

俄羅斯與外界對台灣的態度

RUSSIAN AND OTHER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD TAIWAN

Отношения России и других стран к Тайваню

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摘要

本文試圖去分析外國對於兩岸關係的態度，特別是比較俄羅斯與美國及世界其他國家對於兩岸的態度。在某些事例上，各國的動機將會相像，但是有些動機會有極其重要的差異。

俄羅斯並不像前蘇聯一樣，它現在基本上可以算做是一個民主國家，所以可能會讓人期待它種種好的一面，但也會讓人看到壞的一面（就像過去在美國、西歐國家、日本與澳洲等地所發生的情形）。可是，俄羅斯直接與中國大陸接壤，因此當然會導致一些特別正面或負面的感覺。俄羅斯人在史達林跟毛澤東時代對於與共產中國親近的關係存有一些正面的記憶，隨後因為中、蘇共的分裂而引起了雙方在烏蘇里江沿岸瀕臨戰爭邊緣的危機，讓俄羅斯人對中國大陸產生了負面的感覺。更進一步來看，俄羅斯與中國在歷史上的關係是前者的帝國主義在後者的土地上攫取利益，這點與中國與美國的關係有極大的不同，因為美國較常採取的作為是對抗外國侵略者以保護中國的領土完整。

所以，種種的動機在俄羅斯處理臺灣特殊的地位政策之中都發揮了影響力。這些動機有時會使俄羅斯在臺灣問題上與美國起爭執。

就如同美國一般，俄羅斯對於激怒北京一事必須要很謹慎，因為它所懼怕的是北京的核武及傳統軍事武力。與美國或其他政治民主國家一樣，俄羅斯必須尋找海外市場，顧及海峽兩岸任一方的軍火市場。

俄羅斯面對車臣的分離運動要比美國林肯總統所要阻止的分離運動在時間點上更為接近現代，因此對北京官方要求中國統一更富同情心。除了立即的分離問題外，後冷戰時期的南斯拉夫與高加索的例子對俄羅斯與美國奏效，對於有時在全球各地導致種族淨化大屠殺的自決較不表支持。倘若臺灣獨立的原因是因為其經濟富裕而不願與較貧窮的大陸分享，並非是因為兩岸的政治自由與生活方式差異太大的話，俄羅斯、美國或其他外國勢力對臺灣獨立的支持將會減弱。

美國人不但關切居住在臺灣的人民，還關切居住在香港或大陸以外其他地區中國人的福利。因此，他們或許並不希望處理模糊的臺灣地位。這種模糊可當成用來保護其他中國人緩慢成長的自由的一種工具。無論中國人民自己建立的民主過程是多麼的新穎或是不完美，俄羅斯政府對此或與美國會有相同感受。

俄羅斯可能不喜歡美國的角色，會利用北京與華盛頓之間就臺灣問題的衝突來削弱美國的權力。廣義地說，俄羅斯保留其行動自由，避免支持臺灣的自由，以致於他們可以在華盛頓與北京因這個問題而陷入戰爭時，進行調停與約束。

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Abstract

An attempt is made to analyze foreign attitudes on the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, in particular comparing the attitudes of Russia with those of the United States and the rest of the world. In some cases the motivations will be very parallel, but there are also some very important differences.

Unlike the old Soviet Union, Russia is now largely a democracy, which might cause one to expect all the good the bad aspects of democracy that have been at work in the past in the United States, and in Western Europe and Japan, Australia, etc. Yet Russia still directly borders China, which can of course produce particularly positive or particularly negative feelings.

The Russians have some positive memories of close relations with Communist China in the days of Stalin and Mao, and some very negative feelings, as the Sino-Soviet split at times produced real risks of war along the Ussuri. Going back even more deeply, the historic relationship between Czarist Russia and Imperial China was indeed that of Russian imperialism at China's expense.

A variety of motives are thus at work in the development of the Russian policy toward the special status of Taiwan, motives which would put Russia sometimes at odds with the United States on the Taiwan question.

Just like America, Russia may have to be cautious about angering Beijing, because of a fear of Beijing's nuclear and conventional military forces. Just like the United States or any other political democracy, Russia may have to seek markets abroad, markets in which to sell weapons on either side of the Taiwan Strait, markets for other more peaceful exports.

Russia, facing a much more recent secession effort in Chechnya than the Southern secession the United States rebuffed under President Lincoln, may thus be more sympathetic to Beijing's official demands for a Chinese national reunification. Beyond the immediate secession issue, the post-Cold War examples of Yugoslavia and the Caucasus will work to make Russians, and Americans and others, less supportive of self-determination around the globe, the self-determination that can lead to "ethnic-cleansing" massacres. Support for Taiwan independence from the outside world, from Russians or Americans or anyone else, will be weakened if the independence seems tied to the greater economic affluence of Taiwan, in an unwillingness to share this with the poorer mainland, rather than to important differences in political freedom and life-style.

Americans will care about the welfare of the Chinese who live in Hong Kong and on the rest of the mainland, and not just about those who live on Taiwan. Hence, they may not wish to resolve the ambiguity of Taiwan's status, where this ambiguity has served as lever protecting the slow growth in freedom of other Chinese; many Russians may feel the same.

Russians may resent the role of the United States, and seize upon the Taiwan conflict between Beijing and Washington as a way of reducing American power. More generously, Russians may also reserve their freedom of action, avoiding any backing for Taiwan's freedom, so that they can mediate and moderate if Washington and Beijing should ever be getting into a war over the issue.

Аннотация

Данная работа ставит своей целью анализ отношения разных стран к взаимоотношениям между Китаем и Тайванем; в частности, автор стремится сопоставить позицию России с позицией США и других стран. В некоторых случаях точка зрения по этому вопросу может быть одинаковой, но в других случаях – значительно отличаться.

В настоящее время Россия, в отличие от бывшего Советского Союза, в основном является демократической страной, где можно наблюдать как позитивные, так и негативные аспекты процесса демократизации, подобные тем, которые имели место в США, в странах Западной Европы, в Японии, в Австралии и т. д. Тем не менее, Россия всё-таки граничит непосредственно с Китаем, который, разумеется, может реагировать на происходящее в России или очень положительно или очень отрицательно.

У русских существует как позитивная память о тесных отношениях с коммунистическим Китаем при Сталине и Мао Цзедуне, так и негативные чувства, вызванные расколом между КПК и КПСС, которые обострились в период напряжённого военного конфликта на реке Уссури. Следует отметить, что история отношений между царской Россией и императорским Китаем всегда была историей отношений господства российского империализма над Китаем.

Следовательно, различные мотивы, оказывающие влияние на развитие политики России по отношению к особенному статусу Тайваня, могут вызывать разногласия между Россией и США.

Опасаясь ядерного и обычного вооружения Китая, Россия и США должны быть очень осторожны, чтобы не рассердить Пекин. Как США и другим демократическим странам, так и России необходимо искать выход на международный рынок, то есть рынок для продажи оружия и других товаров по обе стороны Тайваньского пролива.

Россия, столкнувшаяся в настоящее время со стремлением Чечни выйти из состава России, более серьёзным по сравнению с противостоянием между Югом и Севером США, которое было прекращено президентом Линкольном, могла бы более сочувственно относиться к притязаниям Пекина на воссоединение Китая. Кроме того, примеры событий в Югославии и на Кавказе, имеющие место после окончания холодной войны, могут заставить Россию, Америку и другие страны меньше поддерживать самоопределение, могущее привести к “этнической чистке”. Поддержка независимости Тайваня со стороны внешнего мира, из России или Американцев или от любой другой страны, может ослабиться, если независимость определяется не значительными различиями в политической свободе и образе жизни двух стран, а лишь экономическим благосостоянием Тайваня не желающего поделиться с бедным Китаем. Американцы уделяют внимание благосостоянию китайцев, проживающих в Гонконге и в остальной части Китая, а не только жителям на Тайване. В связи с этим, американцы не спешат решить амбивалентность статуса Тайваня. Ибо двойственность как таковая служила средством защиты медленного темпа роста свободы остальных китайцев; такую мысль, пожалуй, разделяют и многие Россияне.

Возможно, что россиянам не нравится роль США в этом деле, они могут использовать столкновение между Пекином и Вашингтоном из-за Тайваня как средство для снижения влияния США. В общем-то, Россия оставляет за собой свободу действий, она может посредничать и примерить Вашингтон и Пекин, если произойдёт конфликт из-за данного вопроса.

This will be an attempt to sort out and predict a variety of foreign countries attitudes on the relationship between mainland China and Taiwan, in particular comparing the attitudes of Russia with those of the United States and the rest of the world. In some cases the motivations will be very parallel, but there are also some very important differences.

Unlike the old Soviet Union, Russia is now largely a democracy, which might cause one to expect all the good aspects, and the bad aspects, that have been at work in the past in the United States and in Western Europe and Japan, Australia, etc. Yet Russia still directly borders China, which can produce specially positive or negative feelings. The Russians have some very positive memories, of course, of close relations with Communist China in the days of Stalin and Mao, and then some very negative feelings as the Sino-Soviet split at times produced real risks of war along the Ussuri. Going back even more deeply, the historic relationship between Czarist Russia and Imperial China was indeed that of Russian imperialism at China's expense, substantially different from Chinese relations with the United States, where the American role was more often to protect China's territorial integrity against foreign land seizures.¹

Elementary Fear of Beijing's Military Power

When asked to explain the American reluctance to endorse independence for Taiwan, critics of such Washington policies sometimes accuse Americans of being too cravenly submissive to the threat posed by Beijing's nuclear weapons, and by the rest of Chinese Communist military forces.² If the Communist Chinese had never acquired nuclear weapons, while both Washington and Moscow possessed them, it is indeed plausible that many of the crises of the past would have had a different tone, with the Soviets or the Americans being prepared to go further in challenging Beijing's resolve.

Beijing's spokesmen continually describe themselves and the Chinese people as being very angry at the idea of anyone separating Taiwan from China, so "angry" that the PRC might go to war, even to nuclear war, in defense of China's rights and China's dignity here. Pretending to be angry and irrational has always been a way to do better in contests of resolve, in the game of chicken that is at the heart of an international crisis, because the other side can not be sure that this is only pretense, and may not take the chance of finding out whether the indignation expressed would lead to outright warfare.

Yet any international crisis is always a two-way street. Americans have indeed stood up to Communist China in various crises of the past, just as they stood up to a much more powerfully-armed Soviet Union, as in the Cuban missile crisis. And the Russians also took chances in crises of the past, in crises with the United States, and

1. On the history of threats to Chinese territorial integrity, see Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990).

2. See James Mann, About Face (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999) for an argument that Washington has tended to give in to Beijing in contests of resolve.

crises with Communist China. A crisis can indeed be defined as each sides taking the risk of an outbreak of very destructive warfare, forcing the other side to endure the same risks of war, hoping that the other side will back down first on the issues in dispute. The side that backs down first serves the interest of world peace by ending the crisis, but this is the side that loses the political questions that are being disputed.³

The phenomenon of crisis diplomacy is thus hardly limited to nuclear confrontations, or even to international diplomacy. It is as the heart of labor disputes, and even domestic disagreements within a family, as each side suffers while an issue remains in dispute, as neither side wants to be the first to make concessions.

Russians and Americans will indeed be reluctant to cause the Beijing regime, or the Chinese people in general, to become too angry, just as they will wish to avoid such anger in other peoples; anger can cause wars or, short of this, can cause other kinds of uncooperative behavior.

Yet such a concern for the indignation of others will also always have some natural limits. The same Russians and Americans will now have principles of their own, principles that they feel strongly about. The entire Cold War, and the earlier confrontations with Fascism and Japanese imperialism, were indeed seen as contests of resolve. Democracies are used to having their resolve challenged, and to having this resolve under-estimated, sometimes with the terrible result that a war happened because the dictatorship in the confrontation assumed that the democracy would not resist.

A Russian or American aversion to military confrontation with the forces of the PRC can thus only explain a part of the picture here. There are indeed other explanations for why Americans, or Russians, or other people around the world, will be reluctant to commit so fully to the security of Taiwan. Some of these will, like the moral cowardice charged here above, also be less worthy kinds of motivation, but some may be more understandable and more worthy.

Simple Material Greed

Leaving aside fears of getting into a war with Communist China, a war in which everyone would suffer (but where China might indeed suffer the very most), one could explain foreign behavior also in terms of simple economic selfishness. The Russian military may be desperate to sell weapons in the post-Cold War world to anyone, because it faces such great difficulties in maintaining its own budgets, and it may thus be delighted to sell the PLA the very weapons which are now seen as so much threatening the security of Taiwan.⁴

3. The general nature of crisis diplomacy is outlined in Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981).

4. Russia weapons sales to the PRC are discussed in Kenneth W. Allen, " PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization", in Susan M. Pushka (editor), People's Liberation Army After Next (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000) pp. 189-254.

Other countries, for example France, The Netherlands, or other members of the European Union, might have been willing to sell weapons to reinforce the defense of Taiwan, but they might be deterred now by threats that they would then be denied the ability to sell ordinary goods to the PRC. Democratic governments all around the world have to be concerned about full employment for their workers, who otherwise may vote them out of office in the next election.

But this kind of motivation can of course also help generate support for Taiwan, as for example when President Bush in 1992 ignored Beijing's threats and chose to allow the sale of advanced jet fighter planes to the ROC. Bush's move was seen by cynics in America as mainly intended to increase his chances of winning the votes in Texas needed to give him a chance to be reelected as President against Bill Clinton.

In the end, Beijing did not go through with its threats of grave and hostile responses to this American arms sale, perhaps showing that Beijing's threats more generally are likely to be bluff and bluster. Since the PRC leadership is still to some extent wedded to Marxist forms of analysis which explain all of American foreign policy as driven by the weaknesses of capitalism, Beijing was perhaps even a little resigned to the likelihood that a President like Bush would have to take domestic prosperity and employment into account.

One could thus speculate about future possibilities where West European weapons manufacturers were able to defy Beijing's threats and sell weapons to Taiwan again, without their country then suffering any serious punishment, because Beijing saw this as a sign of the inevitable failings of capitalism as outlined by Marx and Lenin.

And one can even speculate about the Russian military and government seeking hard currency by selling modern weapons to the ROC. The United States and other western powers are very concerned that Moscow, desperate for hard currency, not sell advanced weapons to states like Iran and Iraq. Yet Taiwan also has substantial reserves of hard currency. The Beijing regime thus ought to be concerned about whether Moscow could in the future deal arms with Taiwan just as it might today be dealing with Teheran, promising others that weapons will not be sold, but quietly letting such weapons get delivered anyway. The international control and verification of arms transfers is inherently imperfect, generating major problems for most arms control agreements.

The desires of weapons manufacturers to make a profit never seem so very noble, and neither do the desires of professional militaries to round out their budgets, or the desires of incumbents in a democracy to retain office by pandering to their worker/voters. But all of such desires are understandable, and all of them may work somewhat at cross-purposes, as the government in Taipei tries to predict where it will get support. At times this may strengthen Beijing militarily, but at other times it may reinforce Taiwan.

Taiwan is much more prosperous on a per-capita basis than mainland China. But the mainland is even today larger as a total market, and has the potential to grow into a very much larger market. The selfish economic drives that account for a part of all countries' foreign policies, and especially for those of democratic countries, might thus, here and

there, reinforce an otherwise more noble inclination to support democracy and freedom on Taiwan, but will also often cut against it.

The economic prowess of Taiwan, based on free markets and a free political atmosphere, may thus be a declining asset if the same economic growth now occurs on the mainland. Yet the outside world would still surely applaud this Chinese growth, in the net, if a new prosperity on the mainland were to be brought with it the same political and economic liberalization that we have witnessed on Taiwan.

Fear of Secessionism

A very different argument against supporting Taiwan may be quite analogous for today's Russia and today's United States, since both have had to deal with secessionist movements in the past. For Moscow, the secession attempt is hardly over, as the struggle for the future of Chechnya is not finished. For the United States, the analogy (which has been alluded to a number of times by Beijing leaders) would be to Abraham Lincoln's resolve in 1861 in resisting the secession of South Carolina and the other southern slave-holding states.

Americans favor democracy and self-determination, and so presumably do the Russians now. The old Soviet Constitution, drafted by Stalin in the years of his most terroristic dictatorship, indeed even had a provision for secession by the member-Republics of the "Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". This constitution (which also provided for a free printing-press and ink and paper for anyone who wanted to criticize the government) was of course regarded as a joke for all the years of Stalin's rule, and then under Stalin's successors. Yet the provision for secession was then remarkably reactivated in 1991 when the Soviet Union fell apart, with the other 14 republics leaving the USSR, and the Russian Federation then being left by itself.

Having been deserted by the other Republics, the remaining Russian Federation, however much it was now to be governed by democracy, would understandably have been reluctant to tolerate further secessions by components of the Russian Federation itself, and Yeltsin's attempt to suppress Chechnya was obviously not directed just at Chechnya, but at any other component that might want to secede.⁵

Democratic countries, however committed they may be to self-determination, will also be committed to national strength and national unity. The American Civil War is today widely (and correctly) remembered as having been about slavery. Yet Lincoln, intent on preventing the breakup of the United States (a breakup that foreign powers such as Britain and France would have welcomed) once described his feelings as follows: "If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving

5. Russian fears of secession are discussed in Mikhail A. Alexseev (editor), Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999).

others alone I would also do that.”⁶ Lincoln, at the time of the American Civil War, thus at least pretended that he cared about national unity more than about the moral human-rights issue of slavery; and Americans might thus today, just like Russians contemplating Chechnya, feel a little bit sympathetic to Beijing spokesmen citing their desire for national unity.

Beijing will remind anyone who is ready to listen that foreign powers have historically sought to divide China by supporting separatism in places like Mongolia, Sinkiang, Tibet...and Taiwan, just as Britain and France were leaning in the 1860s toward supporting the independence of the Confederate States of America. There are indeed many people on Taiwan who remember this history in the same way as the regime in Beijing, people who resent the earlier humiliations and invasions of China, who thus oppose any moves for independence for Tibet or Sinkiang. Not all of the PRC's "indignation" at the idea of Taiwan is simply bluster or aggressiveness. Some of it is indeed a genuine Chinese memory of some very painful history.

A portion of the Russian and American and other outside sympathy for appeals for Chinese unity thus will indeed derive from some guilty memories of the decades when China was a victim. By all historical accounts, Russia was more culpable than the United States on the question of threatening China's territorial integrity (and, despite the PRC's anti-American propaganda, one indeed finds scholars and ordinary people around Beijing who typically remember the Russia's behavior in history as quite different from that of the Americans).⁷

The American positive feeling toward China, which indeed explains much of the American involvement in World War II, has meant that Americans feel more strongly about supporting freedom for the people on Taiwan, precisely because these people are seen by Americans as Chinese. Beijing spokesmen often attempt to portray any American support for Taiwan as "anti-Chinese"; but the reality is that it is indeed pro-Chinese.⁸

Historically, Russians have been less "pro-Chinese", seen as more intent on gaining territory from China, as more inclined thus to view China as a traditional rival in Asia. If Russians today have had to renounce their imperialism against places like Estonia and Latvia, they may also be somewhat more ashamed of their past such advances against

6. The Lincoln quotation is cited in Benjamin Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.128-129.

7. On the real mainland Chinese perception of the historical role of the United State, se David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist" (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991).

8. This author's more extended version of this argument can be found in George H. Quester, "Sources of American Attitudes about Taiwan and the Rest of China", in Chun-Chieh Huang and Peng-Pu Tsao (editors), Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1998) pp. 259-279.

China. Since "splitting" China was a tool of such Russian imperialism, in Mongolia, Sinkiang, and Manchuria, the same Russian inclination to avoid imperialism would stand in the way of endorsing a "split" by Taiwan.

Fears of Excessive Division

A Russian reluctance to support independence for Taiwan might thus be explained by the immediate analogy to places like Chechnya; the United States does not have to fear any secession attempts among its component states, but is somewhat burdened by its memory of Lincoln's resolute defense of national unity, with Lincoln often being remembered by Americans as the greatest of the Presidents.

Yet Americans, and Russians, and many other people in Western Europe and elsewhere now have a related, but slightly different, reason to be reluctant to support divisions of countries around the world. Such divisions, in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus, have produced warfare and massacres, as renewals of ethnic hatreds have led to the worst kinds of "ethnic cleansing", often seen live on television through networks like CNN. Americans and other peoples governed by democracy will naturally favor self-determination, but they will have their enthusiasm for such self-determination markedly reduced when it brings wars and massacres with it.

Beijing often accuse Americans, and any other supporters of Taiwan, of being intent on dividing China into pieces, with the separation of Taiwan being merely the first precedent-setting step back toward the China of the 1920s governed by competing warlords. The United States is alleged to be intent on dominating the world as the global "hegemon", and a policy of "divide and conquer" has historically been an appropriate avenue to achieving world domination.⁹

In the case of the Americans, and probably for Russians and other outsiders, this accusation is most probably false, for one finds very few Americans now looking forward to seeing intra-Chinese warfare on the pattern of intra-Yugoslav warfare. The disagreement between Taiwan and mainland China is of course political and ideological, and not religious or ethnic (while the issues for Tibet, or for Sinkiang, may indeed more resemble those tearing apart the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union). Yet the human costs of the intra-Chinese wars of the years of the warlords were also quite horrible, and outsiders will be reluctant to uncork anything that brings a resumption of such Chinese division to their living-room television screens.

We began this analysis by outlining some of the less noble motives that might influence Russians, Americans, and others on the tension between Taiwan and Beijing. Any such outsiders will fear what Beijing might do with its military power and its nuclear arsenals, and the same outsiders will be selfishly concerned for economic

9. For examples of such a Chinese accusation that America wants to be the "hegemon", see Michael Pillsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000).

prosperity and the balance of payments; Russia and America in particular will have to wrestle with what the abstract issue of secession does to their own political constitutions.

Yet we have now moved into somewhat more noble motives. If Russia was interested only in national power, interested only in maintaining comparative military strength against its enormous Chinese neighbor, it might indeed favor the secession of Sinkiang and Tibet, and might similarly support the separate status of Taiwan. Chinese forces that are deployed along the Taiwan Strait are forces that might otherwise be deployed in northern Manchuria, etc. And, if the United States were truly interested in dominating the world as a “hegemon”, as analysts in Beijing (and in Moscow, New Delhi and Paris) so often charge, the United States would be eager for the same kind of breaking up of China.

But the more noble objective here is that Russians and Americans and everyone else can not be looking forward to the violence and economic sacrifice, and general human hardship, that such a fractionation of China could lead to. One of the characteristics of democracy is that such governments truly care about people for their own sake abroad, feeling good when peace and prosperity are achieved in other regions, grieving when war and poverty are instead the pattern. If a separation of Taiwan from China were to make war more likely, democracies on the outside will be very reluctant to see this separation become so clear.

Fear of “Cherry Picking”

There are many good reasons why Taiwan must be slow to accept any kind of unification with mainland China. The People's Republic of China has indeed come a long way politically since the Mao's Great Leap Forward and Great Cultural Revolution, as life on the mainland is much freer than before. But the Republic of China regime on Taiwan still offers a far better life for the individual in terms of personal freedom, and it offers everyone a voice in how they are governed. On these dimensions, Taiwan will indeed draw a great deal of sympathy from the United States, and from any democracy, even from so new a democracy as the Russian Federation.

But one can also see some other motives for why the people of Taiwan would want continued separation, or even outright independence, motives which will produce somewhat less of such sympathy. The people of Taiwan are, on a per-capita basis, much wealthier economically than their cousins on the mainland, and some of Taiwanese desire for independence might instead simply reflect an aversion to sharing this wealth, i.e. a materially-selfish intention of retaining this higher living-standard for themselves.¹⁰

10. For an analysis of the comparative wealth of Taiwan and the mainland, see Lucian Pye, "Money Politics and Transitions to Democracy in East Asia", Asian Survey (March, 1997) pp. 213-228.

If this is the Taiwanese motive for independence, Americans and Russians and others will be somewhat less sympathetic, for it looks less like a love of liberty and much more like simple greed.

One might quickly enough be drawn to the analogy with the breakup of Yugoslavia, which was spearheaded by the secession of Slovenia, the northernmost, and richest, of the former Yugoslav republics. The Slovenians clearly wanted self-determination and independence, and they managed to achieve it with next to no bloodshed. Slovenia indeed had the strong support of Austria and Germany as it won independence and achieved membership in the United Nations, in part because these European countries identified with the affluent life-style and culture of the Slovenians.

The United States was conversely reluctant to see any breakup of Yugoslavia, because the precedent of Slovenian independence would lead to the much more violent secessions that inevitably were to follow, and perhaps because the economic viability of the entirety of Yugoslavia had so obviously depended on the wealth of the north being redistributed to address the poverty of the south.¹¹

If any large part of Slovenian desire for independence stemmed from a simple reluctance to be taxed to relieve poverty in Serbia and Macedonia, it would reduce the outside sympathy this draws in any foreign democracy that regularly redistributes its own wealth from richer regions to poorer. And the same will hold in the future if the economic difference between Taiwan and mainland China looms larger than the political difference.

If Taiwan remains prosperous and mainland China remains poor, while mainland China becomes less dictatorial, outside world sympathy will thus be thinned. The mainlanders would look economically-motivated in seeking to take over Taiwan, but the people on Taiwan would look greedy as well in resisting unification, and much of the public in any democratic country will now sympathize somewhat with the poor wanting to have some redistribution of prosperity by the wealthy.

But the entire picture, and indeed the entire cause of tension across the Taiwan Strait could change, of course, if some of the recent trends continue, by which investment capital is finding the mainland more profitable than Taiwan.¹² Various portions of mainland China are indeed now booming economically, most especially the coastal regions, with Shanghai perhaps looking even more affluent than Taipei. If this continues, it is thus possible that the perceived economic per-capita gap between the PRC and Taiwan will be much less obvious for all concerned; this might reduce Taiwanese desire for independence, and it might also reduce any mainland eagerness to

11. American attitudes on the breakup of Yugoslavia are outlined in Steven Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis", Security Studies (Spring, 1992) pp. 361-381.

12. Recent trends by which investment is shifting to the mainland are discussed in Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999).

take over Taiwan (this could also all along have been driven, of course, by material considerations, rather than the “national pride” arguments so often presented in Beijing).

If the political differences between the two alternative Chinese regimes also loom less large over time, one could thus even imagine people on Taiwan becoming more favorable to a merger with the mainland, while the regime and people on the mainland became less interested in such a merger (which, perhaps twenty or thirty years from now, could produce a bizarre reversal of roles on the issue).

For the moment, however, Taiwan remains politically freer, and economically richer. The basic point remains as noted: If the outside world, Americans, Russians, and others, come to see the Taiwan independence sentiment more in terms of economic greed, of “who gets to escape taxes”, and less in terms of political freedom, this democratic outside world will be less supportive of Taiwan.

The outside world wishes for political freedom and economic prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The larger the political gap, and the smaller the economic gap, the greater the outside support from any foreign democracy. If the political gap fades and the economic gap remains, such support will diminish. If both the gaps disappear, one wonders what the issue on reunification would be.

Fear for the Welfare of the Other Chinese

Americans do indeed care about the freedom and welfare of the people living on Taiwan, and so must free people all around the globe, including the citizens of newly-democratic Russia. But these same outsiders will also care about the freedom and welfare of the Chinese living in Hong Kong, and about the freedom and welfare of the more than one billion Chinese living on the rest of the mainland.

An immediate and outright independence for Taiwan might be the best possible reinsurance for the political freedoms that have been achieved in the Republic of China. But such an outright independence might very much threaten the arrangements for Hong Kong.

If the Communist leadership continues to respect the life-style of Hong Kong, it is in important part doing so because it hopes to woo Taiwan back into union with China by the one country, two social systems formula. For Taiwan to definitively reject this wooing would be to eliminate an important incentive for Beijing's respect for individual liberties in Hong Kong. An American, or a supporter of democracy anywhere, will care about Taiwan, but he or she will also care about Hong Kong, and one can not deny that the two are connected.¹³

But there is even more at stake that a liberal foreigner would care about. Because the PRC had made promises to Hong Kong (largely because it was wooing Taiwan), it

13. On the connections between the fates of Hong Kong and Taiwan, see Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1993).

has had to offer similar concessions to its own entrepreneurs and its own individual citizens. The “Special Economic Zones” such as Shenzhen, matching Hong Kong in liberalization, have multiplied and spread to the point that all of China in effect became an “SEZ”. When asked about the imminent Chinese takeover of Hong Kong, one analyst in Beijing responded, only half in jest, that it was actually the “Hong Kong takeover of China”.

Mainland China and its Communist regime have tolerated this, and have indeed benefitted from it, importantly because it was seen as a necessary part of retaining the hope of winning back Taiwan. Americans (and Russians and anyone else committed to liberal values) will welcome this because it makes all of China a much more prosperous and relaxed place to live, because it reinforces the chances that the mainland will, over time, become a more democratic country, a more reliable partner for the international system.

One could indeed suggest that the prospect of a China takeover of Taiwan might also someday look instead like a Taiwan takeover of China. If any part of the uncertainty about Taiwan's future contributes toward the mainland following the Taiwan model, most of the outside world, Russia included, would have to welcome this.

The continued freedom of Hong Kong, and the political and economic reform of the mainland, are thus inevitably somewhat tied to the ambiguity of the future of Taiwan. If Taiwan were to submit immediately to Beijing's rule, the useful leverage here would be gone. If Taiwan were to immediately achieve independence, this leverage would similarly be gone. The hesitation of the outside world can be accounted for by all the motives, noble or ignoble, listed above, but this will also be another one of such important motives.

When asked whether the Communist regime in Beijing will completely fulfill its promise to leave the political style of Hong Kong undisturbed, any outside observer would quite correctly respond "of course not". Yet, if Beijing sticks to even 90% of its pledge, this will not be such a great setback for the welfare of the people living in Hong Kong; if, in the meantime, it has had to offer similar liberalization to the more than one billion people it governs on the mainland, Americans and others would regard all of this as a very worthwhile exchange, where the freedom and well-being of all the Chinese involved, those in Hong Kong and those on the rest of the mainland, is concerned.

Similarly, if asked whether the current ambivalent situation of Taiwan puts into question the freedom and well-being of the people living there, the answer would have to be "of course". Yet if this ambivalence works to support liberalization processes affecting all the Chinese on the mainland, the same Americans, and many others, will welcome it, rather than being in a hurry to clarify the situation.

The Role of the United States

When we are analyzing the role of Russia on the future of Taiwan, or the role of Japan or Western Europe, or the role of Australia, we can never forget that the outside country that has been the most important here has indeed all along been the United States. The American motives we have been describing here have made more difference than the Russian motives, or any of the other motives.

This may be because of the historical special ties the United States has had with China, ties of trade and ties based on the letters home of American missionaries, the ties that made many Americans identify positively with China and which brought the United States to support China against Japan, even when Washington saw Nazi Germany under Hitler to be a greater threat than Imperial Japan. In the years after the Communist takeover of the mainland, it was the United States, of course, that was the most important for continuing to recognize the Republic of China on Taiwan, thinking of it as "Free China", and in the aftermath of the "Great Cultural Revolution" on the mainland, as the "real China".

The special American role might have emerged even if Americans did not have these special feelings about China, simply because the United States has so long been at the forefront of defending self-determination and democracy. Yet the ties of American missionaries to China, making Americans often think of Chinese as "people like us", with the "Confucian ethic" seeming so much to resemble the "Protestant ethic" has surely made America even a little more resolute on behalf of Chinese freedom than on behalf of human freedom more generally.

When the United States is thus in the lead on anything, as the most powerful country in the world in the aftermath of the Cold War, other countries can go in two alternative directions in responding to this.

One kind of reaction is sometimes labelled "band-wagoning", as everyone in the system is watching for a leader, in particular a benign leader, and is then inclined to join with that leader, in establishing useful ways of coordinating to solve the world's problems. The world thus is more prosperous because it uses the American Dollar as the unit of account for facilitating greater trade. The world uses English as the global language, not because English has grammatical advantages over other languages, but because of the earlier power of the British Navy, and the 20th Century power of Hollywood and American popular culture. The world tends to send its students to American universities, because America has moved to the forefront of education, and probably because the world trusts the academic freedom and political freedom that has been achieved in the United States.

But a second, opposite, reaction would be that of the old "balance of power" mechanism, where all the other states can be counted upon to lean against any power that looks like it is becoming too much of a leader, too much of a "hegemon". This is the world that is often portrayed by the political scientists who describe themselves as

"realists", a world in which all countries are more or less the same in their motivations, as everyone seeks power for themselves and fears power in the hands of others. This is a picture of the world, and of American foreign policy, that is now often endorsed by analysts in Beijing, arguing that America supports Taiwan only because it wants to be a "hegemon" and thus pursues a policy of "divide and conquer". It is an analysis of international power politics often put forward by similar analysts in France and India. And, most importantly, it is a picture of the world now often endorsed by Russian political and strategic analysts.

If Moscow is now truly worried about American power, rather than seeing America as a natural leader in the sorting out of important international issues, Russians will therefore not follow the United States in being resolute in the protection of what Taiwan has achieved; they will instead welcome the resulting tensions between Washington and Beijing, as a drain on American power, as a check to American leadership.¹⁴

This would be an interpretation of Russian and other motivations that would assign very little importance to the actual details of the interactions between Beijing and Taipei, and much more to simple rivalry among the powers. The average Russian has to be aware that Taiwan is a much more successful society than Communist China, but (unless and until the PRC becomes a very powerful military threat to Russia) he may not be guided by these considerations, but instead by a supposed rivalry with the United States. A resentment of American leadership, in Moscow, or in Paris or in New Delhi, could thus cause others, even in democratic countries, to override the consideration of supporting democracy, in favor of calculations of comparative power.

The end of the Cold War has thus seen a lively debate, now that democracy has spread to so many countries, as to whether the "realist" or the "liberal" assumptions will be proven correct about future foreign policy behavior. The "liberal" argues that democracies will never fight against each other, that power politics will now fade away, that democracies will be driven mainly by a desire to help other peoples maintain or achieve democracy. The "realist" would instead predict that democracies will have the same motives, and the same fears about other states' motives, as any other powers in history, i.e. that wars and arms races and power-contests will indeed appear between democracies.

It is still too early to tell which vision of democratic behavior will be proven correct, and Russian attitudes on the interaction between mainland China and Taiwan will surely be an important test case for this debate. If Russia chooses to follow the American lead in reinforcing freedom on Taiwan, this would be a sign that the "realist" interpretations

¹⁴ See John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001) for a well-developed outline of the "realist" argument by which power considerations will continue to be central for Russian or American decision-making.

of national behavior are not so valid, and that "liberal" assumptions about the foreign-policy of democracies are more appropriate. If Russia instead exploits the American commitments to Taiwan, so as to conspire with Beijing against the United States, the "realists" will have reason to feel confirmed.

Fears of Wartime Escalation

As noted above, if the Russians are interested in power, they may welcome a rivalry between Beijing and Washington. But, even if power is an important motive here, it most surely will not extend to Moscow's welcoming an actual war between the United States and Communist China, for such a war would threaten Russian safety and interests, just as it would threaten the safety and well-being of Taiwan and Japan, and everybody else in the system. If the Russians care at all about the people of East Asia, and if they care about themselves, such a war, nuclear or non-nuclear, is something that Moscow would very much seek to prevent, even at the risk of perhaps sacrificing any support for Taiwan's freedom.

Here the Russian intentions would not be so much to be the exploiter of conflict between Beijing and Washington, but to be the mediator. Because Washington is so much committed to Taiwan, at least more committed than any other power, the Russians would thus lean against being aligned in the same direction as the Americans, if only to retain an ability to offer peace-mediation services when Beijing and Washington felt the need.

Moscow could thus remain much less committed than Washington to the status quo on Taiwan, not because it was indifferent to this status quo, and not necessarily because it resented Washington's role as the one remaining superpower, but because it perhaps distrusted how far Americans would go in escalating a conflict, and because the Americans had captured the role of being the "tough cop" in resisting Beijing's demands, so that Moscow would want, at most, to be the "nice cop".

If all Moscow was doing here was showing a fear of Beijing's military potential, it could again be accused of showing an ignoble lack of fortitude. But if what it rather feared was the suffering of Chinese and Taiwanese and others (in a war that could get out of hand, because America had come to be seen as an excessively fervent and immoderate "cop"), then the motivation would be a bit more altruistic and noble.

Much of what Moscow does on this dimension (and also what Tokyo and every other important democratic center does) will thus depend on what the George W. Bush administration and following administrations do in foreign policy, i.e. on whether they maintain the image of consultation and careful service of the world's interests, or whether they are instead seen as too much inclined to unilateral approaches.

Summation

A large variety of motives are thus at work in the development of the Russian policy toward the special status of Taiwan, motives that are parallel to the motives driving other democracies such as the United States, but motives which could thus nonetheless put Russia sometimes at odds with the United States on the Taiwan question.

Just like America, Russia may have to be cautious about angering Beijing, because of a fear of Beijing's nuclear and conventional military forces. Just like the United States or any other political democracy, Russia may have to seek markets abroad, markets for weapons on either side of the Taiwan Strait, markets for any other exports.

Russia, facing a much more recent secession effort in Chechnya than the secession the United States rebuffed under President Lincoln, may be more sympathetic to Beijing's official demands for a Chinese national reunification. Beyond the immediate secession issue, the post-Cold War examples of Yugoslavia and the Caucasus will work to make Russians, and Americans and others, less supportive of self-determination around the globe, the self-determination that has sometimes led to "ethnic-cleansing" massacres. Support for Taiwan independence in the outside world, among Russians or Americans or anyone else, will be weakened if the independence seems tied to the greater economic affluence of Taiwan, in an unwillingness to share this with the poorer mainland, rather than to important differences in political freedom and life-style.

Americans will care about the welfare of the Chinese who live in Hong Kong and on the rest of the mainland, and not just about those who live on Taiwan. Hence, they may not wish to resolve the ambiguity of Taiwan's status, since this ambiguity has served as a lever protecting the slow growth in freedom for other Chinese; however new and imperfectly established its own democratic processes may be, the Russian government may well feel the same.

Russians may resent the role of the United States, and may seize upon the conflict between Beijing and Washington over Taiwan as a way of reducing American power. More generously, Russians may also reserve their freedom of action, avoiding any backing for Taiwan's freedom, so that they can mediate and moderate if Washington and Beijing should ever be getting into a war over the issue.

這篇論文試圖去整理及預測各國對於台海兩岸關係的種種態度，特別是比較俄羅斯與美國及世界其他國家對於兩岸的態度。在某些事例上，各國的動機將會相似，但是有些動機會有極重要的差異。

俄羅斯並不像前蘇聯一樣，它現在基本上可以算做是一個民主國家，所以可能會讓人期待它種種好的一面，但也會讓人看到壞的一面（就像過去在美國、西歐國家、日本與澳洲等地所發生的情形）。但是，俄羅斯直接與中國大陸接壤，因此當然會導致一些特別正面或負面的感覺。俄羅斯人在史達林跟毛澤東時代對於與共產中國的親近關係存有一些正面的記憶，隨後因為中、蘇共的分裂而引起了雙方在烏蘇里江（the Ussuri）沿岸瀕臨戰爭的危機，讓俄羅斯人對中國大陸產生了負面的感覺。更深一層地來看，俄羅斯與中國在歷史上的關係是前者的帝國主義在後者的土地上攫取利益，這點與中國與美國的關係有極大的不同，因為美國較常採取的作為是對抗外國掠奪者以保護中國領土完整。¹

對北京軍事力量根本的恐懼

當被要求去解釋為何美國不願支持臺灣獨立時，批評這項政策的人有時會指責美國太過於懦弱，以致於屈從於北京的核子武器以及其他共產黨的軍事部隊威脅之下。² 如果共產中國沒有核子武器而美、蘇擁有核子武器的話，那麼過去很多的危機的確會因為美、蘇能夠進一步挑戰北京的決心而有了不一樣的面貌。

北京的發言人一直形容他們和中國人民對於任何人要將臺灣自中國分離的主意感到『非常憤怒』，因此他們可能會憤怒到發動戰爭（甚至核子戰爭）以防衛中國的權利與尊嚴。佯裝憤怒與不理性一直是在試探決心的比賽（在國際危機的核心而言就是『小雞遊戲』）當中取得上風的一種方式，因為另一方不能確定是否對方只是作態而已，所以可能不會冒險去瞭解此種憤慨到底會不會馬上導致戰爭。

但是，任何的國際危機都像是一條雙向道。在過去，美國人的確已經在各式各樣的危機之中冒險與共產中國對抗，就像他們在古巴飛彈危機之中對抗軍事力量更強大的蘇聯一樣。而俄羅斯人在過去的危機中也冒險，對美國或對共產中國的危機亦然。『危機』其實可以視為一方冒著毀滅性戰事爆發的危險（同時也讓另一方冒著同樣的危險）去逼使另一方率先在爭議的問題上讓步。率先讓步的一方藉由讓危機結束而對世界和平做出貢獻，但是它卻也正是輸掉爭論議題的一方。³

¹有關歷史上對中國領土完整的威脅，參見Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)。

²對於有關華盛頓想要在決心的競賽中對北京讓步的論述，參見James Mann, About Face (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1999)。

³危機外交的本質請見Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,

於是，危機外交的現象幾乎不侷限於核子衝突或者是國際間的外交。危機外交是解決勞資糾紛（甚至是家庭內部歧異）的核心，也是一個當議題的爭議性仍在，因而使每一方都受到損失，或是當沒有任何一方想要先妥協之時的主要解決方式。

俄羅斯與美國的確將會不願意讓北京政權（或者廣義的說，中國人民）『太』憤怒，就像他們希望避免其他的民族會同樣憤怒的情形一樣。憤怒能導致戰爭，即使不能，那也會產生其他種種不合作的行為。

但是，對於別人憤慨的顧慮總是有其自然的限度。俄羅斯人跟美國人都會有他們自己的原則，特別是他們非常堅持的原則。整個冷戰以及稍早的與法西斯主義和日本帝國主義的對抗被視為試探決心的比賽。民主國家對於其決心被挑戰或者被低估是習以為常了，有時候造成了因為獨裁者假定民主國家不會堅持決心而導致戰爭發生的可怖後果。

俄羅斯或者美國不想與中共的軍隊發生衝突的意願只能解釋當下部分的情勢。有別的原因來說明為什麼美國人、俄羅斯人或者其他人民不願意全面地對臺灣的安全做出承諾。正如前面所述的道德上的膽怯（moral cowardice）一樣，有些原因也是比較沒有價值的動機，但有些可能是比較容易去瞭解而且比較有價值的。

單純的物質貪慾

暫時撇開與共產中國發生戰爭的恐懼不談（雖然說這場戰爭中，每個人都會受害，而且中共可能受的傷害最深），吾人或可從單純的經濟自私自利當中來解釋對外行為。在後冷戰的時代，俄羅斯的軍隊可能很渴望將武器出售給任何人，因為他們在維持他們自己的預算時，面對著極大的困難。因此，他們可能很高興能夠賣給人民解放軍一些在目前看起來會對臺灣安全造成威脅的武器。⁴

其他的國家（例如法國、荷蘭或者其他歐洲聯盟的會員國）或許早已經願意出售武器給臺灣以強化臺灣的國防力量，但是現在看來，他們可能因為被威脅將不得賣給中共日常貨物而打消此一念頭（雖然他們也許會否認此種威脅）。全世界的民主政府必須考慮到勞工的充分就業，否則勞工可以在下一次的選舉之中把政府投票出局。

但是這種動機當然也有助促進對於臺灣的支持，例如當老布希總統在一九九二年不顧北京的威脅而選擇讓售予臺灣先進戰鬥機的案子過關。布希的舉動被美國的批評家認為主要是為了在德州有機會贏得選票以增進打敗柯林頓的機會。

1981)。

⁴關於俄羅斯對中共的武器銷售的討論，參閱Kenneth W. Allen, "PLA Air Force Operations and Modernization", in Susan M. Pushka (editor), *People's Liberation Army After Next* (Carlisle, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2000) pp. 189-254。

最後，北京並沒有因為它對於此次軍售深惡痛絕的反應而真正實踐其威脅，這或許顯示了北京的威脅一般而言比較可能是吹吹牛皮、虛張聲勢而已。既然中共的領導班子在某種程度上依然堅守著馬克思式分析，認為所有的美國外交政策是被資本主義的弱點所驅使，北京或甚傾向於向布希這樣的總統必須將美國國內的繁榮與就業納入其決策考量之中。

所以，吾人能推敲出未來西歐軍火製造商在母國沒有受到嚴厲的懲罰之下，能夠抗拒北京的威脅而再度賣給臺灣武器的可能性有多少，因為北京把這種決定視為馬克思和列寧所描述的資本主義不可避免的衰落。

吾人亦可推測俄羅斯軍方與政府藉由賣武器到臺灣以換取外匯。美國與其他西方國家非常關切亟需外匯的莫斯科不應該出售先進武器給伊朗及伊拉克等國家一事。但是臺灣有很多外匯存底，所以北京政權應該關心是否莫斯科在未來將會出售武器給臺灣（就像莫斯科今日可能會對德黑蘭所做的一樣，答應其他國家不會賣武器給德黑蘭，但默默地讓武器流入德黑蘭）。國際軍控與武器轉移查核先天有其缺陷，使得多數的武器管制協議都有重大問題存在。

軍火商追求利潤的意圖從來不是那麼的高尚，而職業軍人想要把預算消化完畢，或者民主國家中在位者想要迎合選民以保住權位的意圖其實也是一樣的。但是，這些意圖都是可瞭解的，而且當台北試著去猜測它的支持到底從哪兒來的時候，這些意圖在某種程度上[譯者註：對台北而言]可以達成多重目標，有時候可能會增強北京的軍事力量，但有時候會強化臺灣的軍事力量。

臺灣在個人基礎上比中國大陸繁榮的多，但是大陸今天在整個市場規模而言比以往更大，同時也有潛力發展成為非常龐大的市場。經濟上自私的驅策解釋了國家外交政策的一部份（特別是民主國家的外交政策），這種驅策力或許加強了對於支持臺灣民主自由的一種較為勇敢（noble）的意願，但有時也會阻礙了此種意願。

因此，倘若大陸有像臺灣一般的經濟成長，那麼臺灣以自由市場與政治環境為基礎的經濟實力或許是一種逐漸萎縮的資產。但是，如果大陸上新興的榮景帶來了與在臺灣同樣發生過的政治及經濟自由化的話，世界各國仍然會支持與稱讚中國大陸的經濟成長。

對分離主義的恐懼

反對支持臺灣的不同論點與今日之俄羅斯及美國的情況非常類似，因為後兩者在過去都曾處理過分離主義的運動。對莫斯科而言，企圖分離的嘗試幾乎沒有結束，未來車臣的獨立運動不會停止；對美國而言，類似的情況為林肯反對 1861 年南卡羅來納州及其他南方主張蓄奴各州的分離運動（此種類似的情況曾被北京領導人多次提起）。

美國人熱愛民主與自決，現在俄羅斯人應該也是如此。史達林在暴力獨裁統治時期所制定的舊蘇聯憲法中，對蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯邦內的各共和國成員甚至有所謂的分離條款，不過在史達林及其後繼者統治的時光裡，這部憲法當然被視為是個笑話（當時依此憲法甚至對任何想批評政府的人士提供免費的筆墨和印刷）。1991 年當蘇聯分裂時，此部憲法分離的條款顯明地復活了，十四個共和國脫離蘇維埃社會主義共和國，只留下了俄羅斯聯邦。

雖然被其他的共和國遺棄，但是俄羅斯聯邦仍然存在。雖然實施民主統治，不過可理解的是它本身卻無法容忍內部組成分子的分離運動。葉爾辛之所以想鎮壓車臣，很明顯地不單是只針對車臣而已，而是針對其他可能想脫離的其他成員。⁵

民主國家承擔了保證自決的責任，不過也同時承擔了維護國家力量與國家完整性的義務。現在，當美國內戰被人們廣泛且正確地回想起來之時，它是跟奴隸問題有關。然而林肯考慮的是避免美國的分裂（此分裂則是外國強權如英、法所歡迎的）。他曾經描述他的感受如下：『倘吾能以解放所有奴隸而維持美國完整，吾往矣；倘吾非能解放所有奴隸而維持美國完整，吾往矣；倘吾能解放部分奴隸而維持美國完整，吾往矣。』⁶ 在美國內戰時期，林肯至少佯裝他對國家的統一比奴隸的道德人權問題更為關切。因此，如同俄羅斯人關切車臣一樣，今日美國人對北京表達國家統一的渴望感到同情。

北京將提醒任何人在歷史上外國強權藉著支持區域性的分離主義以對中國領土（如蒙古、新疆、西藏以及臺灣）進行瓜分的行為，其實就如同英、法兩國在 1860 年代時傾向支持美利堅邦聯（Confederate States of America）的獨立。許多臺灣民眾的確與北京政權一樣記得這段歷史，痛恨早期對中國打壓與入侵的外國人，於是反對西藏與新疆的獨立。中華人民共和國對臺灣的主張所產生的『憤怒』並非只是咆哮或具侵略性的，實際上是由於中國人過去慘痛的歷史記憶所為。

部分俄羅斯人與美國人以及其他同情中國統一訴求的外國人，實際上來自於他們幾十年來對中國是一個犧牲者感到內疚的回憶。就歷史上而言，在威脅中國領土完整的問題上，俄羅斯比美國更應該受到責難（雖然中共對反美的宣傳不遺餘力，實際上卻可以發現北京學者們與一般民眾仍記得歷史上俄羅斯的行為與美國的行為仍是有相當的差別）。⁷

⁵關於俄羅斯對於分離運動的恐懼，參見Mikhail A. Alexseev (editor), Center-Periphery Conflict in Post-Soviet Russia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999)。

⁶此一對於林肯的引述乃原註於Benjamin Quarles, Lincoln and the Negro (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp.128-129。

⁷有關實際上中國大陸對於美國歷史角色的觀感，參閱David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1991)。

美國人對中國正面的情感，確實可解釋美國介入第二次世界大戰，意謂著美國人強烈地支持臺灣人民的自由，的確是因為這些人民被美國人視為『中國人』。北京發言人常將任何支持臺灣的美國人描繪成是『反中國』的，但這些人事實上是『親中國』的。⁸

歷史上俄羅斯人『親中國』的較為稀少，多被視為有獲取中國領土的企圖，對中國的觀感傾向於是一個在亞洲傳統的敵國。倘若俄羅斯今日宣布停止他們在愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞所行的帝國主義，他們將會對過去侵略中國的發展感到稍許慚愧。既然在蒙古、新疆以及滿洲分裂中國是俄羅斯帝國主義的一種工具，同樣地俄羅斯傾向避免落於帝國主義，將站在贊成臺灣分離的立場之上。

對過度分化的恐懼

就像其對車臣一樣，俄羅斯不願支持臺灣獨立。美國不用害怕國內各州的分離企圖，卻是因為林肯決心維護國家統一的回憶而感到些許負擔，因為在美國人心目中，林肯是最偉大的總統。

然而，美國人、俄羅斯人及其他西歐民眾如今有相關且差異性小的理由而不願支持世界國家內部分化。在前南斯拉夫、高加索地區，這種分化將造成戰爭與屠殺。我們可以透過電視網（如 CNN）活生生地看到當種族仇恨復甦時導致了種族淨化，所以美國人及其他民主統治下的民眾自然地贊成自決。不過，當此種自決帶來戰爭與屠殺時，此種熱忱卻明顯地減少了。

北京時常指控美國及其他臺灣的支持者想要以臺灣的脫離來分化中國，這種前例背景可回溯到 1920 年代軍閥割據中國的情況。美國被稱為具有統治全世界而成為全球霸權的意圖。從歷史的角度來說，其分化（divide）與征服（conquer）的政策是達到世界統治的合適途徑。⁹

至於對美國人、俄羅斯人或其他外國人而言，這樣的指控大多是錯誤的，因為我們可以發現少數的美國人視中國內戰與前南斯拉夫內戰是同一類型，臺灣與中國大陸當然是政治上與意識型態上的爭論，而非宗教或種族的（然而在西藏或新疆的問題上，確實與前南斯拉夫與前蘇聯的分裂有異曲同工之妙）。但是中國多年來的軍閥內戰所花費的成本是可怕的，外國人不願將中國此種分化的情況傳回國內，透

⁸作者對於此一論點的範圍較廣的解釋載於George H. Quester, "Sources of American Attitudes about Taiwan and the Rest of China", in Chun-Chieh Huang and Peng-Pu Tsao (editors), Postwar Taiwan in Historical Perspective (Bethesda: University Press of Maryland, 1998) pp. 259-279。

⁹關於中國對於美國意欲成為「霸權」的指控，參見Michael Pilsbury, China Debates the Future Security Environment (Washington: National Defense University Press, 2000)。

過電視傳達到每個家庭。

我們在文章剛開始時利用可能影響俄羅斯人、美國人及其他外國人的淺顯動機來分析臺灣與北京的緊張局勢。任何外國人均恐懼北京將以軍事武力或核武來解決，其他人則自私地關切到經濟的繁榮與收支的平衡，俄羅斯與美國特別在分離的抽象問題上各以本身的政治體制進行角力。

然而現在我們將以嚴謹的動機來做分析。假如俄羅斯只對國家力量有興趣（亦即欲對維持相對軍力與對抗廣土眾民的中國有興趣），它可能支持新疆及西藏的分離運動，也可能同樣地支持臺灣分裂的地位。中國軍隊除了部署在臺灣海峽沿岸外，同樣地亦須部署在滿州的東北方等地。假如誠如北京分析家（以及在莫斯科、新德里與法國）所指的，美國的興趣是成為一個統治全世界的霸權，美國將希望見到中國的分裂。

但一個更正當的目的是，俄羅斯人與美國人並不想要中國的分裂後引起的暴亂、犧牲經濟以及普遍的貧窮。民主的特質之一是政府實際上關切的是人民在海外本身的利益，並對其他地區能達到和平與繁榮感到愉快，對戰爭與貧窮感到悲傷。倘若臺灣從中國分離出來而引發戰爭的話，很清楚地，民主國家將不願見到這樣的分裂。

最佳選擇的恐懼

有許多好的理由可解釋為何臺灣必須放慢腳步以接受任何與中國大陸統一的任何型式。中華人民共和國自從毛澤東採取大躍進政策以及文化大革命之後，在政治上便展開漫長之路。大陸的生活是較以往更為自由，不過在臺灣的中華民國當局在個人自由方面提供更好的生活，人民可就如何統治方面擁有發言權。在這方面，臺灣博得了美國及其他民主國家甚至是新的俄羅斯聯邦的同情。

同樣地，我們亦可以看到為何臺灣人民想要分離（甚至於徹底地獨立）的動機，而這些動機將不太可能引起同情。臺灣人民平均每人在經濟上與大陸的親戚相較之下較富有，某些臺灣人想要獨立是不願分享財富，也就是說在物質上想要維持本身較高水準的生活。¹⁰

假如這臺灣人民尋求獨立的動機是如此，美國人與俄羅斯人將不太會寄予同情，因為這看起來不像喜好自由，而僅只是貪婪而已。

我們可以很快地自前南斯拉夫聯邦最北端及最富有的國家斯洛伐尼亞要求分裂的事件中找到例子。斯洛伐尼亞人清楚地要自決與獨立，而他們幾乎是沒有流血

¹⁰關於臺灣和大陸富裕程度的比較，參見Lucian Pye, "Money Politics and Transitions to Democracy in East Asia", *Asian Survey* (March, 1997) pp. 213-228。

地達到這目的。斯洛伐尼亞在贏得獨立與成為聯合國會員國方面，實際上得到了奧地利與德國的強烈支持，部分是因為這些歐洲國家認同斯洛伐尼亞人富裕的生活方式與文化。

美國不願看到南斯拉夫的分裂，因為斯洛伐尼亞人獨立的先例將導致接下來不可避免的暴力分離運動，或許因為南斯拉夫全境的經濟能力，明顯地依靠北方的富裕，而北方的財富在重新分配後須用來應付南方貧窮的情況。¹¹

倘若大部分的斯洛伐尼亞人對獨立的渴望僅源於不願被課徵稅賦以減輕其對拯救塞爾維亞及馬其頓貧窮的責任，民主國家對它的同情自然將減少。正常而言，富有的地區為了挽救濟貧窮的地區，將會作財富的重分配。未來臺灣與中國大陸因經濟性的差異所引起的情況將會比政治上的差異性更大。

假如臺灣維持繁榮而中國大陸仍然貧窮的話，當中國大陸比較不獨裁時，世界上對臺灣的同情將會變少。大陸人如以經濟上的動機以取得臺灣，而臺灣人民因貪婪而拒絕與之統一，許多民主國家的民意將同情貧者為了繁榮而尋求財富的重分配。

但是，海峽兩岸緊張情勢的根源與局面在實際上卻改變了。假如依據現有的趨勢繼續這樣下去的話，外國資本家將發現投資在中國大陸獲利將比臺灣多。¹²中國大陸許多地區經濟景氣都很不錯，大多數集中在沿海地區，上海甚至看起來將比台北更為富裕。倘使這種情況持續的話，中共與臺灣人民的經濟平均所得的鴻溝將明顯地變小，如此可能降低臺灣人民對獨立的期望，也可能減少大陸想要接收臺灣的渴望（當然這是以物質來考慮，而非以北京常常強調的民族自尊心）。

假如兩岸雙方中國人政治差異性比過去更小的話，可以想像臺灣人民更將喜愛與大陸合併，而大陸人民與政權對此種合併越來越不感興趣（或許二、三十年後，在此問題上將產生角色的大逆轉）。

然而，就目前來看，臺灣在政治上維持著政治上比較自由，在經濟上也是比較富有。我的基本論點則還是沒變：假如世界上如美國、俄羅斯或其他國家看到臺灣獨立的訴求是因經濟貪婪、避稅而非因為政治自由的因素，這些民主國家將不會支持臺灣。

世界上其他國家希望海峽兩岸都能擁有政治自由、經濟繁榮。倘使兩岸政治上

¹¹美國對於南斯拉夫分裂議題上的態度可見Steven Van Evera, "Managing the Eastern Crisis", *Security Studies* (Spring, 1992) pp. 361-381。

¹²有關最近投資轉向大陸的趨勢，參閱Ralph N. Clough, *Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999)。

的鴻溝越大，經濟上的鴻溝越小，則海外民主國家[譯者註：對於臺灣]的支持將會越大。假如政治上的鴻溝消失了，而經濟上的鴻溝持續存在，則這樣的支持會減少。假如兩種鴻溝均消失，我們則要問：統一的問題將會變成什麼樣子。

對（影響）其他中國人福利的恐懼

美國人的確關切居住在臺灣人民的自由與福利，使全世界的人民都享有自由，包括新興民主國家俄羅斯的公民，同樣地關切居住在香港的中國人的自由與福利，以及居住在中國大陸以外超過十億中國人的自由與福利。

臺灣立即且公開的獨立或許是對中華民國政治自由的再保障，不過此種立即的獨立將對中共對於香港的安排產生威脅。

假如中共領導人持續尊重香港的生活方式，這樣做的原因是希望爭取臺灣以一國兩制的公式與中國統一。就臺灣而言，如最後拒絕這樣的勸誘，將會消除北京尊重香港個人自由的誘因，美國人或其他任何地方民主支持者將關切臺灣，不過他們也同樣關切香港，不可否認的是這兩者是有關連的。¹³

但在這緊要關頭，外國人有更為關切的事務，因為中共已對香港承諾（主要是要對臺灣勸誘），也同樣對它自己本身的企業家與個人讓步。配合香港自由化的特別經濟區（如深圳）已擴增及擴展到全中國各地，使全中國實際上成為一個特別經濟區。當問及有關中國接管香港時，一位北京分析家半開玩笑地回應說，實際上是香港接管了中國。

中國大陸與其共黨政權對此能夠容忍，確實從中也獲取不少利益，重要的是他視此為保住贏得臺灣回歸的希望所在。美國人（以及俄羅斯人及其他保證自由價值人士）將歡迎這樣的發展，因為將使得全中國成為生活上比較繁榮與輕鬆的地方，增加中國成為更民主國家的機會，並成為一個在國際體系中更為可信的伙伴。

確實有人建議中國大陸接管臺灣的可能性在某天會看來像是臺灣接管中國大陸。假如有關臺灣未來不確定的部分能夠促成大陸依循臺灣模式，世界上大多數國家（包括俄羅斯）將歡迎這樣的結果。

不可避免地，香港持續的自由及大陸的政經改革與臺灣模糊的未來有些關聯性。假如臺灣立即屈服北京的統治，可用的籌碼將盡失；假如臺灣立即獨立，該籌碼同樣地會消逝的。上述的所有動機（不管是不是冠冕堂皇的）可以用來解釋世界各國的躊躇，不過這種躊躇也是另一個重要的動機所在。

¹³關於臺、港命運的關連性，參見Ralph N. Clough, Reaching Across the Taiwan Strait (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1993)。

當問及是否北京共產政權將完全承諾使香港政治型態不受干擾，任何外國觀察家均給予正確的回應，認為『當然不會』不受干擾。然而，倘若北京信守其所保證的 90%，香港人民生活的福利將不會倒退。此時此刻，如果它對於所統治的大陸地區超過十億的人民提供同樣的自由，美國人將認為這是好的政策，而且關係到所有中國人（居住在香港以及大陸地區的中國人）的自由與福利。

同樣地，如果問及是否臺灣現在矛盾的情況是出自於其人民對生活自由與福利的懷疑上，答案應是『當然如此』。然而，假如此種正反感情並存的情況能對影響到大陸所有中國人的自由化過程有所支持的話，美國人及其他外國人將歡迎這樣的發展，而非急於澄清這樣的局面。

美國的角色

當我們分析俄羅斯對臺灣未來的角色時，或是日本、西歐、澳洲的角色時，在此最重要的是不能忘記其他國家均踏著美國的脚步前進。在此我們所描述的美國之動機與俄羅斯或其他國家的動機將有較多的差異性。

這或許是因為歷史上美國與中國有特殊的關係、貿易的往來，而傳教士的家書更使中、美兩國產生的連接，從而讓許多美國人對中國產生正面認同的關係，即使當時華盛頓視希特勒的納粹德國比日本帝國更具威脅，美國仍支持中國對抗日本。當然，最重要的是繼續承認在臺灣的中華民國，把它看作是『自由中國』（free China），而將在文化大革命之後的中國大陸視之為『真正的中國』（real China）。

即使美國人對中國並沒有特別的情感，亦會出現特殊的角色，只因為美國長久以來是防衛自決與民主的先鋒，不過到中國的美國傳教士使得美國人認為中國人是和我們一樣的，認為儒家倫理與清教徒倫理類似，使美國人確信中國人的自由比對其他人自由更為堅定不移。

當美國對任何事具領先地位時（就像它在冷戰結束後成為世界上最強的國家），其他國家將以兩種方法回應此事。

第一種反應有時被貼上『西瓜偎大邊』（band-wagoning）的標籤，當體系內的任何人等待著一個領袖出現（特別是好的領袖）時，將會傾向於與這個領袖一同建立有用的方法以解決世界問題。這世界因為使用美元作為貿易交易的計價單位所以更為繁榮。世界使用英文作為全球語言，並不是因為英語的文法較其他語言優，而是早期英國海軍的強權以及二十世紀好萊塢與美國大眾文化的原因，世界各國傾向將學生送往美國大學就讀，因為美國已成為教育的前鋒，或者是因為相信美國已達到學術自由與政治自由。

但第二種相對的反應卻是舊有的『權力平衡』機制，也就是許多國家互相依靠以對抗逐漸成為領導國家或是霸權的國家，這是自稱現實主義者的政治學家時常所描繪的世界。所有的國家的動機或多或少都有相同之處，也就是說每個人都在尋求權力而且害怕權力會落入他人之手。這是世界以及美國外交政策的寫照。現在北京許多分析家均贊成此種論點，主張美國支持臺灣只是因為它想成為霸權，因此追求的政策便是分化與征服。這種對國際權力政治的分析同樣由法國與印度的分析家所提出，而最重要的是俄羅斯的政治與戰略分析家也贊同這是世界的寫照。

假如莫斯科現在真正地對美國權力擔憂，而非視美國天生為解決國際問題的領袖，俄羅斯將不會遵循美國堅決保護臺灣自己已達到的成就，相反地，它將歡迎華盛頓與北京的緊張情勢，消耗美國的權力，以阻止美國領導地位。

這可解釋俄羅斯把北京與台北之間的互動細節實質上歸於不太重要的事情，而將強權間的敵對視為較重要的事。一般俄羅斯人都知道臺灣社會比中共的成功（直到中共的軍力強大到足以威脅到俄羅斯時才會改觀），不過他們不以此為考量，相反地，他們以要與美國競爭對抗的假設來作為行動的準則。於是，在莫斯科、巴黎或新德里對美國領導地位的怨恨導致了其他國家甚至是民主國家忽視對民主支持的考量，讓它們只顧著比較著彼此權力而已。

冷戰的結束已歷經熱烈的辯論，而今民主已散播到許多國家，對未來外交政策行為而言，將要證實的是現實主義者亦或是理想主義者哪個正確。自由主義者認為民主國家之間不會發生戰爭，權力政治將消逝，民主國家將協助其他民眾維持或達到民主的境界。相反地，現實主義者預測民主國家也有相同的動機，對其他國家的動機亦有相同的恐懼，民主國家間將出現戰爭、軍備競賽與權力競賽。

現在去辨別何種民主行為的遠景是正確的尚言之過早。俄羅斯對中國大陸與臺灣互動之態度將對此種辯論給予重要的檢測，假如俄羅斯選擇依循美國的領導，增強臺灣的自由，象徵現實主義者解釋國家的行為是無效的，自由主義者有關民主國家外交政策的假設是適切的。反之，如果俄羅斯利用美國對臺灣的承諾，與北京密謀對抗美國的話，現實主義者的理論將獲得證實。

對戰時對峙情勢升高的恐懼

如上所述，假如俄羅斯人對權力感到興趣，他們將歡迎北京與華盛頓彼此間的對抗。不過，即使權力在此是一個重要的動機，可確定的是莫斯科將不會樂見美國與中共打一場真實的戰爭，因為這樣的戰爭將威脅到俄羅斯的安全與利益，亦威脅到臺灣與日本及其他體系內國家的安全與福利。假如俄羅斯人關切東亞的人民以及其本國人民，莫斯科將會努力尋求制止使用核武或採取非核武戰爭，即使冒著犧牲任何支持臺灣自由的危險亦在所不惜。

俄羅斯的目的並不是變成北京與華盛頓之間衝突的得利者，而是調停者，因為華盛頓對臺灣有許多承諾（至少是比其他強國多），俄羅斯因此傾向於反對不要美國的同路人，只要維持其能力，當北京與華盛頓感到需要其協助時，可以提供和平調停者的服務即可。

莫斯科對臺灣維持現狀的承諾較之華盛頓為少，非因其對維持現狀默不關心，也不一定是因為其怨恨華盛頓維持強權的角色，而或許是因其懷疑美國將會把衝突升高到何種程度，或是因為在美國這個『難纏的警察』（a "touch cop"）拒絕北京要求的情況下，俄羅斯可能至多想要成為一個『好的警察』（a "nice cop"）。

假如莫斯科因此表現懼怕北京的軍事潛力，將被指責為缺乏不屈不撓的惡名，但是假如它所恐懼的是因中國大陸人民與臺灣人民的衝突而遭致損害（在戰爭中可能無法控制，因為美國被視為是過激的及毫無節制的『警察』），那麼這樣的動機較為利他且是名正言順的。

對於這一點，莫斯科與東京及其他重要民主國家所做所為一樣，幾乎都將以小布希政府及其後的美國政府的外交政策為準，亦即會以它們是否將維持對於世界利益做出協商及服務的形象為準，或者以它們是否被認為太過於傾向採取單邊的途徑為判斷的基點。

總結

有很多的動機在俄羅斯對臺灣特殊地位的政策中發揮作用，這些動機和美國等民主國家的並沒有交集，有時俄羅斯與美國在臺灣問題上就會產生不睦。

就像美國一樣，俄羅斯對激怒北京一事必須要很謹慎，因為它所害怕的是北京的核武及傳統軍事武力。與美國或其他政治民主國家一樣，俄羅斯必須尋找海外市場，顧及海峽兩岸任一方的軍火市場。

俄羅斯面對的車臣分離運動要比美國林肯總統時期分離運動更為接近現代，因而對北京官方要求中國統一更富同情心。除了立即的分離問題外，後冷戰時期的南斯拉夫與高加索的例子對俄羅斯與美國奏效，對於有時在全球各地導致種族淨化大屠殺的自決較不表支持。倘若臺灣獨立的原因是因為其經濟富裕而不願與較貧窮的大陸分享，並非是因為兩岸的政治自由與生活方式差異太大的話，俄羅斯、美國或其他外國勢力對臺灣獨立的支持將會減弱。

美國人不僅僅關切居住在臺灣的人民，還關切居住在香港或大陸以外其他地區中國人民的福利。因此，他們或許並不希望處理模糊的臺灣地位。此種模糊可當成一種工具，用來保護其他中國人緩慢成長的自由。無論中國人民自己建立的民主過程是多麼的新穎或是多麼的不完美，俄羅斯政府對此或與美國會有相同感受。

俄羅斯可能不喜歡美國的角色，會利用北京與華盛頓之間就臺灣問題的衝突來削弱美國的權力。更廣泛地說，俄羅斯保留它行動的自由，避免支持臺灣的自由，以致於他們可以在華盛頓與北京因這個問題而陷入戰爭時，進行調停與制約的工作。