

"Order Beyond Design": Intergovernmental Relations and the Downsizing of Taiwan's Provincial Government*

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This paper examines the interrelationship between the central and local governments in Taiwan, with particular reference to the period after the 1996 decision to downsize the Taiwan Provincial Government. The paper argues that in the wake of the 1996 decision, while relations between the different levels of government in Taiwan have become confused, the contemporary state of intergovernmental relations is not entirely without order. In order to shed some light on the development of contemporary intergovernmental relations in Taiwan, this paper refers to three main theoretical approaches: the bounded rationality, incrementalism, and "garbage can" models. The paper also refers to documentary analysis combined with a survey of relevant government officials. These are used to explain the contemporary pattern of relations between the different levels of Taiwan's government. In conclusion, the paper argues that leadership is the key factor shaping the patterns of interaction among different levels of government in Taiwan today.

KEYWORDS: intergovernmental relations; downsizing Taiwan's provincial government; Taiwan

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Analyses of intergovernmental relationships (IGR) have been rare indeed.¹ As part of a growing interest for such analyses, however, this paper examines the 1996 decision by the Republic of China's (ROC's) National Development Conference (NDC 國家發展會議) to reduce the size of the Taiwan Provincial Government (TPG 台灣省政府),² which was immediately followed by the National Assembly's 1997 decision to amend provisions of the ROC Constitution to allow this reduction.³ The ROC's four layers of government (central, provincial, county/city, and rural) were required by legislation to adhere to the provisions of the downsizing law.

The downsizing of the TPG has been proceeding since December 1998. The intended and publicized purpose of the move was to eliminate one "layer" of government⁴ so as to reduce the high cost of the four-tiered government. We will focus on the motivation for this "intended" purpose⁵ and what in particular in the law led to the results we found.

To display the manifestations of the law and its intended impact, we employ three decision-making theories. We utilize a range of criteria to

¹Da-chi Liao et al., "Intergovernmental Relations During and After Downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government" (Unpublished research report, in Chinese, 1999).

²The ROC governs two provinces, Taiwan and part of Fujian. Fujian's provincial government represents little more than a "symbolic" status as its jurisdiction encompasses two small island counties (Kinmen and Lianjiang) only, and its chairperson has always been appointed by the central government. However, the Taiwan Provincial Government was another story. This level of government had jurisdiction over twenty cities and counties and occupied approximately 98 percent of the ROC's territory, with 80 percent of its population. Bluntly put, before downsizing, the governing power of the TPG was almost equivalent to that of the ROC central government. Thus we can discern the motivation of the central government to downsize.

³These are the first and second clauses in the Ninth Amendment, which exclude the TPG from the category of local self-governance and subject it to the Executive Yuan. See Hsieh Jui-chih, *Xianfa xinlun* (New interpretations of the constitution) (Taipei: Cheng Chung Book Company, 2000), 936-37.

⁴See Yeh Wei-chuan et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations: The Case of the Taiwan Provincial Government" (Unpublished manuscript, in Chinese, 1999), 10-12.

⁵There is the "intended" purpose; there must also be another "inferred" one. The inferred motivation, then, might be that the central government was concerned that the TPG, because of its size, was assuming powers reserved for the central government. The TPG may have been becoming too powerful, too national "for its own and the nation's good," hence the central government's effort to downsize and eliminate its power. Since this inferred motive is outside the scope of our concerns here, we will not elaborate on this.

provide insights since choice followed by actions under structural constraints (i.e., laws) is the essence of IGR;⁶ we also focus on the governmental units which are directly influenced by the downsizing policy: the central, the provincial, and the county/city units. Since the downsizing of the TPG has not been under way for too long, we have mainly elicited public officials' responses to IGR as they have been participating in the downsizing process.⁷

Theory and Method

Theoretical Approaches

The analysis we offer is based on the following three decision-making models:

1. *The bounded rationality model*: Herbert A. Simon's bounded rationality model embodies the notion that decision-making is not capricious but, on the contrary, inevitably "bounded rationally" by a decision-maker's ability and the environment in which he finds himself.⁸ Traditionally, decision-makers were viewed as having global rationality, tending to look for "rational," acceptable solutions to the problem or problems encountered. This model also presumes a person will be able to understand his role within a specific work environment. He will be able to make decisions, to choose among alternatives, to identify and to select goals, even to provide a solution to a problem.⁹ This model has been labeled as one that leads toward "decision-making under certainty";¹⁰ at the same time, critics of the model argue that "certainty" scarcely exists in real decision-making situations and that decision-making is inevitably constrained by both a

⁶Deil S. Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, third edition (Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company, 1988), 15-18.

⁷A detailed introduction to the method may be found in the section "Theory and Method."

⁸Herbert A. Simon, "Rational Choices and the Structure of the Environment," *Psychological Review* 63 (1956): 129-38.

⁹*Ibid.*; James G. March and H. A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), chap. 6.

¹⁰See note 8 above; Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957), 4-6.

person's ability and his environment. As a result of these constraints, the decision-maker would "satisfy" rather than "maximize" when considering a solution. In other words, he would look for an alternative that merely meets an acceptable standard.¹¹

Simon suggests that human beings are "bounded rationally" and are therefore unable to know themselves or their environments. He also points out that people are constantly in a state of uncertainty despite their desire to be otherwise. An individual, for example, may be uncertain either about his own preferences or the most efficient manner of matching a problem with its solution in accordance with his best interests. In addition, "bounded rationality" may prevent someone from even offering a "best" choice since the meaning and existence of the "best" is often ambiguous; a "satisfactory" level may then be substituted for the "best" choice. The environment in which the decision is to be made plays a crucial role in deciding which biases would be evident in establishing satisfactory standards.

"Bounded rationality" has value in that it takes "uncertainty" into account in attempting to understand political phenomena and because the approach helps explain Taiwan's IGR following the decision to downsize the TPG. We will elaborate on bounded rationality's application later in this paper.

2. *The incrementalism model*: This approach stresses that, instead of considering each program or issue afresh, decision-makers take what they are currently doing as a given, and make small, incremental, marginal adjustments to their behavior. These actors do not spend time defining their goals so as to calculate the cost/benefit between various means and their ends. They do not even look for satisfactory levels of solutions. In other words, their daily experiences help them form organizational routines, which in turn govern their responses and behavior to a great extent.¹²

Budgetary processes best exemplify incrementalism.¹³ As Aaron

¹¹See note 8 above.

¹²Richard R. Nelson and Sidney G. Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1982); John F. Padgett, "Bounded Rationality in Budgetary Research," *American Political Science Review* 74 (1980): 354-72.

¹³Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, third edition (Boston: Little Brown, 1979).

Wildavsky argued, most bureaucrats would adopt an incremental approach to budgets because they cannot handle too much information on and too many demands (usually conflicting with each other) surrounding budgetary decisions.¹⁴ However, John Kingdon's research of public policies has demonstrated that incrementalism both describes the way the world is, and is also a strategy that an actor might use to manipulate outcomes. He states: "Apprehensive about being unable to calculate the political fallout, politicians shy away from grand departures. Apprehensive about not fully understanding the unanticipated consequences that might ensue, specialists also avoid significant changes."¹⁵

In other words, facing uncertainty, incrementalism may be a good strategy for both politicians and bureaucrats to observe, helping them to gradually learn from a new situation. For example, under uncertain conditions, politicians and bureaucrats may choose to adopt a step-by-step approach to change irrespective of their organizational goals or their own preferences.

3. *The "garbage can" model*: Our third, and final, decision-making model is the so-called "garbage can" model, a model which not only abandons the notion of any organizational rationality driving decision-making in an uncertain world, but also includes all possible influences—hence the descriptor "garbage can."¹⁶ The "garbage can" model has three general properties, all seemingly negative: problematic preferences, unclear technology, and fluid participation.

The first, "problematic preferences," portrays participants as being unable to define their preferences clearly. And even when they do, actors still may tend to conflict with each other. Preferences are inconsistent—both between and among participants and even within a given individual. The second refers to members within a "garbage can" situation who do not understand the organizational processes very well. They may know their

¹⁴Ibid., 15-16.

¹⁵John W. Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies* (New York: Harper/Collins, 1984), 84.

¹⁶James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, eds., *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations* (Bergen, Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), 10-36.

own jobs, and the organization as a whole may stay focused, but the organization's members have only fragmentary and vague understandings of what they are doing and why, especially how their jobs fit into a more general picture within the organization. The choices participants make in these situations are often dictated by chance, trial and error, or by some pragmatic invention when faced with a crisis. The third presumes that participants drift in and out of decision-making, thus making the boundaries of decision-making in an organization rather fluid. Furthermore, the time and effort members of the organization devote to different problems vary from one time to another. When the three dynamic properties are active in making a decision that is also fluid (a garbage can, so to speak), the outcome is, more often than not, unpredictable and uncontrollable.

Downsizing the TPG:

Applying the Models to the Reality of IGR in Taiwan

The above three decision-making models take "uncertainty" into account. This consideration of "uncertainty" is quite appropriate in the case of the downsizing of the TPG.¹⁷ However, these three models treat the human ability to make rational calculations very differently. Following the logic of "bounded rationality," one expects that public officials from the various "layers" of government perceive, interpret, and act upon IGR during the downsizing process quite differently. We expect the following three tendencies to emerge:

1. Central government officials will follow regulations aimed at the downsizing of the TPG quite closely and carefully since they were role-players in formulating the downsizing of the TPG, and could profit or perhaps lose the most from any change in policy.¹⁸
2. The county/city government officials will be second in line to follow the relevant regulations of the downsizing policy. They would have—

¹⁷According to a survey of 140 provincial officials since June 1999, 36 percent felt that uncertainty has most troubled them in the face of the downsizing of the TPG. See Liao et al., "Intergovernmental Relations During and After Downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government," 75.

¹⁸See Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 50.

if bounded rationality is any guide—a tendency to stress the promotion of their status in the new IGR under the downsized TPG. The reasons are twofold. County/city government officials have not been directly involved in formulating the policy of downsizing the TPG.¹⁹ They have less knowledge and understanding than central government officials regarding the downsizing policy, and that may lead them to interpret relevant provisions of the downsizing policy to their advantage. On the other hand, their contexts (at the county/city level) and positions (status) may also bias their view of the downsizing policy toward the direction taken in line with their interests.

3. Provincial government officials may dislike following the relevant regulations about the downsizing of the TPG. They may even interpret their responsibilities under the new regulations as being identical to those of the past.

The second model, incrementalism, and its relationship to IGR in the downsizing process may lead bureaucrats and politicians from all strata of government to make incremental choices based on their previous experiences or understandings of IGR in Taiwan. In other words, new regulations associated with the downsizing of the TPG do not exercise much influence on public officials' attitudes or actions. Our last model, the "garbage can," suggests that either regulations do not govern public officials' responses to IGR in the downsizing process or there do not clearly exist any patterns of IGR in Taiwan.

Method

Our evaluation of IGR in Taiwan focuses on three strata of government—central, provincial, and county/city. Since legal systems and public officials who enforce them are the two crucial components that are the substance of IGR, our study gathers data for analysis from these two sources. We provide relevant rules and regulations for IGR, both before

¹⁹The National Development Conference did not invite county/city-level officials to attend. The Executive Yuan has been mainly responsible for drawing up the relevant rules in regard to downsizing the TPG. The counties/cities then have not played a significant role in the process so far. See *ibid.*, 1.

and during the process of downsizing the TPG. The most directly relevant regulations can be found in four acts, three administrative orders issued by the Executive Yuan, and in the ROC Constitution (including amendments).²⁰ In addition to these regulations, we also review the previous research related to the allocation of power between the ROC's central and local governments.²¹

Our data consists of information from survey and subsequent interviews with those responsible for TPG downsizing. The survey elicits information from chief officers of departments and bureaus of the TPG. This information leads to an understanding of the modus operandi of chief officers before and during the downsizing process (see appendix).

Our survey focused on chief officers of the TPG who not only dealt with routine administrative work but also enjoyed discretionary powers.²² Thus, they represented the employees within the TPG. In addition, these officers had direct experience in working with both the central and local governments. We mailed 415 questionnaires on June 25, 1999 and asked for their return by July 31, 1999. The return rate, with 140 returned, was 33.74 percent.

Another source for information was the interview. We designed these interviews for central government officials and county magistrates/city mayors or their deputies. Two magistrates participated in oral interviews:

²⁰A detailed introduction to these rules will be provided in the following section.

²¹These mainly include: Huang Chin-tang, *Difang zizhi fazhizhua wenti zhi yanjiu* (A study on the institutionalization of local self-governance) (Taipei: Yuetan, 1995), 153-98; Chao Yung-mao, "Suggestions and Disputes on the Theory of Decentralization," *Zhengzhi kexue luncong* (Political Science Review), 1991, no. 3:155-81; Chao Yung-mao, "The Institutionalization of Local Self-Governance and the Division of Power Between the Central and Local Governments After Amending the Constitution," *Zhongshan shehui kexue jikan* (Sun Yat-sen Social Science Quarterly) 7, no. 2 (1992): 66-78; Chao Yung-mao, "The Settlement and Adjustment of Organizations for County/City Governments," *Lilun yu zhengce* (Theory and Policy) 11, no. 3 (1997): 30-42; Chao Yung-mao, *Zhongyang yu difang quanxian huafen de lilun yu shijian* (Theory and practice for the power division between the central and local governments) (Taipei: Luhan, 1997), 33-145; Chi Chun-chen, "The New Local Institutions and the Downsized Taiwan Provincial Government," *Zhongguo difang zizhi* (Chinese Local Self-Governance) 52, no. 2 (1999): 3-23; and Po Chinchin, *Difang zhengfu yu zizhi* (Local government and self-governance), second edition (Taipei: Wunan, 1995), 111-56.

²²They were recommended by the chief secretary of the Research, Evaluation, and Economic Development Commission of the TPG (before July 1999).

the magistrate of Taitung County (台東縣) and the deputy magistrate of Taipei County (台北縣). Twenty of the twenty-one questioned (including those interviewed in person) returned their questionnaire (see appendix). Of the twenty, twelve were county magistrates or city mayors, five were deputy magistrates, and three were chief secretaries.

We also interviewed two individuals involved in planning for the downsizing of the TPG: Chi Chun-chen (紀俊臣), director of the Civil Affairs Department in the Interior Ministry, and Yeh Wei-chuan (葉維銓), director of the Overall Planning Department in the Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission of the Executive Yuan. Any degree of confusion in their mission provided data for this analysis.

Intergovernmental Relations under Regulations

Before the Downsizing of the TPG

Before the downsizing commenced, regulations directly related to IGR in Taiwan consisted of the following: The 1950 Outline for Implementation of Local Self-Government by Counties and Cities in Taiwan (台灣省各縣市實施地方自治綱要),²³ the 1991 Act for Dividing Revenues and Expenditures Between the Central and Local Governments (ADRE, 中央與地方財政收支劃分法),²⁴ and the 1994 Act for Provincial and County Self-Government (APCS, 省縣自治法). These regulations divided IGR in Taiwan before downsizing into two periods: 1950-93 and 1994-98. This division arises from the government's decision to replace the 1950 Outline governing local affairs with APCS.

From 1950 to 1993, Taiwan's political system was based on a four-tiered configuration. The central government occupied the dominant tier.

²³The 1950 Outline was an administrative order.

²⁴ADRE is valid even as of today. This act has been revised four times so far: 1954, 1965, 1981, and 1998. See Tsai Li-hu, "The Even Greater Tendency of the Central Government to Centralize After Revising the Act for Dividing Revenues and Expenditures Between the Central and Local Governments," in *Gaoxiong xianzheng yantaohui huiyi zhilu* (The proceedings for the conference on Kaohsiung County affairs) (Fengshan: Kaohsiung County Government, 1999), 57.

The central government's authority, moreover, came from both its legislative power, which deeply influenced the operation and substance of local governments,²⁵ and its control of local financial resources.²⁶ The TPG occupied the second layer.²⁷ The TPG had been designed as the highest administrative organ of local governments (the 1950 Outline, chap. 6) and also controlled a certain amount of local financial resources (the 1950 Outline, chap. 5 and ADRE). The next two tiers consisted of counties/cities and rural townships (*xiang/zhen* 鄉鎮). The county/city units had jurisdiction over *xiang/zhen* (the 1950 Outline, chap 6). The former also controlled a limited amount of *xiang/zhen* financial resources (the 1950 Outline, chap 5).

IGR within this four-layer system may be analogous to the so-called "inclusive authority model" which was formulated by Deil S. Wright.²⁸ The model for the Taiwan case can be diagrammed as figure 1. As Wright points out, the inclusive authority model "conveys the essential hierarchical nature of authority."²⁹ Furthermore, this model also stresses the dependency between the different levels of government: "To the question of who governs, this model provides an unequivocal answer: the national government."³⁰

During this period (1950-93), some have labeled Taiwan's IGR as

²⁵Chao, "Suggestions and Disputes on the Theory of Decentralization," 155-81; Chao, "The Settlement and Adjustment of Organizations for County/City Governments," 30-42; Huang, *Difang zizhi fazhizhua wenti zhi yanjiu*, 153-98.

²⁶Since ADRE has decided on how to distribute the total revenues, and its formulations and revisions are all in the hands of the central government, the central government usually takes the most advantage of this legislative act. Taking the year 1998 as an example (before the fourth revision of ADRE), the central government had 55 percent of the total revenues, and further controlled 5 percent of the total for redistribution. The twenty counties/cities as a whole only had direct control over 9 percent of the total. The TPG then had 8 percent of the total, yet enjoyed another 6 percent of the total for redistribution. See Tsai, "The Even Greater Tendency to Centralize," 74.


²⁷During this period, martial law was still in effect in Taiwan (1950-87). The TPG was not a self-governing body. While the chairman of the provincial government (*sheng zhuxi* 省主席) was appointed, not elected, he legally occupied the number two position in the system.

²⁸Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, 40, 43-51.

²⁹*Ibid.*, 44.

³⁰*Ibid.*

Figure 1
The Inclusive Authority Model of IGR in Taiwan (1950-93)



*The local government includes both county/city and *xiang/zhen* units.

being centralized or dependent.³¹ A parallel or interdependent relationship among different strata of government was not an option in the legal format for IGR in Taiwan at this time.


Promulgated in 1994, APCS rendered more autonomous powers than the 1950 Outline to the TPG and the local governments, the most important of which involve enlarged powers over personnel and legislative power.³² This new local self-governing act shifted the legal framework of IGR in Taiwan somewhat away from the inclusive authority model. The changed IGR framework can be diagrammed as figure 2.

The overlapping authority model shows that the TPG was not totally dependent on either the central or the local governments. Both the TPG and the local governments enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy. However, the

³¹Chao, *Zhongyang yu difang quanxian*, 33-145; Huang, *Difang zizhi fazhihu wenti zhi yanjiu*, 153-98; Po, *Difang zhengfu yu zizhi*, 111-56.

³²Huang, *Difang zizhi fazhihua wenti zhi yanjiu*, 153-98.

Figure 2
The Overlapping Authority Model of IGR in Taiwan (1994-98)



hierarchy of the central government, the TPG, and the local governments had not been changed much. IGR within this legal framework should have manifested greater interdependence with bargaining on the rise in accordance with Wright's paradigm.³³

Since the 1994 APCS was abandoned in October 1998, the time period for both the TPG and county/city units to take action was short: only from 1994 to 1998. The new laws were quickly passed,³⁴ and what ensued provides new insights into IGR in the age of downsizing the TPG.

The Process of Downsizing the TPG

The decision-making and implementation of the downsizing of the TPG involved three legal constructs:³⁵ the Ninth Amendment of the Constitution (1997), the Temporary Provisions for the Adjustment of Functions and Organizations in the TPG (TP, 台灣省政府功能業務與組織暫行條例 October 1998), and the Act for Local Institutions (ALI, 地方制度法

³³Wright, *Understanding Intergovernmental Relations*, 40.

³⁴See the next section on the process of downsizing the TPG.

³⁵ADRE is still valid in this period, though not included in the following introduction to the new rules put into effect in this period.

January 1999). In addition, the putting into effect of two administrative orders was also crucial to the implementation of the downsizing of the TPG.³⁶ The first was the Items for the Attention of Each Ministry, Council, Bureau, Department, and Office of the Executive Yuan to Establish the Central Taiwan Offices (IAMC, 行政院各部會局處署設置中部辦公室注意事項 May 1999); the second was the Temporary Organizational Regulations for the TPG (TOR, 台灣省政府組織暫行條例 June 1999).

Under these regulations, the downsizing of the TPG was divided into three stages. The first stage was from December 21, 1998 to June 30, 1999. The main task at this stage was to regulate the implementation of the downsizing. The second stage began on July 1, 1999 and will continue until December 31, 2001.³⁷ The main objective here has been to substantially downsize the TPG until its functions and organizations come in line with the requirements of ALI.³⁸ The third stage will begin on January 1, 2002. By then the TPG's functions and powers should fall under the jurisdiction of ALI under which local governments will operate.³⁹ Since the first stage was very short (only half a year), and the third stage which has not yet begun lies outside of the parameters of this study, the following analysis of the legal framework of IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG will mainly focus on the second stage.⁴⁰

According to the Ninth Amendment, the elected provincial governor (省長) and provincial assemblymen (省議員) were required to step down in December 1998. The appointed provincial governor (省主席) and provincial councilors (省諮議) then took over. Even though TP and ALI had set out the general guidelines for the downsized TPG at the beginning of

³⁶Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 23-28.

³⁷Originally, the second stage was supposed to have terminated at the end of 2000, but a new resolution was passed on November 24, 2000 to postpone the ending date for the second stage to December 31, 2001.

³⁸According to ALI, the TPG will exist as the Fujian Provincial Government, i.e., more in symbol than in substance. See Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 22.

³⁹Ibid.

⁴⁰The period in which the survey for this study was conducted was from June 25 to July 31, 1999. On the one hand, this time period was quite close to the end of the first stage; on the other hand, the implementation had been taking place in the second stage.

the first stage, the detailed procedures for implementation have not yet been formulated.⁴¹ Thus the two administrative orders (TOR and IAMC) were issued during the first stage, which have regulated how to adjust the personnel, functions, organizations, and properties of the TPG to fit the requirements of TP for the moment and those of ALI in the future.

The second stage is expected to last from July 1999 to December 2001. Since the two administrative orders (IAMC and TOR) have been proclaimed in the first leg, this stage mainly followed the two administrative orders in implementing the policy of downsizing the TPG. According to the two orders, the TPG will be shrunk down to a tiny organization. In the past, the TPG had more than 294,000 employees and 29 first-level institutes.⁴² From July 1, 1999 on, the provincial government has had only six sections, five offices, three committees, and some other subordinate units. The total number of formal employees of the new TPG during this stage is 476.⁴³

The functions of the TPG have also been dramatically reduced. First, the new TPG has been regulated as a subordinate unit to the Executive Yuan. The new provincial government has lost its status as a public juridical entity of local self-governing groups.⁴⁴ This means that the provincial government does not have the right to legislate, to propose its own budget, or to own properties. Secondly, the new TPG has been assigned three functions: (1) to supervise county/city self-governing matters; (2) to implement the administrative work of the TPG *per se*; and (3) to deal with other affairs under authorization of laws, orders, or the Executive Yuan. All these three functions have to be conducted under the supervision of the Executive Yuan (TP, art. 2; ALI, art. 9). Thirdly, since the new TPG has lost its financial autonomy, the downsized government certainly does not have its own financial resources to distribute to the local governments.

The original offices, bureaus, departments, and other segments of the

⁴¹Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 25-41.

⁴²*Ibid.*, 62-63.

⁴³The TPG will even have fewer employees in the third stage than in the second. According to TOR, the TPG will only have 285 employees after the year 2002. *Ibid.*, 27.

⁴⁴*Ibid.*, 20-22.

TPG now have been transferred to each corresponding or related ministry, department, bureau, council, and other office of the central government. The temporary titles for all of these units are the Central Taiwan Offices (中部辦公室) of the Executive Yuan and those of the Examination Yuan.⁴⁵ The functions of the Central Taiwan Offices have been regulated to continue implementing various procedures, and to properly absorb the previous employees of the TPG.

However, the future of the Central Taiwan Offices has not yet been made very clear under the current legal system.⁴⁶ There are two main reasons for this. First, the Central Taiwan Offices were supposed to be a temporary measure for incrementally downsizing the TPG. Thus, they should not exist in their current size and scope after December 2001. Secondly, their individual futures now are still in the hands of the central units to which they belong.⁴⁷

Under the foregoing mentioned legal framework, figure 3 demonstrates the legal and logical IGR within Taiwan's political system during the July 1999-December 2001 stage. Figure 3 shows that authority in the second stage involves both inclusive and overlapping types. The central authority is still the most powerful, although it should to a certain extent respect the autonomy of local governments (county/city and *xiang/zhen*) under ALI. The TPG has become smaller than in the past, but is still related to each central unit. Its relationship with the Central Taiwan Offices should be parallel and interdependent because both are designed to be directly subordinate to the Executive Yuan (TP and IAMC). The new provincial government's relationship with the local governments should be both hierarchical and interdependent (TP and ALI). Since TPG has a small yet solid circle, the size and functions of the body are more clearly defined in this period.


Because the Central Taiwan Offices have had an uncertain status, a dotted circle is presented (yet is much larger than that of the TPG). The

⁴⁵There are sixteen offices belonging to the Executive Yuan, and three belonging to the Examination Yuan.

⁴⁶Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 32.

⁴⁷*Ibid.*, 30-36.

Figure 3
Legal IGR during the Second Stage of TPG Downsizing (July 1999-December 2001)



relationship between the Central Taiwan Offices and the local governments should be similar to that between the TPG and the local governments—i.e., both hierarchical and interdependent.

What will happen to Taiwan's IGR after returning to ALI in 2002? The question is interesting but lies outside of the concerns of the paper and will be left to future discussions. The next section will instead explore what IGR have been in practice during the process of downsizing the TPG by gauging public officials' responses.

Intergovernmental Relations in Practice during the Process of TPG Downsizing

As mentioned in the section "Theory and Method," this paper employs a decision-making approach to analyze the responses of public officials toward IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG. This section will apply the three models outlined in "Theory and Method" to the responses of Taiwan's public officials in an attempt to understand IGR in practice during that period.

This section has two parts. The first will demonstrate the mixed nature of Taiwan public officials' responses toward IGR during the process of TPG downsizing, arguing that no one theory can fully explain the differing attitudes of Taiwan public officials toward IGR. The second will discuss how the entire phenomenon may be understood as "order beyond design."

A Mixed Feature

1. *Application of the bounded rationality model:* Under the bounded rationality model, one expects that public officials from different layers of government will respond differently to IGR during the process of TPG downsizing. The theory suggests that central government officials may follow the relevant regulations more closely; the county/city officials then will try to emphasize their higher status in the new IGR. The provincial officials, meanwhile, will then be the most reluctant to accept their new positions in the new IGR. Do these expectations accord with reality?

The two central government officials who were interviewed for this study did present a clearer understanding of IGR under the new regulations:⁴⁸ both emphasized the authority of the central government on the TPG either before or during the process of downsizing the TPG. With regard to the status of local governments (mainly at the county/city level) in relation to the central government under the process of TPG downsizing, the two also displayed some interesting but not surprising responses. For example, they reassured that the central government would regulate new ways for the local administration to interact directly with the central government. At the same time, they blamed the local governments for not being self-responsible for solving local problems. These kinds of comments to a certain extent reflect both hierarchical and interdependent relationships between the central and local governments under the new laws.

However, the two central government officers interviewed did not appear to have similar attitudes toward the future of the Central Taiwan

⁴⁸Chi Chun-chen was interviewed once in March 1999. Yeh Wei-chuan was interviewed twice separately in March and July 1999. The records for both interviews can be found in Liao et al., "Intergovernmental Relations During and After Downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government," 120-27, 128-33.

Offices. One, for example, stressed the transitional functions of the Central Taiwan Offices: he stated that the Central Taiwan Offices should be discarded after December 2000.⁴⁹ The other stressed that the future of the Central Taiwan Offices was still uncertain, and would depend on subsequent interactions, communications, and regulations between each central unit and its branch in the Central Taiwan Offices.⁵⁰ This discrepancy between the two readings can be explained by the ambiguity of the relevant regulations.

The bounded rationality model assumes that county magistrates/city mayors and their representatives will pay more attention to the regulations of the TPG downsizing, especially with regard to the promotion of county/city status. According to this "bounded rationality" logic, county magistrates/city mayors should exhibit the tendencies to: (1) upgrade the position of the local government especially in relation to the new TPG; (2) emphasize both hierarchical and interdependent relationships between the central and local governments especially during the process of TPG downsizing; (3) emphasize the transitional functions of the Central Taiwan Offices; (4) ignore the plausible relationship between the Central Taiwan Offices and the local governments; and (5) engage in interactions that only focus on the central units, especially during the process of downsizing the TPG.

There are eleven county magistrates/city mayors and their representatives who exhibited the above behavior. What were the interpretations and responses toward IGR of the remaining nine during the process of downsizing the TPG?⁵¹

The bounded rationality model expects that provincial officials should be less likely to follow the regulations since their positional bias would be to emphasize the importance of the TPG. However, since the employees of the provincial government were divided into two groups after July 1, 1999 (one group is still in the TPG, the other in the Central Taiwan Offices), the

⁴⁹See the interview records for Chi Chun-chen, *ibid.*, 120-27. At that time, the positions of officials of the Central Taiwan Offices were supposed to be eliminated by the end of 2000.

⁵⁰See the interview records for Yeh Wei-chuan, *ibid.*, 128-33.

⁵¹If following the regulated IGR as shown in figure 3, only six out of twenty county magistrates/city mayors might fall into this category. The six actually overlap with the eleven.

analysis of their responses should also take this factor into account. The following section will, therefore, first elaborate on the plausible bounded rational responses from the public officials who have continued belonging to the TPG, and then those who have belonged to the Central Taiwan Offices in the period following July 1, 1999.⁵²

The bounded rationality model expects that public officials of both the old and the new provincial government will be inclined to: (1) still choose the hierarchical relationship between the new TPG and the local governments; (2) consider the relationship between the Central Taiwan Offices and the new provincial government as purely parallel; and (3) consider the Central Taiwan Offices mainly as a transitional arrangement.

There were only three interviewees who fell into the category of being part of the TPG in any sense.⁵³ However, none of these actors acted in the three above-mentioned ways. In general, they seemingly followed the new regulations closely by both considering the new TPG no higher than the local government or the Central Taiwan Offices and by also maintaining an ambiguous attitude toward the Central Taiwan Offices.

Being the minority in their environment, these three interviewees may find difficulty in ignoring the fact that the status of the TPG has been substantially downgraded.⁵⁴ Those who have been shifted from the old TPG to the Central Taiwan Offices, however, should not have the same problem as these three since they are the majority.⁵⁵ The logical responses for the larger group in accordance with the bounded rationality theory should

⁵²Since the survey began in June 1999 (before the establishment of the Central Taiwan Offices), all provincial respondents still belonged to the TPG at that time. The study then labeled these respondents as provincial officials in general. For the sake of analysis from a bounded rationality perspective, however, they are divided into two groups in accordance with their final positions after July 1, 1999. According to TP and TOR, only the Secretariat, the Rules and Regulations Commission, and the Petition Review Commission in our samples still belong to the new TPG. See Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 61.

⁵³As mentioned in note 52 above, in our samples only three first-level units of the old TPG have still belonged to the new TPG since July 1, 1999. However, among the three units, only three samples, all from the Secretariat, responded to the questionnaire.

⁵⁴Here a certain sense of tokenism may be involved. See Rosabeth Moss Kanter, *Men and Women of the Corporation* (New York: Basic Books, 1977), chap. 8.

⁵⁵Among the 140 respondents, 137 belonged to the Central Taiwan Offices.

therefore be as follows: (1) to be open to the relationship between the new TPG and the local governments; (2) to identify the relationship between the central and local governments as hierarchical either before or during the process of TPG downsizing; (3) to consider the relationship between the Central Taiwan Offices and the new TPG as hierarchical (the Central Taiwan Offices are higher than the TPG); and (4) to choose that future functions of the Central Taiwan Offices will involve all possibilities except a transitional arrangement.

Among the 140 respondents, only 89 wrote down the office titles to which they belonged. Furthermore, 3 needed to be deducted from the 89 since they still belonged to the TPG. Among the 86 that were left, only 12 responded according to the above-mentioned four predictions. Indeed, 13.95 percent (12/86) is by no means a high percentage.⁵⁶

In sum, applying bounded rationality to analyze the responses of public officials toward IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG highlights the following results: (1) central government officials most closely reflect the behavior predicted by the bounded rationality model; (2) county/city officials, to a certain extent, have coped in a manner corresponding to the expectations of bounded rationality, but nearly half have not; and (3) the responses of the provincial officials, who have been divided into two groups in accordance with their current positions, are even more distant from the expectations derived from the bounded rationality model.

2. Application of the incrementalism model: As mentioned previously, incrementalism refers to when decision-makers take a step-by-step approach to change without considering their long-term goals. Furthermore, in uncertain situations, both politicians and bureaucrats may lean toward making incremental choices. Since the policies concerning the downsizing of the TPG have involved numerous uncertainties,⁵⁷ reasonable is to expect that both politicians and bureaucrats in Taiwan from all layers of govern-

⁵⁶For instance, thirty-one respondents who have belonged to the Central Taiwan Offices still consider this as a transitional arrangement. See Liao et al., "Intergovernmental Relations During and After Downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government," 99.

⁵⁷*Ibid.*, 75; and Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 31-32.

ment would respond to the IGR in an incremental manner. Put more simply, these officials will not depart too far from the previous pattern of IGR in Taiwan (see figure 1).

Following this logic, the incrementalism model expects the central, provincial, and county/city public officials to: (1) consider the previous relationship between the TPG and the local governments as hierarchical; (2) be open to the current relationship between the new TPG and the local governments; (3) consider the relationship between the central and local governments as always being hierarchical; (4) perceive that the Central Taiwan Offices would play a certain role in the future; and (5) slightly change the way they interact with other governmental units.

To what extent do all the public officials who were interviewed and surveyed in the study act in the above five ways? As discussed in the application of the bounded rationality model, two central government officials have mainly demonstrated inclinations corresponding to the bounded rationality model in regard to IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG. However, they displayed different opinions toward the role that the Central Taiwan Offices would play in the downsizing process then and also in the future. One stated that there should not be too much room for the Central Taiwan Offices to exercise power both currently and in the future. The other, nevertheless, revealed a certain incremental way of thinking. He pointed out that the appointment of the Central Taiwan Office employees should be incremental.⁵⁸ Furthermore, he was open to the possible development of the Central Taiwan Offices in the future, since he considered that the functions of the TPG in the past and those of the Central Taiwan Offices currently could not be so easily substituted within one and half years (July 1999 to December 2000).⁵⁹ Based on the response of the second individual, fair is to suggest that an attitude favorable to incrementalism has existed but has not been dominant in the thinking or decision-making of central government officials toward IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG.

⁵⁸Yeh et al., "A Study on the Adjustment of Local Governmental Organizations," 29.

⁵⁹*Ibid.*, 50-60. Also see note 37 above.

County magistrates/city mayors usually are considered politicians.⁶⁰ As incrementalists, however, they may also use incrementalism as a strategy to avoid unexpected consequences. Among the twenty interviewed/surveyed local leaders, only seven followed the above line of thought in making choices consistent with the above-mentioned five attitudes (seven of twenty is well below the halfway mark).

Provincial officials, who are all bureaucrats, would usually be considered as being more oriented toward incrementalism in decision-making than politicians. However, 40 among 140 of such officials gave answers corresponding to the above five attitudes⁶¹—a percentage (28.6) even lower than that of the county magistrates/city mayors (35 percent). Provincial officials, nevertheless, did not demonstrate a stronger incremental tendency toward IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG than the local politicians. One phenomenon needs to be pointed out, however. Thirty-nine of the 140 respondents failed to answer the questions relating to the five attitudes, thus disallowing us an understanding of what these people's attitudes were toward IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG.

In sum, incrementalism does, to a certain extent, explain the responses of public officials in regard to IGR during the process of TPG downsizing. However, incrementalism by no means fully explains the complicated world of Taiwan's IGR that was constructed by public officials from different layers of government.

3. *Application of the "garbage can" model:* As mentioned before, the "garbage can" model refers to a fuzzy situation in which participants with their own solutions "bump" into various problems, thus making outcomes unpredictable. Following the logic of this model, difficult should be to formulate any pattern of IGR based on the responses of public officials during the process of downsizing the TPG because of the massive uncertainty

⁶⁰Among the twenty respondents, twelve were county magistrates/city mayors, five were deputy magistrates/mayors, and only three were chief secretaries. Since both deputy magistrates and chief secretaries are political appointees, they are still treated here as politicians.

⁶¹There were thirty-nine officials not fully responding to the relevant five questions.

Table 1
Results of Theoretical Applications

	Bounded Rationality	Incrementalism	Other Possibilities
Central	1.5/2*	?/2	?/2
Provincial (TPG)	0/3 (0%)	40/140 (28.6%)	88/140 (62.9%)**
(Central Taiwan Offices)	12/86 (13.95%)	—	—
Local	11/20 (55%)	7/20 (35%)	2/20 (10%)

Notes:

*1.5/2 is a rough estimation of the answers given by the two central government officials, which may correspond to the expectations of bounded rationality to this high degree (see the "application of the bounded rationality model").

**This number results from deducting 12 and 40 from the 140 samples, and then dividing by the total.

facing these respondents. Do the expectations of the "garbage can" model fit reality?

The answer to the question is both "yes" and "no." A positive response is mainly due to the fact that the last two decision-making models—bounded rationality and incrementalism—have not fully described the observed phenomena. Table 1 tries to summarize the results that have been explained by each model.

Table 1 graphically illustrates the fact that no single model can fully explain the responses from all layers of government. The table also highlights the degree to which each model leaves plenty of room for further suspicions. The bounded rationality model seems to explain the central officials' responses quite well, but only can explain about 14 percent of the Central Taiwan Offices' way of thinking. Incrementalism is even more lacking in their thinking than bounded rationality, while barely even entering into the minds of the central and local officials.

However, when putting the results explained by each model together, one may find some general patterns (though still containing a certain degree of ambiguity). First, the responses of the central government officials fit more clearly into the bounded rationality model than those of the other two layers of public officials, although their inconsistency about the future of the Central Taiwan Offices may leave room for both incrementalism and garbage-can-like decision-making to step in. Secondly, county magis-

trates/city mayors also demonstrate more traits of bounded rational behavior than the provincial bureaucrats, even though many also have a tendency toward incrementalism, and two of them do not yet fit into either model. Thirdly, provincial bureaucrats have shown a certain degree of incrementalism despite the fact that there is no clear pattern in their attitudes toward IGR.⁶²

Based on the responses of public officials from all layers of government in the survey, a mixed picture regarding the IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG is observed. Within this picture, moreover, bounded rational interpretation has mixed with incremental thinking and quite a few uncertain responses toward the IGR under the new regulations regarding downsizing the TPG.

"Order Beyond Design"

Based on the forgoing analysis of IGR in practice during the process of downsizing the TPG, we believe that the current state of IGR in Taiwan may be characterized as "order beyond design." This definition involves a twofold structure:

1. *Regulations do rule, though not fully.* The application of the three decision-making models demonstrates that regulations have played an important role in framing public officials' attitudes toward the new IGR under the downsizing policy. Central government officials certainly have followed the rules more closely since participating in the process of designing these rules. Over half of the county magistrates/city mayors have also displayed a high degree of understanding and acceptance of the relevant rules.⁶³ This result should not be too surprising, since the new rules have promoted the status of these individuals in the new IGR. Some provincial officials have also accepted the rules,⁶⁴ however, despite the fact that these

⁶²Even using the regulated IGR model to examine their responses (see note 51 above), we find only 7 out of 140 coped in this manner.

⁶³Among the eleven bounded rational county magistrates/city mayors, six have totally coped with the regulated IGR model (see note 51 above). Furthermore, the bounded rationality model for the county magistrates/city mayors does not diverge from the regulated one too much. Thus the five (who were left from the eleven) could be viewed as mainly following the regulated IGR pattern.

⁶⁴Seven out of 140 entirely adapted to the new rules (see note 62 above), and another 40 (see

regulations have substantially reduced their vested interests. The power of such regulations cannot be ignored, yet neither should their power be exaggerated.

There have been plenty of discussions regarding the long distance between policy formulation and its implementation in organization.⁶⁵ This kind of gap is also applicable to the case of IGR in the process of the downsizing of the TPG. Regulations that have been mainly formulated by central government officials would and should result in difficulties and ambiguities in implementation for local officials, especially at the provincial level. In addition, the regulations themselves involve ambiguous and uncertain elements. Thus the different understandings or recognitions of the regulations from different levels of government in regard to IGR during the downsizing of the TPG should more or less bear the seeds of future uncertain development.

2. *Order still exists, though it may be beyond the comprehension of any individual.* As mentioned above, the regulations should, to a certain extent, create order for the new IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG. However, since the overall structure has not fully materialized, what has been happening to the practical interactions among the different layers of government? In other words, has the intended order given way to actual chaos?

This paper has tried to show that order still exists, though identifying this structure may be beyond the ability of any individual. In addition to the governing power of the regulations, the routinization of individual public officials' attitudes may have contributed to formulating procedures.⁶⁶ For instance, about 78.6 percent of the provincial respondents pointed out that they would still do their best to follow procedure in the face of the

table 1) who were mainly identified as "incrementalists" followed the rules by accepting their inferior status to the central government at all times.

⁶⁵Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process*, 213-58; James G. March et al., "Implementation as a Doubtful Metaphor" (Unpublished manuscript, 1986); Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), "Conclusion."

⁶⁶Martha S. Feldman, *Order Without Design: Information Production and Policy Making* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1989), 106-28; Nelson and Winter, *An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change*, 72-95.

large-scale changes resulting from the policy of downsizing the TPG.⁶⁷ In addition, about 76.9 percent of county magistrates/city mayors expressed the intention to directly contact the central government through their own connections.⁶⁸ Equally, around one-fourth of either the county magistrates/city mayors or the provincial officials appear to be using some other way to deal with the situation of downsizing the TPG.⁶⁹ In other words, these officials have made sense of the new situation in their own way and have also ordered procedures that may or may not have followed the regulations. On the whole, interactive patterns among different layers of government through different individuals during the downsizing of the TPG are therefore beyond our comprehension and also, to a certain extent, beyond design.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

This paper has attempted to study Taiwan's IGR during the process of the downsizing of Taiwan's provincial government. Since both legal and human elements are crucial to construct IGR, this paper has also focused on analyzing both the legal backgrounds of IGR and the attitudes of public officials from the central, provincial, and county/city governments toward IGR in Taiwan. Three decision-making theories have been employed to examine the observed phenomena.

To sum up our findings, the legal framework of IGR in Taiwan has been transformed. In the past, a hierarchical system existed in which the central government had the highest authority over local affairs, and the TPG was an established player (1950-94). During the process of downsizing the TPG, this framework has been replaced by a system that is both hierarchical and overlapping. Within this new framework the central gov-

⁶⁷This is based on the responses to Question 11 for county magistrates/city mayors (see appendix).

⁶⁸Ibid.

⁶⁹The estimate of one-fourth is a rough one derived from separately deducting 78.6 percent and 76.9 percent from 100 percent.

ernment's authority is still powerful, yet the local governments (mainly at the county/city level) also possess a certain degree of autonomy. The TPG has thus become a subordinate unit to the central government without exercising much power over the local governments.

Given this legal background, the bounded rationality model would suggest that public officials from different layers of government may interpret and thus respond to the laws differently during the process of downsizing the TPG. That is, central government officials would follow the rules more closely since they have established the rules and would have benefited most from the policy of downsizing the TPG. The county/city public officials should be the second group who would most prefer to follow the rules since they are also considered as having benefited from the policy. The provincial officials then should be less likely to follow the rules governing IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG.

The incrementalism model offers another perspective that stresses that both bureaucrats and politicians adopt an incremental attitude toward IGR since the policy of downsizing the TPG has brought much uncertainty into the scene. A safer way for both groups might have been to follow previous experiences by making marginal changes in response to IGR under great uncertainty. The "garbage can" model then would predict that since the new IGR have been full of uncertainty, no regular patterns can be discerned in regard to IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG.

Applying the three theories to the data gathered from public officials of the three layers of government has demonstrated that no single theory can fully explain the observed phenomena. A more complete explanation of IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG may thus entail mixing the results that have been separately decoded by each theory. In other words, a better understanding of IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG should at least involve the three theories to analyze the observed phenomena. Furthermore, the mixed features of the results from utilizing the three decision-making theories seem to suggest that IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG have been under the control of relevant regulations, but not fully.

Based on the findings of this study, three suggestions that involve both practical and academic utilities may be laid out as follows:

1. Regulations are still fundamental to Taiwan's IGR, especially during an era of change. However, the formulating process of regulations may need to contain both bounded rational and incremental decision-making methods without excluding the possibilities of unanticipated consequences emerging through a garbage-can-like decision process. The usefulness of doing so is: (1) to be more human; (2) to be more pragmatic in facing uncertainty so as to be able to learn and to adapt; and (3) to be more creative.

2. Since regulations do not fully govern in the case of Taiwan's IGR during the process of downsizing the TPG, leadership should play a very important role in substantially influencing the future development of IGR. If local leaders from both the county/city and provincial levels are not satisfied with the current arrangements of IGR under the new regulations, they still have plenty of opportunities to fix these regulations. The caveat is that these leaders should be more active, more creative, and more result-oriented in coordinating resources so as to redefine their status.⁷⁰ However, if central government officials want to fix the rules regarding IGR, conditions for them may be easier if, of course, they are willing to do so.

3. The current study of IGR in Taiwan is set against a very dynamic and changing background. This study has tried to utilize some theories to analyze the observed phenomena. What the paper has presented, however, only involves a general picture of IGR based on surveying and interviewing some relevant public officials. Thus, future studies of IGR in Taiwan may choose issues as research objects. The research methods could also be multiplied, which may include participant observation.⁷¹ Then some more

⁷⁰A successful example of a unit's redefining its status so as to be able to entirely maintain its organization, functions, and personnel, only changing by attaining a higher status in the hierarchy, is the Department of Water Conservancy, which belonged to the TPG before July 1, 1999, and now belongs to the Ministry of Economic Affairs. See Liao et al., "Intergovernmental Relations During and After Downsizing the Taiwan Provincial Government," 115.

⁷¹The use of the "garbage can" as an analytical model especially requires participant observation. See Feldman, *Order Without Design*, 16-34; Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17, no. 1 (March 1972): 1-25; March and Olsen, *Ambiguity and Choice in Organizations*, 10-53; Kingdon, *Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies*, 1-22; and Keith G. Provan and H. Britton Milward, "A Preliminary Theory of Interorganizational Network Effectiveness: A Comparative Study of Four Community Mental Health Systems," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 40, no. 1 (March 1995): 1-33.

sophisticated interactive patterns may be discovered, which in turn will help further theorize IGR in a unitary system.

Appendix

Questionnaires for Provincial Officials and County Magistrates/City Mayors

A. For Provincial Officials

1. Before the downsizing of the TPG, how did you view the main interactive relationship between the old TPG and the county/city governments? (1) Hierarchical; (2) parallel and interdependent; (3) both hierarchical and interdependent; (4) no relationship; (5) others.
2. During the process of downsizing the TPG, how did you view the main interactive relationship between the new TPG and the county/city governments? (1) Hierarchical; (2) parallel and interdependent; (3) both hierarchical and interdependent; (4) no relationship; (5) others.
3. Before the downsizing of the TPG, how did you view the main interactive relationship between the Executive Yuan and the county/city governments? (1) Hierarchical; (2) parallel and interdependent; (3) both hierarchical and interdependent; (4) no relationship; (5) others.
4. During the process of downsizing the TPG, how did you view the main interactive relationship between the Executive Yuan and the county/city governments? (1) Hierarchical; (2) parallel and interdependent; (3) both hierarchical and interdependent; (4) no relationship; (5) others.
5. During the process of downsizing the TPG, how did you view the main interactive relationship between the Central Taiwan Offices and the new TPG? (1) Hierarchical—the Central Taiwan Offices are above the TPG; (2) parallel and interdependent; (3) both hierarchical and interdependent; (4) no relationship; (5) others.
6. Before the downsizing of the TPG, whom did you often look to when you faced problems for which you were responsible? Multiple choices: (1) direct supervisor; (2) the provincial governor; (3) the old TPG; (4) the relevant offices of the old TPG; (5) provincial assemblymen; (6) the Executive Yuan; (7) the relevant ministry or units of the Executive Yuan; (8) representatives at the national level; (9) county/city councilpersons; (10) influential people from society; (11) civil associations; (12) local factions; (13) county/city party head-

- quarters; (14) provincial party headquarters; (15) central party headquarters; (16) the media; (17) labor unions; (18) others.
7. During the first period of TPG downsizing (December 1998 to July 1999), whom did you often look to when you faced problems for which you were responsible? Multiple choices: (1) direct supervisor; (2) the provincial governor; (3) the TPG; (4) the relevant offices of the TPG; (5) provincial councilors; (6) the Executive Yuan; (7) the relevant ministry or units of the Executive Yuan; (8) representatives at the national level; (9) county/city councilpersons; (10) influential people from society; (11) civil associations; (12) local factions; (13) county/city party headquarters; (14) provincial party headquarters; (15) central party headquarters; (16) the media; (17) labor unions; (18) others.
 8. After the establishment of the Central Taiwan Offices (July 1, 1999), whom do you think you would look to in order to solve your job-related problems? Multiple choices: (1) direct supervisor; (2) the provincial governor; (3) the new TPG; (4) provincial councilors; (5) the Executive Yuan; (6) the relevant ministry or units of the Executive Yuan; (7) representatives at the national level; (8) the Central Taiwan Offices; (9) county/city councilpersons; (10) influential people from society; (11) civil associations; (12) local factions; (13) county/city party headquarters; (14) provincial party headquarters; (15) central party headquarters; (16) the media; (17) labor unions; (18) others.
 9. During the process of downsizing the TPG, how did you think the central government should interact with the county/city governments? (1) Regular meetings between the central and county/city governments; (2) directly interacting with the relevant ministry in the Executive Yuan; (3) directly interacting with the premier; (4) through the Central Taiwan Offices; (5) establishing a single channel in the Central Taiwan Offices to coordinate all local affairs; (6) through the new TPG; (7) through the provincial governor of the new TPG; (8) through the premier when he is visiting the local government; (9) others.
 10. What role do you expect the Central Taiwan Offices to play in the future? (1) To present and deliver all local requests to the central government and to coordinate all local affairs; (2) to present and deliver the requests of the new TPG, the twenty counties/cities, and the Fujian Provincial Government to the central government, and coordinate among them; (3) to present and deliver the requests of the twenty counties/cities to the central government, and to coordinate among them; (4) to present and deliver the requests of several counties/cities around central Taiwan to the central government, and to coordinate among them; (5) to carry out the duties of the old TPG; (6) to be a transitional arrangement, not necessarily playing any active role; (7) others.

11. In the face of the sudden change of the TPG's status, how do you respond to the new situation? Choose two items at most: (1) by still doing my best on job; (2) by making efforts to get information so as to find new jobs; (3) due to the uncertain future, by being as relaxed as possible on my job; (4) by retiring earlier; (5) by acting as usual; (6) others.

B. For County Magistrates/City Mayors

Questions 1 to 5 are the same as those for the provincial officials.

6. Before the downsizing of the TPG, whom did you go to if you needed help in solving local problems? Multiple choices: (1) county/city councilpersons; (2) provincial assemblymen (later provincial councilors); (3) representatives at the national level; (4) influential people in society; (5) the TPG; (6) civil associations; (7) county/city party headquarters; (8) provincial party headquarters; (9) central party headquarters; (10) the Executive Yuan; (11) local factions; (12) the media; (13) labor union; (14) the provincial governor; (15) the relevant ministry in the Executive Yuan; (16) the relevant departments in the TPG (later the Central Taiwan Offices); (17) others.
7. During the first period of the downsizing of the TPG (December 1998 to July 1999), whom did you go to if you needed help in solving local problems? Multiple choices as for Question 6.
8. After the establishment of the Central Taiwan Offices (July 1, 1999), whom did you go to if you needed help in solving local problems? All choices are the same as those for Question 6.

Questions 9 and 10 are the same as those for provincial officials.

11. In the face of the sudden change of the TPG's status, how do you respond to the new situation? Choose two items at most: (1) through personal connections to express opinions to the central government; (2) by uniting with other counties/cities to confront the central government; (3) by observing other counties/cities' responses, then deciding how to react; (4) through one's party to negotiate with the central government; (5) by acting as usual; (6) others.

