Mass Production of Individualized Services: Machine Politics in Hong Kong

Abstract

Political machines are built to distribute spoils, buy support, and influence election outcome. Existing research argues that political machines target poor and illiterate voters because their votes are cheap to acquire with non-programmatic benefits. Using the case of Hong Kong, we critically examine the extent to which the ruling coalition utilizes non-programmatic benefits in elections where votes are generally too expensive to purchase. Using interviews with local councilors and data from the 2015 Hong Kong Election Study, we find that: (1) pro-Beijing parties tend to specialize in the provision of highly individualized services; (2) demand for these services tends to come from non-poor citizens; and (3) unable to monitor individual votes, pro-Beijing parties use services and benefits to influence the turnout of the recipients, rather than their vote choice. These findings suggest that the growing electoral strength of pro-Beijing parties in Hong Kong reflects their responsiveness to constituent demands.

政治機器的建立，是為了利益分配、爭取支持和影響選舉結果。現有的文獻認為政治機器一般會籠絡貧窮與教育水平低的選民，因為他們的選票相對便宜。本論文以香港為例，審視當地的執政聯盟有多大程度在選舉中利用非政策綱領的利益（non-programmatic benefits），來爭取貴得難以收買的選票。通過訪問當地的議員和分析2015年《香港選舉研究》的數據，我們發現（1）親北京的政黨傾向提供高度個人化的服務；（2）需要這些個人化服務的市民，一般都不貧窮；（3）因為不能監控個人如何投票，親北京的政黨只能利用服務和利益來影響收益者投與不投的決定，而不是投給誰的選擇。這些發現反映親北京政黨長期的得票增長，是來自他們回應了特定選民的訴求。