道德特殊主義：批判性縱覽

Abstract

本文以回顧圍繞道德特殊主義——特別是原則消除論——的論戰為主線，呈現各方為辯護自己的立場而在理由理論和道德之本質兩個層次上掀起的辯論。文章旨在檢視哪些論證是關鍵性，哪些論證是有定論的，哪些論證又使得論戰陷入僵局。筆者也嘗試在文章中做一些概念澄清與區別，比如暫時性地闡明何謂道德原則、何謂道德特殊主義、將道德特殊主義與其它容易與之混淆的理論分辨開來。經過抽絲剝縷，筆者將行文過程中的線索串在一起，在結論中指出關於道德原則是否存在的辯論礙於「無限制的」理由整體論上的分歧難有進展。但是，由於道德特殊論揭示了道德生活的複雜性，筆者認為相較於道德原則是否存在、這些道德原則是否有利於我們的道德實踐這些議題，特殊論應該將討論重心放在我們如何在極其複雜的道德生活中做好特殊個案中的實踐推理上。同樣地，本文也認為倫理學研究應該聚焦具體個案，而非抽象原則。

This article aims to be a survey of the debates around moral particularism, especially principle eliminativism. It will represent the arguments made by different parties in defence of their respective positions, with the intention to investigate which arguments are vital, which allow of determinate verdicts and which draw the controversy into a deadlock. In this article, I will also attempt to clarify some concepts, including the notions of moral principles and moral particularism. Eventually, I will draw, from the clues revealed in the course of the discussion, the conclusion that the debate about whether there are true moral principles confronts a standoff due to the difficulty in ascertaining the plausibility of ‘unrestricted’ holism of reasons. However, I will suggest that compared with the existence of moral principles and their practical value, moral particularism should concentrate on how to appropriately conduct practical reasoning in particular cases, given the complexity of our moral life. Finally, the article will suggest that the cause of ethics should pay more attention to concrete moral cases rather than abstract rules.