

A Convenient Crisis: Looking Behind Beijing's Threats Against Taiwan*

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To explicate the discord between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan in terms of the former's reactions to the rising independence sentiments in Taiwan barely touches the surface of the problem. The roots of Beijing's militancy toward the ROC lie within the PRC. The Jiang Zemin administration has escalated tensions over the Taiwan Strait in order to divert and externalize domestic predicaments. Specifically, Jiang's tactics for achieving national unity, intra-Party cohesion, the loyalty and effectiveness of the military, and personal status have contributed to conflicts across the Strait. To unify the country, Jiang has appealed to regressive nationalism, a force which castigates the ROC as a national traitor. Jiang also exploits conflicts with the ROC in order to resolve the penetration crisis inside the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The high command of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) practices brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait in order to mask corruption and disunity within the military. Last but not least, Jiang has assumed the role of a strong nation-builder in order to compensate for his feelings of insecurity and lack of legitimacy as a political leader. As long as Beijing continues to rely on these tactics for domestic purposes, tensions over the Taiwan Strait will not significantly decline.

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The Beijing Politburo's militant stand toward the Republic of China's (ROC's) second competitive presidential election in March 2000 defies realism or rationality. The leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appear to have learned nothing from the dismal results of their 1996 "missile diplomacy" during the ROC's first free presidential election.¹ Secondly, the latest Beijing threats of war against Taiwan came at the crucial juncture when the Clinton administration was about to persuade the U.S. Congress to grant China permanent normal trading privileges. Thirdly, Beijing's latest intimidation of Taiwan discredited Jiang Zemin's (江澤民) 1995 thesis that because of U.S. involvement, unification with Taiwan was necessarily a "long-term and complicated struggle."² This paper seeks to clarify these anomalies by following two rules of thumb: (1) when actions are so obviously counter-rational, look for the reasons in the non-rational; and (2) more often than not, perceived imperatives in domestic politics will override a state's short- or long-term goals in interstate relations.

Thus, in the standard three-level analysis of international relations (the international system, the actor or domestic politics, and the decision-making levels), this article focuses on the second and third levels. The analysis puts aside the international system level because such an approach tends to emphasize the "output" aspect of interstate relations, viewing a state's behavior—in this case being Beijing's categorical claim of its right to incorporate Taiwan—as being a reaction to the actions of other states (in the present case, that of the ROC and the United States). Myron Weiner's descriptions of the dynamics of irredentism, which he called "the Mace-

¹Employing a rationalist mode of analysis, Segal wrote in 1996 that "China may have learned that saber rattling against Taiwan is counterproductive." See Gerald Segal, "Get Through and Beyond Chinese Nationalism," *International Herald Tribune*, November 14, 1996.

²"Jiang Zemin's Closing Address at the Fifth Plenum of the CCP's Fourteenth Central Committee," *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies) (Taipei) 39, no. 2 (February 1996): 78.

donian syndrome," exemplify the international system approach.³ Weiner's analysis sheds light on the conflicts between the PRC and the ROC over Taiwan's political status.⁴ The "Macedonian syndrome" has sixteen characteristics, of which fourteen may be observed in PRC-ROC disputes over Taiwan.⁵

However, the "output" mode of analysis begs the question as to the sources setting "the Macedonian syndrome" in motion. One wishes to know why a particular state or regime seeks to revise the status quo with such a degree of urgency at a particular historical juncture. In the case of Beijing's militant reactions to the Taiwanese independence movement, some might maintain that the PRC had no other choice.⁶ As Henry Kissinger suggested, however, rarely does a state face such a dire situation in which only one choice is viable. He amplified: "But for the majority of states the margin of decision has been greater. The actual choice has been determined to a considerable degree by their interpretation of the environment and by their leaders' conception of alternatives."⁷

The key is the phrase "leaders' interpretation of their environment." For instance, when the Mao regime sought to enlist Soviet aid in an armed conflict with the ROC and the United States over Quemoy (金門) and Matsu (馬祖) in 1958, Nikita Khrushchev reminded Mao Zedong and his colleagues of the Brest treaty between the Soviet Union and Germany in 1918 in which the USSR had agreed to the annexation of some of its territory in order to buy time for the consolidation of the new regime.⁸ In other

³Myron Weiner, "The Macedonian Syndrome: A Historical Model of International Relations and Political Development," *World Politics* 23, no. 4 (July 1971): 665-83.

⁴That the PRC has treated its conflicts with the ROC in an irredentist framework is shown in China's claim that the United States has controlled Taiwan completely, in order to weaken China's national power. See Jiang Zemin's confidential talk to the military in Nanjing and Guangdong in February 2000, as reported in Li Zijing, "Jiang Zemin Going South to Mobilize for War Preparation," *Cheng Ming* (Contending) (Hong Kong), March 2000.

⁵For the sixteen characteristics, see note 3 above.

⁶Yongnian Zheng, *Discovering Chinese Nationalism: Modernization, Identity, and International Relations* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

⁷Henry A. Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," in *Comparative Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays*, ed. Wolfram A. Hanrieder (New York: David McKay Company, 1971), 24.

⁸Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-61* (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 282.

words, Khrushchev suggested an alternate way of dealing with the existence of the ROC. The PRC had refrained from brinkmanship in the Taiwan Strait thereafter until 1996 when the People's Liberation Army (PLA) fired missiles into the vicinity of Taiwan. During this long period of relative peace, Beijing of course never changed its policy of nonrecognition of the ROC as a separate Chinese state. There is no compelling reason why the PRC today could not continue the same policy of nonrecognition even if a new Taiwanese leader should decide to change the official national title. There has been no proof that an autonomous Taiwan has somehow harmed the PRC's declared central task—economic reform. So the key research question is: Why has *the Jiang Zemin administration* taken a confrontational stand toward Taiwan's determination to continue as a sovereign state?

The importance of studying the internal conditions of the PRC may be underscored by revisiting Allen Whiting's thesis on the PRC's decision to intervene militarily in the Korean War. According to Whiting, a crucial contributory factor to Beijing's decision to fight the United States in Korea was the Chinese leadership's feelings of vulnerability and insecurity. "The final step," wrote Whiting, "seems to have been prompted in part by general concern over the range of opportunities *within* China that might be exploited by a determined, powerful enemy on China's doorstep."⁹ For reasons known to all knowledgeable students and scholars of contemporary Chinese affairs, half a century after the Korean War, the Beijing Politburo's sense of vulnerability and insecurity remains strong. Without taking this fact into consideration, we cannot undertake a credible analysis of Beijing's militancy toward Taiwan's 2000 presidential election.

The Conceptual Framework

In linking the PRC's internal conditions and behaviors toward Taiwan's politics, the two primary conceptual references are diversion and

⁹Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (New York: Macmillan, 1960), 159. Emphasis added.

externalization. Kissinger, for example, viewed the leaders of newly established nations as particularly prone to using diversion for domestic reasons. "Many of the leaders of the new nations," Kissinger wrote, "use foreign policy as a means to escape intractable internal difficulties and as a device to achieve domestic cohesion."¹⁰ If the term "politics" is meant negotiating with diverse interests so as to achieve a consensus, then diversion is designed to avoid politics. Unlike diversion, externalization is designed to further politics, albeit of a partisan kind. Externalization projects domestic conflicts to the international realm so as to defeat one's opponents. For instance, Iranian clerical leaders used confrontation with the United States to discredit the pro-U.S. elements in the country. Robert Snyder suggested that although more likely than other types of leaders to employ the externalization tactic, revolutionary leaders are not the only ones that practice externalization. Snyder wrote: "As globalization and transnationalism increase, politics may become divided between groups that have international connections and those that do not. Domestic conflict may lead one group to use international conflict to weaken another group."¹¹

Furthermore, national elites who are liable to employ diversion and externalization are also likely to exploit statist or symbol-suffused nationalism. Statist nationalism seeks to develop a state cult, with an overwhelming emphasis on the primacy of the state and national sovereignty.¹² Symbol-suffused nationalism draws power primarily from myth rather than empirically-based institution and culture. One brand of symbol-suffused nationalism is based on three varieties of mythmaking: self-glorifying, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning.¹³ Self-glorification may take the form of a reconstructed history that is designed to benefit a particular political elite or political organization. Another name for this term is regressive (or

¹⁰Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy," 44.

¹¹Robert Snyder, "The U.S. and Third World Revolutionary States: Understanding the Breakdown in Relations," *International Studies Quarterly* 43 (1999): 286.

¹²Daniel Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies of International Conflict Resolution," in *International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis*, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1965), 359-60.

¹³Stephen Van Evera, "Hypotheses on Nationalism and War," in *Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict*, ed. Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1997), 48.

revivalist) nationalism.

According to Kissinger, Van Evera, and Katz, three types of states seem to be particularly susceptible to both the two types of nationalism mentioned above as well as to using foreign policy to overcome internal problems. They are new states, states in severe internal crises, and declining states. Van Evera observed that when experiencing severe crises in legitimacy, economic performance, and commitment of their citizens, states are likely to engage in chauvinistic or regressive nationalist myth-making. This is particularly true when their societies do not have strong independent evaluative institutions, such as an independent mass media.¹⁴ Katz's concept of "declining societies" is of particular relevance in understanding the PRC and its conflicts with the ROC. The state of a society in decline finds its power blocked either by external or internal constraints.¹⁵ To arrest the loss of power, the state often resorts to redefining nationalism and repressing internal opposition, which in turn set off an escalating conflict dynamic. Katz's descriptions are worthy of quoting at length:

But the regressive type of nationalism, if it captures the state, can rarely succeed without the resort to military aggressiveness or war. The very reason for the revival of the patriotism of the past is the failure of internal institutions to meet the problems of the present. Instead of the development of new institutions, there is an attempt to anticipate revolutionary change by a reactionary counter-revolution. This is accomplished by internal repression and the use of the state to resurrect old institutions utilizing emotional chauvinism. . . . The dynamic is one of war. . . . The internal stresses and strains are projected outward. This externalization of internal conflict occurs in other types of nation-states but regressive nationalism is the example par excellence of this process.¹⁶

There have been several instances in the PRC's foreign relations that suggest either diversion or externalization at work. We have already mentioned Whiting's interpretation of Mao's possible motivations to fight in Korea. Other episodes include: the army's intense shellings of Quemoy and Matsu at the height of the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1958, the 1962

¹⁴Ibid., 47-54.

¹⁵Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies," 364. Katz mentions only external constraints on the power of a declining state. I think, however, that a state may be equally likely to be constrained by internal forces.

¹⁶Ibid., 379.

border war with India amidst a catastrophic man-made (more accurately, Mao-made) famine in the countryside, the armed clashes with the former Soviet Union on the islands on the Ussuri River in 1969 during the Cultural Revolution, and the short war with Vietnam in 1979 as Deng Xiaoping attempted to rally the country behind his reform scheme.¹⁷ In all these instances, the CCP invoked statist nationalism by alleging that China's sovereignty or territorial integrity was imperiled.

This paper argues that the Jiang Zemin administration is following the same path in its conflicts with the ROC. Specifically, four internal forces have accounted for the Jiang administration's militancy toward Taiwan. They are:

1. Forces deriving from the PRC's use of regressive nationalism to achieve national cohesion
2. Forces deriving from the PRC's state reconsolidation crisis
3. Forces deriving from the growing contradiction between the PLA's rising national status and internal decay
4. Forces deriving from the psychological factors of leaders (mainly Jiang Zemin and Zhu Rongji 朱鎔基) and the PRC citizenry

Regressive Nationalism

As mentioned earlier, the Jiang Zemin administration's militancy toward Taiwan stems fundamentally from the leadership's sense of vulnerability and insecurity (see next section). The Jiang regime's appeal to regressive nationalism must be understood in this context. This section demonstrates the CCP's instrumental approach to nationalism and argues that Jiang's regressive nationalism has contributed significantly to the current tension across the Taiwan Strait.

By regressive nationalism, Katz meant that the political elite redefine and restrict nationalism "with respect to the types of people and the kinds

¹⁷Lin Tung, "Forty Years of the People's Liberation Army," *Ming Pao yuekan* (Ming Pao Monthly) (Hong Kong), October 1989, 4-15.

of values considered truly patriotic."¹⁸ As a result, the state hunts for internal enemies aggressively and at the same time seeks opportunities to externalize domestic dissension. Regressive nationalism is inherently self-contradictory—the ostensible purpose is to broaden the basis of support for the state by linking the state to the nation's history but the effects may be more alienating than uniting. The history of the CCP's approach to Chinese nationalism demonstrates this self-contradictory character.

First of all, the CCP's treatment of nationalism is almost consistently and persistently instrumental. That is shown clearly by the CCP's attitude toward the archsymbol of modern Chinese nationalism—Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the Republican revolution of 1911. Whenever feeling politically defensive or unsure of its rule, the CCP invariably stages public ceremonies or makes statements honoring Dr. Sun and the Republican revolution. At such times, the CCP only affirms the aspects of Dr. Sun and the Nationalist revolution that, in the Party's view, have contributed to the triumph of the CCP. For instance, in a pioneering study of the CCP's relations with Dr. Sun, Leng and Palmer wrote that after 1949, "the Chinese Communists' attitude toward Sun's ideas has become increasingly opportunistic and selective."¹⁹ One may find evidence of the CCP's instrumentalism toward nationalism in: (1) 1949-50, when the PRC was first established; (2) 1956, before the Party's launching of the Hundred Flowers campaign, as Mao felt the need to differentiate himself from Stalin whose despotism had just been bared by Khrushchev; (3) 1961, in the midst of a mass famine and troop unrest as a result of the Great Leap Forward; (4) 1981, during the transition from Mao's holdovers to Deng's administration; and (5) the nationwide patriotic education campaign from 1993 to the present, which marked the assumption of power of the Party's third generation of leaders, headed by Jiang Zemin.²⁰ In his speech to the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997, the first such congress without Deng, Jiang unprecedentedly mentioned Sun

¹⁸Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies," 364.

¹⁹Shao-chuan Leng and Norman D. Palmer, *Sun Yat-sen and Communism* (New York: Praeger, 1960), 123.

²⁰For the periods of 1949-50 and 1956, see *ibid.*; for 1961, see *Xinhua yuebao* (New China Monthly), 1961, no. 11:4-32; and for 1981, see *ibid.*, 1981, no. 10:47-48. More discussions of the post-1989 patriotic education movement will follow.

Yat-sen together with Mao and Deng as "the three great leaders of China" in the twentieth century.²¹ In all these episodes, the CCP felt vulnerable and insecure for one reason or another. Moreover, the CCP always made sure that the PRC was the sole beneficiary of any respects paid to Sun and his revolution. This includes the 1981 homage to Sun, which marked the beginning of the Party's peace offensive against Taiwan. The PRC pronouncements in 1981 replaced the earlier threats of "liberating" (解放 *jiefang*) Taiwan with the more benign terminology of the "returning" (回歸 *huigui*) of Taiwan to China. On the surface, the PRC seemed to have viewed the anti-Manchu revolution of 1911 as being common ground with the Nationalists in Taiwan. In reality, by claiming to be the legitimate heir of Dr. Sun's revolution, the CCP delegitimized and alienated the Nationalists. Furthermore, Deng and Jiang played the nationalism card differently, which brings to the fore their different degrees of insecurity and feelings of vulnerability.

When Deng was alive, he was able to keep a lid on regressive nationalism due to his high degree of legitimacy both inside and outside the CCP. In other words, Deng's sense of insecurity was probably much less than that of Jiang and the rest of the third-generation leadership. Deng was confident that the patriotism of the Chinese people would come forth after the Party had achieved success in economic development.²² In academic terms, Deng's concept of nationalism was more institutional than statist. Stated differently, Deng had wished nationalism to be based more on reality than symbols.²³ Even after the shock of the near-revolution of June 1989, Deng reminded the Party that what had saved the PRC from collapsing (as had most of the East European regimes) was the positive results of the CCP's economic reforms.²⁴ For that reason, Deng had cautioned Jiang Zemin not

²¹Xu Bin, "An Extraordinary View: Putting Three Great Men on the Same Level," *Xuexi* (Learning) (Hangzhou), 1997, no. 10:9-10.

²²*Wenhui Bao* (Shanghai), December 3, 1991; and Xu Jiatur, *Xu Jiatur Xianggang huiyilu* (Xu Jiatur's Hong Kong memoirs), vol. 2 (Taipei: Lianhe bao, 1994), 601.

²³On the differences between statist and institutional nationalism, see Katz, "Nationalism and Strategies," 359-60.

²⁴"Deng Xiaoping's Southern Trip," Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), *Daily Report: China* [hereafter *FBIS-CHI*], Supplement, 92-063-S (April 1, 1992): 1.

to carry his xenophobic campaign of "Vigilance against Peaceful Evolution" too far.²⁵

The Jiang administration has been the one to make a major investment in regressive nationalism. The third generation of CCP leadership ascended to the ruling position against the background of the upheaval in April-June 1989, the dismissal of yet another General Secretary of the Party, and rampant corruption in the political system. The psychology of the third-generation CCP leaders may be gleaned from a 1995 report in the Hong Kong journal *Ching Pao* (鏡報):

Zhu Rongji once said to some friends in private: We are able to do something in the central government now, but we have lived off the past gains of our older generations and have owed our happiness to them. If the veteran comrades are gone, what shall we do? Therefore, we should lose no time in doing more things that will be highly appreciated by the people of the entire nation. We must depend on this in building up our authority.²⁶

Apparently, one of the efforts of the third generation of leaders has been to promote a nationwide patriotic education movement. From 1993 to 1995, the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee issued films, television programs, and books for patriotic education and propaganda. The nationalism and patriotism in these works are highly restrictive and partisan. For instance, of the one hundred books that the Propaganda Department of the CCP Central Committee recommended for teachers, twenty-four are not explicitly connected with the CCP, being primarily about China's geography and landscape. The rest consists simply of the history of the CCP.²⁷ In sum, these books teach Chinese youngsters that patriotism/nationalism is embodied in the history and institution of the CCP.

Yet another example of the CCP's partisan interpretation of patriotism/nationalism is the Party's 1995 ceremony honoring the victory of the Allies in World War II. According to Chinese press accounts, the CCP

²⁵ *Ming Pao* (Hong Kong), October 8, 1991, as cited in *Zhongguo shibao* (China Times) (Taipei), October 9, 1991.

²⁶ *FBIS-CHI-95-123* (June 27, 1995): 37.

²⁷ Judgment made based on an examination of the book titles. For a complete list of the one hundred books, see *FBIS-CHI-95-124* (June 28, 1995): 40-44.

portrayed itself as the national leader of China's resistance against Japan's aggression. The CCP claimed that Mao had formulated China's grand strategy of the war of resistance and CCP troops were the ones to decisively defeat Japan.²⁸ The role of the Nationalists in the war was almost entirely ignored.

Clearly, Jiang's patriotic education is but mythmaking. Several possible effects of such a campaign can contribute to tension with Taiwan. First, the accounts of China's humiliations and sufferings during the war legitimize the CCP's claim of the right to "recover" Taiwan. As Pool aptly wrote: "The leader who would shape opinion is constrained to behave in appropriate ways. And when he succeeded in creating opinions he limits his further freedom to change. What he has led the public to believe in, the public will demand."²⁹ Second, the campaign seems to be designed to insult the Nationalist Party on Taiwan, as the Nationalists and their leader Chiang Kai-shek were the wartime government of China. Third, since the overwhelming majority of the Taiwanese did not share with the Chinese people on the mainland the histories of civil war and Japan's atrocious deeds in China, Beijing's so-called patriotic education highlights the different historical experiences between the two states and societies. Fourth, the lurid accounts of fratricide depicted in this propaganda can only alienate the people of Taiwan from both the CCP and the Nationalist Party, thus contributing to independence sentiments. For example, ROC Vice-President Lu Hsiu-lien (呂秀蓮) had prepared a speech to be broadcast after the election victory in which she contrasted her party's assuming power through the ballot box with the CCP's acquiring power through "countless instances of bloodshed" (her speech was not broadcast for obvious reasons).³⁰

Furthermore, in 1996 the Jiang administration launched yet another xenophobic campaign: "Anti-Colonial Culture." The military spearheaded this drive by publishing an editorial in the army paper entitled "National Spirit and National Dignity." The Shanghai Party establishment, being a

²⁸*Xinhua yuebao*, 1995, no. 10:6-28.

²⁹Ithiel de Sola Pool, "Public Opinion and the Control of Armaments," *Daedalus*, Fall 1960, 987.

³⁰*Shijie ribao* (The World Journal) (Los Angeles), March 22, 2000.

client of Jiang Zemin, also played an active role in the movement. The activities of this campaign were reminiscent of the days of the Cultural Revolution as Chinese stores were ordered to take down signs bearing English-sounding names.³¹ The Jiang administration also saw Taiwan and Hong Kong as conduits of "decadent" Western culture. Propagandists in Beijing accused Taiwan and Hong Kong media productions that have been imported to the PRC of "recklessly propagating high consumption, pleasure seeking, a corrupt life-style, and negative and decadent ideology and culture."³² As noted by a Taiwanese correspondent in China, the media in Beijing have been persistently negative about Taiwan.³³

All these examples suggest that contrary to Beijing's public declarations of welcoming Taiwan to "return" to China, the CCP's restrictive and regressive nationalism has actually been pushing Taiwan away. The Jiang leadership has almost seemed to have made Taiwan a negative example for the patriotism movement, with the island thus deserving punitive action from the PRC. Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) and Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of Taiwan are not the only ones responsible for the alienation between the two Chinese societies.

Jiang could have chosen a type of nationalism that less alienates Taiwan. Indeed, there has been another nationalistic movement in the PRC that is integrative and unifying for all Chinese: the cultural revivalist campaign organized by Chinese historians and scholars in other fields who were revolted by Mao's Marxist universalism (a view which sought to eliminate Chinese cultural uniqueness). Under Mao's rule, Chinese history was rewritten to fit Marxist concepts. Chinese cultural integrity was sacrificed. Until Mao's death, no Chinese schools were allowed to teach Chinese cultural history. Nowadays, Chinese historians have accused Mao of committing the sin of "national nihilism" (民族虛無論 *minzu xuwulun*). In the opinion of a considerable number of Chinese cultural historians, that

³¹*Zhongguo shibao*, July 16, 1996; Xie Fangping, "Watch Out for the Resurgence of the Dregs of 'Colonial Culture'," *Jiefang ribao* (Liberation Daily) (Shanghai), November 20, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-242* (December 18, 1995): 28-30.

³²*FBIS-CHI-94-057* (March 24, 1994): 28.

³³*Zhongguo shibao*, October 3, 1994.

Chinese youth was so open to Western cultural influences when Deng's reforms began was the direct result of Mao's national nihilism.³⁴ These Chinese intellectuals advocate cultural nationalism, a concept which is inclusive of the Chinese mainland and Taiwan. For obviously political reasons, Jiang and his colleagues have selected exclusive and regressive nationalism instead, which has caused primarily conflicts with and the alienation of Taiwan.

Jiang's playing of the nationalism card can potentially lead to conflict escalation in two ways. One is the fact that diversion techniques tend to develop into a vicious circle. Jiang hoped to use conflicts with Taiwan as a means to reduce internal disunity. Since the sources of China's internal dissension lie within the country and cannot be resolved in a short time, Jiang might be tempted to increase the scale of tension across the Taiwan Strait for better results. Another possible way for conflicts to escalate between Beijing and Taipei is, as Pool's statement cited earlier suggested, Jiang's nationalism campaign. This movement has created a responsive group within the public who will demand that Jiang seriously play the role of a chauvinistic nationalist leader. In fact, such a phenomenon is already occurring.

In 1996, the American media brought to the attention of their readers a Chinese bestseller entitled *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu* (中國可以說不 The China that can say no). The book, quotes Patrick Tyler of the *New York Times*, is a work of "Yankee bashing."³⁵ To the three young authors, all of whom are engaged in literary activity of one form or another, a vast U.S. conspiracy has kept Taiwan separate from the PRC. Their message to the people of Taiwan was simple: "The state in Beijing has decided your future; you have no say in this matter."³⁶ In a sequel to the book, the authors (now

³⁴Li Kang, "Preface to Chinese Regional Cultures Book Series," in Yuan Tingdong, *Bashu wenhua* (Sichuan culture) (Shenyang: Liaoning jiaoyu chubanshe, 1991); and Tan Jixiang, "Differences of Chinese Culture in Times and Regions," *Fudan xuebao* (Journal of Fudan University), 1986, no. 2:4-13.

³⁵Patrick E. Tyler, "The Rebels' New Cause: Book of Yankee Bashing," *New York Times*, September 4, 1996.

³⁶Song Qiang, Zhang Cangcang, and Qiao Bian, *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu* (The China that can say no) (Beijing: Zhongguo gongshang lianhe chubanshe, 1996), 36.

augmented to five) declared that "a China without Taiwan is unfit to be called China" and that the PRC ought to set a deadline for Taiwan's compliance to the PRC's terms of unification.³⁷ The sort of chauvinist nationalism expressed in this genre of works in the PRC is limited to young, university graduates. The masses in the Chinese mainland have been more attracted to religious revivals and cultist movements, such as Falun Gong (法輪功), than extreme nationalism.

Lasswell has noted that the attitudes of intellectuals in non-Western nations toward Western cultures usually proceed through three phases: "initial rejection of foreign models; attempts at near-total incorporation or foreign models, including national or international symbols of identity; and partial rejection of foreign models and emphasis upon distinctiveness."³⁸ A portion of university-educated Chinese youth now display attitudes of the third phase. There are possible psychological, structural, and political reasons underlying current Chinese youthful chauvinism.

First, the present youth is a generation that is innocent of both the disillusionment of the late Mao generation and the enthusiasm for Western cultures characteristic of the young at the initial phase of Deng's reform. The current predicament facing young people today is a lack of an accepted and stable ideological framework. Socialism is dead. Capitalism is tolerated in substance, but not in name. Democracy has been crushed. Nationalism is not only allowed, but also actively promoted by the state. Nationalism in a still poor and information-sanitized China is prone to extremes.

Second, as evidenced by the CCP's patriotic education campaign, both the elites and a considerable proportion of the Chinese masses are living in a time warp. Their frames of reference are derived from the late nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries that extolled national exclusiveness, self-sufficiency, and centralization of power. To Jiang Zemin and the writers of the *Can Say No* type of literature, nationalism is

³⁷Gu Qingshen et al., *Zhongguo haishi neng shuo bu* (A China that still can say no) (Hong Kong: Ming Pao chubanshe, 1996), 37, 63.

³⁸Harold D. Lasswell, "The World Revolution of Our Time: A Framework for Basic Policy Research," in *World Revolutionary Elites: Studies in Coercive Ideological Movements*, ed. Harold D. Lasswell and Daniel Lerner (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), 88.

a once-born entity. These "patriots" cannot accept that a new national identity may be born among a people such as those in Taiwan as a result of success in achieving a distinct way of life. The elites and a portion of the public in the PRC equate diversity/pluralism with national weakness.

Yet another possible reason for the extreme nationalism of some Chinese youth is a differentiation among the young generation today, reminiscent of when young intellectuals split into two groups in both the Mao and Deng eras. One group went abroad to be exposed to more Western values for both personal and national reasons (as did Deng). Another group stayed home (as did Mao). Later, there were conflicts between the homebounders and the "returned students' clique" inside the CCP. Xenophobic nationalism seems to be more pronounced among the homebounders, as exemplified in Mao's attitudes toward the West. The same type of split among the intellectual youth of today may be fueling the flames of extreme nationalism. The writers of *Can Say No* unashamedly showed their resentment of those who have gone to the United States for advanced study.³⁹

Finally, there have been dramatic changes in social conflicts in China. Under Mao, social conflicts had been simplified into only being between state and society. Deng's reforms have pluralized social conflicts, however. Political dissent has been but one of the conflicts. More and more young intellectuals in the PRC have grown alienated from society; they are disgusted with people's worshipping of foreign things and excessive materialism. Some have turned to the state for social salvation. This group idealizes the state and wants to use the state to cleanse society. The authors of chauvinist works belong to this group of alienated intellectuals. Taking Taiwan by force is a way these intellectuals can worship the state.

State Reconsolidation

As mentioned earlier, Whiting attributed the PRC's military intervention in Korea in 1950 to the CCP's facing "a host of actual and potential

³⁹Song, Zhang, Qiao, *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu*, 17-22.

enemies at home." Specifically, Whiting mentioned remnant "Kuomintang forces, traditional secret societies, non-Chinese peoples, and mountain bandits."⁴⁰ Astonishing is that fifty years after the Korean War, the third-generation CCP leadership is confronted with a new host of actual and potential enemies at home. Although the Kuomintang (KMT) has no forces left in the PRC, secret societies, separatist movements by minorities, and bandits have all staged comebacks. In addition, there are intellectual dissenters, underground parties, and warring factions within the CCP. However, the most serious "enemy" is dissension and alienation within the CCP itself. This section argues that the Party-state in the PRC is suffering a penetration crisis and that the Jiang administration is using tension over the Taiwan Strait to divert or externalize internal divisions. For example, the Hong Kong journal *Cheng Ming* (爭鳴) commented quite aptly upon Jiang's describing reunification with Taiwan as an "urgent" (迫切 *poqie*) task of the CCP:

The separation between Taiwan and the Chinese mainland has existed for decades. That has not hampered China's modernization in any way. Even if Beijing wishes to reunify with Taiwan, they must wait for the necessary conditions to mature. Now the PRC seems to feel a strong sense of urgency; Beijing gives the impression that the CCP cannot carry on without immediate unification. That is puzzling. The truth of the matter is that Beijing has created tensions in the Taiwan Strait in order to divert a crisis in CCP rule. Only by diverting people's attention to this matter can the Communist Party suppress the myriads of internal problems.⁴¹

The following analyzes Beijing's penetration crisis by discussing: (1) divisions within the CCP, (2) relations between the CCP and non-CCP elites, and (3) conflicts between the Party and society.

"In its broadest sense," LaPalombara wrote, "penetration means conformance to public policy enunciated by central governmental authority."⁴² At the core of penetration is, so to speak, a sender-receiver relation. The central government as the sender must have legitimacy, resolve, and re-

⁴⁰Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*, 158.

⁴¹Editor, "What Is Behind 'An Urgent Task'," *Cheng Ming*, January 2000. 12.

⁴²Joseph LaPalombara, "Penetration: A Crisis of Governmental Capacity," in *Crises and Sequences in Political Development*, ed. Leonard Binder et al. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971), 208.

sources (remunerative, identitive, and coercive) in order to make and disseminate public policy. Subnational elites and communities as receivers must have the requisite physical, structural, and cultural conditions in order to conform to policy. Penetration crises can occur at either end of the communication chain. Policy conformance cannot be obtained because of the central leadership's lack of legitimacy, resolve, or resources. Political elites may also prove to be incapable of creating viable institutions acceptable to both the central and local officials. On the other hand, failure in policy conformance may be due to the inability or unwillingness of the rank and file. The PRC seems to be plagued by all these penetration difficulties.

The most eloquent spokesman of the Party's penetration crisis is none other than Jiang Zemin. Since the early 1990s, Jiang's speeches have been replete with phrases critical of Party member insubordination. Such phrases include "despite repeated instructions, [Party members] go their own ways" (三令五申，我行我素 *sanling wushen, woxing wosu*), "while the superior has his policy, the subordinate still has his counter-policy" (上有政策，下有對策 *shangyou zhengce, xiayou duice*), and "commands disobeyed, proscriptions ignored" (有令不行，有禁不止 *youling buxing, youjin buzhi*). Jiang even maintained that he was in danger of being a "phony commander" (空頭司令 *kongtou siling*).⁴³ In response to these phenomena, Jiang launched repeated campaigns, all for the purpose of insuring subnational leaders "being one with the Party Center" (與中央保持一致 *yu zhongyang baochi yizhi*) and that "policies and decrees be fully implemented" (政令暢通 *zhengling changtong*). These include: the 1994 campaign of "upholding the authority of the Party Center," the 1995 campaign of "stressing politics," and the current campaign of "three stresses: study, politics, and righteousness." Jiang has taken the unprecedented step of requiring newly elected members of the Party Central Committee to par-

⁴³Jiang Zemin, "Talk at Meeting of Directors of Organization Departments," *Qiushi* (Seeking Truth) (Beijing), 1989, no. 20:9. See also: Jiang Zemin, "Struggle to Build the Party into a Stronger Vanguard of the Working Class," *ibid.*, 1990, no. 13:2-9; Jiang Zemin, "In Commemoration of the 72d Anniversary of the Founding of the CCP," *Renmin ribao* (People's Daily), July 1, 1993; Jiang Zemin, "Talk at the Sixth Plenary Meeting of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection," *ibid.*, March 1, 1996; and Jiang Zemin, "On Stressing Politics," *Qiushi*, 1996, no. 13:2-4.

ticipate in an orientation program at the Central Party School in Beijing to insure policy conformance.

Judging by the Party's own admissions, the penetration crisis has been caused by legitimacy problems, political apathy, status conflicts and disparities, dissolution of the Party at the base, and rising demands for fundamental reforms from the rank and file. Regarding legitimacy, Deng Xiaoping's redefinition of socialism and philosophy of reform have not yet been accepted by the majority of Party members. They find Deng's insistence that China is still practicing socialism groundless. Many have questioned whether there is any difference between what the CCP is practicing and capitalism elsewhere in the world. An investigation by the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) in 1995 discovered that a majority of cadres had not changed their ways of managing economic affairs to suit the reform policy.⁴⁴ The nucleus of a political party is a set of ideals. When these ideals have lost their meaning to a large number of members, then a party lacks the most important reason of existence. That is why Jiang Zemin has expressed grave concern over political apathy in the CCP; even members of the Beijing Higher Party School have shown disinterest in ideological matters.⁴⁵ Meanwhile, there have been growing status differentiation and other disparities among Party members due to their different degrees of economic successes. Some have gotten rich and become employers; others have not caught on with the market economy. The political stands of these two groups have changed accordingly. Conflict, confrontation, and low morale among Party rank and file are a serious cause of lack of unity within the Party.⁴⁶

All the above forces seem to have undermined the CCP at the basic

⁴⁴Dong Degang, "The Relationship between the Standard of 'Three Conduciveness' and the Party's Ideological Line," *Zhongguo dangzheng gangbu luntan* (China Forum for Party-State Cadres), 1995, no. 1:26-27, 32; and Zhen Xiaoying, "Seriously Study the New Situation and Problems That Party Construction Faces in a Market Economy," *ibid.*, 1997, no. 3:36-38.

⁴⁵Jiang Zemin, "On Problems of Strengthening Construction of Party Schools," *Renmin ribao*, August 12, 1990; Jiang Zemin, "Leading Cadres Must Stress Politics," *ibid.*, January 17, 1996.

⁴⁶Guo Yading, "The Growth and Elimination of the Party's Internal Deviations," *Zhonggong Zhejiang shengwei dangxiao xuebao* (Journal of the Zhejiang Provincial Party School), 1998, no. 5:55-60.

level, particularly in rural areas. According to numerous authors writing for Party press and journals, the CCP is a giant with clay feet. They declared that the Party has been "eliminated" at the grass roots. The three phrases describing the Party organizations in rural areas are: paralysis (瘫痪 *tanhuan*), weak (软弱 *ruanruo*), and lax (涣散 *huansan*). It is at the elementary level of the Party that one sees the crux of the penetration problem in China: the inability and unwillingness of grass-roots cadres to receive information and policies from the central authorities. The cadres in the countryside have been described as aged, uneducated, and incompetent. They have been accustomed to the Maoist standard operating procedure—waiting for centrally decreed mass campaigns and then executing these faithfully. Now required to rely on their own resources to develop their communities economically and socially, the cadres are simply not equal to the task. A survey of 1,358 villages in 1990 found that 70 percent of the rural cadres investigated failed to perform any leadership function.⁴⁷ Competing power centers have emerged in the countryside including clan organizations, religious organizations, and organized crime. Against this background, unsurprising is that voices for fundamental political reforms have been rising *within* the CCP. Most recently, a professor at the Beijing Higher Party School called for ridding the CCP of personal rule, institutionalizing competitive elections, improving the work of the people's congress, and granting genuine autonomy to ethnic minorities.⁴⁸

The forces of dissension and dissolution are not confined to within the CCP, but have spread to traditionally compliant and formalistic representative organizations, especially the National People's Congress (NPC) and

⁴⁷Zhong Zhushan, "A Study of the Present Condition of Rural Party Organizations," *Liaowang* (Outlook Weekly), 1990, no. 1:12-14. For other reports on rural Party cadres, see: "Mainland Academic Says Party 'Eliminated' at Grass Roots," *FBIS-CHI-94-191* (October 3, 1994): 40; Wang Tianyi, "Challenges to Rural Party Primary Organizations and Its Solution," *Qiyishi*, 1996, no. 8:37-39; "Some Outstanding Problems in Party Building in Rural Areas," *Zuzhi renshixue yanjiu* (Organizational Personnel Studies), 1997, no. 3:23-25; Gao Yun, "A Preliminary Commentary on the Weaknesses of Party Primary Organizations," *Lilun yu gaige* (Theory and Reform), 1998, no. 1:70-71; and Jing Wei and Li Qingzhong, "An Analysis of Theoretical Education in Party Primary Organizations," *Qiqihar shehui kexue* (Qiqihar Social Sciences), 1998, no. 4:30-32.

⁴⁸Wang Guixiu, "Why Political System Reforms Cannot Be Postponed," *Cheng Ming*, February 2000, 11; also *New York Times*, September 20, 1998.

the CPPCC. Since 1995, a growing number of the delegates to these two institutions have been defying the CCP by casting negative votes on both personnel and policy issues. These delegates have used their "voice" option more aggressively, criticizing the preponderance of Party members among congressional deputies and the incompetence of the majority of Party cadres. The "democratic parties" in the CPPCC had expressed a desire for autonomy and freedom in order to conduct real party politics, revise the national constitution, and share rule with the CCP.⁴⁹ The CCP Central Committee responded by cautioning them not to be "seduced" and "corrupted" by "international anti-China forces" (read: democratic ideas from the United States).⁵⁰ Before the convening of these organizations in February 2000, the Jiang administration issued a ten-point guideline to Party officials in order to restrict the deputies from speaking out on political system reform or wanting to emulate Western parliamentary models. As had happened during the "Anti-Colonial Culture" campaign, the CCP took the opportunity to again malign Taiwan. Hu Jintao (胡锦涛), Jiang's protégé, warned the deputies that they should guard against "agents of the Taiwan independence movement" using their organizational meetings to encourage separatist views.⁵¹

Two cases demonstrate that Taiwan has been foremost in Jiang's mind in his handling of the penetration crisis. First, while calling on Party officials to "stress politics," Jiang said: "The hostile forces in the West want to 'Westernize' and 'split' us; they want to impose their so-called democracy and liberty on us. Lee Teng-hui wants to initiate 'Taiwan independence.' Should not we stress politics?"⁵² The second case was Hu

⁴⁹Lo Ping, "The CCP Prepares for Repression," *Cheng Ming*, January 1999, 23-25; and Lo Ping, "Some Congressional Deputies Challenge the Power of the Party," *ibid.*, April 1999, 14-16.

⁵⁰"CPC Document Warns against 'Infiltration'," *Lianhe bao* (United Daily News) (Taipei), April 15, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-073* (April 17, 1995): 31-32. For more on the changes of these two organizations, see: Cheng Yin, "Jiang Zemin's New Crisis," *Jiushi niandai* (The Nineties) (Hong Kong), May 1996, 26-29; Sha Min, "The Two Sessions in the Post-Deng Era: Anxious and Dull," *ibid.*, April 1997; and Zong Hewen, "In Reality, They Cast a Vote of No-Confidence," *China Focus* 5, no. 5 (May 1, 1997): 7-8.

⁵¹Yue San, "The Ten-Point Guidelines to Prevent the 'Two Conferences' Getting out of Control," *Cheng Ming*, March 2000, 19-20.

⁵²Jiang, "Leading Cadres Must Stress Politics."

Jintao's recent relaying of Jiang's concern over ideological education. Hu had this to say:

General Secretary Jiang seriously criticized some departments and leading cadres for loss of confidence in ideological work and for being apathetic. That reflects their loss of communist ideals and deviations in world outlook. In such a world of rapid change; economic globalization; developments in science, high technology, and information; and cultural exchanges, we must be alert to America's hegemonic stand that regards China as its number one enemy, trying to launch an offensive against us economically, politically, and ideologically. At the same time, we should never forget that we are faced with finding a solution to our nation's most important task of national unification.⁵³

The above descriptions of Jiang's statements and actions have made clear that Jiang wants to use the alleged "U.S. hegemony" and "Taiwan independence" to discredit the democrats among the non-CCP elites. At the same time, Jiang seeks to divert the various divisive forces within the Party to "the urgent national task" of taking over Taiwan. Furthermore, as any student in international politics knows, a divided state is unable to negotiate from a position of strength, let alone deliver credible threats to an external enemy. In the final analysis, behind Jiang's many campaigns and polemics against the United States and Taiwan lies his sense of vulnerability and insecurity.

In almost every political campaign organized by Jiang, his propagandists have purveyed the myth of a solidary CCP that is idealistic, principled, selfless, and conscientiously practices "criticism and self-criticism" as well as "democratic centralism." This is the image of a combat party facing a deadly enemy in a life-or-death struggle. Jiang's wish must be to portray Beijing's imperial ambition of incorporating Taiwan as a sacred crusade. For that reason, Party members must set aside their differences and unite around the central leadership.

Finally, with respect to the CCP's treatment of social conflicts, uncontroversial would be the statement that Jiang has relied primarily on repression. So far as political dissidents are concerned, the U.S. State Department stated in 1997: "All public dissent against party and government was effectively silenced by intimidation, exile or the imposition of prison

⁵³Lo Ping, "Jiang's Views on 'Three Antis'," *Cheng Ming*, May 2000, 15-17.

terms, administrative detention or house arrest."⁵⁴ Perhaps the one act of repression most telling of Beijing's sense of insecurity and vulnerability has been the Jiang administration's reaction (some would say overreaction) to the group Falun Gong.⁵⁵ In December 1998, the CCP issued three directives: one setting down conditions under which the armed police should shoot to kill; the second one dealing with controlling non-CCP elite groups such as the CPPCC; and the third one calling for strengthening the Party's supervision of university students, faculty, and staff. Particularly horrific is the first directive which stipulates fifteen situations in which the armed police are allowed to use their weapons. These include even peaceful sit-down demonstrations outside of what the CCP considers important installations or public squares.⁵⁶

In justifying these draconian measures, the Jiang regime never tires of pointing to alleged subversions from Taiwan and the United States. State Council official Luo Gan (羅幹) said: "Lee Teng-hui publicly flaunts claims of supporting democracy [in the PRC]; he is giving economic assistance to help forces hostile toward China infiltrate into the mainland to carry out subversion and destruction."⁵⁷

In sum, the really "urgent task" of Jiang and his third-generation colleagues is to adopt a new set of ideals so that the CCP is more like a genuine political party than an assemblage of careerists. In the absence of new ideals, Jiang has been using the reunification issue as a substitute. Thus, recovering Taiwan has become for Jiang "an urgent task" of the CCP.

The PLA and Nationalism

Jiang Zemin's chauvinist nationalism-cum-ideology means that the

⁵⁴*New York Times*, January 30, 1997.

⁵⁵As Jacques deLisle's excellent analysis points out: "Falun Gong conjures nearly all of the demons that haunt the PRC's leaders." See Jacques deLisle, "Who's Afraid of Falun Gong?" *E-Notes* (Foreign Policy Research Institute, Philadelphia), August 5, 1999.

⁵⁶Lo, "The CCP Prepares for Repression."

⁵⁷Li Zijing, "Beijing Decides to Strengthen Repression against Hostile Forces," *Cheng Ming*, December 1998, 19.

PLA would play a central role in his administration, especially with respect to Taiwan and any other foreign policy issues that are charged with nationalist sentiments. As a result, the PLA high command has been making extremely bellicose statements about Taiwan. Before the ROC presidential election on March 18, 2000, the *Liberation Army Daily* declared that the military would "spare no effort in a blood-soaked battle" to prevent Taiwan from separating from China.⁵⁸ After the election, various PLA spokesmen and publications declared: (1) a devastated Taiwan is better than a lost Taiwan; (2) attack first and deal with construction (both on the mainland and Taiwan) later; (3) the PLA would take Taiwan in one week; and (4) the PLA would strike the U.S. homeland, if Washington defends Taiwan militarily.⁵⁹

However, the PLA high command has been warning and threatening Taiwan for more than a decade, ever since the massacre of pro-democracy students at Tiananmen Square in 1989. In 1990, for example, the PLA ordered the troops in Fujian (福建) to be ready for action on a moment's notice because of two mishaps at sea involving Taiwan's repatriation of illegal mainland immigrants and a collision of fishing boats from the two sides. When Beijing and Chris Patten, the last British governor of Hong Kong, clashed over the latter's democratization of the now former colony, the PLA high command urged the CCP to take "resolute and decisive" measures to deal with Patten. After the voters in Taiwan elected a substantial number of delegates from the opposition party to Taiwan's first fully democratic legislature in December 1992, Admiral Liu Huaqing (劉華清), vice-chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, declared that Beijing should not allow Taiwan to drag the unification issue on forever and that the PLA was prepared for a surprise attack on Taiwan. President Lee Teng-hui's visit to the United States in 1995 elicited another serious warning from the top brass of the PLA, which pronounced that better would be to solve "the Taiwan question" by force early than wait endlessly and

⁵⁸Erik Eckholm, "China Army Renews Threat against Taiwan Separatism," *New York Times*, March 7, 2000, A10.

⁵⁹*Shijie ribao*, March 23, 2000; *Santa Barbara News-Press*, March 21, 2000; *Shijie ribao*, April 3, 2000; and *Zhongshi dianzi bao* (China Times Electronic News), April 11, 2000.

that the PLA was confident in paralyzing Taiwan in two days. In 1996, when the United States sent two aircraft carrier groups to monitor the PLA's missile firing around the Taiwan area during the ROC's first competitive presidential election, the PLA representatives in the Central Military Commission coined the slogan "Anti-America, Defend Country" (抗美衛國 *kang-Mei weiguo*) which is reminiscent of the "Anti-America, Assist-Korea" (抗美援朝 *kang-Mei yuan-Chao*) slogan that was used during the Korean War period. Moreover, a group of senior PLA officers was reported to have volunteered to go to the front in any fight with the United States. These hawkish generals also criticized Jiang's administration for being "too soft" toward the United States.⁶⁰

We may explain the PLA high command's belligerent stand toward Taiwan in terms of the military's organic and strategic relations to nationalism. The first refers to the identity and role of any military (including the PLA) in a modern nation-state. The second aspect deals with the playing of politics by the PLA high command.

Organically, the military in any modern state is the first and foremost institution of nationalist expression. It embodies both the tangible and intangible components of national power. Thus, by nature, the PLA is duty-bound to take a strong stand in any foreign relations matter that is charged with nationalist sentiments, particularly territorial integrity.

Another plausible reason for the PLA's aggressive pronouncements toward the ROC is internal changes in the PRC military. Under Deng, the

⁶⁰Kuan Yeh-chen, "The CCP Inflamed the Military to Oppose Taiwan," *Cheng Ming*, October 1990, 19-20; Li Zijing, "Twelve PLA Generals Advocating Confronting the UK," *ibid.*, January 1993, 12-13; Lo Ping, "The PLA Demands End to Sino-British Talks," *ibid.*, October 1993, 8-9; Fan Chun, "Will the CCP Resort to Force to Unite Taiwan with China?" *ibid.*, February 1993, 12-14; "CCP Taking a Hard Line toward Taiwan," *Zhongguo shibao*, March 22, 1994; Fan Chun, "CCP's Policy toward Hong Kong out of Control," *Cheng Ming*, April 1994, 16-19; "The PLA Increases Role in Foreign Affairs," *Zhongguo shibao*, June 26, 1994; "Military Urges Measures 'To Restrain Taiwan'," *Lianhe bao*, July 20, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-139* (July 20, 1995): 16-18; Lan Hsin, "Lee Teng-hui's Visit to the United States Causing Internal Conflicts in the CCP," *Cheng Ming*, July 1995, 11-12; Yu Yu-lin, "PLA Increases Its Role in Pronouncing Stands in Foreign Affairs," *Zhongguo shibao*, September 5, 1995; I Fan, "The Head of PLA Boasting Occupation of Taiwan in Forty-eight Hours," *Cheng Ming*, December 1995, 29-30; Yueh Shan, "The Head of PLA Challenges the United States," *ibid.*, March 1996, 21-22; Lo Ping, "American Carriers Causing Internal Conflicts in the CCP," *ibid.*, April 1996, 6-7; and Patrick E. Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," *New York Times*, December 3, 1996.

PLA has undergone regularization and professionalization.⁶¹ The PLA command and organization as a whole is more differentiated than under Mao's "politics taking command" (政治掛帥 *zhengzhi guashuai*) policy. Most noticeable of all is the rise of military academies specializing in strategic studies and planning. Western diplomats in Beijing have connected these academies with chauvinistic nationalism in the PRC in recent years.⁶² One also sees a pattern in the PLA's threats to Taiwan. After each dire warning to Taiwan, one of the PLA academies would convene a conference on possible military operations against the ROC.⁶³ In a short time, fragments of these discussions on the PLA's projected assaults of Taiwan would circulate—deliberately or not—in the public. These new military academies seem to be not only reaping profits from their conference papers and books but also using crises over Taiwan to enhance their status. By all accounts, the PLA high command was shocked and impressed by the Allies' victory in the 1991 Gulf War.⁶⁴ Exaggerated predications by PLA academy strategists of a spectacular victory over Taiwan revealed their wishes to match the Allies' deeds in the Gulf.

The PLA high command's various aggressive statements regarding Taiwan must be seen against the overall political situation of the PRC, especially the spread of fissiparous forces. Like Jiang and associates, the PLA's top leadership wishes to use nationalism and war crisis to overcome a sharp contradiction between the military's greatly elevated status after 1989 and the PLA's internal decay.

⁶¹Shiping Zheng, *Party vs. State in Post-1949 China: The Institutional Dilemma* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 225-54.

⁶²Patrick E. Tyler, "China's Military Regards U.S. as Main Enemy in the Future," *New York Times*, November 16, 1993.

⁶³He Shaomin, "Any Timetable for 'Unification with Taiwan'?" *Cheng Ming*, December 1990, 14-15; I Fan, "CCP Prepares Public Opinion for an Assault on Taiwan," *ibid.*, February 1995, 25-26 and "The Head of PLA Boasting of Occupation of Taiwan in Forty-eight Hours"; Wang Er, "The CCP Making Use of People's Hatred of Japanese to Deal with Taiwan," *ibid.*, August 1995, 29-30; and Yueh, "The Head of PLA Challenges the United States."

⁶⁴Lo Ping, "Old Generals Complain about Deng's Neglect of Military Capability," *Cheng Ming*, May 1991, 6-9; "High-Tech Weaponry to Play Role in Peaceful Unification," *Ming Pao*, July 21, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-143* (July 26, 1995): 23; and Wu Chia-pao, "The Fifteenth Party Congress, Reduction of Military Forces, and Policy of a Quality Military," *Ming Pao yuekan*, November 1997, 71-73.

In terms of political and social status, the PLA has undergone a "big fall and then a big rise" (大落大起 *da luo da qi*) from the early 1980s to the 1990s. Deng had made the military accept his "economic construction first" policy in the 1980s, which caused the PLA's political and social status to decline.⁶⁵ The student pro-democracy movements of 1987-89, however, made Deng extremely conscious of the CCP's heavy reliance on the PLA to continue ruling the Chinese mainland. The status of the PLA began to rise rapidly after that. In his celebrated talks during the "southern tour" of 1992, Deng explicitly designated the PLA as the most important assurance of the security of the Party-state after the passing of elderly revolutionaries like himself. Subsequently, Deng repeated similar remarks on other occasions.⁶⁶ Jiang Zemin followed Deng's instructions faithfully by increasing the PLA's budget and socializing with the top and middle leadership of the military. The PLA high command, particularly the faculty at the National Defense University, reciprocated Jiang's support for the PLA. The *Guofang daxue xuebao* (國防大學學報 National Defense University Journal), an organ of the National Defense University, has unswervingly defended the political legitimacy of the third generation of CCP leaders, particularly Jiang Zemin. Conforming to Jiang's ideological conservatism, this defense journal has become a forum for conservative views.⁶⁷ Jiang in turn has designated the National Defense University as one of the "bases" for researching "the theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics" (the other "bases" being the Central Party School, State Education

⁶⁵ Jim Tyson, "Red Army's Glory Fades," *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 31, 1988.

⁶⁶ Deng Xiaoping, *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* (Selected works of Deng Xiaoping), volume 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), 380; "Paper Views Jiang's Measures to Control Army," *Hsin Pao* (Hong Kong), December 23, 1994, in *FBIS-CHI-94-247* (December 23, 1994): 33-35; and "Is the Future of China in Deng's Iron Hand?" *New York Times*, January 17, 1995.

⁶⁷ Du Tiehuan, "To Adhere to the Leadership of the Party Means to Have Faith in the Leadership of the Party's Third Generation of Leaders," *Guofang daxue xuebao* (National Defense University Journal), 1991, no. 3:53-56; Zhang Guorong, "The Thought of Mao Zedong Is the Sinicized Marxist Theory of Party Building," *ibid.*, 1991, no. 4:38-43; Zhao Yunxian, "Lenin Created the New Theory on the Political Party of the Proletariat," *ibid.*, 1991, no. 5:47-53; Lin Yunhui, "On Mao Zedong's Stress of Ideology as the Main Principle of Party Building," *ibid.*, 1991, no. 2:73-76; Zhang Chuanmiao, "On Cultivation of Party Spirit in a New Situation," *ibid.*, 1995, no. 4:73-75, 93; and Li Shenmin, "Leading Party Cadres Must Be Marxist Politicians," *Qiushi*, 1996, no. 2:13-18.

Commission, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences).⁶⁸ The various belligerent pronouncements on Taiwan from the PLA may thus be seen as a part of the PLA top leadership's expressions of appreciation for Jiang's support of the PLA.

Like the CCP, the PLA has been plagued by internal divisions which might tempt the top brass to use nationalist appeals and threats of war over the Taiwan Strait to unite the military. The first kind of division among PLA officers is political in nature. The intellectual fervor for Western values such as democratization in the late 1980s apparently had spread to the military. In 1989-90 there were reports that army officers were organizing forums or salons for discussing modernization, democracy, and Taiwan and South Korea's economic and political developments. One army internal report estimated that about a thousand officers were involved in such activities.⁶⁹ This modernist influence in the PLA also causes resurfacing of the time-honored division between professionals and ideologues over issues such as disunity among the rank and ways to enhance the PLA's combat readiness. The professionally oriented officers want to transform the PLA into a fully professionalized force. Thus, they have advocated ridding the armed forces of CCP controls. The ideologues, however, such as those in the faculty of the National Defense University, wish to strengthen the Party's control of the PLA. Jiang Zemin and the Central Military Commission apparently have been indecisive about the matter. In parallel to Jiang's policy toward Party reforms, Jiang and the Central Military Commission fell back on traditional rhetoric, such as "vigorously stepping up education and management of party members," "taking party branches as a crucial link in grass-roots building," "respecting cadres and caring for soldiers," and "supporting the government and cherishing the people." One report stated that professionally oriented officers responded to Jiang and the high command's ideological conservatism with a sense of

⁶⁸Xia Yuanshen, "Jiang Zemin's Contributions to the Theory of Building a Ruling Political Party," *Mao Zedong sixiang luntan* (Forum on Mao Zedong Thought), 1996, no. 4:62-67.

⁶⁹He Pin, "The Double Role of the PLA in the Post-Deng Era," *Ming Pao yuekan*, October 1994, 49-55; also Fox Butterfield, "An Army with Its Own Grievances," *New York Times*, June 6, 1989.

hopelessness.⁷⁰ It was reported that the late Marshal Lin Biao (林彪) still maintains a degree of appeal among the professionally oriented officers.⁷¹

More serious than the political divisions among the officers is the presence of disintegrative forces in the PLA, a fact which has already undermined the CCP. The internal decay of the PLA may be summed up into four "C's": competition, corrosion, corruption, and criminalization.

For the first time in the post-1949 history of the PLA, the military now has difficulties recruiting young men to serve in the armed forces due to competitions from other lines of work. For instance, reports hold that in 1994 national Party and government leaders were shocked to learn that in some cases air force pilots were leaving to join the civil aviation industry.⁷² In 1995 the journal *Guofang* (國防 National Defense) listed six manifestations of the recruitment problem: (1) yearly declines in the number of young people signing up for the draft; (2) increases in cases of young people excusing themselves from military service under false pretense; (3) frequent occurrences of families obstructing their youngsters from joining the military; (4) unwillingness of business firms to cooperate with recruiting agencies (for example, by concealing the number of young employees eligible for military service); (5) rising cases of draftee disputes with the authorities over the kinds of units and places to which they are assigned; and (6) a growing number of desertions. The reporter regarded "expanded job opportunities" as the primary cause of these difficulties.⁷³

Except for the first "C" (competition), the other three "C's" (corrosion, corruption, and criminalization) are different manifestations of the fact that the PLA has a weak corporate identity. A modern corporation's

⁷⁰"Paper Warns of Army Instability, Discontent," *Lianhe bao*, January 25, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-018* (January 27, 1995): 22-24. See also: Zhao Keming, "Thoughts on Some Problems on the Party Building in the Military in a New Era," *Guofang daxue xuebao*, 1997, no. 4:61-68; and Chen Kemin, "With the Spirit of the Fifteenth Party Congress as the Guide, Strengthen Party Building in the Military Comprehensively," *ibid.*, 1998, no. 4:51-56.

⁷¹*Zhongguo shibao*, July 10, 1994.

⁷²"Column Views 'Personnel Drain' in Air Force," *Hsin Pao*, February 25, 1994, in *FBIS-CHI-94-051* (March 16, 1994): 50-52.

⁷³"Difficulties in Conscription Examined," *Guofang* (National Defense), July 15, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-191* (October 3, 1995): 23. See also "Stock System Interferes with Reserve Training," *Zhongguo minbing* (Chinese Militia), March 9, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-125* (June 29, 1995): 33-34.

distinct identity is based on the degree that members live up to the organization's formal values and norms. The external environment is also important. A modern organization's ability to maintain a distinct professional identity depends on cultural climate as well. In a society with advanced functional specialization and a widespread acceptance of universalistic norms, an organization or institution finds maintaining its professional identity and ethos to be easier. Extremely difficult is for a modern corporation to do the same in a society still operating on traditional and particularistic norms. As mentioned earlier, the PLA has undergone regularization and functional specialization in the post-Mao era. This process has not been even, however. In a lengthy analysis of the military's state of mind, Chinese sociologist Yu Bin (余滨) concluded that even though the PLA had recruited many new officers with university degrees, the armed forces as a whole are still deeply influenced by traditional peasant mentality, being rife with parochialism and particularism. The well-educated new officers constitute islands of professionalism in a sea of traditionalism.⁷⁴ It is thus not surprising that analysts of the PLA's combat capability reached a similar conclusion: Although having "pockets of excellence," the PLA as a whole is an obsolete force when judged by world standards.⁷⁵ The most important point of this analysis is that the PLA is a microcosm of China that nowadays is marked by uneven differentiation or modernization.⁷⁶

The PLA's difficulty in maintaining a distinct military and professional identity is also due to other reasons. Prestigious authorities—such as Mao, Deng, and, presently, Jiang Zemin—themselves either obstructed or were ambivalent about the process of professionalization. As a result, in

⁷⁴Yu Bin, "Anatomy of Changes in Self-Perception: Thoughts on the Traditional Mentality of the Military" (Part I), *Shehui* (Society), 1989, no. 6:38-40; Part II, *ibid.*, 1989, no. 7: 25-27.

⁷⁵Patrick E. Tyler, "China's Military Stumbles Even as Its Power Grows," *New York Times*, December 3, 1996.

⁷⁶Sociologist Paul Colomy suggested that uneven differentiation is particularly pronounced in a society with a high degree of "subcultural and social diversity." See Paul Colomy, "Uneven Differentiation and Incomplete Institutionalization: Political Change and Continuity in the Early American Nation," in *Differentiation Theory and Social Change: Comparative and Historical Perspectives*, ed. Jeffrey C. Alexander and Paul Colomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 122.

the post-Mao era of marketization and opening up to the world, the PLA has been thoroughly penetrated by *anomie*, which is widespread in Chinese society. Under Mao, Party propagandists maintained the myth that the PLA was a paragon of political and ideological virtues. In reality, worshipping Mao's personality cult and enjoying a privileged life was what distinguished the PLA then. Under Deng's reforms, the PLA lost both. A Chinese sociologist described the feelings of PLA officers and men in the post-Mao era as follows:

In front of the big tidal wave of reforms, the military has been the one suffering the most from an acute sense of a spiritual loss. They are the ones most burdened by intellectual bewilderment and perplexity. On the one hand, they support the state's reform policy. On the other hand, they are reluctant to let go of the benefits of the old system.⁷⁷

Another group of sociologists discovered from a survey of soldiers that the rank and file was disinterested in any high-sounding principles, worshipped material things, exhibited "vulgar sentimentalism" (庸情 *yongqing*: purely personal or private feelings and emotions), and had a strong taste for the easy life. What concerns the authorities the most is a general indifference to or doubts about the CCP's formal ideology. Reportedly, a soldier asked his company political director as to why after such a long time of supposedly building socialism, China presently is still in "the primary stage" of socialism. The director replied that he was at a loss himself and then told the soldier to find answers in the press.⁷⁸ Without a distinct identity to instill pride and dedication, the PLA has been open widely to corrosive social mores. The army paper declared that: "The influence of decadent ideological culture has a regular and large-scale effect on the officers and men of the armed forces through cultural channels."⁷⁹

Corruption in the PLA is but another manifestation of corrosion. Since the PLA has weak formal norms, informal norms among officers and

⁷⁷Yu, "Anatomy of Changes" (Part I), 38.

⁷⁸Yang Mingqing, Chen Shusong, and Song Jinghua, "Study of the Reasons for Weak Political Education at the Base," *Shehui*, 1989, no. 5:14-17.

⁷⁹"Speeches at Army Forum on Political Building," *Jiefangjun bao* (Liberation Army Daily), May 26, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-136* (July 17, 1995): 46.

men have grown in strength and now threaten to displace formal norms. Both Mao and Deng contributed to the PLA's identity confusion: Mao deliberately, and Deng, unwittingly. Under Mao, the PLA was designated to be a jack-of-all-trades (for example, a production force, a school for learning Maoism, the instrument of class oppression, and a political police). Deng turned the PLA into a business corporation as a desperate measure to cope with the guns-or-rice dilemma. The results of allowing the PLA to operate businesses, said Chinese scholar-official Hu Angang (胡安鋼), are "commercialization, regionalization, and degeneration of the PLA."⁸⁰ The corrupting influence of PLA business operations has been the subject of many reports and studies.⁸¹ The noteworthy aspect of Jiang Zemin's recent campaign to terminate the PLA's business operations is that he apparently waited for Admiral Liu Huaqing to retire in 1997 to begin the campaign. As Seth Faison of the *New York Times* suggested, Admiral Liu was believed to have overseen many of the military business operations.⁸² Liu was also one of the most hawkish PLA top brass on the Taiwan issue.⁸³ A plausible link between his belligerency over Taiwan and business operations of the PLA may be that Liu tried to legitimize PLA business operations by demonstrating that the PLA's capability and willingness to attack Taiwan had not been compromised.

Finally, capping all kinds of expression of internal decay in the PLA is the military's involvement in criminal activities. As expected of a corporation with only a weak sense of identity and integrity, crimes committed by PLA men conformed to general social trends. In the early 1980s, political dissent among intellectual youth and juvenile crimes were two of the more serious social disturbances. The PLA was affected by similar ac-

⁸⁰*Zhongguo shibao*, March 20, 1994.

⁸¹*Ming Pao*, March 5, 1994, in *FBIS-CHI-94-045* (March 8, 1994): 40-41; Thomas J. Bickford, "The Chinese Military and Its Business Operations: The PLA as Entrepreneur," *Asian Survey* 34, no. 5 (May 1994): 460-74; Patrick E. Tyler, "China Military's Business Profits Being Put Back into Business, Not Arms," *New York Times*, May 24, 1994; Seth Faison, "China Moving to Untie Its Military-Industrial Knot," *ibid.*, July 28, 1998; and Seth Faison, "China Tries a Great Tippy-Toe Forward," *ibid.*, August 2, 1998.

⁸²Faison, "China Moving to."

⁸³See note 39 above. Admiral Liu was the main spokesman in the majority of these references on the PLA's capability to achieve a spectacular victory over the Taiwan Strait.

tivities among the men.⁸⁴ In the 1990s, major crimes in the PLA were of an economic nature, especially smuggling and swindling.⁸⁵ In July 1997, Reuters reported that weekend leaves were canceled so PLA officers and men could concentrate on studying and reflecting upon a document issued in the name of Jiang Zemin regarding crime waves in the PLA. Jiang denounced offenses such as rape, murder, robbery, and graft. Members of the People's Armed Police Force were said to have been involved in a criminal plot to break into the Russian Embassy.⁸⁶

In the face of all these disintegrative forces, using war as a cleansing force lurked behind some of the PLA high command's pronouncements. In August 1995, Defense Minister Chi Haotian (遲浩田) published a long essay in the Party paper *People's Daily* concerning the danger of the PLA degenerating in the same manner as past dynasties. He said that the PLA was facing a "severe test in the long-term peaceful environment." Chi was not sure, however, that the PLA was equal to the task. Chi then said:

An army is a product of war, and it exists in order to fight wars. In the years of war, officers and men of our Army consciously carried forward the spirit of arduous struggle for the emancipation of our nation and class, and courageously devoted themselves to the interests of the people. . . . However, after entering a period of long-term peaceful environment, our Army is no longer frequently tested by hardships and death. It is easy for our officers and men to [relax] their fighting will and seek pleasure and comfort. This will probably lead to the decline of their combat effectiveness.⁸⁷

For the PLA high command and Jiang to question the Party-state for their predicament is out of the question. Instead, a national armed crusade to recover lost territory holds some promise. Furthermore, a real war does not have to occur in order to obtain benefits. The very threat of war would justify drastic actions against all kinds of domestic opposition and win for

⁸⁴See "'Document No. 7' Issued by the General Political Department of the Chinese Communist Armed Forces in 1981—The Stipulations against Political Incidents at the Basic Level," *Zhonggong yanjiu* (Studies on Chinese Communism Monthly) (Taipei) 17, no. 2 (February 15, 1983): 111-28.

⁸⁵Faison, "China Tries."

⁸⁶*Shijie ribao*, July 19, 1997.

⁸⁷"Chi Haotian on Traditional Virtues," *Renmin ribao*, August 10, 1995, in *FBIS-CHI-95-188* (September 28, 1995): 27.

the PLA a bigger budget. The PLA rose to the occasion during Hong Kong's return to China in 1997 in order to demand an increase in the state's allocations to the military. Their rationale was that China must be ready to resist new imperialist aggressions.⁸⁸ Jiang and the PLA high command repeated the same tactic in March 2000 during the ROC's presidential election.⁸⁹ The war scare over Taiwan conceivably has helped Jiang speed up transforming the PLA into a high-tech armed force. In early March, Jiang declared that he had advanced yet another step toward making the PLA leaner and stronger by discharging 500,000 men from the services.⁹⁰ The units on the southeastern coast have received new equipment and facilities. The CCP in Fujian has pledged total support, especially more funds, to the PLA units stationed in the province and speed up modernization of the militia.⁹¹

Psychological Factors: The Leaders

No discussion of Beijing's coercive diplomacy toward the ROC would be complete without taking into account personality or perceptual factors in the PRC decision-making process. This section suggests some hypotheses on the personal and psychological basis of the PRC's belligerency toward the reunification issue. The analysis makes use of general social-psychological insights that view a person's beliefs and opinions as a function of his/her cultural environment, choice of reference group, role perception, values, and inner drives and anxieties.⁹²

Jiang Zemin made known his stand on PRC-ROC relations comprehensively and candidly in three lengthy conversations with Professor

⁸⁸*Shijie ribao*, June 21, 1997.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, March 6 and 8, 2000.

⁹⁰*Ibid.*, March 10, 2000.

⁹¹*Ibid.*, March 27 and April 3, 2000.

⁹²M. Brewster Smith, Jerome S. Bruner, and Robert W. White, *Opinion and Personality* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1964); Robert E. Lane and David O. Sears, *Public Opinion* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964); Vincent Price, *Public Opinion* (Newbury Park, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1992).

Chun-shan Shen (沈君山), president of National Chiao Tung University (國立交通大學) of the ROC, in 1990-92. Hong Kong's *Jiushi niandai* (九十年代 The Nineties) published these conversations in August 1996. These reports require special attention for three reasons. First, these reports were not supposed to be published. They were originally "internal documents" of the National Unification Council (NUC), an organization which was established by ROC President Lee Teng-hui in order to advise him on dealing with the PRC's demand for incorporating Taiwan. Professor Shen was then a research associate in the NUC. *Jiushi niandai* had published these documents without Shen's consent and over his strong protests. Second, Jiang Zemin was the one who had approached Shen repeatedly for these interviews. Both Jiang and Shen understood that their conversations were not for publication.⁹³ Through his contact with Professor Shen, Jiang wished to gain a deeper understanding of Lee and at the same time to transmit Jiang's personal stand on the reunification issue to the Nationalists. Third, Jiang had selected Shen because of Shen's status in Taiwan of coming from a very prominent scholar-official family in Nationalist China. Shen has, moreover, been active in Taiwan's politics, especially on the question of reunification.

Throughout these talks, Jiang was a true partisan, in contrast to what Lane called an "open partisan"—"the man who has a tentative commitment to one side of an issue, but is continually reassessing this commitment as new information comes in."⁹⁴ On the ethnic problems of China, Jiang indulged in self-glorification, self-whitewashing, and other-maligning. As an example of the first myth, Jiang stated blandly that the nationality policy of the PRC "has been a success." He alleged that the living standard of the Tibetans is higher than that of the residents of Shanghai and Beijing, all because of the central government's preferential policy toward the Tibetans.⁹⁵

⁹³Li Yi, "Shen Chun-shan on 'Jiang-Shen Conversations,'" *Jiushi niandai*, September 1996, 55-58.

⁹⁴Robert E. Lane, *Political Thinking and Consciousness: The Private Life of the Political Mind* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1969), 93.

⁹⁵The Third Talk with Jiang Zemin: On When to Start Negotiations between the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait, *Jiushi niandai*, August 1996, 105.

Yet another example of self-glorification was Jiang's attitudes toward former president of the ROC, Lee Teng-hui. At first, Jiang feigned modesty by asking Shen to help him understand Lee, and then declared: "We probably know Lee better than you do."⁹⁶ Jiang's self-whitewashing is exemplified in his views that there is a common language or understanding between "the old comrades" of the CCP and the Nationalist Party in Taiwan since the two had formed a united front twice in history.⁹⁷ Jiang incredibly left out the two decades of fratricide between the two parties.

Probably the most noteworthy point illustrating other-maligning is that throughout the three talks with Shen, Jiang showed no interest in the views and even the existence of the native Taiwanese (pre-1945 immigrants from the Chinese mainland). Jiang was concerned only in dealing with the elites of the Nationalist Party, just as the CCP negotiated solely with the British on the fate of Hong Kong. When Shen mentioned Taiwanese nationalism, Jiang responded scornfully: "What nationalism?"⁹⁸ Shen had stated that Taiwanese people's desire for independence was comparable to American people's wishes for independence of the British Empire. Jiang exclaimed: "What kind of comparison is this?"⁹⁹ Jiang enthusiastically and repeatedly dwelled on historical myths, alleging: (1) the master trend of Chinese history has been unification; (2) unification means one nationality (民族 *minzu*), one state, and one central government; (3) unification is for fulfilling national righteousness (民族大義 *minzu dayi*); and (4) federalism is "un-Chinese."¹⁰⁰

Clear from Jiang's remarks to Shen is that the first source of his views is the historical and cultural environment of China in the late 1930s, the period in which Jiang grew up. This was a time when such key symbols as national survival, sovereignty, and unity were the order of the day. China was then fighting against the Japanese invasion. National unity overrode


⁹⁶"The First Talk with Jiang Zemin: CCP's Policy toward Taiwan and the Reality of Taiwan," *ibid.*, 67; "The Third Talk," 103.

⁹⁷"The First Talk," 75; "The Third Talk," 107.

⁹⁸"The Third Talk," 100.

⁹⁹*Ibid.*, 101.

¹⁰⁰*Ibid.*, 103-7.



all other concerns, including personal wishes. The third generation of CCP leaders, headed by Jiang, shared this historical spirit with their mentoring generation headed by Deng Xiaoping. Deng claimed that the sanctions levied by Western nations against the PRC after the brutal suppression of the pro-democracy movement in June 1989 reminded him of the 1900 allied expeditionary force punishing China for the Boxer Rebellion.¹⁰¹

In addition to historical or generational *zeitgeist*, the elderly second generation of CCP leadership—Deng in particular—had also molded Jiang's world-view. Deng and his associates bore the burden of controlling the effects of the severe damage Mao did to the Party-state. Deng's world-view and pronouncements were crafted to defend his power. The 1981 document that Deng composed to inaugurate his reform regime, entitled "On Questions of Party History," is steeped in self-glorifying mythmaking (nearly half of the document being devoted to self-congratulation on the alleged achievements of the CCP) and self-whitewashing (the 1957 campaign against intellectuals was right and necessary, though carried a bit too far).¹⁰² In any case, as long as the CCP rules, there will not be truly influential and independent evaluative institutions in China able to contradict the Party's mythmaking. Deng had used mythmaking as a panacea, and Jiang has been following his mentor in this regard.

Although Jiang Zemin and, for this matter, also Zhu Rongji have been significantly influenced by their close dealings with Deng, the impacts left by Mao and the first-generation leaders were always evident. To Jiang and Zhu, Mao also links them to an even more distant reference group—the illustrious emperors in Chinese history. Like Mao, Jiang and Zhu have become avid readers of Chinese historical works, especially those on the last dynasty. Jiang was reported to admire Emperor Kangxi (康熙 1662-1722) and Zhu Rongji identifies himself with Emperor Yongzheng (雍正 1723-35).¹⁰³ Kangxi was an empire-builder and his son Yongzheng, a state con-

¹⁰¹ *Deng Xiaoping wenxuan* 3:358.

¹⁰² *Beijing Review* 24, no. 17 (July 6, 1981): 10-39.

¹⁰³ Shih Yen, "Jiang Zemin's Rough Road in Power," *Cheng Ming*, August, 1996, 25-29; Ting Kuo, "Zhu Rongji in the Shadow of Emperor Yongzheng," *Ming Pao yuekan*, July 1999, 44-45.

solidator. Kangxi was most known for expanding the Qing dynasty's boundary to the limit. It was under Kangxi that Taiwan was forcibly incorporated into Qing administration. Kangxi combined "force" (剿 *jiao*) and "enticement" (撫 *fu*) to defeat the then independent regime of Taiwan. Throughout his sixty-one years of reign, Kangxi never ceased launching campaigns of conquest or suppression. Chinese historical works praised Kangxi for his territorial acquisitions. Emperor Yongzheng was famed for streamlining the administration, concentrating power, and punishing corrupt officials. Jiang and Zhu apparently identified themselves with these Manchu rulers. According to Friedrich and Brzezinski, leaders of modern totalistic states feel the need to be judged favorably by history.¹⁰⁴ Jiang and Zhu seem not to see any contradiction between their championing nationalism and, at the same time, worshipping Manchu rulers, who subjected the Chinese (the Han race) to blatant racial discriminations down to the last day of their rule.

At a deeper level, Jiang probably acutely feels a deficit in status. He is in the company of titans like Mao and Deng. Deng lifted Jiang into the paramount position because of Jiang's being a loyal agent of Beijing. Shanghai people are known to be quite critical of Jiang's administration of the city; he had sacrificed Shanghai's interests in order to ingratiate himself with Deng.¹⁰⁵ Elite figures in and out of China do not take Jiang seriously. Tyler of the *New York Times* wrote that a member of one of China's most prominent families said: "Jiang Zemin is a nothing."¹⁰⁶ Erik Eckholm reported that to many Chinese, "Mr. Jiang displays no vision or charisma worthy of Mao or Deng" and that Jiang became a victim of Beijing's merciless joke circuit.¹⁰⁷ A Hong Kong analyst wrote: "Nothing in Jiang's

¹⁰⁴Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956).

¹⁰⁵Lam Tao-chiu, "Local Interest Articulation in the 1980s," in *Shanghai: Transformation and Modernization under China's Open Policy*, ed. Y.M. Yeung and Sung Yun-wing (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1996), 139-40.

¹⁰⁶Patrick E. Tyler, "Clinton's Chinese Counterpart: A Weak Old Panda?" *New York Times*, November 29, 1996.

¹⁰⁷Erik Eckholm, "As China Turns 50, a Duel of Stability and Reform," *ibid.*, October 1, 1999; and "One Giant Step for Mr. Jiang's China," *ibid.*, November 21, 1999.

background suggests that he has a grand vision.¹¹⁰⁸ Some U.S. administration officials predicted in 1995 that Jiang would last no more than a year or two.¹¹⁰⁹ However, most important of all is that Jiang is aware of these public denigrations. Jiang told Professor Chun-shan Shen of Taiwan that people called him a dilettante or jack-of-all-trades.¹¹¹⁰ Throughout 1997-99, reports came out of China about various Politburo leaders' opposition to Jiang's attempts to create a personality cult. These leaders objected to displaying Jiang's portraits in offices, his continuation as the president of the republic, and the saying among Jiang supporters that "Mao established the state; Deng governed the state; Jiang strengthened the state."¹¹¹¹ Reasonable is to suggest that Jiang has the possible motivation to accomplish great deeds to counter public and private disparagements of him. Jiang's two noteworthy idiosyncrasies—reciting classical Chinese poetry in front of Chinese visitors and showing off his command of English in front of foreign dignitaries—opened him to the suspicion that Jiang suffers from low self-esteem.¹¹¹² As some had suggested, Jiang's being the chief beneficiary from Hong Kong's return to the PRC has probably whipped up his appetite to increase the glory of both the nation and himself by forcing Taiwan's acceptance of Beijing's terms of unification.¹¹¹³ In a nutshell, Jiang's aggressive stand toward Taiwan serves his self-interest, expresses his identification with his reference groups, and insures his place in history.

¹¹⁰⁸R.N. Schiele, "A Long Way to Go Before Jiang Can Secure Leadership," *Eastern Express* (Hong Kong), December 29, 1994, in *FBIS-CHI-94-250* (December 29, 1994): 28.

¹¹⁰⁹Bruce W. Nelan, "End of a Dynasty," *Time*, October 30, 1995, 19-22.

¹¹¹⁰"The Second Talk with Jiang Zemin: On Peaceful Evolution and Peaceful Unification," *Jiushi niandai*, August 1996, 96.

¹¹¹¹Lo Ping, "Jiang Criticized for Building Personal Power," *Cheng Ming*, December 1997, 12-16; Li Zijing, "Another Wave of Opposition to Jiang's Assuming the Presidency," *ibid.*, February 1998, 18-20; Lo Ping, "A Tide of Toppling Jiang from the Presidency," *ibid.*, March 1998, 8-9; Lo Ping, "Criticisms of Tian Jiyun and Ye Xuanping," *ibid.*, March 1998, 10-12; Lo Ping, "CCP High Circle Trying to Create a Climate for Jiang's Continuation in Power," *ibid.*, December 1999, 12-13.

¹¹¹²Chen Yin, "Explanations of Chairman Jiang's Hair Combing Episode," *ibid.*, August 1996, 34-36.

¹¹¹³Lo Fu, "Jiang Zemin's Season of Troubles," *Jiushi niandai*, September 1997, 22-23; Pai Lang-tung, "The CCP's Internal Bulletin on Jiang Zemin's Visit to the United States," *ibid.*, November 1997, 44-46.

Conclusion

If the foregoing analysis is correct, then ridding Taiwan people of the idea of independence is not going to change to any appreciable degree the tensions between the two sides. Conflicts between the PRC and the ROC are also to a significant extent due to the CCP's internal crises and political decay. The Jiang administration's proneness to mythmaking only further aggravates cross-Strait confrontations. Instead of Beijing's setting a timetable for the ROC to comply with the former's terms of unification, the PRC might consider setting a timetable for fundamental political reforms, as a Singaporean engineer has suggested.¹¹⁴ There are extensive political cultural distances between the PRC and the ROC. For example, after several visits to the PRC and talks with Jiang Zemin, former ROC legislator Shu-jung Liang (梁肅戎) said: "There have been little political changes on their side, but a great deal of changes on our side."¹¹⁵ A generous allowance of time is needed for the PRC to be free of regressive nationalism, overcome its legitimacy and penetration crises, and keep the military in place. Only then will the differences between the two Chinese societies be resolved.

¹¹⁴*Shijie ribao*, March 15, 2000.

¹¹⁵"Jiang Zemin and Cross-Strait Relations," *Jiushi niandai*, September 1996, 60.

