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中國對台灣選舉和台灣回應演變的影響

China's Evolving Influence over Taiwan's Elections and Taiwanese Responses

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Abstract

Beginning with Taiwan's transition to democracy in the late 1980s China's influence over Taiwan has begun to evolve. China, although still maintaining the right to use military force, has transitioned to a more economic way of dealing with Taiwan. China attempts to influence Taiwanese voting behavior by offering economic incentives for closer relations with the Mainland. This change has resulted in both of Taiwan's main political parties evolving their positions on China. The Kuomintang (KMT) views China as an opportunity and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) views China as a threat.

Keywords: China, Taiwan, Kuomintang (KMT), Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)



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Chapter One

Introduction

I. Background

Elections in Taiwan are very different from elections in other democratic nations, and yet they are very similar. They are similar in the fact that they are, by definition, democratic. They also share with other nations the feeling of unease regarding elections. That is to say every election in Taiwan as well as other democratic nations has the potential to change the political dynamic and bring new people into power in a relatively short amount of time. The similarities between Taiwanese elections and other nation's elections are that they share in the "brotherhood of democracy". While these similarities are important, the far more important issues when it comes to Taiwanese elections are the differences.

Taiwan is a special case in the lab of democracy. Since Taiwan is recognized on the international stage by only a smattering of smaller nations, Taiwan lacks the international recognition of its democracy that most modern, democratic nations enjoy. This international isolation has affected how Taiwanese vote, especially when it comes to the economy. When trying to trace the source of this isolation, the trail is always led back to the Chinese government's position on Taiwan. Namely, that Taiwan is a wayward province of China.

This Chinese policy towards Taiwan affects the elections on the island and is the single most prominent issue when it comes to how Taiwanese people cast their vote. The China factor influences every other issue and factor that comes into play when Taiwan holds elections. China influences how people perceive the economy, becoming isolated, military issues, as well as a host of other factors. This perception of China has gradually evolved, on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. On the Taiwan side China has been viewed through the guise of being an enemy during the Chen presidential period to being a potential opportunity during the Ma presidency.

On the Chinese side of the issue is the all encompassing One China Policy. China's ultimate goal is a reunification of the two sides. Everything that Beijing does when it comes to Taiwan is done with the ideal of reunification, or at least denying Taiwanese independence. China must be very cautious when it deals with Taiwan as China's attitude and behavior can hold a major influence

over how Taiwanese vote. This interference in Taiwan's domestic elections on the part of China is a major, if not the major, variable when Taiwanese people are deciding to cast their vote. What this thesis will do is show China's evolving position on the Taiwan issue and how China attempts to influence Taiwanese elections. It will also show how the Taiwanese respond based off of their political ideology.

There is a saying in the sciences that math is the handmaiden of science. If that is true; then we can safely say that in the social sciences money is the handmaiden of politics. If it is logical to claim that the China factor is the most prominent variable that influences the elections in Taiwan, than it is logical to conclude that this China factor will influence other prominent variables such as the economy. With China currently representing the second largest consumer market on the planet (soon to be the first), many Taiwanese businesspeople want access to this booming market. The way to access the Chinese market it bound to politics and how the Taiwanese vote. If an average Taiwanese citizen is more concerned with China as a potential place to do business and make money, then this Taiwanese citizen will more than likely vote for a candidate or party that also views China as an economic opportunity.

The two main political parties have seized on these two variables in terms of campaigning as well as policy. The Nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party is more inclined to view China as a potential opportunity for economic growth. The main opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party, tends to view China as a potential threat to not only Taiwan's political systems but also the economy. The two main variables that the political parties always form their platforms around are China and economic issues.

What this thesis proposes to do is show that the two most influential variables in Taiwanese elections are the China factor and economy. These two variables can be even further divided into three different actors, China, the U.S. and Taiwan. In the light of China, how does Taiwan react to marginalization on the international stage and how does this affect elections? How does China's behavior affect Taiwan's elections? How does the United States and its position in the triangle play into Taiwanese elections when viewed as a deterrent to China? When it comes to economic issues, how does China influence the Taiwanese economy and thus elections? How does Washington? By examining these two variables in Taiwanese elections and their subgroups

I will show that China and the economy hold the most sway over Taiwan's elections and how the Taiwanese vote.

II. Purpose of Research

The purpose of research will be to assess the current relationship between China, the economy and Taiwan's elections. These two factors are the most prominent actors in Taiwanese politics and hold the most influence over Taiwan.

If we look at the China factor from Beijing's point of view we can see that China's position has evolved over time. Beginning with the founding of the People's Republic in 1949, Taiwan was viewed as a wayward province that needed to be liberated and brought back into the fold of greater China. Beijing has always tried to use the proverbial stick when it comes to influencing Taiwan's elections and the general political situation in Taiwan. In recent years though there has been an evolution of attitude in how Beijing treats Taipei, especially when the KMT is in control. China has realized that force has usually led to the opposite of what they intended. China now can be satisfied with something less than full reunification, as long as this system denies Taiwan's international space.¹ This has shown how China has gone from overtly using military force to influence Taiwan to a softer approach.

This evolution on the China issue from Beijing's point of view has had a direct influence on Taiwan's elections and how Taiwan's political parties operate. The KMT has a closer relationship with the Beijing government. Both recognize and propagate the One China Principle² and both desire a unified China. This effects how Taiwanese vote. The opposition party, the DPP, also has had an evolution from being fervently anti-China (恐中) to becoming more tolerant of China and trade across the Straits. With the Chinese economy being the second largest in the world (the first if going by purchasing power parity), the DPP has realized that there can be tremendous benefits to Taiwan if there is careful economic interaction between the two sides.

¹ Nathan, A.J. (1996) China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait, *The China Journal*, No, 36, p. 88

² The One China Principle is best described as both Beijing and Taipei recognize the existence of only one China. The legitimate government to represent that China is open to interpretation. The oral agreements between the two sides in the form of the 1992 Consensus are the best representation of the One China Principle.

In the world of politics, nothing is absolute. Situations are always changing and evolving. This evolution is best seen in the treatment of Taiwan by Beijing, especially when it comes time to hold an election in Taiwan. According to Andrew Nathan, China has gone from overtly threatening Taiwan and emphasizing reunification, to a more subdued tone of simply denying Taiwanese independence or international recognition of Taiwan. “Beijing can be satisfied with something less than full unification. It can accommodate Taiwan’s international activity and so too any residual diplomatic activity that is part of the winding down of Taiwan’s independent diplomatic posture.”³ This is an unprecedented shift from the times when Beijing would use brute military force and threats to attempt to influence Taiwan’s elections. It shows that China has tried the “stick” and not gotten the desired outcome so now Beijing will attempt to use the “carrot” to influence Taiwan. It should also be noted though that China has limits when it comes to the “carrot” approach. Recently Xi Jinping has released his 地動山搖說 (Di dong shan yao shuo) policy. This policy dictates that any dealings China has with Taiwan must be done under the pretext of both sides recognizing the 1992 Consensus. Xi and China value the 1992 Consensus above all and that any dealings China has with Taiwan must recognize Chinese authority over the island.⁴ Well there has been an evolution on the side of China because Beijing recognizes that the heavy handed approach has the opposite effect of what is desired; China still maintains the principles of Taiwan being a part of the nation. This has vast influence of Taiwanese elections.

Throughout this thesis I will attempt to show how China has attempted to influence Taiwan’s domestic elections and how the Taiwanese voter reacts to China’s actions. It will also be important to show how the average Taiwanese citizen views China and how this influences whom they vote for.

³ Nathan, A.J., P.88

⁴ 兩岸與國際》最怕地動山搖的其實是習近平, *Liberty Times* (2015, May 15)
<http://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/breakingnews/1317512> accessed May 16, 2015

III. Literature Review

Before discussing the relevant literature on the issue of China's influence on Taiwan's elections it should be pointed out that there is a great deal of contradictory literature available on the topic, especially from Taiwanese authors. The literature that paints China as more of a threat to Taiwan's elections tend to favor less reliance on China and view Beijing as a threat. On the other side are those that believe that China should not be viewed as a threat, instead Beijing should be viewed as an opportunity.

Wu Yu Shan in his paper 兩岸關係的理論詮釋 (The Theoretical Interpretation of the Cross Strait Relations) provides the basic background of the relations between China and Taiwan. He shows the evolution of China's Taiwan policy, and how Taiwan has responded. The important background information of how China attempts to influence Taiwanese elections is provided as well as how Taiwan responds on a national scale to China's influences through "bandwagoning" and other measures. All of these terms and background information can apply to how Taiwanese people vote. The actions of China has a direct result on Taiwanese voters and they tend to vote based off of their perceptions and opinions of China. The average citizen's perception of China is an example of an independent variable. If China is viewed as more of a threat, the citizen will more than likely vote for a politician or party that takes a more cautious approach to China. Conversely, if China is viewed as an opportunity, the citizen will vote accordingly.

This view of China as an opportunity by some in Taiwan has led to the KMT increasingly becoming more amicable to Beijing. When President Ma was first elected in 2008 it was hoped that there could be a diplomatic "truce" between the two sides and that economic cooperation could eventually lead to political stability.⁵ The Taiwanese population was weary of eight years under President Chen and the animosity that had developed between the Strait during Chen's presidency. Taiwanese business people also began to want greater access to the Chinese market and President Ma and the KMT began to bring forth more China friendly policies. This marked a shift from the previous administration.

Leading the charge in Ma's attitude and policy shift towards viewing China as an

⁵ "The Baoao Forum, One Small Step for Cross-Strait Dialogue," *Zhongguo Shibao* (China Times), Editorial, April 8, 2008; "President-elect Ma calls for 'Diplomatic Truce'"

economic opportunity were businesspeople. These second track agents were able to successfully show the KMT that China. The business elite in Taiwan tended to have a more favorable attitude towards doing business with China and see the vast market in China as an avenue to increase profit. Shu Keng and Gunther Schubert in their paper *Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration* go into great detail about how businesspeople in Taiwan influence Taiwan's elections. One interesting aspect that they develop in the paper is the idea of "Dualism of Taiwanese public opinion on Cross-Strait relations."⁶ This duality consists of the perception that closer ties with China provide economic advantages, but leads closer to unification. There is a trade off when it comes to dealing with China, namely a political price to pay. Wu Yu Shan also developed this idea of a duality in Taiwanese voters' minds. If an individual supports unification they will vote for closer ties, if they support independence they will vote for the opposition. This idea of closer economic ties with China leading to unification is nothing new. However, the idea that businesspeople can, and in many cases, are leading the charge to closer economic ties with China have a direct influence on Taiwan's elections and how people vote. It is especially interesting given the recent dealings between Eric Chu, the party leader of the KMT and current mayor of New Taipei City, and his counterparts in the CCP.

IV. Research Hypothesis and Analytical Framework

For this paper I will show how the influence of China plays a direct role on Taiwanese elections. How a Taiwanese voter views China also has an undisputable role to play in Taiwanese elections. My main hypothesis can most accurately be summarized by the following:

1. Because of China's claim to Taiwan, China has a direct role to play in how Taiwanese vote. Whether it is a direct threat of force or economic incentives, Beijing is always the most prominent factor in Taiwan's elections.

⁶ Keng, S. and Schubert, G. (2010) *Agents of Taiwan-China Unification? The Political Roles of Taiwanese Business People in the Process of Cross-Strait Integration*, *Asian Survey*, Vol, 50, No. 2, pp. 287-310

2. Taiwanese citizens voting behavior is based on their perception of China. If someone believes China is an opportunity, especially economically, they tend to vote Pan-Blue. Conversely, if China is viewed as a threat the voter will most likely vote Pan-Green.

In order to best “tell the story” of China’s role in Taiwanese elections I will be relying on academic research already done by others. To supplement this research and news reports will be data collected by National Chengchi University’s (NCCU) election center. This TEDS data will help to prove the correlation between the voting practices of Taiwanese citizens and China. It will show the direct, enormous, effect China’s influence exerts on Taiwan. When China speaks, especially when it comes to Taiwan, voters in Taiwan take heed and vote accordingly. This data will be helpful in showing how Taiwanese not only view themselves, but also China. It will further show how Taiwan is divided into two main camps; those that view China as an opportunity and those that view China as a threat.

V. Election Case Study

Once it has been established and shown the vast influence China holds over Taiwan’s elections, a direct analysis of certain elections in Taiwan will be done. The 2012 election marks a shift in Taiwanese elections and the voter’s attitudes, especially when it comes to China. Well it may be arguable that the victory of Ma in 2008 was to the fact that the electorate was apathetic to having had eight years of DPP rule under Chen with such animosity across the Strait. The “incumbent effect” was a decisive variable in Ma’s election victory in 2008. Ma came into office with a pledge of lowering tensions across the Taiwan Strait and improving relations, especially economic ones, with China.

During President Ma’s first term in office there were many breakthroughs in Taiwan’s relationship with China. The crowning feature of Ma’s first term was ECFA. This pact between China and Taiwan increased trade across the strait. It has also had a very describable impact on Taiwanese politics. The full effect of ECFA on Taiwan’s economy has yet to fully come to fruition, however ECFA can be seen as a litmus test for Ma’s reelection in 2012. President Ma was able to fend off the DPP’s candidate Tsai Ing-wen in 2012. It is safe to say that voters were

more comfortable with a KMT presidency under Ma versus the unknown of Tsai. The majority of voters still believed that Ma and the KMT were the best to handle China and continue the bettering of the relationship between the two.

The 2012 election in Taiwan showed how China and China's economic prestige had a direct affect on Taiwanese voting behavior. The analysis of these two elections will show that the majority of voters viewed China as more of an opportunity rather than a potential threat; at least in terms of the economy. As such, President Ma was given another four years to improve the relations between the two sides.

Structure of Thesis

- 1. Introduction.**
- 2. The China Factor-China's influence on Taiwanese politics and elections.**
- 3. Taiwanese electorate and their view of China- Threat or opportunity?**
- 4. The 2012 election case study.**
- 5. Conclusion.**

Conclusion

The story of China's influence on Taiwanese politics is intertwined in history and money. The very fabric of Taiwan's democracy is often put to the test by China, and China enjoys a vast amount of influence on Taiwan in regards to Taiwanese voting behavior. There has been a subtle evolution in how China deals with Taiwan in order to affect elections. China still maintains its principles of Taiwan being a part of its territory; however there has been an evolution in how China deals with Taiwan. China can now be placated with something less than full unification. As long as Taiwan does not take any provocative steps towards full independence, China has learned that a more hands off approach works better in China's favor. This evolution in attitude on Beijing's part also affects how the Taiwanese vote. If they are more supportive of closer relations with China they will vote for the KMT. If China is a treat in their mind they will vote for the DPP. The ideology of the electorate will also heavily influence future elections, especially the 2016 presidential election.

Chapter Two

China's Influence on Taiwan's Democracy and Elections

In China there is a notion that China, as a nation, has historically been ostracized and bullied by the developed world. One does not need to look far in Chinese textbooks and media to see the attitude of not only the government in China, but also the culture as a whole. This form of ethnocentrism and belief that unity is a necessity on display in China does have its roots in the historical treatment of China by foreign nations. China sees itself as being the victim throughout much of history. One of the byproducts of this historical attitude is the sacred belief and principle that China, and the Chinese race, must be unified. Chinese have the tendency of viewing race and nationality as one in the same. That is to say, if one is of Han descent then one is Chinese. This person belongs to the greater 中華 (Chinese) identity. This “Chinese” identity bleeds into everything it comes into contact with, including politics. It is because of this belief that China must be unified that the government in the People's Republic of China is so adamant when it comes to the issue of Taiwan. It is a very nationalistic position that the PRC holds when it comes to Taiwan and this nationalism is one of the main factors that holds sway over how the PRC views and deals with Taiwan.

I. China's One China Principle

The sacred belief that China must be a unified nation and people has seeped into how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan and the issue of Taiwan's separation from China. The CCP has as one of its core principles the ideal of a unified China and Chinese race. The fact that, in the opinion of the CCP, that modern day China is not unified is very tragic to the government in Beijing. One of the main principles that Beijing holds steadfast to is the idea of uniting “greater China”. This unified China would be under the watchful eye of the CCP and China would finally be the united society that many deem desirable. This has evolved into what Beijing calls the “One China policy” or “One China Principle”.

According to China's White Paper on “The one-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue” which was released on February 21, 2000, Taiwan must always be viewed as a part of China. “The

One-China Principle has evolved in the course of the Chinese people's just struggle to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and its basis, both de facto and de jure, is unshakable."⁷ The Chinese government has as one of its core principles the reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland. This doctrine is an intrinsic part of how the CCP deals with Taiwan. The issue of Taiwan's status has been given prominent status in Chinese politics and how the Chinese deal with Taiwan. It also factors greatly into how the Chinese view Taiwan's democracy and election system. China bases its views and actions on Taiwan's elections off of the principle that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory, a part that must eventually be reunited with Beijing. One of the most prominent examples of how the CCP has decided to deal with Taiwan is through the above mentioned White Paper that was released in 2000. Through examination of this paper it is clear what the CCP's goals are and principles it wishes to uphold when it comes to dealing with Taiwan. The paper has a historical component to it that traces the origins of the One China Principle to a point of origin that predates the People's Republic of China. China believes that at the end of the Second World War Taiwan was returned to China (at the time the Republic of China) under the guise of the Cairo Doctrine. The CCP believes that since Taiwan and all other territories ceded to Japan by the Qing dynasty were returned upon Japan's defeat and that the Postdam proclamation solidifies the legitimacy of the CCP to govern Taiwan. This is a curious case for the PRC to make given the fact that the PRC as a nation did not exist until 1949. The idea that the current government in Beijing can claim Taiwan as part of its territory can be traced back to the belief that the PRC is a continuation of the Republic of China (ROC). The PRC claims that since the ROC has been defeated, the PRC has inherited the entire sovereign territory of China, which in their view contains Taiwan. For the PRC to even entertain the notion of Taiwan being a separate nation outside of the jurisdiction of Beijing would be anathema. The ROC is no longer in existence and to even entertain the idea that the PRC and the ROC can exist separately without the ROC in Taiwan recognizing Beijing as the central government is not possible. Taiwan is an issue at the core of the PRC's existence, China needs to

⁷ Xu, Sh. Origin of the One China Principle, *Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council PRC* (2001, December 18) http://www.gwytb.gov.cn/en/Special/OneChinaPrinciple/201103/t20110317_1790075.htm accessed May 15, 2015

resolve the Taiwan issue in order to be legitimized; especially since the PRC as a nation state is still relatively young.

With the founding of the PRC in 1949 all of the territory of the ROC was ceded to the PRC. “On October 1, 1949, the Central People's Government of the PRC was proclaimed, replacing the government of the Republic of China to become the only legal government of the whole of China and its sole legal representative in the international arena.”⁸ The government in Beijing sees itself as the continuation of China; it is the next incarnation of the “Middle Kingdom” and the true representative of the Chinese people. The PRC believes that any diplomatic relations and treaties held by the ROC were transferred to the PRC on its founding in 1949. Although the ROC does still exist as a rump state to this day, the PRC believes that the ROC is no longer a recognizable entity and that any representation of China must be done and recognized through Beijing. It is this ingrained belief in the PRC that only the government in Beijing can represent China that has led to China being very adamant in the international arena when it comes to how the international community deals with the Taiwan issue. This idea of China being only represented by the PRC is one of the most sacred principles the PRC affirms and holds onto. This principle has to do directly with the PRC’s legitimacy as a government as well and is one of the reasons why the PRC attempts to influence Taiwanese elections. It also speaks to Chinese legitimacy on the claim of Taiwan. China needs to maintain the principle of a unified China, with Taiwan as an important part of China. If China were to relinquish the principle, the CCP and China as a whole would have a legitimacy issue when it comes to other hot button problems facing Chinese leadership. Hypothetically, if China were to resolve the Taiwan issue by allowing Taiwan self determination this would set a dangerous precedent for other issues of sovereignty that China faces. If China were to follow this line of reasoning it would be dangerous since it sets a precedent for people in Tibet, Xinjiang and other areas within China that take issue with being under the jurisdiction of Beijing. Especially given the recent Umbrella movement in Hong Kong, China finds itself in the precarious position of a lack of maneuverability when it comes to the Taiwan issue. The appearance of any system without Taiwan recognizing that Taiwan is a part of China and Beijing as the central government would not be acceptable by Beijing since it has invested heavily in claiming Taiwan as a part of China.

⁸ Xu, S. Origin of the One-China Principle

II. China's Evolving Approach, Taiwan Responds

Having established China's historical view on the issue of Taiwan being a part of Chinese territory and how China believes that Taiwan must be reunified, by use of force if necessary, the next step is to examine how China goes about achieving this goal and how this affects Taiwan's democracy. "On Comrade Deng Xiaoping's initiative, the Chinese government has, since 1979, adopted the policy of peaceful reunification and gradually evolved the scientific concept of "one country, two systems."⁹ After Mao brought China to its knees via the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, China received a leader that was strikingly different than Mao. Deng Xiaoping, who himself was persecuted by Mao. Under Deng, China not only embarked on economic reforms but also on how China dealt with Taiwan. Beginning with Deng the world began to see a shift in how China dealt with Taiwan. China would no longer insist on full unification as being the only available option, although this is still the most desired outcome by Beijing. The PRC could be content with something less than full unification. A system similar to that of what modern day Hong Kong has would be acceptable to Beijing in the modern era. This system would still grant Taiwan an aura of independence while at the same time still being under the rule of the PRC.

The evolution of Chinese policy regarding Taiwan's unification; going from being very staunch in demanding full reunification to a more workable one state two system model has had great influence on the Taiwanese voter. One way that China has pursued to influence the Taiwanese voter is through the politicians in Taiwan. The best example would be that of former President Lee Teng-hui. "In 1988, after Lee Teng-hui became the leader of the Taiwan authorities, he publicly stated time and again that the basic policy of the Taiwan authorities was that "there is only one China, not two."¹⁰ Lee was the first popularly elected president in the ROC after the lifting of martial law, and as such there was a vast amount riding on Lee's election. China desperately desired to have a president that would be more inclined to Beijing's overtures win the election in 1996. Well the above quote and commentary may seem to support the notion that Lee would be the preferred candidate for Beijing, this was not the case. Lee, even though he was nominated by the KMT, turned into a divisive candidate rather quickly from the perspective of

⁹ (2000) White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue, *Taiwan Documents Project*, <http://www.taiwandocuments.org/white.htm> accessed May 17, 2015

¹⁰ White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.

Beijing. Beijing believed that Lee, if elected in 1996, would pursue and implement policies that would promote Taiwanese independence and a unique Taiwanese identity. Beijing's view of Lee can best be summarized as follows: "In ideology and culture, the Taiwan authorities have endeavored to obliterate the Chinese awareness of Taiwan compatriots, especially young people, and their identification with the motherland."¹¹ China could not accept a presidential candidate that had any potential of disrupting Beijing's one China policy. As such China attempted to sway influence on Taiwan's 1996 election through military force.

China believed that any Taiwanese citizen voting for Lee Teng-hui in 1996 would be a vote against China and the eventual reunification of Taiwan. For many in Beijing, particularly in the People's Liberation Army (PLA), Lee's 'pragmatic diplomacy' constituted 'splittism' or 'disguised independence' and was a direct threat to the PRC's claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Because of this belief China decided to pursue military action in order to influence Taiwanese voters. This led to the Third Taiwan Straits Crisis. Well there is still debate as to China's actual motives behind the crisis; it is safe to say that the Chinese military action had a decisive impact on the 1996 election. "Some viewed the exercise as motivated by Beijing's desire to influence Taiwan's 1996 presidential elections-the first direct elections of a Chief of State in Chinese history."¹² The Straits Crisis is a pivotal point in China's relationship with Taiwan and how Beijing believed it could influence over Taiwan's elections.

Because of China's belief in the One China principle, Beijing believed that they were justified in using the threat of violence to influence Taiwan's 1996 election. China maintains that any action by China when it comes to dealing with Taiwan is a domestic issue; and the 1996 election was by extension a domestic issue for Beijing. The historical significance of the 1996 election cannot be ignored either. This was the first time an open and democratic election was held in a Sino ethnic nation. This development in Taiwan of a democratic election was historically significant because it also represented a turning point in how the ruling KMT party treated elections. Since the KMT lifted martial law and instituted reforms, they took a risk of the Taiwanese electorate voting for non KMT candidates and parties. This happened in 2000 and again in 2004. This marked a shift in how the CCP dealt with Taiwan as well. Although the CCP believed, and still does to this day, that Taiwan is a part of China, they never the less realized the great

¹¹ White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.

¹² White Paper- The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue.

ramifications a direct democratic election could potentially have on the issue of reunification. This caused great stagnation in the CCP and led to the saber rattling of the third Taiwan Straits crisis. It speaks to the principle of China maintaining that Taiwan is a part of Chinese territory. China is willing to risk military confrontation over this principle.

III. The Third Taiwan Straits Crisis

In order to fully appreciate the actions of China in the Third Taiwan Strait crisis it is important to first understand what transpired. “China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait between July 1995 and March 1996.”¹³ These military tests were a continuation of China’s use of military coercion when it comes to Taiwan. The only difference was that this time there was an election about to take place in Taiwan, and China had too much to lose by allowing a more independent leaning candidate to win the presidency. “The military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China’s displeasure at the visit of Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to the United States that June.”¹⁴ China was displeased that a presidential candidate, especially one with a chance of victory, would visit the United States. From Beijing’s perspective this represented a possible weakening of Beijing’s legitimacy over Taiwan. Lee was a very outspoken candidate when it came to the relationship between China and Taiwan. This represented new and untested ground for the PRC. They were concerned that a Lee administration would take drastic steps that would further the separation of Taiwan from China. Any potential separation or appearance of separation of Taiwan from China through electoral means could not be tolerated by Beijing. This was a potential threat in Beijing’s perspective that had to be dealt with in a timely manner. As such, the government in China decided to use a show of force to attempt to sway Taiwanese voters to choose a candidate more amicable and receptive to Beijing. This was also meant to be a warning to Taiwanese politicians and political elites that there would be consequences for not agreeing with Beijing, and that said consequences could result in violence. China has always maintained this threat of force and said it reserves the right to use force to reunite with Taiwan. However, what makes the Third Taiwan Straits crisis different from the previous ones is the election.

¹³ Scobell, Andrew. *Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis*. <http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/scobell.pdf> accessed online June 28, 2015

¹⁴ Scobell, 2

After Beijing conducted the initial military tests in the straits, they continued with their military exercises and drills in order to send a clear message to Taiwan. “Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of the Strait, including joint operations involving air, land, and naval arms of the PLA.”¹⁵ China’s goals in the Third Crisis were very clear. They wanted to send the message to Taiwanese voters that casting a vote for a candidate that the PRC did not have a favorable view of could be dangerous and have deadly consequences. “Clearly, China’s decision to resort to military coercion was due largely to its rising concern that Taiwan’s democratization and diplomatic offensives were rendering its strategy of national unification ineffective.”¹⁶ There was great amount of consternation in China when it came to the first open election for president. It was a litmus test for China and Chinese policy that had up until the point of the first democratic election been geared toward unification. China now stood at a crossroads when it came to how it was going to deal with the issue of Taiwan. Beijing believed that they needed to act in order to prevent what could possibly be the first of many elections in Taiwan that did not go their way. This resulted in a very direct show of force and was meant to intimidate the Taiwanese into voting a certain way. It was also meant as a deterrent to international actors, such as the United States.

IV. American and Taiwanese Response

China believed that if it wanted to reunite with Taiwan, it must be done on Chinese terms. To Beijing, Taiwan is domestic territory and any interference from outside actors causes great concern in China. “The message for Washington was that Beijing was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan with China, American intervention notwithstanding.”¹⁷ The United States had a lot invested in the Taiwanese election as well. American policy towards Taiwan has always been one that favors stability across the Strait. This desire to see stability would lead the U.S. to favor the current status of the Taiwan Straits; namely maintaining the status quo. The first democratic election had influence on the U.S. and its often chaotic Taiwan policy. Ever since the U.S. decided to recognize Beijing as the

¹⁵ Scobell, 2

¹⁶ Yu, T. (1997) *Taiwanese Democracy Under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion*. *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 1, PP 7-36. P. 8.

¹⁷ Scobell, 6.

legitimate administrator of Taiwan the U.S. has still maintained close relations with Taipei. This has included sales of weapons to Taiwan to deter a possible Chinese attack on the island. The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis was also meant to show the U.S. that China was serious about its claim to administer Taiwan. China needed to send a clear message to the United States and other nations that any perceived assistance to Taiwan from the outside would be seen in a very negative light in Beijing and put China in a precarious position to attempt to solve the issue. China could not allow any perception of foreign interference in Taiwan. Foreign meddling in the Taiwan issue would be a blow to China's legitimacy of administration rights over Taiwan. China needs to avoid any international interference in Taiwan, especially when it comes to Taiwan's defense and elections in the island. By using the military drills in the Straits to show that China was serious about the use of force when it comes to the Taiwan issue, Beijing showed both Taipei and Washington the extent it was willing to go to deal with Taiwan.

The United States initially did not want to use military force to respond to China's aggressive actions in the Third Straits Crisis. However, once the use of missiles by China was detected, the U.S. believed that it had to act. "Initially the Clinton administration did not use force to defend U.S. policy against Chinese coercion. The missile tests, however, challenged the commitment of the United States."¹⁸ As has been stated before, the United States has had the policy of desiring stability across the Taiwan Straits. That stability has been the priority of the U.S. when it comes to dealing with China and Taiwan. However, when China made a direct use of force in an attempt to influence Taiwan's election and send a message to Washington; President Clinton decided to use U.S. forces to deter further Chinese aggression. From Washington's perspective, the U.S. had a duty to protect security partners in the region from Chinese aggression, and that included Taiwan.

The U.S. responded by sending warships into the arena. "Secretary of State Warren Christopher, accusing China of "reckless" military provocations against Taiwan that "smack of intimidation and coercion," announced Sunday that the United States is responding by moving warships closer to the island."¹⁹ The United States could no longer tolerate Beijing's use of military force

¹⁸ Ross, R. S. (2000) The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force *International Security* vol. 25, No. 2 P. 89

¹⁹ Risen, James. (1996) *U.S. Warns China on Taiwan, Sends Warships to Area*. *Los Angeles Times*, http://articles.latimes.com/1996-03-11/news/mn-45722_1_taiwan-strait accessed July 25, 2015

to try and influence Taiwan's domestic election. Washington also wanted to send a message to both China and Taiwan that Taiwan was worth defending. The aircraft carrier groups under the *USS Nimitz* and *USS Independence* were dispatched to Taiwan to show Beijing how gravely Washington took the situation. The U.S. also wanted to reassure the Taiwanese voter that Washington took any threat to Taiwan's democracy seriously and was willing to defend Taiwan.

Because of the action taken by the United States in the Third Taiwan Straits crisis China eventually ceased military drills and actions in the Straits. One of China's main goals throughout the military actions was to attempt to influence Taiwan's 1996 election and show its disapproval of Lee Teng-hui. The results of the election showed that China failed in its goals. Taiwan not only elected Lee in the first democratic election in a Sino-centric nation, showing China that it would not allow external pressure to influence Taiwanese elections; the United States also sent a message to China that foreign interference in Taiwan's elections would not be tolerated.

The third Taiwan Straits Crisis is a concrete example of China attempting to influence Taiwan's elections. In order to fully appreciate why China is so invested in influencing Taiwanese elections it is important to fully understand the amount of legitimacy the CCP has invested in the Taiwan issue. One way of examining how the CCP has vested a substantial amount of legitimacy; and why China tries to influence Taiwan's elections, is to examine this legitimacy through the theories of Max Weber.

V. China's Continued Claim of Legitimacy

Max Weber propagated his three theories of legitimacy in an essay originally published in 1922. In his essay Weber proposed three different types of rule that garner legitimacy with the ruled. Basically, the politicians and or government will employ three different forms of ruling to maintain their legitimacy. The Chinese Communist Party has used these three types of legitimacy as well in order to claim Taiwan as part of its sovereign territory. The issue of Taiwan is entrenched in the CCP's legitimacy. Weber's first form of legitimacy is legal authority. According to Weber, legal authority is "based on a system of rules that is applied administratively and judicially in accordance with known principles. The persons who administer those rules are appointed or elected by legal procedures. Superiors are also subject to rules that

limit their powers, separate their private lives from official duties and require written documentation.”²⁰ When looking at Taiwan’s role in international space as well as the CCP’s continued insistence on its one China principle in the international arena; this form of legitimacy begins to become clearer. Taiwan once enjoyed this legal authority in the international community, but the situation has evolved since that time to a point where the international community by large recognizes China’s claim over Taiwan. China will utilize this form of legitimacy to reinforce the claim that Taiwan must never be separated from China or Chinese identity.

Weber’s second form of legitimacy is called traditional authority. Traditional authority, according to Weber “is based on a system in which authority is legitimate because it "has always existed". People in power usually enjoy it because they have inherited it. Officials consist either of personal retainers (in a patrimonial regime) or of personal loyal allies, such as vassals or tributary lords (in a feudal regime). Their prerogatives are usually similar to those of the ruler above them, just reduced in scale, and they too are often selected based on inheritance.”²¹ The CCP uses this form of legitimacy in conjunction with legal authority. I will call this the fusion of traditional authority with legal characteristics. The CCP uses traditional Chinese characteristics to claim legitimacy in the eyes of the governed. And, according to CCP doctrine, since Taiwan is a part of China; this traditional authority extends over the island as well.

China has always been a society that has valued tradition and a continuation of authority. “China is one of the oldest civilizations. There were twenty-five dynasties, and more than four hundred kings or emperors. During the period of the last two and half millenniums, Chinese philosophers and political thinkers developed many elaborated and sophisticated theories of political legitimacy.”²² This system of governance is very important in Chinese society and especially when enforcing legitimacy. To the untrained eye, Chinese society may appear chaotic and dysfunctional, but everything in the society has a purpose. The issue of government is no exception to this rule. Traditional Chinese government has always relied on a bureaucratic system. Well this is not endemic to only China, after all governments all around the world tend

²⁰ Bendix, R. (1977) *Max Weber: an intellectual portrait*, University of California Press, p. 294

²¹ Bendix, 295.

²² Guo, BG. (2003) Political Legitimacy and Taiwan’s Transition, *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, vol. 8, nos. 1 & 2, p. 3

to be bureaucratic and inefficient, the Chinese concept of order is unique. The CCP is well aware of this need for order and bureaucracy, and they have staked a large part of their legitimacy on establishing this traditional order, this traditional bureaucracy, over the people of China. This traditional appeal to legitimacy also extends to how the CCP views Taiwan as an integral part of China that cannot be separated from the greater whole no matter what. It is also for this reason that China exerts a vast amount of political and economic capital in an attempt to influence Taiwan's domestic policies and elections.

The Chinese government strongly believes that because of this traditional authority over Taiwan, any attempt to influence elections in Taiwan is legitimate because Taiwan is a part of China. The CCP can play semantics with this form of legitimacy to solidify their claim over the jurisdiction of Taiwan.

One fruition that this principle of Taiwan belonging to China; and why the CCP invests heavily in Taiwanese elections, is a phenomenon that shall be referred to as the "New Mandate of Heaven". According to scholar Guo Baogang, the "Mandate of Heaven" is "based on the following principles: heaven grants a ruler's right to rule; there is only one Heaven, therefore, there can be only one ruler."²³ This historic approach to power is not necessarily a phenomenon unique to Chinese culture. However, when viewed in the light of Weber's theory of traditional legitimacy, this new Mandate of Heaven makes more sense on the claims of the CCP.

"Historically, legitimization of authority involved the use of abstract and religious ideas. The notion that a ruler's right to govern is derived from a supernatural force is as old as human civilization. Beginning in the West Zhou Dynasty, ancient Chinese emperors always legitimized their political power by "tian" or Heaven."²⁴ CCP doctrine has always extended the party's legitimacy over Taiwan. Even though the CCP was founded on doing away with the "olds" (traditional culture) in China, it still follows the new Mandate of Heaven. The CCP will appeal to Chinese people's sense of culture and historical tradition in order to show that under the new Mandate of Heaven Taiwan should be seen as under the legitimacy of the CCP in Beijing.

The CCP has been very successful in their public relations campaign as to date in their claim to Taiwan. They have international recognition as well as traditional authority on their side of the fence. Another way that the CCP, and by extension individuals within the CCP, invest legitimacy

²³ Guo, p. 4

²⁴ Guo, p. 4

in Taiwan is through charismatic authority. This is the third type of legitimacy propagated by Max Weber. According to Weber, charismatic authority “is based on the charisma of the leader, who shows that he possesses the right to lead by virtue of magical powers, prophecies, heroism, etc. His followers respect his right to lead because of his unique qualities (his charisma), not because of any tradition or legal rules. Officials consist of those who have shown personal devotion to the ruler, and of those who possess their own charisma.”²⁵ This third and final type of legitimacy is also very important when it comes to the CCP’s investment of legitimacy into the Taiwan issue. The issue of personal charisma and charm should not play any role at all in the politics of the People’s Republic. After all, the elevation and charisma of one individual over the whole plays in the exact direction of what the party, and state, were founded on. Reality however is a different matter. The charisma of leaders within the party, and by extension the party itself, are very important when it comes to building and investing legitimacy. Xi Jinping is a leader that has developed a personal charisma. He has branded himself as the representation of the CCP, and of all of China. When Xi speaks, whether he is talking about corruption or Taiwan, the people must listen. Xi has developed this persona about him that is very similar to the one Mao Zedong developed around him in the early years of the People’s Republic. This shows that Xi has grand plans not only for himself, but for China as a whole. This planning and setting up a cult of personality affect Taiwan and how the Taiwanese perceive China. Because of the charisma of Xi groups of Taiwanese; particularly those that have attachment to China, may vote for more favorable China candidates in Taiwanese elections. Xi is, if you will, “spreading the Chinese Gospel” by his actions and especially by establishing his personality in the media. This form of charismatic legitimacy could influence how Taiwanese voters view China as a whole and by extension influence the candidate that they choose to cast their vote for.

These three form of legitimacy propagated by Weber show how the CCP views Taiwan and how the CCP has invested a majority of its legitimacy in solving the Taiwan issue. These forms of legitimacy also extend to how the CCP attempts to influence Taiwan’s elections. The CCP must exert influence on Taiwan’s elections because it has invested too heavily in Taiwan and has rested the legitimacy of the CCP on solving the Taiwan issue.

In conclusion it should be noted how China has taken an evolutionary approach to Taiwan and how to resolve the issue of Taiwan. Beginning with the founding of the People’s Republic in

²⁵ Bendix, p. 295

1949, reclaiming Taiwan has always been a priority for Beijing. China has however evolved in its approach to dealing with Taiwan. Beginning with a very staunch attitude towards Taiwan, Beijing has slowly evolved to a more patient one. This evolution has changed how China deals with Taiwan. The CCP is willing to play the waiting game when it comes to Taiwan and reunification. Beijing believes that economically there is only one way for Taiwan to go, and that is furthering reliance on China. Beijing simply has to wait for this reliance and dependence on the Mainland to come to full fruition. China no longer has to constantly threaten Taiwan with military force to achieve its objectives. China now uses economics and the promise of continued economic growth to attempt to win over influence in Taiwan.



Chapter Three

Taiwan's Political Parties

Having established how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Taiwan and what methods China uses in an attempt to influence Taiwanese elections; it is important to analyze how the voters in Taiwan and how the two main political parties in Taiwan react to China's attempts to influence elections. There is, naturally, a considerable difference between the Kuomintang (KMT) led pan-blue coalition and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) led pan-green coalition. Although in recent years, when faced with a rising China, the DPP has become more accepting of slightly closer relations with China; there is still no doubt that the DPP views China as somewhat of a threat. This view of China as more of a threat than an opportunity by the DPP has led to apprehension about the future of Taiwan's political and economic system when it comes to a rising China. This concern over China has become more prominent, especially in recent years given the growing reliance of Taiwan's exports on the mainland; as well as the continued financial integration between the two sides. The DPP has continued to view mainland China as more of a threat to Taiwan than an opportunity.

I. The Democratic Progressive Party

The DPP has its roots in historic opposition to the KMT. As such it is natural that the DPP would be skeptical of any KMT proposal. That being said, the only DPP administration that has ever been in power in Taiwan was that of Chen Shui-bian ; and Chen began his first term with a more conciliatory tone towards China. Chen's initial China policy can be described as one of pursuing peace and democracy. "Ever since May 2000, Taiwan's China policy of the Chen Shui-bian administration could be characterized by three pillars, which can be abbreviated as the DPP principle: democracy, peace, and prosperity."²⁶ This conciliatory approach did not come lightly. The DPP has as one of its core principles Taiwanese independence, or at the very least a separate identity from China. President Chen however realized that in order to promote peace and security

²⁶ Chen, Y.Y. (2005) *The Evolution and Prospects of Cross-Strait Relations in the Chen Shui-Bian Administration*, *The Institute for Far Eastern Studies*, p. 2

across the Taiwan Strait he needed to have a more balanced approach when it came to China. The government in Beijing did not return the courtesy.

China has always maintained that all parties in talks regarding the status of Taiwan must adhere to the One China principle. However, during the Chen administration China made minute concessions in an attempt to bolster the KMT. “In August, 2000 China went so far as to alter its definition of the One China principle in an attempt to bolster the Kuomintang after Chen Shui-bian took office, with the Kuomintang handing over power.”²⁷ The fact that the Chinese would be willing to make any small changes would be significant in and of itself. However, the fact that the PRC would make changes to attempt to benefit the KMT shows an evolution in PRC attitude towards Taiwan. This change in attitude reveals how the CCP has come to view the KMT as more of a opportunity instead of a challenge. “The new Chinese concept of “one China” is that, “There is only one China in the world, the Mainland and Taiwan are both parts of China, and China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity should not be separated.”²⁸ This showed a shift in the leadership of the PRC when it came to the issue of Taiwan and how best to deal with it.

II. Chen Shui-bian and China

When Chen came into office there was great unease in Beijing since Chen was the first DPP president Taiwan elected. This resulted in Beijing taking a more pragmatic view towards the KMT. Beijing began to come to the realization that when engaging Taiwan it was in their best interests to have the KMT in political power. In the recent years of the Ma administration this has become even more true and a visible issue that the KMT must deal with. As such, when Chen assumed office, there was a slight evolution in Beijing’s position when it came to the One China principle. To make inroads with the KMT and to show the disdain for the Chen administration China changed the principle from outright claiming “Taiwan is a part of China” to “China and Taiwan are both parts of China” in order to make it consistent with the expression once espoused by the Kuomintang that both sides should be treated as equals.”²⁹ This shift in

²⁷ Matsuda, Y. (2004) *PRC-Taiwan Relations under Chen Shui-bian’s Government: Continuity and Change Between the First and Second Terms*, The Brookings Institute, Pg. 3

²⁸ Matsuda, p. 3

²⁹ Matsuda, p. 3,4

rhetoric was directed at Chen and the DPP. China did not want the DPP to hold any political power over Taiwan, and this minor shift in policy was one way in which Beijing believed it could show its willingness to accept KMT, and only KMT, political power.

President Chen believed that his moderated position towards China would be accepted by Beijing. However, after it was clear that China would not accept a DPP administration Chen began to harden his stance towards Beijing. “In August 2002 Chen Shui-bian used the characterization “one country on each side” (*yi bian yi guo*) to describe cross-Strait relations.”³⁰ This declaration by Chen showed how that he believed that Taiwan and China were separate. This change in attitude resulted after his overtures were repeatedly rejected by Beijing. This type of treatment of Chen by China revealed that China would only accept KMT power and any DPP administration would be pushed further towards a more Taiwan independence stance. This changing of the Chen administration’s stance on China came about as a direct result of the CCP’s treatment of Chen and his young administration. Because of China’s strict ideology and unwillingness to meet Chen halfway, this led to Chen embracing and advocating a more independence oriented cross strait policy. This change in attitude by Chen and the DPP shows how the party evolved in its dealing with China and how China was solidified as more of a threat than an opportunity for the DPP. The laissez-faire attitude that Chen came into office with regarding China was quickly replaced with a more hardened, staunch response once it was clear that China; at least politically and diplomatically, was not willing to engage a DPP administration.

With President Chen’s initial overtures towards Beijing rejected by the government in China; Chen became increasingly more determined to push for Taiwanese independence and full international recognition. Chen did this in a way that was consistent with not overtly provoking Beijing; however there was still a shift in attitude when it came to China. It is true to say that there was a shift in attitude, but there was also a cautious approach as to how to implement the desired changes the DPP wanted, all done with great care as to not provoke a hardened response from China. This evolution of policy for Chen was more in line with the historical understanding of Taiwan that the DPP has. “In the DPP’s party charter, ratified in 1991, there is a clause

³⁰ Lu, Yan. (2001) *Minjindang zhizheng yu haixia liang’an guanxi*, *Taiwan yanjiu*, Peking, No. 3, p. 38

advocating the development of Taiwan as an independent sovereign Republic of Taiwan”³¹ For Chen to begin his administration with overtures towards China went against the history and fundamental principles of the DPP. After he was rejected by China he became more staunchly independent. This rejection by Beijing also helped ensure that the DPP would not be an acceptable political party that China would deal with when it came to the issue of Taiwan. China would only be content with a KMT administration, and even if the KMT was the party in power there would still be certain conditions that would have to be met in order to placate Beijing.

III. Business, Chen and China

Given the fact that China was very skeptical of a DPP president; and that the CCP attempted to ostracize President Chen, it should still be noted that the Chinese government still attempted to use economics to attract Taiwan. This was part of the Hu regime’s continued evolution on Taiwan and how best to reunite with Taiwan. China offered many benefits to the 台商 *taishang*, the Taiwanese businesspeople working in China. The Chinese government believed that they could use these *taishang* to direct politics back in Taiwan, even though the island was under DPP rule. “Even during the Chen Shui-bian era, Hu’s Taiwan policy included offers such as loans reserved only for *taishang*, direct Charter flights across the Taiwan Strait, duty-free agricultural imports from Taiwan to the mainland, etc.”³² During the early years of Chen was when the “three mini links” between China and Taiwan were established as well. These links served the purpose of easing business restrictions across the Taiwan Strait and assisted in many Taiwanese businesspeople setting up operations in China. These links also were used for political purposes as well by China in an attempt to lure the *taishang* into setting up more operations in the mainland.

China’s policy at the time of the DPP may seem on the surface to be contradictory. On the one hand Beijing is very anxious about a DPP president. Politically, China was very cold and sometimes openly hostile towards Taiwan under the DPP. On the economic side of things China can be seen as treating Taiwan very well. This was all part of the Hu strategy in China to “use

³¹ Ding, A. S. (2013) *Turning tension around in the Taiwan Strait; Taiwan Policy under Hu Jintao* Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Pg. 2

³² Keng, Schubert, p. 295

people to pressure officials, and use business to constrain the government” (*yimin biguan, yishang weizheng*).³³ This was a strategy employed by Beijing in the hopes of luring these *taishang* to the Mainland for political purposes. While the Taiwanese business were opening up plants and shifting a vast majority of production and R&D from Taiwan to China, the Beijing government was hoping that there would be political benefits as well. This desired political benefit was to flow from Taiwanese businesspeople using their influence in business to carry that influence into the political realm. China believed that allowing track II individuals; those without official ties to government, to benefit from increased relations with China, the government of Taiwan would have to eventually listen. The track II individuals and entities would lead the track I individuals and entities in the state towards closer relations with China. All of these business benefits and incentives that China used to lure the *taishang* into the mainland had one ultimate goal; the eventual reunification of Taiwan with that of Greater China. For this reason many Taiwanese voters in Taiwan who support the DPP tend to not have a very high opinion of doing business with China.

IV. Beijing’s Response

The two-pronged approach China took during the DPP administration of Chen Shui-bian showed how China has become more pragmatic when dealing with Taiwan. There were many in the business community that saw the opening up of China as an advantage when it came to doing business. Business would have a windfall of profits once Taiwanese business and enterprise could access the mainland. It is safe to argue that China took the approach of the famed economist Frederic Bastiat who said “when goods cannot cross borders, armies will”. The spirit of Bastiat’s quote would show the idea that trade and commerce helps prevent military aggression between nations. China, however, also likes to use trade for political and military purposes. During the Chen administration this was particularly obvious. Chinese leadership made the conscientious decision to shift the attitude and approach employed when dealing with Taiwan. There was still the constant threat of force, and the leadership in China has always

³³ Keng, Schubert, p. 296

maintained the right to use force to settle the Taiwan issue. However the shift began to take shape in more economic terms.

President Chen was passive towards China in his first term. In fact, “In his first inaugural address, Chen pledged that as long as China had no intentions to use military force against Taiwan he would not declare Taiwan independence or change the country’s name.”³⁴ After Chen was reelected to a second term in 2004, there was still the atmosphere of non-provocation with China. In fact, Chen’s second inaugural address set the tone of his second term as that of non-aggression against China. “In his 2004 inaugural speech, Chen mollified the United States and China by ruling out Taiwan independence for the next four years and saying any kind of relationship with China was possible with the Taiwan people’s consent.”³⁵ Any political leader in Taiwan is always placed in a precarious situation politically. They have to navigate an international political system that has marginalized Taiwan, all the time making sure to not create tension with China. For President Chen this task was particularly grueling. Being the first DPP elected president there were many in Taiwan that expected Chen to take a bold and definitive stance towards China. However Chen realized that in order for Taiwan to compete globally he should not provoke China. This led to the more subdued attitude in his term in office. Although there was still the desire to carry out full independence in accordance with DPP doctrine, it was largely empty rhetoric when faced with the reality of Taiwan’s situation in the world.

The reaction in Taiwan under the DPP to the change in attitude of China towards Taiwan; namely using business to direct politics, was negative. In fact, the terms “use people to pressure officials, and use business to constrain the government” were popularized by the DPP and Chen as a response to China. “The expression referred to the Chinese government’s alleged attempts, both through trade and investment incentives and via political pressure, to use the *taishang* as agents of its unification project.”³⁶ In the eyes of the DPP and their voters China was to be always seen as an economic, as well as a militaristic threat. The DPP would always be mistrustful of China and Beijing’s intentions when it came to the future of Taiwan.

³⁴ Larus, E.F. (2012) Taiwan's 2004 Presidential Election: Implications for Taiwan's Politics and Relations with Mainland China, *Virginia Review of Asian Studies*, p. 7

³⁵ Larus, p. 8

³⁶ Keng, Schubert, p. 296

V. Ma and the Kuomintang

After the election in 2008 and the loss of the presidency to the KMT the DPP continued their advocacy of China as an entity not conducive to Taiwan's future. In an article published on the DPP official website in 2008 the party claims that China continues its belligerence towards Taiwan. "China's 2008 defense budget increased by 17.6%, military exercises by the People's Liberation Army staging a rehearsal of special combat procedures to take over airports, the Chinese government's refusal to remove the missiles directed at Taiwan."³⁷ With China modernizing rapidly there was a belief in the DPP that this rapid ascent onto the global stage would have negative consequences for Taiwan. One way that the rise of China was viewed as a threat was through the military buildup in China. In more recent years the angst that the DPP exhibited during the beginning of the Ma administration regarding the perceived threat of China may have been proven accurate. With China increasingly hostile to her neighbors and engaging in reckless actions in the South China Sea, many in Taiwan are apprehensive over the rise of China. Many in the DPP were quick to seize on what they perceived as failings of the Ma administration. They believed that Ma was not bringing about real change to Taiwan and the military threat that Taiwan faced.

China has always used the threat of military force to attempt to coerce Taiwan; especially during election seasons. After the election of Ma in 2008 there was some hope that the threat of military force by China against Taiwan would be toned down some given the fact that the KMT was in power again. Many in Taiwan believed that Ma's "three no" policy (no unification, no independence, no war) would be enough to placate the Chinese leadership. This shift in government policy from Chen to Ma was not, however, enough to pacify the CCP. The DPP believed that China's insistence on continuing its military buildup proved that China's rise was a major threat to Taiwan's security. China's continued insistence for nations to recognize its unilaterally declared nine dash line, Beijing's continued construction of manmade islands, as

³⁷ DPP: China has never wavered on its belligerence towards Taiwan, *Official Democratic Progressive Party Website* (2008, July 05) <http://english.dpp.org.tw/dpp-china-has-never-wavered-on-its-belligerence-towards-taiwan/> accessed May 28, 2015

well as increased naval activity in the Pacific have given pause to people not only in Taiwan, but also throughout other nations in the region.

VI. China: Threat or Opportunity?

The presidency of Chen Shui-bian marks a shifting point in Taiwan in how the electorate views China. For the first time a non-KMT political party had the presidency and there was not any major incident in regards to China because of the DPP being elected. However, China clearly rejected any dealings with the DPP and its supporters. For these reasons and others, the electorate that supported pan-green politicians such as the DPP grew even more skeptical of China and believed that China was a serious threat towards Taiwan.

President Chen and the DPP also took notice of the shift in official Chinese policy towards Taiwan. Because of his political ideology and more or less being rejected by China, Chen and the DPP began to view China as even more of a threat. The growing appeal of China and reliance on the Mainland by Taiwanese business was not only a unique issue for the Chen administration. The KMT actually were the first to be skeptical of growing Chinese influence in politics. “Taiwan in turn since the mid-1990s has promoted policy initiatives of “going south” (*nanxiang zhengce*) and “patience over haste” (*jieji yongren*), in an effort to dampen the effects of economics on politics.”³⁸ Although the KMT once had a more judicious view of China’s economic initiatives in regards to Taiwan, since the election of President Ma there has been a substantial shift in how the KMT views China. Well it is true that China has always been viewed with some skepticism by the leadership of both major political parties in Taiwan; the KMT in recent years has come to the conclusion that China is more of an opportunity than a threat. This view of China as an opportunity is especially prominent in the Taiwanese business community.

In order to fully grasp the scope and reasons as to why China, in the opinion of the pan-blue voters, has become such an enormous opportunity, it is important to look at the economic history between the two. It is especially imperative that the history of Taiwan’s economic development be taken into account.

³⁸ Keng, Schubert, p. 289

Ever since the economic miracle of the Four Asian Tigers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, growth in these four areas have fueled growth in the area as well. These nations experienced industrialization and rapid growth of their economies mainly because of foreign investment. In the post World War II state of affairs, there was a great amount of emphasis placed on increasing global trade, particularly from the United States. Japan was one of the first nations to have a large amount of emphasis placed on trade and investment. It was from this trade pattern that the Flying Geese Paradigm was formulated. The Flying Geese Paradigm (FGP) is an economic pattern that has industries shifting from one nation to another. In an ideal interpretation of the paradigm, a nation that “climbs the ladder” into the next economic realm will shed itself of a less advanced form of economic development. If we were to take the example of textile manufacturing and apply it to the paradigm we would see an investment by U.S. and other foreign companies into Japan in textile manufacturing. Once Japan has reached a certain level of economic development, this type of economic activity is shifted to less developed nations such as Taiwan and other Asian countries. Japan climbs the ladder and the industry it no longer enjoys is sent to another nation with less development than the original country. This is how Taiwan was able to develop so rapidly. Taiwan was able to channel into the success that Japan enjoyed through foreign investment and was also able to attract these investors. Taiwan, along with the other Asian tigers, was the next “goose” to receive the industry that Japan shed as it climbed its way up the production ladder. Taiwan was also able to capture a lot of Japanese investment because of the history between the two nations. Because of the geographic proximity to Japan, and having the history of once being Japanese territory, this proved to Taiwan’s advantage when it came to investment from abroad.

Taiwan, along with the three other Asian Tigers, was very successful if following in Japan’s wake. These nations were able to follow the Japanese model in addition to adding their own separate identities to the formula. Once Taiwan had achieved the level of development that had led Japan to search for opportunities to invest abroad, Taiwan naturally began to look outside its borders for business opportunities. As mentioned before, because of political differences and ideology, there was pressure to originally look at Southeast Asia and other areas to invest into instead of Mainland China. However, because of China’s close proximity to Taiwan and a shared culture, the Mainland proved to be an alluring market.

Taiwan has always had investments in China. However, this was greatly increased with China's economic liberalization policies. After China adopted its Open Door Policy in 1979, Taiwan's trade with the mainland increased dramatically. Once China decided to reform its own domestic market and open up to foreign investments there was a flood of investment into China. This was particularly true of Western, namely American, investment. With the United States having global hegemony in the post WWII era there was a push by many in the U.S. to establish an international system of trade and investment. This resulted in investment into Japan, then Taiwan and other Asian tigers, and eventually to China. Once Taiwan had reached a certain development point the trade with China expanded. This was also due to the fact that both countries have a shared history and ethnic background. Taiwanese investors had an advantage over their foreign counterparts when it came to doing business in China. The shared customs and traditions that Taiwan and China share proved to be an asset for the Taiwanese business community. Because of these shared similarities it was much more conducive for the Taiwanese business community to invest in China. These shared similarities also influence the legal and regulatory environment in China. Having the same regulatory customs and culture allowed Taiwanese businesspeople easier access when navigating the market as well.

VII. KMT: China is an Opportunity

One of the other allures that the Chinese market offered the KMT was the allure of investing in what many within the KMT saw as their homeland. The ethnic connection that the KMT has with China made it much easier to starting up operations in the mainland. This was in part because the KMT, even to this day, views its home as China. "Even today, both parties hold to the "one China" principle. The CCP sees the elimination of the ROC as unfinished business, and the KMT — and President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) — claims that the territory of the ROC also includes China."³⁹ Because of this Chinese nationalist sentiment that is so prominent in the KMT and pan-blue political parties, there is a tangible connection to the mainland of China. This connection that the KMT has with China extends into how they see the mainland. The KMT believes that China is an asset to be used in the development of Taiwan's economy. The Chinese

³⁹ KMT, CCP Both See Their Home in China, *Taipei Times* (2013, October 21)
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2013/10/21/2003574998> accessed May 28, 2015

market is the second largest on the planet, soon to become the first. Because Taiwan has already reached a certain stage in economic development, it must begin to look for investment opportunities abroad and one major opportunity is China. Having access to the vast market that is the PRC would, in theory, be a boon for Taiwan's economic development. For this reason the KMT has been very vocal and active in their support for increased trade ties with China. In recent years however the KMT has had to temper their support for increased economic ties to China against a public that is increasingly skeptical of ties with Beijing. However, the vast majority of KMT and pan-blue supporters still view China as an opportunity more so than a threat.

The allure of China's market proved to be too tempting of a target for the Taiwanese business community. This was a shift from the Lee era policy. Under President Lee there was trepidation when it came to investing into the Mainland. This was largely due to the fact that Lee was not the typical KMT president. There was initial trepidation at the idea of doing business with China, especially since China has consistently threatened Taiwan. However through the evolution of Taiwan's young democracy the KMT began to take a more open attitude when it came to China and Taiwan's economic development. The ultimate expression of Taiwan and China's growing economic interaction is the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). Signed in 2010, this pact between China and Taiwan increased trade and economic integration between the two sides. This agreement represented an important milestone in the KMT's policy evolution. The KMT government of Ma was now willing to grant China greater access to Taiwan and further the interaction between the two sides. This agreement shows how the KMT views China as an opportunity. It also shows the steps the government is taking to increase relations between the two. ECFA was a central issue in the 2012 presidential election in Taiwan and will be dissected later on in light of the 2012 election. ECFA showed how serious the KMT was in promoting economic interaction across the strait and what concrete steps it would take to ensure the continued economic cooperation between China and Taiwan. Although ECFA remains controversial to this day it was never the less a major victory for the KMT and those that view China as an economic opportunity.

Chapter Four

Case study: The 2012 Election

The January 14, 2012 presidential election in Taiwan was carried by the Kuomintang Party (KMT) candidate Ma Ying-jeou. With over 74% of the nation turning out to vote⁴⁰ it is surprising that the opposition candidate Tsai Ing-wen did not receive more of the vote. Tsai Ing-wen was met with a great deal of opposition during the 2012 presidential election, and there are a plethora of reasons as to why she lost the election. Of the many reasons that led to Tsai Ing-wen's defeat during the election, this chapter will examine a few prominent cases and examples. Through the examination of these factors and reasons I will show how Tsai met a "perfect storm" of factors that contributed to her defeat and a KMT victory. Through these examples the reader will see how the election was won by the KMT as well as what were the reasons that the DPP and Tsai lost. It will also show the evolution of issues and issue based voting made a Tsai victory impossible, even though during the campaign Tsai and Ma were very close in the polling data.

I. Background

The Democratic Progressive Party gained the presidency in 2000 and again in 2004, they however lost the presidency in 2008. Ma Ying-jeou was elected in 2008 and reelected in 2012. Ma had two challengers in the 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen and a third party candidate, James Soong. Ma Ying-jeou won the election with 51.6% of the vote, or 6,991,139 votes. Tsai Ing-wen came in second with 45.6% of the vote, or 6,093,578 votes. James Soong received 2.77% of the popular vote which translates to 369,588 individuals voting for him.⁴¹ The results of the election indicate that Tsai Ing-wen lost by a large margin, much larger than expected. Although President Ma only captured slightly more than half the vote, Tsai barely made it past forty-five percent. Even if you were to take all of the votes James Soong received

⁴⁰ President of Taiwan Is Re-elected, a Result That Is Likely to Please China, *The New York Times*, (2012, January 14) http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/15/world/asia/taiwan-presidential-election.html?_r=3&hp accessed March 30, 2015

⁴¹中選會公布第 13 任總統副總統及第 8 屆立法委員選舉選舉人數," General Election Commission 中央選舉委員會, <http://web.cec.gov.tw/files/15-1000-17863,c4133-1.php> accessed May 14, 2015

and give them to Tsai Ing-wen; something unlikely since Soong was also a Pan-Blue candidate, she still would not have exceeded 49% of the vote. She did well in southern Taiwan though. The south of Taiwan is considered a Democratic Progressive Party stronghold because the area has more people who view themselves as Taiwanese in the south of the island. The south of Taiwan has always been an area that votes against the KMT.

The Democratic Progressive Party is certainly considered the minority party in Taiwan. It is the second largest in terms of size. It is, however, still vastly overshadowed by its main rival, the Kuomintang. Because of the shorter history that the DPP has, the lack of resources it has, it is not hard to imagine why this would contribute to Tsai Ing-wen losing the election. The DPP had less capital to spend on promoting Tsai; as such it is easier to understand why she lost. Imagine going to work every day and seeing twenty different campaign signs for President Ma versus seeing only one or two for Tsai. The DPP, in its existence, is major contributing factor to why Tsai lost. The DPP is still conducting itself as a minority party. Even though they are a minority party, they do not seem to have the willpower to overcome this status. It is almost as if the DPP has become so accustomed to disagreeing just for the sake of it (in Taiwan some Kuomintang supporters, and one of my interviewees, say that the DPP disagrees just to disagree, (民進黨老是爲了反對而反對)). The DPP needs to take charge of its future and debate the KMT more so on the issues than on personal politics. While I believe that Tsai did her best to try and accost Ma on issues that affect Taiwan and not just the DPP, her voice was overtaken by other DPP personal campaigning for her. If the DPP continues to see itself as representing only party backers instead of all of Taiwan they will continue to lose elections in the future.

II. The 1992 Consensus

Given the basic background of the Democratic Progressive Party and a general idea of the election results for the 2012 presidential election, we can begin to understand the reasons why Tsai Ing-wen did not fare better. One of the main reasons was that Tsai Ing-wen, supposedly, denied the 1992 Consensus or reinterpreted this 1992 Consensus (九二共識). The 1992 Consensus was, as the name suggests, a consensus reached between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan). What the consensus states is that there is only one

China, and both China and Taiwan are a part of China. While both sides agree that there is only one China, they disagree as to which government represents that one China. This is a very purposefully ambiguous definition of China. It is ambiguous on purpose because neither side recognizes each other, but both claim to represent all of China. This Consensus also shuts down any debate about an independent Taiwan. 海峽兩岸均堅持一個中國之原則，但雙方所賦予之涵義有所不同；臺灣固為中國之一部分，但大陸亦為中國之一部分。⁴²This quote from the Chinese news service Xinhua says “The Cross-Strait relations committee both supports and agrees on the One China Policy, but each side differs on their definition of this policy. Taiwan is a part of China, but the Mainland is still considered a part of China.” While not everyone agrees with the signing of the 1992 Consensus, especially the Democratic Progressive Party, it has been an important part of Cross-Strait relations since 1992. Even President Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan’s first DPP president, accepted the 1992 Consensus. Most Taiwanese citizens have been comfortable with the consensus because it keeps the government in mainland China mollified while also continuing the de facto independence Taiwan enjoys. This status quo is important to the citizenry because it keeps the issue of independence versus reunification at a distance and allows people to keep living their lives undisturbed for the most part. Well this may be seen having the “kicking the can down the road” attitude, it keeps most Taiwanese placated.

According to the Republic of China’s official government website: “At the heart of the 1992 consensus is the concept of "one China, respective interpretations." It is clear that as far as we are concerned, "one China" is the Republic of China stipulated in the ROC Constitution.”⁴³ The ROC government believes that the consensus strengthens their constitutional validity in regards to being the representatives of China. While I believe that the consensus is ambiguous on purpose since both the ROC and PRC can claim that the consensus strengthens their respective positions, the official government position in the ROC is that there is no ambiguity when it comes to the interpretation of the consensus. “There has never been any "ambiguity" or

⁴² “九二共識,” 新華網, http://news.xinhuanet.com/tw/2006-04/05/content_4385932.htm accessed May 29, 2015

⁴³ The 1992 Consensus: Foundation for Cross-Strait Peace and Stronger International Links, *Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada* (2011, September 7) <http://www.roc-taiwan.org/CA/ct.asp?xItem=219017&ctNode=150&mp=77&nowPage=4&pagesize=15> accessed May 29, 2015

"concession of sovereignty" regarding the concept of "one China" in the 1992 consensus. To support the 1992 consensus is to support the Republic of China, and to support the ROC Constitution."⁴⁴ The official government position leaves no doubt about the importance of the consensus and how the consensus affects politics in Taiwan. When the debate is already framed in a way that shuts down any potential questioning or suspect in regards to the consensus and what it means for Taiwan. One of the purposes of the consensus was to make sure there would be no debate about an independent Taiwan. The government at the time under the KMT came to this consensus to shut down speculation or official discourse on the issue of Taiwanese independence. They also ingrained the consensus with the ROC constitution.

After the election results became known, Xiao Shixin 蕭師信, a reputable political commentator at the 中華日報, The Chinese Daily, offered these comments as to why Tsai Ing-wen lost the election. 如果蔡英文打內政牌，在兩岸關係方面稍具彈性，應該是很有勝算的。但是，她堅決否認“九二共識”，使選戰的焦點從內政轉為兩岸關係，馬蔡幾次辯論也集中在兩岸關係上。⁴⁵ This journalist said that “if Tsai Ing-wen had focused more on domestic issues, and a little less on Cross-Strait issues, she would have had a strong case to make. However, she (allegedly) denied the 1992 consensus, and moved the focus of the election away from domestic issues and moved it towards Cross-Strait relations, most of the debates that Ma Ying-jeou and Tsai Ing-wen had also focused on cross-strait relations.” Xiao Shixin hit the nail on the head when he said that Tsai had the upper hand on domestic issues. If she had focused on domestic issues and shied away from cross-strait relations, the results of the election might have been different. In fact, during one of the presidential debates President Ma asked Tsai Ing-wen if she would comment on Taiwanese independence.⁴⁶ Tsai did not give an answer. She understood that if she maintained her position of independence it would alienate the majority of Taiwanese voters who want to maintain the status quo; de facto independence. It would possibly provoke China, and if Tsai were to be elected, it could impair her relations with China. To try and understand how important this consensus is to the political stability of Taiwan, one could compare the consensus to some important document in US history, such as the Constitution.

⁴⁴ Taipei and Economic Cultural Office in Canada

⁴⁵ 分析稱蔡英文落敗關鍵因堅決否認九二共識。”敏捷新聞, <http://cn.agile-news.com/news-555109.html> accessed May 24, 2015

⁴⁶ 分析稱蔡英文落敗關鍵因堅決否認九二共識

While to compare the 1992 consensus to the US Constitution is a bit of a stretch, it is important to realize that if someone were to deny the US Constitution, they would be seen as unpatriotic in the US political landscape. Likewise, a candidate denying the 1992 Consensus in Taiwan is seen as very suspicious. Tsai Ing-wen claimed that she never denied the consensus, but that she supported a “Taiwanese consensus” which took parts of the 1992 Consensus and added important factors such as strong pro-independence language. Regardless of whether or not Tsai Ing-wen denied the consensus the damage was done to her campaign and she would not recover from that point.

Tsai Ing-wen herself said that she has never denied the 1992 Consensus. Tsai believes in a Taiwanese consensus instead of the 1992 Consensus. What she, and the DPP, believes is that Taiwan is already an independent nation. They also believe that when Taiwan and China hold diplomatic conferences that China should treat Taiwan as an independent nation. This is part of what the DPP calls the “Taiwanese consensus”. This position is highly controversial, especially to the majority of older Taiwanese. The older generation came with their parents and relatives to Taiwan after China was taken over by the Communists under Mao. When the DPP and Tsai scream at the top of their lungs for a Taiwanese consensus, many of these older Taiwanese feel somewhat uncomfortable. They still view China as home and want both sides to work for a peaceful solution to the China-Taiwan independence issue. Because Ma used Tsai’s issues with the 1992 Consensus and her own Taiwanese consensus, many voters were distracted and preferred Ma over Tsai. And even that preference for Ma over Tsai could be seen as simply preferring stability and knowing what Taiwan already had in President Ma versus what could possibly happen under a hypothetical Tsai presidency. The older generation also has the majority of wealth in Taiwan. These factors, combined with others, ensured Tsai Ing-wen’s defeat in the election.

It can be argued that the results of the 2012 presidential election solidify the Taiwanese electorate’s acceptance of the 1992 consensus. Since President Ma was reelected and the consensus was such a hot button issue in the campaigning it can be inferred that the electorate in Taiwan is more or less comfortable with the consensus and that they want to maintain the status quo, much to the chagrin of the DPP base. The 1992 consensus can also be seen as being more representative of overall cross strait stability.

The electorate in Taiwan may not have known exactly what the 1992 consensus actually meant at the time of the election; however it may be seen as simply representing cross-strait stability.⁴⁷ People in Taiwan wanted to continue the stability under President Ma that was once lost under former President Chen. Most Taiwanese did not enjoy the undercurrent of a threat from China during Chen's two terms. When Ma was elected in 2008, there was more stability returned to the cross straits and the electorate awarded Ma a second term for this perceived stability. "Therefore, it would be more accurate to say that Ma's win is an endorsement of cross-strait stability, whereas Tsai fails to convince people that she can."⁴⁸ The electorate wanted a more stable relationship with China and thus awarded President Ma a second term in office. The 1992 Consensus and issues surrounding it did not go away in 2012. The consensus still plays a pivotal role in Taiwanese politics to this day and will play a role in the 2016 election. This will be developed further when the 2016 election will be discussed.

III. ECFA and Business

There is a saying in the hard sciences that math is the handmaiden of science. In the social sciences the direct equivalent would be that economics is the handmaiden of politics. The two are inseparable. This is the case throughout the whole world; Taiwan is no exception to this phenomenon. When taking control in 2008, President Ma pledged greater economic cooperation and bi-lateral trade with China. He believed that this would help Taiwan's economy as well as keep China relatively satisfied. To some, his reelection in 2012 was a sign that the majority of the electorate approved of his handling of the economy. It was also seen as approval of Ma's government signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). ECFA is a controversial preferential free trade agreement between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (Taiwan).⁴⁹ This trade agreement would provide a lot of economic opportunity for Taiwan, in fact according to experts, the benefit to Taiwan far outweighs the benefits China would receive. "The advantage to Taiwan would amount to US\$13.8 billion (NT\$443 billion),

⁴⁷ Huang, D. WF. (2012) Elections in Taiwan: Lessons from the Past, and Policy Issues for the New Administration, *IEAS, Academic Sinica Taiwan*

⁴⁸ Huang, D. WF.

⁴⁹ ECFA Signing Scheduled for June 29, *Taiwan News* (2010, June 25)

http://www.etaiwannews.com/etn/news_content.php?id=1299089&lang=eng_news&cate_img=83.jpg&cate_rss=news_Politics_TAIWAN accessed May 24, 2015

reports said, while China would receive benefits estimated at US\$2.8 billion (NT\$90 billion).”

⁵⁰While it is obvious that ECFA would help Taiwan in the short run, many worried that by signing ECFA President Ma was signing over Taiwan’s future to a nation that considers Taiwan part of its own territory.

ECFA was designed to allow Taiwanese businessmen access to the Chinese market. It also allowed Taiwan to sign various trade agreements with nations that previously only had trade agreements with China. Because of the design of ECFA, it benefited the business class, the shangbanzu 上班族. Most businesspeople already supported the Kuomintang Party because of its conservative economic policies, the signing of ECFA was more closely aligned with what a KMT president and cabinet would do. Since Taiwan’s economy did incredibly well in 2012 and relatively well in 2011⁵¹ many people in Taiwan saw this as vindication of Ma Ying-jeou and his signing of ECFA. To the majority of Taiwanese, if Ma had not signed ECFA than there was no way the economy could have performed so well. Tsai Ing-wen and the Democratic Progressive Party did not support ECFA. They believed that ECFA would harm Taiwanese workers by slowly transferring factory jobs offshore to China. Although ECFA would initially provide Taiwan a lot of economic assistance, eventually it would not benefit Taiwan. Because of Taiwan’s economic performance, and Tsai’s opposition to ECFA, many businesspeople voted against her and this is another reason as to why she lost. I believe that the situation between China and Taiwan in regards to ECFA is easier to understand if we look at the situation in North America with NAFTA. NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement, was designed to allow Mexico, Canada and the US to compete with each other in differing industries. Canada would receive some benefits, Mexico would receive some, and the US (in theory) would receive some. However, ever since the signing of NAFTA the United States has slowly lost a vast multitude of manufacturing jobs to Mexico where labor is cheaper. To say that NAFTA is a total failure would be disingenuous though. At the time NAFTA was signed, the United States received many benefits from the trade agreement. Over time though, these benefits have vanished. This is what ECFA is going to do to Taiwan. In the short term Taiwan will receive these benefits, but in a few years China will be the one profiting. Voters in Taiwan, like voters

⁵⁰ ECFA Signing Scheduled for June 29

⁵¹ Taiwan Economy: Growth Update, 天下杂志 *tianxia zazhi*,
<http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=12635> accessed May 27, 2015

everywhere, were mainly concerned with immediate results. When they saw that Taiwan's economy was doing well they decided to reward Ma with reelection. One of my interviewees who support the KMT had very poignant words when it came to describing ECFA: "If we did not sign ECFA our economy would die right away. Only through ECFA can Taiwan hope to develop more FTAs." In his opinion, if Taiwan were to decide not to sign ECFA, the economy would be doomed right away.

Since signing ECFA, direct flights between Taiwan and the Mainland have become more frequent. During the election, many Taiwanese in China were encouraged to fly back home to vote in the election to support Ma Ying-jeou "Huang Jin-hsun, chief of the Association of Taiwan Investment Enterprises in Chongqing, is encouraging the members of his association to return to Taiwan for the Jan. 14 presidential elections."⁵² Although the trade organizations and business groups did not come out and say that returning Taiwanese citizens should vote for a certain candidate, it was understood that most of these businesspeople would vote for Ma because it was his policies that allowed them to set up in China in the first place. The Democratic Progressive Party claimed that the Communist government in Beijing was subsidizing the flights back to Taiwan, purchasing tickets for businesspeople.⁵³ If these allegations are proven true, it would be an unprecedented step that China would have taken to meddle in Taiwan's internal affairs. This would be more proof that Ma Ying-jeou stole the election with the help of the government in Mainland China and it would make it easier to understand why Tsai Ing-wen lost the election to Ma. It would also destroy the credibility of the Kuomintang and the Ma administration. If they were willing to allow China, whom they are technically still at war with, to assist them in gaining votes, it would be treasonous. This would be the proof that the DPP would need to show to the entire population that the KMT is more interested in winning elections and placating China than protecting Taiwan's sovereignty. To some people in Taiwan, this was proof that Ma is China's puppet. A large number of people believe that Ma is in the pocket of China. If the allegations about the Chinese government helping him win the 2012 election are true, it is no wonder why Tsai lost.

⁵² Taiwanese Citizens in China book their election flights, *Want China Times* (2012, January 4)
<http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120104000071&cid=1501> accessed May 29, 2015

⁵³ Taiwanese Citizens in China book their election flights

IV. Business Pressure

In the 2012 election and campaign it was no secret that big business supported the KMT and President Ma. The business community wanted to keep developing the ties that has been forged by Ma as they saw these links as important for business. One case of prominence in the 2012 campaign cycle was that of Evergreen founder Chang Yung-fa. Mr. Chang, being a businessman, held major influence over people. He came out strong for the KMT by stating that the 1992 Consensus was of utmost importance for cross strait relations. Chang claimed that anyone that denies the 1992 Consensus was not fit to be president. “The tycoon (Chang) said on Tuesday that he “simply cannot agree with the denial of the [1992] consensus by a ‘specific’ presidential candidate.”⁵⁴ This naturally caused controversy, especially for the pan green coalition. Chang’s endorsement of the 1992 Consensus was seen as being beneficial to the KMT and Ma as this showed that big business backed the KMT. The business community believed that only Ma and the KMT could continue to better Taiwan’s economy. This translated into many endorsements for the KMT and Ma by the business community which assisted Ma in fending off the challenge by Tsai.

Chang was not the only business leader to heavily emphasize the importance of the 1992 Consensus and endorse Ma. Many other business leaders also lent their voices and support to Ma and the KMT. “A group of business leaders have in recent weeks publicly endorsed the so-called “1992 consensus” and have appeared to offer their support for Ma, including Hon Hai Precision Industry chairman Terry Gou (郭台銘), Ruentex Financial Group chairman Samuel Yin and others.”⁵⁵ It was clear by the business community rallying around the 1992 Consensus that many in the business world desired a Ma victory. The business community attacked Tsai based off of her denial of the 1992 Consensus. Accessing the large Chinese market was of the utmost importance for these businesspeople and only Ma represented bettering relations with Mainland China. The business community saw China as more of an opportunity than a threat and thus they responded accordingly by supporting Ma.

⁵⁴ 2012 Elections: TSU Criticizes Evergreen founder, *Taipei Times* (2012, January 6)
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2012/01/06/2003522558> accessed October 5, 2015

⁵⁵ 2012 Elections: TSU Criticizes Evergreen founder

V. Internal DPP Factors, KMT Factors

While there are many external factors that influence the outcomes of election as we have seen so far, sometimes there are internal factors that impede a candidate and a campaign, and this can be seen in Tsai Ing-wen's campaign. After the election results were known publically, Tsai Ing-wen and the DPP came out and gave reasons as to why they lost. One was that the KMT had run a better campaign. According to a DPP spokesman, Lin Yu-chang, "The committee agreed that the KMT had run a more "technically successful" campaign in terms of crisis management and campaign tactics, as well as communications, Lin added."⁵⁶ The KMT has existed longer and has more resources than the DPP. Because of this, they have the finances to run more campaigns and, frankly, garner power through their money. Anecdotally, if you were to look at the social networking site Facebook and the amount of people who have "liked" Ma Ying-jeou's Facebook page versus the amount of people who have "liked" Tsai Ing-wen's page, you will see major differences. Ma's page has far many more followers than Tsai's page. While this may not mean much in the political world, it helps to track the amount of social support a politician or political party may have. Because Tsai's campaign did not have as much funding and support as the KMT backed Ma campaign, it is no wonder that her campaign could not compete with the Ma campaign. It also shows that organization is very important when campaigning for political office. While it is unquestionable that Tsai did everything within her power to win, if the people running her campaign come up short and do not perform as well as their equivalents on the Ma side, than they will lose. Tsai and Ma were not the only people who were running for office. Every single one of their campaign staff and volunteers was running with them. It did not matter how well Tsai spoke or performed, if her subordinates were not performing better than the campaign staff under Ma, they would lose.

Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT may have used more questionable means than their superior political clout to win the election. It is possible that Ma and his campaign may have used government funds and resources unscrupulously to further his campaign. "Taiwan's opposition challenger for the presidency has accused intelligence services under the control of incumbent

⁵⁶ DPP Cites Six Main Reasons for Loss, *Taipei Times* (2012, February 16)
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2012/02/16/2003525589/1> accessed May 29, 2015

President Ma Ying-jeou of tracking her campaign events for political advantage.”⁵⁷ Allegations such as these are very serious matters because if proven true, it is a direct attack on Taiwanese Democracy and reminiscent of the times under the KMT regime before the 1990s. It would also help shed some light on why Tsai lost in an election that was considered very close by experts. Although not proven outright, the allegations were first reported in Taiwan’s *Next* magazine and were later repeated by DPP officials and Tsai’s campaign. “The allegations of intelligence service abuse were first raised last week by Taiwan's *Next* magazine, which said the National Security Council secretary General Hu Wei-chen instructed justice ministry investigators to monitor Tsai's activities in May after she became a presidential candidate.”⁵⁸ The Ma government clearly had some connection between what was going on in their intelligence department and the actions taken against the Tsai campaign. This kind of political espionage is shocking, however not unheard of. In the United States we have had a few similar issues such as Watergate. It was hard for Tsai Ing-wen to compete just on her own, but add in this political trickery and her proverbial goose was cooked. It is hard to win elections fairly; it is even harder to win them when the deck is stacked against you. If these allegations are ever proven true it will go a long way toward understanding why Tsai Ing-wen lost. It would also be a horrendous abuse of power by the Ma administration that conjures up images of the autocratic KMT regime before the DPP was legalized.

The previous examinations into why Tsai Ing-wen lost the election are very important; however, one substantial reason cannot be overlooked is, Ma Ying-jeou chose his words very carefully during the campaign season. It is true that all politicians, in order to get elected, will say and do things to appeal to voters; President Ma Ying-jeou certainly is a prime example of a leader who excels at this kind of political jargon. Before being elected in 2004, Ma would make such statements as “the future of Taiwan will be determined by 23 million people”.⁵⁹ This was received well by the majority of the Taiwanese electorate because this candidate stood out from the President Chen in that he wanted to seek out a more diplomatic approach with China while

⁵⁷ Spying Claim Against Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou, *The Guardian*, (2012, January 3) <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/03/spying-claim-taiwan-president-election> accessed May 30, 2015

⁵⁸ Spying Claim Against Taiwan’s President Ma Ying-jeou

⁵⁹ 馬英九主張：兩岸統一、台灣未來兩岸人民共同決定！ ma yingjiu zhuzhang: liangan tongyi, Taiwan welai liangan renmin gongtong jue ding, http://www.hi-on.org.tw/bulletins.jsp?b_ID=113160 accessed June 29, 2015

simultaneously supporting the idea of Taiwan as a sovereign nation. These dichotomous positions are antithetical if examined closely.

Upon winning the election in 2004 and regaining the presidency for the Kuomintang Party, President Ma seemed to have a change of heart when he said in December 2005 “our party’s ultimate goal is reunification”. 我們黨的終極目標是統一!⁶⁰ He again, shook Taiwan politically when in February 2006 he stated “Taiwan’s future will be determined by the people of the cross-straits.”臺灣未來有兩岸人民共同決定!⁶¹ Judging from his statements before and after his election, it can be argued that Ma said certain things before the election in 2004 to garner votes. After being elected he let his true opinions come out. He is a classic example of a “flip-flopper” in that he chooses his rhetoric carefully based on the political sentence of the time. By saying that the population of Taiwan will decide Taiwan’s future, it is implied that only Taiwanese citizens will determine their futures. On the other hand, when you say that Taiwan’s future will be determined by over one billion people, it is implied that China will take part in the negotiations. To many Taiwanese this was very controversial. Ma wanted to have it both ways.

While these issues happened in the 2004 election season, they came back in the 2012 election season. The Tsai campaign battered Ma by reminding him that he had said these words not four years ago. They also made sure he remembered that after he was elected he changed his positions. In order to placate China, Ma changed his words to make them less clear. In theory Tsai should have benefited from Ma’s choice of words. However, because most Taiwanese citizens did not want to exasperate China any further, they believed what Ma said and what he believed was different. During the Chen presidency relations with China got so bad that China threatened war. While it was not something new, the threats increased greatly under Chen. Most Taiwanese citizens did not want to see this happen again and they believed a Tsai presidency would only deteriorate relations with Beijing.

Although Tsai Ing-wen was not the DPP candidate during the 2004 presidential election, the words and decisions made by Ma during that campaign season should have hurt him more with

⁶⁰馬英九主張：兩岸統一、台灣未來兩岸人民共同決定！ ma yingjiu zhuzhang: liangan tongyi, Taiwan welai liangan renmin gongtong jueding

⁶¹馬英九主張：兩岸統一、台灣未來兩岸人民共同決定！ ma yingjiu zhuzhang: liangan tongyi, Taiwan welai liangan renmin gongtong jueding

voters. However, as seen by his reelection, even though he changed his words on the issue of who would decide Taiwan's future, the voters still reelected him. Even though Tsai made connecting Ma Ying-jeou to his previous statements an integral part of her campaign, she still lost. The flip-flopping and changing of words by Ma should have helped her win the election; however it turned out to be a key reason as to why she lost. I believe that she did not hit the Ma campaign hard enough on this issue. After all, saying that your nation's future is to be determined by both your people and the people of another nation normally should not go over well with the majority of voters in a nation. When Tsai did mention these word choices, it was nearly always at a debate where Ma could rebuttal by asking her about her supposed denial of the 1992 Consensus. Also, Ma would avoid the question by asking her a question or by some other tactic that would make sure he saved face without answering the question. This led to people not focusing on Ma's previous statements and focusing on how Tsai would respond to Ma's accusations. Ultimately, Ma's flip-flopping and use of language made him slippery enough that it was a major detriment to Tsai Ing-wen's campaign and one of the reasons she lost.

When discussing a certain elections' results and why a certain candidate lost, one must always look at who else participated in the election and whether or not there was a "Ross Perot" candidate. That is to say if there is a candidate who is a third party candidate and will take votes away from one of the other candidates, effectively winning the election for one of the main party's candidates. In the election in January, the only other candidate besides Ma and Tsai was James Soong. Soong is the founder of the People's First Party, which is allied with the Kuomintang. In theory, Soong should have assisted Tsai in taking away votes from Ma since both his political party and the Kuomintang share much in common. However, even if all of the votes Soong received, 369,588, were given to Tsai Ing-wen, she still would not have had enough votes to beat Ma Ying-jeou. While this may not be directly related to why Tsai Ing-wen lost, I believe it shows how hard it is for the Democratic Progressive Party to win elections. It shows that the political climate in Taiwan is one that puts up barriers to any party besides the Kuomintang. The KMT has historically been a party that has had a lot of money and other assets. This was in issue in the 2012 election and is still an issue to this day. It will no doubt surface again in the 2016 election. The proverbial phrase that "money wins elections" is accurate.

VI. Procedural Moves

When it comes to elections and democracy, sometimes there is blatant corruption that makes sure one political party stays in power over the other. While we know already that Ma may have abused his intelligence community's power, another abuse of power comes from changing the election date to disenfranchise some segments of the population from. "As many as 1.8 million Taiwanese voters in the 20-24 age group, 10 percent of the about 18 million eligible voters, are expected to cast their ballot for the first time in Saturday's elections."⁶² The younger generation in Taiwan was expected to vote in larger numbers in the election. This part of the population was expected to support Tsai and the DPP because they have more connections to Taiwan than to the "old" system in China.⁶³ The ruling Kuomintang moved up the presidential election to January so that it coincided with the election of the legislatures. This move was seen as disenfranchising the youth vote. "The principal reason why the move has been called unfair to young voters is the fact that the election will coincide with the final week of exams for many students."⁶⁴ Many students would not be returning to their homes in time to cast a vote in the election, and thus their vote would not be heard. This was just another trick that Ma and his KMT government pulled in order to win reelection. It is known that the older generation still believes that Taiwan and China will be reunited under the broad banner of "China". For the younger generation, though, it is a somewhat different story. Younger people born and raised in Taiwan know nothing of China. Most do not favor aggression with a global superpower, but at the same time they are attached to the idea of Taiwanese independence. Imagine your parents telling you stories of the "motherland" and how you should work to get back there. You, however, have never been to this "motherland" and feel no affiliation to it. You enjoy your life the way it is now. You love the nation that you live in now. For many of the younger Taiwanese, this is a common feeling. Ma knew this. The KMT changed the election date in order to put up one more obstacle to these DPP leaning voters to cross.

⁶² Cole, M.J. A plot against first time voters?, *Ballots & Bullets | School of Politics & International Relations, University of Nottingham*, (2012, January 10) <http://nottspolitics.org/2012/01/10/a-plot-against-first-time-voters/> accessed May 29, 2015

⁶³ Cole, M. J. A plot against first time voters?

⁶⁴ Cole, M.J. A plot against first time voters?

On the other hand, the changing of the election date was seen as some as a way to benefit the wealthier citizens in Taiwan, who tend to support the Kuomintang. “The timing of the election benefits wealthier and more mobile Taiwanese who will be returning to Taiwan for the Lunar New Year holidays, which this year fall one week after the elections.”²² The switching of the date by the Kuomintang and the Ma administration was intended to benefit his party and candidacy. Well the changing of the date was technically not illegal; the change was clearly intended to stop some voters from voting while encouraging others to vote. It is also important because it helps to explain why Tsai Ing-wen lost to Ma by such a small amount of votes. If all of the reasons I have listed above were added up and considered in the context of the election, it is easy to see how Tsai lost and why Ma used different strategies to encourage people to vote for him, including the changing of the election date. The changing of the date was a win-win situation for President Ma. He could make sure that his wealthy supporters had more of an incentive to vote. He also made sure that the younger generations had an obstacle in their way when it came to voting.

By now it is easy to see the various methods that the KMT used in order to win the 2012 presidential election. With his victory in 2012 Taiwan continued to improve relations with China. Taiwan will also continue to lose its de-facto independence, and this gave birth to social unrest culminating in the Sunflower Movement. The political situation in Taiwan is a very delicate balance between keeping China pleased while at the same time promoting a distinctive Taiwanese culture. I also believe that if there were to be a vote held today that President Ma would not win reelection. With approval ratings as low as his are currently it would be hard to be reelected. It is perhaps because of certain parts of ECFA coming into effect only after the 2012 election that Ma was able to avoid harsher criticism in regards to ECFA. Many people may have not realized how ECFA would affect their lives and thus they did not consider this when voting. As seen by Ma’s recent low approval numbers, many citizens in Taiwan are beginning to regret their decision to reelect Ma. As stated before, with Ma’s reelection in 2012, relations with the Mainland will continue to improve and the consequences, whether positive or negative, will continue to be felt by Taiwan for years to come.

Taiwan’s democracy offers many advantages to individuals doing research. One of these advantages is the ability to publicly express your opinion when asked about certain issues of the

day. One way that Taiwanese can express their opinions on the current issues of the day is through surveys. National Chengchi University in Taipei, Taiwan hosts the Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). “Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (abbreviated as TEDS) is a continual large-scale survey research project supported and funded by the Department of Humanities and Social Science (hereafter, DHSS) of the Ministry of Science and Technology.”⁶⁵ This organization provides invaluable data in regards to how Taiwanese voters view issues and how that translates into voting practices. These four data sets will show how the 2012 election played about and how the voters that view China as an opportunity vote KMT and those that view the Mainland as a threat vote DPP.

VII. TEDS Data National Identity

One of the first questions I researched on TEDS was that of national identity. In the TEDS 2012 survey on national identity, one of the first questions asked is “Do you consider yourself as Taiwanese, Chinese or both?”⁶⁶

Values	Categories	n	percentage
1	Taiwanese	1033	56.6%
2	both	669	36.6%
3	Chinese	73	4.0%
90	others	3	0.2%
95	refuse to answer	19	1.0%
98	don't know	29	1.6%
		Frequency : 1826	100%

(Source: TEDS)

For my question corresponding with this one the three individuals who are pan-green said they are Taiwanese, one said both. Two individuals from pan-blue said both and two said Chinese. The two remaining independent voters said they are both Taiwanese and Chinese. These answers, along with the TEDS data, would go to prove that more and more Taiwanese view themselves as either Taiwanese or

⁶⁵ Teds Website http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/intro/super_pages.php?ID=intro1 accessed June 2, 2015

⁶⁶ TEDS Website, http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/list.php?g_isn=62&g_tid=2&g_cid=15 accessed June 3, 2015

both Chinese and Taiwanese. This shows the growing distance from China and Chinese identity over time. It proves a problem for Chinese leadership in claiming legitimacy over Taiwan based off of historical continuity. It also is an issue for Taiwanese political parties and politicians that cling to a Chinese only national identity. In future elections political parties that emphasize a purely Chinese identity run the risk of alienating voters, especially younger voters. This could have serious implications for the KMT and other pan-blue parties in future election cycles.

VIII. The 1992 Consensus

The second question deals with the 1992 Consensus. “Some people say that we should continue using the 1992 Consensus as the basis of Cross-Strait negotiations while other people say we should reject the 1992 Consensus. What do you agree with?”⁶⁷

Values Categories	n	percentage
1 continue using the 1992 Consensus	794	43.5%
2 reject the 1992 Consensus	246	13.5%
3 there is no 1992 Consensus	340	18.6%
4 support both	19	1.0%
5 support neither	8	0.4%
95 refuse to answer	16	0.9%
96 it depends	18	1.0%
97 no opinion	67	3.7%
98 don't know	318	17.4%
	Frequency : 1826	100%

(Source: TEDS)

⁶⁷ TEDS http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/list.php?g_isn=62&g_tid=2&g_cid=15 accessed June 3, 2015

The overall consensus on the 1992 Consensus seems to be that it is a good thing and should be continued to be used by Taiwan when it comes to China. However, there is still a sizeable minority that either wants to reject the 1992 Consensus or simply denies the existence of the 1992 Consensus. The scope that the 1992 Consensus played in the 2012 election, namely many Taiwanese voters being apprehensive about Tsai Ing-wen’s position on the Consensus, shows how important it is. The data supports the train of thought that Taiwanese wanted to maintain the relationship with Mainland China that the 1992 Consensus had afforded them up to that point.

IX. ECFA

The third question I used has to deal with ECFA directly. “After signing the cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), do you think Taiwan’s economy has gotten better, worse or is about the same?”⁶⁸ As the data shows the majority believed that the economy stayed about the same when it came to ECFA. This is an interesting result as ECFA was promoted by the government and the KMT as being a way for Taiwan to continue economic expansion and avoid marginalization. However, the data seems to say that the voters felt that ECFA did not bring about this result.

Values Categories	n	percentage
1 get better	677	37.1%
2 get worse	215	11.8%
3 stay about the same	667	36.5%
95 refuse to answer	6	0.3%
96 it's hard to say	32	1.8%
97 no opinion	27	1.5%
98 don't know	202	11.1%
	Frequency : 1826	100%

(Source: TEDS)

⁶⁸ TEDS, http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/list.php?g_isn=63&g_tid=0&g_cid=9 accessed June 4, 2015

X. Personal Economic Situation

Because there is sometimes a discrepancy when it comes to how people feel about the nation's overall economic performance versus their own personal economic situation, the next question asked related to how they felt personally about ECFA. "Thinking about your own economic situation, do you think it has gotten better or gotten worse as a result of ECFA, or stayed about the same?"⁶⁹ Below is the TEDS data from 2012.

Values Categories	n	percentage
1 get better	109	6.0%
2 get worse	173	9.5%
3 stay about the same	1387	76.0%
95 refuse to answer	8	0.4%
96 it's hard to say	12	0.7%
97 no opinion	16	0.9%
98 don't know	121	6.6%
	Frequency : 1826	100%

(Source: TEDS)

It is clear that in 2012 out of the people TEDS polled the majority believed that ECFA had neither harmed nor helped their personal economic situation. It was perhaps still too early to fully appreciate the effect ECFA would have on Taiwan's economy. What can be said for sure from the data is that the debate over ECFA was split down party lines. Those falling into the pan-blue camp viewed ECFA as an important step in not only maintaining cross Strait relations; but also for Taiwan to avoid being economically marginalized. The pan-green voters were naturally skeptic of any agreements that, in their view, would bring Taiwan and China closer together.

XI. Overall Impressions

The overall impression I was left with when reviewing the TEDS data was how divided the electorate seems to be when it comes to how they view China. Most of the KMT supporters have a much more positive take on China and economic interaction with China. The majority view

⁶⁹ TEDS http://teds.nccu.edu.tw/teds_plan/list.php?g_isn=63&g_tid=0&g_cid=9 accessed June 4, 2015

China as an economic opportunity and feel that Taiwan should continue to improve relations with Beijing. Conversely, the DPP voters tend to all be more skeptical and suspicious of China and China's intentions. For the most part they feel as if China represents a potential threat to not only economic growth, but also stability. Well the KMT supporters view Taiwan's actions as the main destabilizing force in cross strait relations, the DPP voters tend to view Chinese aggression as more of a destabilizing force to cross straits peace. The KMT voters will always have the connection to China as many view it as their homeland. This naturally translates towards viewing China as an opportunity and a desire to further business ties with the Mainland. The DPP on the other hand does not have as much of a cordial connection with China and, as the TEDS data shows, DPP voters view China as more of a threat to Taiwan than an opportunity.



Chapter Six

Conclusions

The political situation of Taiwan, especially in how China attempts to influence Taiwan's democracy and elections, is very precarious. Taiwan can be considered a rump state in that the ruling government still claims the whole of China as its legitimate territory. However, since democratization has occurred on the island local politics has taken precedent. China was not happy about Taiwan's democratic development. Beijing would much more prefer to deal with the Taiwan issue in a way in which the average Taiwanese citizen does not have a vote. However, given the changing demographics and political winds in Taiwan, China has taken on a broader, more evolved approach to Taiwan. China has always reserved the right to reunite Taiwan by military force if necessary, but in recent years the tone has shifted more to economics. China has tried the "stick" when it comes to Taiwan and has been met with a great deal of opposition. They are now going to try the "carrot" approach of economics. If China can show the Taiwanese electorate that better relations with Beijing means better economic development in Taiwan then there may be greater incentive for Taiwan to better relations with Beijing. This shifting approach from Beijing has had vast influence in how the Taiwanese political system and the average Taiwanese voter views China.

The two main political parties view China differently. The KMT still views itself as a Chinese centric party, and this translates into how the party deals with not only China, but also Taiwan's foreign policy. The majority of the KMT believes that China represents an opportunity for Taiwan and Taiwanese business. This policy and trend of viewing China as an opportunity also has historical reasons. The KMT still holds out hope of reuniting with China. This hope corresponds with their continued support for policies that further cooperation across the Straits, especially in regards to economic cooperation. Because of the friendlier policies the KMT employs in regards to China the party enjoys the support of Taiwanese citizens that also view China as an opportunity. If a Taiwanese voter sees China as an opportunity they will more than likely vote for a KMT politician.

The DPP, born out of opposition to the authoritarian KMT regime, takes a different position when it comes to China. As a party that advocates for full independence, the DPP has a skeptical view of China and Chinese economic interaction. The DPP tends to view China as not only an

economic threat but also a real, substantive military threat. Because of this differing view that the DPP takes towards China it is able to pool support from Taiwanese citizens who also view China as more of a threat than an opportunity. Although there has been some evolution in policy positions in recent years, the DPP and voters that support the DPP still view China as a threat. The reelection of Ma Ying-jeou in 2012 showed that, at the time, voters in Taiwan preferred the status quo versus something unfamiliar. President Ma represented the stability of the 1992 Consensus as well as continued economic development. Tsai was an unknown factor and the electorate was not sure how China would respond if she were to be elected. Looking back on Ma's reelection in the year 2015 it is easy to see how he was reelected. Analyzing the current dissatisfaction with Ma and the KMT in the 2015 political climate it is also easy to predict the future election results; however these results have yet to come to fruition.

In the final analysis, the Taiwanese electorate is continually changing. With more and more young voters joining the voting ranks it will be interesting to see how the KMT and other pro-China parties try and appeal to a demographic that tends to view themselves as purely Taiwanese. The next few years will be very interesting in the development of Taiwan's democracy and how these developments will shake up the global political status quo.

Because more and more Taiwanese voters view themselves as only Taiwanese, especially younger voters, there is some apprehension in pan blue groups over future elections. One such election is the 2016 presidential election. With the Ma Ying-jeo's anemic approval numbers and image of being a "bumbler" so heavily ingrained in the public's eye, it will be difficult for a fellow KMT candidate to break free from this image. The KMT has currently nominated Eric Chu, the current mayor of New Taipei City. Mayor Chu will have a difficult time of changing the public perception that has arisen of the KMT under the leadership of President Ma. Currently in Taiwan there is a strong anti-Ma wave of sentiment running through the populace. This translates into anti KMT sentiment as well. One of the best examples of this sentiment was the Sunflower student movement in 2014. This movement was an argument against "black box" procedures and also an argument against closer economic relations with China. President Ma was also a target of the protesters and their supporters. Because of Ma's involvement in the Sunflower Movement many voters are strongly opposed to Ma and his policies. It is possible that the national sentiment is not necessarily anti-KMT or anti-China but only anti- Ma ying-jeou. However, either way the

KMT does not fare well in its national image. All of this does not bode well for the KMT in the January 2016 election.

On the other side, running for the DPP, is the established Tsai Ing-wen. Tsai has the advantage of an electorate that is tired of eight years of KMT rule with not a lot of positive results for the country. There is a growing populist movement concerned about domestic issues in Taiwan such as stagnant wages, lack of opportunities and others. This works to Tsai's advantage. If she can keep the focus on domestic issues instead of being drawn into a debate about cross strait relations, she has the advantage. On the issue of China Tsai has also showed an ability to be more pragmatic when it comes to dealing with Beijing. With China being a juggernaut powerhouse, it is all but impossible not to have dealings with Beijing. Tsai understand this, and has promoted policies of not only peace across the Taiwan Strait, but also furthering the relationship with China. This must all be done however with mechanisms to protect Taiwan's sovereignty. Tsai must also attempt to ease any angst Washington might have over being drawn into a conflict with China because of Taiwan.⁷⁰ Because of Tsai's more balanced approach towards China and domestic issues taking more prominence in the election, the odds of her carrying the election in 2016 are quite high.

One interesting area of note is how the roles of established candidate versus something unknown have changed for the 2016 election. In 2012 Tsai was the unknown candidate and Ma was established. In 2015 and 2016 Tsai seems to be the more established candidate when compared to Hung. When the candidacy of James Soong is factored in, it appears there is a "perfect storm: of variables similar to the situation in 2000 and 2004 to guarantee a DPP win. In the final analysis of all the domestic and international factors the main issue that will decide the election is whether or not the electorate views China as an opportunity or whether it is a threat. As this thesis has already shown; those that view China as an opportunity will more than likely vote pan blue. If in a voter's mind China is a threat they will vote pan green.

⁷⁰Cole, Michael J. (2015) Two Myths about Taiwan's DPP that Need to be Laid to Rest, *The Diplomat* <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/two-myths-about-taiwans-dpp-that-need-to-be-laid-to-rest/> accessed online 10/05/2015

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