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The PRC's Policies Toward Nonproliferation Regimes

Hung-yi Jan

This paper examines the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) policies toward nonproliferation regimes, focusing on the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

The author finds that China holds a positive attitude toward the NPT and the CTBT, evidenced by China's public discourse about these treaties and its eventual signing of them. In contrast, China feels moderately negative about the MTCR. This paper also confirms that China's cooperation in nonproliferation has been based on the broader context of its relations with the United States. Finally, this paper suggests that frequent contact between the United States and China will be useful for communicating the importance of nonproliferation in bilateral relations. Chinese bureaucrats at all levels need to understand that they should be held accountable for nonproliferation behavior, and that reckless exports can threaten Chinese, U.S., and world security.

Keywords: PRC; NPT; CTBT; MTCR; PRC's arms control policies

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The "China threat" debate has been proceeding for a while in the United States and other Western countries. Spirited arguments have appeared in academic journals, news magazines, and on the op-ed pages of major newspapers, and have been echoed through radio and television talk shows.[1] Those

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[1]This debate has become increasingly animated during 1997, particularly in the United States. Nigel Holloway observes that America's policy toward China, which used to be the preserve of the Washington elite, is fast becoming everybody's business. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 5, 1997, 14-16. David Shambaugh dubbed it "the Great American China Policy Debate of 1997," ibid., June 12, 1997, 62-63.

who argue for the existence of a "China threat" maintain that an increasingly powerful China is likely to destabilize regional security in the near future. This idea has become highly topical, as China has experienced remarkable economic growth in the 1990s; a developed economy could potentially turn China's huge population from a weakness into a strength, and give China the basis for world-class military and technological capability. With this increasing clout, it has been expected that China will actualize its long-repressed yearnings for hegemony and pose a grave threat to U.S. interests.[2]

Critics of the "China threat" arguments have questioned not only the arguments but also the motives of the "threat-mongers," who are often alleged to carry mean-spirited prejudices or an ignoble hidden agenda. This anti-threat school points out a variety of constraints against Chinese assertive behavior and holds that the benefits of constructive engagement with China will outweigh the dangers.[3]

Usually, this kind of debate has often lapsed into dichotomies, and analysts' pro-China or anti-China predispositions have clouded analyses. If we take the perspective of international regime management to investigate how China behaves in different issue areas, we will have a more complex picture. For example, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has adopted many liberalization policies which are compatible with the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) regime,[4] whereas it has been more confrontational toward countries and multilateral institutions which are critical of its performance in the issue area of human rights. We also find that China is more committed to

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[2]See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China?" *Time*, July 31, 1995, 72; Barber B. Conable, Jr. and David M. Lampton, "China: The Coming Power," *Foreign Affairs* 71, no. 5 (November/December 1992): 133-49; Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," *Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 129-40; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constraining' of China," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107-35; Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 18-32; and Robert Kagan, "What China Knows That We Don't: The Case for a New Strategy of Containment," *Weekly Standard*, January 20, 1997, 22-27. *The Economist* made "Containing China" as its cover story in the issue published on July 29, 1995. The *New Republic* criticized the Clinton administration's "destructive engagement" with China in its issue of March 10, 1997.

[3]Among others, see Cheryl L. Hart, "Engagement or Containment: A Clear Choice," in *China's Economic Future: Challenges to U.S. Policy* (Selected papers presented to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, August 1996), 53-56; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 180-209; Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 33-44; and Robert B. Zoellick, "China: What Engagement Should Mean," *National Interest*, no. 46 (Winter 1996/97): 13-22. Denny Roy has done a fine analysis of the debate; see "The 'China Threat' Issue: Major Arguments," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 8 (August 1996): 758-71.

[4]See the author's article "The PRC's Bid to Enter the GATT/WTO," *Issues & Studies* 33, no. 6 (June 1997): 33-51.

its trade and foreign exchange reforms than reining in its arms exports.

The concept of "regime," as derived from international law, has increasingly been applied to the study of macropolitics in the late twentieth century.[5] One widely-accepted definition is given by Stephen D. Krasner: "Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations."[6] The interaction between China and international regimes can be best conceptualized as a two-way flow. Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg use the metaphor of "two moving targets of undetermined trajectories" in describing the process of mutual adjustment and legitimation between China and "keystone international economic organizations" (i.e., the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and GATT), and conclude that the PRC's participation in these global economic organizations has prompted changes in policies, policy processes, and institutions within it.[7] In this paper, we will consider the unidirectional flow of this interaction–China's recent policies toward the nonproliferation regimes.

According to Leonard S. Spector and Jonathan Dean, there are four existing nonproliferation regimes which have acquired various degrees of normative basis, transparency, and sanctions: nuclear, missile, chemical, and biological.[8] Due to limited space here, this paper will focus on the former two regimes and examine China's policies toward the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).[9] In each

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[5]Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 344. For the discussion and application of the concept of regime, among others, see Stephen D. Krasner, ed., *International Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Oran R. Young, "International Regimes: Toward a New Theory of Institutions," *World Politics* 39 (1986): 104-22; idem, "International Regimes: Problems of Concept Formation," ibid. 32 (1980): 331-56; idem, "Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the Development of Institutions in International Society," *International Organization* 45, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 281-308; Stephen Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, "Theories of International Regimes," ibid. 41, no. 3 (Summer 1987): 491-517; Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory and International Relations* (New York: Clarendon Press, 1993); and Volker Rittberger, ed., *Regime Theory in the Post-Cold War World* (Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1993).

[6]Krasner, *International Regimes*, 2.

[7]The metaphor is the title of chapter 2 in Harold K. Jacobson and Michel Oksenberg, *China's Participation in the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT: Toward a Global Economic Order* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: The University of Michigan Press, 1990), 21 and the conclusion, 139-52.

[8]Leonard S. Spector and Jonathan Dean, "Cooperative Security: Assessing the Tools of the Trade," in *Global Engagement: Cooperative and Security in the 21st Century*, ed. Janne E. Nolan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1994), 131-74.

[9]I am aware that with this omission of the latter two regimes, I might encounter the small-n problem; that is, the rigor of analysis and inference based on a small number of cases is somewhat

case, each regime will first be discussed, followed by an analysis of China's recent policies toward it. Finally, we will compare those policies.

In the following discussion, foreign policy is considered as a form of behavior consisting of the concrete steps that officials of a nation take with respect to events and situations abroad, and activities that follow generalized orientations, and the development and articulation of specific goals and commitment.[10] Using the Comparative Research on the Events of Nations (CREON) event data set,[11] we will try to measure the type of affect and the degree of commitment in China's foreign policy behavior. "Affect" refers to the government's degree of manifest feeling and attitude in terms of hostility (negative affect) or friendliness (positive affect) toward the recipient of its action: that is, the norms of regimes in the following analysis. This affect scale can be represented by a continuum with negative affect and positive affect at the poles, and moderately negative affect or moderately positive affect in between. "Commitment" involves the degree to which a government's current actions limit its future options, either through the allocation of resources or the generation of expectations in others. The commitment scale ranges from low commitment (symbolic verbal behavior) to high commitment (the irreversible allocation of resources, and the signing of international agreements and abiding by them). Between these two extremes is moderate commitment (it is difficult for the government to totally reverse allocation of resources, or there exist some discrepancies between what it promises and what it has done).

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inferior to that based on a larger number of cases. Although there has been debate on this issue, most scholars have adopted conciliatory position on it, emphasizing the complementarity of small-n and large-n studies. See Stanley Lieberson, "Small N's and Big Conclusions: An Examination of the Reasoning in Comparative Studies Based on a Small Number of Cases," *Social Forces* 70, no. 2 (December 1991): 307-20; Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (September 1971): 682-93; and David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," *World Politics* 49 (October 1996): 56-91. In this particular context, I believe a study including the chemical regime and the biological regime will not invalidate the conclusion reached in this paper. For a glimpse of China's official position toward the latter regimes, see its 1995 White Paper on Arms Control and Disarmament, "China: Arms Control and Disarmament," *Beijing Review* 38, no. 48 (November 27-December 3, 1995): 10-25, especially Section V.

[10]James N. Rosenau, "The Study of Foreign Policy," in *World Politics: An Introduction*, ed. James N. Rosenau, Kenneth W. Thompson, and Gavin Boyd (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 16.

[11]Charles F. Hermann, Maurice A. East, Margaret G. Hermann, Barbara G. Salmore, and Stephen A. Salmore, eds., *CREON: A Foreign Events Data Set* (Sage Professional Papers in International Studies) 2:02-024, 1973.

China's Policies Toward the NPT

The NPT was opened for signing in July 1968 and came into force in March 1970 after having been ratified by forty states. The NPT seeks to achieve three principal goals. First, it aims to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons from states possessing them to states that lack this capability. The first and second articles of the NPT cover this contingency.[12] Second, it allows for the continuation of technology transfers regarding civilian nuclear power facilities. The signatories established a safeguard system for the proliferation of peaceful nuclear technology under the aegis of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The NPT includes the notion that the IAEA will have full and open access to the civilian nuclear programs of all nonnuclear states, including the right to conduct periodic inspections of all their plants and facilities. Third, the NPT seeks to control further proliferation by enjoining the signatories to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." For instance, Article VII of the treaty encourages the establishment of nuclear-free zones, and Article VIII commits the contracting parties to meet at five-year intervals to review the progress made in establishing and extending the regime.[13]

Before the 1980s, China condemned the NPT because it bestowed a nuclear monopoly on the five declared nuclear states and relegated other nations to permanent nonnuclear status. Seeking to lead the Third World and chart an independent foreign policy course, China repudiated such discrimination as a vestige of colonialism and advocated the overthrow of the NPT regime. Since the early 1980s, as part of its modernization program, Beijing has begun to convert its primarily military nuclear program to include peaceful applications of nuclear technology. After the normalization of relations between the United States and China, as Qingshan Tan indicates, one important driving force behind the United States seeking nuclear cooperation with China has been to advance U.S. nonproliferation interests;[14] that is, bringing China into the NPT. Nevertheless, China has resisted U.S. efforts, and at best, has oc-

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[12]For the text, see "Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (1968), in *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament*, ed. Richard Dean Burns (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), 1437-40.

[13]Evans and Newnham, *The Dictionary of World Politics*, 281-82.

[14]The other force is the intention to secure a share of China's nuclear market. See Qingshan Tan, "U.S.-China Nuclear Cooperation Agreement: China's Nonproliferation Policy," *Asian Survey* 29, no. 9 (September 1989): 870-82.

casionally praised the objective of nonproliferation, with which it has coupled its criticism of the treaty's discriminatory aspects. In practice, driven by its post-1978 economic modernization needs, China has established a pattern of exporting nuclear materials and technology to a variety of nations known or suspected to have secret nuclear weapons programs. Examples of such sales have included exports of heavy water to India and Argentina; nuclear technology to Brazil; nuclear technology and bomb design to Pakistan; possible nuclear cooperation with Iraq, Syria, and South Africa; a secret reactor sale to Algeria; and nuclear cooperation with Iran.[15]

However, Beijing's policies toward the NPT showed signs of entering a new stage in 1990.[16] Trying to improve its tarnished international image after the Tiananmen Incident, China sent officials to observe the Fourth Review Conference on the NPT and issued favorable statements about the treaty. Three factors added to scrutiny of China's nonproliferation policy: worldwide nonproliferation sentiment stirred by the 1990-91 confrontation with Iraq; the April 1991 revelations about China's secret reactor project in Algeria; and the announcement by French President François Mitterrand in June 1991 that France would join the NPT. These events factored into a contentious U.S. Congress debate over China's most-favored-nation (MFN) trading status.

The turning point came in August 1991, when Premier Li Peng announced China's decision "in principle" to join the NPT. Chinese leaders promised U.S. Secretary of State James Baker during his November 1991 trip to Beijing that China would join the NPT by April 1992. Although some observers expected China to delay its accession to the treaty, China did become the fourth acknowledged nuclear state to accede to the NPT in March 1992 (French accession came five months later, in August).

The change of China's position was the result of many factors. First, China hoped to deflect criticism of its nuclear export policy, especially in the aftermath of Tiananmen. In signing the NPT, China committed to few, if any, new constraints on its policy or behavior, but it muted criticism in Western industrialized countries that it was leading a Third World revolt against the nonproliferation regime. Second, signing the NPT was a step toward securing normal MFN trading status from the United States, as it removed the possibil-

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[15]Shirley Kan, "China's Arms Sales: Overview and Outlook for the 1990s," in *China's Economic Dilemmas in the 1990s: The Problems of Reforms, Modernization, and Interdependence* (Selected papers presented to the Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, April 1991), 2:696-711.

[16]Zachary S. Davis, "China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime?" *Asian Survey* 35, no. 6 (June 1995): 587-603.

ity that MFN status could be denied if Congress were to link MFN with NPT membership. Third, NPT membership would secure China's ability to purchase nuclear goods and services, particularly from France and other countries increasingly unwilling to sell nuclear technology to non-NPT states. Fourth, without NPT membership, China would remain the only acknowledged nuclear state not party to the treaty, and would continue to share non-NPT status with threshold nuclear states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel. Not only had this association equated China with lesser powers in a general sense, it linked Beijing with rogue rival New Delhi as the main critics of the treaty. The PRC therefore found the marginal rewards of joining the NPT as a nuclear state preferable to continued isolation. Finally, as Bruce D. Larkin points out, "a nuclear weapons state has an evident interest to discourage proliferation, both as a measure of protection against attack and to prevent dilution of the influence associated with its own nuclear capabilities"; China may have accepted the rationale that nuclear proliferation could threaten its interests and that the NPT could contribute to China's security and prestige.[17]

The PRC's willingness to abide by the nonproliferation regime was evidenced by its agreeing on extension of the NPT in perpetuity at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995. As indicated by Chinese officials prior to the opening of the conference, Beijing's foremost interest was in a "smooth" extension of the treaty, as failure of the NPT parties to agree on the terms of renewal would be viewed as damaging to China's security interests and a setback to global efforts to contain nuclear proliferation.[18] The Chinese shared the U.S. objective of achieving NPT extension by consensus, and worried that if extension were put to a vote, the treaty's authoritativeness would be undermined and the global regime to stem nuclear proliferation would unravel.[19] Following four weeks of intensive discussions and some-

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[17]Ibid., 592-93; Bruce D. Larkin, *Nuclear Designs: Great Britain, France, and China in the Global Governance of Nuclear Arms* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 1996), 325.

[18]According to Du Gengqi, a researcher with the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, "if the treaty is renewed, then not only will the existing mechanism for nonproliferation be maintained and strengthened, but the nuclear states, particularly the United States and Russia, will be spurred to further reduce their nuclear stockpiles. Otherwise, the 25-year-old NPT will collapse and the world will be thrown into a nightmare of nuclear proliferation." *Beijing Review* 38, no. 17 (April 24-30, 1995): 9.

[19]Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang said in an interview with Xinhua on May 1, 1995 that the best method to extend the NPT "is to have all signatory states reach a consensus through broad consultations; otherwise, it will be necessary to put the issue to a vote and have it voted through by simple majority. However, the vote's outcome will affect the authoritativeness of the treaty regardless of the number of such a majority vote." Cited in Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspective on Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security* 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96): 52 n. 18.

times bitter debate,[20] the PRC joined the other four declared nuclear powers in announcing agreement with indefinite extension of the NPT on May 12, 1995.[21]

One sideline story is indicative of China's strategy of flexibly exploiting multilateralism and bilateralism to maximize benefits for itself. Before the start of the month-long conference to extend the NPT, the United States, which wanted to keep nuclear technologies out of the hands of the militant Iranian government, failed to persuade China to end its nuclear cooperation with Iran.[22] China probably considered it enough to show the United States its conciliatory gesture by moving from its self-made middle position[23] to the position of other nuclear states headed by the United States. Five month later, in order to rehabilitate the relations damaged by America's allowing ROC President Lee Teng-hui's private visit to Cornell University, the PRC canceled a deal to sell two nuclear power reactors to Iran.[24] This example demonstrates that China has been very clear about what the United States wants it to do, and has tended to do it when the action could bring extra benefits.

Two more steps taken by China in 1997 signal that it is trying to implement the NPT in terms of controlling its own nuclear exports. The State Council promulgated regulations governing nuclear exports on September 10, further formalizing the export control system.[25] On October 16, China joined the Zangger Committee, a group of nuclear equipment suppliers who have signed the NPT and aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons by identifying a "trigger list" of items that its members agree can only be exported subject to IAEA safeguards in the importing country.[26]

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[20]In April, there were three positions regarding the extension of the NPT. First, all the nuclear states except China lobbied for an indefinite and unconditional extension of the treaty. On the opposition side, Egypt, Indonesia, and Venezuela held that the NPT should not be indefinitely extended. China found itself between supporting the other nuclear powers' position and backing the treaty's extension by multiple periods of no less than twenty-five years each. In the end, the former materialized. *New York Times*, April 19, 1995, A6.

[21]Ibid., May 12, 1995, A1, A4.

[22]Ibid., April 18, 1995, A1.

[23]See note 20 above.

[24]Ibid., September 28, 1995, A1, A3.

[25]*Beijing Review* 40, no. 40 (October 6-12, 1997): 6.

[26]*New York Times*, October 18, 1997, A5. After the NPT came into force in 1971, a group of IAEA supplier and potential supplier members formed the Zangger Committee (named after its chairman) to govern international trade in nuclear technologies and materials. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG, also known as the London Supplier Group) was formed in 1975. Since then, the Zangger Committee and the NSG have cooperated to monitor exports of nuclear-related materials and technologies. The latter has stricter export control than the former. See Antonia Handler Chayes and Abram Chayes, "Regime Architecture: Elements and Principles," in Nolan, *Global Engagement*, 65-130, esp. 77-80.

With its accession to the NPA and its agreement on NPT extension, as well as its efforts since then, China has displayed positive affect toward the treaty. But how committed is China? The alleged secret sale of 5,000 ring magnets to Pakistan which was disclosed in 1996 shows that China still has much work to do in strengthening its export control system. Based on a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report from late 1995, U.S. State Department officials confirmed to the press in February 1996 that China secretly sold ring magnets used to refine bomb-grade uranium to a state-run nuclear weapons laboratory in Pakistan, and the evidence was strong enough to trigger sanctions.[27] The secret sale to Pakistan was done by the China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation, which belongs to a giant military industrial conglomerate, the New Era Corporation, under the supervision of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND). COSTIND is subordinate to the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (see appendix). Under the decentralization trend of China's economic reforms, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the State Administrative Committee on Military Products Trade, which are all responsible for export control, have had a hard time imposing effective control on industries run by the Central Military Commission and the People's Liberation Army (PLA).

Although the Clinton administration initially suspended the financing for American companies doing business in China from the Export-Import Bank for one month, it found that China's top leaders were unaware of this sale, and after their plea that they would make efforts to prevent such sales in the future, the White House waived penalties on China.[28] In November, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher met with China's leaders in Beijing and discussed the nonproliferation issue. Christopher seemed satisfied with China's adherence to its earlier commitments, and indicated that "the United States is prepared to consider . . . further steps in the area of peaceful nuclear cooperation."[29]

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[27]*New York Times*, February 8, 1996, A1, A6.

[28]However, the Senate passed a bill stipulating that the suspension of loans should be effective for one year. See *Lianhe bao* (United Daily News) (Taipei), July 12, 1996, 9.

[29]*Wall Street Journal*, November 21, 1996, A18. The United States and China signed a 1985 nuclear cooperation pact, but the pact has not been implemented due to the controversy caused by China's proliferation behavior. In September 1997, one month before Jiang Zemin's visit to Washington, the Clinton administration told Congress that it was preparing to certify that China had stopped exporting technology related to nuclear weapons to such countries as Pa-

The Chinese government laid out a series of reforms in 1991 and 1992 aiming to clarify export licensing responsibilities and procedures in order to enhance the effectiveness of export control mechanisms.[30] China's promulgation of regulations governing nuclear exports in September 1997 and its joining the Zangger Committee one month later are both evidence of its efforts to reach that goal. However, as many analysts are still suspicious,[31] China's ability to achieve its goals in export control and how long it will take remains to be seen. At the moment, it is safe to make the tentative conclusion that China's commitment to the NPT regime is just moderate.

China's Policies Toward the CTBT

A comprehensive nuclear test ban is actually part of the NPT. In the preamble to the treaty, the three nuclear parties–the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom–recall their determination, as expressed in the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 (PTBT), to achieve a comprehensive test ban pact as a means of ending nuclear arms races. The PTBT banned nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, but not underground. China, which was preparing for its first nuclear test at the time, reacted vigorously, charging that "manipulation of the destiny of more than one hundred nonnuclear countries by a few nuclear powers will not be tolerated."[32] Instead, Beijing counter-proposed that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed.

The first Chinese test (October 16, 1964) required that China address the inevitable criticism; three days afterwards, Premier Zhou Enlai sent a cable to all heads of government repeating the Chinese proposal for a world summit on prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons.[33] He insisted that China's motives and aims were peaceful, and that the nuclear program was altogether justified. In June 1967, Beijing tested its first thermonuclear weapon, and has

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kistan and Iran. The certification would allow such U.S. giants as Westinghouse Corp. and General Electric Co. to sell U.S. nuclear power technology to China for the first time. *International Herald Tribune*, September 19, 1997, 6.

[30]Davis, "China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," 595-600.

[31]For example, A. M. Rosenthal, "What They Do Get," *New York Times*, October 3, 1997, 11; Editorial, "Nuclear Recklessness," *International Herald Tribune*, October 4-5, 1997, 6; on the same page, Jim Hoagland, "U.S.-China Summit: Just How Much Fudge Will Clinton Eat?"

[32]*Peking Review* 6, no. 31 (August 2, 1963): 7-8.

[33]Ibid. 7, no. 43 (October 23, 1964): 6.

since maintained a regular testing program.

The three signatories of the PTBT resumed formal negotiations of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1977, but upon Ronald Reagan's election in November 1980, their talks were suspended. In any case, the United States saw a test ban as a subordinate element in strategic weapons negotiations with the Soviet Union. The post-Reagan momentum for an outright ban on testing was set in motion by Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15, 1986 call for an end to nuclear weapons by the year 2000. Gorbachev proposed global elimination, bringing France, Britain, and China into the process.

The Soviet Union declared a moratorium on nuclear tests in October 1991, followed by France in April 1992. After the summer 1992 U.S. test series, pressure grew in Congress to force a halt to testing, and a bill enacted in early November 1992–attached to legislation which President George Bush could not comfortably veto–compelled the president to present a plan for up to fifteen tests between 1993 and 1996, with a ban then taking place if no other state tested. By July 1993, President Bill Clinton, who had been in office almost six months, replied to Congress by ending U.S. tests altogether–again providing that no other state tested. His action meant, too, that there would be no U.K. tests, as they had been conducted at a Nevada test site since 1962.[34]

The Clinton administration's initiatives of June and July 1993 were followed by the United Nations Conference on Disarmament (UNCD) taking up the question of a comprehensive test ban. The UNCD resolved in August 1993 that it would begin to address the issue in January 1994, and talks began on January 25 in the UNCD's Nuclear Test Ban Ad Hoc Committee. In the meantime, consultations among nuclear states continued in Geneva, outside the UNCD's own sessions.

Thus by the end of 1993, all declared nuclear states except China were subject to a moratorium. All were alert to the relationship between their testing posture and the forthcoming NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, as failure to halt tests would imperil the nonproliferation regime. Agreeing to a comprehensive nuclear test ban seems to have been a more complicated decision for Beijing than joining the NPT; a CTBT would involve restrictions on China's freedom of action in a core area of national security, the viability of the Chinese nuclear deterrent. A CTBT would also crimp Chinese nuclear warhead modernization efforts, although China might calculate that after successful completion of its current series of tests, it will

[34]Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, 85.

sufficiently narrow the qualitative gap with the United States and Russia in warhead design to warrant agreeing to a universal halt to testing without weakening its deterrent capabilities. The NPT, in contrast, does not require Beijing to pay a cost in forgone opportunities in its self-help efforts to enhance security, although it does restrict Chinese exports of nuclear weapons technology.

Although it was reluctant, China became a partner in the CTBT negotiations in Geneva, agreeing to participate in the talks partially in response to international criticism of its continued nuclear testing at a time when the other nuclear states had declared a test moratorium. As indicated above, China's recalcitrance on the test ban issue was primarily due to its desire to continue nuclear tests for the safety, reliability, and modernization of its nuclear arsenal. Nevertheless, according to interviews done by Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, most Chinese arms control experts and officials assert that on balance, the signing and implementation of a CTBT will be in China's security as well as political interests.[35]

During the course of multilateral negotiations, China seemed to gradually arrive at a positive attitude toward a CTBT. Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen presented an authoritative statement on arms control to the UN General Assembly in September 1994. Among other things, Qian said: "Negotiations should be undertaken with a view to concluding a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty not later than 1996."[36] An unidentified senior Foreign Ministry official with experience in arms control negotiations said that the date was "artificial" and mentioned "just to show [that] there is political will."[37] Another possible reason for the 1996 target date is that since a CTBT would be inevitable after extension of the NPT, China decided to bow to international pressure. China's final nuclear tests were also arranged for 1996, and may have completed the data that it needed for the safety and reliability of its nuclear arsenal. It was also suggested that China would gain the high-tech computers to simulate tests in 1996, and thus would not need to stage real explosions after then.[38]

China's willingness to sign a CTBT was also reinforced by external

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[35]Garrett and Glaser, "Chinese Perspective on Nuclear Arms Control," 54.

[36]*Beijing Review* 37, no. 41 (October 10-16, 1994): 29-32.

[37]Larkin, *Nuclear Designs*, 102.

[38]In August 1997, the U.S. Congress learned that American firms have sold the PRC forty-six supercomputers that could be used for the testing of unclear warheads. See *Far Eastern Economic Review*, August 14, 1997, 15.

events. China provoked an unprecedented wave of international protest, especially from Asian states, when it conducted a nuclear test on May 15, 1995, just three days after the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. Similar criticism followed China's forty-third nuclear test on August 17. China is especially sensitive to pressure from nonnuclear developing countries, many of which had demanded that nuclear states sign a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty as a prerequisite for extension of the NPT. China also cannot ignore France's negative international image after it broke a three-year moratorium and conducted an underground nuclear test in French Polynesia in September 1995.[39]

Eventually, after having its forty-fifth nuclear test on July 29, 1996, China announced its moratorium.[40] Later, it decided to take a more flexible stand on the on-site inspection issue which had been its key dispute with other negotiating parties, agreeing that consent from only thirty states among fifty-one states of the CTBT's Executive Committee was needed to inspect countries suspected of conducting nuclear tests.[41] On September 10, China voted for the CTBT.[42]

As indicated above, China has gradually shifted from reluctance to a positive affect toward the CTBT. Given that it agreed to on-site inspection based on looser criteria, a consensus now exists among Chinese arms controllers and officials, and that it has maintained self-restraint (no testing) up to now, we can say that China's commitment to the CTBT is high.

China's Policies Toward the MTCR

Chinese arms sales and transfers (since some of these transactions have been donations) are an on-and-off topic because the amounts involved have fluctuated enormously, and also because their political or nuisance value has not always been assessed as very high. Up to the early 1990s, transactions were very much an "on" topic, as China was the only state that exported mis-

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[39]Philip Shenon, "Nuclear Test Plan Tarnishes France's Image in Pacific," *New York Times*, September 1, 1995, A3; and David S. Yost, "France's Nuclear Dilemmas," *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996): 108-28.

[40]*Lianhe bao*, July 30, 1996, 9.

[41]China's original position is that it needs two-thirds to do so; that is, thirty-four states. *Zhongyang ribao* (Central Daily News) (Overseas edition), August 3, 1996, 4.

[42]Ibid. The vote was 158-3 in favor of the CTBT. The three "no" votes came from India, Libya, and Bhutan, and there were five abstentions: Cuba, Lebanon, Mauritius, Syria, and Tanzania. See *New York Times*, September 25, 1996, A1, A6.

siles of various ranges, and because its conventional arms sales, regardless of their actual quantity, had a marked impact on the developing world, if not on the armies of industrialized countries.[43]

The MTCR is the most high-profile set of controls on specific missile technologies in the post-Cold War era. About twenty states in the developing world now possess some type of ballistic missile; thirteen to sixteen states possess weapons with a range greater than two hundred kilometers; and approximately five states may be able to produce missiles by the year 2000. In response to a growing concern about the proliferation of ballistic-missile technologies, the Group of Seven (G-7) industrialized states established the MTCR in 1987. The MTCR was originally designed to restrict the export of technologies that could be used to deliver nuclear weapons. It prohibited the export by MTCR members of missile systems (or related technologies) with a range greater than three hundred kilometers and a payload greater than five hundred kilograms.[44] Currently, there are twenty-eight member states.

Although China is not a member of the MTCR, it has caught flak for what have been perceived to be prohibited transactions. It transferred CSS-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988, provoking intense U.S. pressure, and its transfer of M-11 missile components to Pakistan has also attracted U.S. attention since then.[45] In November 1989, the United States thus formally asked China to adhere to the MTCR. In March 1991, after protesting against China's sale of M-11 missile components to Pakistan, Richard Solomon, U.S. assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, again requested that China comply with the MTCR. Foreign Minister Qian Qichen responded that China has no obligation to comply with that regime. However, as indicated above, at this time China was beginning to reevaluate its policy orientation toward nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and missiles. Combined with this internal policy redirection, sanctions announced by President Bush in May 1991 against the China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation and the Great Wall Industrial Corporation,[46]

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[43]For details, see François Godement, "China's Arms Sales," in *Chinese Economic Reform: The Impact on Security*, ed. Gerald Segal and Richard H. Yang (London: Routledge, 1996), 95-110; and Richard A. Bitzinger, "Arms to Go," *International Security* 17, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 84-111. Also see the cover story "Sowing Dragon's Teeth" of the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 2, 1988.

[44]Burns, *Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament* 2:1032-33.

[45]The M-11 is a short-range, mobile-launch, two-stage, solid propellant ballistic missile. See Robert G. Sutter, "China's Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control Policies: Implications for the United States," *CRS Report for Congress*, May 1988.

[46]These two companies are affiliated with New Era (Xin shidai), which is together with Poly

as well as cancellation of a space cooperation project and the sale of twenty high-speed computers to China, pushed China closer to complying with MTCR regulations.[47]

Beijing began to adjust its claim of being exempt from the voluntary MTCR guidelines by issuing statements supporting the principle of missile nonproliferation. During his November 1991 visit to Beijing, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker announced that Chinese officials had verbally agreed to observe the MTCR guidelines and that this would apply to M-9 and M-11 missiles. In return for its promise of adherence to the MTCR, China required that the United States lift the sanctions imposed earlier in 1991. The Bush administration effectively waived those sanctions on March 23, 1992 to secure Chinese nonproliferation commitments.

Beijing's promises to abide by international missile nonproliferation norms were informal; China's foreign minister did not hold a joint press conference with Secretary Baker, but instead issued a series of statements through the official news agency. In addition, Premier Li Peng gave no written assurances when he met with President Bush at the UN in January 1992, nor did he personally state China's position on the MTCR. Instead, the Bush administration received a letter the next day that reportedly confirmed the November 1991 promise in writing. However, these informal promises did not end China's controversial missile exports. Since 1992, there have been numerous reports that China has continued to transfer M-9 and M-11 missile components, but Beijing argues that it has adhered to its MTCR commitments.[48]

In September 1992, in retaliation for the U.S. sales of 150 F-16s to Taiwan, China withdrew from the UN Security Council in the talks on arms control in the Middle East (ACME, or "Perm 5")[49] and intimidated that it might withdraw (at least temporarily) from the Chemical Warfare Convention, which it had earlier announced it would sign. Most disturbing was Beijing's threat to reconsider its MTCR compliance in view of the U.S. violation of the August 1982 joint communiqué on arms sales to Taiwan.[50]

Technologies (Baoli) to be the two major weapons-export corporations, dominated by the Chinese military. See appendix.

[47]I Yuan, "Multilateralism and Cooperation under the Security Dilemma: International Relations Theories and U.S.-PRC Relations," *Wenti yu yanjiu* (Issues & Studies) (Taipei) 35, no. 6 (June 1996): 12.

[48]Davis, "China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," 593-94.

[49]*New York Times*, September 4, 1992, A3; *Beijing Review* 35, no. 39 (September 28-October 4, 1992): 9.

[50]The communiqué pledges that the U.S. arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed either in qualita-

In August 1993, after months of reviewing the evidence, the Clinton administration determined that China had transferred missile-related equipment to Pakistan in violation of MTCR guidelines, and reimposed sanctions on eleven Chinese and one Pakistani arms exporting enterprises. China called the U.S. sanctions "a naked hegemonic act" that placed Sino-U.S. relations "in serious jeopardy." In his protest to U.S. Ambassador Stapleton Roy, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu maintained that "China has honored its commitment to act in accordance with the MTCR guidelines and parameters and has done nothing in contradiction of that commitment." Accordingly, China threatened to "reconsider its commitment to MTCR." Several months after its decision, the Clinton administration attempted to soften the impact of the sanctions–both on Sino-U.S. relations and on U.S. high-tech firms doing business in China–by offering to waive the ban on exports to China of commercial satellites that were to be launched on Chinese rockets.

Reports that China had provided M-11 assistance to Pakistan surfaced again in 1994, but the United States sought to avoid a new rift with Beijing, particularly in view of China's critical role in negotiations with North Korea. On October 4, 1994, U.S. and Chinese officials signed an agreement to waive the August 1993 sanctions in return for a commitment from China not to export missiles "inherently capable of reaching a range of at least 300 km with a payload of at least 500 kg." The agreement did not resolve the missile issue, but moved China one step closer to full membership in the MTCR.

However, China seems to have had difficulties carrying out its promises. In June 1995, CIA assessments of Chinese missile component sales to Iran and Pakistan raised the prospect of new U.S. sanctions against China. *New York Times* reports described the CIA assessment as follows: (1) China had delivered to Iran missile-guidance systems and computerized machine tools that would enable Iran to improve the accuracy of its North Korean-supplied SCUD missiles and construct additional missiles; and (2) China had delivered to Pakistan component parts of M-11 ballistic missiles.[51] Several months

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tive or quantitative terms the levels in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it will gradually reduce them. For the text of this communiqué, see Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1992), 383-90. State Department spokesman Joseph Snyder argued that because Taiwan's aging air force consisted of outdated F-5s and F-104s, the only way to maintain the quality of its air force was by obtaining new planes; thus, the sale was fully in keeping with the spirit and letter of the 1982 communiqué. He further argued the communiqué also spoke about the need to maintain peace and stability in the region, and the sale was consistent with maintaining a certain balance of power between Taipei and Beijing. See *New York Times*, September 4, 1992, A3.

[51]*New York Times*, June 22, 1995, A1, A7.

later, the White House and the State Department said that they did not have enough evidence to verify that China had violated the MTCR guidelines.

In May 1996, the White House waived penalties on China after China vowed that it would not allow sales, such as those of ring magnets to Pakistan, to happen again. However, Paul Leventhal and Daniel Horner of the Nuclear Control Institute observed that China still kept an open pipeline to Pakistan with loopholes large enough to push an atom bomb through.[52] Not surprisingly, in August 1996, U.S. intelligence agencies discovered that China has been helping Pakistan build a factory for medium-range missiles in Rawalpindi, ten miles from the capital of Islamabad.[53] The missile in question is the Chinese M-11, which when equipped with a warhead has a range of three hundred kilometers, with a payload of five hundred kilograms. This act violates the MTCR regulations which China agreed to observe, as well as the agreement reached in October 1994 between China and the United States. The United States protested on August 30, but nothing came of it; these events led a columnist to write that the pattern has become "China makes a sale, collects the cash, the U.S. protests, then backs off."[54]

Apparently, compared with its attitudes toward the NPT and the CTBT, China seems to have had a moderately negative affect toward the MTCR. First, it has not formally joined the regime. Second, since 1992, the Chinese government has linked its policy on missile sales to other countries with the U.S. decision in 1992 to sell F-16 fighters to Taiwan. Besides withdrawing from the "Perm 5" on arms sales to the Middle East, China has sometimes offered the rebuttal "if a superpower can sell advanced weapons, why should it restrain itself?" Its attitude can be classified as moderately negative because there has been a group of elite who have made efforts to comply with the MTCR, as evidenced by some expressions of willingness to observe the MTCR and the 1991 and 1992 internal reforms which strengthened export control mechanisms. As for commitment, the same problem exists, i.e., in the export of sensitive nuclear components to some "risky" states: the PRC's export control mechanisms still lack effectiveness, and more resources and political will will be needed to improve them. Furthermore, China's violations of the MTCR guidelines have been more serious and frequent than those of the NPT. Thus, we can say that China's commitment to the MTCR is low.

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[52]Paul Leventhal and Daniel Horner, "Proliferation: Show China We Mean Business," *Washington Post*, June 14, 1996, A25.

[53]*New York Times*, August 26, 1996, A6; *Time*, June 30, 1997, 58.

[54]A. M. Rosenthal, "The Nuclear Gamble," *New York Times*, October 11, 1996, A21.

Comparison and Conclusion

We have touched on comparisons of China's policies toward the NPT, the CTBT, and the MTCR, from which we can derive the following table for further comparison:

Regimes	Affect	Commitment
NPT	Positive	Moderate
CTBT	Positive	High
MTCR	Moderately negative	Low

In this study, we have found that China has become increasingly involved in a web of international entanglements, especially compared with the pre-1978 era. This involvement makes it difficult for the Chinese leaders to totally ignore international pressure, as shown most obviously in China's evolving policies toward the CTBT, and to a lesser extent, the NPT and the MTCR. If the trend continues, it will be possible that deeper involvement with regimes and international organizations, combined with other favorable conditions like sanctions and incentives from the United States or other bilateral relationships, can exert constraints on China.

A common feature of these three cases is the United States' significant role in "socializing" China with existing international norms, and eliciting its collaboration in and compliance with international regimes. As Jing-dong Yuan has pointed out, China's cooperation in nonproliferation has been conditioned within the broader context of its relations with the United States.[55] François Godement also observes that China has adopted a policy of what he terms "conditional compliance" in arms sales to other states; that is, China only complies with international regimes if it can receive some extra benefits from the United States and other Western countries.[56] To the extent that the three above cases reflect China's policies toward the nonproliferation regimes, his point is valid in the NPT (canceling the sale of two nuclear reactors to Iran in exchange for better Sino-American relations) and the MTCR (reaching

[55]Jing-dong Yuan, "China's Arms Transfers and the Implications for Nonproliferation," in *Unraveling the Asian Miracle: Explorations in Development Strategies, Geopolitics and Regionalism*, ed. Jayant Lele and Kwasi Ofori-Yeboah (Aldershot, England: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1996), 185-202.

[56]Godement, "China's Arms Sales," 107.

agreement with the United States in October 1994 in exchange for waiving the August 1993 sanctions; and as an example of "conditional noncompliance," withdrawing from "Perm 5" talks on arms control in the Middle East and reconsidering compliance with the MTCR due to U.S. sales of F-16s to Taiwan). But we cannot see conditional compliance in China's policies toward the CTBT.

The fragmentation of China's central authority and its growing inability to control arms exports partly account for China's noncompliance with the MTCR and the NPT, although we cannot see this fragmentation in the case of the CTBT.[57] Recently China's top leaders have made efforts to strengthen the central government's capacity in order to address mounting problems.[58] Therefore, China's future compliance with international regimes will be a function of these recentralization measures.

China's signing of the CTBT and its compliance with it have been the result of international pressure, in addition to consensus among arms controllers and officials. In terms of internalizing international norms among officials and policymakers, the situation of the CTBT can be seen as the best case, and the MTCR as the worst. Thus, besides maintaining proper pressure, those who want to enhance the effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes should bring China fully into the global nonproliferation consensus. The United States and other countries should therefore engage MFA, MOFTEC, and PLA officials on a broad range of proliferation issues, as frequent contact will be useful for communicating the importance of nonproliferation in bilateral relations. In addition, MFA, MOFTEC, and PLA officials should be held accountable for China's nonproliferation behavior; bureaucrats at all levels need to understand that reckless exports can threaten Chinese, U.S., and world security. As Zachary S. Davis has recommended, one concrete way to promote nonproliferation is through confidence-building measures such as military exchanges, semiofficial meetings of mid-level officials, and seminars which build a foundation for more substantive cooperation.[59]

In conclusion, although the PRC has not yet become a "team player" in

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[57]Kenneth Lieberthal and David M. Lampton have dubbed China's decisionmaking as "fragmented authoritarianism." See their work *Bureaucracy, Politics, and Decision Making in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1992). See also Zhao Quansheng, "Domestic Factors of Chinese Foreign Policy: From Vertical to Horizontal Authoritarianism," *Annals, AAPSS* 519 (January 1992): 158-75.

[58]John Bryan Starr, "China in 1995: Mounting Problems, Waning Capacity," *Asian Survey* 36, no. 1 (January 1996): 13-24.

[59]Davis, "China's Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies," 601.

the existing international system, it is not a "rogue elephant," either.[60] To enhance international cooperation on nonproliferation, supply-side export control measures can be effective only to the extent that all major suppliers share more or less similar foreign policy preferences and security concerns in this issue area. The PRC is currently at an important juncture in its international orientation: it has never before been more open to the outside world and exposed to international influences, yet it has its own world views which are not completely congruent with its mounting internal problems and today's major powers. Western leaders would be well advised to adopt a long-term strategy of socializing China with the existing norms and rules in combination with appropriate pressure. It takes a long time for a dragon to awaken, but it may well take a longer time to peacefully incorporate it into the international system.

[60]The metaphors are from James V. Feinerman. See his "Chinese Participation in the International Legal Order: Rogue Elephant or Team Player?" *The China Quarterly*, no. 141 (March 1995): 186-210.

Appendix
China's Institutions Related to Arms Sales



Sources: Adapted from John W. Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litai, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms-Export Enigma," *International Security* 15, no. 4 (Spring 1991): 86-109; "China: Arms Control and Disarmament," *Beijing Review* 38, no. 48 (November 27-December 3, 1995): 10-25.