Security in East Asia and Taiwan's Role*

Szu-yin Ho
Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University

Since the end of the Cold War, some students of international politics have believed that "history has ended," while others have stated that the more things change, the more they stay the same. These two schools of thought—roughly, liberalism and realism—are the two main conceptual frameworks by which East Asian security is analyzed. This paper first examines East Asian security from these two perspectives. It then analyzes the security stances of the PRC and the United States, the two major powers in East Asia, arguing that the PRC's reading of East Asian international politics is leaning toward a realist interpretation, while the United States is leaning toward a somewhat liberal one. Since Taiwan is a hot point in Sino-American relations, this paper further probes Taiwan's role in East Asian security. It finds that Taiwan's drive for international recognition, while largely propelled by its internal democratization process, will continue to drive a wedge into Sino-American relations, which will have tremendous repercussions in the East Asian security situation.

Keywords: liberalism; realism; PRC security stance; U.S. security stance; Taiwan's democratization

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"We have the damned best navy in the world."

—William Perry

"Americans had better start building another war memorial for all the soldiers who might die in future conflicts with China."

—China Can Say No
A bestseller in China

With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, power politics in East Asia have undergone a complete about-face. Debates concerning the nature of power politics abound. In

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the immediate wake of the Soviet meltdown, Japan, with its economic colossus, was deemed by some observers as the next persona non grata in East Asia, at least from the American point of view.[1] The emphasis of the Japan-bashing school of thought was mostly on Japan's potential to transform its economic power into military-security power. But since 1991, when Japan's bubble economy burst and still shows no signs of a robust recovery, the fear of Japan as a potential superpower was much alleviated. Replacing Japan as the prime object of strategic targeting has been China. China is now considered one of the great powers who "are like divas; they enter and exit the stage with great tumult."[2] It is regarded as a "hegemon on the horizon"[3] that has to be either contained,[4] constrained,[5] or engaged.[6] Since the United States is also a Pacific power, its *raison d'état* is inevitably entangled with that of China and its neighboring countries. U.S. dealings with China, Japan, and a number of middle powers in East Asia will have immense implications for the stability in this area. The end of the Cold War may not signify an end of history, at least in this corner of the world; rather, the end of the Cold War may prompt a "Back to the Future" trend in which realpolitik is still the modus operandi among nations. This paper will reflect on three aspects of East Asian security: the structure of East Asian international system; the security stances of China, the United States, and Japan in East Asia; and Taiwan's role in the East Asian security structure.

The Structure of East Asian International Politics

The analysis of international politics can be generally lumped under two headings: realism and liberalism. While taking note of

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[1]See, for example, Chalmers Johnson, "History Revisited: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century," in *Pacific Economic Relations in the 1990s*, ed. Richard Higgott, Richard Leaver, and John Ravenhill (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 39-61.

[2]Fareed Zakaria, "Speak Softly, Carry a Veiled Threat," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 18, 1996, 36-37.

[3]Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," *International Security* 19, no. 1 (Summer 1994): 149-68.

[4]Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 129-39.

[5]Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107-35.

[6]Audrey Kurth Cronin and Patrick M. Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China," *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 147-69.

the basic tenet of realism, i.e., international relations are determined by each state's individual attributes and national interests, neorealism argues that each state's position in the international system and the systemwise distribution of power are key to understanding international politics.[7] Viewing anarchy as the only ordering principle of international politics, states are engaged in pursuing relative gains which will change the international power configuration, which in turn will change the structure of international relations and hence the nature of international relations.

Through the realist or neorealist lens, the end of the Cold War has spelled significant changes in the structure of East Asian international relations. During the Cold War, the East Asian international structure was characterized by bipolarity where the United States coalesced with Japan and China to balance the power of the Soviet Union. Members of this tripartite coalition submerged their differences and divisions so as to serve the larger purpose of containing the polar bear. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, bipolarity has given way to a multipolar structure in which the United States, Japan, and China feel much less constrained in letting the cat out of the bag. Trade disputes between the United States and Japan and the long litany of problems in the Sino-American relationship—trade, intellectual property rights, human rights, nuclear proliferation, military technology transfer, Taiwan, and to a lesser degree, environmental protection, drug-trafficking, and illegal immigration—are all too obvious examples. This development squares with the neorealist assertion that multipolarity is intrinsically more prone to instability than bipolarity.[8]

When it comes to systemwise distribution of capabilities, the neorealist perspective prescribes that a new power like Prussia from 1870 to the eve of World War I will be balanced by the old powers. The end of the Cold War has changed China from a status quo power to anti-status quo power. Table 1 shows several power dimensions of countries in proportion to East Asia's total power dimensions in 1994.

What table 1 demonstrates is that in East Asia, China is really a "dead weight" country whose sheer presence places enough pressure

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[7]Much of the realist school of thought is based on Hans J. Morgenthau's classic *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1948), while many neorealists owe their intellectual debt to Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), another classic.

[8]Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, 161.

Table 1
East Asian Countries' Power Dimensions, 1994 (in %)

	Population	Land	GDP	Military spending
China & Hong Kong	65.2	68.3	35.7	33.3
Japan	6.8	2.7	37.5	27.0
South Korea	2.4	0.7	5.6	9.9
North Korea	1.2	0.9	0.3	3.2
Taiwan	1.2	0.2	2.8	6.4
ASEAN	22.4	24.1	17.9	19.5

Source: Modified from Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 111.

on its neighbors. On top of the power dimensions in table 1, one should add the facts that China is a nuclear country, occupies a pivotal geopolitical position in East Asia, has experienced the longest, fastest economic growth in world history, and has internal problems so severe that no other country can afford to see it collapse without extending a helping hand. Once China shows any sign of expansionism, and to some it has already, it needs to be balanced; the efficient balancing can come only from the existing U.S.-Japan security nexus. Neorealists therefore see East Asia as a region ripe for power rivalry, especially between the United States and China.[9]

Liberalism, by contrast, contends that structure need not be the main determining factor in international relations. A range of other factors such as international institutions,[10] collective security,[11] and economic interdependence[12] can be at work in international relations. All these factors tend to have a dampening effect on the competitive nature of states, as they can pursue absolute gains even though they may fare worse in relative terms. Therefore, in analyzing international politics in East Asia, neoliberals tend to emphasize increasing

[9]Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 5-33.

[10]See, for example, Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two Approaches," *International Studies Quarterly* 32, no. 4 (December 1988): 379-96.

[11]Alexander Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 2 (June 1994): 384-96.

[12]Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd edition (New York: Harper Collins, 1989).

intraregional trade and investment,[13] institution-building measures like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), etc.,[14] or communal "Asian values."[15] The neoliberal prescription for East Asian international politics is pure and simple: keep trading, investing, and instituting.

But what of China? Here again analyses based on liberal teachings are much more optimistic than neorealist analyses. After all, if the PRC maintains that economic development tops its political agenda, there is no reason to suspect that China will run the risk of wreaking havoc in the Asia-Pacific region just to satisfy its sense of power and entitlement. Asia-Pacific countries now provide 75 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in China, with Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and ASEAN ranking as no. 1, 2, 3, and 5, respectively, among China's top investing partners. The United States provides nearly 4 percent of China's total FDI, ranking as the 4th largest investing country in China. In terms of trade, Hong Kong, Japan, the United States, and Taiwan, in that order, are the four largest trading partners of China, with South Korea, Singapore, Canada, Australia, Indonesia, and Malaysia constituting the next echelon.[16] Moreover, there has been increasing economic integration between Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the southern coastal provinces of China: intraregional trade and investment between these three economic regions are projected to grow even further.[17] While the southern coastal provinces have been instrumental in the transition of China from a centrally-planned economy to a market-based economy, China should have every incentive not to rock the boat in this tripartite integrated economy in particular, and East Asia in general.

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[13]For example, Thomas J. Duesterberg, "Trade, Investment, and Engagement in the U.S.-East Asian Relationship," *Washington Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 73-90.

[14]See, for example, Richard A. Higgott, Andrew Fenton Cooper, and Jenelle Bonnor, "Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation: An Evolving Case-Study in Leadership and Cooperation Building," *International Journal* 45, no. 4 (Autumn 1990): 823-66.

[15]Chris Patten, "Asian Values and Asian Success," *Survival* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 5-12; Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 5 (November/December 1993): 75-85.

[16]Ding Jingping, *China's Domestic Economy in Regional Context* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1995).

[17]Randall S. Jones, Robert E. King, and Michael Klein, "Economic Integration between Hong Kong, Taiwan and the Coastal Provinces of China," *OECD Economic Studies*, no. 20 (Spring 1993).

In sum, realism and liberalism as analytical approaches to international politics have both merits and demerits.[18] They see the world, and in this case, East Asia, in different lights, and hence have different analyses and prescriptions for East Asian power politics. With both analytical frameworks in mind, we now examine the roles of China, the United States, and Japan in East Asian security.

The Security Stances of China, the United States, and Japan in East Asia

In a span of roughly three years, the pendulum of China's international security calculations has swung from liberalism to realism. The earlier liberal tendencies can be amply demonstrated in the writings of a figure no less than Qimao Chen, who was the president and chairman of the Academic Council of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies and is widely believed to be a close foreign policy adviser to current Chinese leadership, especially President Jiang Zemin. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 certainly brought shock waves through China. Acutely aware of the dawning of a new era in international politics with a variety of favorable and unfavorable factors for China, Beijing has adjusted its foreign policy approach from one emphasizing balance of power to one that will "provide a long-term peaceful and secure environment for China's modernization and a favorable condition for its reform and opening-up policy."[19] But a careful reading of China's official materials concerning Chinese international relations in the past year reveals that realpolitik is now the talk of the town. Many observers concur that the once burgeoning liberal school of thought has dwindled in China and realism is now the theoretical construct of the foreign policy community.[20] This reorientation of China's security calculations can be accounted for by several factors including factional politics,

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[18]Robert O. Keohane, ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

[19]Qimao Chen, "New Approaches in China's Foreign Policy: The Post-Cold War Era," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 3 (March 1993): 244.

[20]Cronin and Cronin, "The Realistic Engagement of China," 143-45; David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," *Survival* 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 44; David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" *Current History* 94, no. 593 (September 1995): 244-45.

leadership instability, the desire to use a tough realist stance to bolster positions in foreign negotiations, perceived or real external challenges, a reassessment of the global power balance,[21] and a very deep sense of insecurity and distrust as a result of the humiliations endured in modern Chinese history.[22]

Anchored in traditional realism or neorealism, Chinese security policy has shown the following defining characteristics:[23]

Territorial and sovereignty integration is the supreme goal of security policy.

National strength is comprehensive: Economic and technological development is of strategic importance to defense buildup, which in turn will help protect economic and technological growth. In other words, the pursuit of wealth and power are not considered a trade-off, as liberal thought would suggest; rather, they are considered complementary.[24] Thus, for example, China's attempt to build a blue-water navy and its behavior in the South China Sea and Spratly Islands can be explained in terms of protecting its economic growth.[25]

Balance-of-power diplomatic maneuvers are necessary: Remote, disentangled balancing, a la nineteenth century Britain, is preferable to multilateralism, alliance, or tight alignment, as the latter constrains national sovereignty and the freedom of diplomatic maneuvering. The Mischief Reef incident in 1995 and China's following diplomatic maneuvers are a case in point.[26] In another case, China turned a diplomatic defeat (President Lee Teng-hui's visit to Cornell University in June 1995) and a military crisis (missile tests in the Taiwan Strait in 1996 and the ensuing facedown by two U.S. carrier flotillas) into diplomatic gains after U.S. National Security Advisor Anthony Lake visited Beijing in July 1996 and promised to open a series of high-

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[21]Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy after Deng," *China Quarterly*, no. 142 (June 1995): 295-316.

[22]Shambaugh, "Growing Strong," 46-48.

[23]Michael D. Swaine, "China," in *Strategic Appraisal, 1996*, ed. Zalmay Khalilazd (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1996), 185-205. David Shambaugh also gives a very similar list of characteristics in Chinese security policy. See "Growing Strong," cited in note 20.

[24]This is indeed a classical thought from the late Qing Dynasty. See Benjamin Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Pelknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964).

[25]Michael Leifer, "Chinese Economic Reform and Security Policy: The South China Sea Connection," *Survival* 37, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 44-59; Mamdouh G. Salameh, "China, Oil and the Risk of Regional Conflict," ibid., no. 4 (Winter 1995-96): 133-46.

[26]Gerald Segal gives a very clear account of this incident. See note 5 above.

level meetings between the two countries, including state visits by President Bill Clinton and President Jiang Zemin.[27] Meanwhile, Chinese leaders' frequent visits to Europe, Africa, Latin America, and Japan from March to July 1996 can be viewed as a balancing move against the United States.

Adequate defense includes not only territorial defense but also local war and power projection: This explains China's persistent efforts in restructuring the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and procuring advanced weaponry,[28] despite that there is no obvious threat to China even in the remote future.

Imbedded in the realist school of thought, China's security stance toward the United States is worth special mention. Though it has shown some tactical flexibility in its dealings with the United States, China embraces these prevailing views, as put succinctly by David Shambaugh:

> First, it is believed that the United States is trying to *contain China* strategically. Second, it is believed that the United States seeks to *frustrate China's* emergence as a world economic power. Third, it is thought that the United States wants to permanently *divide Taiwan from China*. Fourth, Beijing sees evidence of a concerted policy to *destabilize and undermine* the regime and Communist Party rule in China, with the intent of bringing about the collapse of the People's Republic itself. . . . Beijing believes that America's cold warriors now have their sights on consigning Communist China to the proverbial dustbin of history.[29]

The above analysis demonstrates that China's security stance is firmly in the realist school.

While China can afford to be a wayward regional power, the United States cannot. It faces an East Asia where powers of various sizes generally have very deep relationships with the United States, but are not very trustful of their own powerful neighbors. By and large, East Asian nations do not really view themselves as a community with binding values and common national interests. They are very jealous of their sovereignty, always guarding it against any sign of foreign infringement. Hence they hold a very suspicious view toward

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[27]Matt Forney and Nigel Holloway, "Sunny Side Up," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 25, 1996, 14-15.

[28]Bates Gill and Taeho Kim, *China's Arms Acquisitions from Abroad* (Oxford: Oxford University Press for Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 1995); Swaine, "China," 205-11.

[29]Shambaugh, "The United States and China," 244. Emphasis added.

regionwide institutions, afraid that these institutions may turn out to be nothing more than puppet regimes controlled by superpowers, including the United States.

Politics among major powers can be neatly described in realist terms.[30] Russia is down but not out, and its future potential always casts a long shadow over Japan and China. Right now, Japan is most wary of China becoming a regional hegemon that will flex its muscle in the South and East China seas, Japan's major sea lanes. China, on the other hand, worries about the prospect that Japan, already the second highest military spending power in Asia, may someday turn its economic power and technological capacity into military superiority. China is therefore ambivalent toward the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. An American safety net will reduce Japan's incentive to remilitarize, but this U.S.-Japan alliance may also serve to balance against rising Chinese power.

Roughly speaking, the United States has had deeper security relations with East Asian nations than they have had among each other. This is largely the legacy of the Cold War: in the 1950s the United States entered into a number of defense treaties with Asia-Pacific nations and in the 1970s developed a triangular relationship among itself, China, and the Soviet Union. U.S. post-Cold War security policy has been strongly influenced by this hub-and-spoke structure. James Baker, secretary of state during the Bush administration, argued that U.S. bilateral alliances with powers in East Asia serve as the backbone of America's Asia-Pacific security policy, comparing the alliance web to "a fan spread with its base in North America."[31] The Clinton administration's East Asian security policy is based on the doctrines of enlargement and engagement, which are very much a continuation of the Bush administration's policy. The doctrine of enlargement, according to Anthony Lake, means that the United States will strengthen the power of market democracies, enlarge the community of these democracies, and dampen the threat posed by backlash authoritarian and anti-liberal states.[32] According

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[30]Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," *International Security* 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 34-77.

[31]James A. Baker, III, "America in Asia: Emerging Architecture for a Pacific Community," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 5 (Winter 1991/92): 4.

[32]Anthony Lake, "Effective Engagement in a Changing World," USIS, *Wireless File*, December 17, 1993.

to Joseph Nye, former assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, the doctrine of engagement means that the United States will reinforce its alliances, keep a military presence, and develop regional institutions in East Asia.[33] Presumably, this security policy could have a strong realist flavor because America is well positioned to fine-tune its bilateral relations in pursuing larger regionwide strategic goals. Indeed, the Bush administration-initiated *1994-1999 Defense Planning Guidance*, completed in May 1995, called for a strategy of preponderance that will block other states' challenges toward the United States. But after severe criticisms from U.S. friends and potential foes alike, the Bush administration toned down this policy. Similarly, because the doctrine of enlargement was widely criticized as an overt American attempt to interfere with the sovereignty of East Asian nations, the Clinton administration now emphasizes the doctrine of engagement only. Deep engagement, according to the case presented by Joseph Nye, is a policy by default, simply because the United States cannot pursue any other alternative strategies. It is indeed very much status quo-oriented, without providing much direction to the East Asian security environment.

Criticisms of American East Asian security policy abound. One criticism, raised by Henry Kissinger, is that America frequently lets its Wilsonian impulses (i.e., desires for democratic values and collective security) dominate bilateral relations, thus losing sight of the larger strategic picture.[34] Another criticism is leveled by Samuel P. Huntington, who argues that it is a plain mistake for the United States not to pursue primacy in the world. In current international relations, preponderance still matters.[35] Those who are well versed in the tradition of realism or neorealism would note that America's East Asian security policy simply lacks a sense of balance of power.[36] A somewhat mild criticism is that since bilateralism precludes America from exerting a more efficient, freehand-style, and remote balancing, America's "bandwagoning" in East Asia should at least aim to prevent

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[33]Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 94-96.

[34]Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 804-36.

[35]Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 68-83.

[36]Paul Dibb, "Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia," *Adelphi Paper* #295 (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995); Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, "A U.S. Strategy for the Asia-Pacific," ibid., #299 (1995).

other powers coalescing against the United States.[37] In sum, most critics believe that U.S. East Asian security policy lacks direction and coherence.

U.S. policy toward China is a case in point. While the mainstream thinking in the Clinton administration is engagement rather than confrontation,[38] the question is frequently asked: Whither the engagement? For Henry Kissinger, engaging China is necessary but the United States must know its national interests in its relations with China in the first place. For Huntington and some other neorealist critics, China needs to be balanced, because ". . . a central focus of conflict for the immediate future will be between the West and several Islamist-Confucian states."[39] In short, engagement must have a purpose; America cannot engage China just for engagement's sake. When a realist China, always second-guessing America's motive, senses containment when an erratic U.S. sees engagement,[40] what good is a liberalism-oriented engagement policy? But in reality, to the United States, engagement is probably just that, no more and no less.

Because Japan is not a heavyweight on security matters like the United States or China, I will not probe into Japan's security stance. Suffice it to say that,

> Japan's reliance on the United States for a security net, government structure, normative value systems (e.g., anti-remilitarization public opinion), and very rigid policy processes have all contributed to make Japan a very passive player in East Asian security.[41] Due to China's muscle flexing in the post-Cold War era, Japan, as a reactive state, has gradually tilted its China policy from commercial liberalism to reluctant realism.[42]

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[37]Josef Joffe, "'Bismarck' or 'Britain'?" *International Security* 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 94-117.

[38]Robert G. Sutter, *China in World Affairs: U.S. Policy Choices* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, January 1995), 16-18.

[39]Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993): 48.

[40]Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Sees Engagement in Current Policy, China Feels Containment," *Washington Post*, July 9, 1995, A-23.

[41]Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," *International Security* 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 84-118.

[42]Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," *Survival* 38, no. 2 (Summer 1996): 35-58.

While Japan is only a potential superpower, both the United States and China would definitely weigh in Japan's reaction to their security stances; so far, Japan still sides firmly with the United States on most East Asian security issues despite its trade disputes with the United States.[43]

Taiwan and East Asian Security

The most recent Taiwan Strait crisis has thrown Taiwan's role in East Asian security into relief. If China's recent saber-rattling is a warning salvo of future military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan, then the implications for internal political and economic development in China and Taiwan, Sino-American relations, Sino-Japanese relations, and long-term prosperity and stability in East Asia will be profound. Because China has long regarded the Taiwan problem as an internal affair, Taiwan should have no place in international diplomacy and security. Due to PRC pressure, East Asian countries have given Taiwan, at most, tacit moral support on these matters. But Taiwan's strong economic presence in East Asia—it is a strong trading partner in the Asia-Pacific region, a major link in East Asian production networks, and the second largest capital exporter in the area—has made such efforts much more difficult. Taiwan is crucial to East Asian security.

For China, Taiwan is both a security concern and a sovereignty issue. If Taiwan, an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" in Cold War polemics, allies itself with a potential enemy, China's security would be in a grave situation. In addition, if Taiwan declares de jure independence, it would have a demonstrative effect on Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia, which constitute approximately 35 percent of China's territory.[44] When it comes to national sovereignty, Taiwan symbolizes the humiliation China has suffered in its modern history.

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[43]Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japan as an Asia-Pacific Power," in *East Asia in Transition*, ed. Robert Ross (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1995), 141-48. In the wake of President Clinton's visit to Japan in April, 69 percent of the Japanese people said they were satisfied with the "realignment" of U.S.-Japan security treaty, in which Japan will play a bigger role in the alliance. In addition, both the Japanese government and people have shown more willingness to shoulder more responsibilities in East Asian security under the auspices of a U.S.-Japan partnership or multilateral drive (e.g., UN Peace-Keeping Operations). See "Japan Edges Forward," *The Economist*, April 27, 1996, 27.

[44]Andrew J. Nathan, "China's Goals in the Taiwan Strait," *The China Journal*, no. 36 (July 1996): 87-93.

Severed from the motherland since the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, Taiwan now stands as the last piece of territory to be brought back into China's fold.[45] China's policy toward Taiwan is thus clearly a product of realism and nationalism.

The United States viewed Taiwan largely as an economic success story of U.S. foreign aid in the old days of the Cold War. But since 1987, when Taiwan first embarked on the path of democratization that culminated in this year's presidential election, the United States has viewed Taiwan as a model of market economy-driven democracy. This development trajectory fits perfectly with an American ideology that sees a linear relationship between market and democracy. In the meantime, China has suffered from a poor image since the 1989 Tiananmen incident. The sentiments favoring Taiwan and against China are especially strong in the U.S. Congress. When the Clinton administration bowed to Congressional pressure to issue a visa to President Lee Teng-hui to visit Cornell University, China felt deeply offended, suspecting that America was discarding the "one China" principle and trying to help Taiwan achieve independence, thus dividing and weakening China permanently. A military crisis involving China, Taiwan, and America unfolded in the wake of President Lee's visit to the Untied States in June 1995 and lasted until late March of 1996, when President Lee successfully won his reelection bid. As of now, China and Taiwan are still deadlocked over their general relationship, with America and China just beginning to mend their differences.

For Taiwan, its drive to more international "space" through its so-called "pragmatic diplomacy" is only a natural outgrowth of its democratization process. As public opinion shows strong support for pragmatic diplomacy, all political parties, including the ruling Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party of China) and the opposition parties (the Democratic Progressive Party and the New Party), have been constrained to follow it. In a large-scale survey conducted in the summer of 1995 by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University in which this author participated, 62.8 percent of the respondents agreed with the government's practice of pragmatic diplomacy, while 9.1 percent disagreed. When pragmatic diplomacy

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[45]Chu Shulong, "National Unity, Sovereignty and Territorial Integration," ibid., 98-102.

was pitted against mainland policy (i.e., emphasizing cross-Strait relationship) as policy alternatives, 35.1 percent thought pragmatic diplomacy should take precedence over mainland policy, 18.3 percent thought vice versa, 21.5 percent thought both are equally important, and the rest (25.1 percent) showed no response. A further analysis of those who rank their policy preferences between pragmatic diplomacy and mainland policy demonstrates that these people do not see a trade-off between these two policy choices.[46] Support for pragmatic diplomacy is by no means support for Taiwan independence, as shown by figure 1. Various surveys have consistently shown that approximately 20 percent of the population are for Taiwan independence, less than 25 percent are for reunification (albeit reunification in the remote future), and about 50 percent are for the status quo—i.e., the Republic of China as a sovereign state. Given its decreasing electoral fortunes (see figure 2), the ruling KMT simply has no incentive to deviate from the median pragmatic diplomacy/status quo position, lest it lose more votes on this very important issue. Moreover, pragmatic diplomacy is regarded by the government, the opposition, and the ruling elite as well as the ordinary people, as essential for Taiwan's survival. Taiwan fears that if it does not carry out stretching-out efforts such as "visit diplomacy," "vacation diplomacy," "academic diplomacy," and so on, its international identity will be absorbed or dissolved by its archrival. Without a presence in international community, it is further reasoned, Taiwan's security would be in grave danger. While pursuing pragmatic diplomacy abroad, Taiwan has adopted a liberal approach toward China, posing only limited constraints on trade, investment, communications, and personnel exchanges with China, in the hope that its archrival will understand its goodwill toward national reunification.

Unfortunately, China has interpreted Taiwan's international drive as a drift toward Taiwan independence; hence both sides are heading to a collision course. The fundamental problem is that China takes a realist or neorealist world view, Taiwan's international stance is a reflection of both domestic consensus regarding pragmatic diplomacy and a real need to seek international support for its survival, and the United States is caught in between.

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[46]Szu-yin Ho, "Pragmatic Diplomacy vs. Mainland Policy" (Research Report, Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, October 1995).

Figure 1
Public Opinions on Taiwan Independence-Reunification



Figure 2
Party Vote Share: 1986-1996



Conclusion

In the literature of international security, it is widely acknowledged that security has a dilemma: If you treat a country (like China) as an enemy, it will become an enemy.[47] Aware of the possibility that a realist security approach will drive China back against the wall and jeopardize East Asian security, the United States is therefore unlikely to adopt a tit-for-tat strategy against China. The United States will continue to engage China, but not contain it. The crux is: Will China change its realist or neorealist perspective on security issues? I venture a guarded "yes"—China will eventually change its security perspective, but only after it experiences more economic and political development. This process will take time. It will also take a lot more patience from China's neighboring countries, and the United States in particular, to resist the intuitive temptation to employ a realist balance-of-power strategy against China. As for Taiwan, China represents a clear and present danger, even though, in the long run, as many in Taiwan have believed, China will ultimately change toward a more benign and congenial regime. Taiwan's relatively liberal policy toward China (especially in the realm of trade and investment) is certainly aimed to expedite China's transition. But before that can really happen, Taiwan feels that in the short run it has no other alternative but to seek international support for its survival. The challenge for Taiwan is therefore how to reconcile its short-run strategy with its long-run view regarding China. Management of cross-Strait relations by all countries involved will have profound implications for East Asian security.

[47]This is a classic "prisoners' dilemma" in which countries only have incentive to defect rather than cooperate. The collective result in which all countries defect is Pareto suboptimal to the result in which all countries cooperate.