

Legislative Activism and Effectiveness of Provincial Delegates at the 1988 NPC

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In post-Mao China, the deputies to the National People's Congress (NPC) became more active in shaping the legislative agenda by sponsoring a larger number of motions at the NPC sessions. Using the First Session of the Seventh NPC in 1988 as a case study, this analysis examines the patterns of motion sponsorship in the 1980s. The analysis dissects the distribution of the number of sponsors as well as the functional areas of both these motions and of others submitted to special committees. It also examines and tests explanations for the regional and provincial differences in the levels of activism in sponsoring motions and the relative effectiveness in getting the special committees to review their motions. The study finds that provinces that contribute more revenue to the center were both more active and effective in motion sponsorship, and that the members of the special committees appeared not to favor the provinces where they served before their committee appointment.

KEYWORDS: National People's Congress (NPC); China's legislature; law-making; regional politics; central-local fiscal relations

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In Mao's China, legislative activism lasted only briefly during the mid-1950s and the early 1960s, being interrupted by periods of political radicalism and suppression. In the mid-1950s, the National People's Congress (NPC) enjoyed a brief period of surge in activism, reflected in an increase in the number of motions and suggestions proffered by legislators. This increase extended from a total of 39 at the First Session of the First NPC in 1954, to 214 at the Second Session in 1955. After dropping to 176 at the Third Session of the First NPC in 1956, the number of motions and suggestions rose to 243 at the Fourth Session in 1957. However, the Anti-Rightist Campaign, the Great Leap Forward, and the purge of Peng Dehuai (彭德懷) brought the number of motions and suggestions down to 81 in 1958, 80 in 1959, and 46 in 1960. As Mao took a political hermitage following the Great Leap Forward disaster, the number of motions and suggestions by legislators increased to 163 in 1962, 172 in 1963, and 188 in 1964. Between 1965 and 1978, however, the NPC held either no session or received no motions and suggestions because of the Cultural Revolution.¹

In post-Mao China, the progress in reform required that new laws be enacted to regulate newly-formed institutions and behavior, and that the party should give the administrative and legislative branches a certain amount of power in their own domains. In addition, party leaders realized that the legislature could serve as an outlet for retired party veterans and governmental leaders, check blatant abuse of power prevalent in Mao's years, rebuild the party's damaged legitimacy, and promote the course of reform.² The reform regarding the separation of the party and government, the introduction of contested elections for national legislators, and the in-

¹Murray S. Tanner, *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China* (Oxford, U.K.: Clarendon Press, 1999), 81-82.

²For elaborate discussion, see Kevin J. O'Brien, *Reform Without Liberalization: China's National People's Congress and the Politics of Institutional Change* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Tanner, *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China*; and Murray S. Tanner, "The National People's Congress," in *The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms*, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderick MacFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 100-128.

creasing opportunity for legislative input allowed Chinese legislators to become increasingly active in national politics in the 1980s, although they were still subject to the heavy influence of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

In the post-Mao period, legislative activism reemerged and, in terms of the number of motions and suggestions, surpassed the level in the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. In addition, although legislative activism in the post-Mao period fluctuated, the number of motions and suggestions—unlike the Mao years—never declined by over 30 percent in the wake of political conservatism.³ The number of motions grew from only 188 (even including "suggestions") at the First Session of the Third NPC in 1964, which was the last session with motions in Mao's China, to 488 plus 3,847 opinions, criticisms, and suggestions in April 1988 at the First Session of the Seventh NPC.⁴

The legislative session of 1988 is of particular significance. First, this was probably the most active NPC session before the Tiananmen crack-down, registering the most motions for any session before 1991.⁵ Second, the political climate was considerably more relaxed in 1988.⁶ As a result, "the delegates to the Seventh NPC did display a considerably stronger inclination toward independence, spontaneity, and critical scrutiny of the government than did their predecessors."⁷

By analyzing the data on motion sponsorship of provincial NPC delegations, this paper explores the patterns of legislative activities of provincial NPC delegations. It examines the levels of activism among the provincial delegates (or deputies), the types of motions the delegates spon-

³See note 1 above.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Crackdowns on the liberals occurred before and after 1988: the crackdown on the Democracy Wall movement in 1979, the anti-spiritual pollution campaign in 1983, the anti-liberalization campaign in early 1987, and the military suppression of the protests in Beijing in June 1989. Since the 1989 crackdown, the Chinese state has been on a constant guard against political liberalism. For discussion of this period, see Richard Baum, *Burying Mao: Chinese Politics in the Age of Deng Xiaoping* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁷Ibid., 225.

sored, the types of motions that were submitted to the special committees of the NPC for further consideration, and possible causes for different levels of legislative activism of provincial delegates.

Literature on the NPC and Legislative Activism

There is a growing literature on the NPC of China, especially in the post-Mao era. The research on the NPC in the 1980s focuses on several aspects of Deng's reform of the NPC and the impact of this reform. One critical aspect of this reform involves the evolution of the NPC during this period, which is best outlined in O'Brien's pioneering *Reform Without Liberalization* and, more recently, Tanner's *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China*. Scholars have also analyzed deputy election reform⁸ and changes in the legislator's power.⁹ In addition, scholars have addressed the new role of the NPC and its deputies,¹⁰ as well as increasingly active motion-sponsorship.¹¹

In an illuminating and comprehensive study of the NPC, Tanner used the number of motions NPC delegates (or deputies) raised at the annual plenary session to measure delegate assertiveness. He observed that during

⁸Brantly Womack, "The 1980 County-Level Elections in China: Experiment in Democratic Modernization," *Asian Survey* 22, no. 3 (March 1982): 261-77; Barrett McCormick, "Leninist Implementation: The Election Campaign," in *Policy Implementation in Post-Mao China*, ed. David M. Lampton (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1987), 383-413; Andrew J. Nathan, *Chinese Democracy* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1985), 193-223.

⁹O'Brien, *Reform Without Liberalization*; Kevin J. O'Brien, "China's National People's Congress: Reform and Its Limits," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13 (August 1988): 343-74; Kevin J. O'Brien and Lianjiang Li, "Chinese Political Reform and the Question of 'Deputy Quality'," *China Information* 8 (1993-94): 20-31.

¹⁰Kevin J. O'Brien, "Is China's National People's Congress a 'Conservative' Legislature?" *Asian Survey* 30, no. 8 (August 1990): 782-94; Kevin J. O'Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators: Role Accumulation by Chinese People's Congress Deputies," *The China Quarterly*, no. 138 (June 1994): 359-80; Dorothy Solinger, "The Fifth National People's Congress and the Process of Policy-making: Reform, Readjustment, and Opposition," *Asian Survey* 22, no. 12 (December 1982): 1238-75.

¹¹O'Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators," 361; McCormick, "Leninist Implementation," 407-8; Barrett McCormick, *Political Reform in Post-Mao China* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1990), 149.

the reform era of 1979-96 "the raw level of delegate assertiveness" had increased dramatically, and that since 1979, delegate assertiveness had decreased by a much lesser extent after the party leaders' suppression of dissidents.¹²

With an increase in legislative activities in the 1980s, NPC delegates played a significant role in legislative agenda-setting. The 1982-86 Five-Year Plan, published internally by the State Council Economic Legislation Research Center in 1983, listed 146 laws to be drafted and promulgated in the following five years. NPC delegates, along with national leaders, the State Council, and State Council ministries, proposed 38 percent of these laws. NPC delegates alone sponsored 23 percent of the laws.¹³

Thus, a number of questions regarding motion sponsorship merit exploration: (1) How many deputies typically sponsored a motion? (2) What type of motions had a better chance of being submitted to the NPC's committees? (3) In what issues were the deputies most interested? (4) Which region or province was most active in sponsoring legislative motions? (5) How do we account for the varying levels of legislative activism across regions or provinces? By using data on the types of motions sponsored and later submitted to the special committees of the NPC, we can answer the first three questions. In addition, by analyzing the varying levels of motion sponsorship among provincial delegations, we can both understand the variation among legislative activism of provincial delegations and the possible sources for legislative activism. In attempting to address the above questions, this paper will first describe the general and regional patterns of motion sponsorship and then test various explanations of the regional patterns.

Pursuing Tanner's innovative work on motion-sponsoring activities in the post-Mao era, this study uses the number of delegate-sponsored motions at the First Session of the Seventh NPC as a measure of delegate legislative activism. "Activism," in this context, is a deliberately neutral word. As studies on active legislators showed, the NPC delegates did not

¹²Tanner, *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China*, 75-80.

¹³*Ibid.*, 213.

necessarily challenge the party's rule through their motions.¹⁴ The word "activism" thus incorporates this aspect of legislative activities. By conducting a systemic and data-based study, the hope is to compensate for a lack of studies on the regional patterns of legislative motion sponsorship in post-Mao China and its causes in the existing literature on the NPC.

Data Sources and Treatment

Data on the motions sponsored at the First Session of the Seventh NPC came from *Zhonghua renmin gongheguo diqijie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui diyici huiyi huikan*, 1988 (Proceedings of the First Session of the Seventh National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China; hereafter "the *Proceedings*"). The *Proceedings* contained a complete set of motions sponsored by deputies of the NPC, the names of the leading sponsors, the number of cosponsors, and the brief contents of the motions. The *Proceedings* listed the motions both by functional areas and whether they were submitted to a specific committee for handling. The former classified motions into three general groups (political/legal, financial/economic, and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary). In the latter, they were categorized separately as those (1) submitted to one of the six special committees of the NPC for handling and (2) not submitted to committee processing, but treated as suggestions (*jianyi*), criticism (*pipi*), and views (*yijian*), forwarded to relevant governmental agencies for deliberation.¹⁵ The *Proceedings* also included the roster of each provincial delegation to the NPC.

Analysis of the data on motions was very strenuous and time-

¹⁴O'Brien, for example, suggested that active legislators played a dual role of regime agents and remonstrators for their constituents at the same time, and their opinions and proposals often concerned micro-level or local issues. See O'Brien, "Agents and Remonstrators," 359-80. Tanner argued that the motions by legislators were not necessarily critical of the party's rule. See Tanner, *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China*, 77.

¹⁵The six NPC special committees refer to the Law, Internal and Judicial Affairs, Financial and Economic, Education/Science/Culture and Sanitation, Nationalities, and Overseas Chinese Affairs committees.

consuming, therefore restricting the amount of data that can be processed. In order to obtain the necessary information, this author undertook a number of steps. First was the classification of these motions by whether or not they were submitted to committee processing and by the three functional areas (political/legal, financial/economic, and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary); these classifications are straightforward and informative.

Second, in calculating the breakdown of motions by categories and the number of sponsors, the author recounted the motions. This method of counting is different from that adopted by the Chinese government. Whereas the Chinese government counted motions with the same contents and sponsored by different groups of deputies as distinct entities, this author counted them as one motion to avoid an overlap. Therefore, the breakdown of motions *by functional areas and the number of sponsors* in my calculation will be less than that claimed by the government.¹⁶

Third, the author calculated the number of motions each province had initialed in the sponsorship.¹⁷ This task involved painstakingly locating the province of each of the over 300 leading sponsors by referring to a list of over 2,800 deputies from the 29 provinces. The next step was to total the number of motions whose sponsorship delegates from each province had put forward.

Fourth, the author collected other necessary information on the provinces, such as the number of deputies, economic growth rate in 1987, per capita tax remittance to the center, and the ratio of newspaper circulation to the number of residents. The most time-consuming task was to ascertain the provincial background of the over one hundred members of the special committees. Obtaining the information required reading through extensive

¹⁶My count is 384 motions, compared to the officially-reported 488 motions recorded in Tanner, *The Politics of Lawmaking in Post-Mao China*, 82.

¹⁷The *Proceedings* only specifies the primary sponsor of each motion, but not the other cosponsors. This data constraint restricts this author to attribute motion sponsorship to only the primary sponsors. When a deputy representing a given province led the sponsorship of a motion, this study counts this province as having sponsored a motion. Nevertheless, since the leading sponsor played a greater role than other unnamed cosponsors, this counting method reflects the level of legislator activism by province.

biographical sources. The data on the number of deputies from each province or autonomous region was derived from the *Proceedings*, and data on economic growth, tax remittance, provincial population, and newspaper circulation was drawn from *China Economic Yearbook* (1988).

For the sake of convenience, abbreviations are used for the following terms in this study:

D: Deputies

M: Total motions

MA: Motions submitted to (accepted by) the NPC committees

MNA: Motions not submitted to (accepted by) the NPC committees

POLAW: Motions regarding political or legal issues

FINEC: Motions regarding financial or economic issues

ESCS: Motions regarding educational, scientific, cultural, or sanitary issues.

The General Pattern of Motion Sponsorship

An Overview of the Motions

An overview of the motions will provide a general picture of legislative politics at the First Session of the Seventh NPC. In table 1, all the motions are organized using a classification scheme. First, they are classified by three functional areas: political/legal, financial/economic, and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary. Second, all the motions are divided into two groups—those submitted to the NPC committees for handling and those that are not. Each of these two groups is further subdivided into the three functional types—political/legal, financial/economic, and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary. Finally, the number and percentage of each of these groups and subgroups of motions are reflected in the right-hand column.

We can see from table 1 that more than half of all the motions dealt with financial and economic matters while 26.8 percent and 20.3 percent of them, respectively, concerned political/legal and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary matters. By contrast, among all the motions submitted to

Table 1
Breakdown of the Motions
(Percentage of total in parentheses)

Total Number of Motions	384
Political/Legal	103 (26.8)
Financial/Economic	203 (52.9)
Educational/Scientific/Cultural/Sanitary	78 (20.3)
Motions submitted to NPC committees	52
Political/Legal	19 (36.5)
Financial/Economic	13 (25.0)
Educational/Scientific/Cultural/Sanitary	20 (38.5)
Motions not submitted to NPC committees	332
Political/Legal	84 (25.3)
Financial/Economic	190 (57.2)
Educational/Scientific/Cultural/Sanitary	58 (17.5)
Percentage of each type of motions submitted to NPC committees	
Political/Legal	(18.4)
Financial/Economic	(6.4)
Educational/Scientific/Cultural/Sanitary	(25.4)

the committees, those related to education and other matters take the largest proportion (38.5 percent), followed by political/legal (36.5 percent), and lastly, financial/economic (25 percent). As far as the three functional types of motions are concerned, those on educational and other matters had the highest chance (25.4 percent) of being submitted to the committees, followed by political/legal (18.4 percent), and financial/economic (6.4 percent). Hence, even though financial and economic motions were the majority, the educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary motions constituted the majority of motions taken up by the special committees. The committees thus seem to have a very different preference for the types of motions than do the delegates.

*Number of Sponsors, Sponsoring Groups,
and Key Sponsoring Provinces of the Motions*

Tables 2 and 3 summarize data regarding the number of sponsors, sponsoring groups, and provinces of the primary sponsors. The motions are grouped into those proposed by (1) less than 30 deputies; (2) 30-60; (3)

Table 2**Breakdown of the Motions by the Number of Sponsors, Sponsoring Groups, and Provinces the Primary Sponsors Represented**

Number of Sponsors	All Motions		Motions Submitted to NPC Committees		Motions Not Submitted to NPC Committee	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1-29	5	1.30	1	1.92	4	1.20
30-60	317	82.55	38	73.08	279	84.04
61-90	21	5.47	4	7.69	17	5.12
91-120	16	4.17	3	5.77	13	3.92
121-	25	6.51	6	11.54	19	5.72
Total	384	100.00	52	100.00	332	100.00
Number of Sponsoring Groups						
1	347	90.36	40	76.92	307	92.47
2	12	3.13	4	7.69	8	2.41
3	15	3.91	5	9.62	10	3.01
4-	10	2.60	3	5.77	7	2.11
Total	384	100.00	52	100.00	332	100.00
Number of Provinces the Key Sponsors Represent						
1	339	91.62	39	81.25	300	93.17
2	11	2.97	3	6.25	8	2.48
3	11	2.97	3	6.25	8	2.48
4-	9	2.43	3	6.25	6	1.86
Total	370	99.99	48	100.00	322	99.99

Note: The total percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

61-90; (4) 91-120; and (5) 121 and more. In addition, they are also grouped by the number of sponsoring groups and the number of provinces the primary sponsors represented, ranging from one to four.

As we see from tables 2 and 3, of all the motions, the motions submitted or not submitted to the committees, and each of the three functional types of motions (all or those submitted to the committees), the largest

Table 3**Breakdown of Three Types of Motions by the Number of Sponsors, Sponsoring Groups, and Provinces the Primary Sponsors Represented**

Number of Sponsors	All Motions						Motions Submitted to NPC Committees					
Type of Motions	POLAW		FINEC		ESCS		POLAW		FINEC		ESCS	
Number and percentage	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1-29	2	1.9	3	1.5	0	0	1	5.3	0	0	0	0
30-60	80	77.7	169	83.3	68	87.2	13	68.4	10	76.9	15	75
61-90	4	3.9	13	6.4	4	5.1	1	5.3	1	7.7	2	10
91-120	7	6.8	8	3.9	3	3.9	2	10.5	2	15.4	1	5
121-	10	9.7	10	4.9	3	3.9	2	10.5	0	0	2	10
Total: 384	103	100	203	100	78	100.1	19	100	13	100	20	100
Number of sponsoring groups												
1	84	81.6	194	95.6	69	88.5	15	78.9	11	84.6	15	75
2	7	6.8	2	1.0	2	2.6	1	5.3	1	7.7	1	5
3	5	4.9	6	3.0	5	6.4	1	5.3	1	7.7	3	15
4-	7	6.8	1	0.5	2	2.6	2	10.5	0	0	1	5
Total: 384	103	100.1	203	100.1	78	100.1	19	100	13	100	20	100
Number of provinces the key sponsors represent												
1	77	83.7	193	95.5	68	89.5	13	81.3	11	84.6	15	79.0
2	6	6.5	5	2.5	2	2.6	1	6.3	1	7.7	1	5.3
3	3	3.3	4	2.0	4	5.3	0	0	1	7.7	2	10.5
4	6	6.5	0	0	2	2.6	2	12.5	0	0	1	5.3
Total: 370	92	100	202	100	76	100	16	100.1	13	100	19	100.1

group in terms of the number of sponsors were those proposed by 30 to 60 sponsors. For all the motions and motions submitted or not submitted to the committees, the second largest portion were those proposed by over 121 deputies, followed by 61 to 90, and finally, those proposed by 91 to 120 deputies. With respect to the three functional types of motions (all or those submitted to the committees), this order varies.

In terms of the number of sponsoring groups and the number of prov-

inces which the primary sponsors represented, all the motions, those submitted and not submitted to the committees, and all three types of motions display a similar pattern. An overwhelming majority—ranging from 76.9 percent to 93.2 percent—were sponsored by a single group or primary sponsors from one province. For all the motions and those submitted or not submitted to committee processing, the next two largest groups of motions were sponsored by two or three groups or by primary sponsors from two or three provinces. The smallest proportion was sponsored by more than four groups or primary sponsors from more than four provinces. For each of the three functional types of motions, the order of the three remaining groups is different from one another. In sum, all motions submitted or not submitted to the committees and each of the three types of motions were all alike in that the largest portion was sponsored by thirty to sixty deputies, by one group of sponsors, and by the key sponsors from one province. This common aspect likely resulted from official rules of the NPC which stipulate that each motion should be sponsored either by at least thirty deputies, or by one delegation that might have less than thirty deputies.¹⁸ Therefore, most motion-sponsors adopted the effort-saving strategy by having a group of thirty deputies, or having the leading sponsors from the same province cosponsor their motions.

Finally, a comparison between the motions in general and those submitted to the NPC committees for handling (tables 2 and 3) shows that the latter were sponsored by a slightly greater number of deputies, a greater number of groups of deputies, and the primary sponsors from more than one province.

Regional Patterns of Motion Sponsorship

Division of Regions

In China, provinces have a population equivalent to a medium-sized country and are an important layer in the political system. Provinces often

¹⁸See Art. 10 of the Organic Law of the PRC and Art. 72 of the PRC Constitution.

Table 4
Provinces by Coastal/Inland/Remote and Six Geographic Regions

Six Regions/ Three Regions	Coastal (11 provinces)	Inland (9 provinces)	Remote (9 provinces)
Northeast	Liaoning	Jilin, Heilongjiang	
North	Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei	Neimenggu, Shanxi	
South-Central	Guangdong, Guangxi	Henan, Hubei, Hunan	
East	Shandong, Shanghai, Jiangsu, Fujian, Zhejiang	Jiangxi, Anhui	
Southwest			Sichuan, Yunnan, Guizhou, Xizang (Tibet)
Northwest			Xinjiang, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia

differ in their respective levels of development, financial strengths, and political influences. NPC delegates are also grouped by provinces. Logical is thus to investigate the provincial differences in motion sponsorship. This paper examines twenty-nine provinces and autonomous regions (ARs).¹⁹

There are two ways of dividing the twenty-nine provinces or ARs into regions. One way is to divide them, on the basis of the level of socioeconomic development, into three regions: coastal (eastern), inland (middle), and remote (western) regions.²⁰ The other way is to group them into six geographic regions: Northeast, North, South (South-Central), East, Southwest, and Northwest. These two ways of dividing the twenty-nine provinces and ARs into regions are illustrated in table 4.

¹⁹At the First Session of the Seventh NPC, the Hainan delegation was still considered part of Guangdong. The PLA delegation is excluded from our research since it is very difficult to determine which province its deputies represented, and since its deputies overlapped with numerous provinces.

²⁰*People's Daily*, March 28, 1986, quoted by He Boquan, *Shan'aoshang de Zhongguo: Wenti, kunjing, tongku de xuanze* (China entrapped: Problems, dilemma, and painful choice) (Guiyang: Guizhou renmin chubanshe, 1989), 158.

*Regional Legislative Activism, Effectiveness,
and Interests Across Different Issues*

A useful measure of legislative activism of provincial delegations is the ratio of motions chiefly sponsored by provincial delegates to the number of delegates (M/D). This ratio can be computed for the motions related to political/legal matters (POLAW/D), financial/economic (FINEC), and educational and other matters (ESCS/D). A useful and ready measure of legislative effectiveness is the ratio of the motions submitted to the committees to the number of delegates (MA/D). An alternative measure is that of the number of motions submitted to the committees to the total number of motions (MA/M).²¹ Three steps were required to compute these measures.

First was computing these three ratios for each province or AR and each sociopolitical or geographic region. Next was the calculation and ranking of the means of each measurement (M/D, MA/D, MA/M, POLAW/D, FINEC/D, and ESCS/D) for all the regions. Finally, by using the statistical tool of analysis of variance (ANOVA), was the analysis of these means to estimate the significance of their differences. The above statistics are summarized in tables 5 and 6.

The analysis below examines whether the three socioeconomic regions differ in their interests in the three functional types of motions (POLAW, FINEC, and ESCS) and their legislative activism (M/D) and effectiveness (MA/D and MA/M). Among the three regions, there are significant differences in their relative levels of activism in terms of sponsoring motions in general (M/D) and in their capabilities to have motions submitted to the NPC committees (MA/D). In addition, there is also a significant difference among these regions in the levels of activities of sponsoring motions related to financial/economic and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary matters.

Now it is necessary to examine how each region differs from the others in the above "significant" cases. The *inland region* was the most active in sponsoring motions in general, the most effective in getting the

²¹"Effectiveness" here means the delegations' ability to turn a motion into law.

Table 5
Summary of the One-Way ANOVA of the Measurements of Legislative Activism and Effectiveness among Three Socio-economic Regions over Different Issues

Measurement	Activism M/D			Activism POLAW/D			Activism FINEC/D			Activism ESCS/D			Effectiveness MA/D			Effectiveness MA/M		
	Mean	Ranking		Mean	Ranking		Mean	Ranking		Mean	Ranking		Mean	Ranking		Mean	Ranking	
P	.009*			.206			.001**			.021*			.053*			.545		
Coastal	.143	2		.041	3		.042	2		.0412	1		.033	2		.300	1	
Inland	.222	1		.070	1		.110	1		.0406	2		.044	1		.195	3	
Remote	.089	3		.043	2		.034	3		.0118	3		.018	3		.225	2	

Notes:

(1) P is the probability of falsely rejecting the null hypothesis, that is, the probability of falsely believing that the difference between the three regions is significant.

(2) * denotes "significant at the 0.05 level" and ** denotes "highly significant at the 0.005 level."

Table 6
Summary of the One-Way ANOVA of the Measurements of Legislative Activism and Effectiveness among the Six Geographic Regions over Different Issues

Measurement	Activism M/D		Activism POLAW/D		Activism FINEC/D		Activism ESCS/D		Effectiveness MA/D		Effectiveness MA/M	
	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking	Mean	Ranking
P	.307		.974		.379		.037*		.072 [#]		.518	
Northeast	.148	4	.044	5	.069	3	.028	4	.014	5	.076	6
North	.183	2	.060	1	.075	2	.042	2	.045	1	.342	1
South-Central	.169	3	.051	3	.093	1	.029	3	.038	3	.279	3
East	.195	1	.056	2	.056	4	.054	1	.044	2	.246	4
Southwest	.108	5	.047	4	.046	5	.015	5	.010	6	.116	5
Northwest	.073	6	.040	6	.024	6	.009	6	.023	4	.306	2

Notes:

- (1) The meanings of P and symbols * and ** are as above.
 (2) # denotes "nearly significant at the 0.10 level."

committees to accept them (measured by MA/D), and the most active in sponsoring motions related to financial and economic matters. The inland region occupied a middle position in sponsoring motions related to educational and other issues. The *coastal region* ranked second in sponsoring motions in general, particularly motions concerning financial and economic issues, and in having its motions submitted to the NPC committees (measured by MA/D). The coastal region was ranked first in sponsoring motions related to educational and other issues. The *remote region* was the least active in sponsoring motions in general and sponsoring financial/economic and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary motions in particular, and the least effective in getting their motions accepted by the committees (measured by MA/D).

Finally, let us turn to the six geographic regions and examine the same patterns (see table 6). There is a nearly significant difference in their ability to have their motions submitted to the NPC committees. As far as the regions' effectiveness in submitting their motions to the NPC committees (measured by MA/D, with $P = 0.072$) is concerned, the order from the most to the least capable is as follows: North, East, South-Central, Northwest, Northeast, and Southwest.

As far as the motions related to educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary matters are concerned, there is a significant difference in the levels of motion-sponsoring activities among the six geographic regions. In terms of sponsoring motions related to educational and other issues, the order appears somewhat different: East, North, South-Central, Northeast, Southwest, and Northwest. The interregional differences in other categories exist, but they are not statistically significant. Likely is that among the three types of motions that coastal or eastern provinces actively sponsored, cultural, educational, and sanitary motions had the lowest political sensitivity and might have the best chance of becoming laws.

Variation in Provincial Delegations' Legislative Activism and Effectiveness

Aggregating the provinces into three regions or six geographic regions may help reveal any broad patterns. However, if provinces within each region differ significantly, this aggregation may artificially lump the

Table 7
Provincial Delegations' Legislative Activism and Effectiveness

	Delegates	Motions	Motions to Special Committees	Activism: Motions/ Delegates (M/D)	Ranking (M/D)	Effectiveness: Motions to Committees/ Delegates (MA/D)	Ranking (MA/D)
Heilongjiang	127	14	0	0.11	19	0	26
Jilin	87	17	3	0.195	8	0.035	12
Liaoning	144	20	1	0.139	16	0.007	25
Xinjiang	59	9	1	0.153	13	0.017	19
Shaanxi	71	5	2	0.07	24	0.028	15
Gansu	43	1	0	0.023	27	0	26
Qinghai	17	2	1	0.118	17	0.059	4
Ningxia	11	0	0	0	28	0	26
Beijing	64	13	3	0.203	7	0.047	9
Tianjin	51	4	4	0.078	22	0.078	2
Hebei	110	19	1	0.173	11	0.009	24
Neimenggu	63	11	3	0.175	10	0.048	7
Shanxi	70	20	3	0.286	4	0.043	11
Henan	151	56	7	0.371	2	0.046	10
Hubei	113	17	3	0.15	15	0.027	17
Hunan	112	20	7	0.179	9	0.063	3
Guangdong	163	12	3	0.074	23	0.018	18
Guangxi	87	6	3	0.069	25	0.034	13
Sichuan	203	32	3	0.158	12	0.015	21
Yunnan	87	18	1	0.207	6	0.012	23
Guizhou	74	5	1	0.068	26	0.014	22
Xizang	19	0	0	0	28	0	26
Shandong	178	17	3	0.0955	20	0.017	19
Shanghai	72	8	2	0.111	18	0.028	15
Jiangsu	138	21	7	0.152	14	0.051	5
Fujian	70	6	2	0.086	21	0.029	14
Zhejiang	120	47	6	0.392	1	0.05	6
Jiangxi	83	19	4	0.229	5	0.048	7
Anhui	103	30	9	0.291	3	0.087	1

provinces into regions, and may thus underestimate their differences. A more accurate analysis is one that summarizes and ranks the measures of legislative activism and effectiveness of twenty-nine provinces in 1988 in table 7. For example, table 6 shows that the Northern delegates were the most successful in submitting their motions to the committees since they had the most per delegate motion submitted to special committees (MA/D). However, the delegations from Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Neimenggu, and Shanxi in this region, as table 7 demonstrates, ranked 9th, 2nd, 24th, 7th,

and 11th respectively in the countries. Although no obvious outliers seem to exist in each of the six regions or the coastal, inland, and remote regions, the interprovincial variation within a region can be large indeed. An analysis of what caused the level of legislative activism and effectiveness among the provinces, instead of the regions, may produce more informative findings.

Explaining Activism and Effectiveness of Provincial Delegates

Legislative scholars propose that environmental and political structural factors may contribute to legislative output. Environmental factors include economic development and other economic indicators, and structural factors include legislative structure and interest group system.²² In the Chinese case, economic, fiscal, social, and political factors of the provinces may have contributed to the variation in provincial delegations' legislative activities and success in delivering their motions to the next higher level (namely, the special committees). Following are individual reviews of the explanations proffered in the Chinese context.

Economic Explanation

This view holds that the political system responds to environmental conditions and stimulus. Environmental factors create legislative demands and generate legislative efforts at formulating corresponding policies.²³ One of the biggest environmental factors in post-Mao China is economic growth. Economic growth has been rapid in China, with the pace of development varying across provinces. Rapid economic change may give

²²John Grumm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Output," in *Legislatures in Developmental Perspectives*, ed. Allan Kornberg and Lloyd D. Musolf (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1970), 430; Malcolm E. Jewell, "Legislators and Constituents in the Representative Process," in *Handbook of Legislative Research*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Samuel C. Patterson, and Malcolm E. Jewell (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 101.

²³Grumm, "Structural Determinants of Legislative Output," 430-31.

rise to many issues that legislators should deal with in order to sustain growth. Ming Xia suggested that provincial legislators actively involved themselves in issues related to marketization and market failure in the course of economic development. The issues related to marketization included the drafting and enforcing of rules to facilitate market transition, such as enforcing property rights and contracts and supervising the officials. The legislative efforts at overcoming the market failure targeted at pollution, as well as underprovision of infrastructure and public goods.²⁴ The faster the provincial economy grew, the more pressing issues likely emerged as a result of rapid economic change, and more motions the provincial delegation might put forward to deal with these issues. In addition, the NPC might be more willing to consider motions from the province.

Fiscal Explanation

Provincial fiscal contribution to the center varied greatly.²⁵ For example, while Shanghai and Tianjin respectively remitted 65 percent and 53.5 percent of their revenue to the center in 1988, Guizhou and Xinjiang retained all of their revenue, and respectively received 740 million and 1,530 million *yuan* in subsidies from the center.²⁶ In 1988 Shanghai alone made 25 percent of the country's local contracted transfers to the center.²⁷ As the provinces, especially the contributing provinces, constantly bargained with the center over the amount of remittance in the 1980s,²⁸ this explanation holds that the center might find it necessary to induce the provinces that made fiscal collection and remittance by rewarding them with political benefits or legislative influence. Unsurprising is thus that provin-

²⁴Ming Xia, *The Dual Developmental State* (Aldershot, U.K. and Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 2000), 144-72.

²⁵Christine Wong, Christopher Heady, and Wing T. Woo, *Fiscal Management and Economic Reform in the People's Republic of China* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1995), 92-93.

²⁶Yehua Dennis Wei, *Regional Development in China* (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 52; PRC State Statistical Bureau, *Gaige kaifang shiqinian de Zhongguo diqu jingji* (China regional economy: A profile of 17 years of reform and opening-up) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1996), 413.

²⁷See note 25 above.

²⁸*Ibid.*, 127.

cial leaders who had generated more revenue for the center were more likely to be rewarded with promotion.²⁹ Jiang Zemin (江泽民), Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基), and Li Ruihuan (李瑞環) are all former leaders of Shanghai or Tianjin who were later promoted to key national posts. Another possible scenario more relevant to this study is that the provinces that had made fiscal "sacrifices" for the country would have a louder voice in lawmaking, especially in regard to how their revenue remittance was used. Their NPC deputies would be more active in proposing the motions at the NPC plenary sessions. As the heavily contributing provinces were financially more valuable to the center, the center might pay more attention to their legislative demands. The NPC special committee members *as a whole* would be more willing to take up their motions. In a way, these more heavily-remitting provinces might have attained "representation for taxation."

(Clientalist) Political Explanation

Some studies of distributive politics in Western legislatures suggest that members of legislative committees tend to allocate more funds to their home areas.³⁰ A similar phenomenon may occur in the NPC. Chinese politics, as scholars have argued, is characterized by "clientalism."³¹ An earlier elaborate and synthetic study on this topic has suggested that Chinese officials tend to form a close tie with others on the basis of similar social attributes, such as common geographic backgrounds, kinship, former classmates, or school ties; in case of need, members of this network (informal base) would seek help from the other members to reciprocate in kind when necessary.³² For this reason, members of special committees who had served in the province right before their committee appointment would

²⁹Bo reached this conclusion in his study. Cf. Peter T.Y. Cheung, Jae Ho Chung, and Zhimin Lin, eds., *Provincial Strategies of Economic Reform in Post-Mao China* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 29.

³⁰Barry Rundquist, Jeong-Hwa Lee, and Jungho Rhee, "The Distributive Politics of Cold War Defense Spending: Some State Level Evidence," *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 21 (May 1986): 265-81.

³¹Andrew J. Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *The China Quarterly*, no. 53 (January-March 1973): 34-66.

³²For a fine discussion and summary of informal politics, see Lowell Dittmer, "Chinese Informal Politics," *The China Journal*, no. 34 (July 1995): 1-34.

return favors to their friends and former colleagues from the province. The provinces with a larger number of delegates sitting at the special committees would thus have a much better chance of getting their motions considered by these committees. This prospect would, in return, encourage legislators from these provinces to submit more motions. This favoritism from the committee members differed from the above-noted national rewards for the provinces that remitted a large amount of revenue to the center. The latter was routine and universal among the national leaders and committee members.

Two additional types of explanations exist. Nevertheless, as will be pointed out below, a preliminary data analysis is necessary for determining whether to include them in the regression.

Social Explanation

Increasingly influential provincial media in the post-Mao period might influence both the provincial population and politicians, and might contribute to legislative activism and influence of the provinces. Although still controlled by the government, the media could cover politically-less-sensitive issues, and attract wide attention within the provinces.³³ The extent of development of the media would affect the level of activities of legislators from the provinces. A developed mass media has the following effects: easier transmission of political information, greater political awareness of the provincial population and the provincial delegates, greater popular pressure on the delegates to push for legislation on behalf of the provinces, and a greater likelihood that the delegates would participate in legislative politics. Therefore, we should expect a positive correlation between newspaper circulation (standardized by per ten provincial residents) and the number of motions per delegate.

Educational Explanation

The quality of the provincial educational system might affect the polit-

³³David S.G. Goodman, ed., *China's Provinces in Reform* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), 9.

ical awareness, abilities, and participation of the provincial population and the provincial legislators. The better educational system a province has, the more likely the population and the legislators would be able to comprehend and be interested in political issues, and the more active and influential the province's legislators would be at the NPC session. The number of college students per 1,000 residents varied widely across provinces in line with their educational facilities, and serves as a good indicator of education.

Findings

The data on the measures of legislative activism and effectiveness, along with these variables, are summarized in table 8. Before a regression analysis of M/D and MA/D, correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables should be examined. The explanatory variables that are highly correlated with others could bias the regression results. Table 9 summarizes the correlation coefficients between the potential explanatory variables.

Newspaper circulations and especially the number of college students highly correlate with other explanatory variables, and their presence in the regression will bias the results. Thus this paper only tests the first three explanations: economic, political, and fiscal explanations. In the analyses, the measure of legislative activism and effectiveness (M/D and MA/D) was regressed on gross national product (GNP) growth, per capita tax contribution to the center, and the number of committee members who had worked in the provinces right before serving at the committee. Prior to the regression, the author examined the scatter plots of either of the dependent variables with each of the four explanatory variables. *Beijing*, *Shanghai*, *Tianjin*, and *Tibet* appeared to be outliers in the scatter plots of explanatory variables with M/D. Two metropolitan centers—*Beijing* and *Shanghai*—appeared to be outliers in the scatter plots of explanatory variables with MA/D. They are thus excluded from the statistical analyses. The author also ran a regression for legislative activism by excluding three provincial-level metropolises, namely, Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai (Formula 3). Regression results are summarized in the following formulae. Variables in boldface are statistically significant at the 0.05 level, and those both italicized and in boldface are significant at the 0.1 level.

Table 8
Provincial Legislative Activism, Effectiveness, and Economic and Sociopolitical Factors

	Activism: Motions/Delegates (M/D)	Effectiveness: Motions submitted to committees/ delegates (MA/D)	GNP Growth Rate (%)	Number of Committee Members	Per Capita Taxes to the Center (100 yuan)	Newspaper Circulations Per 10 Residents	College Students Per 1,000 Residents
Heilongjiang	0.11	0	15.4	6	0.364	1.95	2.39
Jilin	0.195	0.035	18.0	8	0.672	1.93	3.14
Liaoning	0.139	0.007	10.0	13	0.731	2.86	3.14
Xinjiang	0.153	0.017	18.1	4	-1.572	1.31	2.14
Shaanxi	0.07	0.028	9.3	2	-0.312	1.52	3.21
Gansu	0.023	0	12.4	2	-0.417	1.38	1.54
Qinghai	0.118	0.059	6.4	1	-1.928	1.07	1.60
Ningxia	0	0	10.0	2	-1.593	1.06	1.70
Hebei	0.173	0.009	11.4	5	0.0751	1.19	1.20
Neimenggu	0.175	0.048	6.8	3	-1.272	0.94	1.50
Shanxi	0.286	0.043	3.1	3	-0.31	2.16	1.86
Henan	0.371	0.046	14.8	1	-0.026	1.80	0.97
Hubei	0.15	0.027	7.3	8	0.086	1.48	2.61
Hunan	0.179	0.063	9.0	1	-0.027	1.26	1.49
Guangdong	0.074	0.018	16.8	9	-0.009	2.82	1.51
Guangxi	0.069	0.034	15.3	2	-0.427	1.01	0.87
Sichuan	0.158	0.015	8.6	3	-0.114	1.40	1.35
Yunnan	0.207	0.012	11.3	7	-0.466	0.62	1.20
Guizhou	0.068	0.014	8.7	5	-0.327	0.68	0.84
Xizang	0	0	5.7	3	-4.41	0.80	0.87
Shandong	0.0955	0.017	13.2	4	-0.031	1.13	1.25
Jiangsu	0.152	0.051	13.8	8	0.617	1.60	2.34
Fujian	0.086	0.029	12.8	7	-0.244	1.57	1.99
Zhejiang	0.392	0.05	14.2	4	0.596	1.83	1.54
Jiangxi	0.229	0.048	8.3	1	-0.269	0.68	1.48
Anhui	0.291	0.087	7.2	2	-0.108	0.96	1.20
Tianjin	0.078	0.078	8.7	6	2.97	6.86	6.60
Beijing	0.203	0.047	17.1	26	1.41	87	12.8
Shanghai	0.111	0.028	8.0	7	9.213	17.97	10.67

Note: Positive per capita taxes to the center denote net contribution, and negative taxes net subsidies from the center.

Table 9
Correlation Coefficients between Potential Explanatory Variables

	GNP Growth Rate	Number of Committee Members	Per Capita Tax Remittance	Newspaper Circulation	College Students
GNP Growth Rate	1				
Number of Committee Members	0.382	1			
Per Capita Tax Remittance	0.053	0.303	1		
Newspaper Circulation	0.260	<u>0.821</u>	0.297	1	
College Students	0.125	<u>0.715</u>	<u>0.700</u>	<u>0.826</u>	1

Notes: Bold letters indicate variables with no significant correlation; underlined numbers denote significant correlation that could bias the regression estimate.

Formula 1: Causes of Legislative Activism, Excluding Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, and Tibet

$$M/D = 0.267 - 0.003 \text{ GNP Growth} + \mathbf{0.078 \text{ Tax Remittance}} - \mathbf{0.012 \text{ Committee Members}}$$

(0.066) (0.005) (0.032) (0.007)

F = 2.20; Significant level = 0.118; R squared adjusted = 0.13

Formula 2: Causes of Legislative Influence, Excluding Beijing and Shanghai

$$MA/D = 0.068 - 0.0016 \text{ GNP Growth} + \mathbf{0.012 \text{ Tax Remittance}} - \mathbf{0.035 \text{ Committee Members}}$$

(0.013) (0.0011) (0.0035) (0.0014)

F = 5.11; Significant level = 0.0074; R squared adjusted = 0.32

Formula 3: Causes of Legislative Activism, Excluding Beijing, Tianjin, and Shanghai

$$M/D = 0.256 - 0.003 \text{ GNP Growth} + \mathbf{0.057 \text{ Tax Remittance}} - 0.010 \text{ Committee Members}$$

(0.066) (0.005) (0.020) (0.007)

F = 2.97; Significant level = 0.05; R squared adjusted = 0.19

Formula 1 falls slightly out of the 0.1 significant level, while Formulae 2 and 3 are significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. Thus, these explanations seem to be able to explain provincial legislative influence quite well, yet seem less reliable in accounting for legislative activism. Nevertheless, political and especially the fiscal factors help us to understand legislative activism and influence. Formulae 1 and 2 lead to the following conclusions. First, per capita provincial fiscal remittance to the center correlates with legislative activism. For each 1,000 *yuan* increase in per capita provincial fiscal contribution, the motions/delegates (M/D) ratio increases by 0.78 (the highest M/D in the sample is 0.39). Second, per capita provincial fiscal contribution again helps to account for legislative effectiveness of the provinces (motions submitted to the committees/delegates, or the MA/D ratio). For each 1,000 *yuan* increase in per capita provincial fiscal contribution, the MA/D ratio increases by 0.12 (the highest MA/D is 0.087). Contradicting the clientalist explanation, however, are provinces where the committee members used to serve, as these members tended to have a lower chance of getting the motions that the delegates from these provinces chiefly sponsored to the committees. For each committee member who worked in a province right before their appointment at the committee, the province's M/D decreased by 0.012, and MA/D decreased by 0.035.

A study by Ming Xia suggested that provincial people's congresses actively developed linkages with the provincial party committees and the NPC, other provincial legislatures, provincial deputies and lower-level people's congresses, and provincial administrative and judicial branches.³⁴ My findings here suggest two possibilities. First, even though the NPC special committee members might have contact with a province that they associated with or served, they tried to act impartially by accepting motions sponsored by legislators from other provinces. Second, provincial legislators' institutional contact might help them to realize that provincial fiscal remittance enhances the NPC's willingness to listen to their concerns. As a result, legislators from important fiscal remitters would be more active in

³⁴Xia, *The Dual Developmental State*, 144-53.

sponsoring motions. In addition, with more resources at their disposal, heavily remitting provinces might have more elaborate institutional linkages, and have contact with more NPC leaders and national party leaders who come from a different province and who are receptive to the demands of these provinces.

As the number of college students per 1,000 provincial residents was highly correlated with other explanatory variables, the author regressed M/D and MA/D respectively on this variable to determine whether provincial education affected provincial legislative influence and activism. Beijing, Shanghai, and Tianjin were excluded since they were clear outliers. The results are the following Formulae 4 and 5. Obvious is that both formulae and the educational variable are statistically highly insignificant, and both formulae can hardly explain any variation in M/D and MA/D. The educational factor thus seems to be unable to explain legislative activism and influence.

Formula 4: Educational Impact on Legislative Activism

$$M/D = 0.168 - 0.009 \text{ College Students} \\ (0.054) (0.029)$$

$$F = 0.096; \text{Significant level} = 0.759; R \text{ squared adjusted} = -0.037$$

Formula 5: Educational Impact on Legislative Influence

$$MA/D = 0.033 - 0.0024 \text{ College Students} \\ (0.012) (0.0066)$$

$$F = 0.135; \text{Significant level} = 0.716; R \text{ squared adjusted} = -0.036$$

It thus seems that provincial delegations' activism in sponsoring legislative motions is related to the amount of the provinces' fiscal contribution to the center: the delegations wanted to have a say in lawmaking, probably in order to influence the way their contribution was used. In addition, the provinces that contributed heavily to the center tended to be more successful in getting their bills on the desk of the special committees. On the other hand, having an ex-colleague from the province on the special committees seemed to work as a disadvantage for the province, especially when the

province wanted to take its motion to the desk of special committees. A likely reason for this effect may have been that the members on these committees tried to avoid a conflict of interest or tried to show their impartiality by intentionally accepting bills from the provinces that they had not served right before their appointment. The pace of economic growth had no significant effect on legislative activism and effectiveness.

Conclusions

This study suggests several characteristics of legislative activities at the NPC in 1988. First, the delegates proposed mostly financial and economic motions (52.9 percent), yet the special committees were more interested in taking up their educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary motions and political/legal motions. Second, largely because of the NPC thirty-delegate requirement for motion sponsorship, most motions were sponsored by thirty to sixty delegates. In addition, most motions were sponsored by one group and represented one province. Third, among the coastal, inland, and remote regions, inland provincial delegations were the most active and influential (measured respectively by the ratio of motions to delegates and by that of motions submitted to special committees to delegates), and were the most active in putting forward political/legal and financial/economic laws. The coastal provinces were the most active in sponsoring educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary motions. Fourth, among the six geographic regions of the Northeast, North, South-Central, East, Southwest, and Northwest, delegates from the East were most active, and those from the North were the most effective in passing their motions on to the special committees and the most active in proposing political/legal motions. The delegates from the South-Central and from the East were the most active in sponsoring respectively financial/economic motions and educational/scientific/cultural/sanitary motions. Fifth, at the provincial level, delegates from the same region might vary noticeably in terms of activism and effectiveness as well as interests in functional areas. Finally, per capita revenue remittance from the provinces to the central government helped to account for provincial delegates' activism and effectiveness. Provinces with a high

remittance tended to be more active in sponsoring motions and more effective in convincing the special committees to review their motions. Surprisingly, the members of special committees appeared to act impartially by not taking up motions from the provinces where they served right before their committee appointment. Economic growth and the educational system did not matter much for provincial motion sponsorship. Instead, the provincial fiscal remittance affected legislative activities and effectiveness.

In conclusion, even though the time-consuming nature of the data analysis limits the amount of data that can be included, this study has uncovered patterns in motion sponsorship, the variations among regions and provinces, and possible causes. The author hopes that additional studies along this line will contribute to a better understanding of legislative activism and effectiveness in China.

