Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ah.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/132450


Title: 固樁或擴張?市議員地方建設建議事項的運用策略
Authors: 李思婷
Li, Sih-Ting
Contributors: 俞振華
Yu, Chen-Hua
李思婷
Li, Sih-Ting
Keywords: 分配政治
肉桶政治
地方議員
地方建設建議事項
多層次分析
Distributive Politics
Pork Barrel Politics
Local Councilor
Local Infrastructure Expenditures
Multilevel Analysis
Date: 2020
Issue Date: 2020-11-03 11:28:48 (UTC+8)
Abstract: 將資源分配給誰始終是至關重要的分配政治議題。然而過去臺灣分配政治研究多以正副總統、中央政府、立法委員以及縣市首長為主,鮮少關注地方議員在選區內部的資源分配情形。本文以第十二屆臺北市議員所提地方建設建議事項為例,旨在探討以尋求連任為目標的理性議員會如何分配公共資源?議員會採取防守型的固樁策略,選擇將資源回饋給既有支持者,亦或採取進擊型的拓展選票策略?
根據描述性統計分析,本研究發現,議員在選區多數里別中根本不會配置任何資源,因此本研究進一步將分配機制就概念上區分為「分配與否」以及「分配多寡」兩個面向。藉由實證分析,在分配與否的模型中,市議員傾向運用防守型策略鞏固既有支持基礎,相當符合一般論者對於在SNTV選制下候選人所採取策略的既有想像。不過,在分配多寡的面向中,無論各里對市議員的重要程度是高是低,資源分配量並未存在顯著差異。然而資源固樁的結論並未因此推翻,反而打破了一般既定印象。整體而言,市議員運用建設固樁的機制應從金額犒賞修正為有所回饋,議員雖會特別照顧核心支持者或重要里長的需求,積極向市府爭取建設,但不會因此讓該地獲得超高額建設,顯示議員對於那些相形重要的地區不會再特別給予差別待遇。
One of the most important debates in the distributive politics literature is who receives allocation. However, previous studies on Taiwan’s distributive politics have examined predominantly the role played by the president, legislators and the local governments. The distributive strategies of local councilors have been overlooked. Few explain the variations in the amount of resources within councilors’ electoral districts. Using data on local infrastructure expenditures by 12th Taipei City councilors, this article investigates how rational politicians allocate infrastructure resources in order to maximize the probabilities of reelection, and whether local councilors use resources to reward their core supporters or to expand their support bases.
According to descriptive analysis, we find that councilors do not allocate any resource in most areas; hence, we identify two dimensions—whether to allocate and the amount of money spent by councilors — to the mechanisms of resource allocation. Based on empirical analysis, we first examine whether councilors tend to favor important subconstituencies or not. The results indicate that councilors do reward their core supporters with public resources to maintain their electoral bases. However, there is no significant difference in the amount of resources no matter how important the area is. Overall, our findings support the core hypothesis and point out that the allocation mechanism of city councilors should be revised.
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Description: 碩士
國立政治大學
政治學系
105252004
Source URI: http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0105252004
Data Type: thesis
Appears in Collections:[政治學系] 學位論文

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