Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/124214
題名: 論城投債何去何從:以違約風險為例
Where is the urban construction investment bonds going: taking the risk of default as an example
作者: 蔡震
Cai, Zhen
貢獻者: 李文傑<br>王信實
Lee, Wen-Chieh<br>Wang, Shinn-Shyr
蔡震
Cai, Zhen
關鍵詞: 城投債
晉升錦標賽
官員換届
房價中介
日期: 2019
上傳時間: 1-Jul-2019
摘要: 本研究使用多種方法,對中國大陸房價調控政策密集出臺和地方官員晉升錦標賽背景下的城投債券違約風險變動進行量化分析。研究整理了城投債券的歷史發展脈絡及其詳盡的風險關聯,並由此提煉或有風險誘因。進一步聚焦35個地級市,2010年至2016年間,城投債風險溢價水準受房價變動與地方官員換屆的實際影響。模型運算結果得出:首先,城投債風險溢價與地方政府財政赤字率顯著呈現正相關關係,城投平臺與地方政府間的密切關聯實際並未應2014年政策要求而徹底切斷。其次,房價變動顯著影響城投債風險溢價水準,呈反向變動,該結論佐證了地方政府運用土地融資的邏輯合理性。最後,城投債風險溢價水準受地方官員換屆的負面衝擊,被官員履新對房價的推動所掩蓋。上述結果說明在難解的財政壓力下,現階段地方政府有動機通過房價和城投債信用風險間的互相回饋,維繫地方發展。但也應認識到,它們之間的關係在規範地方政府債務和房價調控的趨勢下不甚穩固。
This research intends to bridge the links among heating housing bubbles, local fiscal imbalances and policy instabilities. By considering the grand tax reallocation starting from the 1994 Chinese tax reform, the Chinese local government has founded the local Chengtou platform to make up for the local fiscal balance with collaterals of land usage rights provided by local governments. It is generally agreed in the literature that the heating up competition among Chinese local agencies on growth target have shaped the escalating fiscal imbalance among Chinese local areas. We then have a theoretic guess that housing price correlates with the issue scale of Chengtou bonds. To prove the above hypothesis, we have hand-collected a dataset delineating Chengtou bonds, housing prices and the replacement of city mayors. The constructed detailed dataset has lent support to our empirical evidence to the proposed hypotheses. We then verify that the skyrocketing stock of Chengtou bonds joint with future declining trend of housing price may cause the follow-up foreseeable default on expired Chengtou bonds. This result is also sustainable by the replacement of city mayors having weak local attachment and eager to be promoted by achieving fabulous economic growth performance.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
經濟學系
106258040
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106258040
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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