

The Effects of Power Expectations on the Intent to Share Knowledge

— The Case of Supervisors in the Banking Industry

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ABSTRACT

More work is needed to address the factors influencing a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent. Past research has discussed the implications of sharing knowledge, but lacks empirical studies. This paper assesses a theoretical framework for studying the power consideration and a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent. The empirical study was based on data collected from supervisors of various banks. Empirical findings support the relationship between a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent and the supervisor's expectation regarding his power (i.e., alternatives and legitimacy) after knowledge sharing. Further, the research illuminates the process of effecting changes to a supervisor's expectation in respect to his power after sharing knowledge.

Key Words: knowledge sharing, expectation, legitimacy, alternatives

INTRODUCTION

Organizational researchers and business writers have recently recognized the importance of knowledge as an asset to organizations (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Holtshouse, 1998) and as one of the key factors for sustainable competitive advantage (Davenport & Prusak, 1998; Grant, 1996). An organization's knowledge is the composite of everything and everybody within the organization. Valued knowledge in an organization can be used to create differential advantages and affect an organization's ability to remain in market places (Steward, 1997). Research on the exchange of knowledge, along with related research, has focused on creation, acquisition, diffusion and transfer of knowledge (Eric, 1994; Grant, 1997; Hedlund, 1994; Helleloid & Simonin, 1994; Krough, 1998; Teece et al., 1997). However, the process of creating knowledge in organizations begins with communication among individual employees. Hagen & Choe (1998) and Nonaka (1994) believed that Japanese firms which motivated employees to absorb knowledge were the winners in the world and the competitive edge of Japanese firms came from widespread knowledge sharing among employees. Then what are the advantages of a successful knowledge management system? An advantage of an effective knowledge management program is that knowledge can be used and shared at different levels in an organization (Bartol & Srivastava, 2002; Davenport et al., 1998). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) postulated that organizational knowledge is created as a result of the combination and exchange of existing knowledge among employees. Thus, it is worthwhile to discuss the issue of knowledge sharing in depth.

Hollander & Offerman (1990) argued that a person sharing his knowledge with others will lose his power in an organization. This concern will reduce the intention to share knowledge. However, Tannenbaum (1968) asserted that it is not certain whether sharing knowledge leads to the elimination of individual power. On the contrary, when a person with expertise is willing to share, this may lead an organization to depend on him. On balance, we would argue that when the owner of knowledge recognizes that the ability of a knowledge receiver may transcend his ability after receiving his knowledge, the former is more reluctant to share.

In practice, owners of knowledge share knowledge selectively. Sometimes, the owner of knowledge will find it impossible to not to share even though he is not willing to share. Reduction of power is not the only result of sharing knowledge with subordinates by a supervisor. Successful learning by subordinates may improve organizational performance and in turn promote a supervisor's status in an organization. That will prompt supervisors to share knowledge. Therefore, when examining the effect of sharing knowledge on the owner's part, one can approach it from a negative but also a positive point of view. Thus this paper examines the role of the supervisor's perceived power in influencing knowledge sharing by the supervisor.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether supervisors take into account the impact on power when sharing knowledge with subordinates. Furthermore, is a supervisor's sharing intent differed for different subordinates? If this is the case, is it caused by different positive or negative influences of the supervisor's power when sharing knowledge with different subordinates?

LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Power dependence theory

Dependence as a source of power is analyzed most fully in Emerson's (1962) power dependency theory. Emerson asserted that in a given relationship, A's power over B is a function of the value of B's dependence on A for valued outcome. The greater B's dependence on A, the greater A's power over B. The phenomenon referred to above by Emerson is also applicable to organizations, similar to the view of Thompson (1967). But the degree of dependence of an organization on any external element varies. Dependence is the obverse of power: the more dependent an organization or department is on any particular element in its environment, the lower the organization's or department's power.

Through knowledge sharing, supervisors will expect to improve their subordinates' work abilities and attitudes towards work. This in turn will affect the departmental power. First, knowledge sharing will upgrade subordinates' work abilities, and turn their attitude towards work in a positive direction. This makes it easier to reach the goals of the department and the department performance will be improved. Therefore, the top management will increasingly appreciate this department's contribution and the organization depends more on the department to earn profits. As Hickson et al. (1971) noted, the distribution of power among departments is related to their interdependence. The more powerful a departments is, the less dependent it is on others.

Second, knowledge sharing will enhance the ability of subordinates to assist other departments in dealing with problems. Therefore, the supervisor anticipates that other departments will rely more on his department. For example, when the survey department shares survey findings with the marketing department and is able to provide constructive suggestions to the latter, the marketing department will depend more on the survey department.

Third, through knowledge sharing, the supervisor and his department may become indispensable to the organization. Then, the supervisor will expect that the organization will rely more on this department. For example, if the survey department does not provide adequate information, the organization will not know what consumers really want, and the performance of the organization will be hurt. These arguments lead to the first hypotheses:

H₁₋₁: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's work ability increases after knowledge sharing, the higher the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which his departmental power grows.

H₁₋₂: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's attitude towards work grows after knowledge sharing, the higher the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which his departmental power increases.

With regard to the interpersonal dependence, a supervisor expects that through knowledge sharing, the work ability of subordinates will be strengthened and subordinates attitudes toward work become more aggressive. Whenever subordinates are in charge of core tasks, their contributions are considered significant and if subordinates quit, the department's performance may be negatively affected. Thus:

H₂₋₁₋₁: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's work ability increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of the subordinate's gaining of centrality.

H₂₋₁₋₂: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's attitude towards works grows after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of the subordinate's gaining of centrality.

Through knowledge sharing, a supervisor not only expects to be able to strengthen the work ability of subordinates and to influence them, but also that these subordinates can become more indispensable to the organization. Additionally, when the subordinates' work ability increases, they will be more attractive to other firms. If there is no other subordinate to replace a person, the supervisor has to depend upon the latter more and more. Therefore, two related hypotheses are:

H₂₋₂₋₁: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's work ability increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of the subordinate's gaining of alternatives.

H₂₋₂₋₂: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's attitude towards work grows after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of the subordinate's gaining of alternatives.

Legitimacy theory

Like Weber (1978) and French & Raven (1959), Johnson & Ford (1996) regarded legitimate authority as a power base in organizations. Walker & Zelditch (1993) and Zelditch & Walker (1984) offered one of the most complete analyses of legitimate authority. They defined legitimate authority as the right to another's compliance with directives that fall within the scope of that authority, regardless of others' feelings.

Endorsement and authorization are two sources of legitimacy (Zelditch & Walker, 1984). The former refers to support of a supervisor by his superiors; the latter refers to support of a supervisor by his subordinates. Ford & Johnson (1998) also found that a supervisor's perceived power will be higher when a supervisor's endorsement and authorization power are higher. Once the supervisor expects that the top management increasingly appreciates his department and depends on this department for the company's success, or expects other departments relying on his department, the supervisor will expect recognition of his increasing contribution to the organization. The supervisor will expect the odds of promotion and status in the firm to rise higher than those of other supervisors. Besides, after sharing knowledge, the supervisor can help subordinates overcome difficulties and raise subordinates' performance to higher levels. The supervisor will then expect subordinates to appreciate his expertise. This suggests the following:

H₃₋₁: The higher the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which his departmental power increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of his gaining of legitimacy.

H₃₋₂: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's work ability increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the extent of his gaining of his legitimacy.

Ford & Johnson (1998) added another dimension to Zelditch & Walker's (1984) argument— "alternatives" to measure a supervisor's power. The first alternative is a perception that a supervisor cannot be replaced by a subordinate.

Second, the perception is that a supervisor's power is greater if he could hire someone else to fill a position when a subordinate quits. They found that a supervisor's perceived power will be higher when the alternatives are higher.

In contrast, Bacharach & Lawler (1981) and Ford & Johnson (1998) measured a subordinate's power by alternatives. Alternatives here refer to the subordinate's chances of alternative employment, and secondly, the degree of difficulty to find a replacement for the subordinate if he quits the job. A subordinate's perceived power will be higher when a supervisor's alternatives are lower (Ford & Johnson, 1998).

When subordinates perform core tasks, the supervisor's dependence increases because it becomes harder for him to find replacements. This suggests the following hypothesis:

H₄₋₁: The higher the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's centrality power increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the negative effect on his alternatives.

Based on the power dependence theory, subordinates should ascribe more power to a supervisor when they have fewer alternatives (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Ford & Johnson, 1998). A subordinate's dependence increases when there are fewer alternatives sources of employment, leaving him in a more vulnerable position. The higher a subordinates' work ability increases after sharing knowledge, the higher the possibility of a supervisor being substituted by his subordinates. Thus well-performed subordinates may affect a supervisor's status in a department. This paper hypothesizes that:

H₄₋₂: The higher the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's alternative power increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the negative effect on his alternatives.

H₄₋₃: The stronger the supervisor's expectation of the extent to which a subordinate's work ability increases after knowledge sharing, the stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the negative effect on his alternatives.

While Hollander & Offerman (1990) argued that one who shares knowledge with another member will lose power in an organization, Tannenbaum (1968) argued that it is not certain sharing of knowledge leading to reduction of individual power. Thus a supervisor's knowledge sharing may either increase or decrease his power in an organization. Because people try to maximize net power in an organization, a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent is higher if knowledge sharing leads to the gaining of net power. With respect to the two sources of net power (i.e., legitimacy power and alternative power), this paper suggests the following:

H₅: The stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the positive effect on his legitimacy after knowledge sharing, the higher the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent.

H₆: The stronger the supervisor's expectation regarding the positive effect on his alternatives after knowledge sharing, the higher the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent.

METHODOLOGY

Sample and Data Collection

Since the types of knowledge important to a firm differs from industries to industries and departments to departments, this research placed its emphasis on a specific department of an industry - the credit department of a bank. Thus the respondents of the study were supervisors of the credit department in a bank or branch, and the amount of the respondents is 1,699. Exploratory interviews with 12 supervisors were conducted in order to obtain extensive information regarding a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent. Interviews helped to clarify the theoretical model and to develop the questionnaire.

To alleviate the preferring problem, we asked a supervisor to rate two subordinates, one with whom the supervisor intended to share more knowledge and one with whom the supervisor intended to share less. The subordinates chosen had to satisfy two conditions. The first condition was that a subordinate had to work less than two years in the

department. From the interviews, we realized that subordinates employed in the credit department for more than two years already owned enough credit knowledge, and there was little benefit to him from a supervisor's knowledge sharing. The second condition was that the subordinate had to work for more than three months in the department. It was found that a supervisor could clearly evaluate a subordinate's work ability and attitude, only if the subordinate had done the credit job for more than three months.

468 supervisors responded. Excluding 62 supervisors who did not provide complete answers, the valid response rate was 24%. Every supervisor was asked to rate two subordinates, resulting in a total sample size of 812.

Variables and Measures

The questionnaires that provided the data for this paper were developed based on extensive interviewing with fifty supervisors and taking from other published studies. Unclear items in the original questionnaire were eliminated. In addition, based on the reliability test, we chose two or three items whose correlation coefficients were the highest. Finally, the Cronbach α had to be higher than 0.7 for each variable.

The supervisor's knowledge sharing intent refers to the extent to which the supervisor of the credit department in a branch was willing to share credit skills and expertise with his subordinates. Chew et al. (1991) and Ryle (1975) indicated that it is very important to distinguish the types of knowledge, as different types of knowledge have different performance implications. Based on the nature of the five indices and interviews with supervisors of banks, the credit knowledge was divided into four types: codified and easy to teach knowledge, non-codified but easy to teach knowledge, learning-by-observing knowledge and experiential knowledge which accumulates over time

The supervisor's expectation regarding legitimacy in this regard represents expectations after knowledge sharing: more support from his supervisions; appreciation from the subordinates; and possibility of being promoted (Ford & Johnson, 1998; Raven et al., 1998; Tjoscolt & Andrew, 1992). **The supervisor's expectation regarding alternatives** refers to the expectations after knowledge sharing (i.e., the extent to which he can be substituted by a subordinate), and the possibility of finding an immediate replacement for the subordinate when the latter quits (Johnson & Ford, 1996). According to Johnson & Ford (1996), **a supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's alternatives** refers to what the supervisor of a credit department expects after knowledge sharing.

Additionally, a supervisor's expectation regarding departmental performance refers to what he expects after knowledge sharing. The measurements of departmental performance are (Robbins, 1990): better organizational responsiveness to environment disturbances; better understanding of organizational objectives; productivity enhancement; better communications; and increasing organizational cohesiveness. Based on Hickson et al. (1971) and interviews with supervisors, **the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's centrality** indicates what the supervisor of a credit department expects, after knowledge sharing, and that the task in the credit department can be affected when subordinates quit or take leave.

A supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's work ability refers to what the supervisor of the credit department expects from a subordinate: ability to analyze and solve problems; ability to make correct credit evaluations; and ability to accumulate credit experience. **A supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's attitude towards work** refers to what the supervisor of the credit department expects after knowledge sharing, i.e., working overtime by a subordinate to complete the tasks assigned by the supervisor, and working more aggressively and creatively by a subordinate.

RESULTS

To check the discriminating validity of various measurements, a confirmatory factor analysis using LISREL 8.30 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 1999) was conducted. The comparative fit index (CFI) was computed to assess the fit of the factor structure to the data (Bentler, 1990). We also examined the correlation among factors for assessing the discriminant validity of measures.

The model fits the data well (CFI=0.94). All factor loadings (lambdas) on specific factors were significant ($t > 1.96$). The reliability estimates were that almost all variables are above the 0.8, except the supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's centrality, which is 0.6.

Using LISREL 8.30, we took a two-stage approach to the structural equation model fitting and assessment. This paper assessed measurement properties of the model prior to considering structural relationships between constructs. In testing the theoretical framework, we fitted several nested models to the data, each incorporating different assumptions about model parameters. The original theoretical framework was regarded as the best-fitting model (CFI=0.92). We assessed the discriminant validity of constructs by examining the change in chi-squares, and the original theoretical model provided a significantly better fit to the data than other models did.

Table 1 present the standardized path coefficients for the theoretical model. The theoretical model's index of 0.92 appears reasonable. Chi-square tests between models indicate that the theoretical relationship does exist between the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent and the supervisor's expectation regarding power (i.e., legitimacy and alternatives); between the supervisor's expectation regarding legitimacy and his expectation regarding departmental power; and between the supervisor's expectation regarding alternatives and the supervisor's expectation regarding his power (centrality and alternatives). The above relationship also derives from antecedents, e.g., between the supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power and the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's work ability; between the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's power (centrality and alternatives) and the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's work ability; between the supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power and the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's attitudes toward work; and between the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's power (centrality and alternatives) and the supervisor's expectation regarding a subordinate's attitude towards work.

[Insert Table 1 about here]

The path coefficients for testing H_{1-1} and H_{1-2} were 0.48 (γ_{11} ; $p < 0.01$) and 0.51 (γ_{12} ; $p < 0.01$). The influence of the supervisor's expectation regarding his subordinate's ability and the influence regarding the subordinate's attitude towards work are similar. The coefficients for testing H_{2-1-1} and H_{2-1-2} were 0.56 (γ_{21} ; $p < 0.01$) and 0.41 (γ_{22} ; $p < 0.05$). The coefficients for testing Hypotheses 2-2-1 and 2-2-2 were 0.40 (γ_{31} ; $p < 0.01$) and 0.19 (γ_{32} ; $p < 0.05$). Thus, the supervisor's expectation regarding the subordinate's work ability and attitude towards work affects the supervisor's expectation regarding the subordinate's centrality and alternatives. Addressing positively associated relationship within Hypotheses 3-1 and 3-2, the coefficient of the former was 0.49 (β_{41} ; $p < 0.05$), and the latter was 0.25 (γ_{41} ; $p < 0.05$). The supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power is more positively associated with the supervisor's expectation regarding his legitimacy than the supervisor's expectation regarding the subordinate's ability. Hypotheses 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 address the negative relationship between the supervisor's expectation regarding his alternatives and the antecedents. The respective path coefficient, -0.45 (β_{52} ; $p < 0.01$), -0.26 (β_{53} ; $p < 0.1$) and -0.18 (γ_{51} ; $p < 0.01$), supports the three hypotheses. Hypotheses 5 and 6 predict that the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent would be positively related to the supervisor's expectation regarding his power (legitimacy and alternatives). The path coefficients for testing Hypotheses 5 and 6 were 0.44 (β_{64} ; $p < 0.05$) and 0.11 (β_{65} ; $p < 0.01$), indicating the support of the two hypotheses.

DISCUSSION

Researchers (e.g., Fisher & Fisher, 1998; Tobin, 1998; Bartol & Srivastava, 2002) have expressed concern that effective sharing of knowledge among individuals or teams may not take place in organizations. French & Raven (1959) identified knowledge (expertise) as a source of power, the disclosure of which might lead to erosion of individual power, thereby partly explaining an individual's reluctance to share it with others. Knowledge sharing among the members in an organization facilitates the development of competitive advantages. Knowledge sharing is a key component of knowledge management systems (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Earl, 2001). While not denying the benefits of knowledge sharing to an organization, relying on a power perspective this paper addresses the sharing issue at an individual level. In the context of a supervisor-subordinate relationship, this paper assesses a theoretical framework for studying the factors affecting a supervisor's knowledge sharing intent. Empirical findings support the relationship between the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent and the supervisor's expectation regarding his power after knowledge sharing.

Now consider the choice faced by an employee who has had the opportunity to develop some new skills or methods that, she believe, could be of great value to some of her co-worker. With relatively little effort, this person could reflect on the nature of the new methods, put together a brief document describing their rational and potential benefits, and distribute the document to her co-worker. The document could help other people save time, improve results or come up with yet more ideas that could add significant value to the company as a whole. There is a real cost in sharing the idea. Putting the documents together and making the contribution consumes valuable time that might otherwise be invested in tasks with clearer returns. Also in organizations with a competitive internal work environment, the contributor of an idea may be assuming a great deal of personal vulnerability by revealing the secrets of his or her own competitive edge (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002). So some individuals will reduce the intent of knowledge sharing

Duncan & Weiss (1979), Hickson et al. (1971) & Pfeffer (1981) contended, knowledge is the collective intelligence of organizational members, and commonly shared through personal interaction. The survival of an organization is dependent on resources emanating from its external environment. Because of the turbulence of environment, only individuals who own the ability of handling uncertainty can survive. When individuals are depended upon by others, their power will increase. Due to fluctuation in environmental conditions, requirements change. Professional skills and also tasks must be replaced, causing organizations to reallocate resources and exchange power. In order to keep benefits and avoid being stripped from power, resource owners will do their best to protect their original status and resources including professional knowledge and information. As stated above, only individuals owning the ability to deal with uncertainty can continue to exist, and by reason of maintaining or upgrading power and status, individuals will try to conceal their knowledge about dealing with uncertainty. This behavior implies that their intent of knowledge sharing will be lowered. Hollander & Offerman (1990) also argued that a person sharing knowledge with others will lose power in an organization. This concern will reduce the intent of knowledge sharing. Additionally, Tannenbaum (1968) pointed out that it is not certain that knowledge sharing leads to elimination of individual power. On the contrary, when a person possesses expertise and is willing to share, it will lead to the organization being dependent upon him. But when the knowledge owner recognizes that the ability of the knowledge receiver may transcend the original owner's ability after knowledge sharing, the former is reluctant to share.

Legitimacy and alternatives are the antecedents influencing a supervisor's intent of knowledge sharing. When a supervisor shares his knowledge with a subordinate, he will consider the possibility of being substituted by a subordinate and the possibility of finding an immediate replacement for the subordinate when the subordinate quits. A supervisor also considers whether knowledge sharing results in stronger supports by CEOs and his subordinates and both may lead to promotion. Our empirical findings indicate that the impact of the supports of CEOs and the subordinate after knowledge sharing is higher than that of being substituted by a subordinate, although both antecedents affect knowledge sharing.

The findings also show that the supervisor does not prefer to share knowledge with a subordinate who has a higher work ability and a more aggressive work attitude after knowledge sharing, in this case causing only this subordinate's difficult substitution by other subordinates or resulting in the replacement of the supervisor. In contrast he prefers to share with a subordinate who has a higher work ability and a more aggressive work attitude after knowledge sharing, in this case causing he may gain expert status within organization, may receive public praise from the top management.

The top management of a company has to design mechanisms to prevent the above negative effects. For example, when the supervisor shares knowledge with his subordinates, the top management may assign the third one to monitor the progress of the supervisor's knowledge sharing. If the supervisor does his best to share knowledge with a subordinate who has great work ability and a more aggressive work attitude after knowledge sharing, the supervisor can have the chance to be promoted. Thus, this supervisor may not fear that the subordinate, who perfectly completes the tasks assigned by the supervisor after knowledge sharing, will replace the supervisor. Moreover, the supervisor is glad to share his knowledge with the above subordinate, because this subordinate effectively completes the tasks and brings in high performance for the department, leading personal gains to the supervisor.

Limitation

The findings of the paper should be interpreted in light of the limitations of the study. First, because the respondents of this study were supervisors working at banks, the findings may be interpreted in this context. Further research is needed to generalize these findings to other types of working relationships. Second, in our theoretical rationale for this study and our interpretation of its result, we have assumed that the supervisor's expectation regarding his power (legitimacy and alternatives) has an impact on the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent. Because power exists at all levels of an organization, power plays or personal values affect the gains and exercise of power. These differences, which influence how people behave, appear to be associated with differences in both personal success and the distribution of power in some modern organizations. Winter (1973) has found that individuals with strong power needs tend to be attracted to occupations which afford them considerable scope in defining their roles, selecting their actions, advising and helping others, and controlling and evaluating the behavior of others. Additionally, in almost all organizations some people are more powerful than others. Disparities in power affect the behaviors, feelings, and attitudes of both the powerful and the less powerful toward many aspects of their world, including themselves. Therefore, a submissive supervisor may care less than others about the gaining or losing of personal power. This may affect the interpretation of our findings because we were argued on a power perspective.

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Table 1. Results of the Structural Equation Analysis

Relationship	Estimate			Hypothesis	
				sign	support
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's work ability → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power</i>	γ_{11}	0.48	***	+	Yes H_{1-1}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's work ability → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding his legitimacy</i>	γ_{41}	0.25	***	+	Yes H_{3-2}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's work ability → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding his alternatives</i>	γ_{51}	-0.18	***	-	Yes H_{4-3}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's work ability → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's centrality</i>	γ_{21}	0.51	***	+	Yes H_{2-1-1}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's work ability → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate alternatives</i>	γ_{31}	0.40	***	+	Yes H_{3-2-1}
The super's expectation regarding subordinate's attitude towards work → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power</i>	γ_{12}	0.54	***	+	Yes H_{1-2}
The super's expectation regarding subordinate's attitude towards work → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's centrality</i>	γ_{22}	0.41	**	+	Yes H_{2-1-2}
The super's expectation regarding subordinate's attitude towards work → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate alternatives</i>	γ_{32}	0.19	***	+	Yes H_{2-2-2}
The supervisor's expectation regarding departmental power → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding his legitimacy</i>	β_{41}	0.49	***	+	Yes H_{3-1}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's centrality → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding his alternatives</i>	β_{52}	-0.45	**	-	Yes H_{4-1}
The supervisor's expectation regarding subordinate's alternatives → <i>the supervisor's expectation regarding his alternatives</i>	β_{53}	-0.26	*	-	Yes H_{4-2}
The supervisor's expectation regarding his legitimacy → <i>the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent</i>	β_{64}	0.44	**	+	Yes H_5
The supervisor's expectation regarding his alternatives → <i>the supervisor's knowledge sharing intent</i>	β_{65}	0.11	**	+	Yes H_6

* : $p < 0.1$ ** : $p < 0.01$ *** : $p < 0.05$