The Republic of China's New National Strategy for the Post-Cold War World

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A general theory of strategy allows scholars to explain or predict national strategies based on certain stable social characteristics. The interactions between national values and national strategy is tested here on a case study of the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. The first part of the paper concerns itself with the identification of the ROC's national values. Taiwanese society is deemed to have materialism and individualism as national values. Accordingly, the theory predicts that Taiwan will adopt a direct strategy of action. An examination of the historical record of the ROC on Taiwan under the process of de-Chiangization takes up the first part of the paper. The second half of the paper concerns itself with empirical investigation of the hypothesis.

Keywords: Taiwan, Republic of China, security, strategy, People's Republic of China

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The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan is in the middle of a political and social "quiet revolution." Political dissidents have been either released or welcomed back from exile; a viable political opposition has developed to the extent of challenging the ruling Kuomintang

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(KMT, Nationalist Party of China) in both local and national elections; and the ROC is pursuing a new and more aggressive foreign policy, along with a less emphatic defense policy. Though it is obvious that all of these changes are linked, there still has been no serious attempt to tie domestic changes to international initiatives. This article proposes to make that link by using the author's own, original framework of strategic analysis to review domestic and international developments in the ROC between 1984 and 1995. This framework makes predictions about the posture of a state in the international system (national strategy), using certain permanent social characteristics (national values). The framework was specifically developed for the conditions of high uncertainty prevalent as a new world order takes shape after the end of the Cold War. It was first applied to the study of France's decision to develop an autonomous nuclear deterrent, which amply documented every aspect of the theoretical proposal, as it then was. Since then, the relationship which was found to exist in that country has been detected in studies of such states and circumstances as the Russian Federation's first year of existence, Canada's defense policy, the U.S. strategy in Asia and the Pacific, reforms on the Chinese mainland in the two decades after the death of Mao Zedong, and inter-Korean relations.

Understanding the ROC's national strategy is increasingly important for a number of reasons. First, the People's Republic of China (PRC) continues to modernize its defense capability: it has in the past received some U.S. assistance in key technical areas; it is now cooperating with Russian experts; and it continues to increase, sometimes dramatically, its defense budget. Faced with these developments, and for as long as it continues to be restricted by the 1982 communiqué in purchasing advanced weapons from the United States, the ROC is bound to lose its qualitative edge. Moreover, the PRC has for many years enjoyed the favorable position of being the pursued rather than the pursuer in Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangular relations. Now that the strategic constraints of the Cold War have faded, whatever pressure the international community or the United States may exert is the only deterrent left, and it is certainly not as powerful as the Cold War once was. The leaders of the PRC have already repeatedly shown that they are willing to brave a certain amount of international opprobrium. Despite Deng Xiaoping's reforms, Taiwan continues to be the most effective catalyst for a democratic and free China on the mainland. It is still one of the mainland's most significant potential sources of investment and, implicitly, of political change. It is also, as the most astute analyst of the mainland, one of the stabilizers and

pacifiers of China in Northeast Asia. An analysis of the ROC's strategy, therefore, is necessary not only to preserve the very existence of the ROC, but also to protect the interests of every state which trades in East Asia, every significant economic power in the world.

Second, the PRC's international maneuverings, particularly with regard to its relationship with the United States, are a constant feature of diplomacy in East Asia.[1] There are three prongs to these maneuverings. The first is Beijing's incessant demand that the United States reduce and even cut off arms sales to the ROC. The second is the offer of seemingly generous terms for "reunification" to Taipei, an offer designed primarily for the consumption of international audiences since it is always unacceptable to the Taipei government. The third prong is unremitting pressure on the government in Taipei, both in terms of maintaining the ROC's diplomatic isolation and in terms of the PRC seeking to address issues on behalf of Taiwan, as if their interests were identical. This kind of pressure can only grow. For the time being, the PRC's most pressing challenge will be Hong Kong.[2] Until such time as Hong Kong is in some way integrated into China, the ROC will probably not be subject to any great increase in pressure. Should successful integration occur, however, then Taiwan will be, from Beijing's point of view, the last unrecovered territory. Now is therefore a much better time to assess its position vis-à-vis the PRC. It is the ROC's hope that it will soon acquire sophisticated weapons as an alternative to the already-rejected nuclear option.[3] It behooves the ROC government, therefore, to be creative in designing its foreign and defense policy. Strategic analysis, such as the one developed in the coming pages, affords a clear and simple method of assessing the soundness of any current or future policy, or policy initiatives.

Finally, the ROC is itself of strategic significance to market-system liberal democracies, because it is a bastion of both the market system and the liberal democratic system.[4] Although understandably bitter

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[1]Yu-ming Shaw, "The Republic of China's Response to International Developments," *Issues & Studies* 21, no. 7 (July 1985): 15.

[2]Ibid., 20.

[3]The most obvious deterrent to any mainland ambitions, the nuclear option, has already been considered and rejected: a nuclear program would provide an easy excuse for the PRC to retaliate militarily against Taiwan; it would be unthinkable and unforgivable for the ROC to use such weapons on fellow Chinese on the mainland; and its acquisition or development would be so expensive that it would harm the continuing economic development of the island.

[4]Shaw, "The Republic of China's Response to International Developments," 24-26.

about its ongoing diplomatic isolation, the ROC regards itself both as the last home ground of Chinese culture and as a melting pot of Chinese and foreign cultures.

There are a variety of reasons, therefore, for the student of ROC politics and the security analyst to be interested in the theory and method presented below. The theory and method developed here make the following prediction: given Taiwan's main social values of materialism and individualism, it should choose a direct strategy of action. For the purposes of this analysis, national values are defined as the accepted standards of historical or ideological origin as well as the national heritage cherished by the population as a whole. National strategy is defined as the comprehensive direction of all the elements of national power to attain national objectives, and to support and pursue the general goals provided by a nation's leaders.

The analysis of the ROC's strategy makes up the bulk of this paper. In turn, the determination of those two variables of the empirical hypothesis—national values and national strategy—takes up a substantial portion of this article, the proposal for the theory of causal relationship between the two variables having been explored in detail elsewhere.[5] Once the type of strategy is established, however, it becomes possible to identify the actual strategy the ROC is using, and, of most interest to the policymakers, to understand and make predictions about its tactics.[6]

National Values

Definitions of values by authoritative scholars are all variations on the same theme; comparing the definitions of these scholars shows just how close they really are (see table 1).[7]

In each case, values are abstract constructs that nevertheless influence and provide coherence for political life, psychological unity for individuals, and integration for society.[8] The theory therefore uses the following definition for national values: "National values are the

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[5]Laure Paquette, "National Strategy and National Values" (Ph.D. diss., Queen's University, Kingston, Canada, 1992).

[6]Shaw, "The Republic of China's Response to International Developments," 14.

[7]Talcott Parsons, R. F. Bales, and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1953), passim.

[8]Ibid., 45-47.

Table 1
Definitions of Values

Scholars	Definitions
Guy Rocher	Way of being or acting which a person or a collectivity recognizes as ideal and which renders desirable or worthy of respect the persons or the behavior to which it is attributed[a]
Robin Williams	Conception of the desirable, influencing selective behavior[b]
Joseph Frankel	Inner element brought by decisionmakers to bear upon the processes of making decisions[c]
Clyde Kluckhohn	Conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection of available modes, means, and ends of action[d]
Jacob and Flink	Normative statement held by individual human beings of what human beings ought to desire, i.e., the desirable. It is supported by internalized sanctions and functions, such as (1) imperatives in judging how one's social world ought to be structured and operated, and (2) standards for evaluating and rationalizing the propriety of individual and social choices[e]

Sources:
[a]Guy Rocher, *A General Introduction to Sociology: A Theoretical Perspective*, trans. Peta Sheriff (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), 55.
[b]Robin Williams, "Values: Concept of Value," in *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David E. Sills (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 283.
[c]Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1970), 115.
[d]Clyde Kluckhohn, "Values and Value-Orientations in the Theory of Action," in *Toward a General Theory of Action*, ed. Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 395.
[e]Philip E. Jacob and James F. Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decisionmaking," *American Behavioral Scientist* 5 (Supplement, May 1962): 22.

heritage and accepted standards of historical or ideological origin cherished by the population as a whole."

National values are shared statewide: given the number of possible values and the number of possible combinations, though, even if single values do recur in several societies, the complete set of national

values is unlikely to recur.[9] In other words, it is safe to assume that national values are state-specific.[10] National values are made up of standards, heritage, and internal sanctions. Heritage and standards influence each other, eventually giving rise to internal sanctions.

There are three types of standards: cognitive, evaluative, and appreciative.[11] Cognitive standards establish the validity and/or ap-

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[9]See the work of Murray Edelman on symbolism and politics, in *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1967) and *Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1971).

[10]There are so many closely related concepts that it would take the bloody-mindedness of a philosopher to clear the matter up. The ones closest in meaning can be lumped into two categories: components of national values (beliefs, attitudes, national character, national style), and alternative concepts (morals, morality, ethics). *Beliefs* are existential statements, expressing what human beings consider to be facts or arising from biologically determined or socially learned impulses. In either case, there is little room for choice. See Philip E. Jacob and James F. Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decisionmaking," *American Behavioral Scientist* 5 (Supplement, May 1962): 17-20. Policymakers hold beliefs to be true, even if they cannot be verified. See K. J. Holsti, *International Politics: A Framework for Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1983), 321. Some beliefs are political in nature, like doctrine and ideologies. See ibid. *Attitudes* are general evaluative statements about some object, fact, or condition that determine whether the object, fact, or condition is more or less friendly, desirable, dangerous, or hostile. Ibid., 321. *National style*, with its three basic components of unifying function of ideals, ambiguous "operator's way" with ideas, and continuity and success of the ad hoc formula in dealing with situations, is another way of coping with the universal, inescapable dilemmas of life. See W. W. Rostow, "The National Style," in *The American Style: Essays in Value and Performance*, ed. Elting E. Morison (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), 249-57. Even by the low standards of international relations, *national style* is an exceptionally fuzzy concept: it is supposed to explain why nations behave paradoxically when judged by arbitrary norms of consistency. The problem with *national character* is that it is naively defined, either as certain psychological traits or features characteristic of the citizens of a given nation, as the "systems of attitudes, values and beliefs held in common by the members of a given society, or by large portions thereof" (H. C. J. Dujijker and N. H. Frijda, *National Character and National Stereotypes: A Trend Report Prepared for the International Union of Scientific Psychology* [Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1960], 20), or as the enduring personality characteristics and unique lifestyles of a population. These definitions also reify the state. For a discussion of national character, see S. V. George De Vos, "National Character," in Sills, *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*. The critique of reification was first suggested by Dennis Stairs, personal communication. *National stereotypes* (R. F. Benedict, "The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Science* 2, no. 8 [1946]: 274-79, passim) are relatively stable opinions of a generalizing and evaluative nature: all alike in a certain respect, nationwide. The expressions of them can be provoked or spontaneous or elicited. The big problem here is that stereotypes, as might be expected, can easily be biased. Ethics, as we saw earlier, are monistic. See Holsti, *International Politics*. Monism is particularly clear in Joseph Nye's *Nuclear Ethics* (New York: Free Press, 1986), passim, for instance. Morality, whose scholarly meaning is closest to the popular conception of ethics, at least, recognizes that, while there is in principle one single set of criteria by which to assess a course of action, there are various and often conflicting, moral points of view. See Felix Oppenheim, "National Interest, Rationality, and Morality," *Political Theory* 15, no. 3 (August 1987): 373.

[11]Joseph Frankel, *National Interest* (New York: Praeger, 1970), passim.

plicability of information, assessing the information available to a state.[12] Evaluative standards serve as the basis for state decisions by assessing the *effectiveness* of any behavior.[13] Appreciative standards predict and explain the nonrational, nonutilitarian potential of actions.[14] Heritage is the part of national values that endures and can be passed on from generation to generation. It is made up of tangible and intangible components. Natural resources and population are among its tangible components. Beliefs and knowledge are among its intangible components.[15] Beliefs are existential statements considered to be facts arising from biologically determined or socially learned impulses.[16] Knowledge has a very specific meaning in this context: the perception of influence or control over the structure and operation of the world.[17]

Internalized sanctions only come into play once the national strategy is in place, and only apply to whoever holds the national values.[18] These sanctions are internal detriments or losses of reward which are meant to reinforce standards, particularly appreciative standards. Dissonance, the uneasiness or discomfort experienced by decisionmakers when their behavior departs from the national strategy or what national standards deem acceptable, is only one example of internalized sanctions. George Lodge and Henry Vogel describe events leading up to dissonance in the following terms: The relationship between ideology and practice generally follows a fairly standard pattern over a period of time. During a certain interval, institutional practice conforms to the prevailing ideology. Then changes in the real world induce complete institutions to behave differently. At that point, practice begins to depart from ideology. After another interval, institutional practice differs markedly from what ideology declares: the old hymns may be sung but they are not practiced. Ideological schizophrenia sets in: the new practice may evoke a new ideology to justify it, but loyalty to the old ideology discourages its being articulated. There is a gap between

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[12]Richard W. Cottam, *Foreign Policy Motivation: A General Theory and a Case Study* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977), 32, 47.
[13]Jacob and Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decisionmaking," 23.
[14]Like gratification, satisfaction, aesthetic pleasure, etc.
[15]Jacob and Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decisionmaking," 26.
[16]Ibid.
[17]Frankel, *National Interest*, passim.
[18]Jacob and Flink, "Values and Their Function in Decisionmaking," 26.

institutional practice and ideology—a legitimacy gap. As it widens, two forms of pressure are increasingly brought to bear on leaders. Some members of the community seek to haul the institutions back into line with the traditional ideology. Others argue for a new ideology to justify the institutions' actual practice. The feature of ideology that both excites and exasperates those who study it is that an old ideology frequently tends to linger on, uninspected, while institutions depart from it in many pragmatic ways. People do not practice what they preach, and they find it difficult to preach what they practice—at least immediately.[19]

National values influence national strategy through the mechanisms of cognition, appreciation, and evaluation. The degree of confidence we may feel for any explanations or predictions rests in turn on the confidence we feel in the identification of national values. This section presents evidence in support of the identification of the national values of the ROC—self-orientation and materialism. It is necessary to discuss in general what method is most appropriate for identifying national values in a way that inspires confidence in students of international relations.

A Method of Identification

Students of international relations are usually reluctant to work with the idea of values, because they find them too subjective.[20] The explosion of scholarship in the 1960s led to decisionmaking becoming a major area of study in international relations,[21] containing a number of studies focusing on intangible aspects of decisions: cognitive elements,[22] operational codes,[23] national character,[24] modal personality,[25]

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[19]George C. Lodge, "Introduction: Ideology and Country Analysis," in *Ideology and National Competitiveness*, by George Lodge and Henry Vogel (Boston: Harvard Business Press, 1987), 7.

[20]James Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 2nd edition (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 106.

[21]Michael Brecher, Blema Steinberg, and Janice Stein, "A Framework for Research on Foreign Policy Behavior," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13, no. 1 (1969): 75.

[22]Ibid.

[23]Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decisionmaking," *International Studies Quarterly* 13, no. 2 (June 1969): 138-57.

[24]De Vos, "National Character."

[25]Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963).

and, of course, values. J. David Singer, in reviewing the theoretical literature of international relations, identified "four basic routes to establishing" national values: elite wisdom, opinion surveys, analyst identification, and subject identification.[26] Predictably, there are problems with each of these. The method of identifying values used here is inspired in part by each of those four paths, but tries to combine them to avoid their respective pitfalls. The method below has the added advantage of addressing a number of conceptual difficulties specific to the study of Chinese political culture, arising from theoretical weaknesses which have been addressed (the subjective perception of objective political reality, and the missing conception of symbols).[27]

Chinese political culture. Political culture is a good way to measure national values because it bridges the gap between social values and political behavior by linking political beliefs to actions, and then to political structures and processes. It can also distinguish empirical (or "cognitive") beliefs from symbols that express them and from more fundamental social values: symbols and beliefs ebb and flow with the prevailing political discourse, but values are much more stable. Most important of all, it allows for the link among individual, social, and national values. However, definitions of political culture are many and varied. By far the most influential and commonly used definition is Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's: the "system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which defines the situation in which political action takes place."[28] Political cultures of older states have usually been studied already, and it is simply a matter of reviewing the research for method and results.

Scholars investigate political culture in a number of ways: inferring from history, analyzing attitudes, behavior, or ideology, using psychological insights, studying institutional and ideological norms, and

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[26]J. David Singer, "Individual Values, National Interests, and Political Development in the International System," in *Research Origins and Rationale*, vol. 1 of *The Correlates of War* (New York: Free Press, 1979). Singer uses the Parsonian definition of a value system: "The value system of the society is, then, the set of normative judgments held by the members of the society who define, with specific reference to their own society, what to them is a good society." See Talcott Parsons, *Sociological Theory and Modern Society* (New York: Free Press, 1967), 8.

[27]Lowell Dittmer, "Thought Reform and Cultural Revolution: An Analysis of the Symbolism of Chinese Politics," *American Political Science Review* 71, no. 1 (March 1977): 69.

[28]As quoted by Dennis Kavanagh, *Political Culture* (London: Macmillan, 1972), 10.

analyzing economic and social conditions.[29] National values specifically can also be identified through content analysis of rituals, literature and films, linguistic analysis, or analysis of cultural thought-systems.[30] In the case of the ROC, special considerations arise, because of the presence of an authoritarian government for several decades. Public opinion surveys before the mid-1980s, for instance, would not necessarily accurately reflect the opinions of the people. Historical analysis is the method of choice because it deflects traditional objections about political culture's subjectivity. Historical analysis identifies "patterns of action"[31] in state behavior by inferring from historical events, in this case from series of decisions made by states in a particular area over time. The sounder the strategy and the more established the values, the more effective historical analysis is likely to be.

Cleavages like subcultures or fragmentation happen in societies from time to time, but they do not significantly affect the most basic social values. Subcultures can affect decisionmaking because whole nations cannot participate: the responsibility falls on a subset of the population. However, because the values the theory focuses on are the most fundamental values, they exert a strong influence on everyone except for the most marginal individuals.[32] No single person can escape the hegemony of culture, unless there are radical social changes going on. If values are broadly shared throughout the population, it is safe to assume that leaders also share the same values. In the case of an extremely authoritarian regime, it is possible that certain values have been imposed, although such instances would require regimes to be in place for more than a generation. It is reasonable to assume that is the case for the Republic of China.

If we accept the foregoing argument about the hegemony of culture, then this hegemony is as intense for the individual or group at the bottom of the pile as it is for those at the top: elite-popular cleavages are therefore not significant.[33] As far as merging or fragmentation of

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[29]For example, Seymour M. Lipset, *Political Man: Essays on the Sociology of Democracy* (New York: Macmillan, 1960); Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960); and Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*.

[30]Benedict, "The Study of Cultural Patterns in European Nations," 274-79.

[31]Graham Crow, "The Use of the Concept of 'Strategy' in Recent Sociological Literature," *Sociology* 23, no. 1 (February 1989): 1-24, passim.

[32]See Edelman, *Symbolic Uses of Politics and Politics as Symbolic Action*, passim.

[33]Ibid.

cultures is concerned, cultures evolve slowly, so merging and fragmentation also happen slowly. Fragmentation is actually uncommon in older states.[34] Although the Republic of China was created in the twentieth century, it is the heir to a Chinese state which has "existed for 2,000 years and advocated an enlightened form of bureaucratic rule by an intellectual or scholarly elite when Europe was in the dark ages."[35] Unlike many Third World countries, its ethnic composition and geographical borders have not been summarily altered by external powers. Also, it was suddenly and completely severed from the bulk of the Chinese population.

Classifying National Values

The theory is best served by a classification adapted from Talcott Parsons' typology of social values,[36] given that no classification of values in international relations respects the characteristics of strategy. Parsons' classification, a set of six binary value-spectra, has the advantage of being essentialist like the definitions. Its main problem, of course, is that it is subjective.

Affectivity versus neutrality.[37] If a state chooses affectivity, it allows both free expression to the feelings of its population and freedom to seek immediate gratification of impulses. Neutrality represents control of the population's feelings, restriction or inhibition of their expression, or minimizing of their importance. It would be possible to argue that the Cambodian (Kampuchean) government made such a decision when it declared an amnesty for the Khmer Rouge, in spite of strong domestic feeling. Assigning either of these values is highly subjective, as is obvious with the case that Yehezkel Dror made about Libya under the leadership of Gaddafi.[38]

Universalism versus particularism. The universalist state judges

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[34]Walter A. Rosenbaum, *Political Culture* (New York: Praeger, 1975), 48.

[35]Cal Clark, "The Nature of Chinese Communism and the Prospects for Teng's Reforms," *Issues & Studies* 21, no. 1 (January 1985): 21.

[36]Talcott Parsons' classification in Parsons, Bales, and Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action.*

[37]By using the term "affectivity," the theory is open to the criticism that it is reifying the state. In this particular case, however, the benefits outweigh the risks: it is important that the terms used to describe various values be as neutral as possible.

[38]Yehezkel Dror, *Crazy States? A Counterconventional Strategic Problem* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Heath, 1971).

situations or behavior using general criteria. The European Community's denunciation of civil war in Yugoslavia, for instance, is probably based on universalism. The particularist state would put aside general criteria of judgment and use standards which apply only to a particular state or a unique situation. During the Persian Gulf War, Israel was the target of several Iraqi missiles, and had to decide whether or not to retaliate. Israel has a tradition of leaders making decisions based on unique circumstances. If it chose not to retaliate because of some specific consideration, then it acted as a particularist.

Quality versus performance. A state which relates to other people and respects them by taking into account who they are, independently of what they do, is a state choosing quality over performance. One such case was the negotiation and ratification of the Irish Treaty, piloted through Parliament by Winston Churchill in 1930 and adopted in Ireland by Michael Collins. This treaty showed a greater understanding of Ireland than was usual for a British government. A state judging other states in light of what they do and the results of their actions is selecting performance over quality.

Diffuseness versus specificity. Diffuseness may lead a state to consider and relate to states as a whole. When the United States negotiated to create an anti-Iraq coalition before the Gulf War, it treated each state as a whole. Specificity leads a state to consider only one aspect of others: that was the case when Canada, the United States, and Mexico negotiated a free trade treaty.

Self-orientation versus collectivity orientation. The self-oriented state may choose to act in accordance with its own goals, the collectivity-oriented state acts according to goals shared with other states. Only states which are not constantly struggling for their very existence against external threats can become collectivity-oriented.

Materialism versus nonmaterialism. A materialist state is a state that considers tangible issues to be more significant than intangible ones. In diagnosing a threat, for instance, it will perceive a threat to material resources more easily than if cultural assets are threatened. For instance, if Canada were a materialist state, it would consider an issue such as acid rain, which threatens forests, more important than a cultural threat. A nonmaterialist state will perceive threats or outcomes first according to nonmaterialist standards, assessing outcomes according to nonmaterial aspects. One example of a nonmaterial value orientation is the significance of the Diaspora to Israel. While the Diaspora does contribute materially to Israeli society, it is regarded as a collection of individuals to be protected, and eventually repatriated.

There is support for a dichotomous approach to political culture. A number of scholars have used binary oppositions such as mine to describe Chinese political culture specifically: either as a series of sharply contrasting antimonies, or binary oppositions (light/darkness, revealed/concealed, pure/filthy, active/passive),[39] or as tridimensional (moral, social, psychological).[40] The moral dimension provides for virtue and evil, social and psychological inhibitions against deviation, a "shame" culture, where virtue is promoted by assuring universal acceptance of a set of norms and by making behavior maximally public, so that any deviant is instantly confronted by unanimous reproof, just as any act of heroism is greeted by widespread applause. The psychological dimension provides a defense mechanism of repression. Therefore this article focuses only on two of these value dichotomies.

Value #1: Individualism versus Collectivism

Historically, the value of community orientation is so basic to the makeup of political culture that it can survive the massive social changes brought about by revolution and civil war. It is also true, however, that such dichotomies offer only a partial and schematic view of Chinese political culture.

For example, it does not do justice to the complex significance of the Confucian heritage in the ROC's political culture. A number of scholars have remarked on the continued significance of Confucianism via the continuities of classical Chinese and contemporary Chinese culture: the cult of the emperor and the personality cult of Chiang Kai-shek; the rule of man instead of rule of law; the coercive power of the military; collective guilt and punishment; wide-ranging power of the state/party and its monopoly of political power; dominance of the state/party over individuals; domination of society by the bureaucratic state;[41] concentration of power in the hands of a few without institutional checks on that power; law as a tool wielded by the ruler to control the populace;[42] state imposition of official ideology as truth

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[39]Dittmer, "Thought Reform and Cultural Revolution," 74.
[40]Ibid., 78-79.
[41]Fu Zhengyuan, "Continuities of Chinese Political Tradition," *Studies in Comparative Communism* 24, no. 3 (September 1991): 259-80.
[42]Ibid.

and state monopoly of communication; private individuals as subject to and property of the state; and subordination of all social groups to the state.[43] The Chinese imperial state, founded as it was on Confucian teachings among others, was such that no private undertaking or any aspect of public life could escape official regulation.

One of the cornerstones of Confucianism, therefore, is not just the subjugation of the individual to the group, but the very abhorrence of the individual, and the portrayal of the individual interest as selfishness. Set against this millenary influence are new, individualistic tendencies permeating the ROC's political culture, tendencies graphically illustrated by democratic reforms and the growth of the market economy. Growth and reform have intensely emphasized the role of the individual: liberal democracy increases the atomization of any society, just as the market system relies heavily on individual initiative for its growth and vitality. The discussion which follows focuses on the developments in the domestic political sphere, including: shifting constitutional arrangements, the developing opposition, and newly-democratized elections.[44]

Shifting constitutional arrangements and political rights. The ROC government is derived from that which ruled the Chinese mainland prior to the 1949 communist revolution; it maintains its claim to legal jurisdiction of this lost territory and continues to designate itself as the Republic of China. The Legislative Yuan, according to the Constitution of 1947, is the supreme legislative authority. Until recently, the majority of the members of both the National Assembly and Legislative Yuan held lifetime seats, having been originally elected in 1947-48 to represent constituencies on the Chinese mainland. "Executive power

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[43]Ibid., 262.

[44]Observers have long noted the personalization of decisionmaking, so typical of liberal democracies and now characteristic of the ROC. This personalization would be in strong support of this article's thesis. The problem, however, is in obtaining reliable and significant evidence in support of this phenomenon. It is usually not possible for scholars to interview decisionmakers while they are in office. In the detailed case studies done previously (in France, Russia, the United States, South Korea, Japan, etc.), recollections of decisionmakers of the past, either in interviews or in published memoirs, have proven notoriously unreliable. Documentary research is not usually possible either: legislative proceedings are usually available, but they are not a sufficient source for determining personalization, nor is any other publicly available source; cabinet proceedings are usually sealed for a prolonged period. Thus this type of evidence, obviously well-suited to the research at hand, must be left to the able care of historians, rather than political scientists.

is in the hands of a President who is elected for a six-year term by the National Assembly."[45]

The first significant change in what was to become a flood of reform was the revocation of martial law. Martial law had been imposed in 1949 and had naturally greatly hindered the development of an effective opposition to the ruling KMT. It was revoked after thirty-eight years in July 1987, and replaced by a National Security Law. The government announced at around the same time that citizens of the Republic of China could travel to the PRC, buy and sell communist publications, and compete in sports events on the mainland.[46] In December of that year, the government also announced that a ban on newspaper registration was to be lifted on January 1, 1988. Finally, in January 1988, the Legislative Yuan approved an assembly and street march law which aimed to "protect the people's constitutional rights of assembly and street march while maintaining social peace and order."[47]

After improving freedom of the press and loosening control on mainland contacts, the KMT Central Standing Committee approved a plan for a drastic restructuring of the country's legislature in February 1988, drawing on a scheme originally initiated by Chiang Ching-kuo in 1986. The two main points for legislative reform were: (1) the overwhelming majority of life-term members of the Legislative Yuan and the National Assembly, who had been elected in 1947-48 to represent constituencies on the Chinese mainland, would be phased out through voluntary retirement, with members living abroad or bedridden being considered retired; and (2) seats in the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan would no longer be reserved for mainland representatives, with a corresponding increase in members representing Taiwanese constituencies.[48] The spring of 1990 saw a massive student demonstration at the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall in Taipei, followed that summer by the National Affairs Conference. The "period of mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion" ended in May 1991, while senior National Assembly members retired and new ones were elected by December 1991. In early 1992, the newly elected

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[45]*Keesing's Record of World Events* (London: Longman, 1992), R82.
[46]John F. Copper, *A Quiet Revolution: Political Development in the Republic of China* (New York: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1988), ix.
[47]*Keesing's Record of World Events* 34, no. 2 (February 1988): 35716.
[48]Ibid.

assembly met to "enact supplements to the Constitution."[49]

Opposition grew markedly as reforms were introduced. The April 1992 session of the National Assembly, for instance, was often heated and violent: fighting erupted in the chamber on the first day when the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) delegates raised a banner protesting against constitutional blackmail by the assembly's elderly members; two members were injured in a fracas which broke out after a DPP member physically attacked the Speaker. The fray accompanying these constitutional reforms is just one example of the development of an organized opposition in Taiwan, itself a sign of increased pluralist political opinion which, in turn, points to an increasing significance of individual political beliefs and initiative. Many of the reforms were actually aimed at protecting the individual's political rights, and at promoting their use within the political system.

The developing opposition. The development of the opposition also predates the advent of President Lee Teng-hui. In December 1986, the first elections with an organized opposition party were held. This election was seen as a test of the political reforms announced by Chiang Ching-kuo that year, and the results gave an increased legitimacy to these reforms.

The second step in the development of a viable opposition was heralded by the release from jail or return from exile abroad of a number of important opposition figures. The record of the government was, at first, mixed, although overall it has been one of steady improvement in terms of respect for human rights. In the later months of 1989, for instance, several exiled opposition activists returned to Taiwan to participate in the campaign for the December elections. Despite the process of democratization, the government continued to pursue a number of these dissidents through the courts. The most prominent of these was Hsu Hsin-liang who returned secretly to Taiwan in September after a decade in exile in the United States.[50] Hsu had twice before attempted to return to Taiwan but had been quietly turned away by officials nervous of the publicity a trial would attract. While in custody he formally joined the DPP, and he was later sentenced to ten years for sedition. The severity of the sentence was seen, on the one hand, as an attempt by the government to forestall criticism from

[49]Ibid. 36, no. 11 (November 1990): 37859.
[50]Ibid., nos. 7-8 (July-August 1990): 37670.

hard-line KMT conservatives in the runup to the presidential election; on the other hand, it was seen as a warning to the opposition that the process of democratization would have its cost. Also worrisome was the September 1989 death, in mysterious circumstances, of Yu Teng-fa, the eighty-seven-year-old patriarch of the Taiwanese opposition. Both the KMT old guard and the anti-KMT separatists were implicated in his presumed murder.

Immediately prior to its lifting in 1987, and from May 1991 on, a number of political prisoners convicted under the harsh sedition law were released. The Legislative Yuan approved legislation in June 1991 which abolished the so-called "thought police" system, a mechanism which had involved the maintenance of special units in government offices to monitor the behavior of civil servants and their loyalty to the KMT. The National Security Law was revised in July to permit most dissidents on the government blacklist to return from exile, leading to the November 1991 return of Peng Ming-min, the father of Taiwan's independence movement. Tsai You-chuan and Hsu Tsao-teh, prominent Protestant opposition activists who had been charged with sedition as late as October 1988 for their alleged advocacy of Taiwan independence, were released.[51] Huang Hwa was sentenced in December 1990 to ten years in prison after being found guilty of having openly campaigned for Taiwan's independence from the mainland.[52]

Another sign of increased focus on pluralism can be found in the success of the main opposition grouping, the DPP. Formed in 1986, it almost doubled its representation in the Legislative Yuan in the December 1989 elections. Unlike the KMT at this time, however, it was subject to internal division over the issue of Taiwanese nationalism. One faction within the DPP, the New National Alliance (NNA), was openly separatist and, despite the obvious risks still involved, advocated the abandonment of the historical claim over the mainland. (Ironically, opposition to Taiwanese nationalism united the older KMT fundamentalists and their implacable enemies, the communist regime in mainland China.) The DPP has also been divided along left-right lines. A radical wing broke away from the DPP to merge with the

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[51]They were jailed for having attended the formation of the Formosan Political Prisoners Association the previous year, an organization whose charter urges that "Taiwan should be independent." See ibid. 34, no. 2 (February 1988): 35716.

[52]Ibid. 36, no. 12 (December 1990): 37917.

leftist Workers' Party, now a very small grouping.[53] Today, the remainder of the DPP, led by the chairman, Shih Ming-teh, and the secretary-general, Chiu Yi-jen, is the main opposition group.

The new freedoms of opposition have found graphic expression in the legislature, which is experiencing instability. This instability is apparently created both by the vigor of the DPP's opposition and the conflicts within the KMT which vitiated the government's capacity to deal with a range of social and economic problems. Shortly after the opening of the Legislative Yuan in February 1990, for instance, there was a backlog of some three hundred parliamentary bills awaiting debate, at a time of widespread popular feeling that legislative action was urgently needed to deal with increasing economic problems and a sharp deterioration in law and order.

The opposition has also expressed itself vigorously through public demonstrations, which have attracted an unprecedented degree of official attention. In March 1990, for instance, the DPP demonstrated with students, resulting in military police dragging fourteen leaders of the opposition from the Presidential Office after officials had denied them a meeting with President Lee. The following day the DPP held a mass rally and sit-in of about ten thousand demonstrators in front of the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to demand the dissolution of the National Assembly, direct presidential elections, the abolition of the "Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization for the Suppression of Communist Rebellion," and a National Affairs Conference. On the eve of the presidential elections in 1990, as three thousand students continued the sit-in and over fifty went on hunger strike, President Lee announced that a National Affairs Conference would be convened in the summer. As a result, the DPP called off plans to surround the building where the National Assembly was to meet for the election, although some radicals managed to stage further protests. This was graphically illustrated by two series of protests, one surrounding Lee's inauguration and the other regarding the appointment of Hau Pei-tsun as premier. Lee was elected by the National Assembly in March 1990,[54] and on the very afternoon of his election, the president met a fifty-strong student delegation for an hour. The students seemed satisfied with assurances that reform would follow

[53]Ibid., nos. 7-8 (July-August 1990): 37670.
[54]Ibid. 37, no. 11 (November 1991): S38636.

the National Affairs Conference scheduled for the summer, and called off their sit-in. However, they demanded the creation of a national union of students and vowed to continue to fight for democracy. Indeed, Lee Teng-hui's inauguration was marred by protests over his unexpected nomination in May 1990 of a former senior general, Hau Pei-tsun, as premier. Some ten thousand demonstrators attacked government targets in central Taipei in protest over the appointment, which they characterized as a step back from democratization toward remilitarization. Hau was to be confirmed by the Legislative Yuan in May 1990, but he was prevented from speaking to the chamber by protesting opposition legislators. The session was reconvened later that month, when the vote was delayed once again as members of the DPP stormed the podium, seized the microphones, and disrupted voting. Police were eventually called into the Legislative Yuan building to restore order. Outside the Legislative Yuan some five thousand demonstrators armed with stones and petrol bombs clashed with riot police.

New electoral concerns. Elections to the reformed Legislative Yuan in 1992 resulted in a setback for the ruling KMT and for President Lee: 50 of the 161 seats went to the DPP, by far the party's best ever performance. The DPP campaigned on a "pro-independence" ticket, but was notably less strident in its advocacy of Taiwan independence than it had been in the 1991 National Assembly elections. Although the KMT won a clear majority of seats, the campaign and the results exposed deep rifts within the party. The KMT was more successful in the elections for county magistrates and city mayors in 1993. Facing strong opposition from the DPP and the New Party (NP), the contest was seen as a crucial indicator of the KMT's continuing level of support. The elections saw the KMT win fifteen of the twenty-three posts, the same overall number it had held prior to the poll. Despite President Lee's personal intervention in the campaign, however, the party's share of the vote fell to 47.5 percent, the first occasion that it had ever dropped below 50 percent.

Free elections have forced the KMT to reassess itself, and there are signs of division, and of the increasing bitterness of those divisions, within the ruling party. In October 1989, the then justice minister, Hsiao Tien-tsang, resigned after being implicated in an influence-peddling scandal over the rezoning of property. As late as 1993, corruption was not unexceptional in the KMT, so the resignation was part of an ongoing feud between mainlanders and islanders in the party. In summer 1993, the congress of the KMT was marked by a formal split, with defectors establishing the NP. The new grouping, which

aimed to garner support from second-generation Chinese mainlanders, advocated a "one-China" policy (rather than the pro-Taiwanese stance of the DPP) and advocated direct talks with the mainland government.

These three types of evidence of the increase in political pluralism, and thus of the advent of a more individualistic Taiwanese society, are no less significant than the increasing concern with trade and business, which illustrates the advent of greater materialism.

National Value #2: Materialism versus Nonmaterialism

The ROC government's priorities, and indeed the priorities of the entire society, have been economic for at least two decades (although government expenditures in the military sphere still exceed foreign or economic expenditures). It is not necessary to establish such an obvious fact, but only to show that the trend continues to this day. Indeed, the most recent government initiatives reflect that priority, including: (1) the launching of Taiwan's Pan-Pacific Operations Center plan, a bid to succeed Hong Kong as one of the financial centers of the world; (2) the use of economically-based diplomacy; and (3) its longstanding focus on international trade.

The Pan-Pacific Operations Center initiative. The ROC government launched its new foreign economic policy with the announcement that it planned to build Taiwan into a Pan-Pacific Operations Center.[55] The blueprint for this operations center calls for Taiwan to become a regional center in six specific areas: manufacturing, sea transportation, air transportation, finance, telecommunications, and the media.[56] In addition to liberalizing trade and investment and lowering tariffs, Taiwan plans to: (1) remove nontariff trade barriers; (2) open up the service industry by reducing entry and exit restrictions on personnel, thus allowing foreign professionals and specialists to engage in short-term stays and work in Taiwan; (3) ease restrictions on capital movement to liberalize foreign exchange controls in stages; and (4) establish a modern legal environment for the information society, including the

[55]Interview with Dr. Kao Charng at the Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, Taipei, May 16, 1995.

[56]ROC Information and Service Office for the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center, Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD), Executive Yuan, *An Initiative into the Next Century: A Plan for Building Taiwan into an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Center* (Taipei: CEPD, 1995).

free circulation of information, the availability of government information, the protection of intellectual property rights, and the prevention of computer crime. There are a number of factors crucial to the success of this initiative, including timing, the efficiency of administrative agencies, coordination with legislative bodies, and the forging of a consensus, all of which are to be achieved, according to government plan, by the year 2005.

Indirect economically-based diplomacy. The ROC has pursued its diplomacy with renewed vigor in recent years, although it is forced to act indirectly as a result of PRC pressure. Since 1988, Taipei has established or reestablished diplomatic relations with a number of small countries in rapid succession: Grenada in 1988; Liberia, the Bahamas, and Belize in 1989; Guinea Bissau, Lesotho, and Nicaragua in 1990; the Central African Republic in 1991; and Niger in 1992. The establishment of these ties was often followed by significant aid or investment from Taiwan. (It should also be noted that it lost its formal ties with Uruguay, Saudi Arabia, and South Korea in the same period.)

Diplomatic visits at a level lower than head of state are now constantly being exchanged: between 1984 and 1995, the ROC's foreign minister visited the United States, Japan, and some of the Southeast Asian countries; other ROC ministers visited their counterparts; and Taipei entertained former U.S. President Gerald Ford, several former prime ministers, leading Liberal Democratic Party officials from Japan, important ministers from France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Sweden, the European Union, and Belgium, a former president and former premiers of France, Germany's vice chancellor, the vice president of the Philippines, the prime minister of Malaysia, and the vice premier of Thailand. President Lee Teng-hui also managed to make a private visit to the United States in June 1995, after an intensive lobbying effort, becoming the first president of the ROC to do so since 1949. In the same month, the premier of the ROC went on a lengthy private visit to Europe.

Finally, Taiwan now enjoys as much access as other countries to diplomatic channels, despite the lack of official recognition. It has negotiated and signed agreements with dozens of countries. The representative offices of foreign countries in the ROC are now staffed by full-fledged diplomats. U.S. diplomats enter into a charade when sent to the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), resigning from the foreign service for the duration of their appointments, and later rejoining it without loss of seniority or benefits. Nevertheless, "Taipei's self-congratulation over its recent diplomatic achievements can only

be appreciated against the background of past humiliations."[57]

Taiwan's economic position is its biggest asset, and it is unrealistic to expect the ROC government not to make use of this asset in the circumstances. The use of this asset has not been free of controversy within Taiwanese society: it is quite understandable that some consider pragmatic diplomacy to be "sucker diplomacy," the Taiwanese taxpayer being called upon to "pay for a dinner to which we are not even invited."[58] Pragmatic diplomacy has also aroused the concern, to say nothing of the ire, of the mainland government. "Taiwan remains important both for its trade opportunities and as a stepping-stone for investment in mainland China."[59] Beijing was concerned over Taipei's developing relations with the Philippines, despite the latter's formal recognition of the PRC, associated as it was with a more general interest among member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Australia in attracting Taiwanese investment capital. This concern may in part come from the PRC's obvious interest in seeking Taiwanese capital itself. After all, the sizeable Taiwanese investments in Southeast Asia included a US$2 billion investment in Batam Island (Indonesia) and a similar arrangement with Vietnam. The Vietnamese agreement, reached in December 1989, was, indeed, indicative of another development in Taipei's foreign policy, a new and more flexible attitude toward relations with communist countries. Indeed, with the 1989 agreement with the Soviet Union on raw materials and consumer goods, only Albania, North Korea, and Cuba were left with the PRC on the prohibited list.

Economics also features prominently in Taiwan's dealings with international organizations. Early in 1990, the then minister of economic affairs, Chen Li-an, wrote to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) seeking entry for the "customs territory" of "Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen [Quemoy], and Matsu"—a formula which avoided the assertion of sovereign statehood.[60]

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[57]Chi Su, "International Relations of the Republic of China During the 1990s," *Issues & Studies* 29, no. 9 (September 1993): 5.

[58]Ibid., 7.

[59]Peter Foster, "In Confusion There's Opportunity," *Canadian Business* 66, no. 11 (November 1993): 36.

[60]In mid-January 1990, however, the Chinese ambassador in Geneva described Taiwan's potential membership as "utterly illegal" and objected to the application being discussed. Beijing's view was that Taiwan could only enter GATT as part of China.

The National Strategy of the ROC

The Prediction

If its national values are materialism and self-orientation, the ROC should choose a direct strategy of action. A materialist state is more likely to use a strategy of action because it develops and applies material standards to the processes of cognition, evaluation, and appreciation. The state is more likely to perceive a concrete threat, to assess outcomes according to tangible realities, and to prefer action to persuasion. In the same way, a nonmaterialist state prefers persuasion to action. The reasons why a self-oriented state chooses a direct strategy are a little less obvious. A state which sees itself as a single unit rather than part of a group is more likely to count on its own resources to solve any problems. It will also see other states as single units, discounting the significance of alliances. In a word, it will generally apply self-oriented standards. Having established a hypothesis, it is now possible to examine the exact content of the ROC's national strategy.

The method for identifying a national strategy must, first and foremost, respect the peculiarities of strategy. It must distinguish carefully between strategy and tactics, a task (as this author has argued elsewhere) Anglo-American strategists are more likely to find difficult.[61] Second, strategy is halfway between thought and action: the process of identification has to account for that, moving easily from abstract considerations to practicalities. Third, though most applications of strategy have been military, a national strategy naturally touches on all sorts of situations, adversarial or not. Finally, a national strategy is different from policies, plans, or programs. They all organize action, but strategy uses a single idea to organize all of the state's actions, usually by developing some slogan or symbol, allowing a great deal of flexibility.

It is proposed to identify strategy by answering three questions.

1. Is a particular state using strategy? The trick here is to tell a

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When GATT was formed in 1948 China had been among the founder members, but its membership had lapsed after the withdrawal of the Nationalists to Taiwan. The PRC sought readmission in 1986 but its application has yet to be finally considered.

[61]Laure Paquette, "Strategy and Peace II: Choosing an Approach to Strategy," *Canadian Political Science Association* (Kingston), May 1992.

strategy apart from a plan, policy, or program. Plans, policies, and programs organize means to an end as much as a strategy does. But a strategy is both an idea and an action, while plans, policies, and programs are not. Also, a state using strategy is much likelier to use slogans or strong images: plans, policies, and programs do not.

2. Is the state using a national strategy? A strategy is national when it uses a broad spectrum of the means available to the state, and tries to achieve objectives important to the whole rather than to parts.[62] In other words, the strategy must cut across several areas of state behavior: economic, political, cultural, military, etc.

3. What strategy is the state using? It is not easy to pick out the exact strategy a state is using from so many possibilities. The best way to proceed is to start by reducing the number of possibilities one has to consider, i.e., by identifying the "type of strategy": this paper uses André Beaufré's classification of strategy, because it classifies strategies according to their nature. There are four types of strategies: direct strategy of action, direct strategy of persuasion, indirect strategy of action, and indirect strategy of persuasion. The difference between strategy of action and strategy of persuasion is quite simple: the first involves physical engagement of the state's material resources, while the second involves threats, discourse, posturing, all means and actions that require nonmaterial resources. The difference between a direct strategy and an indirect one is not quite so obvious: a direct strategy is one that changes the opponent's direction or momentum itself; an indirect strategy changes the opponent's direction using an intermediary. Once the type of strategy is identified, then only those possibilities need be considered. The next step is to identify the "components of strategy." The components of strategy are: (1) objectives;[63] (2) means or tactics; and (3) approach (sometimes called strategic culture).[64] Each component has its own best source of information: direct observation

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[62]Ray S. Cline, *World Power Trends and U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1980s* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980), 2.

[63]Although Ali calls it aims. See F. B. Ali, "The Principles of War," *Journal of the Royal United Services Institution for Defence Studies* 108 (May 1963): 159-65.

[64]"The entirety of traditional practices and habits of thinking which, in a society, governs the organization and the use of the military forces in the pursuit of political objectives." Author's translation, as quoted by Bruno Colson, "La culture stratégique américaine," *Stratégique* 8 (1988): 33. The original reads: "l'ensemble des pratiques traditionnelles et des habitudes de pensée qui, dans une société, gouvernent l'organisation et l'emploi de la force militaire au service d'objectifs politiques."

for means, official statements for objectives, and secondary analysis for approach.

Speeches, press releases, legislative debates, or minutes from executive meetings and other government documents are usually widely distributed and readily available. They usually contain broad references to national objectives. It is important to consider a number of these documents in context, because it is always possible that they are self-serving or even misleading. Means are observed directly. A nation's approach to strategy is made up of recurring characteristics. Because observations about the approach occur only over the long term, historical sources are a must. These indirect sources are only as good as their authors, and often different authors will use different words to describe the same approach. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify a state's approach to strategy.

National Strategy, New and Old

The old strategy. For many years, Taiwan was led by Chiang Ching-kuo, whose personal strategy for Taiwan was to "occupy or dominate key bases of power, . . . recruit and train a group of staunch followers and co-opt supporters to retain control over such bases."[65] As might be expected, Chiang established control over the security apparatus.[66] He secured control over the military by instituting a system of political commissars to oversee commanders and ensure the ideological rectitude of officers and men and by constructing an organized following. As early as 1952, Chiang established the China Youth Corps to organize the youth, broaden his base of appeal and support, and most of all, to recruit political followers among young Taiwanese. He himself moved into posts of greater governmental responsibility from the late 1960s on, serving as vice premier in 1969 and premier in 1972 to broaden his administrative experience and acquire wider expertise.

Toward the end of Chiang's rule (and life), the impetus for change grew dramatically, however. Under Chiang Ching-kuo, "Taiwan has accomplished nearly as much as Japan, but in a much shorter time (Japan had built an infrastructure well before World War II)."[67] By

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[65]Parris H. Chang, "Evolution of Taiwan's Political Leadership after Chiang Ching-kuo," *AEI Foreign Policy and Defense Review* 6, no. 3 (Fall 1986): 11.
[66]Ibid.
[67]Copper, *A Quiet Revolution*, 14.

the mid-1980s, however, there was cause for reevaluation. In 1985, for instance, economic growth slipped to 4.9 percent. There were two structural causes for that downturn. First, the nation's economy had passed the takeoff period of rapid growth that often characterizes the first phases of economic development. Second, Taiwan had for some time been in transition to a knowledge-intensive economy, having earlier moved from an agricultural to an industrial one. A third, nonstructural reason for Taiwan's recent economic difficulties was its dependence on foreign trade. A fourth was shaken investor confidence after the Tenth Credit Cooperative scandal of February 1985.[68]

A fifth and very potent factor in Taiwanese loss of confidence was the increasing threat posed by the PRC's rapidly increasing military capability. In the early 1970s, the political leadership of the ROC had undertaken a program of self-reliance, i.e., an effort to meet Taiwan's defense needs out of domestic resources. Since that time, the ROC had developed the local capacity to produce about 50 percent of its required military supplies, including small arms, artillery, some missile systems, spare parts, and ammunition. The most notable exception was the domestic production of fighter aircraft that would fill its needs over the next decades.[69] But none of this ever resulted in a degree of self-reliance such that the ROC could maintain its edge in the face of the PRC's increasing capability.

Chiang's attempts at reform, which occurred in an atmosphere of shaken Taiwanese public confidence, have received relatively little attention from the scholarly community. For instance, the KMT has been responsible for overseeing a transition toward broader participation and the dismantling of single-party authoritarian rule.[70]

Problems have followed these changes. Indeed, "the speed and magnitude of economic and political change in Taiwan have contributed to its current problems."[71] Taiwan has moved toward democracy, and

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[68]In which the cooperative, which owned shares in over one hundred companies worth over US$3.5 billion, was discovered to have bad debts of over US$1 billion. The government, despite being in full possession of the facts, had failed to intervene. See Copper, *A Quiet Revolution*, 21.

[69]A. James Gregor and Maria Hsia Chang, "Military Power, the Taiwan Relations Act, and U.S. Interests in East Asia," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 8, no. 3 (Fall 1985): 256.

[70]Paul Evans, "Canada and Taiwan: A Forty-Year Survey," *Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada* 11, no. 1 (1990): 180.

[71]Copper, *A Quiet Revolution*, 24.

democracy accentuates ethnic problems, especially in elections. But the importance of Taiwan's subethnic differences (Taiwanese versus mainlanders, plus consideration of Taiwanese aborigines) has disappeared very quickly in the context of a changing society which has generated economic growth and political freedom.

The new strategy. Chiang Ching-kuo's passing in January 1988 signalled more than the passing of the Chiang Kai-shek generation: it also signalled an accelerated pace of change culminating with the introduction of a new posture in the international system, a new national strategy, one of direct action. The first inkling of the ROC's new strategy can be found in the appointment of Lee Teng-hui as president. President Lee Teng-hui, a native Taiwanese who succeeded Chiang as president and chairman of the ruling KMT in 1988, was nominated in February 1990 as the KMT presidential candidate. However, there was uneasiness among conservative KMT members not only about his Taiwanese (as opposed to mainland Chinese) origins but also about his aims for rapid reform. These broad aims were made clear in the 1990-91 budget which increased spending on foreign policy by 50 percent but decreased defense spending. In developing an aggressive new foreign policy, critics charged that Lee was disregarding Nationalist dreams of recovering control of the mainland. Yet when Lee Teng-hui was sworn in as president of the ROC, his inaugural speech gave only a vague outline of the policies to be pursued during his six-year term.

This article argues that the ROC's new strategy is a direct strategy of action, however counterintuitive that may seem for a diplomatically isolated country. The first step in arguing that this is the strategy of Taipei's choice, however, is to show that Taipei did in fact select this strategy from a number of options. Those options include balance of power, collective security, functionalism, and confidence-building measures.[72] Predictably there are problems with each of these options.

If Taipei were to adopt a balance of power strategy, it would urge the United States to sustain a balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region or look favorably on Japan's efforts to counter the PRC's military buildup, so as to prevent Beijing from achieving absolute military superiority in this region. Taiwan would also have to keep a close eye

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[72]Cheng-yi Lin, "Taiwan's Security Strategies in the Post-Cold War Era," *Issues & Studies* 31, no. 4 (April 1995): 78-97.

on fluctuations in the relative strengths of the PRC and any third power, and remain alert and determined to adopt decisive means to maintain the existing order at all times. The Institute for National Policy Research in Taipei has proposed a subtype of such a "connecting with the South, approaching the North, maintaining peace with the West" strategy, but with regard to economic cooperation, not military alliance.[73] Another possibility would be to divide and rule, a long-term strategy for encouraging the peaceful evolution of the mainland Chinese system, where Taiwan would act in concert with Hong Kong and the local governments of Fujian and Guangdong to weaken Beijing's hold on south China.

The second option is functionalism. According to this approach, a spillover of accumulated experience into the tougher security issues occurs naturally in the wake of social and economic cooperation. Pursuing functionalism would entail eliminating barriers between nations and the concept of sovereignty. The problem, of course, is that nations are not necessarily willing to enter into social and economic cooperation before political and security problems are settled. The third alternative is for Taipei to opt for confidence-building measures. The overall purpose here is to bring individual countries' military intentions out into the open, decreasing the possibility of a surprise attack, misunderstanding, and misjudgment. In Asia, this has developed bilaterally rather than multilaterally. As one scholar has stated: "Taiwan has been forced to establish functional contacts with the country that is the main source of threat—the PRC. In addition, Taipei continues to adhere to a balance of power strategy and to eliminate destabilizing factors affecting its security."[74] Finally, there is collective security, an option favored by many Western countries. For collective security to exist, several conditions must be met. All member nations must: (1) regard the invasion of any region as a threat to themselves; (2) be ready to fight for the maintenance of the existing order; (3) pledge to come to the rescue of any country being invaded; (4) abide by collective decisions and repudiate neutrality; and (5) make no distinction between friend and enemy, except that every aggressor is a common enemy.

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[73]Hsu Chieh-lin, Li Wen-chih, and Shiau Chyuan-jeng, *Taiwan's Asia-Pacific Strategy* (Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1991), 152-60.

[74]Lin, "Taiwan's Security Strategies," 96-97.

The strategy the ROC eventually chose has been called pragmatic diplomacy. Pragmatic diplomacy is "flexible, non-ideological, and multi-directional," and cannot be divorced either from the economic dimension, democratization, or "the great transformation of the society itself."[75] Pragmatic diplomacy also serves a balancing function against the fast-moving relations with the PRC. Shortly after his accession to the presidency, Lee Teng-hui expressed his desire for renewal in terms of a striving "with greater determination, pragmatism, flexibility, and vision in order to develop a foreign policy based primarily on substantive relations."[76]

A number of conditions have favored these efforts, including the collapse of the Soviet Union, the democratization of Eastern Europe, the reunification of Germany, the end of the Cold War, the depletion of the ranks of the communist-ruled countries, the democratization of the former Soviet republics, and the world economic situation. Nevertheless, the usual irritants continue to occur, against which the ROC is powerless given its diplomatic isolation.[77] The 1988 break with Uruguay, which aroused much debate, was thought to reflect mainland China's growing importance as a potential export market.

Having established that a new strategy was selected, and having posited that strategy can be called pragmatic diplomacy, the next step is to examine the components of this strategy, the first of which are tactics. The means or tactics to the ROC's goals are interrelated: economic, military, domestic political, and foreign relations. The economic and political spheres were discussed above. Discussed below are the military and the foreign relations of the ROC, among which the PRC figures prominently.

Military Policy and the Renewed Role of the Military in Society

Taiwan has one of the best-coordinated and best-planned economies in the industrialized world, and it has an extremely sophisticated appreciation of the international system. Defense policy, however, is currently in disarray, despite the considerable resources of the

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[75]Su, "International Relations of the Republic of China," 6.
[76]*Zhongyang ribao* (Central Daily News) (Taipei), July 8, 1988, 1.
[77]Interview with Dr. Chang Jaw-ling at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, May 1995.

country and the historical significance of the topic. Financially, defense has sunk from its preeminent position as the biggest item in the national budget to being the poor cousin of trade and diplomacy. What policy has survived the end of the Cold War seems to be concentrated around two issues: the relationship between government and the armed forces after the post-Chiang reforms, and the future of inter-Chinese relations.

Taiwan's economic power is now considerable, making it the first asset to be protected, yet it is not usually considered to be big enough to have a positive impact on its security.[78] In fact, it is one of Taiwan's great vulnerabilities: even the threat of a PRC attack, however militarily insignificant it may be, could disrupt economic activity on the island literally at any moment, and such a disruption would quickly force the Taipei government to negotiate. What Taiwan must maintain, therefore, is enough of a commonality of interest between itself and the PRC that Beijing will think twice before killing the goose which lays the golden egg.

Although Taipei has certainly not made any such points overtly, there is some awareness that, as long as the PRC benefits from ROC investment (which currently stands at about US$20 billion), it will be unlikely to recklessly dislocate the island's economy. After all, Taiwan's defense policy is now coordinated with its foreign policy,[79] with Taiwanese investment concentrated in the southeast region of China, from where any military action against Taiwan would be launched.

So much for the policy focus of the military. There is also an important social dimension to the armed forces, since they consume enormous human and fiscal resources of the state in the ROC. Taiwan has, historically, borne a rather heavy defense burden. Yet the usual tradeoff between defense burden and economic growth does not seem to obtain. The ROC has achieved one of the highest and most sustained growth rates in gross national product (GNP) and in exports in the world.[80] Its savings rate, its inflation rate, and its unemployment

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[78]Interview with Dr. Lin Cheng-yi at the Institute of European and American Studies, Academia Sinica, Taipei, May 19, 1995.

[79]Despite some efforts by the government of Taiwan to encourage diversion of capital from the PRC to the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia. Interview with Dr. Lin Cheng-yi, Taipei, May 19, 1995.

[80]The GNP grew at an average annual rate of 8.8 percent during 1952-85, and exports at an average rate of 24.0 percent during 1953-85.

rate again rank it among the top performers globally.[81] Although military expenditure has not promoted infrastructure development (or contributed to the spread of modern skills and attitudes), it has stimulated fuller capacity utilization. The declining size of the ROC armed forces has been accompanied by rising literacy and falling birth rate, thus hardly supporting the view of the military as a key modernization agent. There may very well be a threshold, over time, in the relationships between economic growth on the one hand and processes such as investment in human capital, development of basic infrastructure, accumulation of capital, and promotion of industrial exports on the other hand.[82]

This leads one to ask, then, why Taiwan has been able to attain these achievements and to at least partially avoid the defense-versus-growth tradeoffs. In this context, various historical legacies and timing assume major importance. Japanese colonialism provided Taiwan with a comparatively developed human and industrial infrastructure. Possibly the Chinese civil war paved the way for a strong state on the island. Massive amounts of U.S. aid (coming on the heels of the Korean War, McCarthyism, and Washington's containment policy) as well as a booming world economy during the 1960s were very opportune developments that occurred just as the ROC government was instituting political control and economic recovery and launching its export drive. A substantial surplus industrial capacity and a large pool of relatively trained labor helped to lessen the adverse impact of the defense burden on the economy.[83] The defense burden, whether operationalized in terms of the relative size of the island's military budget or in terms of the relative size of its military establishment, has played neither a major positive nor negative role in determining the changes in its social welfare. There does not seem to be any statistically significant evidence of the defense burden influencing social welfare either directly or indirectly (through its effects on the growth of per capita GNP and on the government's welfare and education spending). These results suggest that Taiwan deviates from general cross-national patterns, and indicate the need for further investigation

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[81]Steve Chan, "Defense Burden and Economic Growth: Unravelling the Taiwanese Enigma," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 913.
[82]Ibid., 918.
[83]Ibid., 919.

into why it has been relatively successful in reducing the widely suspected tradeoffs between defense burden on the one hand, and economic growth and social welfare on the other.[84]

This is also the segment of Taiwanese society where important aspects of the political culture of martial law still continue.[85] Military leaders, such as Hau Pei-tsun (a former chief of the General Staff and premier), remain apprehensive about the effect of political reforms on internal security and stability.[86] Indeed, the majority of the judiciary, police force, and military remain staunch members of the KMT. Nevertheless, Chiang Ching-kuo's death posed something of an identity crisis for the ROC officer corps. For the first time since 1924, they had no member of the Chiang family leading them, the link with the Chiang dynasty having been broken.[87] The new president, having been a technocrat without military background or any close links with the officer corps, had to contend with the question of military support as a key political issue as early as 1988.[88] Over the longer term, questions also remain about the military's response to more thorough domestic political reform and future fundamental change in the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China.[89]

Overall, then, the evolution of the military as a political force is like a newly emerging professional group within modern societies; the military man and the civilian are, generally, distinct and inherently conflictual groups in society; the military should remain apolitical and subordinate to civilian control; effective control mechanisms should be installed lest the military run amuck.[90]

Foreign Relations

The bulwark of the ROC has been and will continue to be the

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[84]David R. Davis and Steve Chan, "The Security-Welfare Relationship: Longitudinal Evidence from Taiwan," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, no. 1 (February 1990): 87.

[85]Brian G. Martin, "The Relationship Between the Kuomintang and the Military in Taiwan," in *Modern Taiwan in the 1990s*, ed. Gary Klintworth (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Center, Australian National University, 1991), 23.

[86]Ibid., 32.

[87]Ibid., 33.

[88]Ibid., 34.

[89]Ibid., 37.

[90]Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 3.

United States. The problem of modernizing the ROC's military equipment continues to be of serious concern, but with the shrinking world arms trade, Taiwan's purchasing power and position has improved considerably. In late 1992, for instance, France approved Taipei's purchase of fighter aircraft and missiles, despite perfectly predictable protests from Beijing. More such decisions are only to be expected.

The most immediate issue, of course, is the potential for refugees crossing the Taiwan Strait because of some crisis on the mainland or simply in search of economic subsistence. The ROC is of necessity restrained in its treatment of these migrants (it can hardly condone defending its border at the cost of human life), and as a result, they continue to arrive. Although estimates of their numbers are still quite low, it is the potential exodus which is cause for worry.

The Bellwether: Relations with the Mainland

Relations between two of the three Chinas have improved considerably in recent years, although Taiwanese isolation at the hands of the mainland seems unlikely to end any time soon. Relations are sometimes edged with considerable irritation while the mainland continues to dominate the foreign policy agenda. This dominance is obvious to anyone who peruses the more recent history of the ROC's foreign relations. Perhaps the most tangible tactic of the entire ROC strategy is the provision of numerous openings by the ROC to the PRC, after over forty years of official coolness.

The KMT announced on October 14, 1987 that Taiwanese residents (excepting civil servants and military personnel) would be allowed to travel to mainland China to visit relatives by blood or marriage; travel to China had been banned since 1949.[91] Lee Teng-hui's inaugural speech of 1990 offered the possibility of full academic, cultural, economic, trade, scientific, and technological exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, leading in turn to the possibility of future reunification. The offer was conditional upon the Beijing government adopting "democratic politics and the free economic system," renouncing its commitment to reconquer Taiwan by force, and refraining "from obstructing our development of foreign relations."[92] Lee's offer

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[91]*Keesing's Record of World Events* 34, no. 2 (February 1988): 35716.
[92]Ibid. 36, no. 2 (February 1990): 37454-55.

followed on the heels of a statement to the ROC's National Assembly in January 1990 in which he had suggested that there should be dialogue within a "one-China framework and on a government-to-government basis with the two sides having equal status." Although some commentators suggested that Lee's offer amounted to a substantial concession, others saw the precondition as too demanding to facilitate any real progress in bilateral relations. This latter view was reinforced in May 1990 when Xinhua (the official New China News Agency) criticized Lee's "impossible preconditions" and reiterated Beijing's claim to be "the sole legitimate government representing all Chinese people."[93] Evidence of Taiwan's desire to improve relations with mainland China was also apparent in the government's less-than-enthusiastic support for the 1990 activities of propaganda radio ship *Goddess of Democracy*, sponsored by a French magazine and supported by a Paris-based group of Chinese exiles.

In 1991, President Lee announced that he had signed a document declaring the end of the "period of mobilization for the suppression of communist rebellion." The document effectively brought to an end over four decades of civil war between the KMT government of the ROC (Taiwan) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)-ruled PRC. At the press conference following this announcement, Lee acknowledged officially for the first time the existence of a CCP-led government in Beijing, although he reaffirmed Taiwan's one-China policy. This occurred after months of intense policy disputes among competing power centers in the KMT, the first sign that such a debate was actually taking place.[94] Shirley Kuo, the minister of finance, became the first senior ROC official to visit the mainland since 1949, when she led a twelve-member ROC delegation to the 22nd annual meeting of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), held in Beijing on May 4-6, 1989. However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lien Chan said that Kuo's visit had "nothing to do with our policy toward the Chinese communist regime."[95] In December 1989, an unofficial Taiwan-China trade mediation group was established in Hong Kong to ease theoretically illegal but rapidly increasing trade. (Trade with China, although extensive, remained "indirect" because of the sensitivities of the political rela-

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[93]Ibid.
[94]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, October 27, 1988, 54.
[95]*The New York Times*, May 10, 1989.

tionship.) In November 1990, the Executive Yuan approved a draft statute on relations with the Chinese mainland, which allowed for the legalization of civilian contacts between the two sides. Such contacts occur through the privately funded Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF), the only important channel entrusted by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) with the handling of civilian affairs.

In 1990, Taiwan lifted restrictions on business travel to the mainland, as well as abolishing a longstanding prohibition on visits by entertainers, academic exchanges, and the import of chemical or agricultural products. It was widely believed that all restrictions on economic relations would be removed once an appropriate formula of agreement could be devised which would be acceptable to nationalist sensitivities.

The first formal Taiwanese delegation to visit the mainland arrived in Beijing on April 28, 1991. Beijing also announced that it had stopped its "loudspeaker war" with Taiwan, i.e., that it had ceased directing propaganda messages from Fujian province to the Taiwanese troops stationed on Quemoy and other islands close to the mainland. Mainland Chinese journalists arrived in Taiwan in August 1991, the first such visit since 1949. They were followed later in the month by two senior Chinese Red Cross officials on the first official visit by mainland Chinese representatives to Taiwan since 1949. In April 1991, President Lee signed declarations which effectively ended the four decades of "civil war" between the ruling KMT government of the ROC and the CCP-ruled PRC.

The Central Standing Committee of the ruling KMT in March 1991 approved a national unification program formulated by President Lee. Lee and his premier Hau Pei-tsun said that consensus on unification with the mainland should be reached within Taiwan first, and only then between the two sides of the Strait. A commentator's article in the mainland *People's Daily* of March 18, 1991, welcomed the new program, especially its proposal of direct postal, trade, and shipping services between Taiwan and the mainland, but referred to "quite a few questionable points," including the Taipei government's demand for recognition as an independent and equal political entity, and its preconditions for unification: democracy, free economy, equal society, and the nationalization of the armed forces.

Some reports in late 1992 claimed that the mainland Chinese leadership had decided to invite the Taipei government to hold direct official talks on reunification. Neither side confirmed such talks, which would have constituted a major shift in policy. Previous Chinese in-

vitations to Taipei for talks on improving ties had been limited to party-to-party discussions. According to commentators, a change in Chinese policy would reflect the leadership's conviction that the prospects for reunification had suffered in 1992, partly because of Taiwan's success in improving its relations with the United States and the West, and partly because of the growing electoral success of the pro-independence DPP.

Relations with the mainland continued to progress in 1992. In June a group of mainland scientists visited Taiwan, the first such visit since 1949. The following month, the Legislative Yuan approved legislation providing the government with the power to lift bans on direct links with the mainland. However, according to ROC officials, implementation of the legislation was dependent on Chinese concessions. In September 1992, the Mainland Affairs Council approved new measures aimed at increasing financial links with the mainland. However, the measures stopped short of establishing direct trade, transport, and postal links. Inter-Chinese trade via Hong Kong rose by 29 percent in 1992. In April, the highest-level contact between Taiwan and the mainland occurred with a meeting between Beijing's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) and Taiwan's SEF. Although no agreements were forthcoming, the settings were symbolically important.

So much for the progress in inter-Chinese relations. Many of the irritants to Taiwan are still present, however, and Taiwan puts a good public face on fairly worrisome developments on the mainland. These worrisome developments include Beijing's increasing disregard for the opinion of its allies in conducting two nuclear tests within three months in 1995, and a continuing series of dramatic military budget increases, reaching 21 percent in 1995.[96] It is easy to see why there is a growing suspicion of mainland China in Taiwan: "China may keep smiling, 'no hegemony ever', but it cannot avoid paramountcy in the region, once it has charge of Hong Kong and Taiwan."[97] And it is increasingly clear, from the PRC's growing military power, that regional hegemony is indeed its object.

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[96]Although much of this was spent on salary increases for military personnel.

[97]Dennis Duncanson, "What Is Taiwan to China?" *Asian Affairs* 16, no. 3 (Fall 1989): 291.

Conclusion

In a word, in response to its circumstances, both domestic and international, the ROC has adopted since 1988 a strategy of pragmatic diplomacy. As Paul Evans has stated:

> Foreign countries which wish to increase substantive relations with Taiwan while maintaining contact with the PRC have much more room for manoeuvre. Canada, Australia, France, and the U.K. have certainly taken advantage of the opportunity . . . enlarged by the ROC strategy of "flexible diplomacy." Flexible diplomacy has occasionally meant head-to-head competition with Peking [Beijing] for diplomatic relations with Third World states, but it has also emphasized the value of substantive contacts, primarily economic, which no longer are used primarily as wedges in the question for more direct diplomatic relations.[98]

In terms of the hypothesis itself, there is certainly evidence in support of at least a correlation between values and strategy. The analysis of the ROC's strategy is valid, although for the theory to be supported, causation must be established (as stated above, that was not the paper's goal). The theory itself is intended to be expanded by other scholars in directions of particular importance, interest, or expertise to them. It is not intended to determine every factor in what is admittedly a highly speculative proposal. Does the theory replace a simple and acceptable explanation, i.e., that circumstances dictate a state's strategy, with a complicated one? That is one of theory's most common failings. Taiwan has a direct strategy of action. Why take the trouble of establishing a complex causal relationship? The answer is simple: to do so implies that the relationship between national values and state behavior is important enough to warrant the exploration.

The theory is general enough and powerful enough to be applied to other cases and other actors. The only requirement is that the actor always be capable of cognition, evaluation, and appreciation of information. To test this particular theory further, one could proceed

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[98]Evans, "Canada and Taiwan," 180-81.

empirically or theoretically. Empirical studies require generating predictions and investigating them. Theoretical studies require variations on conditions and assumptions, or using other propositions to contradict the findings of the current study.

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