Implications of the Chinese Response to U.S. Business Strategy: External-Internal Rival Nexus in International Trade Policy Making

Abstract

This paper explores the emerging stale-business alliance and its impact on international trade policy making through interplay s between China and the United States. The paper examines the dispute over intellectual property rights between the two economies based on Putnam`s two-level game approach. It analyzes the policy option chosen by China, and its impact on Washington`s shift of policy preferences in result of the rival competition between the Boeing Corporation and the Microsoft. The findings suggest that (1) the intercompany contest drives a politically rival market, where the government sides with one state-business alliance, other industries are/arced out of this contest in influencing trade policy preference; (2) rival states might acknowledge and utilize such competition to press the target state to change its policy priority, and (3) companies tend to compete to form such state-business alliances for creating favorable conditions in international trade.