Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/127741
題名: 混合寡占市場下利潤稅的中立性公營廠商目標函數一般化的情況
Profit Tax Neutrality in a Mixed Oligopoly When a Public Firm Pursues General Objectives
作者: 李品逸
Li, Pin-Yi
貢獻者: 翁堃嵐
李品逸
Li, Pin-Yi
關鍵詞: 混合寡占市場
民營化政策
利潤稅中立性
一般化目標函數
Mixed oligopoly
Privatization policy
Profit tax neutrality
General objectives
日期: 2019
上傳時間: 6-Dec-2019
摘要: 本文在公營廠商的目標函數一般化的情況下,探討同質混合寡占市場下利 潤稅中立性以及最適的民營化政策。依據本文研究結果顯示: (1) 在混合寡占市場下,由於公營廠商的目標函數並非追求利潤之極大,因此在釋股比例為外生的情況下,利潤稅的課徵對廠商的產出決策將不具中立性,然而在釋股比例為內生的情況下,課徵利潤稅對產出決策及社會福利水準均具有中立性。(2) 在考慮外人持股的開放體系下,不論民營化程度為外生或內生,利潤稅的中立性將無法成立。
This paper considers the case where a public firm pursues general objectives. We discuss the profit tax neutrality theorem and the optimal privatization policy under the\nhomogenous mixed oligopolistic market. The major findings are as follow (1) The objective function of public firms is not pursuit of maximizing profits under mixed oligopolistic market. When the privatization level is exogenously given, the profit tax which affects market equilibrium is no longer neutral. However, under the optimal privatization policy, an exogenous increase of profit tax rate will not affect market equilibrium and the social welfare level (i.e. profit tax is neutral) (2) The model of foreign shareholding is considered.Regardless of whether the degree of privatization is exogenous or endogenous, the neutrality of the profit tax doesn’t hold.
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描述: 碩士
國立政治大學
財政學系
106255027
資料來源: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0106255027
資料類型: thesis
Appears in Collections:學位論文

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