At the same time, it is doubtful that "policymaking principles" will have the time to commit to going through some five hundred plus pages of text and endnotes—and this is shame. In a world dominated by Power Point and three-page background papers, this reviewer's suggestion to the project committee would have been to have included an appendix in which the key judgments of each chapter were presented in a quickly digestible executive summary format.

These critical comments aside, it is clear that this study should be required reading for the government analysts that support key policymakers. There is simply no other study that will provide as rich an overview and context for over two decades of change in Beijing's foreign and security policymaking process.

New Path to Data

Ross Terrill

The aims of this accurately-named collective volume, *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform*, are largely fulfilled. It informs us on the post-Mao party-state's responses to a foreign policy environment that has grown more interdependent and policy-complex. For students, analysts, and diplomats, this new work will be an important resource.

The book forms a genre of China scholarship nonexistent until recently. Traditional Sinology knew little of the nuts and bolts of Chinese

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foreign policy. Foreign ignorance of China's ways was long severe, from Tamerlane's as he planned to convert the Chinese emperor to Islam during the Ming Dynasty, to Western guesses at the Empress Dowager's goals a century ago, to Hong Kong-based U.S. analysts weighing Mao's health as a clue to peace or war in the 1960s and 1970s. Lampton and his fellow authors—of both American and Chinese background—form the first academic generation with both close knowledge of Beijing's foreign policy deliberations and acquaintance with Chinese officials involved in offering advice. In this respect, we are in new and welcome territory.

The twelve chapters all contain insight and sound information. For instance, we learn there is no "well-defined overall PLA" foreign policy position (p. 54), and that a consensus exists in Beijing that China is relatively secure. We see how arms sales abroad reveal the rocky intersection between economic and security goals.

The editorial theme of *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* is that Beijing is a modern regime that operates much like others. This argument is mainly built on analysis of policy areas involving technology (such as arms control) and economics (such as trade policy), in which high politics do not regularly intrude. In these selected areas, Lampton's optimism that Beijing is entering new perceptual and value realms is reasonable. The book contains fine case studies of Korea, the WTO, Taiwan, and ozone and climate change policies; these sometimes stray from or even undermine the editor's managerial progressivism inspired by Doak Barnett (to whom the book is dedicated).

The shortcoming of the book is that nuts and bolts give little picture of architecture. Disarmingly, Lampton admits the limited significance of recent changes in China's foreign policy decision-making: "... just because more—and more diverse—information is available to top decision-making does not mean that basic strategic decision-making will be insulated from other powerful considerations, such as domestic political struggle, deeply embedded personal perceptions, or basic value or interest commitments" (p. 9). Lampton says "economic objectives have become the Chinese policy lodestone, although Taiwan could supersede it" (p. 28). The left hand seems to take back what the right hand delivers (also pp. 31, 33).

In key strategic areas we get less light on the direction of Chinese foreign policy than we do on technical and economic issues. Peter T. Y. Cheung and James T. H. Tang declare: "China's provincial-level units have emerged as important political and economic actors since 1978" (p. 91). However, they tackle only bureaucratic foreign policy processes, not foreign policy problems. Hence their conclusion that provinces "have not generally pursued their own foreign policies" (p. 119) seems inherent in their premises. Policy in its totality within Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia—the PRC's three largest provinces—has long been heavily shaped by foreign policy concerns. After all, Muslim groups outside China seek an independent state in Xinjiang, a Tibet government in exile sits in India, and Mongolia is a divided country. No surprise that Foreign Affairs Offices in Urumqi, Lhasa, and Huhehot have nothing to say on these sensitive matters!

The book mostly accepts the Beijing view that ideology has evaporated and China and other great powers, regardless of differing political systems, now share the managerial task of keeping the "international system" in synchronization. The authors prefer the term "elite" to "Communist Party." Frequently they call leftists "conservatives." This puts the Chinese Leninists, of whom many exist in powerful posts, into a category manageable to the American liberal mind: inconvenient Jesse Helms of the East upon whom light will dawn in due course.

Process triumphs over nature, military build-up is merely "defense modernization effort" (p. 145), the advance to a stable international system is judged un-derailable, and Doak Barnett's gospel of incremental progress is borne out. The foreign policy research offered to China's leaders, Lampton observes, is more and more "valued for analytical independence, not its political correctness" (p. 10). This reviewer wonders if that was the case prior to Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan in 1998.

No hint is given that the interests of China may vary from the interests of the CCP regime. This gap is finessed by the delicate phrase "Elite and Societal Opinion" that heads Part Two, as if the Communist Party and the people are somehow partners in the shaping of foreign policy. "Whether Chinese leaders view interdependence mainly as a tool for economic mod-

ernization or as an independently valued goal, the reality of interdependence is the same" (pp. 36, 228). That assertion simply sidesteps the question of the party-state's foreign policy goals.

A key sentence in the book reads, "The great watershed in Beijing's international outlook, of course, came in 1971, when China joined the United Nations and so became a fully sovereign legitimate member of the international political order for the first time since the Opium War" (p. 148). Some will find this convincing and even inspiring. Others will see this proposition as factually dubious and philosophically naive. Let the future decide. The twentieth century was not kind toward the liberal internationalist outlook; perhaps the twenty-first century will be.

In the view of this reviewer, the direction of Chinese foreign policy is discerned neither in the process of decision-making nor in the words spoken by Beijing leaders on party-state or international occasions. Moreover, a competent, modernized state bristling with technical expertise can make unwise policies (consult German experience, or ask Robert McNamara to look back on his Vietnam policy). Competent states can pursue a variety of foreign policy goals. They can be hard-line or soft-line, aggressive or defensive, ambitious or modest.

For the ears of the world, Beijing says it seeks "peace and development," favors "multipolarity," and will "never seek hegemony." The Chinese Communist leadership purrs that all countries are equal and the UN is the hope for peace and justice in the world. In practice, I believe Beijing has quite different goals: use international relations to shore up the party-state at home; build up wealth and power in a mercantilist fashion; be seen as an equal of America; and supplant the United States as the leading force in Asia. To demonstrate that fresh nuts and bolts of foreign policy decision-making in an era of interdependence have changed the goals of Chinese foreign policy, it would be necessary first to examine, if only to disprove, two alternative propositions: first, that the CCP remains committed to catching up for past periods of bullying at the hands of the West and Japan; and second, that the CCP requires, for its own legitimacy within China, a stance of struggle against "anti-China hegemonists."

New paths to data are on display in *The Making of Chinese Foreign*

and Security Policy in the Era of Reform—in particular, interviews with (generally) lower-level players in China's foreign policymaking, and the statements Beijing makes to international bodies and in international circles. During the Mao era, to go no further back, these paths to data were not available to Sinologists. However, light on policy is not a necessary consequence of new ways of obtaining material. Zhou Enlai used to consult his wife Deng Yingchao over dinner about policy toward the United States. Jiang Zemin assembled a group of "twenty-five former ambassadors to advise him on foreign policy" (p. 153-54). Neither mode of culling advice tells us anything about the quality of the advice or the direction of policy. Likewise, the asides whispered by Chinese officials and scientists to "the international scientific community," while a welcome part of our new pool of information, are not necessarily "true" in the sense of reflecting behavioral intent or even policy direction. The same caution was required in assessing Mao's words to foreign visitors. At times he threw sand in their eyes. At other times, as when he told the Yugoslav ambassador in the late 1960s, "The Americans are bastards, but they are honest bastards. The Russians are also liars," he broke word of a fresh direction in strategic policy.

Tang Tsou years ago said a foreign policy is "an integrated structure of assumptions, objectives, and means."[1] *The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform* adds to our knowledge of means. The book shows how new influences and constraints put the authoritarian party-state under pressures it did not face in the Mao era. No balance sheet of the interaction is drawn, nor could it readily be drawn. It is unclear whether the world view of the Chinese Communist leaders has been transformed by the new expertise, bureaucracy, and proliferation of advisory bodies in PRC foreign policy circles. In terms of the evolution of Sinology, this reviewer would describe Lampton's industrious book as an evaluation of "new paths to data," rather than a delineation of a putative post-Communist foreign policy in Beijing. To be fair, I think that was the essential aim of most of the team of authors. The book fulfills this goal.

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[1]Tang Tsou, *America's Failure in China, 1941-50* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), preface, ix.