

domestic politics, public opinion, and international organizations. This is the good news. I have already suggested, however, that the great potential of the social sciences (other than history and the more traditional political science) is largely neglected. The relative absence of their concepts, their findings, and—perhaps most critical—their methods just do not make much of an impact on the study of Chinese foreign policy. This is unfortunate, and not only in the scholarly sense of the word. To deal with a society of such economic, political, and military potential, one with such increasing regional and global influence, we need a far better understanding of how that society works. By denying ourselves the insight and knowledge that might be provided by attention to the behavioral sciences, we jeopardize the welfare and security of those peoples whose lives are and will be intertwined with those of China. That means a rather large fraction of the human race.

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## The Role of Theory in the Study of Chinese Foreign Policy

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In keeping with the nature of this special edition of *Issues & Studies*, this article reviews the extent to which David Lampton's edited volume on

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Chinese foreign and security policy uses and contributes to general political science theories. To summarize, though many of the authors draw from broader theories of international relations (IR) in their chapters, the book contributes primarily to second-level questions that can be generalized to the larger concerns of Chinese foreign policy behavior across a wide array of issue areas. This volume provides a wealth of case study, historical, descriptive, and process-oriented information that political scientists tackling questions regarding Chinese security behavior can use to test and/or build theories of Chinese foreign policy. The book also goes beyond the study of China, however, offering useful case material for those interested in IR's bigger questions—grand theory, "two-level games," and "learning" vs. "adaptation." In the space below, this review addresses the more important contributions made by each chapter, concluding with an in-depth discussion of Lampton's summary chapter.

### Chapter Contributions

*Lu Ning* is one of the foremost experts on the inside workings of the Chinese foreign policy establishment. His chapter on the structure and process of Chinese foreign policy, primarily descriptive in nature, is an excellent overview of Chinese foreign policymaking and is particularly useful for those less familiar with the nature and processes of decision-making in China's foreign policy establishment.<sup>1</sup>

*Tai Ming Cheung's* chapter on the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and the Central Military Commission (CMC) in Chinese foreign policy decision-making argues that the PLA plays less of a role in decision-making than in the past. Civilian control over the military is firm, Cheung maintains, though PLA influence is more pronounced in issues of territorial integrity such as Taiwan.

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<sup>1</sup>For Lu's more in-depth, theoretical work, see Lu Ning, *The Dynamics of Foreign Policy Decisionmaking in China*, second edition (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000).

*Peter T.Y. Cheung* and *James T.H. Tang* have contributed a much-needed study on the role of China's provinces in the Chinese foreign policy process. The authors provide interesting case studies on Shandong (山東) and Jilin (吉林), noting, for example, how Jilin provincial leaders—in a bid for access to the Sea of Japan—came up with the Tumen River (圖門江) Project that Beijing initiated with Moscow, Pyongyang, and Seoul. The authors conclude that while the provinces are increasingly outward-looking and active in IR, their activities are still not beyond Beijing's control.

*H. Lyman Miller* and *Liu Xiaohong* cover the general outlook of China's third generation of leaders. They give particular reference to its core figures (Jiang Zemin 江澤民, Zhu Rongji 朱鎔基, Li Peng 李鵬, etc.), noting the substantial differences between these leaders and their revolutionary forbears. The authors also provide a very helpful review of some of the recent books on Chinese foreign policy published in China.

*Joseph Fewsmith* and *Stanley Rosen's* treatment of the role of public opinion in Chinese foreign policymaking is one of the most interesting chapters in the book, also making perhaps its best contribution to theory. They create two matrices of interest. One reveals the recent trend in Chinese nationalism toward a combination of populism and nativism, creating the potential for increased erratic political behavior with the further decentralization and pluralization of China's politics and foreign policymaking. A second matrix on public opinion mobilization, elite cohesion, and Sino-U.S. relations reveals that when elite cohesion on a policy issue in Sino-U.S. relations is low, public opinion becomes more salient as leaders seek to exploit popular sentiment for their own ends; a high degree of elite cohesion, on the other hand, tends to marginalize the role of public opinion. The authors conclude that public opinion is not a major factor in Chinese foreign policy at present—yet does set constraints on Chinese foreign policy and will play an increasingly larger role in years to come.

*Thomas G. Moore* and *Dixia Yang* have written a theoretically rich chapter on the effects of economic interdependence on Chinese foreign policy, including a solid case study of China's reaction to the Asian financial crisis. The case shows that while the painful steps China took to avoid

devaluing the *Renminbi* were ultimately made in its own interests, the important point is that China's interests have become inextricably linked to the global economy. The authors conclude that economic interdependence is not a worldview the Chinese hold, per se, but rather a predicament China's leaders find themselves in as they seek to maximize national power.

*Elizabeth Economy* contributes an analysis of the impact of international regimes on Chinese foreign policy, drawing from IR's regimes and epistemic community literature. Her arguments relate to what Alastair Iain Johnston and others in the broader IR literature call "adaptation" vs. "learning."<sup>2</sup> Using two case studies, she paints a picture of a China that is adapting but not learning. While the international environmental epistemic community has catalyzed major changes in Chinese thinking on the environment, her findings suggest that China would revert to earlier, less environmentally conscious practices in the absence of continued financial and technical incentives provided by the international community.

*Bates Gill* offers a look at how domestic and international factors have shaped China's non-proliferation and arms control behavior. Looking at China's military sales to Iran and China's defense-related White Papers as two case studies, he concludes that while China's behavior is realpolitik and adaptive (as opposed to "learning"), China's international ties and responsibilities increasingly "constrain and shape" Chinese foreign policy (p. 280).

*Michael D. Swaine's* chapter on China's decision-making on Taiwan in the reform period employs four useful case studies. He concludes that Chinese policy regarding Taiwan in the Jiang period was more bureaucratic and consensus-oriented than under Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平). This is be-

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<sup>2</sup>Alastair Iain Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," *The China Journal*, no. 35 (January 1996): 27. See also Emanuel Adler, "The Emergence of Cooperation: National Epistemic Communities and the International Evolution of the Idea of Nuclear Arms Control," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (Winter 1992); Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Jack Levy, "Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield," *International Organization* 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994); and Philip Tetlock, "Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy: In Search of an Elusive Concept," in *Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign Policy*, ed. George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

cause Jiang spun much of his own authority into the more pluralized Taiwan Affairs Leading Small Group, giving it a greater role in Taiwan policy. Swaine concludes that the PLA has not dominated Taiwan policy of late, even during the 1995-96 crisis.

*Margaret M. Pearson* provides a chapter on China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a case in Chinese foreign policy-making. Differing from other authors in the volume, she maintains that both adaptation and learning occurred in China's WTO accession. She found elite preferences, pluralization of domestic actors, and external influences to be the three key factors behind the decision to accede to the WTO. While public opinion was important, in the end elite preferences won out; she states that opposition in China to accession was "not won over ... but rather run over" (p. 364).

The last chapter, by *Samuel S. Kim*, is a well-researched case study of China's decision to recognize South Korea in 1992. He finds Robert Putnam's two-level games at work in the combination of international factors and Deng's intervention into the policy process.<sup>3</sup> Fascinating is Kim's elaboration of internal documents showing that North Korea has attempted to extort China (and not just the West). One point of confusion in this essay, however, is the question of whether or not China really desires Korean reunification (pages 401 and 402 suggest no; p. 404, yes).


### Lampton's Summary and Findings

Probably the best single essay of the book, *David M. Lampton's* opening article serves as both introduction and conclusion. The structure of this book—while not quite as neatly delineated as his *Same Bed, Different Dreams*,<sup>4</sup> in which he employed Waltz' three-level breakdown of global,

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<sup>3</sup>Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (Summer 1988).

<sup>4</sup>David M. Lampton, *Same Bed, Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001).



state/civil society, and individual level factors<sup>5</sup>—is noteworthy as well given the book's division into sections on institutions and localities (second level), elite and societal opinion (first level, although civil society is also included here), and international system influences (third level), followed by case study chapters.

In reviewing the other eleven chapters, Lampton found two broad changes in the Chinese foreign policymaking process, and four "-izations" which drive these changes. The two broad changes are the "thickening" of the elite (i.e., an increase in the number of elite actors participating in the Chinese foreign policy process), and the increase in space for policymaking participation by individuals, organizations, and localities who are not formal actors in Chinese foreign and security policymaking. The four "izations" driving these changes are (1) *professionalization*, a move from reliance on compulsion and preeminent leaders, to suasion and specialized knowledge among the elite and from institutions, bureaucracies, and experts; (2) *corporate pluralization*, "the proliferation of organizations, groups, and sometimes individuals" and their input in the Chinese foreign policy process, including that of public opinion; (3) the *decentralization* of power, particularly in economic matters, although less so in critical security issues; and (4) *globalization*, or increases in economic interdependence, acceptance of international norms, and multilateral security ties.

As a result, Lampton finds that the Chinese foreign policymaking process has two faces. First, in regard to "major issues of strategy, the setting of broad agendas, and crisis management, the senior elite still have considerable latitude." Secondly, for routine issues of Chinese foreign policy, the regime increasingly speaks with many voices, as is more the norm in other more modern, pluralistic polities (p. 2). As to perennial questions about China's future behavior—such as the likelihood of the PRC becoming an expansionist power, its ability to avoid conflicts with the United States and other powers, and its recognition of the value of cooperation in

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<sup>5</sup>Kenneth Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959).

attaining security, the chapters in this book lead Lampton to be "cautiously optimistic" (p. 31).

This review concludes that the book—as noted by Lampton—has three areas of theoretical contribution. First, the essays offer much in the area of working out the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy, or again what Putnam calls "two-level games." Most of the chapters have cases that increase our understanding of this two-track process and how it applies in the changing world of Chinese foreign policymaking. Second, this edited volume contributes to our understanding of "adaptation" vs. "learning" in how China relates to international regimes and norms. Lampton concludes that "adaptive learning" is a good label for China. While perhaps more adaptive at this present point in time, "international involvement is a slippery slope," and China not only is becoming increasingly constrained by its interdependencies but its interests are also becoming more entrenched in the international system, such that the PRC is moving toward greater "learning" (pp. 34-35). The third area of contribution relates to the question of whether China's international behavior is becoming more cooperative or remains essentially *realpolitik* in nature. Among the authors there is a strong consensus that China's behavior is still very much in the realm of *realpolitik*, an important point for those studying and/or trying to anticipate Chinese foreign policy behavior. All three of these contributions apply to both levels of theory discussed at the outset—that of Chinese foreign policy studies, and that of IR theory writ large—as cases that can be used for theory building and theory testing. Consequently, this book is a welcome addition to both. This volume will undoubtedly become a standard in the field on Chinese foreign policy.

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