

Obstacles to Integration: What Would It Take to Reconcile People on the Two Sides of the Taiwan Strait?*

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Cross-Strait relations are at a crossroads, and there may be a peaceful way out: a hybrid of federation and confederation. However, such an association, or any other kind of integration, is faced with obstacles such as the difficulty for people to cross (sub)cultural boundaries in order to overcome their prejudices and discriminatory attitudes, and the difficulty of reconciling political realism on the one hand and cosmopolitanism and

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idealism on the other. This paper examines these obstacles. While discussing them, it analyzes the political, economic, and cultural forces that together affect the direction of future cross-Strait relations. The paper points out that ultimately the future depends on both sides' efforts and ability to negotiate their differences and find a balance between individuality and humanity. It is not going to be easy. In its examination of these issues, the paper uses the historical-comparative method, supported by textual analysis of policy statements of the parties involved.

KEYWORDS: cross-Strait relations; cultures; realism; idealism; cosmopolitanism.

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Relations between mainland China and Taiwan are at a crossroads.¹ On the one hand, the independence movement in Taiwan is increasing in strength, as can be seen by the victory—though not a landslide victory—of the pro-independence forces in the 2004 presidential election.² It can also be seen in the large-scale protest against China's Anti-Secession Law (反分裂法) in March 2005, and the decision by the Taiwan government to abolish the National Unification Council (NUC, 國家統一委員會) and the Guidelines for National Unification (國家統一綱領) in February 2006.³ By doing the latter, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has eliminated one of the symbols of Taipei's political links with Beijing. Of his original five pledges of "*si bu yi meiyou*" (四不一沒有, four no's and one will-not) only "four no's" remain, and they continue to exist mainly on paper and in words.⁴ Taiwan is moving farther and

¹To neutralize the connotations of these terms, I will use "China," "mainland China," and "the People's Republic of China" (PRC) interchangeably, and likewise with "Taiwan" and "the Republic of China" (ROC). Whichever term is used, it refers to a political entity that shares some historical and cultural traits with the other but also differs from it in its current political system.

²The victory was narrow, but support for the independence movement had grown substantially since Chen first came to power six years previously, and it still seems to be growing.

³The United States wants to appear to believe that the National Unification Council is only suspended, but practically everyone else believes that abolishment would be a more accurate description even though the formal document says that the NUC only "ceases to function."

⁴When Chen was elected president in 2000 and reelected in 2004, he pledged that his government would not do the following: (1) declare independence; (2) change the name of the

farther away from China. The successive visits to the mainland by Lien Chan (連戰), James Soong (宋楚瑜), and Yu Mu-ming (郁慕明), the opposition party leaders, in the spring and summer of 2005, seem to have brought Taiwan a little closer to the mainland again, but the effects of those visits are still barely visible in Taiwan. It is not clear whether the economic and trade forum jointly sponsored by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨) in Beijing in April 2006 will do much to check the independence movement.

On the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the mainland Chinese government's will to unify China has not slackened at all. It is true that China promises to resolve the issue through peaceful means, as declared by President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) in March 2005 and as stated in the Anti-Secession Law passed by the National People's Congress (NPC, 全國人民代表大會) immediately after.⁵ However, the Chinese government has also warned that it will use "non-peaceful means" if Taiwan legally breaks away from China. In the case of a war across the Taiwan Strait, there has even been talk of using nuclear weapons against the United States if the American military intervenes.⁶ In other words, the will to become an independent

country; (3) change the constitution to state that there is one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait; (4) push for a referendum to change the status quo; and (5) abolish the Guidelines for National Unification with mainland China. Hence "*si bu yi meiyou*," or "four no's" and one "will-not." He restated these principles in his meeting with James Soong, chairman of the People First Party (親民黨), in February 2005. For the agreement between Chen and Soong, see *Ziyou shibao* (自由時報, Liberty Times), February 25, 2005, <http://libertytimes.com/>. However, the Taiwanese government's policy seems to be to encourage the growth of the independence movement while not formally declaring independence until the time is ripe to do so. For this point, see an interview with the then Premier Hsieh Chang-ting (謝長廷, Frank Hsieh) by Zou Jing-wen and Wang Bei-lin, "Zhonghua minguo yi Taiwanhua" (The ROC is Taiwanized), *Ziyou shibao*, February 14, 2005, <http://libertytimes.com/>. Hsieh stated that he would like social organizations to do the "de-Sinicization" work and the government to follow when it is able.

⁵For the text of Hu's speech, see *Lianhe bao* (聯合報, United Daily News), March 5, 2005, <http://udn.com>.

⁶See Joseph Kahn, "Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs If U.S. Intrudes," *New York Times*, July 15, 2005. See also Baohui Zhang, "Nuclear Weapons and Strategic Stability in U.S.-China Relations" (Paper presented at the international symposium on "Globalization and the Opportunities and Challenges Facing China's Foreign Policymaking," Nanchang, Jiangxi Province, China, June 6-10, 2005). This paper analyzes the usefulness of changing China's policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. On July 22, 2005, Li Zhaoxing (李肇星), China's foreign minister, reaffirmed China's "no first use" nuclear policy. See "China

country on the part of many Taiwanese and the will to unify China by all means necessary on the part of the mainland Chinese are equally strong despite occasional acts of apparent reconciliation.⁷

What, then, can be done to avoid a conflict escalating into war? Is there a way out for the relationship between the mainland and Taiwan? If there is a way out in the form of a certain kind of association between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, what difficulties might such a compromise encounter? This paper will first briefly discuss a possible solution to the cross-Strait conflict. The following two main sections will focus on the difficulties, which are the main subject of this research. First, I will discuss the difficulty of crossing cultural boundaries, especially in terms of overcoming prejudices and discriminatory attitudes. I will then discuss the difficulty of achieving a compromise between political realism on the one hand and cosmopolitanism and idealism on the other.

The chief method I use in this paper is historical-comparative. I consider the important impact of historical forces and cultural and socio-economic factors on a nation's behavior and compare their influence on the major parties involved, that is, mainland China and Taiwan.⁸ My arguments will be supported by some textual analysis of their policy docu-

Affirms 'No First Use' Nuke Policy," *China Daily*, July 23, 2005, http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-07/22/content_462350.htm.

⁷In addition to restating the "*si bu yi meiyou*," another example of reconciliation is the use of the term "Zhonggong" (中共, Chinese Communists) by President Chen in his six-point response to the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005. This is a term that harks back to the Chinese civil war, and therefore the possibility of unification. The use of "Zhongguo" (中國, China) instead would imply that mainland China is a separate state and that independence is a possibility. See *Lianhe bao*, March 17, 2005, <http://udn.com>. The Chen administration has even flirted with the idea of "one China, two interpretations," or the so-called "92 consensus" (九二共識), when it talked about the Hong Kong model, another way of talking about the "92 consensus." This is the idea of putting aside political differences (the PRC vs. the ROC, implying there is one China of some kind) and focusing on economic cooperation. However, such gestures of reconciliation have been short-lived. Chen has mainly followed the policy of "one state on each side" (海峽兩岸一邊一國). In a 2005 speech at a rally to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (台灣團結聯盟), for example, Chen said that he is firmly against the idea of "one China" and will protect Taiwan's sovereignty at all times. See *Ziyou shibao*, August 7, 2005, <http://libertytimes.com/>.

⁸The United States is another important player in cross-Strait relations. However, limitations of space forbid detailed discussion of the U.S. factor here, although I will occasionally mention the United States when it is necessary for the purpose of my analysis.

ments and government statements.

A Hybrid of Federation and Confederation: A Possible Way Out for Future Cross-Strait Relations

In academic discussions of the disputes between Taiwan and mainland China, one idea that has repeatedly emerged is that of a federation or confederation, or rather, a hybrid of federation and confederation (HFC). This paper will use this hybrid as an example of a way to achieve reconciliation in this section, and the obstacles to this form of integration will be discussed later.

He Baogang (何包鋼), for example, believes that in these days of "overlapping identities, multiple citizenships, shared boundaries, and a shared economic destiny," it should be possible for both sides to share sovereignty in a political arrangement similar to that of the European Union.⁹ Paltiel also points out that there are many possibilities in an association between the two, where Taipei can recognize there is only one China and Beijing can acknowledge the ROC as a legitimate government.¹⁰ In such an association, Taiwan will not be relegated to the status of a local government and will maintain its political and cultural identity, while mainland China will also benefit from Taiwan's participation in building a greater China, politically, culturally, and socially. Other theorists and political activists also entertain similar ideas.¹¹

⁹He Baogang, "The Question of Sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait: Re-examining Peking's Policy of Opposition to Taiwan's Bid for UN Membership," *China Perspectives*, no. 34 (March/April 2001): 7-18.

¹⁰Jeremy T. Paltiel, "Dire Straits: Rescuing the Taiwan Problem from the Zero-Sum Game of International Sovereignty," *China Perspectives*, no. 34 (March/April 2001): 19-34.

¹¹See also Jean-Pierre Cabestan, "Cross-Strait Tensions and Their Impact on Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Security Policy" (Paper presented at the conference on Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe, National Chengchi University, Taipei, December 8-9, 2003); Chang Ya-chung, *Liang'an tonghe lun* (Thesis on cross-Strait integration) (Taipei: Shengzh, 2000); Chen Yu-jun, *Zhong-Mei-Tai fengyunlu* (The vicissitudes in the relationship between China, the United States, and Taiwan: from the conflicts across the Taiwan Strait to the confrontation between China and the United States) (Hong Kong:

This HFC would be a political entity in which both Taiwan and mainland China would share Chinese sovereignty, and by so doing, each would lose some sovereignty also. For example, the PRC would have to agree to the ROC having a seat in the United Nations, which would be a characteristic of a confederation in which each state has its own sovereignty. However, the ROC would have to write into its constitution a pledge not to break away from the confederation, which would be a characteristic of a federation, with each state being a part of a single nation, with shared sovereignty.¹²

The formation of such an association, however, would face various obstacles. We will now discuss (1) the difficulty of crossing cultural boundaries, or overcoming prejudices and discriminatory attitudes in our relationship with others; and (2) the difficulty of reconciling political realism on the one hand and cosmopolitanism and political idealism on the other. We will see that while cosmopolitanism and political idealism might bring the two sides closer in some ways, regional factors—such as cultural divisions and perceived national interests—would often complicate the rela-

Haixia xueshu chubanshe, 2001); Nanfang Shuo, "Yizhong jiji de xin taidu" (A positive new attitude), in Ohmae Kenichi, *Zhonghua lianbang* (The emergence of the United States of Zhonghua), translated by Zhao Chia-yi, Liu Chin-hsiu, and Huang Pi-chun (Taipei: Shangzhou chubanshe, 2003), 246-60; Ge Yong-guang, *Wenhua duoyuan zhuyi yu guojia zhenghe: jianlun Zhongguo rentong de xingcheng yu tiaozhan* (Multiculturalism and national integration: the formation and challenges of the Chinese identity) (Taipei: Cheng Chung, 1991); Gottfried-Karl Kindermann, "Cases of Successful Rapprochement and Integration and a Roadmap to Cross-Strait Rapprochement" (Paper presented at the conference on Perspectives on Cross-Strait Relations: Views from Europe, Taipei, December 8-9, 2003); Shi Ming-teh, *Qiyishi zhi chun* (The spring in the prison cell) (Taipei: Dunli chubanshe, 1989); Wei Yung, "Maixiang minzu nei gongtongti: Taihai liang'an hudong moshi zhi jiangou, fazhan yu jianyan" (Toward an "intra-national union": theoretical models on cross-Taiwan Strait interaction), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies) 45, no. 5 (2002): 1-55; and Yan Jiaqi, *Disan gonghe: weilai Zhongguo de xuanze* (The third republic: the choice of the future China) (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1992).

¹²As one of the anonymous reviewers points out, "Although there are basic features and arrangements of federation and confederation in most textbooks, the precise contours of each political institution are still subject to contextual bargaining and political finesse in different cases." That is very true. Whatever the form, however, it is a Chinese association implying "one China." The duties, obligations, and rules pertaining to political entities in the hybrid federation/confederation are not the main concern of this paper, thus I am not elaborating on these issues. Rather, the focus is the difficulties of forming any kind of association like this across the Taiwan Strait.

tionship. It is not going to be easy to balance the two conflicting forces, and it will take great efforts on the part of those involved to achieve such a compromise. As I said above, the future of cross-Strait relations hinges on the various parties' ability to overcome the difficulties and reach such a compromise.

The Difficulty of Crossing Cultural Boundaries and Overcoming Prejudices and Discriminatory Attitudes and Its Implications for an HFC

People belong to different cultures, and race or ethnicity affects interpersonal as well as international relations.¹³ What are the cultural boundaries between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait? Sociologically speaking, culture refers to the norms, values, beliefs, language, technology, etc., of a society. We will now look at the cases of Taiwan and the mainland respectively, focusing on how each one views the other and the extent to which they can go beyond these views and overcome their prejudices and discriminatory attitudes so as to reach a compromise like an HFC.

Overcoming Prejudices and Discriminatory Attitudes: Taiwan

Fifty years of Japanese colonial rule in Taiwan transformed the culture of the island to a great extent, despite the existence of various resistance and autonomy movements there. The Japanese surrender and the return of Taiwan to China at the end of World War II ended the "Japanization" process and marked the beginning of a process of re-Sinicization by the KMT. However, the brutality of the latter process, symbolized by the February 28th Incident of 1947, gave birth to a Taiwanese consciousness

¹³Race, a problematic term, often refers to physical characteristics, and is often accorded meanings of inferiority and superiority. Thus when the term is used, I mean mostly ethnicity. Chinese and American cultures are two different national as well as ethnic cultures, and mainland Chinese and Taiwanese mostly share one Chinese culture but two Chinese subcultures. For a discussion of conflict of (sub)cultures and its meanings and implications for national identity, see Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).



and a new independence movement. The KMT's anti-communist ideology only further intensified dislike of all things Chinese on the part of many Taiwanese. As a result, the latter now believe that they have a different culture from the mainland Chinese, and many believe they are not Chinese at all, despite the fact that their ancestors were from China, and they use the Chinese language and share a Chinese culture and large part of Chinese history. It does not matter that culturally the Chinese in Taiwan may be more "Chinese" than those on the mainland, as some would argue.¹⁴ Many of the former believe that they are different from mainland Chinese as a result of their experience over the past one hundred years. Even if they are part of the larger Chinese culture, theirs is a different subculture, especially now that they have a democratic system which the mainland does not.

While this Taiwanese consciousness, or nationalism, has bred self-esteem and self-respect for the people in Taiwan, it has fostered prejudice and discriminatory attitudes toward mainland Chinese and a strong belief in Taiwan independence, just as a Chinese consciousness on the mainland has fostered prejudice and discriminatory attitudes against Taiwanese and a strong belief in unification, which we will discuss below. Nationalism of this kind tends to divide people rather than unite them. The examples below may help us see what I mean by prejudices and discriminatory attitudes.

During a farewell press conference held in early 2005 by Chiu Tai-san (邱太三), a deputy chair of Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council (MAC, 大陸事務委員會), journalists jokingly asked Chiu whether the MAC had plans to open jobs in the sex industry to spouses from mainland China, since the latter would suit Taiwanese men's tastes really well.¹⁵ Although this question was viewed as a joke, the condescending and contemptuous

¹⁴ One obvious example is the use of traditional Chinese characters rather than the simplified ones used on the mainland. Other examples may include religion and Confucian ethics, which we will again mention in the following section.

¹⁵ 黃國樑, "邱太三告別秀 女記者: 想念你的小窩!" [2005/04/01 聯合晚報]. From now on, I have kept the original Chinese titles of newspaper articles rather than translating them into English because I want to keep the original flavor and the embedded emotions in them. These could be so easily lost in translation.



attitude toward mainlanders it implies is obvious.

Indeed, sexual discrimination against women and discrimination against mainlanders in general in Taiwan is an ongoing problem. Spouses from mainland China have to spend longer in Taiwan before they can gain residence than spouses from other parts of the world. Even when they are granted residence, they may still be kept under surveillance. This is understandable in a country that is fearful of its own national security. However, to suspect almost every scholar, spouse, laborer, or even prostitute of spying for China may go beyond reasonable concern for national security.¹⁶ Hsieh Chang-ting, the former premier, has even gone so far as to say that foreign spouses (most of whom are women from the mainland) have "lowered the quality" of Taiwanese.¹⁷

Following the opinion of U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld,¹⁸ some Taiwanese believe that mainland Chinese are not yet civilized. As Chuo Jung-tai (卓榮泰), the spokesman of the Taiwan Executive Yuan, has said, "If China does not pass the Anti-Secession Law, it will still have a chance of entering the civilized world."¹⁹ Since China has passed the Anti-Secession Law, what is the point of talking with "barbarians"? One interesting article by Huang Wei-li (黃偉力) in *Taiwan Daily* (台灣日報)

¹⁶The same applies in the United States, where Chinese students and scholars are suspected of spying for the Chinese government.

¹⁷For the above information, see 黃忠榮, "有人策動大陸新娘 圖影響總統大選"【2002/12/02 自由時報】; 修淑芬, "大陸新娘投書取得身分證 仍被跟監"【2004/06/01 中時晚報】; 李順德, "謝長廷: 推動引進大陸高科技人才"【2005/02/17 聯合報】; 龍應台, "向核心价值邁進— 超越台灣主義" <http://www.ccforum.org.cn>【2004/05/07 世紀沙龍】.

¹⁸In Rumsfeld's words: "The People's Republic of China is a country that we hope and pray enters the civilized world in an orderly way without the grinding of gears and that they become a constructive force in that part of the world and a player in the global environment that's constructive." "They've got competing pressures between the desire to grow, which takes a free economy as opposed to a command economy, and their dictatorial system, which is not a free system. And there's a tension there, and I don't know how it'll come out, but I quite agree with you that we need to be attentive to it." Lawrence Di Rita, the Pentagon spokesman, later said that Rumsfeld did not mean to say that China was not a civilized nation. He meant that China was inward-looking. See Eric Schmitt, "Rumsfeld Warns of Concern about Expansion of China's Navy," *New York Times*, February 18, 2005.

¹⁹溫貴香, "謝揆上街政院提兩階段條件說, 第一階段採柔性勸說第二階段則視情勢演變決定"【2005-03-11 台灣日報】.

depicts mainland Chinese, wherever they are, as dirty, selfish, shameless, and unreasonable. It accuses those who have come to live in Taiwan of having no feelings for the place at all, and says that it is no wonder that they are treated differently.²⁰

These prejudices and discriminatory attitudes on the part of Taiwanese thus reinforce the independence movement within Taiwan. They are easily translated into government policies and political views, which may further impede negotiations and communication between the two sides. This can also be seen from the reaction of some Taiwanese to people associated with the mainland, which is also an indication of the ethnic conflicts within Taiwan over cross-Strait relations. For example, after Chiang Ping-kun (江丙坤), a vice chairman of the KMT, visited China in March 2005, he was dubbed a "traitor," and the KMT "the representatives of the CCP" and "a party from outside of Taiwan."²¹ Lien Chan and James Soong were also viewed as assisting the communists to take over Taiwan.²² This internal rift in Taiwan corresponds to the rift across the Strait.

This attitude toward mainlanders on the one hand and the rift in Taiwan over cross-Strait relations on the other may very well be political issues, which we will discuss later in the paper. However, they are also

²⁰Huang Wei-li, "Taiwanren bushi Zhongguoren" (Taiwanese are not Chinese), *Taiwan ribao* (Taiwan Daily), July 30, 2005.

²¹Some of the reactions are: 國民黨"公然容共親共" (副總統呂秀蓮語); 國民黨"喪權辱國" (民進黨秘書長李逸洋語); "臺灣敗類江丙坤不要臉"、"出賣臺灣"、"臺灣民族主義萬歲" (獨台會和臺灣教授協會語); 我們"一定要正視中國是臺灣敵國的最大問題" (黃昭堂語); 江丙坤此行"自失立場、也失國格" (陸委會副主委邱太三語); "國民黨形同共產黨在臺灣的「一個中國」的代理人, 國民黨已成「以台制台」工具", "國民黨把自己變成中國的「統戰工具」" (台聯黨主席蘇進強); "中國國民黨副主席江丙坤到中國去「賣身投靠」, 這是「外來政黨」現形記", 五四運動時的「國賊」是曹汝霖、章征祥、陸宗輿, 今天的「國賊」是連戰、江丙坤、張榮恭" (金恆煒語), 等等。See 林朝億, "呂秀蓮: 反共變親共價值錯亂" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 林朝億, "《國民黨聯共制台》李逸洋: 喪權辱國" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 劉裕彬、王佩雯, "史明率眾抗議江「賣台」, 江丙坤返台指中國行非國共和談台教會獨台會群眾赴機場斥責" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 張振峰, "黃昭堂: 造成台海問題中國內政化" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 張國政、王佩雯, "謝揆: 商談當比賽不利台灣, 邱太三批江丙坤自失立場及國格" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 鄒麗泳, "蘇進強: 國民黨成制台工具, 形同台灣「一個中國」代理人批中共分化作法卑劣" [2005-04-02 台灣日報]; 金恆煒, "外抗強權內除國賊" [2005-04-02 台灣日報].

²²This loathing for communism is a legacy of the civil war. It also indicates a lack of understanding of what communism was and is like today, and it can be viewed as prejudice.


cultural conflicts derived from perceived cultural differences. What would it take for the Taiwanese to overcome their prejudices? We will come back to this issue after discussing the mainland Chinese case.

Overcoming Prejudices and Discriminatory Attitudes: Mainland China

As well as the Taiwanese subculture, there is also a mainland Chinese subculture. Members of this subculture may also find it difficult to cross cultural boundaries and overcome their prejudices and discriminatory attitudes.

For most Chinese, Taiwan is the last symbol of China's humiliation over the past one hundred and fifty years. Japan took Taiwan from China in 1895 after defeating the Qing (清朝) government in a war. Before 1895, Taiwan had been under Qing rule for over two hundred years. After 1945, Taiwan came under the rule of the ROC, while the mainland came under the rule of the PRC, and China has been divided into two parts under two governments ever since. It is hard for most mainland Chinese to understand why, as Chinese, the Taiwanese do not want to unite with them to eliminate the last symbol of humiliation at the hands of foreign powers. One may argue that Taiwan does not want unification because the mainland is not democratic.²³ However, should not the Taiwanese, as Chinese, recognize that they have an obligation to help their mainland brothers and

²³One reviewer comments that while focusing on cultural barriers, I did not explore other explanations for the standoff across the Taiwan Strait, which include "differences in ideology and the political system between the two entities separated by the Taiwan Strait, lingering effects of the civil war legacy magnified by decades of anti-communist education in Taiwan since 1949, the still huge per capita income gaps with the mainland, etc., etc." In the revised version of this paper, I have further incorporated these ideas by emphasizing the lack of understanding and empathy on the part of each side because of these differences and the lingering effects of the civil war legacy. However, I have again included them in the framework of cultural barriers since they are about values, norms, and beliefs. The per capita income gap is often used by Taiwanese politicians to scare voters, but it could be a red herring, since the Chinese government has never said that it would rob Taiwan of its wealth to feed the poor in China. The Hong Kong and Macao examples of unification do not lend any credence to that argument, either: neither of these pays taxes to the central government. Rather, the Chinese government has lent economic support to them even though the per capita income gap may be larger in their case than in the case of Taiwan. Thus the income gap issue is largely one of perception, and thus a matter of prejudice and discriminatory attitudes.



sisters in their democratization? Would not some kind of association be the best way to do that?


If Taiwanese are mostly Chinese from a historical point of view, they are even more so culturally. It is hard for mainlanders to understand why independence-minded Taiwanese do not recognize that they are also culturally Chinese. Do they not speak and write the same Chinese language, despite the differences between the simplified and traditional Chinese characters, and do they not believe in the same religions, like Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism (道教)? Do they not worship Mazu (媽祖) as other Fujianese (福建人) and Cantonese (廣東人) do?

The problem here is that mainland Chinese do not realize that although these are all good reasons for unification, they are not necessary or sufficient reasons. If both sides of the Taiwan Strait would come to an agreement, they could still exist as two states. That they cannot agree is another matter. Theoretically, there does not need to be only one solution to the Taiwan issue. If the mainlanders want the relationship to go in a certain direction, they cannot take it for granted that it will go in that direction.

In addition, because of the various problems experienced by Taiwanese democracy, some mainlanders may think that democracy is not that good a system after all. The lack of press freedom in the mainland does not help at all in that regard. Most of what mainlanders know about Taiwan is what the state media or the government wants them to know.

It is understandable, then, that mainland Chinese have only a limited knowledge of Taiwanese society. They lack an understanding of and empathy for the Taiwanese regarding their different history over the past one hundred years. It is hard for them to understand that other Chinese can have a different form of nationalism from theirs, and they thus demonstrate prejudice and arrogance toward the Taiwanese. One wonders, for example, what Beijing's Foreign Minister meant when he said to reporters from Taiwan at the NPC session in March 2005 that he did not know who Hsieh Chang-ting was and did not know that Taiwan had a constitution.²⁴

²⁴Li Zhaoxing's face was shown again and again on TV ads rallying people to go to the March 26, 2005, mass protests against the Anti-Secession Law.



In another example, we hear mainlanders use phrases like "*jiwang bujiu, buji qianxian*" (既往不咎不計前嫌, to forgive past misdeeds, and to disregard past problems) with reference to the new policy of working with people in favor of independence.²⁵ This kind of phraseology indicates intolerance and arrogance and implies that there is only one way of thinking. It is certainly not democratic, and the lack of democracy in mainland China is one of the obstacles to the unification of China.

If people who are relatively well informed still have difficulty overcoming their prejudices, it will be even more difficult for those who are less informed to make sound judgments, making it harder to achieve any kind of association between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. Why such prejudices exist and how they may be overcome will be discussed below.

The Difficulty of Overcoming Prejudices and the Implications for an HFC

There are people who truly believe in Taiwan independence,²⁶ and there are people who truly believe in the unification of China. Currently, these two groups seem to have difficulty reaching a compromise. We will discuss the political reasons for this difficulty in the next section and focus now on the limited capacity for people from different (sub)cultures to understand each other.

In response to Martha Nussbaum's advocacy of cosmopolitanism, which we will discuss later in the paper, Elaine Scarry observes:

The difficulty of imagining [and understanding] others is shown by the fact that one can be in the presence of another person who is in pain and not know that the person is in pain. The ease of remaining ignorant of another person's pain even permits one to inflict it and amplify it in the body of the other person while remaining immune oneself. Sustained and repeated instances of this are visible in political regimes that torture.²⁷

²⁵ 奇培東, "反分裂法標誌兩岸關係進新時期" [2005-03-31 澳門日報], A7。

²⁶ For example, see 陳重生, "台聯靜坐落幕 新胡溫「頭」嗆聲" [2005-03-16 中國時報]; 張振峰, "908 台灣國運動正式成立, 史明疾呼建立台灣民族主義對抗「中華民族主義」併吞台灣的野心" [2005-05-30 台灣日報]。

²⁷ Elaine Scarry, "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon, 1996), 100. This brings to mind an image from the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, of a U.S. soldier reading a Bible

Even when we use our mental powers to imagine an object, or other people's pain, what we imagine will be far less accurate and vivid than the real thing. Scarry cites Jean-Paul Sartre's study of the imagination to underscore its limits.²⁸ Let us close our eyes and imagine the face of a beloved friend whom we know in intricate detail, or imagine anything in front of us. Open our eyes and look at the real person or the thing, and we will find that the real face is more vital and vivacious while the imagined face is thin, dry, two-dimensional, and inert. The real person or thing is vivid while the imagined person or thing is dull.

If we cannot even fully understand or know the person we are most familiar with, or know the thing in front of our eyes, how can we ever understand people we do not even meet or things we do not see every day? To what extent can mainland Chinese understand Taiwanese, who have a different view of history than they do? To what extent can Taiwanese understand mainland Chinese, who are still recovering from what they perceive to be over a hundred years of humiliation at the hands of the great powers, with Taiwan as a painful reminder of that humiliation?²⁹ Scarry therefore concludes, "*The human capacity to injure other people is very great precisely because our capacity to imagine other people is very small.*"³⁰

Imagining others is difficult even when all the channels of communication, such as the Internet, television, and the printed media, are open. It is even more difficult when the channels of communication are partly closed, as is the situation now across the Taiwan Strait. This makes reconciliation between two sides intrinsically difficult.

Because of our limited human capacity to imagine other people, we rely on stereotypes and generalizations. The mainland Chinese tend to

and wearing a helmet on which is written the slogan, "Kill'em All." It appears to be easier even for religious people to kill people from other races and ethnic groups, since we do not feel the same pain as we would if we were killing our own people.

²⁸Ibid., 102-3.

²⁹Similarly, to what extent can the Americans trust the Chinese (with more cultural differences) as they trust the Europeans (with fewer cultural differences), other things being equal?

³⁰Scarry, "The Difficulty of Imagining Other People," 103. Italics original.

think that the Taiwanese are narrow-minded, and the Taiwanese tend to think that mainland Chinese are arrogant. In addition, we often use the word "people," as if everybody thinks or behaves in the same way.³¹ Is every Taiwanese who favors independence like the former president, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), or like Vice President Annette Lu Hsiu-lien (呂秀蓮), whose criticism of the Chinese (government) has often been unpleasant?³² And are all mainland Chinese who favor unification like Li Zhaoxing (mentioned above) or Zhu Rongji (朱鎔基), the former premier of China, whose stern warnings to Taiwanese voters during the 2000 presidential election campaign were televised repeatedly? Are they like the men who accompanied Wu Yi (吳儀) to the World Health Organization meeting in 2003, who rebuffed the Taiwanese media's request for an explanation why Taiwan was not allowed even to be an observer of the U.N. organization, and dismissed their questions with a curt "Who cares about you?!" (*Shui li nimen*, or 誰理你們?) and "Didn't you see the result of the vote?"

Once such stereotypes and overgeneralizations are established, they develop a life of their own. People from each group are stereotyped and even demonized as such from then on. In the relationship between Taiwanese and mainland Chinese, stereotypes and overgeneralizations continue to exist, which can then lead to prejudice, racism, discrimination, and even possibly war.³³

³¹Another example is the politicians' often repeated claim that 23 million Taiwanese want independence, or 1.3 billion Chinese want unification. Neither is totally true.

³²One of the reviewers of the previous draft comments, "What is grossly missing [here] in the discussion is the fact that both Lee and Lu are known for their perverse, subservient attachment to Taiwan's former Japanese colonial masters (1895-1945) and their alleged 'superior' culture. Apparently, their intemperate, blanket hostility toward anything associated with China or 'Chinese,' while obsequiously extolling Japanese virtues (Annette Lu even praised the fifty years of Japanese colonial rule as the best possible blessing for Taiwan), cannot be explained within the author's subculture theory, or any theory for that matter." It is true that more is needed to explain why people like Lee and Lu think the way they do. However, the point I am making here is different. It is about mainlanders wrongly assuming that all independence-minded people are like Lee and Lu. Lee is also well known for his praise of Japan's colonial rule in Taiwan as well as the "Japanese spirit," or *bushido*. Again, however, not every Taiwanese is like Lee or Lu.

³³One key event that affected the way Taiwanese perceive mainland Chinese was the robbery and murder of Taiwanese tourists by mainland Chinese criminals at Qiandoahu (千島湖)

When Samuel Huntington talks about the clash of civilizations, he must have these problems in mind. In his 2000 book, Huntington says that we often (but not always) feel superior to people who are different from us.³⁴ And we fear and distrust the "other." In addition, differences in civilizations, or cultures and subcultures for that matter, make it difficult for them to communicate with one another. As a result, we do not understand other groups' assumptions, motives, social relations, and social behavior. Thus we do not identify with them. That is one of the sources of prejudice, racism, discrimination, war, and various other forms of conflict. Huntington even goes on to say that the more interaction we have with others, the more differences we see between "us" and "them," which then lead to more prejudices. Huntington suggests that in order to get along, civilizations should learn to negotiate their differences and avoid getting into conflicts with each other.

While it may be true that more and more people have had opportunities to visit each other across the Taiwan Strait, the total number is still very small. Most of their visits are brief, and they may go home with more prejudices than they had before, especially because China in general is less developed than Taiwan. It takes anthropological training to be empathetic to another (sub)culture, and most of these visitors do not have that. Therefore, most people's understanding of the other culture comes from the mass media, which tend to report negative events, and from politicians, who use negative events to advance their political agendas.

The difficulty of crossing cultural boundaries and overcoming prejudices and discriminatory attitudes makes it hard for people to appreciate each other's differences. They thus lack confidence in each other. As a result they may be less willing to form an association like an HFC. This can be seen from the way some mainland Chinese insist on treating the gov-

in 1994. Rather than viewing this as a purely criminal case, the then President Lee Teng-hui described the Chinese people and the Chinese government as bandits. Since then, it has been hard to change people's stereotype of China.

³⁴Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" in *Globalization and Conflict*, ed. Lawrence E. Sneden (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt, 2000), 2:21-44.



ernment of Taiwan as a local government. It can also be seen in the way some Taiwanese do not want to have anything to do with China.³⁵ This lack of understanding leads to prejudice. The more prejudice there is, the farther apart the two sides get from one another, politically and socially.³⁶ Conflicts may intensify to the extent that war may occur. This is one reason why an HFC would be difficult, though not impossible, to achieve. It would take much more effort than is now being made on both sides to overcome this kind of prejudice. More cultural, social, and political exchanges are certainly needed if there is to be any hope of achieving an HFC.³⁷

The Difficulty of Reconciling Political Realism on the One Hand and Cosmopolitanism and Idealism on the Other

In this section, we will first discuss a nation's strong belief in political realism and in protecting its own national interests. Then we will examine

³⁵Even though Hu Jintao stated in March 2005 that neither side would devour the other and that they are equal, the Chinese Constitution still says that Taiwan is part of the PRC. China has yet to reconcile these two positions. As for the attitude of some Taiwanese toward China, on one occasion in 2003, I asked the former president, Lee Teng-hui, why the two sides could not form a hybrid of federation and confederation. His response was, "Is it necessary?" When I asked a couple of scholars at the Academia Sinica in Taiwan about this, their response was, "Just leave us alone."

³⁶For the conflicts within Taiwan between independence and unification and how difficult it is for one to understand the other, see also Lee Ting-tzan, "Daolun: shimin shehui yu gonggong lingyu zai Taiwan de fazhan" (Introduction: the development of civil society and public sphere in Taiwan," in *Gonggong lingyu zai Taiwan: kunjing yu qiji* (Public sphere in Taiwan: difficulties and opportunities), by Lee Ting-tzan et al. (Taipei: Guiguan, 2004), 1-59.

³⁷In the vocabulary of political science, the cultural obstacles discussed in this section may be viewed as a problem of human nature. In other words, human beings are by nature flawed, selfish, power-seeking, and otherwise imperfect. See James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., *Contending Theories of International Relations: A Comprehensive Survey*, 5th edition (English reprint edition by Pearson Education Asia Limited and Peking University Press, 2004), 71. They will make every effort to maximize their own interests, while being unwilling to try to understand each other and take care of each other. However, a cultural argument is less pessimistic since it assumes possible changes in one's cultural beliefs, and therefore possible amendments to one's nature. Nonetheless, this argument resembles the nature argument in that it holds that it is difficult, though not entirely impossible, to change one's beliefs.

cosmopolitanism and idealism and see how they may counter political realism.

Political Realism and Protecting National Interests

If prejudices and discriminatory attitudes are hard to change, it is equally difficult to change belief in political realism. Beliefs about the other (prejudices and discriminatory attitudes) and beliefs about one's relationship with the other (political realism) are closely connected and they reinforce one another.

What, then, is political realism? The central concept in political realism is power. While many theorists discuss power in the political relationship among states, we will rely on Max Weber for a brief explanation.³⁸ We will look first at Weber's sober definition of state and politics. The state is "a relation of men dominating men, a relation supported by means of legitimate (i.e., considered to be legitimate) violence." It is "a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force* within a given territory."³⁹ Politics, on the other hand, "means striving to share power or striving to influence the distribution of power, either among states or among groups within a state." And the "decisive means for politics is violence."⁴⁰ In this sober view of state and politics, where each nation or group is trying to maximize its own power and interests, resorting to violence if necessary, people are unwilling to share power and sovereignty, even in an HFC, unless forced to do so. As Weber himself would say, this could very well be "the realities of life",⁴¹ hence political realism.


For Weber, struggles for power and domination are inescapable and fundamental for social life, thus politically separate individual states will

³⁸For a fuller discussion of political realism, see Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, *Contending Theories of International Relations*, esp. chap. 2: "From Realist to Neorealist and Neo-classical Realist Theory."

³⁹Max Weber, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. Italics original.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 121.

⁴¹*Ibid.*, 127.



all be vying for more power, just as on a personal level separate souls will be struggling to realize their own subjective values. One is supposed to strive and dominate, and the other is supposed to surrender and subordinate.⁴² Those who believe in realism would determine the fate of the world. They would use dubious means to achieve what they believe to be good goals, since they believe that the end often justifies the means. As Anthony Lake, the Clinton administration's national security adviser, commented about the change from a value orientation to an interest orientation regarding the administration's China policy, "until human nature changes, power and force will remain at the heart of international relations."⁴³

What is the most important national interest in the power relations across the Taiwan Strait that each party is trying to protect, then? For Hans J. Morgenthau, the core national interest is a nation's physical, political, and cultural identity and integrity.⁴⁴ That is exactly the case with both Taiwan and mainland China. What do they think they need to do to protect this vital interest according to political realism? We will focus on these two questions: one's most important national interest and the means to protect it.

Although in some people's eyes, independence is the most important national interest for Taiwan, for most people it should be the protection of the ROC. The two are different, but they are closely related. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) would argue that Taiwan does not need to declare itself independent since it already is independent. Thus the de facto independence of the ROC appears to be the core national interest for Taiwanese.

⁴²For a summary of Weber's ideas, see Roslyn Wallach Bologh, *Love or Greatness: Max Weber and Masculine Thinking—A Feminist Inquiry* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1990), 275, 296-98, 306.

⁴³For Lake's comments, see John T. Rourke and Richard Clark, "Making U.S. Foreign Policy toward China in the Clinton Administration," in *After the End: Making U.S. Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. James M. Scott (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1998), 219.

⁴⁴Cited by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff in *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 76-77.

During their meeting in February 2005, both Chen Shui-bian and James Soong agreed that the ROC and its constitution should be respected by all parties, internal or external. Indeed, this stance has been criticized by the Taiwan Solidarity Union, the party that is most adamant about Taiwan independence, but they are in a minority in the "pan-Green" (泛綠) camp, the governing coalition. If the majority in the pan-Green support Chen on this issue, then one can say that the majority of the people in Taiwan adhere to the ROC, since this is definitely the stance of the opposition "pan-Blue" (泛藍) coalition. Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), the current Taipei mayor and the newly elected chairman of the KMT, claimed in his election proclamation that he stood for the protection of the ROC from the military threat of the PRC and the political threat of the Taiwan independence movement.⁴⁵

How, then, do those in power protect Taiwan's de facto independence? The pan-Blue has been trying to negotiate a peaceful solution with the mainland but to no avail. Neither Lien Chan nor James Soong succeeded in even getting the mainland to formally recognize the ROC during their visits there in 2005. Believing in political realism, the pan-Green, on the other hand, has been trying to buy more weapons from the United States. The government has for a long time tried to persuade the legislature to approve its plan to spend NT\$600 billion on submarines and defensive missiles. As Yu Shyi-kun (游錫堃), the former premier of Taiwan, says, if you attack Taipei, I will attack Shanghai. A balance of power has to be maintained by terror (恐怖平衡, *kongbu pingheng*), hence an arms race.⁴⁶ After the U.S. Department of Defense published its July 2005 annual report on China's military power, which predicted a military threat from China,⁴⁷ the Taiwanese government increased its efforts to purchase weapons from

⁴⁵ 馬英九, "這是中華民國的關鍵年代——參選國民黨黨主席聲明" [2005/04/03 中國時報]。

⁴⁶ 李祖舜, "軍購摺狠話 揆游:你打台北 我打上海" [2004/09/25 中時晚報]。

⁴⁷ See the U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report to Congress: The Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (July 23, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719_china.pdf.

the United States. That is based on the principle of political realism, the belief that each side is trying to maximize its own interest, and only violence, or the threat of violence, can counter violence.

Mainland China also believes that national identity and integrity is its vital national interest, but it believes that Taiwan is a part of China. Beijing will not tolerate Taiwan independence, and it is prepared to fight a war over it. This is not only because of the strategic location of the island but for reasons of Chinese nationalism. The strategic importance of Taiwan can be seen from the following quote from the U.S. Department of Defense in its report in 2004:

Many Chinese strategists and analysts view Taiwan as occupying a critical geostrategic location whose control would enable the PLA Navy to move its maritime defensive perimeter further seaward and improve Beijing's ability to influence regional sea lines of communication. Alternatively, according to some observers, permanent separation of Taiwan from the mainland would constrain China's ability to project power and provide the United States with a strategic foothold adjacent China's coastal economic centers.⁴⁸

The geostrategic location of Taiwan is so important that for reasons of political realism it is very unlikely that China will give it up.

In one recent article, I analyzed two different kinds of nationalism: individualistic ethnic nationalism and collectivistic ethnic nationalism.⁴⁹ The former emphasizes the interests of the individual as well as those of ethnic groups, such as individual freedom, human rights, equality, and democracy, while the latter emphasizes ethnic group interests as opposed to individual interests, such as national interest, including national sovereignty and territorial integrity. These two nationalisms exist in just about every nation, although one type may dominate at one time or another. In mainland China, it is collectivistic ethnic nationalism that dominates as it does in Taiwan or the United States. Taiwan is the last symbol of China's humiliating

⁴⁸See the U.S. Department of Defense's "Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China" (May 28, 2004), <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf>.

⁴⁹Zhidong Hao, "Between War and Peace: The Role of Nationalism in China's U.S. Policy-Making with Regard to Taiwan," in *China's Foreign Policy Making: Societal Force and Chinese American Policy*, ed. Yufan Hao and Lin Su (London: Ashgate, 2005), 139-68.

history over the past one hundred and fifty years, as we mentioned earlier. It is unlikely to be erased from the Chinese memory, thus collectivistic ethnic nationalism will continue to be strong, whether China is democratic or not.

China has been developing its own weapons systems and acquiring offensive weapons from Russia. As we mentioned earlier, there has been talk about using nuclear weapons if the United States intervenes in a war across the Taiwan Strait. From the point of view of political realism, both the strategic location of Taiwan and Chinese nationalism will prevent Beijing from allowing Taiwan to become independent without a fight. Violence may even be the only way to unify China. As Paltiel points out:

One of the most dangerous features of the current standoff has been the way that PLA strategists have seized on the Taiwan Strait as an experimental case in the use of force in international diplomacy. One detects an eagerness and even enthusiasm to test the capabilities of a modernized PLA in action as a badge of China's power status.⁵⁰

What, then, are the political realism implications for any future association like an HFC? Indeed, an arms race is already under way, and both sides have been conducting military exercises. Will such actions create a balance of power across the Taiwan Strait, as realism would imply, or will they escalate into a real war? It is not at all clear. One thing is clear, though; that is, political realism is not very conducive to an HFC, because it causes the two sides to lack confidence in one another and believe in a zero-sum game.

So far we have analyzed two kinds of obstacles to an HFC: the difficulty of crossing cultural boundaries, overcoming prejudices and discriminatory attitudes, and the difficulty of ignoring political realism regarding one's vital national interests and the protection of national integrity. The first difficulty is about the two sides understanding each other and negotiating the differences between different cultural and political entities. This difficulty is intensified by the desire to protect one's own interests, as-

⁵⁰Paltiel, "Dire Straits," 27.



suming, according to the political realist view, that other people's interests are in conflict with one's own. Both of these obstacles lead to a belief that it is necessary to maintain a power balance in the region and thus prevent a possible association between China and Taiwan. An HFC would be very difficult in these circumstances. What do cosmopolitanism and idealism have to say about this?

Cosmopolitanism and Political Idealism:

A Counterargument


Cosmopolitanism holds that people have the capacity to understand each other, and that one's primary allegiance should be to the community of human beings in the entire world, rather than to the nation-state, or to one's own cultural and ethnic group, as a patriot would say.⁵¹ Thus the community is now even larger than a confederation, let alone an HFC. One can imagine that while cultural boundaries and political realism would pose obstacles to an HFC, cosmopolitanism would facilitate it, because a cosmopolitan's primary concern is human beings in general regardless of cultural or ethnic divisions. All problems are human problems, and the accident of where we were born is just that, an accident.

Being a cosmopolitan does not mean that one has to give up local identifications, "which can frequently be a source of great richness in life."⁵² We still have the self, the family, the extended family, our neighbors or local group, our fellow city-dwellers, and our fellow countrymen, as well as other groups based on ethnicity, gender, class, profession, language, and other characteristics.

Above all, though, we have humanity, our fellow human beings. This becomes increasingly clear as the world becomes further globalized politically, economically, and culturally. Himmelfarb complains that cosmopolitanism obscures or even denies such givens of life as parents, ancestors, family, race, religion, heritage, history, culture, tradition, com-

⁵¹Martha C. Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism" and "Reply," in Cohen, *For Love of Country*, 2-20, 131-44.

⁵²*Ibid.*, 9.



munity, and nationality as accidental attributes.⁵³ However, as Nussbaum admits, with all those attributes, people are still human beings to begin with.⁵⁴ They are born as human beings and interact with others as human beings. Those other attributes are concepts that are developed later in life.

Nussbaum provides several arguments for cosmopolitanism,⁵⁵ which are also good reasons for an HFC. First, learning more about other human beings helps us see what in our practices is local and unnecessary. We can then see that many of the conflicts between mainland China and Taiwan are unnecessary. Second, we are better able to solve problems that require international cooperation, with the epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 being a good example. Third, we recognize that others are real human beings just like us, with the same feelings and desires for life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. We thus have a moral obligation to act accordingly, regarding immigration, international labor, and war, for example. Fourth, we will be able to conduct ourselves in world affairs as full human beings rather than as hypocrites. For example, we will value other people's lives more than we do now, if not as much as we do our own. If to worship one's country, or nation, as if it were a god, would be tantamount to bringing a curse upon it, then it would be easier for people to accept an HFC if they find it better suits their needs. For, as a cosmopolitan, one "puts right before country, and universal reason before the symbols of national belonging."⁵⁶ In these circumstances, the virulent aspects of Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism will melt away.


In other words, if we understand that people who are not like us suffer in the same way that we suffer, and if we count people as moral equals regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, religion, class, race, and gender, we will find better ways to handle our conflicts. People would, as Confucius says, treat others just as they would treat their own relatives, and

⁵³Gertrude Himmelfarb, "The Illusions of Cosmopolitanism," in Cohen, *For Love of Country*, 77.

⁵⁴Nussbaum, "Reply," 141-43.

⁵⁵Nussbaum, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," 11-15.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 16-17.



treat other people's children as their own children (不獨親其親，不獨子其子). This "worldism" (大同主義) is also what Kang Youwei (康有為) and Sun Yat-sen (孫逸仙) advocated.⁵⁷ The idea of the equal worth of all human beings would be "a regulative constraint on our political actions and aspirations."⁵⁸ We should then "cultivate world citizenship in our hearts and minds as well as our codes of law," since, as Adam Smith noted, compassion for others is a fragile and inconstant device. A constitutional HFC might be a good place to begin in cross-Strait relations.⁵⁹

Related to cosmopolitanism is political idealism. Idealism assumes that human nature is essentially good, and people are fundamentally concerned about the welfare of others, which makes cooperation and progress possible. Violence, or war, occurs not because people are ethically flawed but because evil institutions encourage people to behave selfishly and to harm others. This is the idealism that is emphasized by David Hume, Jean Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, and Richard Cobden.⁶⁰

In Taiwan-mainland China relations, cooperation is as commonplace as conflict, if not more so. Although political realists may argue that such cooperation is derived from self-interest, idealists would argue that an element of mutual understanding, mutual concern, and mutual desire should not be denied. That is what makes progress possible.

One can find many examples of interdependence between China and Taiwan. Economically neither side would do as well as they do now with-

⁵⁷Wang Kuo-chen, *Yige Zhongguo yu liang'an tongyi* (One China and cross-Strait unification) (Taipei: Huanyu chubanshe 1995), 112-25.

⁵⁸Nussbaum, "Reply," 132-33, 138-39.

⁵⁹For more discussion on cosmopolitanism, see also Chiang Yi-hua, *Ziyou zhuyi, minzu zhuyi yu guojia rentong* (Liberalism, nationalism, and national identity) (Taipei: Yangzhi, 1998), 121-27.

⁶⁰See Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation*, 6th edition (New York: St. Martin's, 1997), 20-24; James M. Scott and A. Lane Crothers, "Out of the Cold: The Post-Cold War Context of U.S. Foreign Policy," in Scott, *After the End*, 4-5; and Peter Van Ness, "Hegemony, Not Anarchy: Why China and Japan Are Not Balancing U.S. Unipolar Power" (Paper presented at the annual conference of the International Security Studies Section of the International Studies Association and the International Security and Arms Control Section of the American Political Science Association, Whittier College, Whittier, California, October 26-27, 2001).

out the other. The charter flights in both directions across the Taiwan Strait during the Spring Festival period in 2005 and 2006 are a good example of the benefits derived from cooperation between the two sides.⁶¹ Politically, a decent resolution of the unification/independence conflict would not only mitigate the conflicts in Taiwan but also speed up the democratization process in China. Advocates of cosmopolitanism and political idealism would say that the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait are capable of thinking along the lines of mutual understanding and development.

If constructive engagement like the examples mentioned above is possible, we can then imagine a democratic HFC, which would help improve human rights conditions in China. Human rights and democracy have been the key issues that have hindered the normal development of Taiwan-China relations. An HFC will help move China in the direction of democracy and respect for human rights. It will also ameliorate the concerns Taiwan has about being "devoured" by a "totalitarian communist" state. There would be more trust and confidence between Taiwan and China. The competition among these political entities would be healthy competition between key players in the region, like that among the European Union nations.

In a word, advocates of both cosmopolitanism and political idealism would argue against the inability of people to cross cultural and political boundaries and against the zero-sum game as portrayed by political realism. Rather, they would hold that individuals are capable of understanding

⁶¹One of the reviewers mentions the geoeconomic modification of *realpolitik* in policymaking. In U.S.-China relations, "China may be a geopolitical opponent to the United States but may be a geoeconomic partner at one and the same time." That explains why President George W. Bush warned Taiwan's DPP government not to pursue a separatist course and instead has encouraged the two sides to engage in dialogue. Indeed, that is exactly what cosmopolitanism and idealism would argue in countering realism. An HFC is not a zero-sum game, but a multiple-sum one, as the reviewer observes. Benefits may outweigh disadvantages in such a reconciliation. An HFC is appealing to both Taiwan and the mainland. However, the hard part is that people still need to be convinced. Still, there is a ray of hope. The reviewer's concern that the PRC may not accept a federal solution might have been more justified in the past than it is now. Events indicate that the PRC is considering all possibilities, including the federal solution and recognition of the ROC. However, events also indicate that it is difficult for the Chinese government to do this, just as it is difficult for Taiwan to unify with China.

each other and appreciating one another's differences. Nations do depend on one another, and the mutual benefits outweigh mutual conflict. In these circumstances, an HFC is quite possible.

The problem, however, is that it is difficult to reconcile political realism and idealism/cosmopolitanism. As with the case of crossing cultural boundaries and overcoming prejudices and discriminatory attitudes, it takes great efforts for individuals to recognize each other's humanity. Cornel West laments the fact that whites in the United States have difficulty recognizing the humanity of blacks.⁶² That is a problem with all human beings with different ethnic and (sub)cultural origins. To more or less follow Anthony Lake, whom we have quoted earlier, until human nature changes, suspicion of each other, rather than recognizing each other's humanity, will remain at the heart of human relations. However, the future of humanity depends on how much we can change that.⁶³

Conclusions

From the (political) realist's point of view, it is indeed difficult for people to cross cultural, sub-cultural, and political barriers, and individuals from different groups may not be able to fully understand each other. Stereotypes and overgeneralizations about the "other" will prevail in intercultural and international relations, thus preventing any large-scale meaningful and empathetic understanding of people from other cultures. Prejudice and discriminatory attitudes will thus dominate cross-cultural relations.

Coupled with that difficulty is the strong belief that each individual or nation is out to maximize its own interests and that it will do so at all

⁶²Cornel West, *Race Matters* (New York: Vintage Books, 1994).

⁶³As Robert Gilpin points out, ultimately, "economic interdependence does not guarantee that cooperation will triumph over conflict; a global community of common values and outlook has yet to displace international anarchy." Cited by Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff in *Contending Theories of International Relations*, 85. Efforts still have to be made in that regard.

costs and by all means, including the use of violence. This political realism points to the difficulties of an association like an HFC since each person or nation is only looking after his/her/its own interests and they may not find an HFC, requiring sacrifice on both sides, conducive to those interests. According to this view, it is these political and economic interests that will finally determine the way of conflict or cooperation between Taiwan and mainland China.⁶⁴ Politicians will continue to use dubious means, especially violence, to achieve what they believe to be ethically good ends. Taiwan and China will each extract what they believe they deserve. None of the parties involved will be enthusiastic about a possible HFC, since it would mean sacrificing some of their sovereign power. And they would not do that unless forced to by violence of some kind. Beijing's military threat against Taiwan and Taiwan's attempts to drag the United States into a possible military conflict are efforts in that direction.

Advocates of cosmopolitanism and political idealism, however, would argue that the future may not be that gloomy, since people are essentially good and can learn to be empathetic. The relationship between Taiwan and China has been essentially good. Thus, an HFC might be possible across the Taiwan Strait because all sides would be able to see the human aspect and the benefits of such an association. They would see that constructive engagement is more favorable than containment or a "cold" or "hot" war, and such an association would appeal to the inner desire for peace, stability, and prosperity of all parties.

In addition to the above arguments in favor of political idealism and cosmopolitanism, it is true that the globalization process has increased understanding among cultures and nations. The existence of more supranational or global identities and associations will gradually decrease the role of ethnicity, nationalism, and nation-states.⁶⁵ Global communication

⁶⁴See also my interview with Chang Mau-kuei in 2003; Lin Man-houng in 2003; and Lin Chuo-shui (林濁水) in 2003.

⁶⁵See Bertrand Badie, "A World without Sovereignty: The End of the Nation-State?" (A talk given at Academia Sinica, sponsored by the Taipei Branch of the French Center for the Study of Modern China, September 30, 2002); Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin, "Introduction: Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era," in

has also opened up the possibility of an incipient world public sphere, which implies that states have lost some sovereignty anyway.⁶⁶ The same is already true across the Taiwan Strait. There is a greater possibility of developing associations and a cosmopolitan citizenship based on cosmopolitanism and political idealism. Cosmopolitanism may be gaining in strength and political idealism may not just remain an ideal.

Problems still remain, however, and individuals or nations do not always follow the principles of cosmopolitanism and political idealism. Rather, they tend to follow political realism. In other words, individuals and nations look after their own interests, which they try to maximize through domination and subordination. They constantly need an enemy, or an "other," in order to define who they are, as Huntington points out in his discussion of national identity. The revitalization of ethnic ties and nationalist insurgencies in the world today are examples of such attempts. The rise of Taiwanese and Chinese nationalisms amidst the globalization process is an indication of the same phenomenon.⁶⁷

Indeed, the forces of individuality and nationality will continue to exist. In a modern society of individuality, fluidity, and multiple identities, ethnicity and individual interests are still big factors in our lives.⁶⁸ When

Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era, ed. Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz, and Charles Westin (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 10-11, 16-18; Anthony D. Smith, *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism* (London and New York: Routledge 1998), 213-20; and Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv, "Asia in Theories of Nationalism and National Identity," in *Asian Forms of the Nation*, ed. Stein Tønnesson and Hans Antlöv (London: Curzon, 1996), 2, 23. See also Huntington, *Who Are We?* for a discussion on how the American identity is influenced by this globalization process in similar ways, although he does not seem to believe that it is a desirable thing.

⁶⁶See Jürgen Habermas, "Citizenship and National Identity: Some Reflections on the Future of Europe," *Praxis International* 12, no. 1 (April 1992): 18.

⁶⁷For Huntington's discussion, see his book *Who Are We?* For a discussion on Chinese and Taiwanese nationalism, see Zhidong Hao, "Between War and Peace: Ethical Dilemmas of Intellectuals and Nationalist Movements in Taiwan," *Pacific Affairs* 78, no. 2 (2005): 237-56; and Hao, "Between War and Peace: The Role of Nationalism in China's U.S. Policy Making with Regard to Taiwan," 139-68.

⁶⁸See Wang Fu-chang, *Dangdai Taiwan shehui de zuqun xiangxiang* (The contemporary Taiwanese society's ethnic imagination) (Taipei: National Taiwan University, 2002), 14; and Zhang Xudong, "Minzu guojia lilun yu dangdai Zhongguo" (The theories of the nation-

we evaluate the influence of regionalism (i.e., cultural and political differences) and cosmopolitanism, realism, and idealism in national and international relations, we will find that regionalism and realism often weigh more in the real world. This would make it more difficult for an HFC, since the latter mainly appeals to humanity rather than sovereignty, and humanity is a fragile thing in real life.

However, this does not mean that an HFC is impossible. As Stanley Henig points out in his analysis of European integration, in the end it is the internal problems and external events, or what he calls the "defining moments" in history, that make or break an HFC, so to speak.⁶⁹ Having said that, however, we must still point out that efforts to reconcile individuality and humanity, realism and idealism are crucial in creating an HFC rather than war across the Taiwan Strait. Such reconciliations can be the "moments" that define history.⁷⁰

In sum, cross-Strait relations are indeed at a crossroads. Will the two sides reconcile their cultural and political differences? And as an example of such reconciliation, will an HFC be possible? If the pursuit of individual and national interests is not balanced by the pursuit of cosmopolitan ones, the region may see more violence and destruction, as the political realists predict. The challenge is how to cross cultural, subcultural, and political boundaries and reconcile the forces of cosmopolitan and national interests so that forms of reconciliation like an HFC can be achieved, and the benefits for both humanity and individuality can be maximized. It is not going to be easy, but it is not impossible. Both sides have to make greater efforts

state and contemporary China), 2004, <http://members.lycos.co.uk/chinatown/author/Z/ZhangXuDong/ZhangXuDong003.txt>. Again Huntington in *Who Are We?* discusses how the American public, especially the whites, counters globalization and multiculturalism in order to protect its own national and ethnic interests.

⁶⁹ Stanley Henig, *The Uniting of Europe: From Consolidation to Enlargement*, 2nd edition (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

⁷⁰ In discussing the U.S.-China relationship, Kenneth Lieberthal observes, "If you let the pessimists—the people who believe that the U.S. and China will inevitably be enemies—drive policy, then the outcome will be the one they predict." By the same token, if you let the realists drive policy across the Taiwan Strait, the outcome will be the one they predict. See Steve Lohr, "Who Is Afraid of China Inc.?" *New York Times*, July 24, 2005.

than they do now. And a good place to start is to expand the cultural, social, and political exchanges in addition to the economic ones between the two sides so as to facilitate the understanding and appreciation of each other's differences.

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