康德的最高善理論

Abstract

最高善理論的存在一直是康德哲學系統中一個棘手的問題。它強烈地違反我們對康德倫理學的印象，並且看起來將使他陷入自我矛盾當中。因為按照康德的道德規範理論，道德的最高原則既不考慮行為的對象最終是否實現，也不要求其結果帶來人類的福祉，那麼又何以包含了幸福概念的最高善之可能性會影響道德法則的成立與否呢？然而，要處理這個問題首先必須面對的困難，就是最高善在康德的著作中甚至不是一個意義固定的概念。在不同文本、甚至同一文本不同處的論證當中，康德似乎賦予了這個概念以不同的涵義，同樣的困難也出現在最高善理論的必要性與最高善實現的可能性條件上。這些困難造就了既有的最高善詮釋也呈現出了莫衷一是的複雜景象。本文的主要目的即是嘗試找出哪一種最高善概念與對其必要性及可能性的理解才能重構出一個融貫且與康德整個哲學系統相一致的最高善理論。最終本文將嘗試指出最高善的必要性在於提供道德的證實根據，並且此最高善必須同時是一個超越、完美、共同體的概念才能提供一個與康德的整個哲學系統相容的最高善理論。

The concept of the highest good poses a difficult problem for Kant`s moral philosophy. It runs counter to the common impression of Kantian ethics and seems to lead to self-contradiction. This is because the supreme principle of morality, according to Kant, neither refers to the realization of objects of action nor is required to ensure the well-being of humans. How could the concept of the highest good that contains happiness decide the validity of the moral law? In order to deal with this issue, however, we must face another problem, namely that there is no fixed meaning of the highest good in Kant`s writings. Across his works, Kant endows this concept with different meanings. The same difficulty appears in our understandings of necessity and possibility of the highest good at once and raises many disputes between scholars. The main purpose of this dissertation is to find out what kind of concept of the highest good and understanding of its necessity and possibility can best provide a coherent interpretation within Kant’s whole philosophical system. I will try to point out that the necessity of the highest good is based on a need of confirmation of morality. Furthermore, it must be understood as a transcendent, perfect, and communal concept that is consistent only with Kant’s whole philosophical system.