main purpose of the AIIB is to provide finance to infrastructure projects in the Asia region. The headquarters of the bank will be based in Beijing. The AIIB is expected to start operating at the end of 2015.

This initiative is one of the brightest examples of China's soft power. More and more countries are willing to join the project. At least 44 countries have applied for membership in the AIIB with the rights of founding countries (*Russia Today*, 2015). The United States and Japan are standing aside for now. However, there are some concerns that the AIIB can diminish the financial hegemony of the U.S. in future. However, it is not likely that the U.S. will totally restrain itself from participating in the project. As directors from the Center for Strategic & International Studies<sup>33</sup> say, "U.S. engagement is needed, but is unlikely to come in the form of bank membership". The government could support the bank by sending experts and advisors to help inform governance structures and standards. It can also work with its allies who have since joined the bank to use their influence to ensure that the AIIB adheres to best practices.

When speaking about China's soft power initiatives there are two significant events which have to be necessarily mentioned: 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and 2010 World EXPO in Shanghai. Both of the events were of great success and brought enormous amounts of investment and tourists to the country. They also helped to boost Chinese image on the international arena. However, in an article published in 2012 in *New York Times* Joseph Nye says that despite all efforts that China makes, its soft power still has its limits. For example, even though the Olympics were successful, but "shortly afterwards, China's domestic crackdown in Tibet and Xingjian, and on human rights

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<sup>31</sup> A forum held annually by leaders of, initially, 16 countries in the East Asian region. Membership expanded to 18 countries including the United States and Russia at the Sixth EAS in 2011. EAS meetings are held after annual ASEAN leaders' meetings.

<sup>32</sup> An official forum between the People's Republic of China and the states in Africa.

<sup>33</sup> CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. The Center's 220 full-time staff and large network of affiliated scholars conduct research and analysis and develop policy initiatives that look to the future and anticipate change.

activists, undercut its soft power gains”. The Shanghai Expo was also overshadowed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo<sup>34</sup>.

Apart from organizing various economic and cultural activities, China is also promoting its television channel CCTV (China Central Television) in order to attract larger amount of international audience.

Speaking about Beijing’s soft power initiatives, they could be divided into further groups:

1. “hard” perception of soft power: economy (banks; investments);
2. “soft” perception of soft power: to promote culture and language using various tools (Confucius Institute; CCTV; Chinese Bridge etc.).

As we can see, in recent years China has significantly improved its international image by using various tools of soft power. According to Kurlantzick (2007), China aims at maintaining peace and stability along its borders, thus it is crucial for it to have friendly relations with its neighbors. Beijing also has begun to show that he could be a constructive actor on the international arena. There is another goal that China is seeking to achieve: it wants to show other nations that it can be a responsible world power helping to shape the international agenda<sup>35</sup>. The example of the AIIB tells us that more and more countries are willing to cooperate with the PRC and it certainly should be regarded as a positive sign. However, Chinese government is still facing challenges, which might be a serious obstacle for the country to express fully its potential. Among the most well-known problems are: violation of human rights in China and the lack of credibility towards the existing political system in the country. China’s one party system imposes strict restrictions on freedom of expression and also censors the internet within the country. The PRC’s stance towards Tibet, Xinjiang and Taiwan is also being criticized by the international community. All these indicate that there is still a lot of work to do if China really wants to become the responsible, trusted state, an example to follow.

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<sup>34</sup> A Chinese literary critic, writer, professor, and human rights activist who called for political reforms and the end of communist single-party rule. He is a political prisoner serving his 11-year sentence in one of the Chinese jails for seeking democratic reforms. During his fourth prison term, he was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.

<sup>35</sup> Huang, Y. (2013). China’s Road to Becoming a “Responsible” World Power. *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*. Retrieved from <http://carnegieendowment.org/2013/03/26/china-s-road-to-becoming-responsible-world-power>

## 2.4 Confucius Institute (Organization; Critics)

One of the best examples of China's soft power is the Confucius Institute. Confucius, 孔子 Kongzi or 孔夫子 Kongfuzi, (BCE 551-479) is the greatest ancient Chinese teacher, philosopher, and political theorist, the founder of Confucianism, an ethical and philosophical system, sometimes described as a religion, though it is not ascertained whether it is really a religion or not. His name is well-known all over the world. It can be considered as Chinese brand. So there is nothing strange that China decided to follow the lead of Germany and Spain and took the name of its most famous person.

However, as Paradise (2009) states in his article, if someone in China had heard four decades ago that the government would not have believed in it. During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) there was a campaign called "Criticize Lin (Biao)<sup>36</sup>, Criticize Confucius". Confucius was seen as an obstacle to social change and a throwback to the past. As we can see now, this name is in fashion again, useful for the government that needs symbols to unify the nation and lending a basis for ideas such as the "harmonious society," which is essentially Confucius concept" (p.648). Confucius is a symbol of peaceful cooperation and harmony. According to Hart's (1978) "The 100: A Ranking of the Most Influential Persons in History", Confucius is ranked number five. When people hear "Confucius Institute" they with obviously think that it must be somehow connected with China or Chinese.

The first Confucius Institute was established in 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. Apart from Confucius Institutes, there are also Confucius Classrooms (CC) which usually operate in schools. The organization responsible for opening Confucius Institutes/Classrooms is known as the Office of Chinese Language Council International, referred to hereafter by its abbreviation in Chinese, Hanban<sup>37</sup>. According to the information published on the official website of Hanban<sup>38</sup>, there are now 95 Confucius

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<sup>36</sup> Lin Biao (林彪) - Chinese military leader who, as a field commander of the Red Army, contributed to the communists' 22-year struggle for power and held many high government and party posts. He played a prominent role in the first several years of the Cultural Revolution but in 1971 he allegedly sought to remove Chinese leader Mao Zedong and seize power; his plot was discovered, and he died under obscure circumstances.

<sup>37</sup> 國家漢語國際推廣領導小組辦公室 (Guojia Hanyu Guoji Tuiguang Lingdao Xiaozu Bangongshi), 簡稱國家漢辦 (Hanban).

<sup>38</sup> <http://english.hanban.org/>

Institutes and 52 Confucius Classrooms in Asia; 38 CIs and 10 CCs in Africa; 144 and 384 in America; 149 and 153 in Europe; 17 and 49 in Oceania. It means that in total there are 443 Confucius Institutes and 648 Confucius Classrooms in the world. According to Xinhua (2006), Hanban is planning to open 1000 CI by 2020.

According to Zhe (2012), one of the main reasons of the creation of the Confucius Institutes is the rapid increase in numbers of those who study Chinese. People become more and more interested in this language due to many reasons: e.g. the economy of the PRC is developing rapidly, and many people realize that if they start learning Chinese it could increase their chance to get a good job in the future. Others just like the Chinese culture itself and are interested in that mysterious difficult language which requires a lot of effort if you really want to master it. If we take a look at the information provided by Hanban, we will see that over 40 million foreigners are studying Chinese<sup>39</sup>. And China has to satisfy the increasing demand.

#### **2.4.1 Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters)**

In July, 2004, the Chinese government proposed five-year plan for Chinese language education abroad under the name of “Chinese Bridge project”<sup>40</sup>. The main purpose of the establishment of this institution is to become a representative of the Chinese culture (p. 33). Its aim was to promote Confucius Institutes overseas in order to boost learning of Chinese language and culture (Yang & Tamney, 2012, p.50). Hanban is the organization that supervises the institutes and comprises the representatives from 12 state ministries and commissions (Zhe, 2012): The General Office of the State Council; The Ministry of Education; The Ministry of Finance; The Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council; The Ministry of Foreign Affairs; The State Development and Reform Commission; The Ministry of Commerce; The Ministry of Culture; The State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television; The State Press and Publications Administration; The State council Information Office; The State Language Council.

The Hanban itself performs the following functions:

1. To make policies and development plans for promoting Chinese language internationally;

<sup>39</sup> 『國家漢辦主任稱：4000 萬外國人熱衷學漢語』，搜抓新聞，2009 年 03 月 13 日，  
<http://news.sohu.com/20090313/n262768846.shtml>

<sup>40</sup> 漢語橋工程 (Hanyu qiao gongcheng)

2. To support Chinese language programs at educational institutions of various types and levels in other countries;
3. To draft international Chinese teaching standards and develop and promote Chinese language teaching materials<sup>41</sup>.

According to the information on Hanban's official website<sup>42</sup>, it is also responsible for the following activities:

1. To make development plans and set down establishment and evaluation criterion for Confucius Institutes;
2. To examine, approve and establish Confucius Institutes;
3. To examine and approve annual project proposals, budgets and financial statements of Confucius Institutes worldwide;
4. To guide and evaluate the teaching activities and to control the quality of the operation of Confucius Institutes;
5. To provide Confucius Institutes around the world with the support and services of teaching resources;
6. To select and dispatch Chinese directors and teaching staff to Confucius Institutes, to offer training programs for the management teams and teachers of Confucius Institutes;
7. To organize annual Confucius Institute conferences.

Although Hanban is responsible for sending teachers of Chinese language to the overseas Confucius Institutes, local Chinese teachers can also work there. However, they as well as those who might give lectures on various topics at the CIs should bear in mind that such issues as Tibetan independence, the status of Taiwan, the fourth of June 1989 at Tiananmen Square, Falun Gong and universal human rights are not the best topics to discuss within this institution. China established the CI to promote its positive image on the international arena, not vice versa.

In April, 2007 Hanban created a Confucius Institute Headquarters in Beijing. It is registered as a non-profit organization (NPO) with corporate status. All expenses for the Confucius Institute Headquarters and for its work of expanding the institute's activities overseas are covered by the state. Thus, as Zhe (2012) states, it is only an NPO de jure, and it can be described as a quasi-governmental organization that strongly reflects government views.

<sup>41</sup> About Hanban. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7719.htm#](http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm#)

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

According to the "Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes", the Confucius Institute Headquarters is governed by the Council. The Council consists of the Chair, the Vice Chairs, the Executive Council Members, and the Council Members. Among the fifteen Council Members, ten shall be the Heads of the Board of Directors of Confucius Institutes overseas<sup>43</sup>.

The following are the duties of the Council:

1. Examining and approving the development strategies and plans of global Confucius Institutes;
2. Formulating and amending the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes;
3. Examining and approving annual reports and working plans of the Headquarters;
4. Discussing issues of significance concerning the development of Confucius Institutes<sup>44</sup>.

The Council shall assemble once a year, called by the Chair. When needed, the Chair may decide to call for provisional Council Meetings or Executive Council Member Meetings. Under the leadership of the Council, the Confucius Institute Headquarters carries out its own daily operations. The duties include:

1. Formulating development plans, criteria for the establishment of Confucius Institutes, and assessment standards for the Confucius Institutes;
2. Examining and approving applications for the establishment of new Confucius Institutes;
3. Examining and approving the implementation plans of annual projects, annual budgetary items, and final financial accounts of individual Confucius Institutes;
4. Providing guidelines and making assessments to activities carried out by Confucius Institutes, supervising their operations and doing quality assurance management;
5. Providing support and teaching resources to individual Confucius Institutes;

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<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid.

6. Selecting and appointing directors and faculties from the Chinese side for individual Confucius Institutes, and training administrative personnel and instructors for these Confucius Institutes;
7. Organizing Confucius Institutes Conferences annually;
8. Constituting regulations and institutions for the management of the Chinese funds.<sup>45</sup>

Speaking of budget, Hanban and the local partner are covering the expenses for the institutes on a 1:1 basis.<sup>46</sup> If the overseas CI wants to hold any activity, it should first agree its action and approximate budget with Hanban and see whether it would approve it or not.

In order to support the development of Confucius Institutes, facilitating international promotion of Chinese language and dissemination of Chinese culture, as well as cultivating qualified Chinese-language teachers and excellent Chinese-language learners, Hanban launched a “Confucius Institute Scholarship” programme to sponsor foreign students, scholars and Chinese language teachers to study Chinese in relevant universities of China. This programme was established in 2009. By end of 2014, near 25 000 applicants from 150 countries have been funded to study in China.<sup>47</sup>

According to the information on the Hanban website, Confucius Institute Scholarship is divided into 6 categories:

1. Scholarship for Students of Master's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTCSOL);
2. Scholarship for Students of One-Academic-Year + MTCSOL;
3. Scholarship for Students of Bachelor's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (BTCSOL);
4. Scholarship for One-Academic-Year Students;
5. Scholarship for One-Semester Students;
6. Scholarship for Four-Week Students.

Applicants shall be non-Chinese citizens in good health, aged between 16 and 35 (Chinese language teachers in post shall be aged below 45, and applicants for BTCSOL scholarship should be aged below 20).<sup>48</sup>

<sup>45</sup> Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm)

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Scholarships. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://english.hanban.org/jxjen.htm>

<sup>48</sup> Ibid.

Scholarship winners are exempt from tuition, accommodation fees on campus, and are provided with monthly living allowance (except Four-Weeks Scholarship Students) , and comprehensive insurance for foreign students studying in China. Monthly living allowances are provided at the following rates (CNY Yuan per month):

- a. CNY 2,500 for Bachelor's Degree Students ,One-Academic-Year Students and One-Semester Students.
- b. CNY 3,000 for Master's Degree Students.<sup>49</sup>

“Every year from the issue date of the Procedures, applicants can log on to the Confucius Institute Scholarship website at <http://cis.chinese.cn>, set up an individual account, read information and introduction of host institutes and majors, complete and submit the Confucius Institute Scholarship Application Form online. Confucius Institutes (independently set-up Confucius Classrooms), overseas Chinese test centers, educational and cultural offices (sections) of Chinese Embassies (Consulates), host institutes and institutions of higher education in those countries with no Confucius Institutes are entrusted by Hanban as the recommending institutions. The recommending institutions shall examine the qualification and application materials of applicants.”<sup>50</sup>

## 2.4.2 Organization of the Confucius Institutes

Confucius Institutes are operated by Hanban in conjunction with universities in China and local partner institutions abroad. According to Zhe (2012), there are three categories of CIs based on the different natures of their relations with the partners:

1. The CI is operated along with a foreign university, which provides a location and facilities, while a Chinese university supplies the faculty and classroom materials (the majority of CIs are of this type, e.g. The CI at Moscow State Linguistic University);
2. The CI is operated along with a public or social organization overseas. Again, the overseas part provide a location and facilities, and the Chinese part provides the faculty and classroom materials. (The example with the partnership with a public organization is the Chicago CI operated jointly by the Chicago Public School Office of Language and Culture Education

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<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

and Shanghai's East China Normal University (ECNU)<sup>51</sup>. The CI at the China Institute<sup>52</sup>, created jointly by the New York-based China Institute in America and the ECNU, is an example of a CI run in conjunction with a social organization).

3. The CI created and operated along with foreign corporations and target Chinese language students in the world of business. (E.g. London's CI for Business. Funding for it has come from several multinational corporations including British Petroleum, Deloitte, HSBC. Tsinghua University<sup>53</sup> and London School of Economics<sup>54</sup> oversee its educational activities and operation.

According to paragraph 11 of the Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes, the most important objectives and services provided by the Confucius Institute are:

1. Chinese language teaching;
2. Training Chinese language instructors and providing Chinese language teaching resources;
3. Holding the HSK examination (Chinese Proficiency Test) and tests for the Certification of the Chinese Language Teachers;
4. Providing information and consultative services concerning China's education, culture, and so forth;
5. Conducting language and cultural exchange activities between China and other countries<sup>55</sup>.

### 2.4.3 Debates and Concerns

Despite its rapid development, the Confucius Institute is facing a lot of challenges in nowadays world. As Zhe (2012) states, the most serious issue are concerns of the foreign countries that China by using the CI as a cultural tool might impose its influence

<sup>51</sup> It is a comprehensive research university in Shanghai, China. Established in 1951, it is the first national normal university of the People's Republic of China.

<sup>52</sup> It was founded in 1926 and is the oldest bicultural organization in America devoted exclusively to China.

<sup>53</sup> It is a research university established in 1911 and located in Beijing, China. In both domestic and international university rankings, Tsinghua University has consistently been ranked alongside Peking University as the top institution of higher learning in mainland China.

<sup>54</sup> It is a public research university located in London, England which specializes in social sciences, and a constituent college of the federal University of London. It was founded in 1895.

<sup>55</sup> Constitution and By-Laws of the Confucius Institutes. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7880.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_7880.htm)

on people. Zhe gives Japan as an example, saying that the government of the country is highly concerned about the influence and the expansion of the CIs, that is why it does not allow any state-run university to open the CI. All 13 Confucius Institutes in the country are affiliated to the local private universities.

Professor Ding in his book “Dragon’s hidden wings” (2008) in chapter named “To Build a “Strong” Language” is speaking about so called “linguistic imperialism” which was introduced by Robert Phillipson in 1992<sup>56</sup>. It can also be called as “language imperialism”. According to the information on Encyclopedia Britannica, “language imperialism involves the transfer of a dominant language to other peoples. The transfer is essentially a demonstration of power--traditionally military power but also in the modern world economic power--and aspects of the dominant culture are usually transferred along with the language”<sup>57</sup>. It can be assumed that some countries might be afraid that with the rapid expansion of the Confucius Institute all over the world Mandarin Chinese could replace English as the new Universal Language at least in the Far East region. That is why Ding (p.125) states that Beijing’s efforts to popularize Chinese could be viewed “as a form of hard power wielding, imposing its cultural values on others”.

In June, 2014 an article named “The Debate Over Confucius Institute” appeared on ChinaFile website<sup>58</sup>. In this article a number of the American Association of University Professors expressed their point of view on the Confucius Institutes. There were so many reflections, that the article had to be divided into two parts. It turned out that the main concern of the majority of people is the fact that Confucius Institutes are sponsored by “an arm of Chinese state” (the euphemism for Hanban) and they are conflicting with academic freedom and traditions. Many professors say that unwillingness of the Chinese government to speak about Tiananmen, Tibet, Taiwan and other sensitive issues which undoubtedly make these topics prohibited also in CIs can be regarded as an evidence of lack of academic freedom and certain censorship which is unacceptable in democratic countries and in our enlightened age. Some professors also find the idea that China sponsors them with the teaching materials, stuff and teaching methods, is wrong, because they already have quite strong China or Asia studies departments with good performance.

<sup>56</sup> Phillipson, R. (1992). *Linguistic imperialism*. Oxford [England: Oxford University Press.

<sup>57</sup> Knowles, G. (n.d.). English Language Imperialism: Year In Review 1997. In *Britannica*.

<sup>58</sup> The Debate Over Confucius Institutes. (2014, June 23). *ChinaFile*. Retrieved from <http://www.chinafile.com/conversation/debate-over-confucius-institutes>

Of course, not everyone is skeptical about the establishment of the CIs. Some professors say that China has great and rich culture and while the CIs are teaching people Chinese, introducing the country to the students, everything is fine. But if something goes wrong there is no necessity to abandon the whole institute, because sometimes only small adjustments are needed to fix a broken thing.

Not only had the lack of academic freedom and hiring policies become main concerns about the Confucius Institutes. There are ways more serious and deep problems like accusation of espionage for example. Some people believe that Chinese government is using the CIs as a spy tool. A top Sinologist and one of the program's most outspoken critics from Philadelphia - Arthur Waldron – says that the CIs may play a key role in effecting China's espionage agenda. He also thinks that they might be used as tools for keeping tabs on Chinese students who are studying abroad<sup>59</sup>.

The CIs are even sometimes called “Trojan Horses with Chinese characteristics.” For example, the former chief of Asia-Pacific for the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), Juneau-Katsuya says that despite the fact that the education level provided by the CIs might be really good, there is still no doubt that this organization is used as a spy agency, thus they represent a particular threat for the Canadian government and the Canadian public<sup>60</sup>.

However, there are also doubts that Beijing would risk and jeopardize its investment by discrediting the Confucius Institute. As it has many other ways of gathering information. No security service has uncovered any such machinations since the creation of the CIs in 2004<sup>61</sup>.

Opinions will always differ. While someone's attitude towards the Confucius Institute is positive, others will remain highly critical. Being afraid that the presence of the CIs might be harmful to them some countries or universities are deciding to close the CIs, or in another words, simply do not want to renew their agreements with the institutes. Among them are the following universities, which due to this or that reason did not want to continue their cooperation with the Confucius Institutes:

<sup>59</sup> Fingleton, E. (2014, May 5). Is Stanford Collaborating With Chinese Propaganda? Just Asking. *Forbes*. Retrieved from <http://www.forbes.com/sites/eamonnfingleton/2014/10/05/is-stanford-collaborating-with-chinas-espionage-program/>

<sup>60</sup> Ghoreishi, O. (2014, October 14). Beijing Uses Confucius Institutes for Espionage, Says Canadian Intelligence Veteran. *Epoch Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/1018292-hosting-confucius-institute-a-bad-idea-says-intelligence-veteran/>

<sup>61</sup> Mattis, P. (2012, August 02). Reexamining the Confucian Institutes. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved from <http://thediplomat.com/2012/08/reexamining-the-confucian-institutes/>.

- Osaka Sangyo University (Japan; reason: claimed that CI is "a spy agency established to gather cultural intelligence", though they apologized later for these words<sup>62</sup>)
- McMaster University (Canada; reason: concerns over hiring practices<sup>63</sup>)
- University of Lyon (France; reason: the Chinese director of the CI was "taking his instructions directly from Beijing", and the content of the courses poses a lot of questions<sup>64</sup>)
- Université de Sherbrooke (Canada; reason: violation of academic freedom<sup>65</sup>)
- University of Chicago (USA; reason: concerns that, Chicago was ceding control over faculty hiring, course content, and programming to Confucius Institute headquarters in Beijing<sup>66</sup>)
- Pennsylvanian State University (USA; reason: goals are not consistent with those of Hanban<sup>67</sup>)
- Toronto District School Board (Canada; reason: "this partnership is not aligned with TDSB and community values, and its continuation is not appropriate"<sup>68</sup>)
- Stockholm University (Sweden; reason: no need in this kind of cooperation<sup>69</sup>)

<sup>62</sup> Japanese university apologizes for calling Confucius Institute spy agency. (2010, June 12). *People's Daily*. Retrieved from <http://en.people.cn/90001/90782/7023278.html>.

<sup>63</sup> Bradshaw, J., & Freeze, C. (2013, February 7). McMaster closing Confucius Institute over hiring issues. *The Globe and Mail*. Retrieved from <http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/education/mcmaster-closing-confucius-institute-over-hiring-issues/article8372894/>

<sup>64</sup> Ching, F. (2014, October 1). World should watch for Confucius. *The China Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.chinapost.com.tw/commentary/the-china-post/frank-ching/2014/10/01/418395/p1/World-should.htm>

<sup>65</sup> Montgomery, M. (2014, September 9). University teachers call for an end to Confucius Institutes. *Radio Canada International*. Retrieved from <http://www.rcinet.ca/en/2014/09/09/university-teachers-call-for-an-end-to-confucius-institutes/>

<sup>66</sup> Redden, E. (2014). Chicago to Close Confucius Institute. *Inside Higher Ed*. Retrieved from <https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/09/26/chicago-severs-ties-chinese-government-funded-confucius-institute>

<sup>67</sup> Confucius Institute update. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.la.psu.edu/news/confucius-institute-update>

<sup>68</sup> Toronto schools reject tie-up with China's Confucius Institute. (2014, October 30). *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from <http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1628071/toronto-schools-reject-tie-chinas-confucius-institute>

If we compare the overall number of the CIs opened all over the world with the number of the closed ones, we might see how on the one insignificant it is if someone does not want to continue its cooperation with the CI. One could say that there are still plenty of other CIs. However, on the other hand it is very important and dangerous. If someone does not want to be friends with you today could mean that tomorrow others can follow his lead. In this case Hanban needs to examine deeper the reasons which stand behind the decisions of the universities to close the CIs and do some “correction of mistakes”. That could help him to prevent precedents of this kind in future.

## 2.5 Russian Soft Power

In nowadays world Russia just as any other country is concerned about its image on the international arena. Even during the Soviet times the country wanted to show to the rest of the world that it is not an “empire of evil”. The advantages of the USSR consisted in its priceless contribution in a bloody struggle with Hitler regime; its readiness to implement innovations in science and technologies; its superiority of cultural and education systems. However, due to the communist regime and rather closeness of the country, its soft power abilities had never been used in a full scale (Nye, 2004).

After the disintegration of Soviet Union, for the next decade soft power was not a priority in Russia’s policy. There were more urgent things that the country had to do. However in recent years, Russian leadership begins to realize that there are various methods to get what you want and it does not necessary imply that you have to use hard power when you want to achieve something. Russian president Vladimir Putin first used the term “soft power” in the article prepared for his presidential campaign in 2012. He said that Russia welcomed those NGOs which provide humanitarian and educational programmes and pointed out that Russia itself also had such organizations, which cooperated with the outside world, like Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation) and Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation (Putin, 2012)<sup>70</sup>.

When it comes to the concept of soft power, it is not actually easy to find many works of Russian authors on that topic. Thus, it could be assumed that it is a relatively new area of research among Russian scholars. Although there could be found some works:

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<sup>69</sup> 『孔子學院變得“多餘”值得警醒』，環球時報，2015年1月13日，  
<http://opinion.huanqiu.com/plrd/2015-01/5395139.html>

<sup>70</sup> Путин В. Россия и меняющийся мир [Электронный ресурс] / В. Путин // Московские новости. – 2012. – 27 Февраля. – Режим доступа: <http://www.mn.ru/politics/20120227/312306749.html>

e.g. Andrei P. Tsygankov, a professor of political science and international relations at San Francisco State University, examines Russia's soft power strategy and finds out that despite great potential possessed by the country and its efforts to build an infrastructure to influence the formation of Russia's image in the world there are still a lot of difficulties to build strong soft power relations (Tsygankov, 2013).

In 2013 Joseph Nye explained why China and Russia do not succeed in implementing soft power. The main reason rests on the fact that both of them have wrong impression that the main driving force of this concept is the government. However, nowadays no one wants to be manipulated by someone's government propaganda, thus people may think that Russian and Chinese soft power are less credible than, for example, the American one.

### **2.5.1 Russia's Soft Power Initiatives**

Though it has been mentioned that Russian soft power is relatively weak it still exists. The following are the most notable initiatives:

#### **Rossotrudnichestvo (Russian Cooperation; Россотрудничество)**

This organization was formed in 2008. According to its official website of the organization, a key aspect of Rossotrudnichestvo's activities is international humanitarian cooperation. The Agency has an actual active system for the support of the Russian language abroad. Promotion of Russian educational services, as well as the expansion of collaboration between Russian and foreign educational institutions is being actively pursued. A great deal of attention is paid to working with alumni of Russian (Soviet) higher education institutions. Thousands of people, especially young people, are currently studying the Russian language in Rossotrudnichestvo's foreign establishments in many countries across the globe. In representative missions, examinations and tests are conducted, the successful completion of which results in the reception of certificates indicating the bearer's competency level in the Russian language. In promoting the propagation of the Russian language, the Agency creates conditions for its active use, and also for receiving education in Russian. Rossotrudnichestvo's missions enable foreign students' admission to Russian higher educational institutions and maintain communication with their alumni, who number over 500 thousand across the globe.<sup>71</sup>

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<sup>71</sup> Rossotrudnichestvo. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://rs.gov.ru/en/node/305>

### **Ruskiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation (Фонд «Русский мир»)**

This foundation was established in 2007. The main aim of it is to promote Russian language and cultural. The Foundation is a joint project of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education and Science and supported by both public and private funds. One of the most notable initiatives of this foundation is to create Russian Centers in partnership with educational organizations around the world. They are created with the aim of popularizing Russian language and culture as a crucial element of world civilization, supporting Russian language study programs abroad, developing cross-culture dialog and strengthening understanding between cultures and peoples. Right now these centers are opened in at least 40 countries all over the world<sup>72</sup>.

### **Russia Today (RT; «Россия сегодня»)**

It is a Russian state-funded television network. With its first channel launched in December 2005, the RT network now consists of three global news channels broadcasting in English, Spanish and Arabic, RT America broadcasting from a Washington, DC studio, RT UK airing from London, and a documentary channel RTDoc – in English and Russian. Today RT has a global reach of over 700 million people in more than 100. RT news covers the major issues of our time for viewers wishing to question more and delivers stories often missed by the mainstream media to create news with an edge. RT provides an alternative perspective on major global events, and acquaints an international audience with the Russian viewpoint<sup>73</sup>.

As we can see, Russia is also trying to march in step when it comes to the soft power issues. However, there are some events happening on the international arena that do not allow Moscow to stay aside: Russo-Georgian war<sup>74</sup> (2008) and Ukrainian crisis (2014). Moscow's direct involvement in these events has been highly criticized by the international society thus making it harder for the country to restore its positive image.

China and Russia have already understood that soft power is a necessary tool in building modern image of the country. Both of them have undertaken various initiatives


<sup>72</sup> Ruskiy Mir Foundation. (n.d.). Retrieved June 26, 2015, from <http://ruskiymir.ru/en/>

<sup>73</sup> About us. (n.d.). *Russia Today*. Retrieved from <http://rt.com/about-us/>.

<sup>74</sup> An armed conflict between Georgia, the Russian Federation, and the Russian-backed self-proclaimed breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The war took place in August 2008 amidst worsening relations between Russia and Georgia, which were both formerly constituent republics of the Soviet Union. It was regarded as the first European war of the 21st century

in this field, and we have to admit that they have partly succeeded in doing so. If we take their educational initiatives as an example we will see that China has gained more in comparison with Russia. However, it can be connected to the fact that Chinese language is more popular in demand than Russian. One of the other reasons why Beijing is outrunning Moscow in “soft power race” could be associated with the current events on the international arena. Russia’s image is damaged because of the events in Ukraine and it is not that easy to restore it. In this case Russia should try harder to use soft power to convince other states that it can pursue not only a stick policy, but also a carrot one.

Speaking about the bilateral relations, since the disintegration of Soviet Union China and Russia managed not only to restore their friendship but also level it up to the strategic partnership phase. The cooperation between these two states embraces many spheres. With the change in nature of relations, the attitude of people also changed. Moscow and Beijing are not hostile towards each other’s plans anymore. More and more people in Russia are studying Chinese because they see these great opportunities that China can offer them. In the following chapters of the study we will look closer on whether, how and why the bilateral relations can influence the perception of people towards educational initiatives of the country (taking Moscow perception towards Confucius Institute as an example).



## Chapter 3      Soft Power and China

### 3.1 Introduction

Nowadays the PRC, in order to keep up with the Western world, is actively developing its soft power strategy. As it has been stated in Chapter 2, China's soft power consists of the following tools: investments; peacekeeping and humanitarian aid, exchange programmes, diplomacy and multilateral institutions.<sup>75</sup> This Chapter is going to deal with China's soft power in greater detail.

When conducting its public diplomacy, China aims at winning the hearts and minds of people abroad. It needs to persuade other countries and nations that when it comes to China, there is nothing to worry about, as Beijing supports peace and cooperation between nations. Chinese rise is peaceful itself and does not aim at targeting any third party. The PRC is also constantly underlining that it is diplomacy rest on Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence<sup>76</sup>: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; peaceful co-existence.<sup>77</sup>

When it comes to China soft power and public diplomacy, it certainly should be mentioned that it has its own Chinese characteristics. According to Wang (2008), China “needs to learn from [its] history, inquiring into ideas, environment, resources, and challenges for public diplomacy and put forward a systematic Chinese public diplomacy strategy” with the following outline:

1. *The target.* The basic target for Chinese public diplomacy should be “a self-confident, trustworthy, cooperative, peace-loving China”. It is public diplomacy should be in close connection with the country's national strategy and step by step change the image of the PRC on international arena “from negative to neutral to positive”;

<sup>75</sup> For more details see Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.3.1.

<sup>76</sup> A set of principles to govern relations between states. Their first formal codification in treaty form was in an agreement between China and India in 1954. They were enunciated in the preamble to the "Agreement (with exchange of notes) on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India", which was signed at Peking on 29 April 1954.

<sup>77</sup> United Nations Treaty Series. (1958). Retrieved from [https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume 299/v299.pdf](https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20299/v299.pdf)

2. *The means.* China's public diplomacy aims at shaping "an affinitive and democratic government. Chinese government organs overseas first should protect the legal rights of every Chinese citizen; second, they should initiate image-promotion activities through cultural exchange and broadcasting, making use of the local media to broadcast Chinese news and other programs with the help of local overseas Chinese, students studying abroad, and transnational companies with investments in China";
3. *Focal points.* "Chinese public diplomacy should focus on the media in the United States and Europe, who mainly shape the public opinion of the world, to erase the bad effect of "hate media." China should make full use of the multilateral stage, particularly the United Nations, to present its voice; learn to be good at communication with the nongovernmental organizations and the world civil society; and break the traditional paradox of public diplomacy and turn the passive entanglement of domestic issues into the active engagement with international issues, thereby shaping China's new image as a responsible great power";
4. *Organization:* "China needs to integrate its diplomatic resources, putting the vice minister of foreign affairs in charge of public diplomacy and public affairs as early as possible, to unify and coordinate the public diplomacy work within the Chinese diplomatic system. China should establish a State Department Information Bureau to take the responsibility for international communication. At the same time, China should continue to make full use of non-state actors such as Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC)"<sup>78</sup> (p.269).

If China successfully follows the steps and rules stated above it might become a responsible player on the international arena with attractive soft power strategy. However,

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<sup>78</sup> CPAFFC (中國人民對外友好協議 zhongguo renmin duiwai youhao xieyi) - is a national people's organization engaged in people-to-people diplomacy of the PRC. The aims of the Association are to enhance people's friendship, further international cooperation, safeguard world peace and promote common development. On behalf of the Chinese people, it makes friends and deepens friendship in the international community and various countries around the world, lays and expands the social basis of friendly relations between China and other countries, and works for the cause of human progress and solidarity. It implements China's independent foreign policy of peace, observing the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, while carrying out all-directional, multi-level and broad-area people-to-people friendship work to serve the great cause of China's peaceful development and reunification and contribute to the building of a harmonious world of lasting peace and common prosperity.

Beijing still needs to face a lot of challenges to prove its good intentions. Let's look more closely at how China perceives soft power and what mechanisms it prefers to use.

### 3.2 Soft Power with Chinese and Russian Characteristics

As it has been already mentioned, China's soft power has its own special features – so-called “soft power with Chinese characteristics”<sup>79</sup>. The same thing is very often said about Russia's soft power. When speaking about “soft power with Chinese/Russian characteristics” we should keep in mind that though many countries nowadays are ready to develop the concept of soft power, first of all they need to adopt it to their needs. As a result, soft power in China, for example, could be different from the Western notion of the same concept. According to Osipova (2014), it means that countries are reconceptualizing soft power “through their own cultural, historical, socio-political lens” and “fit it to their own interests and objectives, as well as to their available resources”.

Russia and China are two countries sharing the same Communist legacy, which undoubtedly has influenced significantly their policies. The Kremlin and Beijing to some extent are used to oppose themselves to Washington. Though, of course, it was more notable during the cold war rather than now, however this habit still remains. Despite the fact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union brought a lot of changes to the international world order, international relations, balance of power etc., it was difficult to Russia to change its habits in a blink. Of course it managed to improve its relations with the Western world, so did the PRC. However they are still regarded by the West as *rara avis*<sup>80</sup>. The reason for that might lie in the fact that China, obviously, has never and will never belong to the Western “family” because of the geographical factor. For Russia everything is much more complicated, as it occupies a unique place being at the same time a European and Asian country, thus it cannot follow the Western path. So when it comes to soft power, for instance, all factors stated above influence both Moscow and Beijing's behavior making them see the Western perception of the concept “nothing less than an existential threat” (Wilson, 2015).

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<sup>79</sup> The phrase “something with Chinese characteristics” comes from the well-know “Socialism with Chinese characteristics”, meaning socialism adapted to Chinese conditions.

<sup>80</sup> [Latin] A rare or unique person or thing.

If we take China's case as an example, we will see that all those issues mentioned above are true and could be found there: e.g. CPC Central Party School<sup>81</sup> professor Men Honghua (門洪華) (2007) states that, when analyzing China's soft power, the theory needs to be enriched with Chinese practice.<sup>82</sup> According to Glasser and Murphy (2009), one very important issue that differentiates Chinese soft power from the American one is that Beijing, in order to improve its soft power, sees this concept globally, meaning developing its domestic and international approach towards the issue, while Washington aims at improving its international positions only (p.20). Most Chinese scholars believe that soft power should be developed internationally as well as domestically and seem attractive both to Chinese and international audience.

The same special characteristics could be applied when it comes to Russian soft power. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia started writing a new page in its history – shift to democracy. However, this democracy has its own specific features. As Russian government failed to incorporate Western-style democracy, it decided to sail its own boat and proclaimed so-called sovereign democracy. There are two basic features of this concept: the primacy of sovereignty over democracy and a sovereign “style” of Russian democratic development which does not have to correspond to Western standards (Petrov, 2005: p.182).

When it comes to the discussion of soft power in Russia and its specific features, it can be observed that Moscow deals with the concept in the same way as it deals with Western concept of democracy – it tries to de-westernize it. Many Russian authors think that the US is using soft power in order to spread their influence around the globe (Ponomareva, 2012<sup>83</sup>; Palazhchenko, 2013<sup>84</sup>; Leontyev, 2013<sup>85</sup>). Leontyev (2013) states, that soft power is a projection of hard power. Thus, in the past Soviet Union was more

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<sup>81</sup> The Party School of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (中共中央黨校 zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao) of China in Beijing, also known as the Central Party School, is the higher education institution which specifically trains officials for the Communist Party of China. China's President Xi Jinping served as the President of School in 2007-2013.

<sup>82</sup> 門洪華, 中國軟實力方略. 浙江: 浙江人民出版社, 2007 年。

<sup>83</sup> Пономарева Е.Г. Железная хватка «мягкой силы» [Электронный ресурс]. – 2013. – Март. - Режим доступа: <http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/zheleznaya-hvatka-myagkoy-sili/>

<sup>84</sup> Палажченко П.Р. От мягкой силы до мягкого невежества - один шаг [Электронный ресурс]. – 2013. – 01 февраля. - Режим доступа: [http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id\\_4=1337#top-content](http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=1337#top-content)

<sup>85</sup> Леонтьев М.В. «Мягкая сила» — реальная, эффективная — является проекцией жесткой силы [Электронный ресурс]. – 2013. – Режим доступа: <http://www.odnako.org/magazine/material/myagkaya-sila-realnaya-effektivnaya-yavlyaetsya-proekciy-zhestkoy-sili/>

capable to develop its soft power than Russia is now, because Moscow lacks hard power. There is another important thing to mention here: if Russia is ready to promote its soft power it wants to do it perfect. It must be sure that everything it is doing could be described “best of the best”, unlike the US which is just trying to win hearts and minds by quantity, not quality.

According to Konstantin Kosachev (2012), head of Rossotrudnichestvo (one of the initiatives of Russian soft power<sup>86</sup>), soft power of Russia should rely on three main principles: cooperation, security and sovereignty. The cooperation, thus, should be built up upon the basis of mutual cooperation (China also very often refers to that stance). The security is crucial for normal development of relations between nations, and sovereignty is a core principle of non-interference between states, which can be regarded as a precondition for security and cooperation.<sup>87</sup>

Besides discussing Russian soft power, Kosachev also touches upon the topic of Chinese soft power, as he thinks that it is a “very interesting case to study”. According to him, the Chinese definition of soft power is wider than the Western one, which opens new possibilities for its implementation. The idea of soft power has been present in Chinese history for centuries. Chinese ancient philosopher, author of the famous *Daodejing*<sup>88</sup>, Laozi<sup>89</sup> once said that “The soft overcomes the hard; and the weak the strong.”<sup>90</sup> It seems that today the Chinese leadership has finally decided to pay attention to these words. In October 2007, ex-President of the PRC Hu Jintao during the 17<sup>th</sup> CPC Congress stated

<sup>86</sup> For more information see Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.5.1

<sup>87</sup> Косачев К.И. Не рыбу, а удочку: в чем состоит особенность «мягкой силы» России [Электронный ресурс]. – 2012. – 04 сентября. – Режим доступа: <http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/Ne-rybu-a-udochku-15642>

<sup>88</sup> *Daodejing* (or *Tao Te Ching*, 道德經) - is a Chinese classic text. According to tradition, it was written around 6th century BC by Laozi. The text is a fundamental text for both philosophical and religious Taoism, and strongly influenced other schools, such as Legalism, Confucianism, and Chinese Buddhism, which when first introduced into China was largely interpreted through the use of Daoist words and concepts. Many Chinese artists, including poets, painters, calligraphers, and even gardeners, have used the *Daodejing* as a source of inspiration. Its influence has also spread widely outside East Asia, and is among the most translated works in world literature.

<sup>89</sup> Laozi (老子) was a philosopher and poet of ancient China. He is best known as the reputed author of the *Tao Te Ching* and the founder of philosophical Taoism, but he is also revered as a deity in religious Taoism and traditional Chinese religions. Although a legendary figure, he is usually dated to around the 6th century BC and reckoned a contemporary of Confucius, but some historians contend that he actually lived during the Warring States period of the 5th or 4th century BC. Throughout history, Laozi's work has been embraced by various anti-authoritarian movements.

<sup>90</sup> Lao Tzu: Quote. (n.d.). Retrieved from <https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/659526-the-soft-overcomes-the-hard-and-the-weak-the-strong>

that China must “enhance the country’s cultural soft power” (Xinhua, 2008).<sup>91</sup> He also added that “Culture has increasingly become an important source of national cohesion and creativity and an important factor in the competition of overall national strength”.<sup>92</sup> As it has been already discussed in Chapter 2, the next generation of Chinese leaders with Xi Jinping at the helm, has further expanded on the importance of soft power being part of the country’s policy.<sup>93</sup> Xi also stressed the importance of culture as an integral part of soft power, its fundamental basis, and he urged Chinese citizens to enhance national soft power as a means of realizing the Chinese Dream (Xinhua, 2014).<sup>94</sup>

Russian highest leadership has also already included soft power in its agenda. In Chapter 2 we briefly spoke about Russian President Putin’s point of view on the subject, especially in terms of Western concept of soft power.<sup>95</sup> Though he thinks that soft power could be used as a negative tool by the Western world it does not necessarily imply that he is opposing the concept of soft power itself. If Western style of soft power is not for Russia, it can create its own, more appealing and appropriate. Russian Prime-Minister Dmitry Medvedev has also spoken about Russia’s soft power. In his point of view – the main target for the Kremlin in this field is to develop the Russian language abroad, do whatever it takes to preserve the language (Kuzmin, 2015)<sup>96</sup>. It can be observed that in terms of soft power both Russian and Chinese leadership give high priorities to the cultural sphere.

Another feature which distinguishes Russian and Chinese approach towards soft power from the Western one is that these two states think that soft power should be orchestrated by the state. It is seen as a state project. Joseph Nye (2013) highly criticized Moscow and Beijing for that. In his point of view, the driven force of the American soft power is civil society, not government. And here lies their greatest mistake. “In today’s world, information is not scarce but attention is, and attention depends on credibility. Government propaganda is rarely credible. The best propaganda is not propaganda.”

<sup>91</sup> 『報告解讀：提高國家文化軟實力』，新華社，2007年12月28日，  
[http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-12/28/content\\_7327640.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007-12/28/content_7327640.htm)

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> For more details see Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.3.

<sup>94</sup> 『習近平：建設社會主義文化強國著力提高國家文化軟實力』，人民日報，2014年01月01日，  
<http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2014/0101/c64094-23995307.html>

<sup>95</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.5.

<sup>96</sup> Кузьмин В. Мягкая сила: На программы поддержки русского языка направят 7,6 миллиарда рублей [Электронный ресурс] / В. Кузьмин // РГ. – 2015. – 20 Мая. – Режим доступа: <http://www.rg.ru/2015/05/20/programma-site.html>

Indeed, if we look closer at Sino-Russian soft power initiatives<sup>97</sup>, we will see that it is true: government plays the key role in them. Wilson (2015) states, that the CCP is hostile towards the concept of civil society. In 2013, Circular on the Current Ideological Situation<sup>98</sup> identified civil society as one of the seven Western-originated reactionary trends that represents a direct threat to the leadership of the CCP (Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation, 2013). In Russia, the situation is different. In 2006, Putin pointed out that “civil society in Russia differs from civil society in the so-called traditional democracies” (Putin, 2006). However, the Russian government still insists that a strict oversight of organizations whose aim is promoting Russia’s image in either a domestic or a foreign policy context is needed (Wilson, 2015).

We see that China and Russia are definitely different from the West when it comes to soft power. They are trying to create alternative models of the concept, thinking that it is not only West who can dictate terms for developing soft power. Both countries are seeking to establish an appealing international image and get rid of their poor reputation. In this field, Beijing is doing greater than Moscow; the latter is always coming across various obstacles, like Georgian or Ukrainian cases, which definitely make things even worse. Anyway, both countries will still have to face many challenges to prove that they are able to perceive and implement soft power though it does not necessarily have to coincide with the Western perception of the concept.

### **3.3 Goals and Means of Chinese Soft Power**

#### **3.3.1 Goals**

When conducting any kind of politics every country has its own goals, and means to reach these goals. If we are speaking about soft power and China’s public and cultural diplomacy, we should bear in mind that the main goal for Beijing is to create an attractive international image, to convince the rest of the world that there is nothing to worry about

<sup>97</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.3.1 and Chapter 2 Paragraph 2.5.1

<sup>98</sup> Circular on the Current Ideological Situation(關於當前意識形態領域情況通報 guanyu dangqian yishixingtai lingyu qingkuang tongbao) also known as Document No. 9 (中辦法 zhongbanfa (2013) 9 號 hao), is a confidential internal document widely circulated within the Communist Party of China in 2013 by the General Office of the Communist Party of China. The document warns of seven dangerous Western values, allegedly including media freedom and judicial independence. With respect to education coverage of the topics is forbidden. There is an emphasis on controlling and preventing communication using the internet of ideas subversive to one party rule. The document was issued in the context of planned economic reforms and increased calls for political reform.

or to be afraid of when they think of China. As Xi Jinping once said: “The stories of China should be well told, voices of China well spread, and characteristics of China well explained” (Dynon, 2014). Chinese leaders and strategists see soft power as an opportunity to achieve long-term strategic objectives. It is crucial for Beijing to construct a favorable image of itself with the help of various means. In Russia, people often say: “First, you build your image. Then your image works on you.” And it is actually true for China (and for any other country): if you are able to convince the world that you are peaceful and do not want to harm anyone, it will be much easier to get what you want in future. Thus, the main goal of China’s soft power is to create a favorable image on the international arena. As Kurlantzick (2007) stated, “changing China’s image and undermining the scenario of a China threat [are] vital to Beijing – and crucial to the future of its foreign relations” (p.53).

### **3.3.2 Means**

In order to reach its goal and create an appealing international image, China uses various means and approaches. All of them could be divided into two main large groups: (1) economic instruments; (2). cultural means.

#### **Economy**

In terms of economic aid and investment China is not a beginner. During the Soviet period, when the relations between Moscow and Beijing were going through serious split, and the Sino-American relations were not established yet, the PRC was seeking to find new friends everywhere it could, especially in the Third world. So, for instance, China had donated US\$2.4 billion to help African states from 1956 to 1977 (Joel Wuthnow, 2008). China is also trying to reassure developing nations by signing free trade deals and making free trade concessions. E.g. back in 2001, the PRC offered ten Southeast Asian nations to create a free trade zone between them and China, which automatically put it on the higher position than Japan, which was traditionally viewed as the region’s economy #1 (Kurlantzick, 2007: p.124).

China is also investing enormous sums of money in various scientific and technological projects abroad. Beijing, for example, has close ties with Moscow in this field. One of the recent projects which have already gained the opportunity to receive

around \$100 billion from Chinese investors is the first high-speed railway linking Moscow and Kazan<sup>99</sup> (China Review, 2015).<sup>100</sup>

In 2013, the PRC presented its initiative of “One Road, One Belt” (一帶一路 yidai yilu), which could be also regarded as a part of country's soft power strategy. This project embraces the development of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” and “21st Century Maritime Silk Road”. The goal of this initiative is to integrate the Eurasian continent. “The project with its land and maritime path components promises to better connect China with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe through its landlocked neighbors in Central Asia and the littoral states of Southeast and South Asia” (Pitlo, 2015). If the initiative works out, it would be considered as a great success of China. Beijing is already investing in some infrastructural objects related to the project, like port the Greek port of Piraeus. This would give China's Maritime Silk Road an important outlet in the Mediterranean and make the Greek port a key hub for Chinese trade (Wishnick, 2015). China is trying to be everywhere, spread its influence all around the globe by offering others really attractive packages. And it has succeeded in it. This so-called “hard” perception of soft power, as we named it in Chapter 2<sup>101</sup>, is really working. We can take another Chinese initiative – AIIB – as a proof of this statement: the fact that so many countries, including close allies of the U.S, such as Germany, the U.K., and South Korea, are willing to take part in the project speaks for itself.

According to Delisle (2010), Chinese economic development success has been the most significant source of the country's soft power. The PRC managed to reach really impressive temps of economic growth after decades of stagnation, and this achievement is admired by many other countries. Beijing even managed to weather the 2008 global economic crisis more smoothly than the advanced market economies, which is certainly a big advantage (p.501). However, economic attractiveness still cannot be fully regarded as soft power, as it embraces hard elements. That is why let's move to the “softer” part of the discussion – culture.

<sup>99</sup> Kazan (Казань) - is the capital and largest city of the Republic of Tatarstan, Russia. With a population of 1,143,535, it is the eighth most populous city in Russia. Kazan lies at the confluence of the Volga and Kazanka Rivers in European Russia.

<sup>100</sup> 『中俄戰略夥伴關係可持久性發展嗎？』，中國評論新聞網，2015年05月31日，  
<http://hk.crntt.com/doc/1037/7/1/2/103771265.html?coluid=137&kindid=7930&docid=103771265&mdate=0531000209>

<sup>101</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.3.1.

## Culture

There is no wonder that the government of the PRC decided to make culture the central element of Chinese soft power. China is known as one of the 10<sup>th</sup> ancient civilizations<sup>102</sup>, meaning that its cultural heritage is really impressive and rich. China definitely has things to share with the rest of the world, so why not use it?

According to Ding (2008), China has been promoting its culture since the beginning of its policy of reforms and opening up. It includes traditional products of culture like acupuncture, herbal medicine, *feng shui*<sup>103</sup>, martial arts, Chinese cuisine, literature, religious practice, etc (p.70). Chinese leader Xi Jinping wants his country to be portrayed as a civilized one, featuring rich history, ethnic unity, and cultural diversity, and as an oriental power with good government, developed economy, cultural prosperity, national unity and beautiful mountains and rivers. The PRC should also show to the rest of the world that it is a responsible state that advocates peaceful and common development, safeguards international justice, and makes contributions to humanity. To strengthen China's soft power, the country needs to build its capacity in international communication, construct a communication system and better use the new media and increase the creativity, appeal and credibility of China's publicity (Xinhua, 2014).

In order to spread its cultural influence, the Chinese government is using various media sources, like CCTV or Xinhua News Agency, which are expanding their influence abroad, by broadcasting and publishing news in many foreign languages, like English, Russian, Arabic etc (Branigan, 2011). As it has been early mentioned, China is also actively popularizing teaching of Mandarin all over the world through establishing Confucius Institutes. It also highly encourages cultural exchanges between states, organizes various forums and events for young talents. The recent news from China even shows that the government is thinking over an idea of creating World Talents Organization (世界人才組織 shijie rencai zuzhi), aiming at examining and analyzing the turnover of staff and creating so-called brain bank. The PRC is highly inspired by an interest that other countries showed towards its AIIB initiative, and is ready to produce more ideas (Wang, 2015).<sup>104</sup>

<sup>102</sup> The other nine are Rome, Greece, Egypt, India, Persia, Mesopotamia, Maya, Incas and Aztecs.

<sup>103</sup> *Feng shui* (風水) - is a Chinese philosophical system of harmonizing everyone with the surrounding environment. The term feng shui literally translates as "wind-water" in English.

<sup>104</sup> 王輝耀, 『中國可組建人才 WTO』, 環球時報, 2015 年 06 月 02 日, [http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion\\_world/2015-06/6569559.html](http://opinion.huanqiu.com/opinion_world/2015-06/6569559.html)

Besides media and education, China is also developing its theatrical art, the brightest example of which is opera<sup>105</sup>, undoubtedly. E.g. every year in late spring Moscow holds the Chekhov<sup>106</sup> International Theatre Festival. Theatres from all over the globe visit the capital of Russia during these days to introduce their art to the public. And the PRC is not exclusion. It is a constant guest there: this year, for example, Fuzhou Min Opera Art Development Centre (China) presented Min opera<sup>107</sup> called “Women Generals of the Yang Family”. The performance is said to be really entertaining, and the director of the performance hopes that this event will set the stage for further cooperation with Russia in this field (RIA Novosti, 2015).<sup>108</sup>

Another source of China’s cultural soft power is the Chinese Diaspora. Beijing has managed to rebuild its relationship with ethnic Chinese organizations around the world - from cultural associations to businessmen - and directly appealed to them to help boost the relations between the developing world and the PRC. Ethnic Chinese also help to advertise Chinese heritage, promote a good and peaceful image of China, as well as facilitate lobbying and doing business. Beijing also assists in organizing meetings, conferences, and summer camps for children from the Chinese Diaspora (Kurlantzick, 2007: p.101).

As we can see, Beijing is using a wide range of cultural tools aiming at spreading its “soft” influence all over the globe. Yet, it still has shown relatively weak performance in terms of soft power. Let’s move to the next paragraph of the study and see what the limitations and challenges for China’s soft power are.

### 3.4 Limits of Chinese Soft Power

If we look at all these efforts and initiatives Chinese government is undertaking in order to boost the country’s soft power, we might assume that the PRC is doing pretty well in that sphere. China is actively establishing Confucius Institute, promoting

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<sup>105</sup> Chinese opera (戲曲 xiqu) - is a popular form of drama and musical theatre in China with roots going back to the early periods in China. It is a composite performance art that is an amalgamation of various art forms that existed in ancient China, and evolved gradually over more than a thousand years, reaching its mature form in the 13th century during the Song Dynasty. It includes various art forms, such as music, song and dance, martial arts, acrobatics, as well as literary art forms. There are numerous regional branches of Chinese opera, of which the Beijing opera (京劇 Jingju) is one of the most notable.

<sup>106</sup> The festival bears the name of one of the greatest Russian writers – Anton Chekhov (Антон Чехов).

<sup>107</sup> Min opera (閩劇 minju) - a type of Chinese opera from Fujian Province.

<sup>108</sup> Труппа китайской оперы Фучжоу представит спектакль в Москве [Электронный ресурс]. – 2015. – 22 Мая. Режим доступа: <http://ria.ru/culture/20150522/1065854389.html>

Mandarin teaching and learning, expanding its media branches, investing, involving Chinese diaspora etc. Yet all these efforts are not enough to convince the international society, especially Western one, that Beijing is animated by the best intentions. Why is it like this? What China is doing wrong? Why cannot it convince the rest of the world that it can be regarded as peaceful state seeking mutually beneficial cooperation?

The first reason for China's relatively weak success in terms of soft power is governmental supervision. We have already discussed that some scholars, like Joseph Nye, for example, highly criticize the governmental involvement in soft power spreading. Especially when the government is not considered to be a democratic one, like the Chinese one. Strong support of the state and lack of civil society involvement makes Chinese soft power less credible than the Western one. There is one more thing to be added here: Chinese leaders seem to be obsessed too much with soft power. And that could play a low-down trick with them. Interesting perspective towards the subject is suggested by a professor of political science at Beijing Foreign Studies University, Xie Tao. According to Xie (2015), one of the indications of this obsession is that a search on CNKI<sup>109</sup> for articles with "soft power" in the title generated 1,777 entries since 2000. The second indication is the sheer number of research centers or programmes for public diplomacy, which is widely viewed by Chinese analysts and government officials as the means to boost China's soft power. "At least two dozen such centers and programme have been established within universities alone, plus a similar number of them within government-affiliated think tanks." Xie also points out, that the government of the PRC has spent large sums of money (hundreds of billions of dollars) to improve "the communication capabilities of its media outlets like CCTV, organizing mega-events such as the Olympic Games and Shanghai Expo, funding Confucius Institutes, hosting summits attended by dozens of world leaders (e.g. APEC), and sponsoring forums on regional security and prosperity (e.g. the Boao Forum)." The government justifies such wasteful spending by stating that these events can contribute to China's soft power. Being obsessed too much with spreading soft power Beijing might not notice that this concept could be just a trap created by an American analyst. The reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union partly rests on its hard power race with the U.S. If China is trying to engage itself in soft power race with Washington, it might also come to no good.

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<sup>109</sup> The China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI; 中國知網 zhongguo zhiwang)- the world's largest digital collection of Chinese language journal articles.

The second reason why Chinese soft power remains relatively weak is connected with the fact that China's political institutions and official values do not enjoy broad appeal abroad, as well as China's record on social equity, the environment, international human rights etc (Delisle, 2010: p. 521). And it is true: if you do not regard the regime of any country as trustworthy, respectful mechanism, how can you possibly believe in the ideas it is trying to impose on you. Even those people of Chinese origin can be highly critical about the situation in the country. E.g. one of Chinese human rights activist Chen Guangcheng<sup>110</sup> states that the Communists who control China are "many times more dangerous" than the brutal terrorist group ISIS (Harkness, 2014). Taking into account all crimes conducted by the Islamic State and the inhuman nature of the organization; the fact that the PRC was compared with it definitely shows that everything is not that optimistic as Chinese government presents. The situation over the human rights in the country is serious, indeed. The PRC is known for its constant human rights abuses since its establishment back in 1949. Though it seems natural to think that during the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the situation was worse than nowadays, it is not true. Some say that now human rights abuses in China are at worst since 1989, the year of Tiananmen protests. Last year in March, Premier Li Keqiang announced a rise in the domestic security, or "stability maintenance," budget to 205 billion yuan (U.S. \$33 billion). As a result, rights lawyers, writers, journalists, academics, NGO activists, political dissidents and rights activists were targeted with often violent measures under the system (Mudie, 2015). According to the Human Rights Watch World Report (2014), the Chinese government also introduces censorship on the press, the Internet, print publications, and academic research. It justifies human rights abuses as necessary to preserve "social stability." It carries out involuntary population relocation and rehousing on a massive scale, and enforces highly repressive policies in ethnic minority areas in Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia. Such actions, certainly, do not give the PRC much trust from the international society.

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<sup>110</sup> Chen Guangcheng (陳光誠 born November, 12 1971) - is a Chinese civil rights activist who worked on human rights issues in rural areas of the PRC. Chen is best known for exposing the horrific "family planning" practices of the Chinese Communist Party, which include forced abortions and sterilization under the so-called One Child Policy. He is a self-taught lawyer from rural China who became blind at childhood when a fever destroyed his optic nerves.

Chen came to wide public attention in May 2012 when, after four years in prison and two years under house arrest in which he endured beatings for standing up for human rights, he and his wife and two children escaped to the United States. Relatives back home then faced arrest and beatings themselves.

The third reason related to the limits of Chinese soft power strategy rests on different understanding of the process how one should get what it wants. In Chinese point of view, spreading soft power means “using the country’s external propaganda” (對外宣傳 *duiwai xuanchuan*). And the government does not see anything bad in it. However, the Western connotation of this word is negative. The Oxford Dictionary definition for “propaganda” is the following: “Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a political cause or point of view.”<sup>111</sup> As you can see, the connotation is pejorative, indeed. And for Beijing external propaganda means “advertising Chinese achievements and boosting the country’s image overseas.” The word “propaganda” has a positive connotation, associated with such essentially benign activities as the release of the news, general shaping of ideology, or even advertisement (Wang, 2008). When Western people hear the word “propaganda”, they immediately think that there must be something negative happening. While for China it is just another means to spread its influence either domestically or internationally. This misunderstanding and different interpretations may also be counted as reasons for Chinese relatively weak performance in terms of soft power.

The Chinese government has already understood the importance of soft diplomacy when dealing with the international affairs. However, it feels the need to de-Westernize the concept of soft power, because the Western perception is regarded as a threat and cannot be completely adopted by China. That is why Beijing has created its own approach to the concept, where the leading role is performed by the government instead of civil society. China has put lots of effort in order to create a positive image of it abroad, to convince the rest of the world that the PRC is rising peacefully and does not want to be regarded as a major threat. Beijing is ready to build cooperation on the basis of win-win relations, as well as develop and expand its soft power. However, it is not enough to persuade the rest of the world, especially the Western part. The political system of the country along with various issues, like violations of the human rights, Tiananmen, Tibet and Taiwan cases etc., prevent people from trusting China. They are always waiting that Beijing will eventually play some dirty trick. All these make it more difficult for the PRC to succeed in delivering its soft power concept.

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<sup>111</sup> Propaganda. (n.d.). In Oxford Dictionary.

## Chapter 4      Confucius Institute; Moscow Case

### 4.1      Introduction to Confucius Institute

Confucius Institute is playing one of the most important roles in spreading of Chinese soft power nowadays. In Chapter 2 we discussed in detail the organization of CI, the work and duties performed by Hanban and some controversy around this particular organization.<sup>112</sup> In this part of the thesis we will look closer at the mechanisms used by CI in order to attract its audience; what goals besides teaching Mandarin it sets; how it achieves these goals and what challenges it faces.

According to Barr (2011), Confucius Institute is regarded as one of the successful soft power initiatives “catering to the society”. The main aim of the organization is to promote Chinese language learning abroad, as well as introduce the world with Chinese history, geography, culture, business, medicine, traditions etc. According to Hanban, there are now 443 Confucius Institutes all over the globe, as well as 648 Confucius Classrooms. Though the history of the CI is relatively short – 10.5 years – compared to Goethe Institute (GI; established in 1951) or Alliance Française (AF; established in 1883), it managed to grow rapidly indeed. Again if we compare the CI and the AF, we will see that the number of the latter throughout its more than one century history has reached 850 language centers all over the world;<sup>113</sup> while Hanban managed to establish half of this figure just within 10 years. There are two possible explanations for such rush: on the one hand, this is meant to solve the need of Chinese language centres, as the number of those interested in learning Mandarin is increasing day by day. On the other hand, it might be just the policy of Chinese government to expand its influence to as many places as possible. The speedy development of the CI has won considerable attention all over the world. The CI has become a unique cultural brand, promoting Chinese language learning and showcasing China’s soft power. From 2010 onwards, a more diversified development of the CI started to emerge. Besides traditional Confucius Institute aiming at teaching Mandarin and providing lectures on various topics, some specific CIs have been established: e.g. Confucius Institute for Traditional Chinese Medicine (中醫孔子學院

<sup>112</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.4.

<sup>113</sup> The French Language Worldwide 2014. (2014). Retrieved from [http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/oif\\_synthese\\_anglais\\_001-024.pdf](http://www.francophonie.org/IMG/pdf/oif_synthese_anglais_001-024.pdf)

zhongyi kongzi xueyuan);<sup>114</sup> Confucius Institute for Music (音樂孔子學院 yinyue kongzi xueyuan);<sup>115</sup> Confucius Institute for Dance and Performance (舞蹈和表演孔子學院 wudao he biaooyuan kongzi xueyuan);<sup>116</sup> Confucius Institute for Food and Beverage Culture (飲食文化孔子學院 kongzi xueyuan)<sup>117</sup> etc (People's Daily, 2014).<sup>118</sup>

In 2014, while delivering a speech and responding to questions at the Closing Ceremony of the 8th Confucius Institute Conference, Director General of Hanban, Madame Xu Lin<sup>119</sup> said that there were plans to set up Model Confucius Institutes (示範孔子學院 shifan kongzi xueyuan) and establish the Confucius Institute Day (孔子學院日 kongzi xueyuan ri), which were successfully put into practice. Speaking about Model CI, it means 15 to 20 percent of CIs will be developed into Model CIs, “each with its own independent teaching buildings (which is the basic requirement)”. There will be four types of Model CIs: CIs centering on faculty training; CIs focusing on academic research; specialized CIs that focus on traditional Chinese medicine and business; and CIs specialized in language and vocational and technical training (Hanban, 2014). Speaking about Confucius Institute Day, according to Confucius Institute Annual Development Report (2014), on September 27, 2014 – just one day prior to Confucius's birthday<sup>120</sup> - this day was officially celebrated for the first time. More than 3,900 activities and

<sup>114</sup> This CI is affiliated to London South Bank University (LSBU). This is a joint initiative with Heilongjiang University of Chinese Medicine, Harbin Normal University and Hanban. This CI is all about promoting Chinese culture with a specific focus on Traditional Chinese Medicine and Chinese Wellbeing.

<sup>115</sup> This CI was established in 2012 in collaboration with the Central Conservatory of Music in Beijing and The Royal Danish Academy of Music in Copenhagen. MCI offers both courses and introductions in the Chinese language and music traditions.

<sup>116</sup> This CI was established in 2012 in collaboration with Goldsmiths, University of London, Beijing Dance Academy, and Hanban, as well as partnership with Capital Normal University, Beijing International Studies University and China Academy of Art. It is the only Confucius Institute in the world dedicated to dance, performance and the arts, as well as the first to use professional arts platforms to promote Chinese language and culture.

<sup>117</sup> This CI has been established in 2012 at University of California, Davis. It offers a savoury programme of courses, lectures, workshops and other events on Chinese food and beverage, culture and language.

<sup>118</sup> 『全球已建立 440 所孔子学院及 646 个孔子课堂』, 人民日報, 2014 年 04 月 18 日, <<http://world.people.com.cn/n/2014/0418/c1002-24914739.html>>

<sup>119</sup> Xu Lin (許琳) is vice-minister-level official of the People's Republic of China, serving on the State Council. She has held the post of Chief Executive and Director of the Confucius Institutes worldwide since 2004. She is also Member of the CPPCC National Committee, Counselor of the State Council, and Executive Member of the Council of Confucius Institute Headquarters.

<sup>120</sup> In some Asian countries, like China, Taiwan, and Philippines, Confucius Birthday, which is celebrated every year on September, 28, is also associated with Teacher's Day.

performances were organized by over 1,200 Confucius Institutes (Classrooms) in 126 countries, attracting more than 10 million participants.

Apart from developing so called Model Confucius Institute and establishing Confucius Institute Day, every year Hanban is presenting CIs all over the globe as well as individuals working in CIs with various awards, for example, there are such awards as “Confucius Institute of the Year” (先進孔子學院 xianjin kongzi xueyuan), “Confucius Classroom of the Year” (先進孔子課堂 xianjin kongzi ketang), “Overseas Chinese Test Center of the Year” (先進考點 xianjin kaodian), “Confucius Institute Pioneer Award” (孔子學院開創者獎 kongzi xueyuan kaichuangzhe jiang), “Best Coordinator Award” (優秀組織獎 youxiu zuzhi jiang), “Confucius Institute Individual Performance Excellence Award of the Year” (孔子學院先進個人 kongzi xueyuan xianjing geren), “Outstanding Confucius Institute Chinese Partner of the Year” (孔子學院先進中方合作院校 kongzi xueyuan xianjing zhongfang hezuo yuanxiao) etc.<sup>121</sup> There are various criteria for the selection process: e.g. if we are talking about “Confucius Institute Pioneer Award”, the criteria are the following: this honor can be granted to those universities or institutions which signed cooperation agreements in as early as 2004 and 2005 and have been in sound operation and made outstanding contributions (China News Service, 2014).<sup>122</sup> As we can see, Hanban is putting lots of efforts in encouraging various CIs to show the best performance in different spheres.

By using Confucius Institute as one of the tools of its soft power, the government of China pursues certain interests. Let's look closer at the goals of the CI, means it uses to reach its aims and challenges it has to overcome.

## 4.2 Goals, Means and Limits of Confucius Institute

Confucius Institute can be regarded as one of the brightest examples of soft power with Chinese characteristics. The Confucius Institute Headquarters – Hanban – is “a public institution affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Education, which is committed

<sup>121</sup> *Confucius Institute Annual Development Report 2014*. (2014).

<sup>122</sup> 『第九屆孔子學院大會在廈門舉行』，中新社，2014年12月07日，<<http://www.chinanews.com/cul/2014/12-07/6852661.shtml>>

to providing Chinese language and cultural teaching resources and services worldwide”.<sup>123</sup> Chinese government is very concerned about spreading learning of Chinese language abroad. It is constantly encouraging domestic universities to cooperate with their international partners, stating that Confucius Institute’s main aim is to teach language and provide students with general knowledge about Chinese culture. According to Yang and Hsiao (2015), such soft power push is political and therefore problematic (p.2). Despite its seemingly benign nature, Confucius Institute became a victim of attacks coming from various scholars. To understand why it happens we should first examine what goals the organization has set and what means it uses in order to reach its aims.

#### 4.2.1 Goals and Means

Confucius Institute is widely known as an organization which aims at providing people from all over the world with Chinese language courses. According to Mosher (2012), the greater goals of the CI initiative include increasing China's popularity, reputation, and influence among the nations of the world. Hsiao and Yang (2015) define the mission of CIs as the following: first, popularization of Chinese language learning; second, promotion of China’s cultural attractiveness through modules; third, organization of cultural events outside campuses; fourth, maintaining existing relationship and constructing new networks;<sup>124</sup> fifth, implementation of joint research project and training local China specialist and faculties. China is doing careful work in order to spread the influence of Confucius Institute all over the world and involve more and more people in this process. And it might be one of the reasons why some countries, particularly Western ones, like the US or Canada, started to feel suspicious of CIs, as it seems that China is caring about their development a little bit too much, which, in return, gives rise to various thoughts that the PRC is using the institute as means of propaganda, which has never been seen as something positive by the West.

Let’s divide China’s Confucius Institutes goals into two categories. So called benign goals will constitute the first category. Such aims as promoting Chinese language and culture belong to this category. The second category will be shadow goals, or greater strategy of China, aiming at spreading its influence to as many countries as possible.

<sup>123</sup> About Hanban. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_7719.htm#](http://english.hanban.org/node_7719.htm#)

<sup>124</sup> According to the authors, this means that CIs have a task “to build up personal relations and institutional network with government units, local elites, corporations, business communities in order to improve new image of China and upgrade bilateral relations with its counterparts.”

In order to boost public's interest towards learning Mandarin at Confucius Institutes, they use various means. First of all, *CI is using brand name of Confucius*. As it has been already mentioned in Chapter 2,<sup>125</sup> the organization is using the name of Confucius, though its courses have nothing to do with Confucius himself. The name of this philosopher is known all over the world, so it was a wise marketing ploy to choose it.

Second, while offering various Chinese language courses for people with different levels of knowledge, *Confucius Institute is using flexible pricing policy* in order to encourage people to choose this particular organization to start or continue learning Mandarin. The author of the research took three various Confucius Institute in three various countries as examples to see how much people have to pay for the courses. It is worth noting, that the universities were chosen randomly. The only condition the author made for herself was to be sure, that all of these CIs are situated in capital cities of chosen countries. In Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities,<sup>126</sup> which is located in Moscow, students pay 34,000 rubles (around 620 USD) per semester (which lasts for about 15 weeks). Confucius Institute at George Washington University<sup>127</sup> offers Chinese courses for 420 USD per semester (around 12 weeks).<sup>128</sup> And Confucius Institute at Paris Diderot University<sup>129</sup> offers courses for 530 euro (almost 560 USD) per semester (which lasts for 30 weeks).<sup>130</sup> As we can see, the prices are average; furthermore, CIs offer various discounts for those who study at those universities they are affiliated with.

Third, *Confucius Institute offer large variety of scholarships*.<sup>131</sup> For Confucius Institute these particular means might be the most efficient in spreading its influence all around the globe. According to Confucius Institute Annual Development Report (2014), there were 7,836 scholarship students in China, an increase of 13% over the previous year.

<sup>125</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.4.

<sup>126</sup> Course Fee and Bank Receipt. (n.d.). *Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities*. Retrieved from <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/students/fees-receipts/> (Стоимость обучения и квитанция для оплаты [Электронный ресурс] Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/students/fees-receipts/>)

<sup>127</sup> The George Washington University (GW, GWU, or George Washington) is a private, coeducational research university located in Washington, D.C. GW is the largest institution of higher education in the District of Columbia.

<sup>128</sup> 2015 Fall Course Offerings. (2015). Retrieved from <http://confucius.columbian.gwu.edu/2015-fall-course-offerings-0>

<sup>129</sup> Paris Diderot University - Paris 7, also known as Université Paris Diderot - Paris 7, is a leading French University located in Paris. It was established in 1970. It is one of the heirs of the Faculty of Sciences of the University of Paris (together with Paris 6), which, founded in the mid-12th century, was one of the earliest universities established in Europe. It adopted its current name in 1994.

<sup>130</sup> Chinese Language Courses. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://www.confucius.univ-paris7.fr/documents/Tarifs 2014-2015.pdf](http://www.confucius.univ-paris7.fr/documents/Tarifs%202014-2015.pdf)

<sup>131</sup> For more detailed information see Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.4.1

Of these 4,230 were new students from 118 countries, including 841 students studying a Master's degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages (MTC SOL). To receive a scholarship to study in China seems appealing for thousands of people all over the world. China knows it and uses various types of scholarship to attract people. Even those who do not attend Confucius Institute courses are eligible to try luck and receive the grant, though the preference is usually shown to the CIs students.

Though the goals and means of Confucius Institute seem to be very positive, there is still a lot of criticism and controversy around the CIs. These institutes are not that welcomed in some countries, and many scholars express their negative opinion about them.

#### 4.2.2 Limits

Though we have already discussed debates and concerns over the Confucius Institute,<sup>132</sup> there are still other things to be added. Apart from being named “Trojan horses” for China, platforms for espionage, being judged for excessive governmental support, Confucius Institutes are also said to be an important tool of China's propaganda. It has been already mentioned, that Western world has a negative connotation of this word in contrast to China,<sup>133</sup> that is why it might be assumed that Western perception towards any kind of propaganda is negative as well. Even CCP officials, like Li Changchun<sup>134</sup>, for example, publicly state that the Confucius Institute is “an important part of China's overseas propaganda set-up” (The Economist, 2009). There is one very important thing in which CIs differ from Goethe Institute or Alliance Française: CIs are operating in a very different context than their Western counterparts. “The Western institutes are political organizations operating in a political context outside university walls, allowed in only when universities find their activities appropriate. The Confucius Institutes, however, are political organizations wrapping their activities within the legitimacy of universities as public, apolitical institutions” (Mattis, 2012). That is why some countries do not want to see CIs within the precincts of their state universities, especially when there are concerns about CIs being used by the government of the PRC

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<sup>132</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.4.3

<sup>133</sup> See Chapter 3, Paragraph 3.4

<sup>134</sup> Li Changchun (李長春) - a retired Chinese politician and a former major leader of the Communist Party of China.

as an instrument of espionage, and that CIs are undermining academic freedoms by prohibiting talks on such sensitive issues, like Tibet, Taiwan and Tiananmen.

In response to all these critique, Chinese officials blame the Western world for so called “cold war thinking”. For example, China's ambassador to Britain, Liu Xiaoming (劉曉明), said that those who were uncomfortable with Confucius Institute’s rapid growing “[clung] to the outdated 'cold war' mentality”. However, personally he thinks that CIs have done a lot for mutual understanding and friendship as well as are providing language and cultural training (Branigan, 2012).

Though there is no evidence whether Confucius Institutes are really used by Chinese government as tools of espionage, which is sometimes said to be unlikely, as China does not want to undermine its international image, it might be better to keep them under scrutiny, especially when they are officially called as tools of Chinese propaganda.

However, it seems that not all countries and scholars feel hostile about the CIs. As this research aims at studying the situation of Confucius Institute in Russia, particularly in Moscow, it is time now to place more emphasis on that very topic and observe how matters stand there.

### **4.3 History of Sino-Russian Cultural Exchanges**

Russia and China are developing cooperation in many spheres. One of the most significant fields among them is cultural exchanges. They include education, mass media, various cultural exhibitions and performances etc. From 2006 onwards, Russia and China began developing so called “The Year of...” initiative. 2006 was marked as The Year of Russia in China, 2007 was The Year of China in Russia. 2009 and 2010 were the years of Russian language in China and the Chinese language in Russia, respectively. 2012 and 2013 are known as the years of Russian tourism in China and of Chinese tourism in Russia. 2014 and 2015 will remain in history of bilateral relations as China-Russia Youth Year of Friendship Exchanges. As we can see, both sides are determined to cooperate in the cultural sphere and put lots of efforts to boost its development.

The interest towards learning the Chinese language appeared in Russia many centuries ago. In 1665, on the Amur River (in China - Heilong Jiang 黑龍江) in Siberia a fortress named Albazin was built. It was situated close to the border with Qing China, that is why very often it was suffering from the Chinese who were trying to oust Russians

from that region. In 1685, the fortress was seized. Part of the Cossacks<sup>135</sup> who were defending the Albazin was taken to Beijing with their families, where the emperor Kangxi<sup>136</sup> allocated them with salary and granted them with territory where they could live. It so happened that there was an Orthodox<sup>137</sup> priest among those people, who continued conducting Orthodox style services first in a Buddhist temple and later in a newly build church on the territory of their settlement.<sup>138</sup>

At the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century Russian tsar Peter I<sup>139</sup> got to know that there were Russian subjects leaving in China and spreading the Christian traditions there. The tsar decided to send a Russian Orthodox Ecclesiastical Mission to China in order to support and further develop the Christianity there. His aim was also to establish diplomatic and trade ties with the Qing Dynasty. In 1727, both sides signed Treaty of Kyakhta<sup>140</sup>, which officially allowed establishing a Russian religious institution in Beijing. After that 6 out of 10 members of the Mission started learning Chinese and Manchurian and later became the first Sino-Russian translators and interpreters. They also compiled the first Sino-Russian dictionaries and created the system for transcribing the Chinese characters into the Cyrillic alphabet, which is commonly known in Russia as the Palladius system named after its author, a Russian sinologist Pyotr Kafarov (Пётр Кафаров). He was also a monk who spent thirty years in China as a member of the Russian Orthodox Mission and his monastic name was Palladius (Палладий).

<sup>135</sup> Cossack (Russian Kazak) - member of a people dwelling in the northern hinterlands of the Black and Caspian seas. They had a tradition of independence and finally received privileges from the Russian government in return for military services.

<sup>136</sup> The Kangxi Emperor (康熙帝; Kangxi Di) reign name of the second emperor (reigned 1661–1722) of the Qing (Manchu) dynasty (1644–1911/12). To the Chinese empire he added areas north of the Amur River (Heilong Jiang) and portions of Outer Mongolia, and he extended control over Tibet. He opened four ports to foreign trade and encouraged the introduction of Western education and arts and of Roman Catholicism.

<sup>137</sup> Eastern Orthodoxy, official name Orthodox Catholic Church, one of the three major doctrinal and jurisdictional groups of Christianity. It is characterized by its continuity with the apostolic church, its liturgy, and its territorial churches. Its adherents live mainly in the Balkans, the Middle East, and former Soviet countries.

<sup>138</sup> Archimandrite Innocent. (n.d.). The Russian Orthodox Mission in China. Retrieved May 11, 2015, from [http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/1610romc\\_en.htm](http://www.orthodox.cn/localchurch/1610romc_en.htm)

<sup>139</sup> Tsar of Russia who reigned jointly with his half-brother Ivan V (1682–96) and alone thereafter (1696–1725) and who in 1721 was proclaimed emperor. He was one of his country's greatest statesmen, organizers, and reformers.

<sup>140</sup> The Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk (1689), which tried to fix a common border, was an agreement between equals. The Treaty of Kyakhta (1727) extended agreement on the borders to the west and opened markets for trade.

It is worth mentioning that the Russian Mission was not only of a religious nature. It also performed diplomatic functions. And the territory given to the Cossacks later transformed into the territory of the present day Embassy of Russian Federation in China.

In Soviet times the cultural exchanges between the Soviet Union and China were also frequent until the split in the relations.<sup>141</sup> Lots of Chinese were sent to the USSR to study Russian and Soviet revolutionary experience. In 1925, a University named the Sun Yat-sen Communist University of the Toilers of China was opened Moscow. It should be noted that not only those who believed in the communist ideas were trained there. At that time the relations between Moscow and the Nationalists were good, so they also had a chance to study there. Those who were sent there had to study Russian, basic theories of Marxism and Leninism and military practice (Usov, 2002)<sup>142</sup>.

At the same time the Soviet Union was promoting learning Chinese language among the soviet students. This period is remarkable because of the many outstanding sinologists in the USSR who played and are still playing an important role in Russian oriental studies. The most famous sinological centres in Russia are based in Moscow at the Russian Academy of Sciences<sup>143</sup> and the Institute of Asian and African Countries<sup>144</sup> at Lomonosov<sup>145</sup> Moscow State University<sup>146</sup>; at the Saint-Petersburg State University's<sup>147</sup>

<sup>141</sup> For more detailed information see Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.1

<sup>142</sup> Усов В. Советская разведка в Китае 20-е годы XX века. М., 2002

<sup>143</sup> The Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) (Российская академия наук (РАН)) consists of the national academy of Russia; a network of scientific research institutes from across the Russian Federation; and additional scientific and social units such as libraries, publishing units, and hospitals. Headquartered in Moscow, the Academy is considered a civil, self-governed, non-commercial organization chartered by the Government of Russia. It combines the members of RAS and scientists employed by institutions. The Academy currently includes around 500 institutions and 55 thousand scientific researchers.

<sup>144</sup> It was founded in 1956 as the Institute of Oriental Languages and is It is the leading Russian Centre for Oriental Studies.

<sup>145</sup> Mikhail Lomonosov (Михаил Ломоносов; 1711 –1765) was a Russian polymath, scientist and writer, who made important contributions to literature, education, and science. Among his discoveries was the atmosphere of Venus and the Law of Mass Conservation in chemical reactions. His spheres of science were natural science, chemistry, physics, mineralogy, history, art, philology, optical devices and others. Lomonosov was also a poet and influenced the formation of the modern Russian literary language.

<sup>146</sup> Lomonosov Moscow State University is a coeducational and public research university located in Moscow, Russia. It was founded on January 25, 1755 by Mikhail Lomonosov. MSU was renamed after Lomonosov in 1940 and was then known as Lomonosov University. It also claims to house the tallest educational building in the world.

<sup>147</sup> It is a Russian federal state-owned higher education institution based in Saint Petersburg, is also the oldest and one of the largest universities in Russia.

Faculty of Oriental Languages; and in the Far East region at Vladivostok Far Eastern Federal University's<sup>148</sup> Oriental Institute (Zagrebnoy, 2010)<sup>149</sup>.

During the Sino-Soviet split the cultural exchanges were suspended and started again with the normalization in the relations from 1985 onwards.

Today the interest towards the Chinese language is relatively high in Russia. In the early 1990s, only about 20 higher education institutions had programmes which required studying Chinese. Twenty years later, in 2010, this number exceeded 100 institutions. Chinese language is also introduced into some schools' curriculum.<sup>150</sup> For example, Moscow boarding school #11 has been teaching its pupils Chinese since 1960s. In some schools Chinese is being taught only starting from the high-school period.

Both Moscow and Beijing are trying hard to increase the number of students who are interested in studying Chinese and Russian. There are various scholarships which allow young people to come and study either in Russia or China. According to Xinhua (2013), in 2013 about 15,000 Russians studied in the PRC, and about 25,000 Chinese in the RF. Moscow and Beijing are planning to increase the number of bilateral students' exchanges up to 100,000 by 2020.<sup>151</sup>

Russian higher leadership regards learning Chinese language as a positive sign and highly encourages people to do it. Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev (Дмитрий Медведев) thinks that learning Chinese opens new perspectives for people. He also says that those who know Chinese have absolutely different world outlook than those who study English, for example (TASS, 2015)<sup>152</sup>.

Learning Chinese is popular nowadays in Russia. Besides universities and schools, there are plenty of other organizations which provide people with Chinese language courses. However, the question is how good is the quality of teaching there? No one wants to pay his money and receive no knowledge in return. That is one of the reasons

<sup>148</sup> It is an institution of higher education located in Vladivostok, Russia. Established in 1899, the university was closed in the late 1930s under Joseph Stalin, and reopened in 1956, two years after Nikita Khrushchev visited Vladivostok.

<sup>149</sup> Загребнов, Е. Триста лет китайского языка в России [Электронный ресурс] /Е. Загребнов// Жэньминь жибао. – 2010. – 30 апреля. – Режим доступа: <http://russian.people.com.cn/31517/6969230.html>

<sup>150</sup> 『俄羅斯人熱衷學中文 人數趕上在俄華人』, 全球新聞, 2010 年 03 月 23 日, <http://dailynews.sina.com/bg/news/int/chinapress/20100323/01501286117.html>

<sup>151</sup> 『俄羅斯希望更多中國留學生到俄深造』, 新華網, 2013 年 11 月 02 日, [http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-11/02/c\\_117979322.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2013-11/02/c_117979322.htm)

<sup>152</sup> Медведев советует молодежи учить не только английский, но и китайский язык [Электронный ресурс] ТАСС. – 2015 – 17 апреля. – Режим доступа: <http://tass.ru/obschestvo/1911165>

why Confucius Institutes could possibly be a good alternative to choose. It is the brand, a well-known organization which provides Mandarin all over the world, which obviously gives it benefit of the doubt.

#### 4.4 Confucius Institute in Russia

The first Confucius Institute in the world was established in 2004 in Seoul, South Korea. Two years later, in March 2006, former Minister of Education of the PRC Zhou Ji (周濟)<sup>153</sup> announced that Russia was planning to open the Confucius Institute on its soil.

In November 2005, both sides signed an agreement to promote Chinese language and Russian languages in their countries. Owing to the long history of relations between two sides many people in Russia are interested in Mandarin, as well as many Chinese want to learn Russian language.

The Ministry of Education of the PRC as well as Hanban strongly supported Russia to open the Confucius Institute. By May 15, 2007 a total of seven Russian state universities signed mutual agreements with Hanban. E.g. in July 2005 Saint-Petersburg State University signed this agreement, and the CI officially started operating in February 2007. It is said to be the first Confucius Institute in Russian Federation. Its partner university is Capital Normal University in Beijing (首都師範大學 shoudu shifan daxue) (China Daily, 2007)<sup>154</sup>.

The CI affiliated to the Far Eastern Federal University is also one of the first CIs in Russia. The agreement to open it was signed in December 2006. The partner University in China is Heilongjiang University (黑龍江大學 Heilongjiang daxue) situated in Harbin. This CI was the first in Russia and second in the world after South Korea to hold the Young Chinese Test (YCT)<sup>155</sup> in May 2008.<sup>156</sup>

<sup>153</sup> Chinese politician. He served as the Minister of Education of the People's Republic of China between 2003 and 2009. He was educated in the United States and served briefly as the Mayor of Wuhan earlier in his career. Zhou is current President of the Chinese Academy of Engineering.

<sup>154</sup> 『中國孔子學院在俄羅斯方興未艾』，中國日報，2007年07月06日，[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-07/06/content\\_911869.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqzg/2007-07/06/content_911869.htm)

<sup>155</sup> The YCT test was launched by Hanban in an effort to encourage foreign young students to learn Chinese and improve their Chinese language proficiency. As part of this effort, since 2004 Hanban has organized experts from different disciplines such as Chinese language teaching, linguistics, psychology and educational measurement to work on the program, conducting surveys in order to understand the latest trends in overseas Chinese language teaching and learning.

Today there are 18 Confucius Institutes in Russia: Confucius Institute at Far Eastern National University; Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities; Confucius Institute at Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; Confucius Institute at Lomonosov Moscow State University; Confucius Institute at Saint-Petersburg State University; Confucius Institute at Irkutsk State University; Confucius Institute at Novosibirsk State University of Technology; Confucius Institute at Kazan State University; Confucius Institute at Blagoveshchensk National Pedagogical University; Confucius Institute at The Kalmyk State University; Confucius Institute at Tomsk State University; Confucius Institute at Buryat State University; Confucius Institute at Ural State University; Confucius Institute at Moscow State Linguistic University; Confucius Institute at Ryazan State University; Confucius Institute at Nizhny Novgorod State Linguistic University; Confucius Institute at Volgograd State Pedagogical University; Confucius Institute at Amur State University of Humanities and Pedagogy.

There are five Confucius Classrooms in Russia: Radio Confucius Classroom at Russian State Vocational Pedagogical University (RSVPU); Confucius Classroom at Moscow #1948 Middle School; Confucius Classroom at Novosibirsk State University; Confucius Classroom at Private Educational Institution, Confucius Classroom at Perm Gymnasium #2.

This study is going to deal with those three<sup>157</sup> which are situated in Moscow.

#### **4.5 Confucius Institutes in Moscow**

There are four Confucius Institutes in Moscow: the CI affiliated to Moscow State Linguistic University (MSLU); the CI affiliated to Moscow State University (MSU); the CI affiliated to Russian State University for the Humanities, and the CI affiliated to the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of the Russian Federation. This paragraph is going to discuss all of them separately in greater detail.

<sup>156</sup> История создания ИК ДВФУ [Электронный ресурс] Дальневосточный федеральный университет Институт Конфуция. – Режим доступа: <http://confucius.dvfu.ru/dvfu/istoriya/>

<sup>157</sup> Though it is said to be four Confucius Institutes in Moscow the research was held only in three of them, as the fourth one doesn't really exist. For the detailed information please refer to part 4.5.1.

#### 4.5.1 Confucius Institute at the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Though the official website of Hanban contains information that this Confucius Institute does exist in Moscow<sup>158</sup>, there is no real proof of it. According to Hanban and the official website of the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of the RF<sup>159</sup>, the agreement between Russian and Chinese side on the establishment of the CI affiliated to the Diplomatic Academy was signed on April 17, 2013. Under the agreement, the CI should be opened within a year after the signing. The Chinese side will send the Chinese language teachers to the Academy, and provide it with the scientific and educational literature, and funds.<sup>160</sup> The partner university is said to be China Foreign Affairs University (外交學院 waijiaoxueyuan)<sup>161</sup>.

However, it turns out that this Confucius Institute was never opened. The author of this study has contacted several persons who belong to the staff of the Diplomatic Academy of the MFA of the RF, and no one knew or could provide any information related to the subject. In the interviews conducted with the three other Moscow's Confucius Institute faculty staff no one ever mentioned this CI. Thus, it could be assumed that something went wrong and the project of the establishment of the CI was not conducted, or it was just suspended and now is waiting for better times.

<sup>158</sup> Confucius Institute at Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://english.hanban.org/node\\_42269.htm](http://english.hanban.org/node_42269.htm)

<sup>159</sup> Agreement on the establishment of the Confucius Institute at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.dipacademy.ru/news981.shtml> (Соглашение о сотрудничестве по созданию Института Конфуция Дипломатической академии МИД России [Электронный ресурс] Дипломатическая Академия МИД РФ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.dipacademy.ru/news981.shtml>)

<sup>160</sup> The delegation of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the RF in China 16-19.04.2013. (2013, April). Retrieved from <http://www.iampdamid.ru/index.php/novosti/11-novosti/62-delegatsiya-diplomaticheskoy-akademii-mid-rossii-v-kr-16-19-04-2013> (Делегация Дипломатической академии МИД России в КНР 16-19.04.2013 [Электронный ресурс] Институт Актуальных Международных Проблем. – Режим доступа: <http://www.iampdamid.ru/index.php/novosti/11-novosti/62-delegatsiya-diplomaticheskoy-akademii-mid-rossii-v-kr-16-19-04-2013>)

<sup>161</sup> China Foreign Affairs University was founded in 1955, and is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The courses of study offered include foreign languages (English, French and Japanese), foreign affairs, international politics and relations and diplomacy, international law and economics. The university awards BA, MA and PhD degrees.

#### 4.5.2 Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities

The Confucius Institute at Russian State University for the Humanities (RSUH) was opened in September 2007. This is the first CI to be opened in Moscow and one of the first CIs in Russia. The RSUH staff wanted to open a language center to provide Mandarin courses. It turned out that the Chinese part had the same initiative, that is why they decided to cooperate and instead of “some” center open the Confucius Institute.<sup>162</sup> The partner university in China is Beijing University of International Business and Economics<sup>163</sup>.

According to the information on the official website of the institute, it has created excellent conditions for the in-depth study of Chinese language and culture. And every year more and more people are willing to become its part. In the beginning only few people were interested in learning Chinese, but this situation has changed.<sup>164</sup> Now at the beginning of each semester there are a lot of those who want to study Mandarin, though of course the number of those who really decide to do it and ‘fight to the bitter end’ is much less. For example, this year at the beginning of the new semester about 100 people came to attend the informational meeting, last year the number was 300 people.<sup>165</sup>

Speaking about the age of those who attend the courses offered by the CI, it varies widely. There are university students, adults and even school-children. At the begging the CI at RSUH accepted only high-school children, however now it is constantly lowering the age.<sup>166</sup>

There are many sources where people can get the information about the CI at RSUH. First of all it is, of course, the official website of the university<sup>167</sup>. It is easy to find all information about the CI there. Besides, the CI is already familiar to many people, and if someone decides that he/she wants to learn Chinese, they know where to go. The CI at RSUH also organizes various events related to Mandarin, Chinese culture, history etc. Usually they are for free, and anyone can take part in them. For example, every

<sup>162</sup> Interview with the CI at RSUH director from the Russian part, Moscow, Russia, February, 2015.

<sup>163</sup> Beijing University of International Business and Economics (對外經濟貿易大學 *duiwai jingji maoyi daxue*) – is a national public research university specialized in economics, finance, management, law and foreign languages established in 1951 in Beijing.

<sup>164</sup> Институт Конфуция РГГУ: коротко о главном [Электронный ресурс] Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/institute/mission/>

<sup>165</sup> Interview with the CI at RSUH director from the Russian part, Moscow, Russia, February, 2015.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid.

<sup>167</sup> <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/>

Tuesday it holds an event called “tea parties”: people are gathering at the CI and drink varieties of teas, discuss their origin and enjoy pleasant company. Thus they have an opportunity to become a part of ancient Chinese drinking tea ceremony, learn more about Chinese culture and maybe find new friends.

The CI at RSUH provides all variety of Mandarin courses: from basic level to advanced. It should be noted that the group is formed only if there are 10 people who can/want attend this or that class:

- Chinese (basic level) 漢語 (初級)
- Chinese (intermediate level) 漢語 (中級)
- Chinese (advanced level) 漢語 (高級)
- Calligraphy (書法)
- Mandarin conversation practice (basic level) 漢語口語強化班 (初級) (the courses are taught by Russian-speaking and Chinese-speaking teachers)
- Mandarin conversation practice (upper-intermediate level) 漢語口語強化班 (中高級) (courses are taught by Chinese-speaking teachers)
- HSK preparation (levels 3, 4, 5, 6) (HSK 培訓班: 3, 4, 5, 6 級)
- HSK mock tests, error correction and test analysis (HSK 模擬考試與學生偏誤分析)
- Chinese movies, discussion of contents and vocabulary
- Business Chinese (basic level) 商務漢語 (基礎班)
- Business Chinese (advanced level) 商務漢語 (提高班)
- Business letter writing (basic level) 漢語應用文寫作 (基礎班)
- Chinese writing (advanced level) 漢語高級寫作
- Brief history of Chinese culture (lectures) 中國文化系列講座
- Chinese economics and trade 中國經濟與貿易

- Chinese studies 中國國情
- Introduction to Classical Chinese language (wenyan) 文言文入門<sup>168</sup>

Speaking about the textbooks used during the classes, it should be noted that one of them (for the basic level group) was designed by the joint efforts of the RSUH professors, the CI at RSUH professors and Heilongjiang University professors. The majority of other textbooks were published by various famous China's universities, e.g. Beijing Language and Culture University<sup>169</sup>, Beijing University of International Business and Economics etc.<sup>170</sup>

Courses for the basic and intermediate levels learners are usually taught by Russian-speaking teachers, while the upper-intermediate and advanced levels are in most cases taught by Chinese-speaking teachers.

Courses usually take place on the weekdays in the evenings, starting from 5 pm onward. It is done out of convenience, because the majority of students have classes or work during the day. However, there might be exclusions, if all of the group members agree to have courses in the morning or/and on Saturday.<sup>171</sup>

The CI at RSUH also provides seminars for those who teach Chinese language, where professors can discuss various issues related to Chinese language, history, culture and share their experience.

There are also a lot of other activities provided by the institute in order to give students an opportunity to become closer to China and its rich heritage: e.g. every year the CI at RSUH organizes events in order to celebrate Chinese New Year<sup>172</sup>, during

<sup>168</sup> Chinese language at CI at RSUH. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/education/courses/> (Китайский язык в ИК РГГУ [Электронный ресурс]. Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/education/courses/>)

<sup>169</sup> Beijing University of International Business and Economics (北京語言大學 Beijing yuyan daxue) was established in 1962. It has the main aim of teaching the Chinese language and culture to foreign students. However, it also takes Chinese students specializing in foreign languages and other relevant subjects of humanities and social sciences, and trains teachers of Chinese as a foreign language. It used to be the only institute of this kind in China.

<sup>170</sup> Textbooks. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/materials/tutorials/> (Учебные пособия [Электронный ресурс]. Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/materials/tutorials/>)

<sup>171</sup> The author of the study received this information during the informational meeting at the CI at RSUH in February 2015.

<sup>172</sup> Chinese New Year or the Spring Festival (春節 chunjie; 華人新年 huaren xinnian) is an important Chinese festival celebrated at the turn of the Chinese calendar. Chinese New Year celebrations traditionally run from Chinese New Year's Eve, the last day of the last month of the Chinese calendar, to

which students of the CI and all those who just want to join the event learn more about this holiday which has a very important place in hearts of Chinese people.

The CI at RSUH also provides people with so called Confucius Institute scholarship. As it has been already mentioned in Chapter 2<sup>173</sup>, the CI provides various types of scholarships. All of them can be found at the CI at RSUH.

For example, the CI at RSUH as well as any other Confucius Institute in order to encourage its students to study more heartily organizes annual trips to China in summer. For example, this year the students as well as those who do not undertake courses at the CI have an opportunity to go to a summer camp in Beijing organized by joint efforts of the CI at RSUH and its partner-university Beijing University of International Business and Economics. There are 25 free places, meaning that those who are lucky enough to get them will have to pay only for the plane tickets, and the rest of their expenses would be covered by scholarship. However, only those who are taking courses at the CI at RSUH have the opportunity to get a free place. Those who cannot go for free will have to pay 600 RMB (about 97 USD) per day. The summer camp will last for 13 days and includes various activities: Chinese classes and cultural experience.<sup>174</sup>

In December 2013, during the 8<sup>th</sup> World Confucius Institute Conference held in Beijing the CI at RSUH was honored as a 2013 Confucius Institute of the Year. This title is considered to be the highest form of recognition of each individual Confucius Institute by Hanban. Evaluation of the Confucius Institutes is done on the basis of several criteria: the dynamics of development, the quality of training, diversity of the courses and events, educational, scientific and methodological activities, etc. The CI at RSUH was also honored to become “Best Coordinator”. According to its director from the Russian part, these two awards play an important role in everyday’s life of the CI. They gave a possibility to improve the capabilities of the institute, to increase the number of students, and also an opportunity to share this positive experience with other Confucius Institutes. Speaking about the selection criteria, the following points should be noted: room space, the number of courses, the number of events and activities; the number of students;

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the Lantern Festival on the 15th day of the first month, making the festival the longest in the Chinese calendar. The first day of the New Year falls between January 21 and February 20.

<sup>173</sup> See Chapter 2, Paragraph 2.4.1 (Hanban (Confucius Institute Headquarters))

<sup>174</sup> Confucius Institute at Russian State Humanitarian University and the Beijing University of International Business and Economics to organize a summer camp in Beijing. (2015, April 30). Retrieved from <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/news/2267/> (Институт Конфуция РГГУ и Университет Бизнеса и Экономики (Пекин) организуют летний лагерь в Пекине! [Электронный ресурс]. Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – 2015. – 30 Апреля. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/news/2267/>)

participation in interuniversity activities; participation in Hanban activities; reporting system etc.<sup>175</sup> Continuous efforts to improve the educational process, working out of its own textbooks, trainings of the teaching staff, weekly courses on history, geography and tea culture, seminars on economic and political cooperation between Russia and China - all these steps turned the scale in favor of this particular CI, and it eventually gained that high status.<sup>176</sup>

### 4.5.3 Confucius Institute at Lomonosov Moscow State University

In 2007, Chinese and Russian sides signed the joint agreement to open the Confucius Institute affiliated to Lomonosov Moscow State University (MSU). The CI was officially established on October, 27, 2008. It became the second Confucius Institute to be opened in Moscow. The partner university of the CI at MSU in China is Peking University<sup>177</sup>.

The structure of the CI at MSU is pretty much the same as for the CI at RSUH: the courses are taught both by the Russian-speaking teachers and Chinese-speaking teachers. According to the information on the CI at MSU official website<sup>178</sup>, the course programme is divided into three categories:

- 1) Chinese language. Basic course;
- 2) Conversational Business Chinese;
- 3) Professional Business Chinese.

The Basic Chinese course usually lasts for 4 semesters (each semester is approximately 4 months). The aim of the programme is to master the basic level of knowing the language among the students. These courses can be attended by people from 14 years old onwards. During this programme students are forming step by step the practical skills in speaking, writing, reading and listening. Those who have successfully

<sup>175</sup> Interview with the CI at RSUH director from the Russian part, Moscow, Russia< February, 2015.

<sup>176</sup> Awarding the CI at RSUH. (n.d.). Retrieved May 20, 2015, from <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/> (Награждение ИК РГГУ [Электронный ресурс]. Российско-китайский учебно-научный центр Институт Конфуция РГГУ. – Режим доступа: <http://www.confucius-institute.ru/>)

<sup>177</sup> Peking University (北京大學 Beijing daxue) – was established in 1898 university in Beijing, one of the oldest and most important institutions of higher learning in China. Its total enrollment is about 35,000. The school originated as the Capital College. By 1920, it had become a center for progressive thought. Peking University has consistently ranked as the top higher learning institution in mainland China. In addition to academics, Peking University is especially renowned for its campus grounds, and the beauty of its traditional Chinese architecture.

<sup>178</sup> <http://www.ci-msu.ru/>

attended four semesters of the courses can continue studying Conversational Business Chinese course or Professional Business Chinese course. The main books for this course are the new edition of a Russian version of famous “Practical Chinese Reader” textbook (實用漢語教科書)<sup>179</sup>. However, other materials are also used.<sup>180</sup>

The Conversational Business Chinese course aims at teaching students oral business communication in Chinese. The student learns the basics of business negotiation or translation/interpreting in commercial sphere. He/she develops skills in reading business materials. This programme is taught by the Chinese-speaking teachers. As it has been already mentioned, if students want to undertake these courses, first they have to complete four semesters of the Basic Chinese course, their level of HSK is approximately 3-4. The Conversational Business Chinese course usually lasts for 2 semesters.<sup>181</sup>

The Professional Business Chinese course aims at training students in oral and written Chinese in business communication. The students are developing skills in conducting or interpreting business negotiations: discussion of the transaction and terms of the contract; the ability to conduct business correspondence; skills in reading Chinese business press. To undertake this programme the students should complete 6 semesters of studying Chinese. They should also possess at least basic level of business vocabulary. Their level of HSK is approximately 4-6. The Professional Business Chinese course also last for 2 semesters.<sup>182</sup>

All Chinese courses mentioned above last for 3 hours and are held twice a week in the evenings, except for the Basic Chinese language course, which could also be taught in the mornings, depending on the group preferences.

There are also free lectures in the CI at MSU talking about Chinese history, economy and culture, as well as calligraphy class taught once per week.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>179</sup> It is a series of Chinese language teaching books developed to teach non-Chinese speakers to speak Chinese. Practical Chinese Reader is administered by the Chinese Department of Culture, and most students of Standard Mandarin in a classroom setting probably have contact with the book. The course consists of a Chinese reader, a character workbook, and a grammar workbook. It was first published in 1981 by Beijing Language and Culture University Press (BLCUP). It allows the use of writing in typical Chinese pinyin.

<sup>180</sup> Chinese language courses. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.ci-msu.ru/studies/kursy.html> (Курсы китайского языка [Электронный ресурс]. Институт Конфуция МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова. – Режим доступа: <http://www.ci-msu.ru/studies/kursy.html>)

<sup>181</sup> Ibid.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid.

<sup>183</sup> Ibid.

As well as any other Confucius Institute, the CI at MSU organizes various cultural activities: e.g. the institute celebrates Chinese New Year; holds exhibitions, aimed at introducing the mysterious Chinese culture, the country's long existing history etc. There were also some exhibitions where the visitors could take a look at different materials on studying and teaching Chinese. Sometimes the CI organizes photo-exhibitions, where all the photos are about China. However, the most popular expositions are with Chinese traditional calligraphy (書法 shufa), stone carving (寶石雕刻術 baoshi diaokeshu) and paper cutting (剪紙 jianzhi).<sup>184</sup>

Every year the CI at MSU organizes concerts in the PRC's embassy in Russia. The concert programme usually includes Chinese and Russian traditional songs, national dances, performances by masters of martial arts other Chinese traditional arts.<sup>185</sup>

The CI at MSU has a wide range of scholarships and opportunities to send its students to China. For example, this year the CI at MSU as well as the CI at RSUH organizes summer school in two Chinese universities – Peking University and Central University of Finance and Economics<sup>186</sup>. Summer school programmes organized by any Confucius Institutes are pretty much alike: students have Chinese classes and also have an opportunity to visit different places in the country (however, though these two particular summer schools are going to be held in Beijing, most of the attractions offered are also situated in the city or nearby, like the Great Wall, for example).<sup>187</sup>

The CI at MSU plays a significant role in bolstering the Sino-Russian cultural exchanges. In 2014, in the context of the Year of Youth Exchanges between Russia and China, the CI organized a youth forum in Moscow Oblast<sup>188</sup> (the vicinities of Moscow).

<sup>184</sup> Cultural activities. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.ci-msu.ru/kulturnaya-zhizn.html> (Культурная жизнь [Электронный ресурс]. Институт Конфуция МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова. – Режим доступа: <http://www.ci-msu.ru/kulturnaya-zhizn.html>)

<sup>185</sup> Ibid.

<sup>186</sup> Central University of Finance and Economics (中央財經大學 zhongyang caijing daxue) was founded in 1949, shortly after the founding of the People's Republic of China. Originally named the Central Institute of Taxation, it was the first university of finance and economics established by the Chinese central government. In 1996, the Institute was given its current name.

<sup>187</sup> Studying in China. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://www.ci-msu.ru/studies/study\\_china.html](http://www.ci-msu.ru/studies/study_china.html) (Учебные стажировки в Китае [Электронный ресурс]. Институт Конфуция МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова. – Режим доступа: <http://www.ci-msu.ru/kulturnaya-zhizn.html>)

<sup>188</sup> Moscow Oblast (Московская область) is a federal subject of Russia (an oblast). Its area, at 45,900 square kilometers is relatively small compared to other federal subjects, but it is one of the most densely populated regions in the country and, with the population of 7,095,120 (2010 Census), is the second most populous federal subject. There is no official administrative center of Moscow Oblast; its public authorities are located in Moscow and across other locations in the oblast.

According to the information on the official website of Chinese Embassy in Russia (2014), the forum was held in May, 17-18, under the name “Chinese and Russian Youth: Today and Tomorrow” (Молодежь Китая и России: сегодня и завтра). More than 50 students of the CI took part in the event along with professors and faculty staff of the institute. The students from China currently studying at various Moscow universities also attended the forum.

Such an event can be regarded as an important scientific part of the Confucius Institute. The directors of the CI at MSU from both sides spoke about the history of Sino-Soviet cultural exchanges, as well as about the present situation in this field. The students had a chance to discuss issues related to various spheres of life in China and Russia. The Youth forum is a good opportunity in further deepening the relations between two nations. Both Russian and Chinese young generations have chance to communicate and get a better understanding of each others' lifestyle, needs, dreams etc. Taking into account the Sino-Russian friendly relations are constantly developing, such an event as only contributes to further development of the bilateral friendship.<sup>189</sup>

In November, 2014 the CI at MSU held another international youth forum called "Sino-Russian relations: past and future trends". That event was dated to the 65th anniversary of the official establishment of the People's Republic of China and the 65th anniversary of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations. The forum consisted of the CI's students, those who participated in summer language school and Chinese students who are studying in Russia.<sup>190</sup>

Nowadays, international youth forums can be regarded as a very important tool of communication between nations. By giving young people an opportunity to share their views, ideas and concerns, it becomes possible to build a modern efficient communication bridge between various countries. The fact that the CI at MSU decided to be responsible for organizing such events as the youth forums between Russian and Chinese students tells us that this particular institute is interested not only in teaching Mandarin and organizing some cultural events, but it also wants to give its students and others an

<sup>189</sup> В Подмоскowie прошел китайско-российский молодежный форум Института Конфуция при МГУ [Электронный ресурс]. Посольство Китайской Народной Республики в Российской Федерации. – 2014. – 22 Мая. – Режим доступа: <http://ru.china-embassy.org/rus/jylx/t1158365.htm>

<sup>190</sup> International youth forum "Sino-Russian relations: Past and future trends" (2014, November 17). Retrieved from <http://www.ci-msu.ru/novosti/forum2015.html> (Международный молодежный форум «Отношения России и Китая: история и перспективы» [Электронный ресурс]. Институт Конфуция МГУ имени М.В. Ломоносова. – 2014. – 17 Ноября. – Режим доступа: <http://www.ci-msu.ru/novosti/forum2015.html>)

opportunity to express their opinions on topics related to various aspects of Sino-Russian relations. If it continues in the same spirit, such events might become more frequent and involve more participants and resources, which will for sure contribute to Sino-Russian relations.

#### 4.5.4 Confucius Institute at Moscow State Linguistic University

The Confucius Institute at Moscow State Linguistic University (MSLU) was opened on March 31, 2011. It was the third Confucius Institute to be opened in Moscow. The author of this thesis was present at the inauguration ceremony, which took place first at the auditorium of the main building of MSLU and then at the new place chosen for the CI, which is situated at another building of MSLU. The partner university is Beijing Foreign Studies University<sup>191</sup>.

Shortly after the opening, the CI at MSLU at the request of the Department of Education of the Chinese Embassy in the Russian Federation together with MSLU conducted X World contest for students of the Chinese language "Chinese Bridge"<sup>192</sup> for the Moscow region, which took place on May, 6.

The CI at MSLU provides Chinese courses for all those who want to start or continue learning Mandarin. According to the information on the official website of the CI at MSLU<sup>193</sup>, currently there are around 105 students enrolled for the spring semester 2015. The average age of the students is above 20. However, there is also a group of school-aged students.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>191</sup> Beijing Foreign Studies University (北京外國語大學 Beijing waiguoyu daxue) - is a university located in Beijing, China, established in 1941. It is China's foremost foreign language teaching university according to recent collegiate rankings. As a renowned teaching university, BFSU was affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from its establishment in 1941 to the early 1980s and was classified a key university under the Ministry of Education. The wide ranging studies at BFSU are provided by over 600 faculty members, in addition to approximately 120 international experts and teachers invited from more than 20 countries each year.

<sup>192</sup> The "Chinese Bridge" (漢語橋 hanyuqiao) - Chinese Proficiency Competition is a large-scale international contest sponsored by Hanban, and is well-known in the cultural and educational exchanges worldwide. It consists of 3 events: "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign College Students, "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign High School Students and "Chinese Bridge" Chinese Proficiency Competition for Foreign Students in China. The competition is held yearly, organized and carried out by the Organizing Committee. In recent years, the "Chinese Bridge" Competition is carried out by Hanban in cooperation with local governments, and presented to the public through TV broadcast, which has achieved good effects.

<sup>193</sup> <http://www.ci-mglu.ru/?q=ru>

<sup>194</sup> Interview with the CI at RSUH director from the Chinese part, Moscow, Russia, February, 2015.

The courses offered by the CI at MSLU include Practical Chinese for the beginning, intermediate and advanced levels, and Chinese language for professional communication.<sup>195</sup>

The textbooks used by the professors at the CI at MSLU include Russian edition of “Practical Chinese Reader”, Russian edition of “New Practical Chinese Reader”. For the upper levels there are specific materials, related to various topics of Chinese studies. The CI at MSLU as well as other CIs provides also free lectures on various topics related to Chinese culture, history, traditions etc. The CI at MSLU together with Beijing Foreign Studies University are currently working on publishing of a new textbook which is due to be present in December 2016 (Beijing Foreign Studies University, 2014).<sup>196</sup>

The CI at MSLU is the only CI in Moscow which holds the HSK and HSKK<sup>197</sup> exams. The exams are organised several times a year: e.g. in 2014, the CI held the exams five times. The same year the CI at MSLU was honored to become the Overseas Chinese Test Center of the Year.<sup>198</sup> According to statistics, the number of those, who undertook the HSK exam at the CI at MSLU in 2013, was 725. The next year, this number increased by 69%: it was already 1,228 people who took part in the exams there. The data show that Russia's "Chinese fever" is continuing to heat up (Beijing Foreign Studies University, 2014)<sup>199</sup>.

The CI at MSLU provides students with various scholarships, including short-term scholarships as well as long-term ones. For example, there is a summer school organised by joint efforts of the CI and Beijing Foreign Studies University, however, according to the information on the CI's website, this schools aims at teaching secondary school students.<sup>200</sup>

Moscow State Linguistic University cooperates closely with the Embassy of the PRC in the Russian Federation. The Ambassador of China is a constant guest of the

<sup>195</sup> Relevant courses. (n.d.). Retrieved from [http://www.ci-mglu.ru/?q=en/relevant\\_courses](http://www.ci-mglu.ru/?q=en/relevant_courses)

<sup>196</sup> 『俄羅斯莫斯科國立語言大學孔子學院』，北京外國語大學，2014年12月31日，<http://oci.bfsu.edu.cn/archives/1146>

<sup>197</sup> HSKK (漢語水平口語考試 hanyu shuiping kouyu kaoshi) – is an oral Chinese proficiency exam. It has three levels: beginner, intermediate, advanced.

<sup>198</sup> About the CI. (n.d.). Retrieved from <http://www.ci-mglu.ru/?q=ru/about> (Об институте [Электронный ресурс]. Институт Конфуция МГЛУ. – Режим доступа: from <http://www.ci-mglu.ru/?q=ru/about>)

<sup>199</sup> 『俄羅斯莫斯科國立語言大學孔子學院舉辦漢語水平考試』，北京外國語大學，2014年12月21日，<http://oci.bfsu.edu.cn/archives/6187>

<sup>200</sup> Beijing Foreign Studies University International Summer Camp for Secondary School Students Chinese Cultural Exploration. (n.d.). Retrieved May 24, 2015, from [http://www.ci-mglu.ru/files/bfsu\\_summer\\_camp.pdf](http://www.ci-mglu.ru/files/bfsu_summer_camp.pdf)

university. MSLU and the CI with support of the Chinese Embassy hold various events related to China, Chinese language, history etc. For example, in November 2014, in the context of the Year of Youth Exchanges between Russia and China, the CI at MSLU hosted 1<sup>st</sup> Recitation Contest both in Russian and Chinese languages in Moscow. 20 Chinese and Russian students from 10 universities of Russia participated in the competition. The event was dated to the 65th anniversary of the official establishment of the People's Republic of China and the 65th anniversary of Sino-Russian diplomatic relations.<sup>201</sup>

Though the CI at MSLU is relatively young in comparison with other two CIs in Moscow, it still keeps up with them, and has already created strong basis for further development. It certainly, along with the CI at RSUH and the CI at MSU, plays an important role in boosting Sino-Russian cultural relations, and heats up the interest of Russian people towards learning Chinese.

#### 4.6 Conclusion

From what we have learned, all three Confucius Institutes in Moscow are very popular among those who are interested in learning Chinese language. Though the courses provided by the institutes are similar to each other, some of the textbooks still differ. The CIs in Moscow have many things in common: besides teaching Mandarin, they are also encouraging students to learn more about China itself with its rich cultural heritage, traditions and history. In order to boost interest towards learning Chinese and China, and improve Confucius Institute's influence in Russia in general, the institutes also organize various joint events. For example, on June, 18, 2014, at the initiative of the CI at MSU with the assistance of the CI at RSUH and the CI at MSU, the institutes held a contest called "Confucius Institute and me" (我與孔子學院 wo yu kongzi xueyuan). 15 students took part in that event. Competition was divided into three sections: written tests,

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<sup>201</sup> 1st Recitation Contest both in Russian and Chinese languages in Moscow. (2014, November 24). Retrieved from <http://russian.people.com.cn/n/2014/1124/c31516-8813208.html> (Первый конкурс чтецов на китайском и русском языке состоялся в Москве [Электронный ресурс]. Жэньминь жибао—2014. —24 Ноября. — Режим доступа: <http://russian.people.com.cn/n/2014/1124/c31516-8813208.html>)

oral presentations and talent shows. There were two groups of contestants: junior and senior.<sup>202</sup>

It is difficult to say which Confucius Institute out of these three is the best. Each has its own feature which makes it unique and better than the rest two: e.g. the CI at RSUH is the oldest Confucius Institute in Moscow with a strong fundamental basis for learning Chinese language and a wide spectrum of cultural activities. The CI at MSU is popular because it is affiliated to the oldest and the most prestigious university in Russia. Last but not the least, the CI at MSLU though is the youngest Confucius Institute in Moscow, it has already earned a good reputation owing to its active engagement into different activities related to Chinese language and China. If the interest of people towards learning Mandarin and reputation of the Confucius institute in Russia continue to increase, it might be assumed that in future there could more CIs in Moscow.




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<sup>202</sup> First Confucius Institute Contest in Moscow Region Ended. (2014, June 24). Retrieved from <http://msu.ru.chinesecio.com/zh-hans/node/106> (『首届莫斯科地区孔子学院学员汉语比赛落幕』, 俄罗斯莫斯科国立大学, 2014年06月24日, <http://msu.ru.chinesecio.com/zh-hans/node/106>)

## Chapter 5 Conclusion

This part of the thesis should be considered as the most important one. The author of the work will present her research findings, draw a conclusion and make some assumptions regarding the future of the research topic.

### 5.1 Research Findings

The main research question of this thesis is to understand what kind of attitude Russian people, on the example of Moscow, have towards the Confucius Institute. As it has been stated in Chapter 1, one of the methods of research is semi-structured in-depth interviews. In total, 13 interviews have been conducted during the authors field work in Moscow in February, 2015. The interviewees are divided into four following categories: *the Confucius Institute Faculty staff*; *Professors who teach Chinese outside of the CIs*; *Students who learn Chinese at the CI*; *Students who learn Chinese outside of the CIs*. The next, and not less important method, is the analysis of secondary data resources. First, the author will speak about her research findings regarding the interviews, and then turn to the conclusions made through analyzing secondary data resources.

#### 5.1.1 Results of the Interviews

In this paragraph summary of four groups of the interviews, and the general conclusion about these interviews will be presented.

##### Summary of the Interviews with Confucius Institute Faculty Staff

This group of interviewees consists of four people: three of them are from the Confucius Institute at Moscow State Linguistic University, and the last one is from the Confucius Institute at Russian University for the Humanities. It was a great luck for the author of this thesis to have a chance to interview two directors of different CIs - one from the Russian side, one from the Chinese side – because they can be considered to be the most knowledgeable about the situation in their CIs and can provide the interviewer with the most comprehensive overview of the topic. In order to keep anonymity of the interviewees, the author will name each of the respondent as **Ia**, **Ib**, **Ic** etc. (meaning Interviewee a, Interviewee b, Interviewee c etc.).

All of the respondents are of different age and background. Their experience in teaching Chinese at the CIs and just working there also varies: e.g. **Id** has been working in the CI since its establishment in 2007, and **Ib** started teaching at the CI only last year. Both of the directors of the CIs are involved not only in administrative work, but also teach students personally. All four interviewees state that they enjoy doing what they are doing and work in the Confucius Institute. Very often they organize and take part in various events organized by the CIs. They encourage students not only to study language, but also to learn more about China, its traditions, holidays, history, culture etc; to participate in competitions which require not only Chinese skills, but also creativity and other talents of their students.

Two of the respondents – **Ic** and **Id** – are of Russian origin. Both of them started learning Chinese in Soviet times and became prominent experts in Oriental sphere. They like Chinese language and do not regret that they got into studying and later teaching it, though Chinese is considered to be one of the most difficult languages to learn. **Ic**, for example, says that Chinese calms her, especially when she writes characters. She also enjoys preparing the teaching materials for the classes, though this kind of work requires a lot of time and patience. **Id** is interested in various philosophical and religious traditions of China. The rest two respondents are of Chinese origin. They have been staying in Moscow for not that long – just about two years. Both of them think that Russian students are really eager to study Chinese, and, what's more important, they are interested not only in language, but also in other aspects of China's life.

All of the respondents agree that creation of the Confucius Institute was a good idea, and a successful initiative. Both Russia and China gained a lot from the establishment of bilateral relations in terms of the Confucius Institute. In their opinion, this initiative helped China to establish good relations with many countries in the educational sphere. Those who study in the CIs have a unique opportunity to receive lots of information about China. *“And those people who understand better [in this case China], they have less prejudices.”*<sup>203</sup> Both **Ia** and **Id** agree that thanks to this institute people are able to learn the truth about China. Speaking about Russia in terms of the Confucius Institute, all of the interviewees also think that it also receives lots of benefits from letting the establishing of the CIs on its territory. By hosting the CIs, Russia has a chance to know its big neighbor better, as well as learn something useful, as China can

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<sup>203</sup> Interview with the THE CI at RSUH director from the Russian part, Moscow, Russia, February, 2015.

share its great and rich cultural heritage. The CIs can also train middle experts in Chinese language, who can find jobs, where their language skills will be required and useful. *“Now there is shortage of Chinese experts in Russia, and the CIs might help to overcome this difficulty by preparing trained people.”*<sup>204</sup> By sending Chinese teachers to Russia, China also solves Russian problem with teachers’ shortage.

The Confucius Institute contributes a lot to the development of bilateral relations. With the help of this organization Russian people can better understand China, its life, values, problems, and needs. At the same time the PRC can also learn more about its friend and neighbor. The CI boosts friendship, mutual cooperation and understanding between these two nations. From this point of view, China’s idea to create and develop the Confucius Institute as part of its soft power initiative can be definitely regarded as a positive one. Actually, it is very important to notice, that none of the respondents had anything negative to say about the CIs. For example, **Ic** believes, that the Confucius Institute does not have any negative influence on its students. Most of them are grown-ups and have their own world outlook, which is not that easy to change, and it is definitely not one of the task of the CIs. What is more important, according to **Id**, Hanban never dictates the CI what to do, as well as it never imposes its will on the institute. So the CI is free to do what it wants: i.e. it can use any teaching materials it wants, organize various events etc. The CI at RSUH even held a series of lectures on Cultural Revolution, which is considered to be one of the most sensitive and forbidden issues in the Confucius Institute. So it can be assumed that Hanban gives autonomy to the CIs, however, it, of course, can offer its ideas, regarding the operating process of the CIs, as well as the activities held there.

### ***Summary of the Interviews with Professors who Teach Chinese outside of the CIs***

This group of interviewees consists of three people, each of them teaches Chinese in different universities. In this work they are named as **Ie, If, Ig**. Though their work is not directly connected to the Confucius Institutes in Moscow, they still know about this organization and from time to time take part in the events organized or hosted by these CIs: e.g. Chinese Bridge, HSK,<sup>205</sup> Recitation Contest, photo contests etc. Moreover, all three professors took part in HSK as examinees while they were students.

<sup>204</sup> Interview with the THE CI at MSLU professor of Chinese, Moscow, Russia, February, 2015.

<sup>205</sup> Though **If** doesn’t work in the THE CI, HSK exams in Moscow take place in the university where she works. Thus, she has to supervise the examinees during the exams.

All of the respondents teach different aspects of Mandarin and China studies in general. They love their job and cannot think of another one, as well as they like Chinese language itself. For example, **Ie** thinks that Chinese “sounds like music”. It is truly a melodious language. **If** states that Chinese is “logical and vivid”, while for **Ig** the most attractive feature of this language is coherence of all aspects of the language. To be a truly expert in Chinese the knowledge of only a language is not enough. You need to have at least some cultural background in order to get better understanding of the language.

According to the answers of all three interviewees, they are well aware of the main tasks of the Confucius Institute, as well as they know what soft power is, and that the CI is one of the instruments of China’s soft power. They also heard of negative attitude which is expressed sometimes by Western scholars towards the CIs. However, in their point of view, there is nothing to worry about. **Ie**, for example, states that the Confucius Institute’s syllabus has nothing to do with politics of the PRC. **If** is well aware of Joseph Nye’s attitude towards Beijing’s soft power and governmental involvement in it. In her opinion, the reason why the US is sometimes unsatisfied with the CIs is because of politics and Sino-American relations: Washington fears China’s rise and tries to slow it down by all means. This stipulates its attitude towards the Confucius Institute.

All of the respondents deny the possibility of negative influence, which the CIs could impose on their students. **Ig** regards the CI as just another place offering language courses, which enjoys high governmental support. **If**, in her turn, thinks that the CIs just do not have enough time to influence their students negatively. However, she also notes that *“China using the CIs all over the world provides only illusory image of itself, without concentrating attention on country’s problems, weak and negative points.”*

Speaking about the advantages, which China gets thanks to the establishment and developing the CIs, **Ie** thinks, that this institute helps extending mutual understanding between nations, as well as helps more and more people to understand better *“Chinese mysterious culture”*. **If** states that the CIs also train new experts in Chinese, who can work as translators or interpreters. **Ig** has the same point of view as two other respondents. All of them agree that Russia has gained a lot from the Confucius Institutes. Students have more opportunities to go to China, using various scholarships and grants offered by the CIs. These institutes help to satisfy an increasing demand in Chinese experts. *“With the establishment of the CI it became easier to find Chinese language courses, which can guaranty good quality of teaching,”* – says **Ig**. The respondents also spoke about the strategic influence of the CI on Russia in general, and about its impact on bilateral

relations. **Ie** notes that the CI boosts exchanges in humanitarian sphere, which are beneficial both for Moscow and Beijing. Besides, opening of such organizations, as the Confucius Institute, is a bilateral phenomenon: i.e. China promotes the CIs in Russia, while Russia, in return, promotes *Russkiy Mir* in the PRC. **Ig** also agrees that this initiative has clear strategic influence on the relations between these two countries, however, **If** does not think that the Confucius Institute can influence Sino-Russian relations in strategic way. “*Business relations have more strategic influence on China and Russia, than the Confucius Institute.*”

### ***Summary of Interviews with Students who learn Chinese at the CI***

This group of interviewees, unfortunately, consists of only two respondents – **Ih** and **Ii** – the rest of the potential interviewees either did not respond to the questions, handed to them via e-mail, or refused to take part in the research. However, the author of this thesis still managed to gather some information using the secondary data resources, which could be also helpful for better understanding of the topic.

Speaking about the interviewees, both of them study in different Confucius Institutes in Moscow. **Ih** has been learning Chinese there for 1.5 year, while **Ii** had already learned Chinese before he decided to apply for the CIs courses. **Ii** also learns Mandarin at university, but he says that the CI helps him to make progress more quickly. The criterion for choosing the CIs to attend for both of the respondents was the following: location. For **Ih** it was also important that the CI she chose is affiliated to the “*outstanding linguistic university.*” It is interesting, that both of the respondents started learning Mandarin only after they went to China. They were amazed by Chinese culture and its diversity and decided to learn the language. **Ih** states that the most interesting part in learning Mandarin for her is characters, because each character has its own meaning. For **Ii** the most exciting part in Chinese is its polysemy: many words can have different meanings. The interviewees enjoy studying in the CIs very much. They say that they like the professors there, as they are friendly and kind, as well as they enjoy the courses, which are both informative and entertaining. **Ii** actively participates in various events organized by the CI; while at the time when the interview was taken<sup>206</sup> **Ih** had not taken part in any of the CI’s activities, though she said that she was planning to.

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<sup>206</sup> February, 2015.

**Ih** is well aware of the term *soft power*, while **Ii** did not know it. The reverse situation is with the aims and goals of the CI. **Ii** defines them as “*bringing Chinese language and culture to every corner of our world*” and “*telling the foreigners what real China is*”, **Ih** could not think of what the CI’s aims and goals are. Speaking about the possibility of negative influence imposed by the CIs, both of the respondents rejected its existence. **Ih** says that during her studying at the CI she has never experienced anything negative or suspicious. **Ii** thinks that sometimes people might be disappointed with the work of the CI, because they, for example, are not that good in Mandarin as they want to be. However, very often such people are to be blamed for this, not the institute. The interviewees are sure that China gains a lot thanks to the Confucius Institute. People begin to understand the country better, respect it. The PRC is able to broaden its cultural influence. Russia, in its turn, raises new experts in Chinese. These answers are pretty much the same as in the previous two groups of interviews.

#### ***Summary of Interviews with Students who learn Chinese outside of the CI***

This group of interviewees consists of four people: **Ij**, **Ik**, **Il**, **Im**. Two of the respondents are studying at the same university; the other two are from different institutes. All of the interviewees showed interest towards the research and were eager to take part in it.

**Ij** did not know that she was going to learn Chinese language, however, when she entered the university she was distributed in Chinese group. However, during 4.5 years of studying her interest towards this language was constantly growing. According to her, the most attracting thing in Mandarin is its melody. **Ik** and **Im** learned Chinese at high school and continued doing it at universities. Both of them like the simple nature of Chinese grammar, unlike other foreign languages, like English or French, for example. **Il** decided to start learning Mandarin because it is considered to be very promising language, especially if we take into consideration the current good relations between China and Russia, which dictate the increasing demand in experts in both languages.

All of the interviewees are well aware of the Confucius Institute and state that its main goal is to spread Chinese language and culture across the globe. Three of the respondents took part in various activities and contests organized by the CI: e.g. **Im** participated in some events while she was still at high-school; **Ik** was the winner from the Russian side of the 1<sup>st</sup> Recitation Contest both in Russian and Chinese languages in

Moscow; and **Ij** took part in *Chinese Bridge*, she also applied for the CI scholarship for Students of Master's Degree in Teaching Chinese to Speakers of Other Languages, and right now is waiting for the results. At the time of the interview **II** had not participated in any activities organized by the CI, but she was planning to go to Beijing's summer camp in July, 2015. All of the respondents assess the CI as a successful initiative, **Ij**, for example, states that *"it is the only place in foreign countries where you can learn decent Chinese, apart from the universities"*. **Ik**, in his turn, does not agree with the statement that you can really master your Chinese there: *"You can get a language base there, but if you want to speak really fluent, you need to go to the Chinese-speaking countries and study there."* Two of the respondents know what soft power is and that the CI is a tool of China's soft power, while the rest two have not heard of this term yet. All of the interviewees do not agree that there is anything negative about the CIs. They do not think that China is using the CI as means of propaganda. **Ik** also thinks that even if there is something suspicious and students do not like it, they always have a choice to leave the CI.

Speaking about the impact of the CI on China, Russia and bilateral relations, the responses of the interviewees were very similar with other three groups of the respondents. **Ij** says that with the establishment of the CIs more and more Russian people get involved in learning Mandarin, and it meets the increasing requirements of Russian government in raising more Chinese experts. In **Ik's** opinion, the Confucius Institute boosts interest of Russian people towards the PRC in general. Without this institute people might not be that interested in China. **II** spoke about the importance of humanitarian exchanges for Moscow and Beijing; while **Im** thinks that the best feature of the CIs is grants. *"If China is ready to pay for us for studying there, why not use it?"* Speaking about China, the respondents think that the Confucius Institute helps the country to rouse interest towards Chinese, which is undoubtedly a great advantage for the PRC. They are also raising the prestige of the country. Both **Ik** and **Im** noted, that the CIs might also help increasing the level of tourism in China, as more and more people abroad become interesting in country's culture, history and as a result they want to visit it and see everything first-hand.

### 5.1.2 Conclusion of the Interviews

According to the information, gathered by the author of this thesis through the interviews, the attitude of the respondents towards the Confucius Institute initiative in Moscow is mostly positive. All of the interviewees are interested in Chinese language and say that the CI gives those who want to start or continue learning Mandarin a good chance to do it. Almost all of the respondents agree that the CI cannot impose negative influence on its students, because its priority mission is to spread language and culture. However, it is crucial to mention that one of the respondents was not that positive about the CIs, as she stated that *“China using the CIs all over the world provides only illusory image of itself, without concentrating attention on country’s problems, and weak and negative points.”* However, this statement does not prove that the general attitude of the respondent towards the CI is negative; it is still interesting that her opinion differs from the rest 12 respondents. So it might be assumed that there are those in Russia who can be critical of the Confucius Institutes.

Not all of the interviewees know what soft power is, however it does not influence their opinion on the Confucius Institute. While those who are well aware of this concept see nothing wrong in China using it as a tool of the country’s soft power strategy. Russia, after all, is doing quite the same thing with its initiative, though not that successful yet.

Speaking about the profits gained by China thanks to the establishment of the CI, almost all of the respondents mention the following: *the increase in number of those who study Chinese; the increase in the interest towards China; a better understanding of China.* The benefits for Russia are the following: *the increase in Chinese experts; students have opportunities to travel to China and study there using various grants, offered by Hanban; better understanding of China, its language and culture etc.* All these factors also have positive influence on the bilateral relations.

Another important feature to mention is that the majority of the interviewees think of the Confucius Institute as a governmental organization. The main reason for that lies in the fact that the CIs enjoy strong support of the PRC’s government, which makes people think that this is a governmental organization.

Though the author of the thesis unfortunately did not had a chance to interview more students who are studying Chinese at the Confucius Institute, through her personal experience during the field work, when she participated in some events organised by the Confucius Institutes, she found out that many people in Moscow are actually very

interested in this organization. No one expressed any negative attitude or distrust in the work of the CIs. Of course, further research is needed in order to understand better the opinion of those people who actually study in the CIs. The next paragraph, which deals with the secondary data findings, will indicate it hat if we are taking Russia in general, there are also those who are highly skeptical about the Confucius Institute initiative.

As we can see the attitude of the respondents towards the Confucius Institute in Moscow is positive. Though these people represent only a very small group of people, the fact that all of them expressed almost the same opinion on the CI indicates that this institute is regarded as a good and successful initiative, aiming at teaching people Mandarin and introducing them to Chinese history, culture and other aspects of China's studies. However, it would be incorrect to build the general conclusion leaning only on the results of the interviews. That is why the next paragraph of this Chapter is dedicated to the secondary data findings.

### 5.1.3 Secondary Data Findings

Frankly speaking, there are not many materials about the Confucius Institute in Russia. The majority of the publications dedicated to this topic can be found either on the official websites of various Confucius Institutes. There are also some occasional articles published in newspapers, or interviews with the directors of the CIs. However, all of them do not reflect the opinion of public towards the CI. It is also very important to mention here, that while looking through various sources, the author has noticed an interesting feature: it is almost impossible to find any negative attitude towards the CI in Russian sources. There can be some critique, but it is either positive or neutral. However, the author still found a couple of articles, the authors of which were criticizing the CIs in a negative way, but we will talk about it later.

Let's start with the neutral position. For example, in April, 2015 one of Russian radio stations called *Echo of Moscow* (Эхо Москвы) interviewed Chairman of the Perm <sup>207</sup> Association for Friendship with China Mikhail Kamenskikh (Михаил Каменских). In the interview one of the questions was dedicated to the issue of the Confucius Institute. Below is the translation of the question and Mr. Kamenskikh's answer:

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<sup>207</sup> Perm (Пермь) is a city and the administrative center of Perm Krai, Russia, located on the banks of the Kama River in the European part of Russia near the Ural Mountains.

**- Last year the Confucius Institute was opened in Perm. This organization is often accused of espionage. Is it true? If not, in what kind of activities is it engaged in?**

- We opened the Confucius Classroom, not Institute, but it has the same power as if it was the CI...Attitude towards it is very controversial not only in Russia but also in other countries, because there are many facts about some unknown information being sent somewhere through the CIs, someone even was caught while sending this information or scanning documents. Again, this is an inevitable part of the activities of any cultural and educational institutions, like the Goethe Institute, the Cervantes Institute. Such organizations are always connected with some additional intelligence organizations. However, they are still performing their main function and role - promotion of culture and language.

**- Have you ever seen Chinese spies?**

- I haven't. In our Confucius Classroom there are no Chinese teachers from China. We teach students by ourselves. We have native speakers, but those who have lived here for over 10 years with a residence permit, with the Russian education, and it is difficult to say whether they are spies or not.<sup>208</sup>

We see here, that though Mr. Kamenskikh does not neglect the possibility that the CIs might be a spy network, he sounds very calm indeed, especially when speaking about Perm's Confucius Classroom. There is nothing negative in his words, as well as nothing positive. According to Mr. Kamenskikh, spy activity is something common when we talk about language centers financed by foreign countries, and if they are still able to cope with their main task - teaching language and culture – there is nothing to be blamed for.

Though it has been mentioned before that finding negative information about the CIs in Russia is not that easy, it is still possible. However, these articles are not published in newspapers; one can find them in the Internet, on different websites – from *livejournal*<sup>209</sup> to the Russian *Facebook* analog *VK*<sup>210</sup>.

In October, 2010 an online-based Russian magazine about business in China called *ChinaPRO*<sup>211</sup> published an article written by China's expert Eugene Kolesov (Евгений Колесов). In his article the author is accusing China of using the Confucius

<sup>208</sup> Zhavoronkov, A., & Rudnev, Y. (2015). Interview with Mikhail Kamenskikh, Chairman of the Perm Association for Friendship with China [Radio series episode]. In *Dnevnoy Razvorot (Daily Inside)*. Perm: Echo of Moscow.

<sup>209</sup> An online service for journals and blogs, that also offers privacy controls, photo storage, publishing tools, style templates, and online communities for many interests.

<sup>210</sup> VK, or V Kontakte - is the largest Russian social network in Europe. It is available in several languages, but is especially popular among Russian-speaking users, particularly in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

<sup>211</sup> <http://www.chinapro.ru/>

Institute as an espionage tool, giving various examples to prove his words. He is also mentioning some controversial issues around the CIs in Russia. According to Kolesov, in Russian city of Novosibirsk<sup>212</sup> there has been a prosecutor's investigation to two of Confucius centers affiliated to the universities based in the cities. During the investigation it was found out that the establishment of the Confucius Institute violates the Russian law. In accordance with the rule of law, the Confucius Institute is not a real institute; it performs the functions of an information-cultural center. Meanwhile, foreign centers can be established outside Moscow only with the approval of Russian Government. At the same time, foreign centers may be established only as non-profit organizations. In other words, *"the establishment of foreign cultural and information center Confucius Institute in the form of a structural unit of the University contradicts the Decree № 746 of the Government of the Russian Federation d/d 24.07.1995 "*, - concluded the prosecutor. It also turned out that Chinese teachers (of Chinese origin) were also violating the law in Novosibirsk. For example, no one checked their documents for the restrictions to maintain their teaching activities, or whether their education satisfies the Russian requirements. It means that those who were hired could possibly be not teachers, but spies. All these actions, certainly, threaten the prestige of Novosibirsk's university, and they should consider undertaking some changes in their relations with the Confucius Institutes.

The author also expressed his opinion on the subject. Mr. Kolesov says that such rapid development of the CIs is nothing else but formation of the intelligence network, legal and very promising. He is even comparing China to Soviet Union, which had an excellent trained intelligence network. Through those who study in the Confucius Institute China can gain useful information. And all these words about "promoting language and culture" are used just to cover the Confucius Institute's real goals and activities.<sup>213</sup>

Though Kolesov gives his readers an example of controversial Confucius Institute issue in Novosibirsk, there is no information to prove it. The CI there continues operating, and Russian newspapers did not publish any articles saying that Novosibirsk was going to suspend its cooperation with Hanban. So further research of this issue is needed to

<sup>212</sup> Novosibirsk (Новосибирск) - is the third most populous city in Russia after Moscow and St. Petersburg and the most populous city in Asian Russia. It is the administrative center of Novosibirsk Oblast as well as of the Siberian Federal District. The city is located in the southwestern part of Siberia on the banks of the Ob River.

<sup>213</sup> Колесов, Е. Институты Конфуция. Что скрывается под "культурной" оберткой? [Электронный ресурс] /Е. Колесов// China PRO. – 2014. – 06 Октября. – Режим доступа: <http://www.chinapro.ru/blogs/6/11790/>

understand whether it is true or not and what it could mean to the situation over the CIs in Russia in general. As for now, everything seems to be fine. However, the opinion presented by Eugene Kolesov is very important, as it differs from the others. The author is directly accusing China of using the CIs as espionage agencies, though without any decent proof. The fact that such critique does exist in Russian society speaks for itself: there are not only those who support the initiative, saying that there is nothing to be worried about; there are also those who are ready to judge and criticize it.

Another Internet user, who remains unknown, accuses the Confucius Institute of being China's "*fifth column*"<sup>214</sup>.<sup>215</sup> He/She is also stating that China's obsession with spreading its language and culture is suspicious, and there is definitely something behind this idea. The author also provides some examples with controversy about the CIs, as Eugene Kolesov, but in another Russian city – Ryazan<sup>216</sup>. The main university of this city – Ryazan State University (RSU) named for S. A. Yesenin<sup>217</sup> – hosts the Confucius Institute since 2010. In 2014, the CI affiliated to the RSU was honored to be among "Confucius Institutes of the Year." However, according to the author, it is not all that simple. E.g. in 2013, Office of Public Prosecutor in Ryazan had to check the activities of the CI and found out some violations, which were later on eliminated, some of the officials were subjected to the disciplinary liability, and the CI could continue functioning. Though there are no direct accusations of the CI in the article, only suggestions, it could be assumed that the author did not write it for any particular reason. The aim is to provoke some thoughts on the issue.

Both of the articles mentioned above also suggest that there is a possibility that in future there will be more dissatisfaction with the Confucius Institute in Russia, especially when the rest of the world is already suspecting the institute in some wrongdoings. However, taking into account current relations between Russia and China, it is very unlikely that the Kremlin will jeopardize them. It is much easier to connive at the

<sup>214</sup> It is any group of people who undermine a larger group—such as a nation or a besieged city—from within. The activities of a fifth column can be overt or clandestine. Forces gathered in secret can mobilize openly to assist an external attack. Clandestine fifth column activities can involve acts of sabotage, disinformation, or espionage executed within defense lines by secret sympathizers with an external force.

<sup>215</sup> Anttim. (2014, November 26) *Sekrety Drakona Konfuciya I Pyataya Colonna* (Secrets of Confucius's Dragon and Fifth Column). [Web log post] Retrieved from <http://anttim.livejournal.com/139092.html>

<sup>216</sup> Ryazan (Рязань) - is a city and the administrative center of Ryazan Oblast, Russia, located on the Oka River 196 kilometers southeast of Moscow.

<sup>217</sup> The Ryazan State University named for S. A. Yesenin (Рязанский государственный университет имени С. А. Есенина) - is a university in Ryazan. It was founded in 1915. It bears the name of famous Russian poet Sergei Yesenin, who grew up in the region.

violations of rules, than to risk marring the relations with such an important economic, strategic and cultural partner.

The director of the Confucius Institute affiliated to the RSUH, Russian sinologist Taras Ivchenko (Тарас Ивченко) criticizes rumors about the suspicious activities of the CIs, stating that everything there is “*clear and transparent*”. Anyone who is willing to know more can come to the Confucius Institute, attend a class or lecture and be convinced that there is no propaganda there (Saigonov & Stezhenskaya, 2013).<sup>218</sup>

As we can see, there are different opinions on the subject. There are those who have neutral attitude towards the Confucius Institute, even if they are aware of a possibility that this organization is used as a spy agency. Other people criticize it, saying that “expansion is one of ways to survive for China, and the PRC is using the CI as means to reach this goal” (Korshul, 2011).<sup>219</sup> There are also those who support the idea, stating that the Confucius Institute aims only at teaching language and promoting culture. When we are talking about such an organization as the Confucius Institute, it is very important to know what the leaders of this or that country think about this initiative. Russian Premier Dmitry Medvedev, for example, speaking about the development of Russian presence in the humanitarian sphere in the world, states that Moscow “due to the well-known reasons fails to keep up with other major players on the international arena. Russia should follow the lead of the Goethe Institute, the Cervantes Institute, and the Confucius Institute. It is necessary to take the best of what these institutes do” (ITAR TASS, 2012).<sup>220</sup> The Premier did not say anything in particular about the Confucius Institute. However, that very fact that he mentioned this organization in his speech makes us think that he appreciates and supports the job which the CI is doing. It, certainly, can be regarded as a positive sign shown by the Russian highest leadership towards the CI and China in general.

<sup>218</sup> Сайгонов, И., Стеженская Л. Китаеведение свелось к хорошему знанию китайского языка [Электронный ресурс] Газета.ru. – 2013. – 05 Мая. – Режим доступа: [http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2013/05/03\\_a\\_5289181.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/science/2013/05/03_a_5289181.shtml)


<sup>219</sup> Коршуль, Е. Китайская грамота [Электронный ресурс] Нижегородские новости – 2011. – 29 Июня. – Режим доступа: <http://www.nnews.nnov.ru/news/2011/06/29/science/institut-konfuciya/>

<sup>220</sup> Медведев призвал развивать гуманитарное присутствие России в мире [Электронный ресурс] ИТАР-ТАСС. – 2012. – 03 Сентября. – Режим доступа: <http://ria.ru/society/20120903/741836357.html>

### 5.1.4 Primary and Secondary Data Sources Findings

In Chapter 1, the author presented the independent and dependent variables, as well as the hypothesis crucial for her research in the form of the following scheme:

*Figure 1*



Source: author

With the help of primary and secondary data findings, let's see whether the assumptions made in Chapter 1 were right or wrong.


#### *Attitude towards China (dependent variable)*

From what we have observed earlier, especially In Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, the current relations between Russia and China are at the height of their development. The countries now are close friends and partners, whose main aim is to reach mutual benefit in the bilateral relations. Taking this into account, as well as the statistics, provided by the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM)<sup>221</sup>, we will see that the general attitude of Russian people towards China tends to be positive. 49% of the respondents view the PRC as a strategic and economic partner, 36% - as a friend and ally, and only 1% - as a threat. Speaking about future, 43% of people see China as Russia's friend in the 21<sup>st</sup> century and 36% as a close partner. 60% of the respondents state that cooperation between the RF and the PRC is mutually benefited for both of them<sup>222</sup> (VCIOM, 2014).

<sup>221</sup> It is the oldest and the leading marketing and opinion research company in the post-Soviet space.

<sup>222</sup> Россия-Китай: от вражды и конкуренции – к дружбе и сотрудничеству [Электронный ресурс]. – Режим доступа: <http://wciom.ru/index.php?id=236&uid=115042>. – ВЦИОМ.

Figure 2



Source: Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VCIOM), 2014

As we can see, the major part of the respondents has favorable perception towards China and Sino-Russian relation in general. That to certain extent influences the attitude of people towards the Confucius Institute. All of the interviewees expressed positive attitude towards the PRC (as well as towards the CI), and regarded Sino-Russian relations as a positive trend.

*Reasons why People Want to Study Chinese (independent variable) and Attitude towards Chinese (dependent variable)*

These two variables are put together here because the second one (*Attitude towards Chinese*) is an outcome of the first one (*Reasons why People Want to Study Chinese*). The results of the interviews have shown that not all of the interviewees decided to learn it by themselves, however, all of them have managed to find attractive features in Chinese which makes this language unique. Those who study Mandarin, as well as those who teach it, like it, and their attitude towards it is positive. It also influences their attitude towards the CI, as they think that this organization can provide its students with decent knowledge of the language. The interest towards Chinese is growing, while China is rising. And this tendency is not likely to slow down in the nearest future, at least in Russia. In Chapter 1, the author of this thesis made the following assumption: “if they like Chinese language, they are likely to feel positive about the well-known

*institution which provides Chinese courses. However, if they do not like Chinese, it will not necessary mean that they also have a negative attitude towards the CI.”* However, no one expressed any negative attitude towards the language.

#### *Russian People Awareness of Soft Power*

Not everyone in Russia is aware of the concept *soft power*, as well as of the facts that Russia as any other country is developing its soft power now, and the Confucius Institute is one of the Chinese soft power initiatives. This conclusion has been made basing on the answers during the interviews and the relatively rare mentioning of the concept in various sources, retrieved from the Internet. However, it does not influence much the people’s opinion on the CI. Irrespective of what people think about soft power, their attitude towards the CI does not change. For example, the interviewees who know what soft power is, and the interviewees who do not, have quite the same opinion the CI. So the assumption, made in Chapter 1, that *it does not necessarily mean that Russian people are unaware of it, or even if they are, it does not imply that they will have negative attitude towards other countries’ soft power initiatives*, was correct.

#### *Sino-Russian Relations Influence on the CI*

The relations between Russia and China are developing really fast nowadays. Both states are cooperating in many spheres, and enjoy mutual benefits. Cooperation in educational and cultural fields has been on bilateral agenda for many years. More and more people in Russia are showing their interest towards Chinese language. Many Chinese people are also interested in Russian. Moscow and Beijing have created a solid educational and cultural exchanges network; both countries are investing a lot of money and efforts in it. All these, as well as other aspects of Sino-Russian cooperation cannot but influence the Confucius Institute issue, and its development in Russia. The rapid growth of Sino-Russian relations implies that more experts who know Russian and Chinese languages are needed, and the Confucius Institute can serve as one of the options to train them.

## 5.2 General Conclusion

This research study deals with the attitude of Russian people towards the Confucius Institute in Moscow. For conducting the research the author used primary data sources (semi-structured in depth interviews and field work) as well as various secondary data sources (books, articles, polls etc.). Though for the interviews a relative small group of people was targeted, the similarity of their answers indicates that the average attitude towards the Confucius Institute in Russia, on the example of Moscow, is good. People see nothing wrong or suspicious in the Chinese initiative to spread Mandarin learning all over the globe, to the contrary, the CIs help to satisfy the increasing demand in Chinese experts, narrow the gap between cultures and contribute to the better understanding of China's rich cultural heritage. At the same time it should be noted, that through the secondary data sources we got to know that there are also those who express their criticism on the issue of the CIs, stating that they are used as intelligence agencies and violate Russian laws. However, the general attitude is still positive. This conclusion is based on both the interviews' results and the number of the CIs in Russia. As it has been mentioned before, according to the information on the official web-site of Hanban, the present number of the Confucius Institute in Russia is 18, as well as 5 Confucius Classrooms. It seems a lot, though if we take into the consideration the territory of Russia, it does not look that big anymore. However, the CIs are situated in almost all of major cities of the country, this allowing people there to study Chinese and its culture.

AS it has been mentioned before, during the field work 4 groups of interviewees were selected in order to understand better what kind of attitude people who teach or study Chinese either at the CIs or somewhere else have towards these organizations. The following are the tables made by the author of this thesis, aiming to show the reader the most significant information received during those interviews and prove the earlier made statement about the similarity of the respondents' answers.

Figure 3

## The Confucius Institute Faculty staff

	<b>Ia</b>	<b>Ib</b>	<b>Ic</b>	<b>Id</b>
<b>Advantages for China</b>	People can learn truth about China	More Chinese people are able to go abroad and share their knowledge	China gains more friends across the world	People learn more about China and as a result have less prejudices
<b>Advantages for Russia</b>	Better knowing and understanding of its neighbour	Better understanding of Chinese culture	Training experts in Chinese language	Better knowing and understanding of its neighbour, can learn something useful
<b>Advantages for the S-R relations</b>	Deepening of mutual understanding	Satisfies the mutual need in experts; two countries are able to deepen mutual understanding	Better mutual understanding	Boosting friendship, mutual cooperation and understanding between two nations
<b>Negative attitude/influence</b>	No	No	No	No
<b>Governmental or NGO</b>	NGO	NGO	Governmental	NGO

Source: author

Figure 4

## Professors who Teach Chinese outside of the CI

	<b>Ie</b>	<b>If</b>	<b>Ig</b>
<b>Advantages for China</b>	More people understand China and its culture	Easier to do business, because more Chinese translators and interpreters; development of country's positive image (especially in Russia)	More students, tourists; Promotion of Chinese language and culture;
<b>Advantages for Russia</b>	Russians are able to study Chinese in China; more experts in Chinese	Satisfying the increasing demand in Chinese experts	Easier to find Chinese courses with good teaching quality
<b>Advantages for the S-R relations</b>	Boosting humanitarian exchanges	Deepening of mutual understanding	Boosting humanitarian exchanges
<b>Negative attitude/influence</b>	No	No	No
<b>Governmental or NGO</b>	Governmental	Governmental	Governmental

Source: author

Figure 5

Students who Learn Chinese at the CI

	<b>Ih</b>	<b>Ii</b>
<b>Knowledge of “soft power”</b>	No	Yes
<b>General attitude towards the CI</b>	Very positive	Very positive
<b>Advantages for China</b>	Promotion of Chinese language	Spreading of the country’s cultural influence; more and more people get to know China; prestige rise
<b>Advantages for Russia</b>	More experts in Chinese	Can gain some experience from this successful initiative
<b>Advantages for the S-R relations</b>	Boosting humanitarian exchanges	Deepening of mutual understanding
<b>Negative attitude/influence</b>	No	No
<b>Governmental or NGO</b>	NGO	Governmental

Source: author

Figure 6

Students who Learn Chinese outside of the CI

	<b>Ij</b>	<b>Ik</b>	<b>Il</b>	<b>Im</b>
<b>Knowledge of “soft power”</b>	Yes	No	No	Yes
<b>Participation in CI’s activities</b>	Participated in Chinese Bridge; Received CI Scholarship	1 <sup>st</sup> place in Recitation Contest both in Russian and Chinese languages in Moscow	Not yet	No
<b>Advantages for China</b>	Promotion of Chinese language	More people speak Chinese; tourism	More experts in Chinese; promotion of China’s positive image	People learn more about true image of China and get rid of stereotypes about it
<b>Advantages for Russia</b>	More Russians are interested in learning Chinese	People learn more truth about China	Closer cooperation with China	Russians can go to China and learn Chinese “for free”
<b>Advantages for the S-R relations</b>	One of aspects of strengthening Sino-Russian relations	Boosting friendship between nations	Boosting exchanges in the education sphere	Better mutual understanding
<b>Negative attitude/influence</b>	No	No	No	No
<b>Governmental or NGO</b>	Governmental	Governmental, though claims to be an NGO	Governmental	Governmental

Source: author

What are the reasons behind such positive attitude of people towards the CIs? In Chapter 1, the author of this thesis proposed the following hypothesis: **while Sino-Russian relations are good, the general attitude of people towards China and Chinese initiatives, like Confucius Institute will remain positive.** In fact, if we look at the current state of relations between Moscow and Beijing we will see that they are in full blossom. Both sides pursue their own interests, which are often mutually benefited. The CIs have been created in Russia since 2006, when the relations between both states were already normalized. Every year more and more people become interested in learning Mandarin, and the CIs can offer them this opportunity.

China means a lot to Russia, especially right now, when Moscow is becoming more and more isolated on the international arena. China is ranked the second after the Netherlands in Top 5 Export destinations of Russia, and the first in Top 5 Import origins of Russia, while Russia itself is not among both these Top 5 for the PRC (The Observatory of Economic Complexity, 2015). The Kremlin has been put into a very vulnerable position, and it is to some extent dependent on the PRC and its investments. This dependency cannot but influence the case of the development of the Confucius Institute in the RF, because if Russia decides to shut down the CIs, it would directly challenge its relations with the PRC, and Russia cannot risk jeopardizing these relations, especially when the CIs help the country to solve the problem with the increase in demands of Chinese experts, which is an outcome of the rapid development of Sino-Russian relations.

The majority of doubts and criticism about the Confucius Institute comes from the Western countries. They blame China for using the CI as a propaganda tool, which undermines the academic freedom of universities and can be used as a spy network, which means that the project presents a serious threat to freedom of thought and speech in education. That is why the West shows its unwillingness to let China steal up that close to its universities. There are concerns that “when a CI shows up at a university, the university is effectively outsourcing its Chinese studies to the Chinese government. Confucius Institutes are funded by and to a certain extent overseen by an agency of the Chinese state” (Worrall, 2015). However, it seems that Russia the situation is quite different. Some of the CIs there are affiliated to the major universities of the country, like Lomonosov Moscow State University or Saint Petersburg State University. It has been already mentioned, that according to the director of the CI at the RSUH, Hanban does not

dictate the CI what to do and what content to include in the courses agenda. Actually, from what the author of this thesis has learned from her own experience, in Moscow, for example, the CIs perform quite independently from the universities they are affiliated with. They do not interfere with the curriculum of the universities itself, thus having not much, or even no influence on them at all.

It is also very important to mention that the CIs in Russia aim at operating not only within their own frames, but they are also willing to go beyond – to the society. They organize various forums, competitions, offer grants to study in China, and Russian society finds it very appealing. People feel that they can gain something from this initiative. Such an interest is definitely connected with the topic of Sino-Russian relations and their influence on the CI, as the bilateral relations are developing, many people in Russia due to various reasons are interested in China and Chinese language, and the Confucius Institute is there to help them satisfy their need. The Russian society needs China right now. This explains the current Chinese language boom in the country, as well as influences its positive attitude towards the CI. However, it is difficult to say whether the initiative would be that successful if Russia was not dependent that much from the PRC.

Of course, we should bear in mind that there is no such thing as free lunch: China is not doing all these things for the love of Russia. It has far-sighted strategy which it follows in order to win hearts and minds of people all over the globe. And in Russian case, all these seem to be really successful. The Confucius Institute is particularly good for those who do not or did not have an opportunity to study Mandarin at universities. From this point of view, the CI can be regarded as an excellent choice, as it is said to provide high-quality courses and lots of opportunities to study in China. According to the research findings, these two things are regarded as the most important for those who study Chinese language, regardless of whether they study it in the CI or not. Such things as thoughts about the violation of academic freedom or involvement in the intelligence work do not bother them that much, the interviewees do not really think that the CIs can have any negative influence on people, as their primary work is to teach the language, and they are said to be good at it.

As it has been shown in the Paragraph about Secondary Data Findings, there are also those who are actually concerned about the presence of the CIs in Russia and try to warn the others that they should pay more attention to the real goals of this organization. The example of two cases of the CIs in Novosibirsk and Ryazan are very interesting, as

they indicate that the CIs actually do have problems in Russia, although they are solved really quickly. An example of a non-existent CI in Moscow, of which we talked in Chapter 4,<sup>223</sup> can also be regarded as something special and unusual. Anyway, further research on all of these subjects is needed.

The PRC is using the Confucius Institute as a tool of its developing soft power. However, those people who study Chinese in Russia either at the CI or elsewhere do not always know what soft power is, and that they are involved in this process. It might be a reminder for Moscow, that it should talk more about soft power in terms of its foreign policy and let people know what soft power is, and that the CI, as well as any other language centers, like British Council or Goethe Institute, are instruments of foreign countries' soft power. If people see how successful these initiatives are, they might want their country to follow the lead and develop its own attractive initiatives. In this case, the main driving force of Russian soft power might become not only governmental, but also come from the civil society.

China is rising, and its influence all over the world becomes more and more important. One of the main goals for the PRC's government foreign policy is to build a favorable image of itself abroad, and soft power has already become one of the directions in the country's foreign policy in order to reach this goal. China's main aim is to deliver the thought that it is rising peacefully, aiming at building the harmonious society and following the Chinese Dream. And for now it seems that Beijing has already convinced Moscow to believe in these statements. In Russia, due to various reasons, China is regarded as a good neighbour, close friend and important strategic partner. Through the research conducted by the author of this thesis with the help of different primary and secondary data sources, we found out that China is really successful in promoting and developing its national image in Russia. The general attitude towards the PRC is positive, with some exceptions, of course. China managed to raise its image there up to the top. Very small percentage of Russians views China as a potential threat to their country. Political, business, economical, trade and cultural relations are the most important factors in shaping the bilateral attitude towards each other. And in all these fields China has no other major competitors to win hearts and minds of Russians.

The Confucius Institute itself can be viewed as one of the tools which help China to shape its peaceful national image. Though it might not work as good as the PRC wants

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<sup>223</sup> See Chapter 4, Paragraph 4.5.1

it to when we speak about Western countries, like the U.S. or Canada, for example, but it totally justifies China's hopes in Russia. Through the primary data sources we got to know that the local perception of Russians, on the example of Moscow favors this initiative. Some people state that with the help of the Confucius Institute people have chance to understand real China, all the truth about country. The CIs themselves are trying to do their best to prove these statements (though it is still not that clear how they deal with the most sensitive issues).

Of course there is still a lot of criticism around the issue of the CI; however it seems that Russia is less susceptible than Western countries, for example, to criticize one of its closest friends and neighbours for using the Confucius Institute as a spy agency. Of course, Moscow is well aware that the CI is a tool of propaganda, however, according to the opinions of many interviewees, there is nothing wrong in propagating language and culture, especially when Russian people are so much interested in it due to various reasons, one of which is definitely connected to the fact that Sino-Russian relations are rapidly developing, and Russian people see lots of opportunities in these relations, both for their country and for themselves. For now, it seems that the development of the Confucius Institute in Russia is stable. However, further research is needed in order to better understand other reasons of such high interest and to predict the possible future of this initiative, especially when some countries in the world are already highly suspicious and skeptical about it.

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## Appendix

### Questions for the Interviews

#### *Questions for Confucius Institute Faculty Staff*

##### **Section I: Basic Information**

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. Where are you teaching Chinese?
4. How long have you been teaching Chinese?
5. What exactly do you teach? (Apart from the language)
6. Do you like it?
7. What do you like the most in Chinese?
8. What do not you like?
9. When you think about Chinese culture what is the first thing popping up in your mind?

##### **Section II: About CI**

10. How long have you been teaching in the Confucius institute?
11. Have you ever participated in any events organised by the CI?
12. What is your opinion on the CI? Do you think it is possible to master your Chinese by attending the classes offered by the CI?
13. Have you ever heard about the term “soft power”?
14. Did you know that some countries blame China for using the CI as a tool to advocate their values?
15. Do you think that the CI can really have negative influence on their students?
16. What kind of effect can China gain through the establishment of CIs all over the world?
17. Does the CI have positive effect for Russia? In what way?
18. What do you think about the influence of China’s CI for Sino-Russian relations in general?
19. Is the CI an NGO or GO?

*Questions for professors who teach Chinese outside of the Confucius Institute*

**Section I: Basic Information**

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. Where are you teaching Chinese?
4. How long have you been teaching Chinese?
5. What exactly do you teach? (Apart from the language)
6. Do you like it?
7. What do you like the most in Chinese?
8. What do not you like?
9. When you think about Chinese culture what is the first thing popping up in your mind?

**Section II: About CI**

10. Of course you are familiar with the name of Confucius. Have you ever heard about the Confucius Institute (CI)?
11. Do you know what the main tasks of the CI are?
12. Have you ever participated in any events organised by the CI? (May add the purpose of participating or their analysis on the purpose of holding these activities by China)
13. What is your opinion on the CI? Do you think it is possible to master your Chinese by attending the classes offered by the CI?
14. Have you ever heard about the term “soft power”?
15. Did you know that some countries blame China for using the CI as a tool to advocate their values?
16. Do you think that the CI can really have negative influence on their students?
17. What kind of effect can China gain through the establishment of CIs all over the world?
18. Does the CI have positive effect for Russia? In what way?
19. What do you think about the influence of China’s CI for Sino-Russian relations in general?
20. Is the CI an NGO or GO?

*Questions for students who learn Chinese in the Confucius Institute*

**Section I: Basic Information**

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. Are you studying or working?
4. How long have you been learning Chinese?
5. Why did you decide to learn it?
6. Do you like it?
7. What do you like the most in Chinese?
8. What do not you like? What is the most difficult part for you in learning Chinese?
9. When you think about Chinese culture what is the first thing popping up in your mind?

**Section II: About CI**

10. How long have you been attending the CI?
11. How often do you attend courses?
12. Why did you choose that particular CI?
13. Do you like the manner of teaching in the CI? Is there anything you do not like?
14. What is your overall impression about the CI?
15. Have you ever participated in any events organised by the CI? (May add the purpose of participating or their analysis on the purpose of holding these activities by China)
16. Have you ever heard about the scholarship offered by the CI? Have you ever tried to obtain it?
17. Have you ever studied in China or in Taiwan?
18. After taking courses of CI, if any, any image change towards China?
19. Do you know what the main tasks of the CI are?
20. Have you ever heard about the term “soft power”?
21. Did you know that some countries blame China for using the CI as a tool to advocate their values?
22. What kind of effect can China gain through the establishment of CIs all over the world?
23. Does the CI have positive effect for Russia? In what way?

24. What do you think about the influence of China's CI for Sino-Russian relations in general?
25. Is the CI an NGO or GO?

*Questions for students who learn Chinese outside of the Confucius Institute*

### **Section I: Basic Information**

1. What is your name?
2. What is your age?
3. Where are you studying Chinese?
4. How long have you been learning Chinese?
5. Why did you decide to learn it?
6. Do you like it?
7. What do you like the most in Chinese?
8. What do not you like? What is the most difficult part for you in learning Chinese?
9. Have you ever studied in China or in Taiwan?
10. When you think about Chinese culture what is the first thing popping up in your mind?

### **Section II: About CI**

11. Do you know the name of Confucius?
12. Have you ever heard about the Confucius Institute (CI)?
13. Do you know what the main tasks of the CI are?
14. Have you ever participated in any events organised by the CI? (May add the purpose of participating or their analysis on the purpose of holding these activities by China)
15. After participating activities of CI, if any, any image change to China?
16. What is your opinion on the CI? Do you think it is possible to master your Chinese by attending the classes offered by the CI?
17. Have you ever heard about the term "soft power"?
18. Did you know that some countries blame China for using the CI as a tool to advocate their values?
19. Do you think that the CI can really have negative influence on their students?
20. What kind of effect can China gain through the establishment of CIs all over the world?
21. Does the CI have positive effect for Russia? In what way?

22. What do you think about the influence of China's CI for Sino-Russian relations in general?
23. Is the CI an NGO or GO?

