Xi Jinping in Command: Solving the principal-agent problem in CCP-PLA relations?

Abstract

自 1949 年以后, 解放军一直是中国政治中的重要行为者。在过去四年中, 一连串的最新发展刺激外界观察家重新评估习近平时代的党军关系。本文主张, 习近平时代党军关系的最重要特征是权力集中在单一文职领导人身上, 具体现象包括重新强调军委主席负责制、在最高领导人领导之下建立新的跨部门协调机制、大规模改革军事指挥系统、积极塑造习近平为三军统帅的公共形象, 以及大规模人事调动。在人事调动的过程中, 习近平的亲信逐渐担任重要军职, 而政敌则逐渐被移除。对习近平来说, 这些做法都是解决最高领导人和高级将领之间, 因信息不对称和利益不一致而引起的委托代理问题。

The PLA has been a key player in Chinese elite politics since 1949. However, a series of developments over the last four years has prompted China watchers to re-evaluate Party–military relations. This paper argues that CCP–PLA relations in the Xi Jinping era are characterized by the centralization of power in a single civilian individual. This centralization is reflected by events such as a new emphasis on the CMC chairman responsibility system, the establishment of new coordination bodies under the top leader, radical reforms to the military command structure, the promotion of Xi`s public image as the top leader, and large-scale personnel reshuffes during which Xi`s trustees have gradually come to occupy key military posts while his rivals have been removed. For Xi, these measures are an antidote to the principal–agent problem in CCP–PLA relations caused by both information asymmetry and the discrepant interests of civilian leaders and the top brass of the PLA.