

中俄戰略夥伴關係及其對台海紛爭的意涵
**THE SINO-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP
AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE TAIWAN STRAIT EMBROILMENT**
КИТАЙСКО-РОССИЙСКОЕ СТРАТЕГИЧЕСКОЕ ПАРТНЕРСТВО И
ЕГО ВЛИЯНИЕ НА СИТУАЦИЮ В ТАЙВАНЬСКОМ ПРОЛИВЕ

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摘要

本文的核心論證是中俄戰略「夥伴關係」代表兩個相鄰大國間近五十年來的最佳關係，如同在二〇〇一年七月十六日簽署的「中俄友好條約」，這是一種「菁英發起」與「菁英處理」的關係，其商貿面向一向是相對微不足道且受到嚴格控制，但戰略面向卻如俄羅斯對中共出售廣泛的武器與技術所顯示，相當具有潛力。此一關係並未立即衝撞美國之戰略利益，但其對台海兩岸關係卻具有顯著重要性，中俄友好關係讓中共得以將原先駐守北方的重兵重新部署到東南沿海，俄國對中共軍售提升了中共對台威脅之能力，另一方面，中俄重新結盟強化了美國對台之安全保障關係。最後，中俄雙方由強烈敵對轉變成繁盛的夥伴關係，關於此一雙邊關係被運用到兩岸關係上，其所操作之外交技巧應該是雙方都考慮過的。

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Abstract

The central argument of this paper is that the Sino-Russian strategic “partnership”, as sealed in a new Friendship Treaty on July 16, 2001, represents the best relationship between these two gigantic neighbors in nearly 50 years. It is an elite-initiated and elite-managed relationship, and the commercial dimension has been relatively modest and tightly controlled, but the strategic dimension has considerable potential, as indicated by extensive Russian arms and technology sales to the PRC. This partnership does not immediately impinge on the strategic interests of the United States, but its implications for Taiwan Strait relations are of considerable consequence. The friendship frees China to redeploy military forces from the north to the southeast, and arms sales enhance China’s threat to Taiwan. On the other hand, the resulting international realignment tends to strengthen US patronage of Taipei. Finally, the diplomatic techniques used to turn bitter bilateral enmity into a thriving partnership are considered with regard to their conceivable applicability to Taiwan-China relations.



Центральным тезисом данной работы является то, что китайско-российское стратегическое «партнёрство», как оно было обозначено в Договоре о дружбе от 16 июля 2001 года, представляет собой наиболее тесные отношения между двумя крупными соседями в течение последних 50 лет. Это – отношения, инициированные и контролируемые руководством обеих стран. Их экономическая составляющая остаётся достаточно скромной и жёстко контролируемой, стратегическая же составляющая обладает значительным потенциалом, что видно из существенного объёма военных и технологических продаж России КНР. Данное партнёрство не оказывает незамедлительного влияния на стратегические интересы США, но его последствия заметно скажутся на отношениях в Тайваньском проливе. Данные отношения позволяют Китаю передислоцировать свои военные силы с севера на юго-восток, а военные продажи России усугубляют угрозу Тайваню со стороны Китая. С другой стороны, вытекающее из этого перераспределение сил на международной арене приведет к укреплению американского патронажа над Тайванем. В заключение, дипломатические методы, использованные для превращения острой двусторонней вражды в процветающее партнёрство, рассматриваются по отношению к применению в области тайваньско-китайских отношений.

On July 16, 2001, Jiang Zemin arrived in Moscow to sign a 20-year Friendship Treaty

with Vladimir Putin, culminating a process of rapprochement in process for two decades. Unlike the 30-year treaty Mao signed with Stalin on February 16, 1950, this accord, reportedly drafted at Jiang's instigation, was no binding military alliance, and it was hence promptly dismissed by spokesmen of the American superpower whose overweening power it was implicitly meant to check. But in Article 9, the two agreed that if one party believes there is threat of aggression, they would confer about measures to be taken in common defense. The treaty provided for extended cooperation in aviation, space, nuclear, military and information technology. The two would also coordinate policy at the United Nations Security Council, in the World Bank, the IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Russian sales of advanced weapons to China, from which Russia had been earning an average of some \$1 billion per annum, would now increase in a two-phase, 15-year mutual security collaboration: In 2000-2005, China would spend up to \$15 billion to purchase 70 Su-30MKI superfighters, six more Sovremenny-class destroyers, two Typhoon-class nuclear missile submarines and eight upgraded Kilo-class diesel submarines; during the second phase (2005-2015), the two would cooperate in the development of next generation weaponry and technology (lasers, particle beams, intelligence-gathering satellites and other military space technology). Bilateral trade, it was envisaged, would expand apace, facilitated by the side-agreement on July 17 to construct a 2,400-mile pipeline to carry oil from the Russian Far East to China's northeastern provinces. (Together with India, China is the world's fastest-growing new market for petroleum products, its limited domestic supply having been overtaken since 1993 by GDP growth.)

Although this treaty was preceded by such lengthy and painstaking diplomatic preparation (e.g., the draft agreement was signed to Jiang and Yeltsin in December 1999, and Jiang met Putin no less than eight times over the past year to nail down various aspects of their new accord) that it raised neither banner headlines nor diplomatic eyebrows, from an historical perspective it is certainly noteworthy.¹ In the wake of an ideological schism culminating in violent border disputes in 1969-1970, Mao had predicted that the two countries would remain bitter enemies for at least a century, and yet within a decade of the Chairman's death they had initiated the long march toward reconciliation. With the longest and once most heavily fortified contiguous land border in the world (though only half as long as during the heyday of the Soviet Union),² with a tirelessly nurtured sense of (Chinese) grievance at the Russian history of imperialist depredations and unequal treaties, followed by some two decades of public polemics over the ideological and policy implications of the ideology they professed to share, reconciliation had seemed quite out of the question.

The wounds were deep, and "normalization" took from 1982-1989, culminating in Gorbachev's May visit to Beijing amid the Tiananmen protests. Yet scarcely had the old

1 The Sino-Soviet border was some 7,000 kilometers long. Since the disintegration of the USSR, it has contracted to 3,484 km, while the Sino-Kazakh border stretches for about 2,000 km., the Sino-Kyrgyz border for 1,000 km. and the border with Tajikistan is about 500 km. long.

2 Cf. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992); and L. Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., China's Quest for National Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

breach healed when divergent reactions to the "counterrevolutionary" paroxysm of 1989, which began abortively in Beijing but then swept through eastern Europe, brought the two countries to a seemingly irrevocable parting of the ways.³ Yet in the absence of attractive Western alternatives, the Russian leadership soon revisited the Chinese option. Bilateral summitry was resumed as early as November 1992, and by September 1994 the notion was first broached (by Moscow) of forming a "relationship of strategic cooperative partnership" [zhanlue xiezuo huoban guanxi].⁴ Although both countries have formed such "partnerships" with other countries as well, none has been so prominently featured or reinforced with such a multi-stranded institutionalization of exchanges and bilateral governmental and quasi-governmental ties. .

It is ironic but in a way fitting that Russia and China should find their way back together amid the ruins of the ideology they once shared. In a deeper sense they never really "shared" Marxism so much as fought over it, each claiming sovereign interpretive jurisdiction. If the first harbinger of the policy rationalization that would eventually bear fruit in the "reform and opening" policy may be perceived in the Sino-American rapprochement engineered under Mao in 1971-72, then surely the Sino-Soviet "normalization's" process undertaken by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s represents the extinction of the last vestiges of foreign policy radicalism. For though it may evoke a nostalgic twinge in the hearts of those who shared the dreams of an earlier era, reconciliation in no sense represents a return to "Sino-Soviet friendship."

Although our focus here is on the post-normalization era, in order to understand the origins and assess the staying power of the agreement we need to place it in the context of the historical events from which it emerged. Our story thus includes three periods. During the first, from 1984-1989, shared aspirations for socialist reform drew the two back together--albeit warily, due not only to their acrimonious bilateral history and continuing security concerns but to their quite different approaches to reform. The second phase, from 1989 to 1994, was one of considerable bilateral turbulence, amid the repercussions of Tiananmen and the collapse of the European Communist Party-states; only skilled diplomacy was able to retrieve the relationship. The period from 1994 through 2001, during which our plot reaches its climax, has witnessed a revival of foreign policy convergence based essentially on shared bilateral interests in the absence of either the strategic imperatives or the shared ideology that animated the relationship during previous honeymoons.

We shall proceed as follows. We begin with the big picture, depicting Sino-Russian relations since the end of the Cold War as the result of a dialectic between domestic political

³ It is fairly clear that Gorbachev's visit played some role in aggravating the Tiananmen protest, but China also played an important if indirect role in the collapse of Soviet and Eastern European communism, essentially by eliminating mass repression as a morally acceptable option. Cf. Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110: 4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 501-519.

⁴ See the thoughtful analysis by Li Jingjie, "Shilun zhong'e zhanlue zhanlue xiezuo huoban guanxi," *Dong'ou zhongya yanjiu* [East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies](Beijing), no. 2 (1997), pp. 3-15.

needs and international strategic realities. The second and third sections are focused respectively on economic exchanges and on diplomatic intercourse. The final section is focused on the impact of the Sino-Russian partnership on the Taiwan Strait problematic. .

Strategic Coordination

The relationship found a new strategic rationale in the early 1990s after being badly shaken by collapse of the Soviet bloc at the turn of the decade. During the waning years of the Cold War, strategic considerations still conformed to a "triangular" logic--meaning that each bilateral relationship was contingent upon each actor's relations with the third.⁵ Whereas Sino-Soviet antagonism could be successfully manipulated by Washington in the early 1970s, during the early 1980s Reagan's revival of the strategic arms race with the "evil empire" enabled China to become a "free rider," reducing arms spending by some 7 percent per annum as a proportion of GDP from 1979 to 1989 without perceptible loss of security. The economic burdens of the arms race eventually led to a revival of Soviet-American detente, however, beginning with the INF treaty (December 1987) and continuing through the START talks (START I signed July 1991), which for the first time achieved significant strategic arms reductions. Meanwhile Sino-Soviet normalization talks began in 1982, followed by a relatively steady if not spectacular growth in trade and cultural contacts. This process, held to a funereal tempo by a Chinese leadership intent on wringing preliminary concessions (viz., the "three fundamental obstacles") from their old adversaries, finally culminated in normalization with Gorbachev's May 1989 Beijing summit. But while a three-way *ménage à trois* facilitated world peace and commerce it also deprived the triangle of its strategic *raison d'être*, and it disappeared as a strategic calculus quite promptly upon the disintegration of the Soviet Union in December 1991. In any event, Soviet-American reconciliation was logically foreseeable, for the 1982-1989 period when the triangle was last operational was one of "romantic" triangularity that placed Beijing, the least powerful member of the triad, at the pivot, from which it could manipulate the other two. The question is why Soviet-American reconciliation did not precipitate another Sino-Soviet split, given Chinese paranoia about collusion between the two superpowers.

That this did not occur was in part due to the diplomatic skill of the Chinese leadership, who carefully preserved the relationship amid storm and stress, and partly to supervening domestic political imperatives. Both countries' economies were running aground after pushing the limits of "extensive development" under command planning--the Soviet Union after years of stagnation under Brezhnev, China after radical Maoism had reached its dead end in the Cultural Revolution. Thus fresh leadership teams in both Moscow and Beijing were inclined to retreat from costly external commitments and turn to the process of internal restructuring. Because their reform effort was directed against quite similar, indeed structurally isomorphic political-economic systems, there was still a sense that they might learn from each other. Because China was first to experiment with reform in 1978, much of

5 Cf. Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics*, 33: 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-516; also Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization*.

the initial learning was on the part of the Soviet Union. Yet China also paid close attention to Soviet experiments, and in fact the liberalization that led to the 1986 and 1989 protest movements was sparked partly by the demonstration effect of the more prepossessing Soviet political restructuring (*perestroika*) project. This "learning" was selective and ultimately led in divergent directions, but the fact that both countries were engaged in analogous socioeconomic reforms and genuinely interested in each other's experience helped for the time being to orchestrate their detente, preventing the Soviet-American rapprochement that began at Reikjavik from eclipsing Sino-Soviet normalization--although the personal chemistry between Reagan and Gorbachev was clearly stronger than that between Gorbachev and Deng, or for that matter between Deng and Reagan.

Sino-Soviet relations from the May 1989 summit until the dissolution of the Union in December 1991 may be subdivided into roughly four stages. In the first, from June to October 1989, Beijing was ostracized from the international community, and the Soviets seemed poised to profit from Beijing's indignant flouting of Western sanctions. During the second stage, from October 1989 through the spring of 1990, relations frayed in the light of Chinese (internal) criticisms of Gorbachev for "deviating from the path of socialism" and contributing to the collapse of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe. During the third stage, which can be dated from Li Peng's April 1990 visit to Moscow, Chinese leaders decided that despite their reservations about Gorbachev, he was "least worst" of an increasingly unpalatable array of options. In the fourth stage, beginning with the Gulf War (January-February 1991), Sino-Soviet relations revived in response to a US-proclaimed "new world order" that both deemed threatening, moving toward an informal alignment without formal alliance. Renewed amity was momentarily threatened by the the August coup and by recriminations over the ensuing dissolution of the Soviet Union into 15 separate republics, but skilled diplomacy salvaged the (now ideologically neutered) relationship.

Part of the reason for Chinese flexibility was that if Beijing did not promptly forgive and forget Moscow's apostasy, many alternatives seemed available: there appeared to be every likelihood of reconciling the old Russo-Japanese territorial dispute (involving three small islands and a tiny archipelago north of Hokkaido) and signing a peace treaty with Japan; South Korea had just granted Moscow a \$3 billion concessionary loan (in gratitude for diplomatic recognition), and Taiwan briefly established consular relations with Latvia and very nearly exchanged ambassadors with the Ukraine before being deterred by PRC diplomats. The new mood in the Kremlin under Yeltsin and Kozyrev was decidedly anticommunist and prodemocratic; these were the iconoclasts who had been least favored by Chinese Kremlin-watchers, and who in turn (plausibly) suspected the CCP of favoring if not supporting the August 1991 coup conspirators. Kozyrev, who cherished hopes of Russia's joining NATO, even criticized China for human rights violations during his March 1992 visit. Though shunned by the West and in no mood to lose Moscow just because it had "changed color," Beijing was apprehensive lest successful reform in the new Russia should lure foreign direct investment from China and undermine the CCP's increasingly performance-based legitimacy.

Yet Russia's Westward "tilt" was based on domestic rather than strategic considerations, which would dictate a more geostrategically balanced posture; moreover, the well-institutionalized network of ties with China was not to be so easily swept aside. The leading Western industrial powers, still overburdened with debt in the wake of the arms race and another oil price shock, were far less munificent with financial support than had been expected; only Germany, now reunified thanks largely to Gorbachev's refusal to invoke the Brezhnev Doctrine, made substantial subventions to Russian economic development (over US\$20 billion in 1993 alone). The most decisive domestic consideration was of course that the "double bang" of marketization and privatization in a democratic political context proved so utterly unsuccessful, at least in the short run, at reviving the Russian economy, which went into free fall: real GDP declined 13 percent in 1991, 19 percent in 1992, 12 percent in 1993, and 15 percent in 1994. Yeltsin's emergent political rivals, both on the left (Zuganov and the revived communist party) and the right (Zhirinovskiy, Lebed) challenged his nationalist bona fides. In the West, Russia had become a diplomatic nonentity, completely excluded for example from any role in resolving the Yugoslav imbroglio, finally invited to the "Group of Seven" but only as an observer; in the Middle East, Russian arms were discredited (and an erstwhile Soviet ally defeated) in the Gulf War. Even in the Far East, illusions of new breakthroughs were soon dispelled: negotiations with Japan seemed to hold promise of a territorial compromise based on Khrushchev's (never implemented) 1958 agreement (essentially splitting the four northern islands), but military and local opposition to such a deal proved unexpectedly vigorous, and Yeltsin skirted the issue during his long-delayed October 1993 visit to Tokyo, dashing widespread expectations. With regard to Korea, Russia's abandonment of Pyongyang precluded involvement in the four-power talks, and even after normalization of relations between Moscow and Seoul in 1990, South Korean businessmen saw little intrinsic value (and considerable risk) in Siberian infrastructure investments. The 1997 enlargement of NATO to include three former satellites in Eastern Europe (rather than disbanding it, as Moscow did the Warsaw Pact Organization), largely a product of American election-year constituency politics rather than any realistically conceived security threat, was just the last straw. Kozyrev was replaced in 1995 by Yevgeny Primakov, former specialist on the Middle East (later chair of the Institute of the Far East) with a background in intelligence work. "China is the most important state for us," Yeltsin announced at a Kremlin meeting in July 1995. "It is a neighbor, with which we share the longest border in the world and with which we are destined to live and work side by side forever." During an April 1996 summit in Beijing the two sides signed a joint statement endorsing a "strategic partnership directed to the 21st century" (a formulation the Chinese claim was initiated by the Soviets, who had to be dissuaded from an alliance), in order to promote the emerging multipolar structure of the world and oppose hegemony by any one power.

What is the domestic political base of the new partnership, and what international strategic goals will it pursue? The domestic base is first of all one of considerable potential economic complementarity. China needs an infusion of high-tech weaponry, and while Russian equipment may not be electronically state-of-the-art neither should it be underestimated; certainly it is much cheaper than comparable US hardware, and the Russians

have been willing to be quite flexible with payment and licensing arrangements. Among China's top economic priorities is the resuscitation of its State Owned Enterprise sector, to which the sale of Russian heavy machinery--usually compatible with the old equipment, supplied by the USSR in the early 1950s--can contribute, and these in fact comprise up to 20 percent of Russian exports. Russia also has wide experience in hydroelectric power projects and nuclear energy development (notwithstanding Chernobyl). In terms of demand, the Russian Far East provides a convenient job market for unskilled Chinese migratory workers (i.e., contract workers), light industrial commodities and food. Second, in terms of bureaucratic politics, there is a sizable bloc of Russian "returned students" currently in leadership posts in the PRC, led by Jiang Zemin and Li Peng; they are representative of a generation of now powerful senior cadres who look back at the Sino-Soviet alliance with fond memories. Of course it is no longer the same Russia or for that matter the same China, yet the fact remains that there is a sizable cohort of high- and middle-level cadres and engineers who spent their formative years in the Soviet Union, assimilating values and sentiments as well as skills.

The base of Russia's political interest in China has shifted kaleidoscopically over the years, from ambitious young reformers in the late 1980s to a "red-brown" coalition of communists and nationalists in the wake of Tiananmen. Though there is perhaps still an ideologically based core of support for pro-China policy (or more generally pro-Asia policy, whose supporters tend to endorse a "turn" from the West in favor of closer relations with the "near abroad" central Asian republics as well as to the Pacific Rim), in the economically strapped 1990s the pro-China lobby has grown beyond ideological boundaries. Specifically, the following groups tend to support the "partnership": (1) The military-industrial complex, for whom China is still their largest customer, and heavy industry more generally (e.g., the machine tool industry, oil and gas companies, the nuclear and hydropower industries), for the same reason. (2) The state trading companies who, since the 1994 Russian tariff and immigration legislation, have regained monopoly control over bilateral trade. (3) Regional governors, though vociferously opposed to territorial concessions, have grown dependent on the Chinese economy as a locomotive for their own economies: as the Russian economic collapse destroyed their principal market and source of consumer commodities, and trade with China boomed, even if the products are of poor quality or overpriced. Those who can still afford it now go to Dalian or Beijing to shop, to Beidaiho for summer vacations--far more convenient than European Russia.

In terms of strategy, the fading relevance of the triangle makes economic cooperation, even strategic coordination, innocuous and risk-free. Indeed, the "partnership" documents stipulate that they are aimed at no third party. This is a bit disingenuous, as the references to opposing hegemony and promoting multipolarity are quite pointed, but it would be going too far to claim that the only purpose of the partnership is to bait the Yankees, for it does have an intrinsic utility. Its greatest value may be bilateral, i.e., simply improving relationships between two of the largest countries in the world. It has already proved itself in this regard, in the sense that both countries have now survived delicate leadership transitions (one a system transformation) with clear implications for each other's legitimacy (no less than

Khrushchev's 1956 repudiation of Stalin had implications for the legitimacy of Maoist authority), without lapsing into public polemics. The successful border demarcation, the mutual force reductions and confidence-building measures promise to make the world's longest and most volatile border as peaceful and stable as that between Canada and the United States. The agreements to detarget strategic weapons, mutual nonaggression and non-first use of nuclear weapons against each other, are merely specifications of the general understanding that both sides will try to resolve conflicts through negotiation, try not to make problems for the other side and try to consult when problems arise. Trade, tourism, and mutual investment are being cultivated to build a reciprocal dependency at the mass level as stable as the now well-institutionalized network of diplomatic and political-military exchanges at the elite level. True, the rhetoric of "learning" from one another seems to have vanished (though both sides continue to support academic and military educational exchanges), except in a negative sense (in China's case), but the assiduous mutual cultivation of national interests may prove a more realistic basis for amity than the will-o'-the-wisp of ideological solidarity.

If the partnership were purely bilateral it would not be "strategic"--nor would it be of much concern to regional security contingency planners. Thus it also has multilateral strategic implications. Their concerted refusal to support international sanctions against the DPRK during the early phases of the effort to prevent Pyongyang from developing nuclear weapons suggests that both nations share a concern with the rim of nuclear threshold countries (viz., Japan, South Korea) on their eastern periphery. Similarly, Beijing concerted with Moscow to decry the December 1998 Anglo-British bombing of Iraq, a former Soviet client with which China has signed a multibillion dollar Ahdaba oil field exploration agreement. For China, neutralization of the border issue permits a reorientation of its military structure from the north to the southeast, and from the infantry to "force projection" arms in the navy and air force.⁶ In the context of a continually waxing PLA budget amply subsidized by a burgeoning economy, this reorientation has particular relevance for Japan, Korea, and Southeast Asia, which depend on sea lanes of communication through the busy South China Sea. The implications of China's more muscular presence in this area were driven home by the PLAN's challenge to the Philippines at Mischief Reef in the Spratleys in early 1995, and by the "test" missile shots off the coast of Taiwan in 1995-1996. (It has also been used as a scapegoat for the reformulation of the Japanese-American security treaty in April 1996 to include shared responsibility for peacekeeping in the Taiwan Straits, though that reformulation began much earlier and was aimed at North Korea.) China's relations with India and Vietnam have also been affected by the partnership, in the sense that both of these former Soviet clients have been thrown upon their own resources vis-à-vis the PRC (the

6 From 1980 to 1992, the army declined from 80.9 percent of the total proportion of the PLA to 5.9 percent, while the navy and air force increased from 8.1-8.6 percent and from 11-15.5 percent respectively, to some extent also reflecting the appointment of Liu Huaqing as vice-chair of the powerful CMC. Liu, former commander in chief of the Navy and a disciple of former Soviet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov's "naval power" theory, has reemphasized the importance of the sea as a "strategic space," and he has shifted focus to building larger and more specialized surface warships, modernizing the naval air force (now perhaps more advanced than the PLAAF), and equipping naval infantry with larger, faster mobile assault ships. Yihong Zhang, "China Heads Toward Blue Waters," *International Defense Review*, 26: no. 11 (November 1, 1993), p. 879.

Russian arms bazaar remains open). Similarly, China's access to markets and resources (including vast oil reserves) in Central Asia has been considerably facilitated by the replacement of the USSR with the far looser Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

From the Russian strategic perspective, Asia has gained importance since the Cold War, following secession of the protective glacis of Eastern European satellites, the Baltic states, Ukraine and Belorussia: though still preferring to consider itself "Western" in terms of national identity, the Russian Federation (RF) now defines itself geopolitically as a land bridge between Europe and Asia. And it has become clear that China and India are the twin pillars of Moscow's Asia policy. These may be supplemented as the opportunity presents itself, of course: thus Moscow's relations with Tokyo improved considerably after the November 1997 Krasnoyarsk "tieless" summit, reviving the prospect of Russo-Japanese rapprochement. Russia has gained entree to the ASEAN Regional Forum and finally (late 1998) to APEC, and has opened a consulate in Chinese Hong Kong (from which it was excluded before 1997). True, Russia has had to make certain concessions to Beijing in terms of refraining from democracy sermons (Moscow now votes to prevent China's condemnation by the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva) as well as nonrecognition of Taiwan--yet neither represents a real sacrifice--indeed trade relations with Taiwan have expanded considerably: Russo-Taiwan trade amounted to US\$1.2 billion in 1995, vs. only \$5 billion with China; Taiwan opened a trade office in Moscow in 1994, Moscow opened one in Taipei in 1996.

Economic Exchanges

The trade and other economic exchanges that flourished in the 1950s were all but completely suspended after Khrushchev's unilateral withdrawal of Soviet advisors in 1960, not to resume again on any scale until the mid-1980s. The economic sanctions against China after Tiananmen (the value of all Western investment in China dropped 22 percent during the first half of 1990) provided a fillip for both planned and free (i.e., border, often barter) trade: total bilateral trade turnover was US\$3.95 billion for 1989, representing an 18 percent hike over 1988's \$3.26 billion). Having increased a cumulative 1.5 times in the course of the 1980s, the Soviet Union had become China's 5th largest trade partner, with some 8 percent of China's total trade.

Although total Soviet foreign trade dropped by 6.4 percent for 1990, Sino-Soviet trade volume increased to \$5.3 billion, a quarter of which was border trade: in the vacuum created by Western sanctions, the Soviet Union overtook Germany as China's fourth largest trade partner. The Chinese State Council approved the designation of the town of Heihe in northern Heilongjiang, which overlooks Blagoveshchensk (the third largest city in the Soviet Far East) across the Amur/Heilong River, as a special economic region in order to facilitate its function as a conduit or entrepot. More than 200 cooperative projects were initialed between localities of the two countries, and China dispatched some 15,000 citizens to the Soviet Far East for labor service; some 20 Sino-Soviet joint ventures were established in the USSR and a few in the PRC--Soviet personnel even got involved in cocoa production on Hainan Island! There

were also some 300 exchanges of Scientific and technological delegations in 1990. The USSR sent some 809 exchange students to China between 1980-1990, while 1,307 Chinese post-graduate students went to study in the USSR.

As agreed in Li Peng's 1990 visit, on January 1, 1991 trade was transformed from escrow trade to trade based on cash settlement. Though this liberated trade from government regulation, the lack of foreign exchange in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the PRC entailed a reduction of program trade to \$3.9 billion in 1991. Yet border trade, still on a barter basis, boomed as never before. In recognition of Soviet economic difficulties, China agreed to extend US\$715 million to the USSR for the purchase of badly needed Chinese agricultural commodities, reversing the old patron-client relationship.

Despite the collapse of the USSR, trade continued to soar in 1991-1993, reaching \$5.8 billion in 1992 and \$7.8 billion in 1993. The first economic and trade agreement since the breakup of the Union was signed in early March 1992; whereas lack of hard currency continued to hinder program trade (the trade balance was in China's favor, but China could not offer much credit due to its own budget deficit), border trade increased by 44 percent over 1991 levels as Russian Far East consumers looked for alternatives to their own collapsing distribution network. Closure of huge arms factories in the wake of the end of the Cold War brought 30 percent unemployment rates in some towns and a reorientation of the economy to Pacific markets.⁷ In May 1992 three economic development zones (similar to the SEZs) were established in Urumqi, Shiheizi and Kuitun in Xinjiang to lure foreign capital, all sited on the Eurasia railway near the inner Asian Islamic countries; similar arrangements were planned for Suifenhe in Heilongjiang, Huichun in Jilin, and Manzhouli in Inner Mongolia. In obvious emulation, Moscow dubbed Vladivostok an "open city" in early 1992, welcoming not only Chinese but Korean and Japanese capital and technology. Chinese "special households" [getihu] were at this time permitted to travel visa-free to the adjoining republics, and thousands of Chinese traders [chelnoki] began shuttling back and forth selling Chinese leather jackets, down coats, and wool sweaters in Siberia (trains from Beijing started arriving in Irkutsk three times weekly), small tractors in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, and whatnot; these traders came home with tales of dismal economic conditions across the border, which got great media play. But Russians, Ukrainians and others also began flocking into China to sell their wares out of duffle bags and accumulate enough currency to purchase consumer goods to take home and resell at a profit: they came in such numbers that "Foreign Guest Special Business Counters" had to be set up at two Beijing markets (Hongqiao and Dongdaqiao) to "avoid disorder." Thus the entire sixth floor of the Guotai Hotel was turned into a sort of mini-mall, with all doors open and all rooms filled with clothing for sale to Russian customers in scale. By 1993 much of the commercial activity became centered at Yabao Lu, near Ritan, where bulk sales were made for transshipment on cargo planes. Economic exchanges came to include labor as well as commodities, as local labor organizations in northern China recruited and hired out gangs of lumberjacks, vegetable farmers, and construction workers--by the summer of 1992, some 20,000 Chinese workers

7 Cf. Judith Thornton, "Recent Trends in Russia's Far East," *Comparative Economic Studies*, 37: 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 79-86.

were working in Siberia.

The Russians, however indebted to the Chinese for selling them commodities at a time of dire need, soon took exception to the shabby quality of Chinese merchandise and the alleged sharp bargaining practices of Chinese merchants. Beginning in 1991 the indigenous population of the Far East began to shrink due to the growing income gap between European and Asian Russia, comprising more more than a quarter million out-migrants in a single year (1992); against this background, the sudden influx of Chinese workers or traders (allegedly including large numbers of criminals) took on a threatening aspect. According to Chinese statistics, border crossings amounted to 1.38 million in 1992 and 1.76 million at their peak in 1993. For the Russians, the central issue was not how many were crossing but how many were staying: estimates in the Russian press of Chinese illegal residents ran as high as 1 million in the Far East and 2 million nationally in 1994, versus Chinese estimates of 1,000-2,000 (official, "objective" figures are unavailable).⁸ The border trade, which reached as high as \$2 billion in 1993, was heavily imbalanced in China's favor, though conducted largely through barter and hence at no loss of foreign exchange; it raised a storm of protest from the Russian business sectors whose sales were impacted. Thus in February 1994 Russia enacted new import duties and visa requirements (with full PRC concurrence) to regulate the uncontrolled influx of both commodities and people.

This caused Russo-Chinese trade to plunge by nearly 40 percent in the first half of 1994. In 1995 it began to recover, reaching \$5.1 billion that year and \$6.85 billion in 1996; but in 1997 it sank to \$6.12 billion, and in 1998 dropped another 7 percent in the wake of the November 1997 devaluation of the ruble. But by 2000 it was back up to nearly \$8 billion, and is projected to reach a record \$10 billion in 2001. Though total trade has been disappointing, approximating barely half of Yeltsin's announced goal of \$20 billion by the millenium, border trade now constitutes only 12-14 percent of the total (restoring the monopoly of the large Russian trading companies) and the trade balance has been sharply redressed in Russia's favor (e.g., a surplus of \$1.7 billion in 1996). Although China's trade with Russia is only a small fraction of its trade with the US, for Russia China is among its most important trade partners.

Reciprocal direct investment has hitherto been much more modest, due to meager accumulations of export capital on both sides and to the risky Russian investment climate (e.g., in 1995 Russia invested US\$22 million in China, China \$40 million in Russia). The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy won a \$3.5 billion contract in 1997 to build a nuclear

⁸ Despite a current labor shortage, given the very sparse population in Russia's Asian region (about 8 million people, a number that has shrunk by perhaps a million since 1991 via outmigration), juxtaposed to some 120 million on the Chinese side, illegal immigration is viewed by Russia as not just irritating but strategically dangerous to its future claim on the territory. Cf. Won Bae Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East: A Porous Border," *Asian Survey*, 34: 12 (December, 1994), pp. 1064-1077.

power reactor and an attached uranium-enrichment facility for making nuclear fuel in in eastern China; construction has been basically completed by the turn of the century. Russia also made a bid for Three Gorges contracts, losing out however to a European firm with more generous credit arrangements. There have been agreements to cobuild several pipelines, one to transport natural gas from the Irkutsk region and oil from East Siberia to China, the other to transport gas from Outer Mongolia to East Asia; also joint construction of a bridge linking Heihe to Blagoveshchensk, and a second transcontinental railway linking China to central Asia along the ancient silk route (through Xinjiang and Kazakhstan). Chinese ambitions to jointly develop the Tumen River basin have been dashed by Russia's waning enthusiasm since 1993 for a project that would give China direct access to the Sea of Japan, which the Russian navy still deems a strategic redoubt.

One facet of the economic exchange has clearly battened on the post-Tiananmen sanctions: military technology and equipment. Deprived of American arms since 1989, the Chinese turned back to the Russians, from whom much of their original hardware came and which hence offered advantages in terms of compatibility of parts. From the perspective of Chinese interests this in fact may have been one of the relationship's saving graces, appealing to precisely those "leftists" who were otherwise most critical of the Gorbachev regime. General Xu Xin, deputy chief of the PLA General Staff, accompanied Li Peng on his ice-breaking (April 23-26) 1990 visit, and on May 30, this was followed up by a military delegation led by Liu Huaqing, vice-chair of the CCP's all-powerful Central Military Commission (CMC) (and 1958 graduate of the Voroshilov Naval Academy in Leningrad), to discuss the transfer of military technology. During Liu's meeting with Soviet Defense Minister Dimitri Yazov (the highest level military contact since the early 1960s), the Soviets indicated that they would be willing to provide help in the modernization of Chinese defense plants constructed on the basis of Soviet technology in the 1950s, at bargain prices. This visit coincided with the Chinese decision to cancel a US\$550 million deal with the United States for avionics to upgrade 50 Chinese F-8 fighters, the first such deal to be considered since Tiananmen. It was reciprocated on June 1 by the first Soviet army delegation to visit China in 30 years. By fall 1990 China had agreed to buy 24 troop-carrying helicopters from the USSR capable of operating in high-altitude climates (the US had refused to consider selling such weapons systems, which seemed ideal for operations in Tibet).

Soviet global arms sales dropped "catastrophically" in the wake of the Gulf war, where Soviet weaponry was seen to be so completely outclassed by high-tech American munitions. Inasmuch as military equipment was the second largest item in the Soviet export repertory (after petroleum products), continued Chinese interest was particularly welcome at this point⁹. As the Russian economic catastrophe deepened in the late 1990s the military-industrial complex became dependent on foreign sales to maintain serial production,

⁹ Russia's export of tanks in 1992 dropped 79-fold, sales of combat aircraft fell 1.5 times in comparison to 199, leaving warehouses of the military-industrial complex overstocked with unsold weapons. China was the principal buyer of Russian weapons in 1992, making purchases worth US\$1.8 billion. Pavel Felgengauer, "Arms Exports Continue to Fall," *Sogodnya* (Moscow), July 13, 1993, p. 3

as the fiscally strapped Russian government could not afford new commissions; Russian officers began joking about the prospect of facing a Chinese military better equipped with Russian weapons than they were. Negotiations for the purchase of Sukhoi SU-27 fighters, under way since early 1990, culminated in the purchase of 26 at a "friendship" price of more than US\$1 billion (about 35 percent of which China could pay in hard currency, the rest in barter goods), with an option to buy an additional forty-eight; the Chinese also ordered an unconfirmed number of MiG-31 high-altitude interceptors, stimulated by India's recent purchase of this model. In March 1992 China also took delivery of the highly sophisticated S-300 anti-aircraft missile system and SA-10 anti-tactical ballistic missile missiles. Shortly afterward Russia's Mikoyan design bureau submitted a proposal to Beijing for the joint development of military aircraft, envisaging joint development of a new Chinese fighter incorporating the strengths of both the MiG-29 and MiG-31. The Chinese have also expressed interest in procuring an aircraft carrier, "Backfire" bombers (or refueling technology to give Chinese bombers a range of more than 1,000 miles), and Soviet space technology; the Soviets expressed reciprocal interest in learning from the Chinese experience in "defense industry conversion" (their own such efforts having been badly mismanaged). Beginning in the second half of the year, China agreed to send military personnel to study in the Soviet union: the first contingent of pilots was sent in June 1992 to undergo a one-and-one-half year training course. Other sources indicate that by 1993 more than 1,000 Russian military experts were based in China by "private" contractual arrangement, helping that country to modernize its nuclear and missile capabilities.

Chinese purchases of Russian weaponry continued to weigh heavily in the composition of trade--in November 1996 the two sides signed a bilateral defense cooperation pact, and in December China purchased two diesel-powered (Kilo-class) submarines, two Sovremenniy-class destroyers with accompanying Sunburn anti-ship missiles, an additional 24 SU-27 fighters (bringing the total up to 50), and a license to produce 200 more (as Chinese F-11s) in an aircraft factory in Shenyang. Russian defense exports to China totalled \$2.1 billion in 1996, comprising nearly 70 percent of China's foreign arms purchases.⁹ But Russia also attempted to sell nonmilitary big-ticket items, as questions began to be raised about the wisdom of rearming a once and possibly future security threat--thus some 25 percent of the Chinese aircraft pool is now Russian.¹⁰ The Russians dismiss Western concerns that their weapon sales might upset the military balance in East Asia, downplaying any Chinese threat and claiming that if they do not sell arms to the PRC some other country will, with the worst conceivable consequences for Russian security (perhaps forgetting that in the 1969 border clashes, both sides used Russian weapons). Motivated basically by commercial considerations, the Russians have offered to sell Taiwan the same weapons it sells mainland China, including Kilo-class submarines.

9 Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Soviet Relations," Harvard International Review, Winter 1996-97, pp. 26-29.

10 Cf. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia," Pacific Affairs, 67: 4 (Winter, 1994), pp. 495-513.

Diplomatic Dialogue

The pattern of the diplomatic dialogue was established during the "normalization" negotiations in the 1980s. Beginning in 1982, these were held on a regular biannual schedule, alternating between Moscow and Beijing in the spring and fall of each year, usually involving the same team of officials on either side. Negotiating breakthroughs were few and incremental, but the regularized reciprocal meeting forum provided an institutionalized base to which a series of other negotiations, at both lower and higher levels, could be added, ultimately leading to the exchange at the foreign minister level and to the 1989 summit. The "normalization" achieved in June 1989 was of Party-to-Party relations, as state-to-state relations had never been breached, even amid the furor of the Cultural Revolution. "Normalcy" was thus fleeting indeed, as the CPSU self-destructed in the wake of the abortive August 1991 coup attempt.

The CPC lost little time crying over spilt milk (their panic lest "The present of the Soviet Union is the future of China"--as the old slogan had it--being to some extent alleviated by a certain Schadenfreude at seeing their old nemesis come to grief), and both sides quickly came to grips with the new diplomatic status quo. The Russian Federation (RF) made clear its intention to continue to foster good relations with China and to honor all international commitments undertaken by the USSR, and the PRC reciprocated. In January 1992 Premier Li Peng met with Boris Yeltsin during a session of the UN Security Council in New York, both pledging to strengthen cooperation and contacts. On March 16-17 the new Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev--the highest-level visitor since Gorbachev--visited China to discuss developing new channels between the two countries, and in August Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev met with Chinese Defense Minister Qin Jiwei in the first such meeting since dissolution of the Union to discuss military cooperation and arms sales. This culminated in another summit, as Yeltsin made his maiden voyage to Beijing on December 17-19, 1992, resulting in no less than 25 agreements in areas ranging from trade to tourist exchanges and arms reduction. Among the most important was a Joint Declaration on Principles of Relations, in which the two pledged not to join any alliance directed against the other side, not to let third parties use their territory to the detriment of the other side's security, and not to use force or threat of force against each other. Very quickly the diplomatic relationship thickened, as a series of bilateral meeting forums were established and regularized.

Although Sino-American summitry in 1997-1998 evoked triangular suspicions of collusion from some Russian strategic analysts (while in the US, Jiang told his hosts that "in China we perceive a multipolar world concept somewhat differently from those in Russia"), in November 1998 Jiang held his first "tieless" or informal summit with an ailing Yeltsin in a Moscow hospital, which reemphasized Sino-Russian solidarity. Moscow uttered the "three nos" against Taiwan as requested by Beijing, and the two sides reviewed the issues raised in their joint statement, "Russian-Chinese Relations on the Threshold of the 21st Century," issued two and a half years ago, and discussed the now growing levels of bilateral trade. In December 1999, the two signed the first draft of a joint friendship treaty, which was

formalized in July 2001.

Whereas diplomatic intercourse has become routinized or even ritualized--indeed, in 1996 a joint preparatory commission was set up (under vice premier Li Lanqing and Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Bolyshakov) just to arrange regular meetings of heads of government--it is not thereby devoid of substance. The agreements reached have been noteworthy in establishing a new regime of military cooperation, mutual force reduction and border demarcation.

Substantial progress on mutual force reduction had already been achieved under Gorbachev, following his addresses on Asia policy at Vladivostok (1986) and Khabarovsk (1988). Yeltsin at the 1992 summit proposed a mutual but gradual demilitarization (thus avoiding the dislocation produced by rapid withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Europe) to the minimal number of troops required for peaceful border patrolling (currently numbering some 200,000). This has permitted both countries to regroup, as China shifts its military focus to Taiwan and the South China Sea and Russia addresses the security threat created by the expansion of NATO. The most significant developments since 1992 have been the five-power agreements between China and Russia and the three bordering central Asian republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) signed in Beijing in April 1996 and Moscow in April 1997. In the former, both sides agreed on mutual force reduction and military confidence-building measures on their borders, agreeing to restrict military activity to a depth of 100 kilometers along the frontiers. The latter established a "zone of stability" restricting military activity to a depth of 100 km along the frontier, and is particularly significant in allowing China to develop regional ties and to be a recognized participant in regional security arrangements.

There had been agreement in principle (e.g., Moscow accepted the Thalweg or deepest part of the main channel as the "line" dividing the Ussuri/Wussuli and Amur/Heilungjiang rivers) on the borders by the May 1989 summit, though precise demarcation remained to be specified. Gorbachev and Jiang Zemin, during their April-May 1991 Moscow summit, signed an agreement "delimiting" the eastern borders in which China gained sovereignty of the symbolically significant one-square-mile Damansky/Chenbao Island (where the 1969 clash had started) and other territory on the Chinese side of the channel. Demarcation was conducted during the next seven years over the vociferous objections of local Russian politicians.¹¹ At the November 1997 Beijing summit, the two sides signed a demarcation treaty for the eastern sector, including an agreement suspending the sovereignty issue for joint development of three still disputed small islands on the Amur/Heilong River (including Heixia/Black Bear Island); at the November 1998 hospital summit both sides were finally able to express satisfaction that both eastern and western sections of the border had been accurately demarcated. (It is however noteworthy that China turned down Russia's request

¹¹ E.g., Yevgenii Nazdratenko, governor of Russia's Maritime Province/ Primorskii Krai, said in February 1995 that the treaty, signed in 1991 and ratified in 1992, was unjust and that Russia should scrap it. Xinhua (Moscow), February 27, 1995. According to Russian foreign policy officials the three areas in dispute are of only symbolic significance, altogether amounting to a few square kilometers.

that the border treaties be negotiated in perpetuity, insisting on a renewal clause for 2010.)¹²

Implications for the Taiwan Strait

Although (unlike the Sino-American case) Taiwan was no more than a peripheral factor in Sino-Russian reconciliation, the partnership has at least three implications for cross-Strait relations. First and most obviously, this reinforces Russian support of Beijing's diplomatic position on reunification, thereby dispelling any conceivable hope that the fall of the iron curtain might provide greater room for maneuver for Taipei's resistance to Beijing's terms. Throughout the foreign policy vicissitudes of the post-communist regime, Moscow has never been less than fully supportive of Beijing's position on Taiwan, nor has it ever given a hint of support to Taipei. The only distinction from its Soviet predecessor is that post-communist Russia has begun a modest amount of informal trade with Taiwan. Yeltsin loyally reiterated Clinton's "three nos" in 1989, and Moscow has frequently reasserted its support of Beijing's reunification proposals and echoed PRC denunciations of American weapons sales to Taiwan.

Second, Sino-Russian reconciliation, specifically the agreements reached in 1996 and 1997 to demilitarize the borders and institute confidence building measures, made it possible for the PLA to redeploy the troops and equipment previously concentrated along the Russian border to the southeastern coast facing Taiwan, which has within the past decade become China's most heavily fortified frontier. And, much as Washington has functioned as Taipei's chief weapons merchant and security guarantor of last resort, Moscow plays the same role for Beijing. According to all accounts, the majority of Beijing's ambitious recent series of weapons purchases have been oriented to the contingency of war in the Taiwan Strait. China's recent acquisition of Kilo-class diesel submarines, added to an existing force of some 64, would obviously be useful in any attempt to blockade the island (Taiwan has a trade dependency ratio of over 100%). The Sovremenny-class destroyers, with Sunburn missiles, were originally designed to kill (or deter) aircraft carriers, hitherto the chief American counter to Chinese coercive diplomacy. The steady buildup (currently estimated at 250, growing by increments of some 50 per year) of Chinese DF-11 and DF-15 short-range surface-to-surface missiles with improved guidance systems offers the prospect of inflicting a crippling preemptive blow on the island's defense facilities and destroying much of its technologically advanced air force on the ground. China's acquisition of the S-300 surface-to-air missile system is intended to protect its Fujian bases. Beijing's plans for the use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue may select among a range of strategic options, each of which rely heavily upon advanced Russian weaponry. And perhaps not only hardware: according to rumors preceding Putin's summer 2000 Beijing summit, Moscow offered China direct military assistance in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. That tallies with a report that in its February 12-16, 2001 military exercises Russia war-gamed its forces to support China's invasion of Taiwan by threatening US bases in South Korea and Japan with nuclear missile strikes. Though such reports strain credulity—what would Russia have to gain by aligning against the US on behalf of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?—they were not denied by

12 Stephen Blank, "Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?" *Orbis*, 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 345-360.

either Russian or Chinese officials.

The third implication is that in terms of strategic geometry, it is at least a gesture toward a return to the triangular pattern of the 1950s, with the Eurasian heartland locked in an embrace against the American superpower. Certainly there are many important differences between the Sino-Russian friendship treaty of 2001 and its antecedent of half a century ago: there is no coherent ideology or common foreign policy mission binding the two, and both have such strong economic interests at stake in their relationship with the US that there is no assurance that either will not abandon the other for a partnership with the US if given a chance (as suggested by the post-September 11 Soviet-American anti-terrorist collaboration).

Nevertheless it is a signal in that direction, and whether it is more than “flirtation” will have to await a defining crisis to be fully determined. The implication for Taiwan is that during the heyday of the Great Strategic Triangle, Taiwan formed a dependent triangle, whose relations to China and the US were always the obverse of their relationship with each other; that is, whenever Sino-American relations were bad, Taiwan-American relations were good, and vice versa. Thus to the extent that the international system is indeed reverting back to the triangular pattern of the 1950s, which remains to be seen, Sino-Russian collaboration could be expected to result *inter alia* in tighter American security guarantees to Taiwan. Indeed, this pattern seemed in the pre-September 11 Bush administration to be falling into place. Whether this is in Taiwan’s interest is however a question over which intelligent and fair-minded people might well disagree: although Taiwan gains stronger security guarantees from the opposing superpower, its relationship with the PRC may be expected to deteriorate concomitantly, jeopardizing not only its security outlook (as a fully exposed, front-line state) but its now heavy investment stake in the mainland economy.

Conclusions

There are optimists and pessimists with regard to the strength and staying power of this second incarnation of Sino-Russian friendship: the latter seem to be in the majority among Western observers, who point out that the relationship still lacks a strong commercial base, and relies almost exclusively on the dovetailing interests of national elites on both sides. It must be conceded that there is a plethora of friction, mutual suspicion, and resentment, particularly deeply rooted on the Russian side, reflecting that country’s current weakness and vulnerability. Yet I take a much more sanguine view. Despite the suspicion, the relationship is stronger than it has been at any time since the 1950s. What Karl Deutsch once called a “security community”—a relationship in which war no longer seems to be a conceivable option—has been constructed between two countries who came to blows just three decades ago, an achievement comparable to that between Germany and France since WWII, providing the basis of the EU.

In view of the fact that Taiwan would also very much like to build a security community with its giant western neighbor, it is worth looking a bit more closely at how this was

achieved. This was at the outset very much a top-down effort, as there was no popular yearning on either side of the border for a closer relationship with the people on the other side—in fact quite to the contrary. Reconciliation was achieved through the diplomacy of incremental bridge-building, an approach inaugurated as early as 1982 in the resumption of Sino-Soviet normalization talks. Institutionalized links grew by accretion, weaving a durable, multistranded network of meeting forums, economic and cultural exchanges. In addition to skilled and patient diplomacy, a modest domestic base for cooperation was then established through trade and the creation of supportive domestic interest groups. Together these help account for the stability of the partnership despite ideological divergence and the absence of any compelling shared strategic imperative.

Across the Strait there has also been an attempt at incremental bridge-building, but it has in contrast been most clearly successful as a bottom-up, market-driven affair: first trade, then investment, have flourished amazingly well. A mutual effort was made in the early 1990s at arranging an elite forum similar to the Sino-Soviet normalization talks, establishing the paired MAC-ARATS meeting forums and holding a series of meetings, but this effort has been far less successful, lasting only about a dozen months before getting derailed amid reciprocal recriminations, and efforts to restart it have repeatedly failed. Thus the bridge-building has been successful at the bottom but not at the top, at the economic but not at the political level. This is so despite the fact that there is far more ethno-linguistic affinity between Taiwan and the mainland than there is between Russians and Chinese. It is difficult to determine who is most responsible for the failure to institutionalize a regular discussion forum, as both sides make plausible offers from time to time and seek to avoid the onus of interrupting the dialogue. My subjective impression, however, is that Taipei's political elites have been more reluctant to talk than Beijing's. This is indicated for example by the frequent Taiwanese use of surprise political announcements to derail the talks: Lee Teng-hui's alumnal visit to Cornell, derailing the planned Taipei summit, is one clear example, and his announcement of the "two state theory" just before Wang Daohan's scheduled 1999 visit is a second. This is in a way quite understandable. Although Beijing's reunification proposals appeal to the interests of Taiwan's economic elites, there are few attractions for Taiwan's political elites, who would be categorically demoted from national to provincial officials (with the exception of ceremonial higher-level positions for some VIPs).

Let me suggest one reason why the lack of any shared cultural Sino-Russian affinity has not been an insuperable obstacle to reconciliation. That reason, paradoxically, has to do with national identities. I submit that one reason Sino-Russian friendship is working reasonably smoothly while Sino-Soviet friendship never worked is that with the abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist ideology they once shared, both nations now have a firmer sense of their distinct national identities. Sharing a messianic ideology of collective salvation gave the two countries a sense of shared goals, shared culture, and ultimately a shared collective identity: nationalism, distinct national foreign policies or national interests were illegitimate and indeed false within that framework of meaning. Within that shared collective identity, or "bloc," the hierarchical structure of the Leninist Party-State implied a center-periphery

relationship. This may have been tolerable during the early 1950s, when China was still just emerging from the rubble of imperialist invasion and civil war, but it was not tolerable very long to the historically self-possessed Chinese once the process of economic modernization got under way. Very soon it became a struggle for ideological hegemony, and when the Chinese could not win they split. Only when Russia had completely abandoned Marxism-Leninism does friendship become possible without the challenge to seize the ideological heights or to define one's identity as ideologically distinct.

In the case of Taiwan no less than with the role of China in the Soviet bloc, the basic problem is that the lack of distinct identities makes bridge-building difficult and risky. In this case, of course, the problem is not an overarching ideology but shared ethno-linguistic "Chineseness" and overlapping sovereignty claims. Yet if one shares the same identity it becomes difficult to negotiate rationally, because both sides are assumed to share the same ultimate value preferences. No bridge is necessary between one and the same sovereign identity. Any attempt to negotiate reconciliation very quickly collapses in recriminations for not recognizing this shared identity, an identity positively valued as "patriotism." This is not to say that the people of Taiwan are bereft of all ethno-cultural distinction from the mainland Chinese, that is a separate issue. In point here is simply the difficulty of reconciling two distinct bargaining positions when placed under such semantic constraint. If one identity is shared, it becomes purely a question of defining the core of the hierarchy. This has been a difficulty that in the cross-Strait case Beijing has understandably refused to acknowledge, inasmuch as its size, national power, and international status give the PRC inherent advantages in the contest to define the core of the hierarchy. Yet Taipei has equally understandably been reluctant to become engaged in such a discussion. The problem for Beijing is how to give Taipei a distinct negotiating identity without legitimating national secession. This would still be possible if some measure of domestic pluralism had legitimacy, but from Beijing's perspective the concept of indivisible sovereignty implies a centralized monocratic hierarchy, in which the only possible bargaining standpoints are informal. Hence they become nonnegotiable.

中文譯本

2001年7月16日，江澤民訪問莫斯科，與俄羅斯總統普欽簽署一項二十年期的「中俄睦鄰友好合作條約」，讓雙方二十年來的和解過程達於頂峰，不同於毛澤東和史達林在1950年2月16日簽署的三十年期中蘇友好同盟條約，在江澤民鼓動下所草擬的「中俄睦鄰友好合作條約」並非軍事同盟，但此一草案隨即被美國反對而擱置，因為美國獨霸世界的權力正是此一條約想要制衡的對象。但在該條約第九款中，兩國同意若一方認為受到侵略的威脅，雙方將商討採取共同防禦措施。此條約提供雙方在航空、太空、核子、軍事信息技術的廣泛合作，並將在聯合國安理會、世界銀行、國際貨幣基金、世界貿易組織等國際組織中協調政策，俄國對中共出售先進武器，讓俄國每年平均賺取十億美元，並增加一項十五年期共同安全合作計畫：在2000年至2005年，中共支出150億美元購買Su-30MKI超級戰機、六艘現代級（Sovremenny-class）驅逐艦、

兩艘颱風級核子潛艇，以及八艘升級後的基洛級（Kilo-class）柴油潛艇；在第二階段（2005年至2015），雙方合作開發下一代的武器系統與技術（雷射、微粒光束、情蒐衛星與其他軍事太空科技）。尤其雙方在7月17日的附帶協議下同意從俄羅斯遠東地區到大陸東三省分建立一條2400英里長的石油輸送管路，可預見雙邊貿易將急速擴展。（和印度一起，中共是世界上石油產品成長最快速的新興市場，其有限的國內已被國民生產毛額所超過）

雖然本條約簽署之前歷經冗長、艱辛的外交準備（例如江澤民和葉爾欽在1999年12月簽署草約，去年一年間江澤民和普丁會面八次以上以敲定新約的各個方面），從歷史前景觀之，仍是值得大書特書的¹。在雙方意識形態分裂之後，並引發1969到1970年間激烈的邊界衝突，毛澤東預測兩國將維持至少一百年的強烈敵對，然而在毛死後十年內，兩國開始進行朝向和解的長期道路。兩國有世界最長以及曾部署重兵的陸地疆界（雖然只有蘇聯鼎盛時期一半長）²，加上中國對俄國歷史上帝國主義侵略和不平等條約難以磨滅的悲情意識，繼之雙方在意識形態及其政策意涵上的公開爭辯，和解似乎是不太可能的。

即使雙方關係有深刻創傷，1982到1989年間的關係正常化，仍導致戈巴契夫在天安門抗議聲中在1989年5月抵達北京訪問，對於「反革命」運動的不同反應，加上民主化浪潮橫掃東歐，讓兩國舊創難以弭平，並走向難以挽回的分離道路³。然而，即使不是西方國家樂見，俄羅斯領導人很快又重新訪問北京，雙邊高峰會早在1992年11月恢復召開，1994年9月莫斯科首先主動提出建立「戰略協作夥伴關係」⁴，雖然兩國均已和其他國家建立類似「夥伴關係」，但未曾如此顯著強調雙方官方與半官方關係中，具有如此多面向、制度化的交流。

諷刺的是，中俄必須從雙方曾共同擁有的意識形態廢墟中，找到同時適合雙方需求的合作方式，在深層的意識上，他們從未真正像雙方過去為馬克斯主義奮鬥一般地「共享」意識形態，各方主張從主權觀點詮釋的管轄權，若政策理性化最終將在「改革開放」政策中開花結果，其前兆可能在1971到72年毛澤東統治時期的中美和解中察覺到，可確定的是，鄧小平在1980年代進行的中蘇「正常化」過程，代表了外交政策激進主義的消逝，雖然這會在一些懷有早期共同夢想的人民心中喚起一種懷舊的刺痛

1中俄邊界過去約有 7000 公里長，自從蘇聯解體後，中俄邊界縮短為 3,484 公里，然中國大陸與哈薩克邊界卻延伸了約 2,000 公里，與吉爾吉斯邊界約 1,000 公里，與塔吉克邊界約 500 公里長。

2 Lowell Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992); and L. Dittmer and Samuel S. Kim, eds., *China's Quest for National Identity* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993).

3很清楚的，戈巴契夫訪問北京對於激發天安門抗議扮演了某種角色，但中共對蘇聯與東歐崩體也扮演了間接的角色，尤其是他們均排除大規模鎮壓作為道德上可接受的選項。見 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "China as a Factor in the Collapse of the Soviet Empire," *Political Science Quarterly*, 110: 4 (Winter, 1995), pp. 501-519.

4參見李靜杰，「試論中俄戰略協作夥伴關係」，北京：東歐中亞研究，1997年第2期，頁3-15。

感，和解並非代表「中蘇友誼」的回復。雖然在此的焦點是後正常化時期，為理解其根源，並評估這種協議的權力，我們必須將之放在浮現歷史事件的情境中，故事包含三個時期，第一是1984到1989年，社會主義改革的共同渴望將兩國拉回到一起，這並非只是肇因於其慘痛的雙邊歷史與安全考量，更源於其對改革的不同取向所致；第二階段是1989到1994年，雙方均經歷動亂，天安門鎮壓與東歐共黨集團崩潰，此時只有高明的外交技巧才能使兩國恢復關係；1994到2001年，故事情節達於高潮，即使缺乏戰略重要性與共同意識形態刺激兩國關係，我們見證了兩國基於共同利益，使其外交政策回復到同一路線。

我們將以國內政治需求與國際戰略現實的辯證關係促成冷戰結束為起點，描繪中俄關係的輪廓，次則把焦點分別置於中俄兩國經濟交流與外交來往，最後討論中俄戰略夥伴關係對台海問題的影響。

戰略協作

九〇年代初期，蘇聯集團在九〇年代初期瓦解後，中俄關係建立了一種新的戰略理論基礎。在冷戰對抗減弱的數年內，戰略考量仍符合「三角」邏輯，意思是每一組雙邊關係都受到每個行為者與第三方關係而左右⁵，1970年代初期，中蘇敵對關係成功地受到美國所操縱，1980年代初期雷根總統恢復和「邪惡帝國」的戰略軍備競賽讓中共成為「搭便車者」，從1979到1989年，中共平均每年可減少軍備支出7%，軍備競賽的經濟負擔終於導致美蘇和解，從1987年12月中程核武條約（INF）開始，經過「戰略武器裁減條約」（START）談判（START條約第一階段簽署於1991年7月），第一次達成戰略武器顯著裁減。同時，中蘇正常化談判始於1982年，隨後開始出現貿易與文化接觸相對穩定的成長，此一過程受到中共領導人要求蘇聯讓步的意圖（亦即「三項基本障礙」）所牽制，終於在1989年5月戈巴契夫訪北京的中蘇高峰會達到正常化的高峰。當美、中、蘇「三方家族型」關係促進了世界和平與商務關係之時，它也剝奪了戰略關係的存在理由，尤其在1991蘇聯解體後，此關係隨即消失，僅剩下戰略計算。在1982到1989年期間內的任何事件中，美蘇和解都是邏輯上可以預見的，因為在美、中、蘇三角關係中，呈現「羅曼蒂克」三角型態，而北京雖是三者中權力最弱者，卻居於樞紐地位，使其得以操縱另二方，問題在於美蘇和解為何未能加速中蘇分裂，即使中共偏執地認為兩個超強彼此在串通。

上述情形未發生的原因之一部分係由於中共領導人的外交技巧，謹慎與美蘇維持風雨飄搖中的關係，另部分是由於中共關注隨之而來的內部政治問題。中蘇兩國的經濟均在推動計畫經濟下的「廣泛發展」中觸礁，蘇聯經歷布里茲涅夫政權之後多年的經濟停滯，中共則是經歷毛澤東激進主義走到文革的死胡同中，莫斯科與北京新一代的領導班底傾向從耗費不貲的對外承諾中撤退，轉向內部重建的過程，因其努力改

5 Lowell Dittmer, "The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis," *World Politics*, 33: 4 (July 1981), pp. 485-516; also Dittmer, *Sino-Soviet Normalization*.

革的方向都是針對結構相似的政經體系，他們覺得應向對方學習，中共早先從1978年學習蘇聯改革，但導致1986年與1989年大陸群眾抗議的自由化過程，部分是受到蘇聯政治重建(*perestroika*)計畫引起的火花所影響，這種「學習」是選擇性的，且最終導向分歧的方向，但兩國相互學習從事類似的社經改革有助於彼此走向和解，由而使中蘇正常化並未因美蘇和解而失色，即使雷根與戈巴契夫的個人關係遠勝於戈巴契夫與鄧小平，或鄧小平與雷根的關係。

從1989年5月中蘇高峰會起，直到1991年12月蘇聯解體，兩國關係可細分成約四個階段：

1. 1989年6到10月，北京被排斥在國際社會之外，蘇聯隨時準備從北京對西方憤慨不平的反應中得利；
2. 1989年10月到1990年春，因中共內部批評戈巴契夫「偏離社會主義道路」，並促成東歐社會主義政權的瓦解，兩國關係時有齟齬；
3. 從1990年4月起，中共領導人決定，縱使對戈巴契夫的態度有所保留，但他還不算蘇聯領導人中最無法讓北京接受的，所以派李鵬出訪莫斯科；
4. 從1991年1至2月間的波灣戰爭起，中蘇關係恢復，以回應美國主張的「世界新秩序」，兩國均將其視為威脅，而朝向組成一個非正式聯盟關係。

兩國友好關係的恢復暫時受到蘇聯八月政變之威脅，隨後蘇聯分解成十五個共和國，更對其造成一個諷刺現象，但兩國技巧性的外交斡旋挽救了雙邊關係。

中共保持彈性的部分原因是，若北京不原諒莫斯科的叛離路線，下列可能性就會出現：日俄領土糾紛（日本北方四島）可能有協商空間，讓兩國簽署和平條約；南韓剛給予莫斯科三十億美元特許貸款（以酬謝其外交承認）；台灣和拉脫維亞短暫地建立領事關係，並幾乎和烏克蘭互派大使，後來在中共外交官的嚇阻之下而中止。在葉爾欽和柯茲瑞夫主政下的克里姆林宮，出現一股反共產主義、支持民主的新氣氛，這是中國大陸若干俄國觀察家最不樂見的，他們甚至質疑為何中共沒有支持1991年八月政變的謀反者。想利用機會讓俄羅斯加入北約的柯茲瑞夫，甚至在1992年三月訪問北京時批評中共違反人權。北京擔心新俄羅斯若改革成功，可能將在中國大陸進行直接投資的外商吸引到俄國，並破壞中共好不容易才重新建立起來的統治合法性。

然俄羅斯向西方「傾斜」主要是基於內政考量而非戰略考量，這將描繪出一個更具地緣戰略性的平衡態勢。再者，和中共制度化的關係網路不會再被輕易置於一旁。隨著軍備競賽與石油價格動盪所帶來負擔過重的債務，西方工業國家無法提供比預期更慷慨的財務支援，只有德國因感謝戈巴契夫拒在其統一過程中引用布里茲涅夫主義，對俄羅斯經濟發展提供實質補貼（僅1993年一年即超過200億美金）。最決定性的國內考量當然是在民主政治被證明完全不成功的情況下，市場化與私有化所帶來的「雙重衝擊」，至少就短期而言，俄國經濟復甦直落而下，1991年實質國民生產毛額（GDP）下滑13%，1992年下滑19%，1993年下滑12%，1994年達到15%，葉爾欽的潛

在政治對手，從左派（朱加諾夫與東山重起的共產黨）到右派（季里諾夫斯基）均挑戰其對民族主義的真誠性。在西方，俄國在外交上變得無足輕重，在解決南斯拉夫糾紛的角色上，俄國被完全排除之外，最後雖被邀請參加「七國集團」（G-7），但只能作為觀察員；在中東地區，俄製武器在波灣戰爭中失去信譽（而且是蘇聯往昔的盟國被打敗）；即使在遠東地區，期待局勢有新突破的幻想很快就破滅了，重啓1958年赫魯雪夫協議架構，和日本談判北方四島領土紛爭似乎頗有希望，但軍事考量和地方上的反對，葉爾欽在1993年訪東京多日停留期間，卻避過此一議題，讓懷有廣泛期待的許多人都感到沮喪；至於在韓國問題上，俄國背棄平壤，避免介入四方會談，即使在與南韓關係正常化之後，南韓商人也看不到投資西伯利亞基礎建設具有多少真正價值（且有相當風險）；1997年北約東擴，將三個前蘇聯附庸的東歐國家納入，這大體上是美國回應總統大選期間對選民的要求，而非現實上對安全威脅的感受，卻是讓俄國政策轉向的最後一根稻草。1995年柯茲瑞夫（Andrei Kozyrev）下台，換上具有情報工作背景的前中東專家普里馬科夫（Yevgeny Primakov）出任俄國總理，同年七月，葉爾欽在克里姆林宮一個會議上宣稱，「中國是對我們最重要的國家，它和我國在世上有最長邊境，也是我們注定要永遠共同生活與並肩合作的鄰國」。在1996四月北京高峰會期間，兩國更簽署聯合聲明建立「邁向二十一世紀的戰略夥伴關係」（中共聲稱這是俄羅斯所提出的表述方式，不能算是一種同盟關係），以促進正在浮現中的世界多極化格局，反對任何國家成為霸權。

這種新夥伴關係的國內政治基礎與其所欲追求的國際戰略目標何在？國內政治基礎最優先的是相當大的潛在經濟互補性，中共需要輸入高科技武器，俄製裝備也許在電子方面不是最先進的，但也不應被低估，和美國類似硬體設備相比較，當然這些裝備便宜多了，俄國人一向願意給予彈性的付款方式與特許安排等，中共經濟發展的優先序列當中，首要任務就是國有企業部門的復甦，而俄羅斯出售重工業機械設備對其貢獻卓著，與五〇年代蘇聯提供設備的作用差可比擬，事實上，目前俄國對中國大陸重工業出口佔其出口總值20%。此外，俄國在水力與核能發電廠的開發計畫均有極廣泛的經驗，在需求面上，俄羅斯遠東地區為中國大陸移民的非技術性勞工、輕工業商品、食品提供了便利的工作市場。其次，就官僚政治而言，大量從俄國歸國學人目前出任中共高層領導職位，尤以江澤民和李鵬居首，他們是帶有中蘇同盟時期美好回憶的世代當中，掌權資深幹部的代表，當然現在已非當時的蘇聯與中共，然事實上仍有一大批中高層幹部與工程師在蘇聯度過成長期，吸收了蘇聯的價值、情感與技術。

歷年來，俄羅斯在中國大陸的政治利益基礎一直在千變萬化地轉變中，從八〇年代野心勃勃的年輕改革者，到天安門事件前夕，變成共產主義者與民族主義者的「紅—棕」聯盟，雖然仍有以意識形態基礎核心為支撐的親中共政策（或是更普遍的親亞洲政策，其支持者傾向認可從親西方態度「轉向」偏好與中亞的共和國、以及環太平洋地區國家建立更緊密關係），在經濟緊縮的九〇年代，支持中共的遊說行動已超越意識形態疆界，並將純粹基於經濟利益的古典自由市場支持群眾涵蓋至其中，特別的是，下列團體都傾向支持這種「夥伴關係」：(1)軍事工業複合體與重工業集團（如機械工具產業、石油天然氣公司、核電、水電工業等），因為中共為其最大消費者；

(2)重新取得寡占控制雙邊貿易的國營貿易公司，尤其是自從1994年俄羅斯關稅與移民法案立法之後；(3)雖然高聲反對領土割讓，但已經相當仰賴中國大陸經濟為其經濟發展龍頭的地方首長，當俄國經濟崩潰摧毀了他們主要市場與消費性商品來源，俄「中」貿易卻異軍突起，即使大陸商品品質低劣或索價過高。購買力較高的俄國人現在都到大連或北京消費，到北戴河避暑，這遠比到歐俄方便多了。

就戰略層面而言，戰略重要性日益消退，使經濟合作甚至是戰略協調都變得較無風險，的確，「夥伴關係」文件載明了他們並非針對第三國，這可能有點虛偽，就像其中論及「反對霸權」與「促進多極化」所清楚表明，若說這種夥伴關係的唯一目的是要激怒美國，可能有點過頭了，因為它本身就有這種效果，其最大價值可能還是雙邊性的，單純就是兩個世上最大國家關係的改善，其本身就已證明，在某種意義上，兩國均從重大的領導權轉移中倖存下來，而未陷入社會大眾的動亂中，對彼此的合法性均有清晰的意涵。成功的劃界、相互兵力裁減與信心建立措施（C B M）讓世界最長且最具衝突可能的邊界帶來希望，變成像美加之間一樣的和平穩定，武器互不瞄準、互不侵犯且不對對方首先使用核武等協定，不過是雙方嘗試透過談判解決衝突、不把問題推給對方、以及問題衍生之際進行協商等諸多普遍諒解中較詳細的部分。貿易、旅遊、相互投資等均在培養階段，以便於在群眾的層面上建立互賴關係，如同當前在菁英層面上高度制度化的外交、政治軍事交流網絡一般。說實在的，說要向對方「學習」的浮誇語言已逐漸消失（雖然雙方持續支持學術與軍事教育交流），除了一些負面的感覺之外，雙方不懈地共同培養國家利益也許可證明維持友好關係較具有現實基礎，不像強調意識形態團結那麼不可靠。

若這種夥伴關係單純只是雙邊性的，就不可能是「戰略性的」，也不會那麼受到規劃區域安全偶發衝突之人士的關心，因此，這種夥伴關係也有多邊性的戰略意涵，在預防北韓發展核武的早期階段，國際對北韓施予制裁，「中」俄雙方協調一致地拒絕支持，他們並共同關注即將具發展核武能力的東邊鄰國（如日本、南韓），相似地，北京和莫斯科步調一致譴責 1998 年 12 月英美聯合對伊拉克轟炸，伊拉克原為蘇聯的附庸國，且和中共簽署數十億美元的阿達巴（Ahdaba）油田探勘協議，對中共而言，邊界議題的中立化容許其軍事結構從北方調整到東南沿海，且可將著重強大步兵的兵力結構轉向發展海空軍⁶。在解放軍預算持續得到資產化經濟發展的充分補助之下，這種調整對於日本、韓國與東南亞特別具有獨特重要性，他們都相當依賴通過南中國海繁忙的海路交通，中共在這些地區的兵力駐守，使其在 1995 年初挑戰菲律賓，出兵佔領南沙群島中的美濟礁，並於 1995 到 1996 年在台灣外海「試射」飛彈（這也有助於解釋了美日兩國為何要在 1996 年 4 月重新修訂安保條約，並將共同維持台海

6從 1980 年到 1992 年，陸軍佔解放軍整體兵力比例從 80.9% 下滑到 5.9%，而海、空軍則分別從 8.1% 與 8.6% 增加到 11% 與 15.5%，就某程度而言，這也反映劉華清出任中央軍委副主席的建軍構想，劉華清為前海軍總司令，也是蘇聯前海軍上將哥斯可夫（S. G. Gorshkov）「海權論」的信徒，劉重新強調海洋作為「戰略空間」的重要性，他把焦點轉到建立更大且專業化的水面戰艦，進行海軍航空兵的現代化（現在也許比空軍更先進），並讓海軍步兵配備更大、更快速機動的攻擊船艦，見 Yihong Zhang, "China Heads Toward Blue Waters," *International Defense Review*, 26: no. 11 (November 1, 1993), p. 879.

地區和平納入其中)，中共與印度、越南關係同樣受到「中」俄夥伴關係影響，這兩個前蘇聯的附庸國均投注資源以嚇阻中共或與中共協商（雖然蘇聯對外軍火市場仍對其開放），相似的，由於蘇聯被更鬆散的獨立國協（CIS）所取代，中共通往中亞地區市場與資源（包括龐大的石油儲量）的管道更加暢通。

從蘇聯的戰略觀點來看，亞洲從冷戰起就受到重視，隨著東歐衛星國家、波羅的海三國、烏克蘭和白俄羅斯從蘇聯分離出去，在國家認同上，俄羅斯聯邦（the Russian Federation，RF）雖仍偏好將自己視為「西方」國家，現在卻把自己定義為歐亞地緣政治上的大陸橋，清楚地將中國大陸與印度視為莫斯科對亞洲政策的兩大支柱。如同此一機會所呈現的，這裡也許有一些可以補充：在 1997 克拉斯諾亞斯克（Krasnoyarsk）高峰會後，莫斯科與日本關係獲得相當改善，恢復了俄日親善關係，俄羅斯重新獲准參加東協區域論壇（ARF），在 1998 年末加入亞太經合會，且重新開設駐香港領事館，說真的，在自我設限不抨擊中共的民主問題（俄國仍在日內瓦的聯合國人權委員會上保護中共不受譴責）以及不承認台灣（即使這不代表實質的犧牲）上，俄國得向北京讓步，但俄國對台貿易關係仍有相當擴展，1995 年俄台貿易總額達到 12 億美金，和中共只有 50 億美金，1994 年，台灣在莫斯科開設貿易辦事處，1996 年，莫斯科也到台北開設了辦事處。

經濟交流

1950年代「中」俄繁盛的貿易與經濟交流，在1960年代赫魯雪夫單方撤回所有蘇聯顧問之後完全終止，直到1980年代中期才恢復到原有規模，天安門事件後，西方對中共的經濟制裁（在1990年上半年所有西方國家對中國大陸投資總值下滑22%），刺激了雙方的計畫貿易與自由貿易，1989年雙方貿易為總額39.5億美金，與1988年的32.6億美金相比，足足增加了18%，增長了1980年代累積總額的1.5倍之後，蘇聯成為中共第五大貿易夥伴，佔中共對外貿易總額的8%。

雖然蘇聯整體對外貿易在1990年滑落6.4%，「中」蘇貿易量增加到53億美元，其中四分之一為邊界貿易，那裡是西方對中共經濟制裁的真空地帶，蘇聯趕上德國成為中共最大貿易夥伴，中共國務院同意指定黑龍江省北部的黑河市為經濟特區，取代橫跨黑龍江的蘇聯遠東地區第三大城市布拉葛夫斯臣斯克（Blagoveshchensk），以促其發揮貿易管道與集散地之功能，兩國地方政府提出超過兩百項的合作計畫，中共派遣約15,000公民前往蘇聯遠東地區從事勞力工作，在蘇聯成立了約20個中蘇合資企業，在大陸境內也成立了幾個，蘇聯人員甚至到海南島參與可可的生產，1990年也有300多個科技代表團交流活動，1980年到1990年間，蘇聯派出約809個交換學生，而中共派出約1307個大學畢業生到蘇聯深造。

如同李鵬在1990年出訪時所簽署協議，1991年1月1日起，雙方的契約貿易轉變成現金貿易，雖然這是政府規範下的自由貿易，在1991年，缺乏外匯的蘇聯、東歐和中共承受了計畫貿易縮減至39億美元，然以實物交易為基礎的邊界貿易卻得到空前成

長，認識到蘇聯的經濟困境後，中共同意伸出援手，提供7億1千5百萬元美金給蘇聯購買大陸不太需要的農產品，正好扭轉了兩國過去的主客關係。

縱使蘇聯崩潰，1991到1993年貿易依舊持續上揚，1992年達到58億美元，1993年則達78億美元，蘇聯解體後的第一項經貿協定在1992年三月初簽署，然缺乏強勢貨幣不斷阻礙俄國的計畫貿易（兩國貿易平衡對中共有利，但中共因預算赤字無法提供太多信用貸款），當俄國資源分配網路崩潰之際，遠東地區的消費者尋找替代方案，使得邊境貿易遽升44%，遠超過1991年的標準，冷戰結束前夕，大型軍火工廠的關閉帶來某些城鎮30%的失業率，並使其經濟導向太平洋地區市場⁷，1992年5月，三個經濟發展區（近似於經濟特區，SEZ），在新疆的烏魯木齊、石河子、奎屯等三地成立，以吸引外資，這三個地方全都位於接近中亞回教國家的歐亞鐵路上，類似的安排計畫在黑龍江的綏芬河、吉林的琿春、內蒙的滿州里成立，俄國模仿中共的作法，在1992年初推動弗拉迪沃斯托克（Vladivostok）成為「開放城市」，歡迎「中」、日、韓等國資金與技術，此時，俄羅斯允許中國大陸的許多個體戶免簽證進入鄰近共和國旅遊數千名左右的大陸商人來回穿梭兩國出售大陸的皮夾克、長大衣、西伯利亞的毛衣（每週從北京到伊爾庫斯克搭乘三次火車來回）、吉爾吉斯和哈薩克的小型曳引機等，這些商人回國後屢屢抱怨邊界經濟的黯淡前景，並受到媒體許多報導，但俄羅斯人、烏克蘭人等開始群聚到中國大陸跑單幫出售零星貨品，累積到足夠金錢後，再購買一些消費品回國零售賺些蠅頭小利，他們大多數是到北京所設立的兩個「外人特別商業區」（紅橋與東大橋）做生意，以「避免脫序」，國泰飯店的六樓整層變成一個小商場，所有房門大開，房內都堆滿要賣給俄羅斯消費者的衣物，到1993年之前，大多數的商業活動進駐靠近日壇的雅寶路，那裡大部分出售的是要裝櫃上貨機的商品，經濟交流也包括了勞動力，大陸北方的地區勞工組織成夥的招募伐木工人、蔬果種植工與建築工人，截至1992年夏天，約有20,000名大陸工人在西伯利亞工作。

俄羅斯人雖感激中共在其艱困時期出售商品給他們，但不久就抗議中共出售商品的品質過於低劣，以及大陸商人做生意時過於苛刻的討價還價，1991年起，因歐俄和亞洲的俄羅斯地區所得差距不斷擴大，遠東地區本地人口開始減少，僅1992年一年就移出25萬人，與此背景相反的是，中國大陸勞工與商人快速流入（據稱包括大批的罪犯），造成具有威脅性的一面，據中共統計，1992年就有138萬人跨越邊境，1993年更達到顛峰的176萬人，對俄羅斯人來說，核心議題不在於有多少人入境，而是有多少人停留在國境內，據俄羅斯媒體估計，在1994年，遠東地區非法居留的大陸人高達100萬人，在俄羅斯全國則有200萬人，大陸方面估計則只有1,000到2,000人（官方「客觀」的人數無法取得）⁸，邊境貿易在1993年達到20億美元的高峰，卻是向中共方面

7 Cf. Judith Thornton, "Recent Trends in Russia's Far East," *Comparative Economic Studies*, 37: 1 (Spring, 1995), pp. 79-86.

8 13以俄羅斯亞洲地區稀少的人口（約有 800 萬人，然自 1991 年起移出人口約 100 萬人），相對在中國大陸方面卻有 120 萬人移入，縱然有勞工短缺問題，俄國看待非法移民不只是惱怒的，且就長遠的領土主張來看，這是具有戰略危險性的。參閱 Won Bae Kim, "Sino-Russian Relations and Chinese Workers in the Russian Far East: A Porous Border," *Asian Survey*, 34: 12 (December, 1994), pp. 1064-1077.

傾斜的極度不平衡，即使大多數只是以貨易貨方式進行，且完全無損於外匯儲備，受到衝擊的俄羅斯商業部門對此提出巨大的抗議，然1994年2月，俄羅斯頒佈新進口稅則與簽證規定（在中共完全同意下），以規範不受控制的商品與人口流入，這導致「中」俄貿易在1994年上半年驟降到原有的40%，1995年又開始恢復，當年達到51億美元，1996年則有68.5億美元，但1997年又下滑到61.2億美元，該年11月盧布開始貶值，導致1998年又滑落7%，但到2000年又回升到近80億美元，預計到2001年可達100億美元的新紀錄，雖然整體貿易額可能不是很令人滿意，約略僅達葉爾欽宣示要在上個世紀結束前要達到200億美元之目標的一半，邊境貿易現在只佔整體貿易額的12-14 %（俄羅斯大型貿易公司寡占的情形又恢復了），貿易平衡已經大幅朝有利於俄國的方向發展（例如1996年就創造了17億美元的貿易順差）。

「中」俄兩國互惠性的投資一向微不足道，這是由於雙方出口資本額累積有所不足，且俄羅斯的投資環境風險過高（例如1995年俄國在中國大陸投資了2200萬美元，中國大陸在俄國投資亦有4000萬美元），俄國的原子能部長在1997年爭取到35億美元的契約，為大陸興建一座核子電力反應爐，並附加濃縮鈾設備，以供應大陸東部核能燃料，該項建設預計在世紀之交完工。俄國也參加了三峽大壩工程的投標，卻敗給了具有更充裕信貸條件的東歐國家，雙方亦曾協議共同興建數條油管，一條從伊爾庫斯克輸送天然氣以及從西伯利亞東部輸送石油到中國大陸，另一條則是從外蒙輸送天然氣到東亞，同時雙方還共同建築連結黑河市到布拉葛夫斯克的大橋，以及第二條沿著古代絲路（經由新疆到哈薩克）連接大陸到中亞的洲際鐵路，中共更懷著雄心壯志要開發圖們江盆地，此一計畫曾被俄國阻撓，因為該計畫如實現，中共即可東入日本海，而俄國海軍仍視其為戰略據點。

另一個面向的經濟交流很明顯是中共在天安門事件後受到國際制裁而興起的：軍事技術與裝備。1989年起，因無法取得美製軍火，中共轉向尋求俄羅斯武器，俄國是中共武器硬體裝備最早的來源國，在武器零件的相容性上也具有相當便利性，從中共國家利益的觀點來看，這的確是兩國關係中雪中送炭的一面，中共直接訴求於戈巴契夫政權中仍具關鍵影響力的左派份子，中共總參謀部副部長徐信隨中共總理李鵬於1990年4月23到26日赴莫斯科展開破冰之旅，隨後在5月30日，中共中央軍委副主席劉華清（1958年畢業於列寧格勒的佛洛施洛夫海軍學院）又率領一個軍事代表團出訪，與俄國討論軍事科技轉移問題，劉華清和蘇聯國防部長雅佐夫（Dimitri Yazov）是1960年代初期以後兩國接觸的最高層軍方官員，在其會談中，蘇聯表示願意以低廉價格，對1950年代依據蘇聯技術建立的中共兵工廠，提供現代化方面的協助，此次出訪適逢中共決定取消和5億5000萬美元提升殲-8戰機航電設備的交易，中共在天安門事件後就考慮要和俄國進行首次類似交易。1991年6月1日第一個蘇聯軍事代表團進行了三十年來首次訪問中國大陸，到1990年秋，中共已經同意從蘇聯購買24架能遂行高空天候行動的運兵直昇機（美國拒絕考慮出售類似武器系統，認為其適於遂行在西藏的軍事行動）。

在波灣戰爭開打後，蘇聯的全球武器銷售急遽下跌，在美國高科技武器相比之

下，蘇聯武器看來似乎完全落伍，在蘇聯對外出口報告中，軍事裝備是第二大項目（僅次於石油產品），就這點而言，中共對蘇聯武器的興趣特別受到蘇聯歡迎⁹，當俄羅斯的經濟災難在1990年末期持續加重，當財政困難使俄國政府無法繼續授權生產武器時，軍事工業集團愈加依賴外銷來維持一系列生產，俄國官員更開始開玩笑說以後他們將面對的中共軍隊，配備的俄製武器比俄軍更精良。從1990年初開始進行購買SU-27戰機的談判上，其中26架是以約略超過10億美元的「友誼價」購得（其中約35%是以強勢貨幣支付，其他以實物商品支付），附帶條件是中共必須購買額外48架，受到印度購買MiG-31高空層攔截機的刺激，中共另訂購數目不詳的同型機種，1992年3月中共接收到高精密的S-300反戰機飛彈系統和SA-10反戰術彈道飛彈的飛彈系統，稍後不久俄羅斯的米高揚（Mikoyan）設計局預見共同開發中共新型戰機可整合MiG-29 與MiG-31的實力，而向北京提交一份共同開發軍用機的企畫案。中共也表達購買航空母艦、「逆火式」（Backfire）轟炸機（或空中加油技術，讓中共的轟炸機續航力可達1,000英里）和蘇聯的太空科技的興趣，蘇聯感興趣的則是希望向中共學習「國防工業轉軌」的經驗（蘇聯在這方面的努力一向是處理很差的），從1992年下半年開始，中共同意軍事人員到蘇聯研究，派遣第一個飛行員分遣團於1992年6月赴莫斯科進行一年半的訓練課程，其他資料來源顯示截至1993年止，超過1000名俄國軍事專家透過「私人」契約安排到中國大陸，協助其核武與飛彈技術能力的現代化。

中共購買俄製武器持續在兩國貿易中佔重要的組成部分，1996年11月雙方簽署一項雙邊防衛合作條約，12月中共購買2艘基洛級（Kilo-class）柴油動力潛艇、2艘配備日炙（Sunburn）反艦飛彈的現代級（Sovremenniy-class）驅逐艦、另外24架SU-27戰鬥機（使其總數達到50架），以及授權瀋陽軍用機工廠生產200多架戰機（中共稱為F-11），俄國對中共國防出口在1996年總數達21億美元，佔中共對外軍事採購將近70%¹⁰，但俄國也試圖出售一大票非軍事項目，因為問題出於：對於一個過去的敵人，且可能成為未來安全威脅的對象，協助其重新武裝起來是否明智？中共空軍機庫中現在有25%是俄製軍機¹¹，對於西方國家關切俄國的武器出售可能打破東亞軍事平衡，俄國則對之敷衍，根本不重視中共的威脅，並聲稱若他們不賣給中共，其他國家也會賣，也完全不考慮對蘇聯安全可能產生的後果（俄國也許忘了1969年的邊境衝突中，雙方使用的都是俄製武器）。

外交對話

「中」俄在1980年代末期建立起外交對話模式，從1982年起，雙方每半年舉辦一次例行性行程，每年春、秋在北京與莫斯科交換主辦，通常由各方相同團隊的官員參加，每次談判的突破都是些許、漸進式的，但受到規範的共同會議論壇為一系列其他

⁹俄製坦克出口數量在1992年滑落79倍，和1991年相較，戰機外銷下滑1.5倍，軍事工業集團的倉庫中堆滿賣不出去的武器，1992年中共是俄製武器的主要買家，共買了約18億美元的武器。Pavel Felgengauer, "Arms Exports Continue to Fall," *Sogodnya* (Moscow), July 13, 1993, p. 3.

¹⁰ Sherman Garnett, "Slow Dance: The Evolution of Sino-Soviet Relations," *Harvard International Review*, Winter 1996-97, pp. 26-29.

¹¹ Cf. Peggy Falkenheim Meyer, "Russia's Post-Cold War Security Policy in Northeast Asia," *Pacific Affairs*, 67: 4 (Winter, 1994), pp. 495-513.

談判提供了制度化的基礎，無論這些談判是更高或更低層級性的均可加入議程中，最後導致雙方外交部長層級的交流與1989年的領袖高峰會，1989年6月「正常化」的達成是以黨對黨關係來進行的，雖然國與國關係曾經破裂，但即使在文革騷動之中，兩黨關係從未破裂過，但此一「常態」飛逝如電，在1991年8月的流產政變之後，蘇聯共黨就自我毀滅了。

中國共產黨無暇自憐（他們對於過去口號所說的「蘇聯的現在就是中共的未來」的驚恐態度，在看到舊敵人的悲慘情況之後，慢慢被一種幸災樂禍的情緒所舒緩），雙方很快就重新緊握新的外交現狀，俄羅斯聯邦清楚表明其意向，要持續和中共塑造良好關係，尊重所有蘇聯所做的國際承諾，中共也給予回報，1992年1月中共總理李鵬和葉爾欽在聯合國安理會會期中會面，雙方保證加強合作與接觸，3月16至17日俄國新外長柯茲瑞夫出訪中國大陸（戈巴契夫以後的最高層訪客），討論發展兩國新管道，8月俄國國防部長葛瑞雪夫（Pavel Grachev）和中共國防部長秦基偉進行蘇聯解體後首度會面，討論軍事合作與軍售，這使得下一次高峰會達到高潮，葉爾欽於1992年12月17至19日到北京進行處女航，導致雙方在貿易、旅遊到軍備裁減等方面簽署25項以上的協定，最重要的是雙方針對彼此關係的原則上，發表聯合聲明，書方保證不加入針對另一方的任何同盟，不讓第三方利用其領土危及他方安全，彼此不使用武力或威脅使用武力對抗另一方，當一系列雙邊會議與論壇建立起來與受到規範之後，這種外交關係很快就加深了。

雖然根據俄羅斯戰略分析家的說法，「中」美1997到1998的高峰會引起三方串通的猜疑（然而在美國時，江澤民告訴柯林頓「在中國大陸，他們認知的多極化世界和俄國有一點不同」）。1998年11月，江澤民在莫斯科一所醫院中和身體微恙的葉爾欽進行了非正式的高峰會，又再度強調「中」俄的團結，俄國在北京要求之下說出對台灣的「三不支持」，繼兩年半前公布的「面向二十一世紀的中俄關係」聯合公報之後，雙方又提起此議題，此外，雙方並討論層次不斷提升中的雙邊貿易。1999年12月，雙方首度起草共同友好條約，在2001年7月正式簽署。

然而，當外交往來變得例行化與儀式化，如1996年成立共同籌備委員會，由中共副總理李嵐清和俄國第一副總理波力夏可夫（Alexei Bolyshakov）共同主持，以安排雙方政府主管例行性會面，這並非不具任何實質意義。

雙方兵力共同裁減已在戈巴契夫手下達成實質進展，尤其是他1986年在弗拉迪沃斯托克（Vladivostok）以及1988年在哈巴洛夫斯克（Khabarovsk）針對其亞洲政策的演講之後。葉爾欽於1992年高峰會提出共同逐步非軍事化之進程，目標在於最終只需維持和平邊界巡邏最小數目兵力（目前數目仍有約200,000人），以避免蘇聯軍力從東歐快速撤離造成混亂，這讓兩國得以重組其兵力結構，中共可將其軍事焦點轉移到台灣與南海，俄羅斯也可著重應付北約東擴造成的安全威脅。從1992年起最顯著的發展是1996年4月在北京和1997年4月在莫斯科簽署的「中」、俄、哈薩克、吉爾吉斯、塔吉克五國協定，前者「中」俄雙方同意在邊境的共同軍備裁減與軍事信心建立措施，同意限制沿邊境100公里深範圍內的軍事活動；後者建立了限制沿邊境100公里深範圍

內進行軍事活動的「安定區」，特別顯著的是容許中共發展區域關係，並被視為區域安全安排的參與者之一。

在1989年5月高峰會之前，雖然精確劃界仍有待具體討論，但雙方在邊界問題上一直有一項原則性協定，例如莫斯科接受圖哩洛格（Thalweg）或主河道最深的部分作為區分烏蘇里江和黑龍江的「界線」，戈巴契夫和江澤民在1991年4到5月莫斯科高峰會中，簽署同意東部邊境的「定界」，其中中共取得僅一平方英里之珍寶島主權，此為具有象徵意義的重要性，以及河道南面之其他領土，之後七年之間，劃界一直在俄國地方官員咆哮的抗議聲中進行¹²。在1997年11月北京高峰會上，雙方簽署東部劃界條約，包括對黑龍江中三個具爭議性的小島（包括黑瞎子島）擱置主權爭議，共同開發。1998年11月在醫院的高峰會中，雙方終於能對東西部邊界準確劃分表達滿意（值得注意的是中共不接受俄國要求邊界條約應進行長期談判，堅持在2010年更新條款）¹³。

對台海兩岸關係的意涵

雖然台灣只是「中」俄和解當中一個邊緣性的因素，它至少對兩岸關係有三種意涵：首先且最直接的是，這強化了俄國對北京在統一問題立場上的支持，從而使台灣期待藉由鐵幕落下可能提供更大操控空間或抗拒北京條件的希望落空，綜觀後共產主義政權外交政策的變動，莫斯科從未完全支持北京對台灣的立場，和前蘇聯唯一的區別在於，後共產主義的俄羅斯開始和台灣進行些微的非正式貿易關係，葉爾欽在1998年忠實地重述柯林頓的「三不」，莫斯科也經常重申支持北京的統一計畫，並呼應中共抨擊美國對台軍售。

其次，「中」俄的和解，特別是1996年與1997年和中共達成劃界及開啓信心建立措施，使中共解放軍原先集中在俄國邊境的軍隊與裝備，重新部署到東南部面對東海、南海（與台灣）的可能性大增，過去十年中，中共在此地區集結最多的兵力。而且，如同美國作為台北最主要的武器供應商與安全保障的最後依靠，莫斯科對中共扮演相同的功能。據外界觀察家說，北京對外軍購的大宗一向是針對台海地區可能爆發的衝突，中共最近獲得先進的柴油潛艇，加上現有約64艘，很明顯可用來封鎖台灣（而台灣完全依賴對外貿易），配備日炙飛彈的現代級驅逐艦原先是被設計用來攻擊航空母艦的，而美國一向以航空母艦來嚇阻中共的強制外交。

中共持續建造東風11號和東風15號短程地對地飛彈，估計每年以50枚的速度不斷增長，加上配備改良過的導向系統，讓中共有能力對台灣的防衛設施進行先制打擊，

¹²例如俄羅斯濱海省省長納茲拉騰柯（Yevgenii Nazdratenko）在1995年2月說道，1991年簽署、1992年批准的條約是不平等條約，俄國應廢除之，見Xinhua (Moscow), February 27, 1995. 據俄羅斯外交政策官員指出，這三個爭議地區僅有象徵的重要性，加起來僅有數平方公里。

¹³ Stephen Blank, "Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?" *Orbis*, 42, no. 3 (Summer, 1998), pp. 345-360.

並摧毀停留在地面上的先進戰機。中共獲取S-300地對空飛彈則是意圖防衛其位於福建之基地，北京對於使用武力解決台灣問題的計畫可能會選擇一些戰略選項下手，但每一項都相當依賴俄製武器，且可能不限於硬體方面，據傳2000年夏天普丁和江澤民的北京高峰會中，莫斯科準備在台海危機事件中對中共提供直接軍事援助，那就符合一項報告中說，2001年2月12到16日的軍事演習中，俄國將威脅使用核武飛彈攻擊美軍在南韓與日本基地，以支持中共對台侵略。這種說法雖不能輕信，因為俄國和中共聯盟對台動武，而和美國對抗，從中能得到什麼好處？但「中」俄雙方官員對此說法均未曾否認。

第三個意涵是，就戰略三角關係而言，這至少是回復到1950年代三角模式的一種態勢，歐亞大陸心臟地帶連鎖在一起共同對抗美國超強，當然2001年的「中」俄友好條約和半世紀前的情勢有許多重要的差異，例如：兩國之間已經沒有凝聚性的意識形態或共同的外交政策使命，雙方在其對美關係均有強大的經濟利益，如有機會，不能保證任一方不會為了和美國的夥伴關係，而拋棄對方（如九一一事件後美俄在反恐主義行動中的合作），儘管如此，這只是一種朝該方向發展的跡象，其是否只是一時興起，仍有待如何界定危機，才能完全決定，對台灣的意涵是，在大戰略三角關係的全盛期，台灣形成另一個依賴性的小三角關係，其與中共、美國的關係一直是美「中」彼此關係的對照，亦即，每當「中」美關係惡化，台美關係就好轉，反之亦然。國際體系的确已經反轉到1950年代的三角關係模式，就其程度而言，「中」俄合作可能導致美國對台提供更緊密的安全保障，這種模式就像是九一一事件前的布希政府，這是否符合台灣利益仍是個問題，雖然台灣得到更強的安全保障，兩岸關係將隨之惡化，不僅危及其安全前景，並使其對大陸龐大投資帶來風險。

結論

對於「中」俄友好關係重新恢復，能有多大的效力，存在樂觀與悲觀兩種看法，後者似乎佔多數，指出這種關係仍缺乏強大的商貿基礎，幾乎完全依靠雙方國家菁英的利益結合，必須承認的是，雙方仍有太多的摩擦、相互猜疑與憎恨，尤其在俄羅斯方面更是根深蒂固的，這也反映其當前的軟弱與脆弱性，而我持一種較樂天的觀點，縱使有這些猜疑，兩國關係卻比1950年代以後任何時期更堅固，美國政治學者杜意志（Karl Deutsch）曾提出的「安全社群」（係指一種不再可能發生暴力相向的關係）已經在兩國之間建立起來，三十年前他們可是打過仗的，這是可以和二次世界大戰後法、德兩國關係發展的成就相比擬的，目前法、德關係已為歐盟提供基礎。

就事實觀之，台灣非常願意和西鄰的大國建立起安全社群關係，至於要如何達成，值得進一步觀察。「中」俄關係從一開始是由上而下的努力（top-down effort），任一方民眾都沒有熱切渴望和另一方發展更緊密的關係，後來事實發展完全相反，經由漸進式的搭橋外交，雙方逐漸達成和解，早在1982年「中」蘇正常化談判起，就開始此一取向，制度化的連結一項一項成長，編織成一個持久、多面向的網路關係，

讓雙方進行會議論壇、經濟、文化交流等，除了有技巧、耐心的外交手腕之外，透過貿易，以及創造出國內利益團體的支持，建立起雙方合作中些許的國內民意基礎，這些都有助於解釋雙方夥伴關係的穩定性，即使雙方具有意識形態分歧，且缺乏強有力的共同戰略重要性。

在台海兩岸也一直有一股漸進式搭建溝通橋樑的企圖心，相對的，在一種由下而上（bottom-up）、市場驅動的情形下，一向是顯著成功的，雙方首先是貿易、再來是投資、最後蒸蒸日上，1990年代初雙方曾努力安排類似「中」蘇正常化談判的菁英論壇，建立了海基會與海協會的對話機制，並舉辦了一系列的會議，但卻不太成功，只延續一年半後開始出軌，並淪為相互謾罵，重啟會談的努力一再失敗，這種搭橋工作在民間、經濟層面上相當成功，但在高層、政治層面上卻不然，雖然台灣與大陸的種族、語言等密切關係遠勝於俄國和中共之間，事實卻依然如此。雙方不時提出一些合理的建議，尋求避免遭受破壞對話的污名，很難決定說誰最應該為制度化例行對話機制的失敗負責，然而我的主觀印象是，如同其幾次利用政治聲明來偏離對話所顯示，台北的政治菁英較不願和北京對話，例如李登輝總統以校友身份訪問康乃爾大學，極為明顯的一個例子，又如他在1999年汪道涵計畫訪台前宣布「兩國論」，是第二個例子，在某些方面，這是可以理解的，雖然北京的統一方案係訴求於台灣經濟菁英之利益，但對台灣的政治菁英卻沒有太多誘因，除少數重要人士可望獲得榮典性之高層地位外，他們可能將從國家官員降級為省級官員。

個人認為正是因為缺乏種族、語言、文化相似性，「中」蘇和解會成功，而兩岸關係會失敗，最重要的差異一向和國家認同有關，「中」俄友好關係成功，而「中」蘇友好關係卻失敗，也是因為雙方放棄共同擁有的意識形態所致，兩國對於其獨特的國家認同現在都有一種更堅實的感覺，共享一種集體救贖的彌賽亞式的意識形態給予兩國一種共同目標、文化、與最終的集體認同感，民族主義、國家利益、獨特的國家外交政策在那種意義架構內是難以理解的，在共同的集體認同或「集團」之內，列寧主義式黨國體系的階層式結構隱含了「中央—邊陲」的關係，在1950年代初期，當中共剛從帝國主義侵略和內戰的廢墟中站起來時，這也許是可以容忍的，但是在經濟現代化過程開展之後，這種關係就難以忍受了，很快這就變成一種意識形態霸權的鬥爭，中共無法獲勝時，就和蘇聯分裂，只有當俄羅斯拋棄馬克斯—列寧主義，不挑戰、奪取意識形態的制高點，或將其認同界定為意識形態的獨特性，雙方友好關係才能建立。

台灣的情形不亞於蘇聯集團，後者的基本問題是缺乏認同使得搭橋工作極為困難且具有風險，前者的問題不在於意識形態，而是共同種族—語言的「中國性」與重疊的主權訴求，若一方與另一方享有相同的認同，就很難進行理性談判，因為雙方都假定享有相同的最終價值偏好，在相同的國家認同之間，橋樑並不是必要的，因為不承認共同的認同，任何談判協商的意圖很快瓦解淪為謾罵，尤其是被評價為正面的認同，這並不是說台灣人民不是種族意義上的中國人，那是另一個單獨的議題。這裡的論點單純只是置於這種語意束縛之下時，調和兩種不同的談判立場的形態而已，若有一種共同的認同，它就變成純然一個界定階層性核心的問題，現實一向是，在兩岸關

係中，由於北京實力龐大，北京一向拒絕承認國力與國際地位讓中共在界定階層性核心時有其固有優勢，可理解的，台北一樣不願進行這種討論，北京的問題是要如何給予台北一種獨特的談判認同，且不會讓台北從中國分離出去，並取得合法地位。可能的情形是，如果某些內部多元化措施取得合法性，但從北京觀點而言，圈內集團仍具有官方獨裁式的階層性，唯一的談判關係只能是非正式的。