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https://ah.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/74839
題名: | A Political Economy of Tax Havens | 作者: | 鄭竹君;朱巡;Lai, Yu-Bong | 貢獻者: | 財政系 | 關鍵詞: | Capital mobility;Interest groups;Lobbying;Tax havens;Tax competition;F21;H41;H73 | 日期: | Sep-2014 | 上傳時間: | 27-Apr-2015 | 摘要: | The welfare effect of the existence of tax havens on high-tax countries has not been conclusive in the theoretical literature. Some papers show that the existence of tax havens is harmful to high-tax countries, while other studies argue that the opposite could occur. We aim to address a question: Do these welfare-reducing or welfare-enhancing properties still hold in the presence of lobbying? We find that the welfare-enhancing property does not hold, provided that the policy-maker attaches a sufficiently large weight to the political contribution received. Moreover, we point out that the cooperation among high-tax countries in restricting the international tax planning activity can lead to a lower level of social welfare in all high-tax countries. | 關聯: | International Tax and Public Finance, 1-20 | 資料類型: | book/chapter | DOI: | http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-014-9338-8 |
Appears in Collections: | 專書/專書篇章 |
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