「中国」規模の軍隊組織と台湾規模の財政の相克－－国府の「十九項目財政・経済改革措置」での軍事支出制限の明文化に至る米華関係 「中國」規模的軍隊組織與台灣規模的財經之相對關係－－中美關係之中有關國府於「十九點財經改革措施」明文限制軍事支出之經過

Abstract

本稿は、国府が1960 年1 月に制定した「十九項目財政・経済改革措置」において、軍事支出に上限を設けるに至るまでの米華関係を、実証的歴史学の手法により考察する。台湾移転後の国府は過大な軍事組織を有しており、兵員削減も試みられたものの、財政運営や「大陸反攻」の構想や外省人兵士の生活保障等の問題により、遅々として進まなかった。膨大な援助を国府に供与していたアメリカも国府に軍事支出の制限を強いられないでいたが、1958 年10 月の「蔣介石・ダレス共同コミュニケ」が軍事を「大陸反攻」の副次的手段と言明したことで、兵員削減と軍事支出抑制を国府に強く求め始めた。これは、一旦は頓挫した陳誠内閣の兵員削減と軍事支出抑制の試みを復活させ、「十九項目財政・経済改革措置」での軍 事支出の制限の設定に繋がった。こうして、「大陸反攻」を想定した国府の「中国」規模の軍事組織は、制度的にも台湾規模の財政に拘束されることになったのである。 本文透過歷史研究途徑探討中美關係之中有關1960年1月國民政府於「十九點財經改革措施」明文限制軍費支出之經過。國民政府遷到台灣之後，由於仍保有龐大的軍事組織，因此企圖裁減兵力。但因為財政規劃、「反攻大陸」、有關外省籍士兵的生活保障等問題而遲遲無法推動相關政策。提供龐大援助給國民政府的美國當初並無法限制國民政府刪減軍費。不過1958年10月發表的「蔣介石‧杜勒斯共同聲明」宣布將軍事作為「反攻大陸」的次要手段後，美國因此開始以此施壓國民政府裁減兵力與軍費，這使得陳誠內閣重新推動了相關政策，於「十九點財經改革措施」明文限制了軍費支出。也就是說，因應「反攻大陸」的「中國」規模軍事This paper examines relations between U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan or ROC) up to the establishment of the `Nineteen Point Reform Program` in January 1960. Following its defeat in the Chinese Civil War and retreat to Taiwan Island, the Republic of China maintained an excessively large military. Attempts made to reduce military spending were stifled given the continuing policies of `re-conquering the mainland` and maintaining the living standards of those soldiers who had fled to Taiwan. Despite having provided a huge amount of aid to ROC, U.S. was unable to have the regime reduce military expenditure. However, following the release of the Chiang-Dulles Communiqué in 1958 which publicly announced military action as a secondary means of re-conquering the mainland, pressure from the U.S. to cut military spending grew. These demands resurrected the project of cutting troop numbers and reducing military expenditure which had been planned by Ch`en Ch`eng`s cabinet and led to a ceiling being placed on ROC`s military budget under the `Nineteen Point Program`. As a result, the `China-scale` military organization, which had been established so as to `re-conquer the mainland`, was constrained to a `Taiwan- scale` budget.組織因為台灣規模財政規劃的制度性限制而無法持續發展。

This paper examines relations between U.S. and the Republic of China (Taiwan or ROC) up to the establishment of the `Nineteen Point Reform Program` in January 1960. Following its defeat in the Chinese Civil War and retreat to Taiwan Island, the Republic of China maintained an excessively large military. Attempts made to reduce military spending were stifled given the continuing policies of `re-conquering the mainland` and maintaining the living standards of those soldiers who had fled to Taiwan. Despite having provided a huge amount of aid to ROC, U.S. was unable to have the regime reduce military expenditure. However, following the release of the Chiang-Dulles Communiqué in 1958 which publicly announced military action as a secondary means of re-conquering the mainland, pressure from the U.S. to cut military spending grew. These demands resurrected the project of cutting troop numbers and reducing military expenditure which had been planned by Ch`en Ch`eng`s cabinet and led to a ceiling being placed on ROC`s military budget under the `Nineteen Point Program`. As a result, the `China-scale` military organization, which had been established so as to `re-conquer the mainland`, was constrained to a `Taiwan- scale` budget.