

Taiwan's Cultural Reconstruction Movement: Identity Politics and Collective Action since 2000*

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This paper examines the social reconstruction of Taiwan's identity since 2000, when Chen Shui-bian and the Democratic Progressive Party won the presidential election. It will address the Chen Shui-bian regime's policies of identity reconstruction in a series of political issues (e.g., the re-writing of history text and language policy) to generate collective action from the public, the resistance from opponents, and the intriguing relationship between identity and ethnicity. Finally, the paper will draw assessments and implications for the future of Taiwan's political development.

KEYWORDS: Taiwan; identity; ethnicity; social movement; cultural reformulation.

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Taiwan is undoubtedly in a cultural reconstruction movement with the goal of establishing an indigenous Taiwanese identity, a movement which is joined with a concurrent effort of de-Sinicization to eradicate Chinese influences in social constructs.¹ In contrast to the radical and chaotic nature of China's Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976, Taiwan's ruling authority appears to be proceeding with a gradual, subtle approach to identity framing, which requires the generation, development, and elaboration of collective action from supporters. The question is how to awaken, incite, and persuade prospective constituents and supporters to follow the political elite's lead to participate passionately in the establishment of this new identity. The process has alternated between "visible" and "latent" phases with a mix of obvious public demands and a subtle hidden agenda to motivate adherents and to sustain the cohesiveness of the movement. Political elite advocating Taiwan's independence have selected issues carefully in order to inspire resonance from the public. The timing and the circumstances of the presentation of issues could also multiply the intended consequences. No doubt, the development of collective action is contested in the politics of signification. Opponents of the new identity would attempt to resist the brave new world vision presented by those who are committed to the new national/state identity reframing movement.

Identity is undoubtedly meaningful in one's participation in social and political activities. It is also crucial in differentiating self and other, and in linking individuals to the collective. We all possess private and public identities derived from kinship, history, cultural heritage, regional

¹Some may refer to Taiwan's social and cultural reconstruction movement in recent years as a "cultural revolution." Although the term "cultural revolution" might not perfectly fit our rigorous definition of revolution, the focus in this paper is to highlight the broad and significant impact of the change of core value systems in Taiwan. Whether it is embraced voluntarily or not, the emergence of a new paradigm (a conception of reality) or a new world view (*Weltanschauung*) surely generates "revolutionary" ramifications in Taiwan's international and domestic affairs. See Earl Conteh-Morgan, *Collective Political Violence: An Introduction to the Theories and Cases of Violent Conflicts* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 159.

ties, ethnicity, and ideology. Even so, the presence of multiple identities does not imply that all these identities have the same weight in emotional attachment and similar meaning to participants in social movements. Some participants may consider certain identities essential and fundamental in life, while others may treat them as contingent on circumstantial changes. Subject to a high level of emotional attachment and rent-seeking behavior of political actors, "political identities are particularly vulnerable to contingency," as Mabel Berezin remarked.²

In the area of political identities, the terms "national identity" and "state identity" are somewhat interrelated. These two terms are mutually inclusive and unlikely to be treated as an "either/or" dichotomy. In Taiwanese political practice, they were frequently cited without clear distinction by political practitioners in the past, though, in legal and scholarly studies, each may have its own definition and reference.³ Whatever definition is adopted, each has been used to draw cultural and ethnic inferences in strategizing politics.⁴ Identification with political groups can be created by various characteristics, be they gender, race, religion, age, or others, and identity politics can operate in various political contexts. Hence, this paper will concentrate on the use of ethnicity and culture to examine Taiwan's identity politics in light of its push for the indigenization of a "Taiwanese identity," which may contradict the once dominant "Chinese" culture's core

²Mabel Berezin, "Emotions and Political Identity: Mobilizing Affection for the Polity," in *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements*, ed. Jeff Goodwin, James M. Jasper, and Francesca Polletta (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 84-85.

³As Melissa J. Brown noted, "Identities are both fluid and changeable." See Melissa J. Brown, *Is Taiwan Chinese? The Impact of Culture, Power, and Migration on Changing Identities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004), 16.

⁴Tun-jen Cheng and Yung-ming Hsu, "The March 2000 Election in Historical and Comparative Perspectives: Strategic Voting, the Third Party, and the Non-Duvergerian Outcome," in *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics: Democratic Consolidation and External Relations*, ed. Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 152; Shi Zhengfeng, "Taiwanren de guojia rentong" (Taiwanese people's state identity), undated, www.wufi.org.tw/shih/f0008.htm (accessed June 9, 2004); Chih-yu Shih and Alvin Yuan-ming Yao, "Shehui kexue yanjiu rentong de jige tuijin" (Methodological approaches to identity in social sciences), *Dongya yanjiu* (East Asia Studies) 35, no.1 (January 2004): 1-36; and Stephane Corcuff, *Fenghe rinuan: Taiwan waishengren yu guojia rentong de zhuanbian* (Gentle breeze and warm sun: mainlanders in Taiwan and the change of national identity) (Taipei: Yuncheng wenhua, 2004).

values. A dose of ethnic affectations in Taiwanese politics has constantly been injected in order to create an exponential result.⁵ The result is that advocates and political elite, driven either by their respective political visions or political gains, may outbid moderate politicians by mobilizing voters and polarizing society into extreme policy stands. Even so, if more and more people convert to the new belief, the idealization, embellishment, and amplification of proposed values and beliefs will gain increasing internalization among the public.

This study primarily attempts to examine the process of social reconstruction of Taiwan's identity since 2000. How did the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) regime reframe the political and social discourses by constantly presenting and engaging in a series of political issues, such as the rewriting of history texts and the language policy? How can one explain the nature of collective action, which ranges from casual events to systematic efforts with a sustained level of support? After all, collective action cannot occur without a "we" characterized by a strong sense of solidarity and consciousness. At the same time, any social movement will surely meet resistance from the opposition. How did opponents of the movement, primarily Taiwan's opposition parties, counter-frame Chen's social construction work? Finally, what assessments and implications can we draw to elaborate the future of Taiwan's political development?

In 2000, the breath-taking presidential election campaign ended with a victory for the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) and the ousting of the long-ruling Nationalist Party (Kuomintang [KMT], 國民黨). Chen Shui-bian's taking over the helm officially ended the Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) era, begun in 1988. Lee's vision, personal conviction, and skillful maneuvering in promoting Taiwan's independent identity had successfully gained Taiwan a forceful and unforgettable spot on the world stage for the island's economic vitality, democratization, and diplomatic resilience. On the other hand, his uncompromising will on the issue of Taiwan's identity not only repeatedly provoked domestic debates on the ethnic identity issue,

⁵"Ethnicity" in Taiwan is primarily based on difference in spoken languages and the timing of immigration, rather than races, written languages, or distinct religious beliefs.

but also frequently lent a roller-coaster suspense to cross-Strait relations. Hence, the immediate priority for President Chen after his inauguration in May 2000 was to adopt a more moderate stance, putting aside his support for a new, independent Taiwanese state and appealing for the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue. Although this cautious approach maintained a sense of fragile amity across the Strait, the basic divide between Taiwan and China remains. This divide translates into a domestic tug of war around state identity between pro- and anti-independence forces.

Groundwork

The achievement of a new state identity possesses the quality of a collective good. The realization of a "new" state identity, if accomplished, will be "consumed" by everyone, regardless of what material and non-material contribution activists have made to the eventual supply of the good.⁶ That means non-contributors have a tendency to become "free-riders," who take advantage of the supply without contributing to it. If self-interest is a key motivation in political behavior, the drive for self-protection and self-preservation will offer a strong incentive to lean toward free-riding. The provision of a collective good, in this case, requires political elite to offer a systematic vision to convince participants that the proposed movement is justifiable, feasible, and sustainable. Like Rousseau's *legislator*, political elite are in charge "of transforming every individual, who in himself is a complete and independent whole, into part of a great whole ... of substituting a social and moral existence for the independent and physical existence which we have all received from nature."⁷ The job of political elite is therefore to "denature" the individual

⁶ Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965); and Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1982), 17-35.

⁷ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality*, edited with an introduction by Lester K. Born (New York: Pocket Press, 1967), Book II, Chap. VII, 43.

concern of self-interest to bring about a new collective rationality in order to ensure the permanence of "sentiments of sociability."⁸

Moreover, the movement also requires additional benefits as selective incentives, as Olson called them, to overcome the inevitability of opportunity cost entailed in any contribution to the collective good. Why should "I" participate in the reformulation of state identity rather than in other activities, which may require less or equal emotional drain and material contribution? The selective incentive given to leading political elite is relatively attainable and foreseeable. The success of a new statehood implies a fresh historical fame and potential rewards derived from political clientele networks and business connections. Yet, to mass followers and supporters, the selective incentive will be less distinctive and individualistic than those offered to political elite, except for a level of satisfaction through participation and the accomplishment of goals. This is not to rule out incentives which may benefit a specific community, such as promised reallocation of budget resources in infrastructural construction or a reversion of favoritism in the wake of the movement's success.

In addition to active participants, a successful movement demands a "silent" majority—a "conscience constituency" in Oberschall's terms.⁹ Such a constituency is made up of bystanders sympathetic to the cause of the movement. Their participation comes from their consciousness regarding justice and fairness, though they seldom receive direct personal benefits. Their direct contribution is to push the movement to reach the necessary critical mass. Simply attending political gatherings adds to the number of participants in the movement, giving opponents second thoughts about adopting radical counter-measures. Bystanders are not always visible because they sometimes show their strength only in electoral politics. While their support comes from the inspiration of a charismatic leader, they have been educated through recognition of a common memory of the past and a shared mental universe of the future.

⁸Ibid., Book IV, Chap. VIII, 145.

⁹Anthony Oberschall, *Social Movements: Ideologies, Interests, and Identities* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1993), 23.

Undoubtedly, a massive recruitment of followers does not imply a smooth ride to victory. A collective good can be perceived by opponents as a "collective bad." While a call for a new statehood represents a new political landscape and legitimacy to some, others may feel that the initiation of a new movement implies social friction, political instability, and ideological chaos. Too many vested interests and established rules of the game would be reshuffled and reorganized. Uncertainties entail risks, confrontations, and higher transaction costs in bargaining and trade-offs before the dust settles down. All these complications point to troubles in the implementation and enforcement of policy. Such a social engineering task entails shaking off the historical legacy experienced and shared by the holders of vested interests and their subordinates. Opponents will therefore try either to ridicule the new calling or to exploit illogical reasoning contained in the new movement's discursive presentation. Their purpose is to minimize the scope and speed of changes proposed by the new agenda-setting process. In contrast, the new movement's movers and shakers will attempt to neutralize and marginalize the opponents' countermeasures and try to brand opponents as "anti-reform," "holders of vested interests," "the scum of the old regime," and "the establishment of conservative forces" in order to erode their political power.

Even with a systematic vision presented by political elite, a sufficient amount of administrative and monetary resources to serve as selective incentives to prevent massive free-riding, and the constant neutralization of resistance movements, the new movement still requires a steady stream of messages to ensure a broad and wide acceptance among constituencies. Society will not be stationary because new political elements will constantly enter the political landscape due to revisions of immigration policy, the entrance of new age groups in voting, and the passing of the older generation from the population. Social constructs are therefore reframed and reformulated. A vision once propagated as acceptable could be found outdated, overused, and no longer appealing to a broad majority. The emergence of a refreshing way of thinking is propagated to replace the old one in order to allow the ruling elite to reclaim a pivotal point to justify and maintain its preponderance in policy debates and decisions.

Surely, the state's coercive authority in a democratic society is best employed as a last resort to prevent the tyrannical use of power in the name of the majority. The reluctance to employ state authority is to avoid pushing the minorities to the edge of desperation and obliging them to resort to physical force, as Tocqueville and Madison have warned.¹⁰ The best way to win the general consent of those over whom the government rules, as Gramsci elaborated, is to develop an ideology to weave together the interests of the ruling elite and the subordinate followers.¹¹ Political elite endeavor to set up a coherent set of values or common social experiences, tantamount to a new cultural framework, which attempts to transcend the boundary lines of different groups and classes as "the whole moral and intellectual condition of a people."¹² Once the movement gains ground in social space and achieves political legitimacy, it will continue to guide the direction and growth of civil society and to stay hegemonic in any civic realm to ensure the perpetual defeat of countermoves.¹³ At this stage, without the extensive necessity of sophisticated reasoning and coercion, political elite could banish those "impious" and "unsociable" non-believers in the new belief system from serious political function within society.¹⁴

¹⁰James Madison, "Federalist Papers, No. 51," in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *Federalist Papers*, first published in 1787, with an introduction, table of contents, and index of ideas by Clinton Rossiter (New York: New American Library, 1961), 323-25; and Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, The Henry Reeve text as revised by Francis Bowen, and further corrected and edited with introduction, editorial notes, and bibliographies by Phillips Bradley, foreword by Harold J. Laski (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), 269.

¹¹Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, edited by Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1971), ¶14.

¹²Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 299. Here, this study does not make a clear distinction between "culture" and social experiences, as some scholars might claim. After all, culture is the product of the cultivation of common social experiences and normative values. Further discussion can be found in Melissa J. Brown, *Is Taiwan Chinese?*

¹³Dante Germino, *Antonio Gramsci: Architect of a New Politics* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1990), 256.

¹⁴Although the reasoning is not fully compatible with Rousseau's claims, he should be credited for his insights here (Rousseau Book IV, Chap. VIII; 1967:145-46); and Saguiv A. Hadari, "'Persuader Sans Convaincre': A Rousseauian Approach to the Insoluble Problem of Social Contract," *Western Political Quarterly* 39, no. 3 (September 1986): 511.

Visions of Political Elite

The reciprocal relationship between political elite and followers is an interactive process of "questioning" followed by "answering," each alternating with the other. In an action-reaction move, a vision is proposed, knowledge is built, and a purposive intellectual framework is laid out subject to historical conjectures and readings of the surrounding environment in order to elicit a response from supporters and cause a sea change in cultural discourse and political awareness.¹⁵

When Chen Shui-bian assumed office in May 2000, his predecessor, Lee Teng-hui, had laid down a solid groundwork for Chen to continue the social engineering process for Taiwan's identity. Chen owes his intellectual vision of Taiwan's politics to Lee Teng-hui. In order to create a new statehood for Taiwan, a consensual confirmation of Taiwan's identity is a prerequisite necessity in order to gain a majority in legitimating Taiwan's claim of independence.

When Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) ruled Taiwan, there was less debate on "one China" because of his conviction to return to mainland China. Realizing the difficulty of resuming control of the mainland and seeing the loss of Taiwan's UN membership, Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) launched the process of "Taiwanization" within the KMT as well as the government in order to maintain the political legitimacy of the KMT.¹⁶ "One China" became a future vision with an expectation of peaceful resolution. Doubts about the usefulness of the "one China" principle gradually began to swell in public forums, particularly during the process of democratic transition under Lee Teng-hui's rule.¹⁷ Undoubtedly, Lee is a pioneering politician

¹⁵ Benedetto Fontana, *Hegemony and Power: On the Relation between Gramsci and Machiavelli* (Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press, 1993), 113.

¹⁶ According to Wang Zuorong (王作榮), Chiang Kai-shek also launched the process of Taiwanization by recruiting more Taiwanese into the government in the late 1950s. See Dai Guofei and Wang Zuorong (oral dictation), transcribed by Xia Zhen, *Ai zeng Lee Teng-hui* (Love and hate Lee Teng-hui) (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 2001), 103. A discussion of the China representation issue during the Kennedy administration in the early 1960s, which began to consider this issue, can be found in Noam Kochavi, *A Conflict Perpetuated: China Policy During the Kennedy Years* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002), 62-82.

¹⁷ A discussion of various meanings of "one China" can be seen in Alexander Chieh-Cheng

in Taiwan's cultural reconstruction movement.

Lee Teng-hui's views were certainly molded at various stages of his life. Lee never hid his enchantment with Japan because he was technically a Japanese until he reached age twenty-two in Taiwan—a Japanese colony from 1895 to 1945. His knowledge of world events was primarily through Japanese publications. Marxism fascinated him as a youth, and he was once a member of the Communist Party in Taiwan.¹⁸ This problematic connection remained in his confidential dossier even after he had been inducted into the ruling circle and promoted to different governmental positions.

Lee's deep fondness for Japan made him ignore that country's past to the degree that made it bearable.¹⁹ Japan's World War II atrocities and colonial suppression in East Asia, including Taiwan, were swept into the dustpan of his historical understanding.²⁰ In contrast, the KMT, the party he joined and eventually chaired for twelve years, was an "alien" regime to him. Lee perceived that the KMT's arrival in 1949 and its suppressive style of governance thereafter were not sanctioned and never legitimately approved by the Taiwanese people.

Stranded in the tug of war between the pro-unificationists' demand for "Republic of China" and the pro-independence supporters' demand for "Taiwan" as the country's name, Lee skillfully coined the phrase "the ROC

Huang, "Taiwan's View of Military Balance and the Challenge It Presents," in *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait*, ed. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University Press, 1997), 294-95.

¹⁸ Dai and Wang, *Ai zeng Lee Teng-hui*, 37-38; *Shijie ribao* (World Journal), June 6, 2002, A2; and Lee Teng-hui, *The Road to Democracy: Taiwan's Pursuit of Identity* (Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1999), 27, 37.

¹⁹ There are numerous Chinese and English publications about Lee Teng-hui's life, intellectual journey, and political visions. For example, Greg Sheridan, *Tigers: Leaders of the New Asia-Pacific* (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 294-317; Lee, *The Road to Democracy*; Lee Teng-hui, *Jingying da Taiwan* (Manage the big Taiwan) (Taipei: Yuanliu, 1994); and Zhang Huiying (Sheena H.Y. Chang), *Lee Teng-hui: 1988-2000 zhi-zheng shier nian* (Lee Teng-hui: 1988-2000 twelve years of ruling) (Taipei: Commonwealth, 2000).

²⁰ A critical comment on Lee's historical understanding can be found in Long Yingtai, "Long Yingtai tiaozhan Lee Teng-hui cuowu shiguan" (Long Yingtai challenges Lee Teng-hui's historical view), *Xin Ximwen* (The Journalist), no. 627 (March 11-18, 1999): 33-39; and Dai and Wang, *Ai zeng Lee Teng-hui*, 55-56.

on Taiwan" to avoid either extreme. His ambiguous stand on the issue of national identity allowed him to reach a delicate equilibrium among contending constituencies at the initial stage of democratization. Later, he became more and more vocal in promotion of Taiwan's independence. Sharing a general sense of the "sorrow of being a Taiwanese" with other advocates for Taiwan's independence because of Taiwan's historical past under the control of alien regimes, Lee Teng-hui pushed for "indigenization" (or "localization," 本土化, *bentuhua*), an agenda broader than Chiang Ching-kuo's "Taiwanization" program to ensure the legitimacy of the majority—Taiwanese (primarily Minnan [閩南] ethnic group)—to reposition national identity, to refocus historical memory, and to redistribute power. Simultaneously, his initial espousal of the concepts of "Taiwan first" and "new Taiwanese" attempted to be diversity-friendly and inclusive in order to avoid severe alienation of the minority mainlanders within society.²¹ His subtle maneuvering of this issue to stress "territorial identity" allowed him to acknowledge that one could be "both Chinese and Taiwanese" in ethnic understanding, and to entertain the possibility of Taiwanese civic nationalism, rather than ethnic nationalism, even though his deeds might not fit perfectly with his words.²² At the end of his era, the acceptance of "Taiwanese identity" rose to 50 percent in 2000 from 28.8 percent in 1994, in contrast to the declining ratio of "Chinese identity" from 24.1 percent to 8.3 percent and the slight change of "double identity" (both Chinese and Taiwanese) from 43 percent to 39 percent during the same period.²³ Unfortunately, his domestic achievements did not translate well into the international arena as exemplified by his espousal of the "two-state" theory in 1999, which infuriated both Beijing and Washington.

²¹ Chia-lung Lin and Bo Tedards, "Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Taiwan's Transition," in *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*, ed. Weichin Lee and T.Y. Wang (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2003), 52-53; and Steven E. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945-1950* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003), 142-50.

²² Shi, "Taiwanren de guojia rentong."

²³ Szu-yin Ho and I-chou Liu, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People in the 1990s," in Lee and Wang, *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era*, 154.

Following Lee Teng-hui's groundwork, Chen took the path of indigenization/localization without much difficulty. While Chen's past experiences differed from those of Lee, his conviction in Taiwan's independence remained as strong as Lee's vision. Because the issue of Taiwan's identity was so divisive among voters, Chen fully understood that his political survivability and vitality relied on the steady support of pro-independence supporters. In order to cast the net wide to attract voters, he espoused a "new middle route" (新中間路線, *xin zhongjian luxian*) to broaden his appeal. It was an imitation of Giddens' "third way" beyond the old left and the new right of the political spectrum, but he appeared to steer away from the middle route after he was elected.²⁴ Unlike Lee, who was immersed in the historical perspective, Chen focused on short-term electoral advantages and lacked a holistic view of Taiwan's place in history.²⁵ In line with Lee's advocacy of "new Taiwanese" to cajole those who believe that "Taiwan is ours, [and we should] love Taiwan and wholeheartedly devote ourselves to its cause,"²⁶ Chen found political expediency in using ethnicity as an electioneering strategy to brand his opponents "betrayers of Taiwanese consciousness" or "people possessing the 'Great China' sentiment," and suggest that they were unworthy to be members of the new Taiwanese category. The dichotomy of "love Taiwan" (愛台灣, *ai Taiwan*) and "feel endearment for China" (親中國, *qin Zhongguo*) based on national identity politics is a reminder of the over-simplification of "red vs. expert" as well as "capitalist-roaders/capitalists vs. socialist-roaders/socialists" during China's Cultural Revolution.²⁷ Analogies, allusions, and metaphors

²⁴ Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000); and Anthony Giddens, *The Third Way and Its Critics* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2000).

²⁵ Hu Zhongxin, *Quanli de aoman: Chen Shui-bian de zongtong zhi lu* (The arrogance of power: Chen Shui-bian's road to presidency) (Taipei: Shangzhi wenhua, 2001), 151-53, 179-89.

²⁶ Lee, *The Road to Democracy*, 61; "Lee Teng-hui yao Tailian tuidong 'Taiwan zijue yundong'" (Lee Teng-hui wanted the Taiwan Solidarity Union to launch "Taiwanese self-consciousness movement"), *Lianhe bao* (United Daily News) (Taipei), June 4, 2004, www.udn.com/news (accessed June 4, 2004).

²⁷ "Red vs. expert" is a problem of combining political commitment and technical expertise

were employed to transmit his views of identity subtly. Like Mao, who, to incite national pride, proclaimed that "the Chinese people have stood up," Chen declared "Taiwan stands up" to offer a new Taiwan to supporters at the beginning of his rule.²⁸ The frequent incitement of ethnicity carries an unspeakable "original sin" that is placed on the unfavorable minority—mainlanders—due to their enchanted memory of mainland China and their likely opposition to the DPP's independence platform. Accordingly, ethnic background leads to an automatic assumption of disloyalty, like a replay of the class background ("bloodlines" theory) strategy in prejudging a person's political inclination and loyalty during China's Cultural Revolution. The emphasis on "genuine Taiwanese" offers a hint of others' "foreignness."

In addition to acting as a pioneer for Taiwan's independence, Chen also pledged "five no's" to preclude any sharp rifts in Taiwan's cross-Strait relations or a radical departure from the U.S. policy on the status quo, but did not disavow Lee's "two-state" theory. Instead, he refurbished the theory with a "*yibian yiguo*" (一邊一國, one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait) proclamation to DPP sympathizers in Japan in August 2002.²⁹ While the "five no's" promised not to declare independence, not to incorporate a "two-state" theory into the constitution, not to change the name of the nation, not to declare independence, and not to terminate the National Unification Council (國家統一委員會) or the Guidelines for National Unification (國家統一綱領), a thorough examination might lead one to doubt the fulfillment of his commitment. The National Unification Council and its Guidelines have practically ceased to function. The name "Republic of China" has been constantly under attack for its relationship to

in Chinese politics. See Kenneth Lieberthal, *Governing China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004), 111.

²⁸Jennifer M. Wei, "Politeness and Politics: A Study of President Chen Shui-bian's Rhetorical Strategies," *Guoli Zhengzhi daxue xuebao* (National Chengchi University Journal), no. 83 (December 2001): 7.

²⁹Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Four Years of Commitment and Crisis," *Comparative Connections* 6, no. 1 (April 2004): 138-41, www.csis.org/pacfor/ (accessed May 27, 2004).

China. Partially driven by electioneering in 2003 and partially compelled by a belief in Taiwan's independence, Chen's intent to rebuild Taiwan as a "normal, complete, and great state" through a draft constitution by 2006 and to legitimize it through referendum in 2008 has expanded the realm of imagination concerning the change of the nation's name, the national boundary defined in the 1947 constitution, and the final achievement of independence of state identity.³⁰

In order to achieve this long-term goal in a democratic society, a majority in the presidential election and a predominant party strength in the legislature are required. However, with only 39.38 percent of presidential votes and a minority of seats in the legislature—in contrast to the combined vote shares of 59.9 percent for the pan-Blue coalition (the KMT and the People First Party [PFP, 親民黨]), and the numerical superiority of the pan-Blue coalition in the legislature in the wake of the 2000 presidential election—Chen Shui-bian and the DPP encountered formidable barriers to carrying out their policy agenda. Struggling to maintain smooth governance, Chen and the DPP apparently adopted a soft pitch to cultivate majority support by continuing Lee Teng-hui's missionary pursuit of an independent Taiwan. The era of Lee Teng-hui's governance had witnessed a political elite's innovation of ideas, institutional systematization of his visions, and strategic interaction between actors to consolidate the awakening of Taiwanese awareness in history and international space. What Chen attempted was to continue the mutual feeding effect between political elite and mass followers—an interplay of micro-manipulation and macro-construction similar to that seen in the conclusions of Tang Tsou (鄒讚) about Chinese politics.³¹ His purpose was to create a shared focus of attention and to build up a critical mass, a substantial majority, to approve of and realize the independence agenda that Chen and the DPP had advocated.³²

³⁰ Ibid., 142.

³¹ Tang Tsou, "Interpreting the Revolution in China: Macrohistory and Micromechanisms," *Modern China* 26, no. 2 (2000): 211.

³² Randall Collins, "Social Movements and the Focus of Emotional Attention," in Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta, *Passionate Politics*, 27-28.

It was easier said than done. After all, the long-term omnipresence of the KMT had infiltrated every aspect of society. The crisis in the KMT's governance due to the "minority" mainlanders' dominance over the "majority" Taiwanese had been postponed by the party's skillful manipulation of economic achievements in the past until the succession of Lee Teng-hui in 1988. Lee's twin positions as the KMT chairman and the ROC president gave him a double advantage to navigate the reconstruction of Taiwan's collective identity through Machiavellian schemes. However, pervasive KMT ideology and "administered" consciousness based on "Chinese" cultural references were so strong that Lee could not launch an overwhelming reconstruction as he wished. Those "Chinese" cultural frameworks were deeply "self-inflicted" norms and rules that could not simply be thrown away in an instant. Showing to some degree the formulation and unity of consciousness for collective action advocated by Georg Lukács or Georges Sorel, Taiwan's independence hinges on a piecemeal, gradual transformation of the behavior of the supporters capable of political consciousness, not a single "leap of faith."³³ The reconstruction of the cultural and social reference framework not only sustains Taiwanese conviction, but also attempts to convert mainlanders. Therefore, the grand project of Taiwan's "cultural revolution" began to untie the bond with the past and to create a new inner world order for society.

Reconstructions Everywhere: Large and Small

Cultural reformulation and social reconstruction can begin with the revision of major political principles as well as small changes. Chen began by arguing that the country named "Republic of China," created in 1912, had become the ROC on Taiwan in 1949 when the KMT regime lost the

³³Georg Lukács, "Toward a Methodology of the Problem of Organization," in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*, translated by Rodney Livingston (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT, 1971), 333-35; and Richard Vernon, *Commitment and Change: Georges Sorel and the Idea of Revolution* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), 50.

civil war and was relocated to Taiwan. In his view, "Now the Republic of China is Taiwan."³⁴ The area under the jurisdiction of the Republic of China is Taiwan only. The laws governing Taiwan-China relations were revised by removing the former KMT claim that Mongolia was part of Chinese territory in order to allow representative offices in Mongolia and Taiwan to operate normally in 2002. Moreover, the establishment of a new semi-official Taiwan-Tibet Exchange Foundation (台藏交流基金會) in 2003 was aimed to take over part of the administrative duties of the cabinet-level Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (蒙藏委員會), though the Commission till now is still operational, with the implication that Taiwan-Tibet affairs would no longer be treated as domestic matters.³⁵ Chen later blasted the opposition parties' preference for "one China" to be the ROC as a "virtual reality." He even stretched his "one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait" to "two sides, three nations"—Taiwan, China, and Mongolia, on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.³⁶

In order to eliminate the "one China" claim, Chen and the DPP plunged into debates about legal technicalities and political ramifications of the Cairo Declaration in 1943, the Potsdam Declaration in 1945, and U.S. policy immediately after the Chinese civil war, trying to vindicate the idea that Taiwan's international status remained uncertain. The goal was to pave the way for the claim that China never "owned" Taiwan, and the "creation" of a new state was justified.³⁷ Juxtaposed with legal analyses

³⁴ Ko Shu-ling, "Chen Adds Mongolia to Strait Debate," *Taipei Times*, December 22, 2003, 1.

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ "Chen Rejects Claim That Taiwan and China Are Same Country," *China Post* (Taipei), December 22, 2003, 19.

³⁷ An analysis of Taiwan's uncertain status can be found in Nanfang Shuo, *Diguo zhuyi yu Taiwan duli yundong* (Imperialism and Taiwan independence movement) (Taipei: Siji, 1980), 89-97; Chen Xifan, "Taiwan shuyu Zhonghua minguo" (Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China), *Zhongguo shibao* (China Times) (Taipei), June 2, 2004, www.chinatimes.com (accessed June 2, 2004); Huang Yandong, "Lun Taiwan zhuquan duli zhi fazhan" (On the development of Taiwan's independent sovereignty), *Xinshiji zhiku luntan* (New Century Foundation Forum), no. 25 (March 30, 2004): 97-110; Hungdah Chiu, "Yizhong yuanze yu Taiwan falu diwei" (The one-China principle and Taiwan's legal status), *Cheng Ming* (Hong Kong), no. 280 (February 2001): 69-72; and Lin Jinjing, "Cong Taiwan zai guojifa shang zhi diwei zhanwang Taiwan zhi weilai" (From Taiwan's status in international law to foresee Taiwan's future), *Lishi yuekan* (History Monthly), June 2002, no. 6:82-89.

were cultural and historical claims delineating Taiwan's "oceanic" orientation in contrast to mainland China's "continental" mind-set. As an island outside of China's control since 1949 (the end of civil war) or even 1895 (the first year of Japanese colonization), Taiwan represents innovation and progress to the outside world. Chen's inaugural speech in 2004 also conveyed such an oceanic orientation. China, on the other hand, as a continental/land state, was described as symbolizing inflexibility and a conservative vision.³⁸ Such a dichotomy explains both Taiwan's willingness to ride the tide of democracy and China's reluctance to accept political changes. Taiwan and China have drifted apart, and the incorporation of Taiwan into China would only suffocate Taiwan's democratic achievement. Hence, the slogan of "*haiyang wenhua*" (海洋文化, oceanic culture) or "*haiyang Taiwan*" (海洋台灣) was propagated with proposals to set up an agency to administer maritime affairs.³⁹

The international division of Taiwan from China coincided with domestic efforts. Before he relinquished his presidency, Lee Teng-hui's definition of "new Taiwanese" attempted to include both indigenous Taiwanese and mainlanders who immigrated to Taiwan after 1949. In contrast, as a consequence of electoral instability driven by political calculation, Chen tended to adopt an either/or tactic by redefining "new Taiwanese," heavily leaning toward ethnic Taiwanese and generating an unfriendly attitude toward mainlander immigrants.

In addition to continual reminders of grievances, such as the anniversary of the "February 28th Incident" (二二八事件) of 1947, a crisis mentality based on fear and distrust was created to mobilize believers

³⁸ An example of mainland state vs. maritime state can be seen in the discussion of Southeast Asian history in Milton Osborne, *Southeast Asia* (St. Leonards, NSW, Australia: Allen and Unwin, 1997), 18-30.

³⁹ Qiu Wenyan, *Hanyang wenhua yu lishi: haiyang yu Taiwan, guoqu, xianzai, weilai* (Ocean culture and history: Taiwan's past, present, and future) (Taipei: Hushi Press, 2003); Qiu Wenyan, *Haiyang yongxu jingying* (Ocean management forever) (Taipei: Hushi Press, 2003); "Tu Cheng-sheng de ditu zhengque dan chenjiu" (Tu Cheng-sheng's map is correct, but obsolete), *Pingguo ribao* (Apple Daily) (Taipei), May 27, 2004, www.appledaily.com.tw/template/twapple (accessed June 3, 2004); and Zhang Yazhong, *Kaifang zhengzhi shichang* (Open political market: leasing Taiwan) (Taipei: Linking, 2000), 47-49.

and sympathizers for Taiwan independence. Neglecting the possibility that even mainlanders and their offspring might harbor deep fears of reunification and would not object to independence as one future solution to the cross-Straits stalemate, Chen and the DPP had a tendency to put all mainlanders in a pro-China category without distinction. It became an easy and cheap campaign strategy to "educate" voters and consolidate the DPP base of support. At any huge political gathering and on talk shows, excitement and sensation were generated by a series of speakers communicating with a like-minded audience and reinforcing specific political messages of this nature. One cannot help but think of some familiar scenes of mass meetings during the Cultural Revolution. Speakers repeated slogans and statements blaming everything on the pan-Blue coalition and demanded a swift "yes or no" answer to arouse public sentiment. The masses are hypnotized by such regurgitation of transmitted messages and long for collective action. On such an occasion, reason, objectivity, and even-handed assessments are unlikely to be any part of the debate and dialogue. Whether or not one suffered from the so-called "white terror" during the KMT era, an individual could participate in a sense of collective victimization that was built up. The simple solution was to defeat the KMT (or the pan-Blue coalition) once and for all in the election. Such thinking is similar to the naive belief during the Cultural Revolution that a new socialist culture would rise as long as the "capitalist-roaders" were wiped out.

Stated differently, democratic politics is not only an exercise of interest representation, but also a process of interweaving interest representation and identity endorsement. Since every movement needs confirmation by electoral results in a democratic society, ethnic variables were injected into campaigning.⁴⁰ China and anything related to China in content or implication were therefore demonized and discarded at the same time that the

⁴⁰Maukuei Chang, "Understanding Contending National Identities: Reading Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson from Taiwan," in *Democratization and Identity: Regime and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia*, ed. Susan J. Henders (Lanham, Md.: Lexington, 2004), 82; and Richard Flacks, "The Party's Over: So What Is to Be Done?" in *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity*, ed. Enrique Larana, Hank Johnston, and Joseph R. Gusfield (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994), 339-40.

Taiwanese identity was constructed and consolidated. When Lien Chan (連戰) and James Soong (宋楚瑜) of the pan-Blue coalition decided to kiss the ground in Taiwan to show their love of Taiwan during the 2004 presidential election, their act was portrayed by the pan-Green coalition (DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union [TSU, 台灣團結聯盟]) as a confession of their past wrongs to the Taiwanese people. They were branded as representatives of "ethnic" mainlanders and the KMT "alien regime" without any "indigenous" qualification. The self-explanatory "new Taiwanese" catch phrase gives a self-referential effect, a constant reminder of one's cultural or other affiliations.⁴¹ It is "new" with a distinction to those "old," or backward, obsolete, and outdated in mind-set and person. While the decision to become a new Taiwanese is a personal, independent choice, the seemingly diffuse and decentralized individual choice is associated with the welfare of the collective by the new identity.

In addition to election campaigns, the new movement also makes sure that the identity formation is embedded in everyday life. As Gillis memorably put it, "Identities and memories are not things we think *about*, but things we think *with*" (original emphasis).⁴² The elite need to offer cues to guide the mass public toward political choices. Therefore, a variety of channels and mechanisms need to be employed to frame and transmit the new thinking.⁴³ Education is a logical choice for political socialization. Precisely through linguistic reciprocity and intersubjective recognition of particular life contexts, an individual's knowledge and rationalization of the life world is integrated into a specific social system by appropriating symbolic generalities and semantic references. Later, individuals and group identity are recognized and formed into a virtually "unlimited com-

⁴¹Hank Johnston, Enrique Larana, and Joseph R. Gusfield, "Identities, Grievances, and New Social Movements," in Larana, Johnston, and Gusfield, *New Social Movements*, 8-9.

⁴²John R. Gillis, "Introduction: Memory and Identity: The History of a Relationship," in *Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity*, ed. John R. Gillis (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 5.

⁴³Martin Gilens and Naomi Murakawa, "Elite Cues and Political Decision-making," in *Research in Micropolitics: Political Decision Making, Deliberation, and Participation*, ed. Michael X. Delli Carpini, Leonie Huddy, and Robert Y. Shapiro (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 2002), 15-49.

munication community" as Habermas anticipated.⁴⁴ Whether they are of careful, painstaking design or incidental occurrence, several educational policies have become embroiled in issues of identity. These policies help the formation of Taiwan's identity.

It is certainly valid to claim that competence in the local Taiwanese dialect might not be a significant factor in identity reconfirmation, particularly if the movement wants to recruit more participants to reach a critical mass for the achievement of the collective good of Taiwan independence. Nevertheless, people who were linguistically incapable of speaking Taiwanese were considered problematic by some others who continue to speak it as their mother tongue. The sincerity of those non-native speakers was questioned in terms of their attachment to the noble cause of indigenization. Moreover, the native culture encountered dangers of dilution as a result of the past systematic imposition of the official culture, i.e., "Chinese" culture, which had penetrated into various social strata. The past infiltration of the KMT's official culture appeared to have an uneven spread in Taiwan, with a higher level of displacement in metropolitan and industrialized areas and a lower level of displacement in rural and less industrialized areas. While studies may not be fully conclusive or convincing, politicians' hunches and commentators' spin usually suggest that the pan-Blue coalition has its advantage in majority support in the northern part of Taiwan, an area usually perceived to have voters who are better educated and have higher incomes, while the pan-Green coalition tends to appeal more to voters in the south, an area considered relatively "local" and

⁴⁴Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, translated and with an introduction by Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), 74; Jürgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays*, translated by William Mark Hogengarten (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), 186-88; and Jürgen Habermas, "Struggles of Recognition in the Democratic Constitutional State," translated by Sherry Weber Nicholson, in *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), 129. A synthesis of Habermas' views can be seen in Simon Thompson, "The Agony and the Ecstasy: Foucault, Habermas, and the Problem of Recognition," in *Foucault contra Habermas: Recasting the Dialogue between Genealogy and Critical Theory*, ed. Samantha Ashenden and David Owen (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1999), 202.

xiangtu (鄉土, native soil) in cultural orientation and social experience.⁴⁵

As soon as the advocates of indigenization assumed political authority, the resuscitation of the local culture in demise became their political destiny. At the beginning, the movement to emphasize local dialects was publicized in the name of multicultural diversity. The reality in practice has tilted toward the primary "local" dialect—Taiwanese—to appeal to the strong call for Taiwanese identity. Moreover, assuming that everyone votes according to their ethnic identity and that Taiwanese are the largest ethnic group in population, there is a high expectation that emphasis on the Taiwanese dialect will lead voters to be in favor of Taiwanese identity-related policy. Therefore, emphasis on Taiwanese is gradually being extended into the public education system with the goal that future generations will adopt Taiwanese as the preferred and politically correct language in daily use in public speeches and official functions.⁴⁶ In Jennifer Wei's view, the language choice helps the audience with the inferences and interpretation of the speaker's identity choices and loyalties. At the same time, with Mandarin as the hegemonic language of the past, the Taiwanese language serves as a means of boundary-leveling and boundary-making to differentiate "us" from "them" in political discourse.⁴⁷

The fad for politicians is to employ Taiwanese colloquial phrases in their statements. Carrying a historical baggage of "original sin," mainlander politicians have to prove their successful assimilation in the "majority" view of Taiwanese cultural norms by demonstrating their Taiwanese language capability to court voters' approval. Otherwise, they would be ridiculed for being insensitive to localization trends or even "unpatriotic" to Taiwan's national cause.⁴⁸ Lee Teng-hui, Chen Shui-bian, and DPP

⁴⁵ Wang Fu-chang, "Zuqun jiechu jihui? Haishi zuqun jingzheng?" (Ethnic contact opportunities? Or ethnic competition?), *Taiwan shehuixue* (Taiwan Sociology), no. 4 (December 2002): 12-13.

⁴⁶ A-Chin Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism* (New York: Routledge, 2000).

⁴⁷ Jennifer M. Y. Wei, "Codeswitching in Campaigning Discourse: The Case of Taiwanese President Chen Shui-bian," *Languages and Linguistics* 4, no. 1 (2003): 161.

⁴⁸ Name callings include "mainlander pigs," if you happen to have a mainlander background, and "Wu Shangui" (吳三桂) as an indication that you betrayed the cause of Taiwan inde-

politicians are clearly masters of employing concise Taiwanese idioms and phrases as political slogans and discursive practices to emphasize their "down-to-earth," grass-roots character.

The indigenization of language education, of course, encounters problems. The debate about the Romanization system for Chinese characters is heavily loaded with connotations of political identity. One side of the coin: if the decision is to adopt the widely used *hanyu pinyin* (漢語拼音) system initiated by the PRC, does it intrinsically imply the inferiority of Taiwan's cultural imagination and creativity and, politically, the loss of Taiwan's autonomy in linguistic indigenization? After all, Taiwan is not part of China, and, to believers in Taiwan's identity, how could such a unique and beautiful Taiwanese dialect be subject to "Chinese rule" in Romanization? The other side of the coin: if the decision is to have the *tongyong pinyin* (通用拼音), Taiwan's unique Romanization system, will this system be adopted and used extensively by others as an effective tool of communication? If not, will it lose its purpose as a tool of communication to connect Taiwan and the outside world, a world from which Taiwan is striving to win political support and economic benefits? In the end, the question is whether the adoption of a Romanization system should be examined from the standpoint of the utility of communication or from that of political consideration of massaging Taiwanese egoistic superiority and showing its separate existence from China in culture and language? The debate has not been settled in accord with everyone's expectation, and the textbook on Taiwanese dialect instruction eventually included several Romanization systems to ensure accurate pronunciation.⁴⁹

The Romanization system is not the only battle front. When the Examination Yuan (考試院) conducted examinations for certification or

pendence. Wu was a historical figure who betrayed the Ming Dynasty (明朝) and deliberately collaborated with Manchus (滿族) to terminate the Ming Dynasty.

⁴⁹ Zhang Wanlin, "Zhongwen yiyin yishi xingtai zhi zheng" (Is Chinese transliteration an ideological competition?), *Xin xinwen*, no. 710 (October 12-18, 2000): 118-21; and "Xue Taiyu Han-Luo bingyong zhengcan haizi" (Learning Taiwanese with a mix of Mandarin and Roman characters makes kids miserable), *Lianhe bao*, June 7, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed June 7, 2004).

personnel recruitment of civil servants in 2002 and 2003, exams on Chinese language included questions written in the Taiwanese dialect (閩南話, *Minnanhua*), ignoring the possibility that examinees might come from non-Minnan ethnicities or could not speak Taiwanese. A concern for fairness prompted an investigation by the Control Yuan (監察院), which has the powers of impeachment, censure, and audit over government agencies.⁵⁰ Apparently, the proclaimed purpose of multicultural policy was to generate a single cultural identity to match a political identity.⁵¹

Through language, native culture is shared and political awareness is raised. All individuals and collectives are invited into the "imaged community" through "the angel of history," as Anderson called it, which attempts to restore the past, to cultivate fellowships, and to conceive future visions.⁵² History is about what people remember and why they remember it, and is an important tool of cultural assimilation. It is not surprising, then, that controversy also entered the writing of history textbooks. Confirming the clichés that history is written by the winners and the past is "rebuilt" by the contemporary, the DPP certainly would not let history rest easily.

The reconstruction of a cultural identity requires congruence between a future vision and details of the past. In the 1970s, *dangwai* (黨外, "outside the KMT," a precursor of the DPP) actually employed a "China-centered" history as an interpretative device to lay out in lavish detail their political reasoning and social discourse.⁵³ However, when Taiwan's po-

⁵⁰"Minnanyu shiti zhengyi, Jianyuan: Bu gongping" (Controversy about exam questions in Taiwanese, Control Yuan: Not fair), *Lianhe bao*, June 9, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed June 9, 2004).

⁵¹"Shiyuan guanyuan zhiyi: guokao shiti jingchuxian Riwen xuanxiang" (Examination Yuan officials questioned: Chinese language exams unexpectedly include Japanese answer in multiple choices), *Lianhe bao*, March 9, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed March 9, 2004). A similar case can be seen with the Catalans of Spain. See Lynn Williams, "National Identity and the Nation State: Construction, Reconstruction, and Contradiction," in *National Identity*, ed. Keith Cameron (Exeter, England: Intellect Books, 1999), 12-14.

⁵²Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, revised edition (London: Verso, 1999), 134-35, 145, 154-62.

⁵³A-chin Hsiao, "Rentong, xushi, yu xingdong: Taiwan 1970 niandai dangwai de lishi jiangou" (Identity, narrative, and action: Taiwanese opposition's historical constructs in the 1970s), *Taiwan shehuixue*, no. 5 (June 2003): 195-250.

litical consciousness and indigenous identity were on the rise, the DPP's world views also shifted. After the 1980s, in the DPP's viewpoint, historical texts had been seriously distorted by the "China-centered" approach and not given full recognition to Taiwanese identity. The "new" history is supposed to place Taiwan at the center and then to extend outward, layer by layer, to other areas for a holistic understanding, as Tu Cheng-sheng's (杜正勝) "concurrent circles" (同心圓, *tongxin yuan*) approach laid out. While the debate centered on how much Chinese culture and history were supposed to be included, issues included the structural layout of the text, the choice of words, and, finally, the defining tone and verdict of historical events. For instance, given limited space and time for instruction, should Taiwanese history be expanded at the expense of Chinese history? In 2003, the controversy over the structure of history texts began because textbook drafters planned to place the mid-Ming dynasty era in world history rather than in the section on Chinese history. Almost instantly, critics charged that a hidden agenda of "de-Sinicization" was embedded in the draft plan and stalled the process of text revision.⁵⁴

Another example concerned the treatment of Japanese colonialism. Should the legacy of Japanese colonialism in Taiwan be wholeheartedly endorsed or critically condemned? Given Lee Teng-hui's adoration of Japan and his world views through the Japanese language venue, this touchy issue had been a focus of contention before 2000. Feelings toward Japan of people who had lived through the era of colonial Taiwan were mixed. To some supporters of Taiwanese independence, Japanese governance was a scale against which to evaluate KMT rule. While the Japanese colonial government was undeniably brutal and oppressive, its neatness and strict social discipline have been highly praised. Such historical nostalgia and the selective memory of "goodness" of Japanese colonialism

⁵⁴Tu Cheng-sheng, *Zouguo guanjian shinian, 1990-2000* (Walk through ten critical years, 1990-2000), vol. 2 (Taipei: Maitian, 2000), 332, 344-46; and Chen Manling, "Jiaobu guanyuan: Gaozhong lishi kecheng wei cai tongxinyuan lun" (Ministry of Education officials stated that high school textbooks did not adopt the concurrent circle theory), *Wenjiao Bao*, part of the *Central Daily News*, April 28, 2004, www.cdn.com.tw (accessed June 14, 2004).

has certainly faced criticism from people who were disgusted by Japanese colonialism and people who fought in the war against Japanese aggression before 1945. When Hsu Wen-lung (許文龍), a well-established Taiwanese businessman who has been a dedicated supporter of independence and has close ties with Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, made a remark about "the glory of being a comfort woman" in February 2001, the friction was exacerbated.

In this context of historical revisionism, it was not a surprise to learn that, in 2002, Chen's government even contemplated the change of Taiwan's national holiday of "*guangfujie*" (光復節, Taiwan's retrocession day), which was adopted to commemorate the victory over Japan in 1945 and Taiwan's return to the ROC, to "*zhongzhanri*" (終戰日, the day ending the war), which carried a neutral tone similar to Japanese expressions devoid of any implication of Japanese aggression.⁵⁵ The rehabilitation of the Japanese image appears to court Japan's support of Taiwan's goal of independence through the colonial linkage and joint fear of China's rise. Also, one would not be surprised by the description of Taiwan as "occupied by ROC forces on behalf of allies" of the Pacific War and annexed by the ROC in the draft of the "Taiwan Decides 2004" pamphlet issued by the Taiwan Foundation for Democracy (台灣民主基金會), a non-profit foundation funded by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 2004, several days prior to the presidential election.⁵⁶ The purpose of this description was to reaffirm that Taiwan had never been under China's sovereignty. In the DPP's view, Taiwan was abandoned, and the KMT took over without approval from the Taiwanese people.

In order to differentiate Taiwan from China, Chen's government also launched a series of changes in agency titles. Previously, such changes had been directed more at external clarification than at domestic consump-

⁵⁵"Guangfuri gai zhongzhanri?" (Change the retrocession day to war-ending day?), October 25, 2002, 222.ettoday.com.tw/2002/10/25/91-1357806.htm (accessed June 14, 2004).

⁵⁶"Guoqing jianjie shouce rulan, Kao Ying-mao rencuo" (A pamphlet for a brief introduction of the country humiliates pan-Blue, Kao Ying-mao admitted that it was a "mistake"), *Lianhe wanbao* (United Evening News), March 17, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed March 17, 2004).

tion because of the concern over strong domestic resistance. In 2003, the Executive Yuan (行政院) approved the removal of "China" from the English names of the China Central Bank (中央銀行) and its China Printing Plant (中央印製局), China Central Trust (中央信託局), and China Central Mint (中央印鑄局).⁵⁷ Although the decision was influenced by practical considerations to distinguish these institutions from their corresponding agencies in the PRC, one could not deny the distinctive correlation with the government's persistent "de-Sinicization" efforts. Once they were accepted abroad without dispute, a request for consistency could be made to facilitate a change in the Chinese titles—a variation of the "*chukou zhuan neixiao*" (出口轉內銷, "import" a previously "exported" domestic agenda) tactic.⁵⁸ The Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (僑務委員會), which had focused on emigrants from Taiwan in recent years, also engaged in debates about dropping "Chinese" from its title to better reflect Taiwan's policy goals. After 2000, these new political choices were not unusual.

Similarly, several changes in titles of government publications were made without arousing much domestic media attention. For example, the annual *Republic of China Yearbook* was renamed *Taiwan Yearbook* in 2003. The *Free China Review*, a monthly magazine published by the Government Information Office (行政院新聞局), was changed in 2000 to *Taipei Review* and again in 2003 to *Taiwan Review*. The same applies to the weekly *Free China Journal*, which traveled the same path of transformation, first to *Taipei Journal* and then to *Taiwan Journal* in 2003. The "Republic of China" quietly stepped out of the scene and "Taiwan" swiftly took center stage.

Name changes were not limited to governmental agencies; non-governmental organizations experienced similar trends. While county or-

⁵⁷ "Tai jigou Yingyu mingcheng quanmian qu-Zhongguohua" (English names of Taiwan's agencies completely de-Sinicized), *Shijie ribao*, October 24, 2003, A1.

⁵⁸ The "*chukou zhuan neixiao*" tactic usually refers to leaking information to a foreign news agency. The foreign news report with "authoritative" remarks then becomes a lead and exerts pressures to begin the deliberation process in domestic society. When a particular domestic agenda was too controversial to be implemented, it could be implemented externally. Its success abroad would then be "imported" back for domestic approval.

ganizations of Taiwan's Boy Scouts decided to delete "China" (中國, *Zhongguo*) from their title, the national scout organization could not follow suit in order to maintain its membership in the world organization of the scout movement. The purpose of the national organization's inaction was to avoid any potential membership dispute with scout organizations in the PRC under the world organization.⁵⁹ The identity problem also extended to the military sphere in naming ships. One TSU legislator aroused a debate by requesting that Taiwanese locality and personal names, rather than places in mainland China and "Chinese" historical figures, be adopted in names of ships. Although the navy decided not to rename old ships in order to avoid a messy battle, it still could not resist the indigenization trend and picked appropriate names of local places for new ships.⁶⁰

Some of these changes were surely not a result of meticulous political decisions. However, when title alteration reaches a critical mass in number, the habitual daily routine breaks down, and consensual patterns of communication and action have to find new means to operate. Furthermore, the law and ethos embodied in the institutional identity also need to be reformulated. Therefore, a full circle has been quietly drawn to connect individual subjectivity with the perceived external environment, the normativity of society, and the intersubjectivity of language.⁶¹ The interpretation of the current "status quo" is also evolving. With the disappearance of China in public image as well as discourse, the status quo is moving to a call for a new Taiwan. Although the process of socialization has accelerated without much coercion, resistance can still be expected.⁶² In this

⁵⁹"Zhongguo Tongzijun" (Chinese Boy Scouts), *Lianhe bao*, December 29, 2003, A11.

⁶⁰"Kangding jian paoda Kangding jian" (*Kangding ship fired on Kangding ship*), *Xin xinwen*, no. 867 (October 16-22, 2003): 46-49. The change of names might be justified in some cases because the PRC also uses Chinese place names and historical figures to name their ships. For example, names such as Kangding (康定), Chengde (承德), and Zheng He (鄭和) have been adopted by both Taiwan and China in naming ships.

⁶¹Habermas, *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, 98-100. In the case of Taiwan, in trends of music (which reflect cultural and linguistic diversity), one can see the formation of identity. See Sylvia Li-chun Lin, "Toward a New Identity: Nativism and Popular Music in Taiwan," *China Information* 17, no. 2 (2003): 83-107.

⁶²Thompson, "The Agony and the Ecstasy," 203.

case, the use of selective incentives is beneficial to convince skeptics and to reassure supporters.

Selective Incentives

Abundant resources and open positions that came along with the change of guard created a swift bandwagon effect after 2000.⁶³ Having mastered the intelligence information activities of his opponents as well as allies through surveillance and wiretapping, Chen is very able to "see without being seen," like the privileged "inspector" scrutinizing prisoners from the central location within the radial configuration of Bentham's *Panopticon*.⁶⁴ His subordinates, supporters, and opponents are all caught up in this asymmetrical power relationship in which they are simply the inferior bearers of power.⁶⁵ As the DPP chairman and the head of the state, he can manipulate the subordinates around him and incapacitate any of his opponent's counter-campaigns.⁶⁶ Opponents have to trail behind and react to his initiative. He has ample resources to personify Han Fei Tzu's (韓非子) *shih* (勢), a self-reinforcing emanation of power and authority over those under him.⁶⁷ The authority to appoint personnel is one crucial

⁶³In Taiwanese dialect, the bandwagon effect in Taiwanese politics is called "xigua wei dabian" (西瓜偎大邊).

⁶⁴Jeremy Bentham, "Panopticon Papers," in *A Bentham Reader*, ed. Mary Peter Mack (New York: Pegasus, 1969), 194-208. For an excellent elaboration of Bentham's *Panopticon*, see Michel Foucault's *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated from the French by Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977), 195-228; Michel Foucault, "Afterword: The Subject and Power," in Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, second edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), 208-26; and David Lyon, *The Electronic Eye: The Rise of Surveillance Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 57-80.

⁶⁵Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 216. Also see Ben F. Barton and Marthalee S. Barton, "Modes of Power in Technical and Professional Visuals," *Journal of Business and Technical Communication* 7, no. 1 (1993): 138-41.

⁶⁶Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 201.

⁶⁷Burton Watson, "Introduction," in *Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings*, translated by Burton Watson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 8. A good introduction to Han Fei Tzu can be found in Gongquan Xiao (Kung-ch'uan Hsiao), *Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi* (Chinese political thought), vol. 1 (Taipei: Chinese Culture University Press, 1980), 231-

tool for his implementation of power.

Although there is no previous data for comparison, an unusually high number (556) of high-level civil servants were reportedly reshuffled for reasons of promotion, relocated horizontally, and demoted during the first year of Chen Shui-bian's governance.⁶⁸ In addition, Chen naturally filled those positions reserved for political appointees with loyal supporters and followers, as a token of appreciation for their contribution and a way of planting seeds for the cause of Taiwan independence. Examples include the nomination of Yao Chia-wen (姚嘉文) for the presidency of the Examination Yuan, the appointment of Chang Fu-mei (張富美) as the chairwoman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, and the selection of Central Election Commission (中央選舉委員會, CEC) members.⁶⁹ Both Yao and Chang have long been known for their Taiwan independence credentials. Chang Fu-mei caused an uproar in 2000 by classifying overseas Chinese into three categories with "Taiwanese" ranking first and "other overseas Chinese" second in the Commission's future service priority. Some members of the Examination Yuan, who have been known for their pro-DPP or pro-independence political inclinations, were later involved in the controversial attempt to include Taiwanese language in civil service exams. Finally, members specifically selected by the Executive Yuan to participate in the CEC tended to show a zealous level of congruency with government policy on election matters. The result was apparent in the 2004 presidential election, when the CEC failed to maintain its integ-

33. The English translation of this book is entitled *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, vol. 1: *From the Beginnings to the Sixth Century, AD*, translated by F.W. Mote (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), 381-93. Also see Suzhen Zhang, *Guojia de zhixu — Han Fei Tzu* (The order of a nation) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1981), 255-68; and Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), 340.

⁶⁸ He Bowen, "Gaoji wenguan 556 ren huan zhiwu" (556 high-level civil servants change positions), *Xin xinwen*, no. 734 (March 29-April 4, 2001): 54-62.

⁶⁹ Lin Xiuquan, "Yao Chia-wen jiusuan guoguan" (Even if Yao Chia-wen passes), *Xin xinwen*, no. 797 (June 13-19, 2002): 28-31; and Li Qingru, "Zhuanfang Qiaoweiwei weiyuanzhang Chang Fu-mei" (Special interview of Chang Fu-mei, the Chairwoman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission), *ibid.*, no. 721 (December 28, 2000-January 3, 2001): 71-73.

city and even-handedness in electoral procedures, and created a series of political controversies prior to the election.

In addition to official appointments and nominations, state-owned enterprises, government-sponsored trust funds, and financial institutions offered opportunities for the DPP's "green fingers" to nurture the party's influence. With its regulatory and licensing authority and its holdings in stocks, the government demanded that the board of governors be restructured to reflect the change of regimes. At a quick glance, it was unmistakably a blunt pursuit of power and wealth, a revelation of the *quid pro quo* of political support and economic reward, and a strategic positioning of their "own" people to secure and guard vital resources from opposition parties. After all, the loss of the election implies not only the loss of governance, but also the loss of the control of the interpretation and manipulation of the social ethos. Therefore, regime change meant substantial changes everywhere—being "green" in ideological inclination mattered greatly.⁷⁰

The mass media became another crucial area for cultural transformation. Unsurprisingly, pro-Green figures would be logical choices to place in charge of major TV networks, in which the government has a lion's share of the investment. Once placed in charge, such figures need no specific or detailed guidelines. The authority of hiring and promoting personnel becomes a legitimate tool to ensure that subordinates expedite the transmission of political messages. Abundant resources originally intended to propagate policy and to facilitate its implementation in budgetary design were shifted subtly for self-promotion in the name of public education. The control of public media was an intrusion into the public sphere. Publicized cases include the wrestling between pro-Green and pro-Blue forces in the selection of board members for the Taiwan Television (TTV, 2000) and the Public Television Station (2001).⁷¹

⁷⁰ Huang Baixue, "Bianxi renma luxu jinzhū jieshou xingzheng ziyuan" (Bian's own people continuously moved in to take over executive resources), *Xin xinwen*, no. 727 (February 8-14, 2001): 20-23.

⁷¹ The TTV case in 2000 involved the choice of actress Chiang Hsia (江霞), an openly

Underground (unlicensed) radio stations, particularly those in southern Taiwan, are another example. Since most of these radio stations are usually perceived to be pro-DPP and to support the cause of Taiwan independence, they became a fantastic tool for public education and political manipulation. They seldom scrutinize their sources and frequently make sensational, outrageous remarks without any fear of legal penalties or any serious attention to journalistic ethics. For instance, the assassination attempt against Chen on March 19, 2004, was immediately denounced as a conspiracy of the pan-Blue coalition, without further verification or clarification, by underground radio stations. Some stations even claimed that the failed assassination attempt was a testimony to Chen Shui-bian's mandate of heaven to govern for another four years.⁷² A crackdown on these stations would be politically unwise and strategically suicidal because of their broad influence among listeners. Moreover, the DPP government did not enforce laws to prohibit them because of their pan-Green inclination. Lee Teng-hui even pledged to find ways to "legalize" them.⁷²

Chen's government and the DPP were also good at spreading "happiness" by hosting carnivals in different places and relocating entertainments and festivals from northern Taiwan to southern Taiwan. While the government's justification was that it was redressing regional inequalities, such acts could be seen as rewards to Chen Shui-bian's loyal supporters in the south. Large-scale ceremonies also served as an opportunity to mobilize participants and followers. They were also a cost-effective hookup between leaders and supporters.

In almost every pro-pan-Green media commentator's references to the new regime after 2000 and at events hosted by the DPP or the government, the hidden subtext has been that happy times and widespread freedom descended upon society at the moment the DPP stepped onto the

pro-Green supporter, and Lai Kuo-chou (賴國洲), Lee Teng-hui's son-in-law, to sit on the board of trustees. In the Public Television Station case in 2001, the selection of board members was intertwined with political fighting.

⁷²Xinwenju: Dixia diantai ruo jiudi hefa tiandi burong" (Government Information Office: Immediate legalization of unlicensed radio stations cannot be permitted), *Lianhe bao*, June 10, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed June 10, 2004).

stage of governance, in contrast to the KMT's suppressive, dogmatic control and the depressing life before then. The style and tone of these comments greatly resemble the ceremonial routine of "*yiku sitian*" (憶苦思甜; recollect the bitter memory [of the pre-1949 KMT past] and think of [the post-1949] "sweet" life [created by the Chinese Communist Party]) during the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s. In Taiwan's case, it was a recollection of suppression prior to the change of center in the 2000 presidential election and the arrival of happy days when the DPP took over after the election.

Contested Framing: Resistance and Opposition

The endeavor to engrave a new national identity is not straightforward and will be contested by opponents fighting to uphold their own version of reality. Against symbolic and ritual revision, there have been attempts to negate the reconstruction of new hegemonic ideas.⁷³ The center of resistance resides in the opposition parties. The pan-Blue coalition has repeatedly adhered to the "1992 consensus" (九二共識), i.e., "one China, with each side [of the Taiwan Strait] making its own interpretation" (一個中國，各自表述, *yige Zhongguo, gezi biaooshu*).⁷⁴ An extension of the 1992 consensus is an implication of the acceptance of "one China, two systems" with a possible reunification of Taiwan and China in the future. The pan-Blue coalition argues that "one China" surely does not mean the People's Republic of China (PRC) with Taiwan as part of it.

⁷³Literature on this can be found in Robert D. Benford and David A. Snow, "Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment," *Annual Review of Sociology* 26 (2000): 625-27; and James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985).

⁷⁴Ying-jeou Ma, "Cross-Strait Relations at a Crossroad: Impasse or Breakthrough?" and Xu Shiquan, "The 1992 Consensus: A Review and Assessment of Consultations between the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait and the Straits Exchange Foundation," in *Breaking the China-Taiwan Impasse*, ed. Donald S. Zagoria (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2003), 43-45, 58, 81-101.



However, "ROC" has unmistakably lost its absolute claim on the name recognition of "China" in international relations since the PRC engaged with the world in the early 1970s. Either because of broad recognition of the PRC in diplomatic circles and international interaction or because of Taiwan's intentional or unintentional withdrawal of the usage of "China" in international society, the notion of "China" has been assumed by the PRC in common reference. At the same time, China's persistent refusal to allow Taiwan to participate as a state in any international organization is also grist to the independence mill. For example, China's refusal to let the World Health Organization (WHO) have official contacts with Taiwan during the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the spring of 2003 reminded the Taiwanese people of the risks of reunification with the Chinese communist regime and offered the DPP an opportunity to propose a referendum on Taiwan's accession to the WHO to demonstrate the necessity of Taiwan's independent statehood.

Within the pan-Blue coalition, there are disputes on the question of relations with China. The "indigenous faction" (pro-Taiwanese identity) established within the KMT during the Lee Teng-hui era is in favor of the historical and political reality of the separation of Taiwan from China. Although its guardian angel, Lee Teng-hui, has left the KMT, the "indigenous faction" implicitly supported by Wang Jin-ping (王金平), a heavyweight player within the KMT and the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan (立法院), is crucial to keeping the "pro-Taiwan" votes of the KMT. However, the PFP within the coalition has been branded a "mainlander" party by the pan-Green coalition and still supports possible future reunification with China and the maintenance of a China-centered cultural value system.⁷⁵ Such disputes on Taiwan's future have put the pan-Blue coalition in an awkward position every time the DPP has shifted its campaign focus to

⁷⁵The classification of the PFP as a "mainlander" party may not be a correct description. The PFP has a respective ratio of 3:7 and 4:6 of mainlanders and Taiwanese in general membership and party officials each. The data is publicized in an interview with the PFP legislator, Li Yong-ping (李永萍). See *Xin xinwen*, no. 787 (April 4-10, 2002): 100. The misperception is deep-rooted. See Chen Roujin, "Qinmindang de shengji maodun" (The PFP's ethnic irony), *ibid.*, no. 783 (March 7-13, 2002): 37.

questions of identity and constitutional revisions for the independence cause. Unlike the DPP, which has consistently demanded Taiwan independence, the pan-Blue coalition has tried to have both a pro-Taiwanese discourse and an advocacy of rapprochement with China. This dual message gave an impression of confusion to unsophisticated voters.⁷⁶ Pounded by Chen's aggressive electioneering strategy, Lien Chan and the pan-Blue coalition trailed in agenda-setting and lacked a powerful identity discourse to circumvent Chen's constant attacks.

Consequently, the pan-Blue coalition faced difficulties challenging the DPP's pro-independence discourse. For example, a survey publicized by the Mainland Affairs Council (大陸事務委員會) in March 2001 showed a 16.1 percent approval of "one country, two systems" (一國兩制). This was followed by an astonishing level of support in various surveys conducted by TVBS (31 percent), the *China Times* (29 percent), and the *United Daily News* (33 percent) in June 2001. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Mainland Affairs Council demonstrated unusual efficiency the following month in putting out the fire by releasing new survey findings to challenge the media's imprecise and misleading survey questions and by ascertaining that the proposal of "one country, two systems" had lost its appeal in Taiwan's political market.⁷⁷ Moreover, the near collapse of the New Party (新黨), which was perceived as the strong supporter of "one country, two systems," in the legislative election in late 2001 cast doubts on the sustainability of the abrupt surge of support for "one country, two systems" in mid-2001.

The demise of "one country, two systems" paved the way for a new interpretation of the status quo, and the DPP now held the interpretative authority. For instance, without the sanction of the DPP, pragmatic solutions to cross-Strait relations such as the KMT's proposal for confederation (邦聯, *banglian*) and the PFP's "Euro-model" (歐盟模式, *Oumeng moshi*)

⁷⁶Frank Muyard, "Taiwan, the Birth of a Nation?" *China Perspectives*, no. 53 (May-June 2004): 39.

⁷⁷Huang Zhida, "Yiguo liangzhi mindiao po sancheng" ("One country, two systems" opinion surveys exceed 30 percent), *Xin xinwen*, no. 750 (July 19-25, 2001): 56-60.

were shelved in fear that they might be stamped as "pro-unification" conspiracies by pan-Green supporters. Ironically, the "Euro-model," once cursed by the DPP, was part of Chen Shui-bian's olive branch to China in his inaugural speech in 2004. When Chen proposed the idea originally conceived by the pan-Blue coalition, pan-Green supporters and the DPP praised his thinking.

The loss of initiative and interpretative authority in defining cross-Strait relations put the pan-Blue coalition in a precarious situation. Feeling that Chen Shui-bian might be wearing his support for Taiwan independence on his sleeve to gain political advantage, the pan-Blue coalition, in the end, had no other choice but to announce "[I]f you put it as simply as each side has one country, there should be no problem"—a departure from the pan-Blue's long-term stand on the "one China" policy—to regain initiative amid the heated election campaign in late 2003.⁷⁸ Whether one calls Lien's policy shift a "flip-flop," "U-turn," or "parroting," Chen Shui-bian's political engineering paid off, and no major parties in Taiwan now dare to be openly pro-unification. Even the connotation of the term "status quo" in cross-Strait relations has been reinterpreted to imply the existence of two states, and the pan-Blue coalition does not rule out Taiwanese independence as one of the available future policy options, as the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-ping, subsequently elaborated in late 2003.⁷⁹ The pan-Blue coalition apparently failed to pose a serious challenge to the DPP's interpretative authority in political discourse.

The battle was also fought over the issue of language instruction and the rewriting of history. Here the resistance was conducted by professionals in cultural enterprises and the educational community. The stress on Taiwanese language/dialect presented opportunities. It allowed the newly emerging Taiwanese national identity to be engrained and spread in popular literature and mass culture. Nevertheless, language-

⁷⁸"Sibu yi meiyou shi nuyan beixi" (Five no's are servile), *Zhongguo shibao*, December 22, 2003, A4; and "Taiwanese Party Reverses Position on China," *Asian Wall Street Journal*, December 22, 2003, A3.

⁷⁹See note 34 above.

learning involves one's linguistic capability and loyalties formulated by past socialization. Reluctance to abandon one's familiar language to assimilate Taiwanese was understandable. Whatever the government tries to incorporate Taiwanese language into the official realm, Chinese Mandarin remains "inscrutable" just as the inscrutability of Taiwanese persisted amid the ardent push for Mandarin in public education during the KMT regime.⁸⁰ Accordingly, far from being politics-free in meaning and in practice, the indigenization drive in language and history tried in the beginning to replace previous ideological investment imposed by the KMT with the "liberalization" of local tradition and cultures, and in the end to reconstruct historical narratives and conclusions to fit the political blueprints. Once Chen and the DPP won the 2000 presidential election, their nation-building policy became officially associated with their vision of Taiwan's identity.

To some critics, the DPP's unwavering stand on Taiwan's independence was primarily a reflection of its belief that Taiwan was and is a separate homogeneous ethnic nation-state. The reality was that the "de-linking" of Taiwan from the cultural China, an attempt at de-Sinicization, was a moot point. The influence of Chinese culture in Taiwan was not imaginative, but real and widespread.⁸¹ Stated differently, Taiwanese nativist ethnic sentiment was more a reaction to the *political* repression that characterized KMT rule rather than any pristine notion of Taiwanese identity, as Allen Chun observed.⁸² Otherwise, how could one convincingly explain why the DPP had not easily grasped power in a population composed of more than 75 percent ethnic Taiwanese before 2000? Whatever answer is offered, there were political motivations behind the movement to

⁸⁰ Allen J. Chun, "The Culture Industry as National Enterprise: The Politics of Heritage in Contemporary Taiwan," in *From Beijing to Port Moresby: The Politics of National Identity in Cultural Policies*, ed. Virginia R. Dominguez and David Y.H. Wu (Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Gordon and Breach, 1998), 77-113.

⁸¹ For a debate about the KMT's cultural policy and national identity, see *ibid.*; David Y.H. Wu, "Invention of Taiwanese: A Second Look at Taiwan's Cultural Policy and National Identity," *ibid.*, 115-32; and Allen J. Chun, "Rejoinder to Second Look," *ibid.*, 133-37.

⁸² Chun, "The Culture Industry as National Enterprise," 102.

create a "natural" and "distinctive" Taiwanese identity completely separate from Chinese culture.

To other critics, when Chen and the DPP took over the switchboard of communication, the presidential palace, and the authority of personnel appointment, they fell prey to the same fallacy of the KMT's monolithic China-centered view of culture, though in a more subtle way. To stretch the point even further, the need for political expediency unnecessarily threw the baby out with the bathwater by denying traces of Chinese culture in the construction of a native Taiwanese collective identity. Resistance and opposition were consequently expressed by educators, who were concerned with the vacillation on educational policy, the complexity of curriculum design, and the revision of textbook contents. The political controversy and turmoil consumed most of the time and energy of the Minister of Education, Ovid J.L. Tzeng (曾志朗), who decided to stand firm on his policy regarding the *hanyu pinyin* system against the government's wish. He faced criticism and pressure to be removed from office from pan-Green intellectual circles, and stepped down eighteen months into his political career.⁸³ Even Lee Teng-hui has complained fiercely that the Ministry of Education should take part of the blame for the incomplete formation of Taiwan's new identity.⁸⁴

The business community became the third source of resistance to the indigenization drive. Unlike educators, who concentrated on the unnatural manipulation of culture, and politicians, who worried about political ramifications of the indigenization trend, the business community had qualms about the financial impact of the acceleration of Taiwan independence through the construct of "Taiwanese identity." To some businessmen, like Wang Yung-ching (王永慶), Taiwan's business tycoon and founder of Formosa Plastics (台塑集團), who had their eyes on China's economic potential and market forces, the gradual approach to Taiwan's independence

⁸³Chen Jingyun, "Ovid J.L. Tzeng yinyan guhuo" (Ovid J.L. Tzeng invited misfortune as a result of his statements), *Xin xinwen*, no. 777 (January 24-30, 2002): 36-37.

⁸⁴"Lee Teng-hui: Taiwanren dang buzhang, mei zuohao jiaogai" (Lee Teng-hui: Taiwanese ministers failed to complete educational reforms), *Shijie ribao*, May 23, 2004, A6.

drive and the conservative style of Taiwan's cross-Strait policy were a hindrance to Taiwan's economic development. The political stalemate virtually obstructed the comparative advantages of trade, mutual gains from the division of labor, and complementary and multiplying effects in different economic sectors. In fact, in their views, the Chen government's conviction in the eventual realization of Taiwan's identity and independence brushed aside the usual "win-win" logic of liberalism. Even if Chen and his supporters frequently reminded people of security threats from trade with potential adversaries like China, the harsh reality was that China's role in Taiwan's trade and investment remained indisputable and inevitable.⁸⁵

Furthermore, China's enviable economic growth seems unstoppable. Its image as the workshop of the world appears attractive to the business community. So, why not let Taiwanese enterprises make the quick, first move to grab the advantage in China? As the first to the field, Taiwanese businesses might get better terms in the market than latecomers.⁸⁶ Moreover, Taiwanese business expansion and penetration into China's market could generate a vigorous civil society that would pressure political reforms there.

⁸⁵ Simply take the example of cross-Strait transit trade via Hong Kong. The estimated value increased from US\$11.57 billion in 2000 to US\$13.95 billion at the end of 2003, an increase of 20 percent. During the same period, Taiwan's imports from China increased only 1 percent, in contrast to a 22 percent increase of Taiwan's exports to China. The closeness of cross-Strait economic interaction is further testified to by Taiwanese investments in China. See Mainland Affairs Council, "Table 2, Transit Trade between Taiwan and Mainland China via Hong Kong," no. 137 (January 2004), www.chinabiz.org.tw/maz/Eco-Month/home.htm (accessed June 9, 2004); and "Renqing liang'an jingmao guanxi benzhi, bimian wudao jueze" (Understand clearly the basic characteristics of cross-Strait economic and trade relations to avoid misguided decisions), *Jingji ribao* (Economic Daily), June 10, 2004, www.udn.com (accessed June 10, 2004). For an analysis of cross-Strait relations, see David Brown, "China-Taiwan Relations: Election Drama and Implications," *Comparative Connections* 6, no. 1 (April 2004): 80-81; and Wei-chin Lee, "The Buck Starts Here: Cross-Strait Economic Transactions and Taiwan's Domestic Politics," *American Asian Review* 21, no. 3 (Fall 2003): 107-52.

⁸⁶ Similar arguments of first movers in institutional design can be found in Robert O. Keohane, "Governance in a Partially Globalized World, Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 2000," *American Political Science Review* 95, no. 1 (March 2001): 5-6.

Accordingly, Wang Yung-ching, for instance, expressed doubts about the persistent movement of Taiwanese identity construction. The process for the creation of a "new" state identity restrained Taiwanese companies' competitiveness in the China market. In addition to official limits on investment in China, business people have to endure a political inquiry into their reasons for investment and public scrutiny of their political loyalty. The omnipresence of identity politics makes all businesses involved in the China market suspect of betraying Taiwan's noble cause of independence. A simple pursuit of happiness carries a heavy political burden of loyalty and patriotism. This is why Wang Yung-ching complained that all these debates and policies regarding Taiwan's identity and independence were self-inflicted wounds over nothing of substantial importance to Taiwan's future economic development.⁸⁷

There are business owners, such as the chairman of I-mei Foods (義美食品), who deeply believe in the cause of Taiwan's unique identity. Nevertheless, even for those politically "green" Taiwanese enterprises, such as the Evergreen Group (長榮集團) and the Chimei Group (奇美集團), any ventures in China encounter unpleasant political speculations on their "patriotism." Evergreen Group Chairman Chang Yung-fa (張榮發) was a staunch backer of the DPP and Chen Shui-bian in the 2000 presidential election. However, the relationship turned sour and tense in late 2003, when Chang criticized Chen for his primary focus on electoral victory without much strategic planning for Taiwan's long-term economic performance. The DPP slammed back with an accusation that Evergreen's criticism was based on its business interests in China.⁸⁸ By advocating the separation of politics and economics, Chimei Group's Hsu Wen-lung justified his business expansion in China and calls for direct cross-Strait

⁸⁷Wang's comment was "*chibao meishi zuo*" (吃飽沒事做, well-fed and trying to find something to entertain oneself). See a roundtable discussion in the Taipei Center for Journalists (台北記者中心) on "*Jiexi quanmin gongtou yu gehou xuanzhan*" (Analysis of public referendum and cut-throat election campaigning), compiled by Chen Yawen et al., February 23, 2004, <http://www.ct.org.tw/new/009.htm> (accessed June 6, 2004).

⁸⁸See "Qiu Yiren: dui'an butanpan, nanyou jinzhàn" (Qiu Yiren: Difficult to move forward when China refuses to negotiate), *Shijie ribao*, November 6, 2003, A4.

linkages. Even so, critics doubt if Hsu realized that direct linkages may pose difficulties for the realization of Taiwan independence.⁸⁹ Adam Smith's invisible hand transplanted to Taiwan's context became "colored" with identity politics.

"We vs. They": Identity, Ethnicity, and Politics

Identity offers a common marking of a person as an individual and as a part of a community. Any identification, such as the singing of national anthems, transmits an important message to allow an individual to have a more secure sense of self-respect, dignity, and confidence in relation to others, and social belonging. As Anderson observed, when singing in unison, even the banal words and mediocre tunes of national anthems still instigate a sense of oneness and create a common experience of association with people utterly unknown to one another.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, the rise of an institutional bond offers a convenient tool for political mobilization, particularly in election campaigning. Group identity and group interests tend to reinforce each other in a democratic society.⁹¹

In Taiwan's case, the demand for a redistribution of resources and authority to "right the wrongs" of the past, mixed with ethnocentric beliefs, easily allows mass followers to find a sharp contrast between *us* and *them*. Whatever *they* have done in the past is usually condemned in big brush strokes, and whatever *we* have advocated carries virtuous qualities. Once these beliefs are internalized to become second nature and hardened over time, it becomes easy to distinguish friends and foes in mass mobilizations.⁹²

⁸⁹"Shi yu Hsu Wen-lung xiansheng yiqi fanxing liang'an guanxi yu shehui wenhua" (An attempt to join with Mr. Hsu Wen-lung to reflect cross-Strait relations and social culture), *Lianhe bao*, June 9, 2004, www.udn.edu (accessed June 9, 2004).

⁹⁰Anderson, *Imagined Communities*, 145.

⁹¹Amy Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003), 15.

⁹²Dennis Chong, *Rational Lives: Norms and Values in Politics and Society* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 87-90.

The singular injection of ethnicity into politics not only invites puzzles and complexity in individual identity but also creates an additional dimension in political debates and policy evaluation.⁹³

The result of the 2004 presidential election appeared to vindicate the transformation of the Taiwan-centered discourse and social construct that Chen and the DPP had striven for in the previous four years. Any critical assessment of the ruling party's policy performance, without the weighted input of ethnicity and identity, would easily lead one to draw a negative conclusion about the government's performance. Yet, at least half of the voters in the 2004 presidential election appeared to be satisfied with the dignity and promises of Taiwan's raised national/state identity and the political vision that Chen and the DPP offered and pledged to pursue. Many were willing to turn their eyes away when debates hovered around Chen's political integrity and errors in governance. To them, poor policy performance and administration were too negligible or minor in comparison with the elevated status of Taiwan's national identity.⁹⁴ Since he

⁹³For example, for people with a strong Taiwanese indigenouness, Ang Lee's (李安) Academy Award for *Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon* (臥虎藏龍) deserves no spectacular excitement because it was made in China and the story line does not reflect much of Taiwan's identity per se. On the other hand, for Chinese nationalistic chauvinists, Ang Lee grew up in Taiwan and lives in New York. He is an overseas Chinese, not a "real" Chinese. In the end, Ang Lee's "mainlander" background faces discrimination from indigenous Taiwanese, and his Taiwanese affiliation encountered resistance from extreme "nationalistic" Chinese. The complexity of identity politics also appeared in the case of Lin Yifu (林毅夫), a Taiwanese who defected to China when he served as captain in the military on Jinmen Island (金門島) in 1979. Later, Lin became Premier Zhu Rongji's (朱鎔基) economic adviser. In 2002, the passing away of his mother ignited a debate over legality and identity between different agencies and political parties in Taiwan during deliberations on whether or not the government should allow him to return to Taiwan to attend the funeral service. Lin's final decision was not to return. One recent debate on individual identity is the case of Taiwanese pop diva Chang Hui-mei (張惠妹; better known as A-mei). Chang's aboriginal background should give the most legitimate grounds for claiming to be an "indigenous Taiwanese," but she faced criticism from both Taiwan and China after her 2004 concert performance in Beijing.

⁹⁴For example, Yan Juan would argue that the rise in self-confidence and dignity offered by Chen actually surpassed those policy deficiencies and mistakes. See Yan Juan, "Shang-tong jiaoliu, chaoyue shengfu" (Exchange pain and distress, surpass winning and losing), *Zhongguo shibao*, March 22, 2004, www.chinatimes.com (accessed March 23, 2004); and Yan Juan, "Ai yu wuru de xianzheng jingshen fenxi" (The analysis of constitutional spirit in terms of love and humiliation), *ibid.*, April 19, 2004, www.chinatimes.com (accessed April 19, 2004).

received 10 percent more votes than he did in 2000, Chen's excessive use of the issue of Taiwan's identity was probably one of the key factors in generating an extreme effect of mobilization. If so, the pan-Blue coalition will have to find a counter-discourse and a niche in order to recapture the hearts and minds of voters.

Unlike the violent and radical Cultural Revolution in China, Taiwan's cultural "revolution" was surely gradual and mild in reframing identity. The risk remains the use of ethnicity in building national identity. Although "mainlander" is a stigma confined to those who came to Taiwan after the end of the Chinese civil war, more and more "mainlander" descendants continue to be born in Taiwan. Given the increasingly significant level of interaction and intermarriage between ethnicities and nationalities in recent decades, it is difficult to establish an unmistakable cleavage in the representation of political interests.⁹⁵

Consequently, the construction of a new "Taiwanese" identity based purely on "bloodlines," if we use the terminology of the Cultural Revolution, will have to be revised. Indeed, as Wang Fu-chang's (王甫昌) findings demonstrate, different degrees of ethnic political consciousness among Taiwan's ethnic groups are a result more of political mobilization than of a simple reliance on objective ethnic background.⁹⁶ This means that overplaying ethnicity in identity politics may impede civic equality by promoting negative stereotypes of opponents. In the end, a strong self-righteous attitude of the ethnic majority endangers the fundamental values of toler-

⁹⁵ Intermarriage with a spouse of foreign nationality (including the PRC) accounted for 15.69 percent of all marriages conducted in 1998 and has increased to 32.14 percent in 2003. At the same time, the fertility rate of foreign spouse couples (including spouse from the PRC) jumped from 5.12 percent in 1998 to 13.37 percent in 2003, while the fertility rate of Taiwanese couples experienced a drop of 8.25 percentage points during the same period. See "Hunxueer jiangcheng Taiwan xin zhurenweng" (Hybrid kids will be Taiwan's new masters), *Shijie ribao*, May 23, 2004, A6. A good case study of the ethnic harmony in social and marital interaction is Wu Naiteh, "Rentong chongtu he zhengzhi xinren: xian-jieduan Taiwan zuqun zhengzhi de hexin nanti" (Identity confrontation and political trust: core difficulty of ethnic politics in Taiwan at the present stage), *Taiwan shehuixue*, no. 4 (December 2002): 94, 112-16.

⁹⁶ Wang, "Zuqun jiechu jihui? Haishi zuqun jingzheng?" 11-74.

ance, respect of the minority view, and rights in democratic procedure.⁹⁷

In other words, when a "regulated society" *à la* Gramsci—a society that regulates from below rather than one that is completely regulated from above—is created through mass conversion and confirmation, the political authority that initiates the cultural changes will eventually feel increasing pressures from below as the surrounding environment evolves into a new stage, as another new or revised "old" discourse could emerge to challenge the newly established hegemonic view.⁹⁸ In this case, it is difficult to claim that the completion of one discourse surely supercedes or replaces the other discourse completely. The end result of the 2004 presidential election demonstrates the tug of war between two discourses—one for and one against Taiwan independence. The pan-Blue supporters' protests in Taipei, in contrast to the pan-Green's low-key quietness and reluctance in social movements, to some extent demonstrate that the pan-Green has not completely overturned the essence of the "hegemon-subordinate" relationship cultivated by the past. Any new national identity must amass supporters and converts to cherish their beliefs.

Combining democratic procedures and the constant framing of a single litmus test of "Taiwanese identity" without addressing the essence of democracy in terms of tolerance of and respect for minorities could create problems similar to those encountered in a theocracy, where religious dogmatism has gained hegemony. One could conclude, then, that Taiwan's democratization has only reached the half-way point, and the precious value of rational and reasonable dialogue to any democratic society has been handicapped by an over-simplification of identity politics.

Taiwan's identity politics have generated its cross-Strait implications. In order to fulfill its goal of unification, the PRC's dogmatic insistence on its representation of the whole of China has born fruits, gaining the recognition that it has longed for. At the same time, however, the PRC's in-

⁹⁷ Gutmann, *Identity in Democracy*, 7. Taiwan's effort to shift from ethnic nation-building to civic conceptions of national identity in recent years can be found in Joseph Wong, "Deepening Democracy in Taiwan," *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 2 (2003): 254-55.

⁹⁸ Germino, *Antonio Gramsci*, 257-58.

sistence on its sole representation of China has excluded the Taiwanese people, regardless of their political imagination or nationalistic wishes, from the cultural and political boundaries of the "Chinese" in the eyes of the international community, although China might deny such an occurrence. The anticipated dissipation of shared cultural traits between Taiwanese and Chinese and the end of Taiwan's "Chinese" frame of reference will push Taiwan further away from China. The exacerbation of cross-Strait relations is sure to follow.

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