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Civilization and Individual Identities: Ye Shengji's Quest for Colonial Self in Two Cultures*

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Based on an overseas Taiwanese student's wartime diary written in Japan, this paper critiques Samuel Huntington's "clash of civilizations" thesis. Huntington proposes that some seven plus civilizations survive in the post-Cold War world, each possessing unique, long-lasting core values. With booming interactions between civilizations, people everywhere distinctively recognize their own civilization identity based on the differences between civilizational core values. He argues that the clashes between civilizational identities or values will most likely result in World War III. This author criticizes these views on the grounds that Huntington overlooks consideration of the mediating role of language, that he assumes a hierarchical rather than multiple view of levels of identity, and that to say core values make a unique civilization identity is to commit the fallacy of essentialism.

Keywords: civilization identity; object; subjective position; discourse; non-essentialism

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> Ye Shengji (October 25, 1923-November 29, 1950) b. Taipei of Taiwan Province. Japanese name: Hayama Tachio. Of Han race. . . . In 1943 he entered the wartime Second College-Preparatory School in Japan. He tried very hard to search for the truth and his school years influenced his view of life tremendously. . . . He went back to Taiwan in 1946 and in 1948 he joined an underground organization of the Chinese Communist Party. . . . He was caught during the "red hunt" in May 1950. He continued to keep his beliefs until he was shot in November of the same year.[1]

The entry of Ye Shengji above is misleading in that it omits one fact. During his school years, Ye devoted considerable energy to the pursuit of a Fascist thought called the Study of Jews. Before his death, however, he was converted to communism during an extremely anticommunist period in Taiwan. Thus, Ye's life resembles a pendulum swinging from right to left: in that his quest for identity was never at ease, and was always "in process." It is his story of his school years during the years of Japan's continuous defeats in the latter half of the Pacific War that I will narrate in relation to Professor Samuel Huntington's notion of the "civilization identity."

Claimed as "one of the most widely discussed academic papers in Asia" in the 1990s,[2] Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" has been joined with a second paper and a book.[3] I will take the two papers as a unit and subject his argument about the civilization identity to a critique from a post-colonial perspective. Schematically, the identity argument runs as follows: Some seven plus civilizations have survived in the post-Cold War world, each possessing unique, long-lasting core values. With booming interactions between civilizations, people distinctively recognize their own civilization's identity based on the differences between their and others' core values. It is thus argued that the clashes between civilization identities

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[1] *Chugoku jinmei jiden* (A biographical dictionary of Chinese) (Tokyo: Nichigan Associates, 1993), 600.

[2] Personal exchange with Professor Chen Kuan-hsing of National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan, who has conducted a survey about Asian countries' responses to Huntington's 1993 article.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1993): 22-49; "The West: Unique, Not Universal," ibid. 75, no. 6 (1996): 28-46; *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).

or values will most likely be the cause of any World War III. I will criticize the argument in terms of how it fails to consider the mediating role of language, or discourse; its hierarchical view of *levels*, instead of *multiplicities*, of identity; and its fundamentalist claim that core values make a unique civilization identity. I will then substantiate my criticisms with an extended example taken from the identity discourses of Ye Shengji when he was a student in Sendai, Japan.

The manner which influences both my critique and my narrative of Ye may be called post-colonial. Full clarification of the term is beyond the scope of this paper, but I simply want to suggest here that post-colonialism found its contemporary popularity in Edward Said's pioneer work, *Orientalism*,[4] which was theoretically inspired by French historian Michel Foucault. Thus my usage of the post-colonial literature will be confined to Foucault's idea of archaeology and Foucaultian scholar Homi Bhabha's discussion of colonial identity. How these two authors shape my post-colonial perspective will be demonstrated in the subsequent critique and narrative. Suffice it to say, this perspective finds it unacceptable that one can talk about identity without considering language. From this perspective, I venture to claim this paper's substantive thesis: that whatever the causes of a possible World War III, civilization identity is most unlikely to be one of them.

The Unbearable Lightness of Identity and Civilizations

Since this paper will be a polemic against the notion of the civilization identity from a post-colonial point of view and with an extended example of Ye Shengji, I will now lay bare my fundamental query about Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilizations. Why has civilization identity been chosen as the master cause of World War III,[5] whereas the alliance of the geopolitical nation-states would serve this explanatory purpose much bet-

[4]Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1979).
[5]Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 39.

ter? Since the traditional realpolitik view of blocks of nation-states competing for world hegemony seems more appropriate for Huntington's kind of analysis, why does he resort to a notion of identity which is theoretically underdeveloped and based on a dubious "essentialist" premise? Specifically, in accord with a post-colonial view, I will challenge his definition of civilization, which lacks both a discursive-linguistic prop and a micro-level concern; his causal reasoning of a highlighted "civilization consciousness" of both the differences between civilizations and the self-sameness within them, which is too clear-cut and hence too remote from the ambiguous reality of identity formation; and his view that the West is unique rather than universal, which is essentialist in the sense of founding a civilization on some core values.

Huntington begins by defining a civilization as follows:

> A civilization is . . . the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have. . . . It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, and institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people. People have levels of identity. . . . The civilization to which he belongs is the broadest level of identification with which he intensively identifies.[6]

Because civilization is the highest level of identification, it approximates what sociologists have been calling a "categorical identity," a collective identity with very low density of interpersonal relationships.[7] It is, as it were, a name tag to be attached to but, by itself, it tells very little about the individual civilization-bearer: In general, Americans are lawful, democratic, and highly individualistic, but what about the particular individual? Since the categorical identity is remote from workaday individuals, it can motivate a person to perform, say, a patriotic action only on the *modern* condition that it is mediated by state apparatuses, or formal institutions in a political society. For example, according to Benedict Anderson,[8] people

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[6]Ibid., 24.

[7]Craig Calhoun, "The Politics of Identity and Recognition," in his *Critical Social Theory* (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), 220.

[8]Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso, 1983), 17-40.

acquire their "national identity" by exposing themselves to modern press and novels which are products, or better yet, media of the state apparatuses in Althusser's sense.[9] And how "nationalistic" they become after exposure is an empirical "effect" question which requires research at the micro level and which cannot be argued away. Therefore, in the strict positivist tradition, I think Huntington grants the civilization identity too much efficacy by skipping the research on mediation and effect issues at the bottom level.

Moving to the non-positivist, post-colonial point of view, I suggest that Huntington's definitions of civilization in terms of objective and subjective dimensions is not so much a mistake as a lack of understanding of what his colleagues in cultural studies and sociology have been researching. In fact, they are arguing, in parallel, that identity issues cannot be understood without inquiring into the "social and psychic reality" of the subject,[10] but with a catch. That is, they also insist that language, or broadly speaking, discourse as a general system of sign, both represents and *shapes* reality. The realities of the social and the psychic which constitute an individual identity are not only linked by discourse, i.e., utterances and gestures from without *and* "inner speech" from within,[11] but are also changed by the working of the discourse. Instead of a firm dichotomy between objective and subjective, which are traditionally relied upon for deciphering identity, we now have a discursive formation which,[12] in metaphorical term, is isomorphic with identity: to understand identity, read discourse. The question of how an analysis of identity is carried out in terms of discourse forked

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[9]Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Monthly Review, 1971), 127-86. Althusser lists eight social institutions as what he calls "ideological state apparatuses": religion, education, family, legal system, politics, trade union, communications, and culture.

[10]Stuart Hall, "Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'?" in *Questions of Cultural Identity*, ed. Stuart Hall and Paul du Gay (London: Sage, 1996), 5; Eli Zaretsky, "Identity Theory, Identity Politics: Psychoanalysis, Marxism, Post-Structuralism," in *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*, ed. Craig Calhoun (Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 1995), 245; Calhoun, "The Politics of Identity and Recognition," 197.

[11]V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973), 11.

[12]I adopt Foucault's understanding of the term here, which I shall discuss in detail later. See Michel Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language* (New York: Pantheon, 1972), 80, 107.

along social and psychic lines will be answered, if only tentatively, in the next section.

Therefore, Huntington's definition of civilization itself invites both a consideration of micro mechanisms that make it tick and an alternative of viewing identity in terms of discursive formation. To turn to his causal statements about how civilization consciousness leads to an us-versus-them view, Huntington has this to say: "The interactions between people of different civilizations are increasing; these interactions intensify civilization consciousness or awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations."[13]

The problem behind this reasoning can be magnified when we take into consideration a sentence from his own definition of civilization: "People have levels of identity." By juxtaposing both sentences, it seems that Huntington is arguing that on each level of identity, from individual to city, nation, religion, continent, and civilization, people do nothing but keep their "same-us" identity separate from the "different-them." How in fact this can happen—what mechanisms transform the differences on the level of nation into the commonalities on that of religion, for example—is unclear. This author suggests that it is more realistic to replace levels of identity with *multiple* identities, all existing at the same time in the mind, so that, for example, the same element in one's national identity (Kill the traitor!) can be in conflict with that in our religious identity (Thou shall not kill!).[14] What interactions among peoples do, in addition to highlighting consciousness of sameness and differences, is to introduce doses of admiration and envy, respect and contempt, or, in a colonial context, what may be called "ressentiment,"[15] in the multiple identities of a self. It is ambivalent feelings, rather than clear-cut distinctions, which are most likely the inherent tendencies not on the levels, but in the very multiplicity of identity.

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[13]Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 25.

[14]I thank Professor Chen Kuan-hsing for sharing the importance of the point with me by allowing me to read one of his manuscripts.

[15]The term "ressentiment" is "an oppressive awareness of the futility of trying to improve one's status in life or in society." *The Random House Dictionary of the English Language*, second edition (New York: Random House, 1987), 1641; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), 15.

In addressing the character of Ye Shengji in our story, we must first remember that his lifelong ressentiment had its point of emergence in his birthplace, Taiwan, which from 1684 to 1895 was situated in the eastern periphery of Qing China and subsequently became the capitalized colony located at the southern end of the Japanese Empire prior to 1945. The historico-structural conflux of the two civilizations (according to Huntington's classification) was the reservoir from which sprang countless drops of cultural ambiguities and clashes that were enacted in the mind and body of Ye Shengji. Furthermore, as can be seen in the next section, Ye lived through what he had called his "two hometowns." The intensive interactions he had with both Taiwanese-Chinese and Japanese actually intensified ambivalent feelings, rather than creating disparity between an in-group togetherness and out-group alienation. Identity thus seems to be a "processual" phenomenon with which those who are troubled are put in a perpetual journey of quest; it is not an end product from which one goes about arguing its causal efficacy.

Finally, I wish to critique Huntington's thesis that the West is unique rather than universal. What is difficult to accept is not so much the uniqueness of Western civilization as the essentialist premise lurking under his statements. In his most recent paper, Huntington pinpoints the "core of Western civilization" as the Greco-Roman legacy, Western Christianity, European languages, separation of spiritual and temporal authority, rule of law, social pluralism and civil society, representative bodies, and individualism. He goes on to comment that "they are what is Western. . . . They make Western civilization unique, and Western civilization is precious not because it is universal but because it is unique."[16] It is this emphasis on the uniqueness of the core values which leads him to state that "in conflicts between civilizations, the question is 'What are you?' That is a given that cannot be changed."[17] The three-phase hypothesis of core values → civilization identity → clash is thus completed.

Founding a collective identity on immutable key values is by no

[16]Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," 35.
[17]Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" 28.

means Huntington's innovation. It can be traced back to the modernization theory popularized in American social sciences immediately after World War II. Certainly the virtuoso of that theory, Talcott Parsons, has implicitly argued that for a Third World society to catch up with the United States, the former must somehow replace their ascriptive, diffusive, affective, particular, and collective values with those of "achievement, specificity, neutrality, universalism, and self."[18] The theory has also influenced Chinese scholars in that they are apt to endorse this kind of core-value reasoning. Thus, Ambrose King has recently argued that the current "Asian" cultural mentality aims at "rebuilding our Asian identity and dignity."[19] He seems to want to create a continental identity based on the core values of "the East Asian or Chinese . . . cultural tradition,"[20] duly in accord with Huntington's scheme of levels of identity. In this respect, our outstanding historian, Professor Yu Ying-shih,[21] seems to be in full agreement with Professor King.

Professors King and Yu, along with Huntington, may be placed in the essentialist camp whose model, according to Lawrence Grossberg,

> assumes that there is some intrinsic and essential content to any identity which is defined by either a common origin or a common structure of experience or both. . . . Basically, the struggle over representation of identity here takes the form of offering one fully constituted, separate and distinct identity in place of another.[22]

Grossberg goes on to elaborate upon the second, non-essentialist model which assumes "[i]dentities are always relational and incomplete, in process. . . . Thus the emphasis here is on the multiplicity of identities and differences rather than on a single identity and on the connections or articula-

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[18]Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, *Toward a General Theory of Actions* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), 77.

[19]Ambrose Y.C. King, "Modernization, Modernity, and Chinese Development) (in Chinese) (Paper presented at the Conference on Social Scientific Application and the Modernization of China, sponsored by Chongji College, the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and the Institute of Ethnic Relations and Culture, National Tunghua University, Taiwan, April 21-30, 1997), 22.

[20]Ibid.

[21]Yu Ying-shih, *Lishi renwu yu wenhua weiji* (Historical figures and the cultural crisis) (Taipei: Dongda, 1995), 9-29, 213.

[22]Lawrence Grossberg, "Identity and Cultural Studies—Is That All There Is," in Hall and du Gay, *Questions of Cultural Identity*, 89.

tions between the fragments or differences."[23] In the essentialist way of thinking, whenever individuals experience a crisis of identity, the sources of the danger are located in the threat of some key values of a cultural system. The remedy for the crisis is therefore to be found either in renovating key values or replacing them. Certainly, Professor Huntington's medicine belongs to the renovation type.

However, there is an alternative, non-essentialist way of thinking. Crisis of identity here is not deemed pathological; it is a "fact of life" whenever civilizations or other collectivities cannot stop interacting with one another. How an individual reacts to immense differences between civilizations and the question "What am I?" is to try to make sense of one's location, which is forever patched up with pieces of this or that civilization and the like. Most importantly, this process of making sense involves continuously connecting oneself to all fragmentary sources of meaning in the discourses about civilizations and is thus nonterminable. That is, the non-essential quest for identity is a discursive project that never comes to an end; there is no homogenous end product for individuals to identify with.

Therefore, Professor Huntington's attempt to hinge future large-scale area conflicts on the civilization identity is deeply flawed. Identity cannot but be enacted on the individual level and one cannot make sense of one's identity except in the discursive forms of both social and psychic realities. Furthermore, identity itself is multiple, not level-laden: an individual inherits all kinds of collective identities in the same body which, once inherited, exist at the same time. The reality of identity for him or her is thus immediate but internally conflictive and ambiguous. Finally, connecting identity with some key values hypostasizes the very identity; instead, we propose to link it with fragments of meaning drawn from any interacting collectivity. We thus make the notion of identity non-essential and set it floating above the sea of immense and very often conflictive discursive formations. Following this conceptual clarification, we should substantiate all our points of disagreement. For this purpose, we now turn to the narrative of Ye Shengji's quest for his colonial identity between the clashing civili-

[23]Ibid.

zations of Japan and China.

Ye Shengji in Japan

Methodological Note

In our previous conceptual clarification, we suggested that a civilization identity can only be enacted by individuals in discursive, multiple, and non-essential forms. It is these discursive forms which, discussed in the following, serve as our theoretical point of departure and with which we begin to tell the story of Ye Shengji. The way we narrate his happenings focuses on the years 1943-45 when he was a student of the Second College-Preparatory School in Sendai, Japan. During this period, which corresponded with the Imperial Army's defeat in the Pacific War, Ye wrote some eight diary volumes and four volumes of reading notes which are the texts to be analyzed below.[24] The content of the text may be classified and labeled both as a discourse on the colonial self and as that on the Japanese Spirit (*nihon seishin*), a Fascist argument concerning the social influences on Ye in a wartime context.[25] To these inner-generated and socially imposed discourses, we need a conceptual tool kit which will serve our purpose of description and is forged in the spirit of viewing a colonial identity

[24]I thank Professor Ye Guangyi of National Chengkung University, Taiwan, for generously providing the majority of his father Ye Shengji's *oeuvre* for me to photocopy. I understand the ordeal he and his mother must have endured for hoarding the works in the extremely anticommunist atmosphere of the postwar Taiwan. I follow the distinctions that Professor Ye made and classify my photocopies as follows: Notes I (July 1, 1943-November 21, 1943, henceforth 11/21/43); Notes II (11/23/43-01/29/44); Notes III (01/30/44-05/12/44); Notes IV (03/16/44-10/27/44); Diary I (12/29/40-12/31/41); Diary II (01/01/42-12/31/42); Diary III (01/01/43-09/23/43); Diary IV (09/30/43-01/29/44); Diary V (03/06/44-06/01/44); Diary VI (06/02/44-09/27/44); Diary VII (07/20/44-12/29/44); Diary VIII (12/30/44-08/24/45).

[25]The first systematic analysis of the content of Ye Shengji's *oeuvre* was done by Ye's classmate in Sendai, Yang Weili, in his biography of Ye, *Aru Taiwan chishikinin no higeki* (The tragedy of a Taiwanese intellectual) (Tokyo: Iwanami, 1993). The book has been translated into Chinese and retitled as *Shuangxiang ji* (The two hometowns), trans. Chen Yingzhen (Taipei: Renjian, 1995). Yang's Japanese text is also being published in serials in *Shoshi kaiho*, a fraternal magazine published by and circulated among graduates of the prewar Second College-Preparatory School in Sendai, Japan. All references to Yang's book in the following are from the Chinese version, although in every case I cross-referenced with the Japanese original in *Shoshi kaiho*, also provided by Professor Ye Guangyi.

as microscopic, discursive, multiple, and non-essential. We will manufacture this post-colonial kit from a combination of Michel Foucault's notion of archaeology with Homi Bhabha's discussion of the subject positions of the colonized.

Foucault's archaeological analysis of discourse has long been criticized as revealing a fundamental "instability," or a relativistic tendency: the analysis depends on four sets of rules of discursive production to decipher other discourses, but itself is a discourse which is also generated from the same rules.[26] This philosophical critique aside, Foucault's four categories of discourse—object, subject, concept, and strategy—and their own generative rules are still very useful for describing Ye Shengji's discourse on the Japanese Spirit. Ye's other discourse on his colonial self is also related to Bhabha's conflictive subject positions of metonym-aggressivity and metaphor-narcissism,[27] which can be subsumed under Foucault's category of subject. It is these four categories of discourse and Bhabha's theory that we shall introduce.

In one formulation, Foucault understands discourse as a "group of statements that belong to a single system of [discursive] formation," whereas statements denote "a group of verbal performance."[28] Thus, a statement appears to be "(t)he atom of discourse,"[29] whose existence is determined by the four sets of rules, or categories, which together constitute one system of discursive formation. That is, a discursive formation consists of rules for the formation of objects, rules for the formation of subject positions, rules for the formation of concepts, and rules for the formation of strategies.[30] These are the rules which co-determine the existence of *certain* modalities of statements, *and not others*. Let us tackle the four sets in turn.

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[26]Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 90; Barry Smart, "Introductory Essay: Situating Foucault," in *Michel Foucault (1): Critical Assessments*, ed. Barry Smart (London: Routledge, 1994), 6.

[27]Homi Bhabha, "The Other Question: Stereotype, Discrimination and the Discourse of Colonialism," in his *The Location of Culture* (London: Routledge, 1994), 66-84.

[28]Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 107.

[29]Ib id., 80.

[30]Norman Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change* (London: Routledge, 1992), 40.

Object

Foucault defines an object as an object of knowledge, or, for example, as "madness" in psychopathology since the nineteenth century, but more commonly as the topic of an academic paper, or "the colonial self" and "the Japanese Spirit" in Ye's discourses. The rules for the formation of objects, in general terms, concern "a group of relations established between authorities of emergence, delimitation, and specification."[31] That is to say, "who is in what institutional position to name the 'object' under what historico-social circumstances and with what battery of conceptual categories" makes up one such authority that, in connection with all available others, determines an "object" of discourse in vogue. What seems to be generated inside a discursive formation, i.e., the object, turns out to be co-determined, or constrained by authorities either from other discourses or from nondiscursive social context. In Foucault's formulation, analysis of an object cannot do without the interdiscursive and social contextual dimensions.[32]

Subject Position

This category of discursive formation may be the most underdeveloped concept in Foucault's theory of archaeology, which therefore calls for an amendment from Homi Bhabha's point of view. Basically, this category has to do with describing "who, in what *status*, occupying what institutional *sites*, and under what *situations*, is speaking in a discourse."[33] As can be seen from the previous discussion, this way of specifying subject position overlaps almost completely with that of objects; the two categories appear to be interchangeable. Even if we stick to Foucault's original label and call subject positions "the enunciative modalities," meaning "types of discursive activity such as describing, forming hypotheses, formulating regulations, teaching, and so forth,"[34] the clarity of the notion is not en-

[31] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 44.
[32] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 42-43.
[33] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 52-53.
[34] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 43.

hanced, for Foucault's own specification of how to study the modalities is still connected to the analysis of the speaking subject's status, sites, and situations.

To make subject position a useful category in a discursive formation, we turn to Bhabha, a literature critic heavily influenced by both Foucault and the Freudian psychoanalyst, Jacques Lacan. According to Bhabha, colonial discourse stereotypically creates two conflictive subject positions to be identified with by the colonial subjects: metaphoric-narcissistic versus metonymic-aggressive.[35] These are two positions which involve two dichotomies drawn from Lacan and structural linguist Roman Jacobson, respectively. For Lacan, the two forms of identification, narcissism and aggressivity, happen simultaneously when a child, at the formative mirror phase, identifies him/herself with his/her image in the mirror and, at the same time, separates him/herself from the image as a discrete entity.[36] Narcissism is looking for a self amid diverse kinds of objects; aggressivity is finding alien, and thus threatening, elements in oneself. Moreover, it is Lacan himself who drew on Jacobson's distinction of the two literary tropes, metaphor and metonym, to reinterpret some of Freud's psychoanalytical concepts.[37] In terms of narcissism, we can readily see that the capacity to recognize oneself among different objects relies on a logic of analogy, just as a poet, by using the metaphor of seasons, illuminates his/her moods. Metaphor embodies the logic of analogy. Aggressive identification, on the other hand, relies on a logic of contiguity to find in the same self-image an alien other (the discrete image-entity): one sees both entities on the spot *and* at the same time, just as the crown is metonymic of the king because one always sees both together. Metonym functions on the basis of the logic of contiguity.

I propose to simplify Bhabha's erudite discussion of the subject position into that of ressentiment: an ambivalent identity which is constantly influenced by two dichotomies (self/other and love/hate), or two figures

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[35]Bhabha, "The Other Question," 77-78.

[36]Jacques Lacan, *Ecrits: A Selection* (New York: Norton, 1977), 16-25.

[37]David Macey, "Introduction," in Jacques Lacan, *The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis* (London: Penguin, 1994), xxviii.

emerged from the interaction between the intradiscursive and interdiscursive dimensions of a colonial discourse. If we think of the two figures as a two-by-two table with four cells, then we first come up with the connection between the cell, "self-love," and the cell, "other-love," which, according to Bhabha, is based on a logic of analogy. Second, we have a connection between "self-hate" and "other-hate" which is informed by a logic of contiguity. With this four-cell classification, we hope to be able to apply it to the analysis of Ye Shengji's discourse on his colonial self.

Therefore, in regard to the category of subject position, we have suggested its ambivalent nature, which invites the participants in a discourse to assume as part of their "self." With the internally conflictive subject positions, they thus reveal a feeling of ressentiment.

Concept

In contrast to the paucity of subject positions, Foucault has much to say about the category of concepts, which he seems to understand as the key words, or categories, that appear and circulate in "the organization of the field of statements"[38] Again, to follow Fairclough's useful distinction,[39] Foucault's rules for the formation of concepts fall within two groups: intradiscursive and interdiscursive. In the intradiscursive group, Foucault first discusses three forms of succession with which concepts are linked to statements, and statements to other statements. These are "the various *orderings of enunciative series*," "the various *types of dependence* of the statements," and "the various rhetorical *schemata* according to which groups of statements may be *combined*."[40] Furthermore, he talks about the procedural rules of "intervention," such as "*techniques of rewriting*," "the means used to increase the *approximation* of statements and to refine their exactitude," or "the methods of *systematizing* propositions that already exist."[41] Admittedly, in discussing intradiscursive rules, Foucault somehow col-

[38] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 56.
[39] Fairclough, *Discourse and Social Change*, 46.
[40] Foucault, *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, 56-57.
[41] Ibid., 59.

lapses the differences between concepts and statements; they appear to be interchangeable.

Rules in the interdiscursive dimension concern three forms of relationships among different discourses. There is the form which circumscribes a *field of presence* (all statements formulated elsewhere [are] taken up in a discourse); a *field of concomitance* (statements that concern quite different domains of objects . . . and belong to quite different types of discourse . . . are active among the statements studied here); and a *field of memory* (statements that are no longer accepted or discussed . . . but in relation to which relations of filiation, genesis, transformation, continuity, and historical discontinuity can be established).[42] What Foucault specifies here is less the know-how that one can directly apply than three exploratory directions that, for example, will be beneficial to our discussion of the relationship between Ye Shengji's discourse on the colonial self and that on the Japanese Spirit.

Strategy

The analysis here is on the level of discourse proper. Whether the previous three sets of rules which constitute a possible field of knowledge can actually be realized or not is determined by the strategic choices taken on the discursive level. Foucault indicates three directions for locating such strategic choices. The first is to find "the possible *points of diffraction* of discourse."[43] Two objects, or enunciative modalities, or concepts may form either points of incompatibility or equivalence to each other. They thus become an "either . . . or . . ." statement available for choice within a discourse. Second, one may describe "*the economy of the discursive constellation*" to which a discourse belongs and which renders a certain strategic choice more authoritative than others.[44] In this economy, a discourse may be a formal system vis-à-vis other systems, or it may be in "a relation of analogy, opposition, or complementarity with certain other discourses."

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[42]Ibid., 57-58.
[43]Ibid., 65.
[44]Ibid., 66-67.

Finally, Foucault suggests that one should take into consideration the constraints upon the strategic choice imposed by the "field of nondiscursive practices," "the rules and processes of appropriation of discourse," and the like.[45]

In Foucault's own thinking, the four sets of rules for discursive formation constitute "a vertical system of dependencies," which involves "a whole hierarchy of relations."[46] That is, from an object at the bottom to strategy at the top, the four categories are tightly integrated into a system of discursive formation. However, for one thing, we have pointed out that his discussion of the subject position is underdeveloped and needs to be supplemented by identities of metonym-aggressivity and metaphor-narcissism. For another, there are rules in both categories of concept and strategy which turn out not to be "rules" proper but exploratory directions that await further research. We therefore suggest that one should take Foucault's archaeological rules, along with Bhabha's ambivalent subject positions, as a working framework: a model consists of separable modules which facilitate our description of Ye Shengji's discourses, but stills require refinement and tests from the actual empirical discourses.

Ye's Discourses

In May 1941, Ye Shengji came to Kyoto, Japan after having graduated from Tainan First Senior High School and failing the entrance examinations for college-preparatory schools held both in Taiwan and Japan in the same year. He stayed in Japan for the next five years, spending two years to pass the examination, another two in the Sendai Second College-Preparatory School, and a couple of months in the medical school of Tokyo Imperial University before the end of World War II. His voluminous writings occurred during his life at the Sendai School, when he had finished two years of wandering (*ronin*) and was a more mature and older student than

[45]Ibid., 68.
[46]Ibid., 73.

most of his classmates. Wartime Japanese school life led him to reflect upon his selfhood, exposing him to the influence of the Study of Jews, which was a key element in the discourse on the Japanese Spirit.

The Colonial Self

Ye Shengji's diary and reading notes retain many traces of his thinking and feelings about himself during his time at school. There was no shortage of genuine love and admiration for Japanese culture and individual Japanese people, but he devoted much more space to his ambivalent feelings about being a colonial subject in a mainstream and prestigious school. In fact, his biographer, Yang Weili, argues that Ye's negative feelings were overwhelming to the point that they prepared him psychologically to welcome the discourse on the Japanese Spirit as a way out of his identity problem.[47] We will discuss these positive and negative, or self/other love and self/other hate, feelings in turn.

Immediately before Ye departed for Kyoto, he applied for permission to adopt a Japanese name, Hayama Tachio, in Taiwan. His application was accepted in September 1941.[48] Not much was mentioned about his motive to change the name, but by 1940 the colonial governments both in Taiwan and in Korea had implemented the policy of name-changing in celebration of the twenty-six hundredth anniversary of the mythical Emperor Jimmu's creation of the Japanese nation.[49] The government provided incentives for Taiwanese who adopted Japanese names, such as educational opportunities and increased rations of meat and rice during wartime. Under the circumstances, to suggest that the root of Ye's Japanese surname, Hayama, involved *yama* (mountain), which actually referred to China (*tozan*, literally the Tang mountains), is not very plausible.[50] Ye could simply have changed his name out of expediency.

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[47]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 63, 94.

[48]Diary I:05/24/41, 09/15/41.

[49]Wan-yao Chou, "The *Kominka* Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations," in *The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931-1945*, ed. Peter Duus et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 55-61.

[50]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 46-47.

However, wearing a Japanese outfit (*haoli*) revealed much about Ye's cultural preference. He agreed with the opinion that "the purpose of putting on *haoli* is not for its convenience. It is for the fact that the senior students' blood was in it. When we wear it we can feel their power. . . . [Indeed] I can feel its warmth, its power, and the relaxation that it brings to me."[51] In wearing a borrowed *haoli*, Ye was enjoying both the friendship from the lender, a student named Abe, and the material of the outfit. This is how we normally consume an object, by using both the material *and* the aura around it, which contrasts with Huntington's view of consumption.[52]

From the objects one consumes, it is not difficult for one to make an analogical connection to the people who in one way or another are related to the things consumed. In his writings, we thus find that Ye registered his gratitude to the "[landlord's] family from a different nationality who took care of this expatriate,"[53] and to his roommates whose passion for their ideals influenced him tremendously.[54] In a moment of tranquillity, Ye even wrote down that, for him, there were two hometowns: "One consists of daily social life. The other originates from genealogy and tradition. . . . I embrace the two hometowns with drastically different lifestyles in my chest. In different contexts, I naturally combine different pieces from the different sources which make up my sense of nostalgia."[55]

It turned out that to embrace two different lifestyles, or what he called a "double life," was by no means "natural"; it was internally conflictive due to the presence of both the colonizer and the colonized whose relationship was forever that of inequality. "In most of my high school life [in Taiwan]," Ye recalled when he was put in the jail after the "red hunt" in 1950, "when it came to the issue of the confrontation with Japanese and of the paradoxes of the double life, I would rather adopt the attitude of avoidance than have

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[51]Notes II:11/18/43.

[52]Huntington states, "The argument that the spread of pop culture and consumer goods around the world represents the triumph of Western civilization depreciates the strength of other cultures while trivializing Western culture by identifying it with fatty foods, faded pants, and fizzy drinks." Huntington, "The West: Unique, Not Universal," 29.

[53]Notes I:09/12/43.

[54]Notes III:02/06/44, 02/12/44.

[55]Notes I:09/12/43.

my eyes wide-open with a nationalist consciousness."[56] Indeed, in his reading notes, Ye analyzed the influence of his background on his weak, avoidance-prone personality:

> First, in the social conditions around me, I saw nothing but a life of subordination. . . . Second, I was raised up in a life in which Japanese contempt was more or less present. . . . In addition, although opportunities to contact with Japanese were plenty, our lives have never fused into one. . . . Another reason was that I have no siblings.[57]

As Ye understood it, it was the colonial relationship that made him what he was.

The internally split double life continued to torture him in the beginning of his college-preparatory school life. It is no wonder when he had chance to read a short story, "Honryû" (Torrent), written by a Taiwanese dentist, Wang Changxiong, in Japanese, he was immediately struck by the problem all the Taiwanese characters in the story shared: How to be assimilated into Japanese?

By 1943, when "Torrent" was first published in *Taiwan bungaku*,[58] culturally speaking, Taiwan was in a stage of high Japanization (*kominka*). Because of the Sino-Japanese War, not only did the colonial government ask Han-Taiwanese to adopt Japanese names, but it also persuaded, and coerced if necessary, every Taiwanese family to give up traditional religion (see below) and worship the Japanese deity, Amaterasu, at home, as well as speak Japanese to each family member. These policies seemed to be in preparation for the coming reality in which the government would impel Han-Taiwanese to fight with Chinese in mainland China; they wanted to make sure that, by then, Taiwanese would become qualified substitute Japanese.[59] In terms of national identity, by 1943 the issue was not whether Han-Taiwanese could choose to remain Chinese or not, but in what way

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[56]Quoted in Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 27.

[57]Notes II:11/10/43.

[58]Wang Changxiong, "Honryû" (Torrent), *Taiwan bungaku* (Taiwan Literature) 3, no. 3 (July 1943): 104-29.

[59]Fong Shiaw-Chian, "Achieving Weak Hegemony: Taiwanese Cultural Experience under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945" (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1993).

they should be Japanized and to what extent. Under the circumstances, "Torrent," which arguably connoted the trend of high Japanization, successfully depicted three Taiwanese characters who stood at different positions in the scales of Japanization:

First, there is Ito Haruo (Chinese name, Zhu Chunsheng) who is a high school teacher teaching the Japanese language. He identifies with the goal of Japanization completely to the extent that he forsakes the responsibility of taking care of his parents, for they did not speak fluent Japanese. When his father dies, he wears a Japanese black robe, instead of the traditional coarse hemp clothes, to stand, not kneel down, at the funeral. Only after his "identity" of being a Han-Taiwanese is exposed to the narrator does the latter discover that, at the age of thirty something, two-thirds of Ito's hair has turned gray.

Next is Lin Bonian, Ito's student and his cousin on his mother's side. It is Lin who exposes Ito's past to the narrator. He is in the school team for Japanese fencing (*kendo*) and is able to defeat his Japanese competitors and become the first Taiwanese to win the *kendo* championship. He chooses to go to Japan, against his parents' will, to pursue his *kendo* career, but writes to the narrator from Japan that "to be a square Japanese I have to be a square Taiwanese first."[60] Lin symbolizes a Taiwanese who can live with his two national identities in peace.

Finally, there is the narrator, a small-town medical doctor who spent ten years studying in Tokyo and, after the death of his father, has come back to his hometown and run a clinic. He adopts a third-person's point of view to observe the goings-on between his two former patients, Ito and Lin. At first, he is partial to Ito's determination to become a full Japanese, but gradually begins to admire the young Lin's way of harmoniously combining two identities. At the end of the story, he witnesses the gray hair of Ito and recalls Ito's behavior at the funeral before leaving us with these memorable lines: "I could not bear it anymore. I ran down the hill shouting, 'Shit! Shit!' I ran like a small kid, falling down but standing up and running again, tripped but balanced myself again to run. I seemed to run into the

[60]Wang, "Honryû," 127.

edge of the wind. I just exerted myself to run faster."[61]

When Ye Shengji read the story, he immediately reflected upon his past and admitted that "so far, haven't I been doing what Ito has done? I feel terribly shameful."[62] He went on to write that "today I fully believed that, as human beings, Lin is far superior to Ito." However, he should have mentioned that his current position came most closely to that of the narrator, the doctor, for they both were wandering between the extremes exemplified by Ito and Lin. Ye stated:

> The double life is painful. . . . But to the extent that I cannot but live the life, it is important for me to endure. Ignoring or giving up either the Taiwanese or Japanese side of this life will be the practice of a mean person without conscience. . . . This is the justice in the world, obedience of which makes the right way for humans.[63]

What Ye, along with the three characters in "Torrent," did not raise was the question of why he had to endure the "double life" in the first place. To the extent that Ye was not conscious of an alternative reality without the colonial rule, we may say that the Japanese colonialism, after a five-decade rule in Taiwan, had achieved hegemony, i.e., assuming both political and *spiritual* leadership of the Taiwanese.

In the last quotation, what Ye called "the justice in the world" may be interpreted as his ideal of being loyal to both the Japanese *and* Taiwanese ways of life,[64] just as in "Torrent" Lin Bonian symbolized the realization of such an ideal. But it was an ideal precisely because, in Ye's writings, the two lifestyles were in drastic conflict, especially in terms of religion. For instance, on November 19, 1943, the freshmen in the school dormitory held a debate. Ye's key theme in the argument was about traditional religion.

Ye was intrigued by Japanese commentator Yamada Yoshio's view of public opinion about "Westernization" after the Meiji Restoration (1868).

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[61]Ibid., 129. Professor Lin Ruiming's analysis of this novel is very helpful. See "Tormented Souls: The Wartime Taiwanese Writers and the *Kominka* Literature," in his *Taiwan wenxue de lishi kaocha* (A historical survey of Taiwanese literature) (Taipei: Yunchen, 1996), 294-331.

[62]Notes I:09/26/43.

[63]Ibid.

[64]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 59-60.

Ye quoted, "Because of it [the opinion about Westernization], those things whose names or substances could not be found in the West, such as Shinto shrines (*jinja*) and national learning (*kokugaku*), were, I am afraid to say, viewed as typical cases of bad traditional customs without exception."[65] Ye immediately saw the parallel between this opinion and that which was current in Taiwan regarding local religion, for he had been reading a book, *Zibyokami no shoten* (Temple gods go to heaven), written in Taiwan by Chureki (Chungli) subcounty official Miyazaki Naokatsu.[66]

Miyazaki's book was his own testimony about how he had implemented religious policy in wartime Taiwan, both by reducing twenty-nine local temples in Chureki into four and by setting up a Japanese *jinja* to convert Taiwanese.[67] According to Miyazaki, there were three reasons why local temples should be abolished: they advocated superstitions which impeded the advancement of Taiwanese culture; traditional worship enhanced only self-interest at the cost of the public welfare; and local temples possessed huge assets whose management and distribution caused social unrest.[68]

After reading both Yamada's and Miyazaki's books, Ye commented:

> I think it is necessary that one respect one's tradition and at the same time one respect others' traditions. The point is that value judgments [behind tradition] are subjective and relativistic. . . . Forcefully assimilating other cultures into one's own does not mean one's culture really has the power of accommodation.[69]

Subsequently, he echoed his early comment by saying, "One should understand one's tradition correctly and deeply respect it. At the same time one cannot but have a tolerant attitude toward other traditions and respect them too."[70] He even rebutted his Japanese debater by pointing out Japanese "contempt" toward Taiwanese religious life. In terms of Ye's attitude to-

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[65]Notes I:11/19/43.

[66]Notes I:11/11/43, 11/19/43.

[67]Miyazaki Naokatsu, *Zibyokami no shoten* (Temples gods go to heaven) (Taihoku: Toto, 1942), 37, 99-111.

[68]Ibid., 17-18.

[69]Notes I:11/19/43.

[70]Notes II:11/23/43.

ward religion, I am inclined to read his writings as registering his objection to the disrespect of Taiwanese faith by Japanese colonizers, although he often said it softly, which seemed to accord with his avoidance-prone personality.

Two months later, Ye again participated in an all-dormitory debate and surprisingly did an about-face, calling for the following of "the way of the only god, that is, the Emperor" of Japan.[71] Ye's strong Fascist tone in the debate will be situated in the discourse on the Japanese Spirit below. But in terms of religion, such a sharp reversal within two short months revealed much of Ye's conflictive inclinations, just as shown in his reading of "Torrent," when he adopted the unstable position of the narrator between the two poles exemplified by Ito and Lin.

Therefore, in the discourse on the colonial self, Ye's selfhood appeared to be that of ambivalence, doubly so. First, during the wartime school life, he showed genuine affection toward Japanese cultural items and people on the one hand, but he also deeply sensed the negative effects of colonial rule on his personality, assimilating inclinations, and Taiwan's traditional religion, on the other. Second, even in these negative effects, he again shifted *between* the positions in which he either was determined to be fully "Japanized" and devoted himself to the way of the Japanese Emperor, *and* the position in which he sought to be both a Japanese and a Taiwanese, and respected Taiwanese religion. As he leaned toward the rightist ideology of the Japanese Spirit before the end of the war, so did he swing to the leftist camp after the war. Ye Shengji's quest for identity amplifies the postcolonial point that what matters is not an end product, a fixed identity, but the quest itself, which is an ongoing process.

The Japanese Spirit

The version of this discourse that was propagated in Sendai's Second College-Preparatory School in 1944 consisted of two elements, or subdiscourses: the Study of Jews (*Yûdaken*) and the World Harmonized as a Family (*Hakkoichiu*). The two elements found their sources of emergence

[71]Notes III:02/05/44.

in one way or another connected to Japan as a member of the Axis during World War II. However, for our purpose of analysis, we need not take the globe as the constellation of the discourse; the scope visualized by Ye Shengji will do. We shall proceed in accord with Foucault's archaeological categories the first of which is object.

The object of the discourse on the Japanese Spirit was ethnicity, or the colonial "races" incorporated into the Japanese Empire, especially in the Pacific War. Because of the Imperial Army's advancement into mainland China and Southeast Asia, the initial project of Japanization in Taiwan and in Korea—known as *kominka*—had to be expanded in order to inject into every new colonial race the spirit of being Japanese. This spirit was deemed the source of cohesion that would harmonize any race under the leadership of the Yamato (Japanese) people. The discourse that dealt with this spirit was called *Hakkoichiu*, which, as we shall see, implied an absolute loyalty to the head of the world-family, *tenno* (the Japanese Emperor), and which literally meant to die for him. The other discourse that dealt with the anti-race which could not be incorporated into *Hakkoichiu*, was *Yûdaken*, fashioned by some Germanophile scholars in the campuses to which Sendai School belonged. Therefore, in terms of the object of the Japanese Spirit, the two sub-discourses, *Hakkoichiu* and *Yûdaken*, constituted two polar elements whose distinction was based on whether a race had been conquered by Japan or not.

The subjects that spoke in the discourse on the Japanese Spirit, particularly that of *Yûdaken*, were Professor Okuzu Genju from Tohoku Imperial University and Professor Ono Ko, who taught Ye German.[72] They were both former overseas students in Germany. Professor Okuzu's public speech on "This War and the Problem of Jews" in January 1944 seemed to indicate his and others' first attempt to organize the students of Sendai into believing their dogma.[73] Professor Ono had long designated an anti-Semitic *Judenfragen* as his German textbook. As pointed out by Yang Weili, both Ye's biographer and wartime classmate, Okuzu and Ono came

[72]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 96-97.
[73]Notes II:01/17/44.

to Sendai at a moment when Italy had already surrendered and Japan had lost control of many Pacific islands. There was an atmosphere of skepticism about the Imperial Army's fighting capacity not only in society at large but within the universities as well.[74] However, the professors were able to attract a few senior students, including Ye, as ardent supporters. In Ye's case, Yang suggests that it was his deep internal schism due to his "double life" that drew him into momentarily taking *Yûdaken* as a higher truth (more below).[75] However, the institutional status of professors, with their territory in the classrooms and in their role as researchers, seemed to guarantee that their political message would be accepted by the receiving ears.

In terms of the concepts used in the discourse, we come to the content of both *Yûdaken* and *Hakkoichiu*. Professors Okuzu and Ono advocated that "the Jews [were] not human beings; they [were] devils" who caused the Pacific War by inciting Americans to fight against Japanese.[76] Moreover, the Jews allegedly controlled the world through secret societies, such as the Freemasons, whose members included Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek. Finally, there were "substitute Jews" (Japanese conspirators) through whom the Jews had built "*Staat im Staat.*"[77]

However, for all the Nazi statements that the professors imported to Japan, there was one kind of statement even they themselves found difficult to swallow: those regarding the supremacy of Aryans. If only Aryans were supreme, what about the Yamato people? As Yang argues, it was at the extreme of the racist discourse about the Jewish people that the Japanese scholars discovered that they had put their own race in jeopardy and sought to find an exit from this embarrassment by resorting to the traditional Shinto religion, which backed up the discourse on *Hakkoichiu*.[78] In Ye's diary, we find a schema which provided such an exit. It ran, from the bottom up, as race-people-citizen-subject and was accorded with a string of

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[74]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 97.
[75]Ibid., 63, 94.
[76]Ibid., 63.
[77]Diary V:05/30/44.
[78]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 101.

explanation, *biologisch-historisch-rechtlich-methsphyisch.*[79] This rhetorical schema was taken from Professor Ono's lecture and, although Ye did not write much, its meaning was not beyond comprehension: Aryans as well as Yamato were products of history. If the two "races" were once unequal, they were now transformed into citizens of equal states (who both joined the Axis). Moreover, the Shinto legend held that the Japanese Emperor came from an unbroken imperial lineage (*banseiikkei*) which had lasted for more than twenty-six hundred years, crediting him with the metaphysical power to incorporate all humans into his subjects, without any distinction of race. The schema itself channeled the believers in *Yûdaken* to the discourse on the World Harmonized as a Family.

Ye Shengji once wrote, "The Japanese Spirit is the spirit of *Hakkoichiu*; it accommodates everything."[80] Ye's understanding corresponded to the common sense at that time, except that *Hakkoichiu* was actually a newly fashioned slogan for dealing with the incorporation of new "races" from Southeast Asia within the Japanese Empire.[81] There were three key themes in the discourse on *Hakkoichiu*. First, it viewed the Emperor as the patriarch of the family-state (Japan), a notion that was connected to the unbroken imperial lineage. Since the royal house had existed from the very beginning, every Japanese originated from the court's family tree. Later, the family-state was transformed into that of "family-world." Second, since the Emperor stood on the pinnacle of the family-state, he was entitled to the utmost obedience from his children, which meant their willingness to die for him in wartime.[82] This theme was encapsulated in the saying, "Loyalty is filial piety." Finally, the discourse contained heavy doses of anti-individualism. Every Japanese lived or died for his or her Emperor; with no concern for self. This essence of being Japanese contrasted with selfish Western individualism. Therefore, *Hakkoichiu* was deemed a collective spirit of sacrifice for every Japanese subject regardless of his or her

[79]Diary V:05/30/44.

[80]Notes III:02/21/44.

[81]Fong, "Achieving Weak Hegemony," 112.

[82]D. C. Holtom, *Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism*, Revised edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947), 86.

racial stock.

Finally, in terms of the Foucaultian category of strategy, we shall concentrate on the relationship between Ye Shengji's discourse on his colonial self and his reception to that of the Japanese Spirit. We have indicated that from Yang Weili's point of view, Ye turned to the discourse on the Japanese Spirit as a psychological outlet for his internal schism caused by the colonial "double life." We certainly cannot discount the validity of this psychological explanation which takes Ye's own statements as supporting evidence. But the statements themselves are dispersed in Ye's two key discourses and *the pattern of the dispersion* does suggest an alternative reading that Ye's words depicted the Emperor as the nodal point at which the discrimination against local religion, and against colonial subjects in general, can be dissolved by the devotion, or even dying, of the colonizers and the colonized together for the only god. That was the effect of the discourse in addition to that of the psychological trauma.

We recall that on January 22, 1944, Ye Shengji gave an about-face speech on "Students' Attitude in the Decisive Battle." This speech was delivered five days after Professor Okuzu's first public lecture on the problem of Jews. The influences from Okuzu may be detected in Ye's own speech, where he made two key points. First, students should pursue "the way of the only god . . . the way of *tenno* and its derivative spirits of patriotism and of sacrifice for the nation. . . . This [way] is the source of our beliefs that the god's land [Japan] is indestructible and that it is this way that will harmonize the world."[83] Second, with this spirit, "we will be able to build the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere successfully."[84] That is, before he became deeply involved with the activities of Okuzu and Ono, Ye had begun promoting a Shinto-styled *tenno* belief which would equalize all the Emperor's subjects in prosperity.

Shinto had been a traditional Japanese religion which, as we mentioned before, was ridiculed as superstition in the tide of Westernization after 1868, just as the traditional Taiwanese religion was now mistreated in,

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[83]Notes III:02/05/44.
[84]Ibid.

for example, the book, *Temple Gods Go to Heaven*. However, Shinto was rejuvenated during the Pacific War and firmly placed *tenno* as the center of gravity for all subjects—be they metropolitan or colonial—to worship. Ye's statements thus revealed an intention to be rid of the discrimination imposed on Taiwanese religion with the help of a metropolitan religion which also had been discriminated against. Such intentions could be called projection in psychoanalytical terms, but, on the discursive plane, it should be properly called an instance based on the logic of analogy.

A few days after his speech, Ye wrote:

> I think of what Okakura Kakuzo has said, "Asia is one." The way my nation is going is toward a World Harmonized as a Family, which should combine two ways [of Japan and its colonies] into one. So it seems the way that my trouble [the double life] impels me to go accords with the direction that my nation is going.[85]

Note that the distinction between Taiwan and Japan was dissolved in "my nation" in the quotation. Both the powers of psychology and discourse drew Ye to believe in the ideology of the Japanese Spirit in which *tenno* promised to abolish all discriminations.

However, the equalizing promise did not hold Ye for long. The discourse on the harmonious, distinction-free Japanese Spirit did not match the nondiscursive reality of war. Following the fall of Saipan on July 20, 1944, supporters of *Yûdaken* held an all-student meeting twice to agitate student patriotism, but were denounced by most of the students and faculty members. By August, the original three years of coursework were cut short to two years, and Ye, along with other graduating students, was sent to a military factory for wartime services. The economic pressures for the rural areas, the disappointment of the people with their government, and the disillusion of *Yûdaken* and *Hakkoichiu* all found expressions in Ye's later writings.[86] At the same time, Ye shifted his interest to learning Mandarin, singing Chinese national anthem, and reading Dr. Sun Yat-sen's political

[85]Notes III:02/06/44. Okakura Kakuzo (1862-1913) was a virtuoso in fine arts in late Meiji period.

[86]Yang, *Shuangxiang ji*, 123-44.

doctrine, *The Three Principles of the People*.[87] His pendulum had reached the far rightist point, and was starting to swing leftward. It would continue swinging until he was executed on November 29, 1950.

Ye Shengji's self-understanding of his identity was mediated by two discourses that occurred at particular places in particular periods: Sendai and wartime. It was the discursive forms of what we have called the colonial self and the Japanese Spirit that shaped both Ye's ambivalent understanding of his selfhood and his desire for dissolving any colonial discrimination in the belief of *tenno*. Without the mediation of these forms, Ye could not, and we cannot, make sense of the impacts on his identity from both social and psychological sources. From Ye's identity discourse, which serves as an extended example of the post-colonial perspective, it seems to us that what matters is the discursive linkage between the sociopsychological sources of impact on the one hand, and the formation of his identity, or subject position, on the other; it is not the causal efficacy commonsensically attributed to sociopsychological dimensions only. The volatile state of identity formation is determined more by the specific discursive forms, which themselves are subject to historical variation, than by brute "objective" or "subjective" forces.

Within Ye's discursive forms of identity, our narrative has concentrated on the intradiscursive and interdiscursive relationships among the Study of Jews, the World Harmonized as a Family, and the colonial self. In terms of the former two sub-discourses, which made up the discourse on the Japanese Spirit, they were connected by the rhetorical schema of the four stages of the relationship between human groups (race-people-citizen-subject), a schema which represented the transformation from the racial discriminations to the equal brotherhood/sisterhood before *tenno*. Moreover, the function of this schema was analogical to what articulated the discourse on the Japanese Spirit together with that on the colonial self. The humiliation that Japanese Shinto, from which emerged the *tenno* belief, had suffered in the past was deemed by Ye as similar to what Taiwanese religion was undergoing. Since Shinto was rejuvenated in the Pacific War, the

[87]Ibid., 116, 148-49.

local religion could also be revived; a colonial desire to be rid of discrimination was revealed at this articulation. Therefore, what connected the colonial self and the Japanese Spirit was, from Bhabha's post-colonial viewpoint, the logic of analogy. By contrast, what constituted the inner dynamics of the discourse on the colonial self was the logic of contiguity. Thus, the love of specific Japanese items and individuals was juxtaposed with Ye's own weak personality, his inclinations to assimilate, and the mistreatment Taiwanese religion received. Moreover, the same logic compelled Ye to choose either between a fully Japanized position and a position of leading a "double life," or between only pursuing the Emperor's way and also respecting the Taiwanese religion. At the highest level of abstraction, Ye Shengji's quest for his colonial self can therefore be read as the functioning of both logic of contiguity and that of analogy.

Conclusion

Ye Shengji's mobile identity is by no means an exceptional case for the time period. Among his cohorts who became literati, many revealed the same identificational tendency in their works, with the author of "Torrent," Wang Changxiong, atop the list. Indeed, "Torrent" is still now read as an outstanding work on the shifting self-recognition of the colonized Taiwanese. In addition, there is also Chen Huoquan, whose 1943 novel—"The Way" (*Do*)—is still being criticized as a pro-Japanese *kominka* work.[88] However, "The Way" does contain a critical dimension that goes beyond Chen's pro-Japanese inclinations: it points out that the way toward the Japanese Spirit was to die for the Emperor and how such an understanding created an insurmountable pressure for the colonized Taiwanese on their way to be Japanized.[89] Finally, there was the case of Wu Zhuoliu, whose wartime novel, *Ajia no koji* (The Asian Orphan), used a title which was a

[88]Lin, "Tormented Souls," 294-331.

[89]Chen Huoquan, "The Way," *Bungei Taiwan* (Literary Taiwan) 6, no. 3 (July 1943): 93-94, 120-22, 140-41.

catch phrase describing the chaotic identity of Taiwanese who were neither Japanese nor Chinese. It remains a fashionable term for many to depict the international status of nowaday Taiwan.

All these literati, in addition to Ye Shengji, testified to the fact that their wartime identity was never fixed: it bent either to Chinese or Japanese values, or to a mixture of both, depending on the sociopolitical pressures of the time and especially on the contemporary government-endorsed public discourses. The point is that identity formation is not necessarily related to a set of immobile values, as Huntington claims. What is more important is the ways this formation occurs among intersecting dominant discourses. The more the discourses become commanding, the more the formation of identity follows suit. Ye Shengji and other literati's examples singularly oppose Huntington's essentialist way of pinning identity down to a set of fixed core values.

Turning to our view of the multiple identity in contrast with Huntington's levels of such, we suggest that Ye Shengji and others' cases clearly support the multiple *and* ambivalent versions. In Ye's narrative, we have encountered the discourses on his colonial self, the Study of Jews, and the World Harmonized as a Family. These discourses show his shifting definition of his self from identifying with the Taiwanese-local tradition to Japanese Fascist ideology. We have not yet been able to probe into Ye's later discourses on *The Three Principles of the People* and Chinese communism in his *oeuvre*, although from the cause of his death we can be certain that his identity subsequently underwent polar changes. As can be seen here, only on an individual level can we really understand the functioning of identity formation, and, as Ye has shown emphatically, what Huntington clearly distinguishes as levels—individual, city, nation, religion, continent, and civilization—of identity is in fact enacted in the same person as coexistent and, very often, conflictive. There is no neat hierarchy of identity at each of whose level people distinguish the "same-us" from the "different-them," a self-other split which, according to Huntington, forms the basis of eventual civilizational clashes.

Finally, our case of Ye Shengji is meant to shed light on the identity issue from a post-colonial, discursive point of view. Against Huntington's definition of identity in terms of objective and subjective elements, the

post-colonial perspective emphasizes the discursive nature of these elements. It is within the discourse, or a general system of signs, that the objective and subjective elements are connected by an individual to form a layer, among many, of his or her identity. This mirrors the discourse on Ye's colonial self, where the love of the Japanese *haoli* outfit and the hate of Japanese contempt for the Taiwanese faith became part of his temporary identity. What perhaps should be emphasized from Ye's case is that the elements which are connected into part and parcel of an identity, again, depend very much on the dominant discourses, such as the Study of Jews and the Japanese Spirit, in vogue. That is to say that, up to this point, nation-states, not civilizations, with their ideological apparatuses which provide dominant discourses, are still the most potent agent in fashioning its citizens' here-and-now identity.

With these afterthoughts, it seems reasonable to say that, whatever the potential causes behind a possible World War III, a hypostasized civilization identity is not likely to be a strong candidate.