台灣金融管制政策的困境：代理人途徑個案分析

Abstract

本文以「代理人理論」（principal-agent theory）的架構分析台灣金融監理未落實及導致「公司治理」失靈，最後引發金融金融機構經營者的道德危險。本文以中興銀行、萬巒農會為案例，企圖探討三個問題：第一，為何政府的金融監理制度無法防止金融機構經營弊端的發生，以及無法抑制逾放比居高不下？第二，為何市場中的金融機構也缺乏經營的理性與安全性，亦即缺乏「風險管理」的能力？第三，市場中金融機構的「公司治理」為何不彰？本文從「代理人理論」（agent theory）的理論建構（theoretical constructs），如：資訊不對稱（information asymmetry）、隱藏性資訊（hidden information）、隱藏性行動（hidden action）等，分析我國金融機關政府管制政策失靈（regulatory policy failure）以及金融機構內部「治理失靈」（governance failure）的根本原因。本文的基本假設，即當前台灣一般商業銀行與基層金融機構所面臨的問題，與「代理人理論」所主張的「資訊不對稱」所衍生的「公司治理」失靈與監理失靈，並導致經營管理者的「道德危機」有密切關係。近年台灣許多金融機構，包括一般商業銀行、農漁會信用部、信用合作社等基層金融機構等，其逾放比攀升以及嚴重虧損的結果，實為經營管理者的「道德危機」升高所致，其根本原因就是「代理人問題」（agency problem）。中興銀行與萬巒農會信用部的案例分析都指出一重要理論意涵，亦即超貸與冒貸的發生與過度追逐風險的現象密不可分，而「資訊揭露」不完全阻礙了金融機構監理效能，終成為經營管理者追逐風險的一大制度誘因。

This paper employs the framework of principal-agent theory to examine institutional failure of financial supervision system and resulting moral hazard in Taiwan. This paper chooses two cases－Chung Hsing Bank (CHB) and Wang Luang Farmers’ Associations (WLFA) for investigating three questions: (1) Why does financial supervisory system fail to prevent managerial problems of financial institutions, and to lower bad loans? (2) Why does financial institutions in Taiwan lack market rationality and the capacity of “risk management”? (3) How is corporate governance of financial institutions in Taiwan not effective? This paper employs agency theoretical constructs, such as information asymmetry, hidden information, hidden action, agency cost to make analysis of failure of financial regulatory system within public institutions and governance failure within financial institutions. In Taiwan, financial problems which both commercial local financial institutions encounters are associated with information asymmetry, resulting failure of corporate governance asserted by the agency perspective. The rising bad loans in Taiwan as a result of financial liberalization since the beginning of 1990s are caused by moral hazard conducted by managers of financial institutions. These case analyses, i.e. CHB and WLFA reveal significant theoretical implications that the rising bad loans come from high risks pursued by managers of banks. However, agency problem becomes a fundamental institutional incentive for high-risk pursuit.