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|Title: ||Deregulation and the Theory of Regulation: An Application of the Core in the Game Theory|
|Issue Date: ||2016-12-05 15:04:16 (UTC+8)|
This paper presents a game-theoretical model which seeks to account for both regulation and deregulation in a single model. By assuming that a policy change requires the unanimous consent of all players in the game and through checking the existence of the core, we conclude that an increase in demand is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for deregulation; an improvement in technology condition is a necessary condition for deregulation; however, only a significant improvement in technology condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for deregulation.
|Relation: ||國立政治大學學報, 59,75-98|
|Data Type: ||article|
|Appears in Collections:||[Issue 59] Journal Articles|
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