

Taiwanese American Grassroots Lobbies on the Hill: A Case Study of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs

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This paper explores the factors that have influenced the effectiveness of Taiwanese American grassroots lobbies on Capitol Hill through a case study of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), a notable non-state actor that has been actively advancing Taiwanese interests in the United States since 1982. I undertake a comparative analysis of FAPA's five campaigns: its request to the Taiwan government to lift its blacklist policy, its urging of the U.S. government to allow Taiwanese Americans to state "Taiwan" as their place of birth on their U.S. passports, its promotion of Taiwan's participation in the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations, and its campaign in favor of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA) in 2000. The direct result of this analysis indicates that FAPA's success does not solely lie in its ability to find a champion in Congress, or to win the U.S. president's support. Equally important is the nature of the issues that FAPA campaigns bring up. If an issue resonates or is compatible with the preexisting collective identities and beliefs of the actors it affects, it is more likely to be pushed through in the legislature.

KEYWORDS: grassroots lobbies; Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA); blacklist campaign; birthplace campaign.

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The United States has historically been an immigrant country and many Americans have strong ties with their countries of origin. Not surprisingly, ethnic lobbies have at various times exerted a profound influence on the course of U.S. policy in relation to their homelands. One quintessential example is the well-endowed pro-Israeli lobby, consisting largely of members of the Jewish diaspora.¹

The pro-Taiwan lobby has much in common, in terms of composition, aspirations, and operations, with the pro-Israeli lobby. Historian Nancy B. Tucker argues that the Taiwan lobby is second only to that of Israel when it comes to outreach in the United States.² Although Tucker's comparison might be contestable, she does highlight the existence and the ambition of the pro-Taiwan lobby in American politics.

This paper consists of a case study of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA, 台灣人公共事務會), the first Taiwanese American interest group to exert systematic efforts in congressional lobbying³ with the aim of promoting international support for the right of the people of Taiwan to establish an independent and democratic country and to join the international community. I intend to conduct a comparative analysis of FAPA's campaigns to find out what influences an overseas Taiwanese lobby's success or failure in the U.S. Congress.

Created in Los Angeles in 1982, FAPA had fifty-five chapters in the United States as of December 2006 as well as informal contacts with politicians and opinion leaders in other countries (i.e., Canada, South Africa, Australia, the United Kingdom, and Japan). Its headquarters, in Washington, D.C., is in charge of planning and coordination, while en-

¹Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004), 276-85.

²Nancy B. Tucker, "China-Taiwan: U.S. Debates and Policy Choices," *Survival* 40, no. 4 (1998/1999): 150-67.

³Catherine Kai-ping Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy in the United States: The Case of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs," *Journal of Contemporary China* 15, no. 46 (February 2006): 133-59.

couraging a more supportive policy toward Taiwan in the U.S. Congress.⁴

To understand the story of FAPA, we have first to understand the political development of Taiwan in the 1950s. In 1949, the government of the Republic of China (ROC) lost its battle against the Chinese Communists (People's Republic of China, PRC) on the Chinese mainland and relocated to Taiwan.⁵ From 1949 to 2000, Taiwan was ruled by this government-in-exile from mainland China, which was in essence an authoritarian regime controlled by one political party—the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨).

Against this backdrop, a political opposition was formed to challenge the KMT's dominance and call for the opening up of society. The opposition's criticisms were unwelcome to the KMT leaders. Many dissidents ended up in jail, disappeared for no reason, or were forced to leave Taiwan to escape persecution. Pertaining to this paper, I would like to mention the life story of Professor Peng Ming-min (彭明敏), who is known as the "godfather of Taiwan's independence movement" (台獨教父) and also as a co-founder of FAPA. Professor Peng was a teacher at National Taiwan University who in 1964 worked with his students on "A Manifesto to Save Taiwan" (台灣自救運動宣言). The Manifesto argued that the government's goal of retaking mainland China was unfeasible and that the constitution should be rewritten to safeguard human rights and democracy in Taiwan. Before the Manifesto could be distributed, Professor Peng was arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison by a military court.⁶

Professor Peng's case received worldwide attention. With the help of Amnesty International's Swedish chapter, he escaped to Sweden.⁷ In 1970, the U.S. government helped him enter the United States. Peng and some of the many other Taiwanese exiles in the United States then co-founded FAPA, in the hope that by making the U.S. government aware of Taiwan's

⁴Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), <http://www.fapa.org>.

⁵I use Taiwan and the Republic of China (ROC) interchangeably throughout the text. I similarly use China and the People's Republic of China (PRC) interchangeably.

⁶Peng Ming-min, *A Taste of Freedom*, <http://www.romanization.com/books/peng/>.

⁷Ibid.

domestic situation it could exert international pressure on the KMT and eventually promote Taiwan's democratic transformation. Professor Peng served as FAPA's president from 1986 to 1988.⁸

When studying the role of non-state actors in international relations, it is always hard to define the accountability of these actors. FAPA's constituency can be defined in two distinct ways: first as Taiwanese people or people of Taiwanese origin (i.e., Taiwanese Americans), and second as those Taiwanese Americans who identify themselves as Taiwanese, not Chinese.

According to the 2000 U.S. census, there are anywhere between 2.3 million and 2.7 million people who identify themselves as Chinese Americans (not Taiwanese) in the United States. This is the largest single Asian grouping in the U.S. population. In the same census, there were around 144,000 Taiwanese Americans.⁹ It is hard to explain why and how people identify themselves as Chinese Americans or Taiwanese Americans. The distinction is vague, and I do not intend to tackle the national identity problem here. Nonetheless, in general, those who identify themselves as Taiwanese Americans usually assert that Taiwan should be recognized as a *de jure* sovereign state. Those who identify themselves as Chinese Americans are usually not supportive of Taiwan's attempt to become an independent state. FAPA's constituency basically consists of the former group of people, and it is FAPA's mission to represent this group's political aspirations.

In this paper, I shall investigate how successful each of FAPA's campaigns has been in influencing the two chambers of the U.S. Congress to pass resolutions supported by FAPA. My question ultimately concerns why FAPA has been able to gain congressional support in some campaigns while failing in others.

The influence of FAPA on U.S. Taiwan policy has been sporadically but unsystematically identified in the English-language literature on Tai-

⁸For a detailed account of the founding of FAPA and its connection to the broader Taiwanese overseas opposition movement, see note 3 above.

⁹The U.S. Census Bureau, *The Asian Census 2000*, <http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/c2kbr01-16.pdf>.

wan affairs and it deserves further attention.¹⁰ Catherine Kai-Ping Lin's (林愷萍) 2006 article was the first comprehensive documentation in English of the organizational history and advocacy activities of FAPA.¹¹ I do not intend to repeat this here, but instead to conduct a controlled comparative analysis of FAPA's five campaigns in order to construct a more analytical understanding of the organization.

I believe that a case study of the Taiwanese American community's experiences will help cast light on what works and what does not work in terms of influencing U.S. foreign policy. Scholars have given different weight to the importance of "domestic structure" or "norms and values" in determining interest groups' influence. FAPA's campaigns offer a background of some fairly uniform conditions while at the same time allowing us to observe different potential explanations of their success or failure. The most distinct factors to be tested are whether it is the nature of the campaign issues or the domestic structure of the United States that determines FAPA's influence. In the next section, I will propose my hypotheses and identify the factors that might have caused FAPA's success or failure in Congress. In the third part I will explain my methodology and research design, and then I will proceed to analyze if the potential explanations on the influence of FAPA are valid. This will be followed by a detailed discussion of the five campaigns and a comparison between them. In the last section I shall analyze the findings and draw some conclusions.

Hypotheses

Hypothesis concerning FAPA's Ability to Find Champions in Congress

I first postulate a positive relationship between FAPA's ability to find champions in Congress and the passage of bills supported by FAPA

¹⁰Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004); and Gary D. Rawnsley, *Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda* (London: Macmillan; New York: St. Martin's, 2000).

¹¹See note 3 above.

in both houses. Risse-Kappen's domestic structure approach suggests that gaining access to the policymaking apparatus as well as cooperating with the right domestic actors have a great impact on the campaign outcomes of interest groups.¹² The United States has many access points for organized interests, and FAPA has access to its target, the U.S. Congress. The question therefore does not rest on FAPA's ability to gain access or not, but rather on its ability to mobilize members of Congress to support its agenda. The key, in Lowery and Brasher's view, is to seek a champion for one's cause in Congress, or even better, in important or relevant committees.¹³

There are many factors leading to a particular legislator's championship of an interest group's cause. Legislators care most about their constituents' positions because they are vital to their electoral success. Constituents matter when they have strong and uniform preferences on a particular bill. If they are uncommitted or divided on a proposal, then lawmakers may be less constrained by constituents' stances when they vote. In addition, one should not dismiss the importance of campaign contributions to legislators. Constituents who can inject relatively large amounts of money into electoral campaigns are more likely to mobilize legislators to work in favor of their interests. This also implies that although U.S. politics is replete with entry points for organized interests, the representation of interests in Congress is uneven. Money and resources can certainly bolster the influence of some constituents and interest groups.¹⁴

Legislators are also influenced by the preferences of their political parties. Equally important is the legislator's personal preferences (deriving

¹²Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Introduction," in *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions*, ed. Thomas Risse-Kappen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 20.

¹³David Lowery and Holly Brasher, *Organized Interests and American Government* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2004), 151-52.

¹⁴Ken Kollman, *Outside Lobbying: Public Opinion and Interest Group Strategies* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), 155-62.

from personal ideology and beliefs). Sometimes his/her preference on a particular issue is strong enough to outweigh any pressures from constituents or organized interests.¹⁵ In brief, if an interest group can master the above factors well, it will have a better chance of persuading legislators to support its cause. I therefore hypothesize that if FAPA can find a champion (or champions) in Congress, the legislation it supports is more likely to be pushed through in both the House and the Senate.

Hypothesis concerning the Importance of the U.S. Administration's Support

My second hypothesis concerns a positive relationship between the U.S. administration's support and the passage of bills supported by FAPA by both houses of Congress. Again, this hypothesis is drawn from Risse-Kappen's domestic structure approach which suggests the significance of winning allies to the outcome of interest groups' campaigns. Here, I will posit that the necessary allies do not only come from within Congress, but also include the president and his administration.¹⁶

Many scholars have pointed out the old conflict between Congress and the presidency over the right to formulate and implement American foreign policy.¹⁷ With regard to foreign policy, and U.S. China policy in particular, there is a tendency for the president and the administration to prioritize national strategic interests, while members of Congress tend to consider issues such as human rights, and to seek to expose the discrepancy between commitment and action in the conduct of Sino-American relations.¹⁸

Although most legislators do not like to admit it, the reality is that the position of the president and his administration does influence the

¹⁵Lowery and Brasher, *Organized Interests and American Government*, 154-56.

¹⁶See note 12 above.

¹⁷Jacob K. Javits, "The Congressional Presence in Foreign Relations," *Foreign Affairs* 48 (1970): 21-34; and John G. Tower, "Congress versus the President: The Formulation and Implementation of American Foreign Policy," *ibid.* 60 (1981/1982): 229-46.

¹⁸Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 158.

way members of Congress vote. The president can influence legislators in many ways, from appeals to members of his/her own party to support the president's legislative agenda, to enticements such as grants to their states or districts.¹⁹ Given the presidency's vital role in foreign policy making, one can therefore posit that if an FAPA campaign can win the support of the administration, the legislation it supports is more likely to be passed by both chambers.

Hypothesis on Norms

Keck and Sikkink take a different approach from that of Risse-Kappen in that they underline the importance of norms and values in determining the influence of transnational networks.²⁰ They believe that the nature of an issue proposed by a transnational network is crucial to the success or failure of a campaign. The most successful networks tend to focus on issues that involve bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or the denial of legal equality of opportunity. This proposition is similar to the resonance hypothesis developed by Finnemore and Sikkink, which argues that if transnational networks can create an issue or idea that resonates with preexisting beliefs in the target state, they are more likely to be influential in their campaigns.²¹ These ideas come in essence from the constructivist strand of thought, and echo a greater theoretical debate within social science about the influence of norms and values on the behaviors of states. Drawing from Keck and Sikkink's observation, I hence posit that if FAPA's campaign issue resonates or is compatible with the preexisting collective identities and beliefs of the actors to be affected, the legislation it supports is more likely to be passed by both chambers of Congress.

¹⁹Lowery and Brasher, *Organized Interests and American Government*, 157.

²⁰Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 27-28.

²¹Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change," *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 887-917.

Methodology and Research Design

In testing hypotheses relating to the influence of FAPA, I will conduct a controlled comparative analysis of campaigns. Five major campaigns identified on FAPA's website are chosen for comparison.²²

The first is the blacklist campaign (1982-92). This was the campaign to get the ROC government to abolish its blacklist of citizens and non-citizens who had been active in or somehow affiliated with anti-KMT organizations at home and abroad and were therefore banned from leaving Taiwan or, if abroad, returning to the island. The ROC government did not welcome FAPA's position on this issue.²³

The second is the birthplace campaign (1992-94). FAPA requested that the U.S. government allow Taiwanese Americans to state "Taiwan" as their birthplace on their U.S. passports, instead of "China." FAPA was the prime initiator of this campaign.

The third is the U.N. campaign (1992-present). FAPA promotes Taiwan's bid for participation in the United Nations. The Taiwan government has its own U.N. membership campaign, but its approach is different from that of FAPA. On this issue, there has sometimes been friction, rather than cooperation, between FAPA and the Taiwan authorities.

The fourth is the WHO campaign (1997-present). The ultimate goal of this campaign is Taiwan's full membership of the WHO. Strategically, as Coen Blaauw suggests, it chose to start "small" by asking for support

²²FAPA states on its website that it has been working on several "important issues" over the years, which I broadly term "campaigns" in this paper. The number and content of these issues are subject to change in line with developments in Sino-U.S. relations. I have arbitrarily chosen five major FAPA campaigns for analysis. Some of the campaigns I have not dealt with are (1) the campaign to support the Taiwan government's plan to hold a referendum on independence; (2) the campaign to get the U.S. government to allow high-level Taiwanese elected officials to visit the United States; and (3) the campaign urging the U.S. government to demand that the PRC withdraw its missiles from Fujian province (福建省).

²³In its early days, FAPA did not divide its work into campaigns on separate issues; it simply took every opportunity to make the U.S. public aware of the human rights situation in Taiwan. It was only when more American legislators began to pay attention to Taiwan issues that FAPA was granted access to present more explicit advice on particular subjects, such as the ending of the blacklist. For the purposes of this article, I extract FAPA's activities concerning the blacklist from this general work in the early period.

for observer status at the WHO's annual meeting—the World Health Assembly (WHA) in Geneva. The ROC government launched a similar campaign for observer status in 1997, and has repeatedly called for its allies to submit proposals to the WHA to this end. However, despite the similarity of their positions, FAPA and the ROC government did not cooperate on this issue during the KMT administration. It was only after the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) came to power that it began to establish contacts with the government with regard to the WHO issue.

The fifth is the TSEA campaign (1999-2000). This was a campaign to promote the passage of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act (TSEA). FAPA was not the prime initiator of this campaign. The TSEA was initiated in 1999 by a group consisting of neo-conservatives and anti-communist legislators and think tanks. This group, that was often termed the "blue team," held the view that the PRC posed a major security threat to the United States and that the United States should contain the PRC and support Taiwan. FAPA's position was to support the bill, while the ROC government took a more discreet (but in fact supportive) position toward the TSEA.

Through qualitative analysis of secondary literature and focused interviews, I will identify which of these campaigns stress issues of bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or the denial of legal equality of opportunity, as well as which campaigns won the support of the administration and which managed to mobilize champions in Congress.

I will discuss each of these five campaigns in depth, in terms of its background, campaign activities, and outcome in Congress. The four types of political tactics identified by Keck and Sikkink will be used as a kind of backbone to this analysis as follows.²⁴ *Information politics* refers to the ability of interest groups to generate politically usable information and move it to where it will have the most impact. The purpose of offering such information is to frame and call attention to issues. *Symbolic politics* refers to the ability of interest groups to use symbolic events to boost their

²⁴Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*, 16-25.

cause. If used tactically, symbolic events can help reinforce interest groups' messages and convince more people to support their campaign agenda. *Leverage politics* refers to the ability of interest groups to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation where they are unlikely to have clout on their own. *Accountability politics* refers to the ability of interest groups to hold powerful actors to their previously stated policies or principles.

The Blacklist Campaign

Background: The ROC government blacklisted local inhabitants and foreigners who had or were perceived to have engaged in political dissent against the regime, and constrained their entry into and exit from Taiwan. Chen Chong-sin (陳重信) estimates that eight hundred to one thousand people were on the blacklist as of 1991.²⁵ From 1987 to 1992, many overseas dissidents attempted to enter Taiwan but were immediately deported.²⁶

Campaign activities: FAPA wanted the blacklist system to be abolished. Before I begin to trace the development of this campaign, I would first like to note that when FAPA was formed in the early 1980s, it had only limited capability to undertake lobbying because it was initially registered as an educational organization under U.S. tax code 501 (c) (3). Legally, FAPA could only publish pamphlets and brochures, as well as organize events to inform and educate the public on issues of concern or to tell them how to participate in the political process in order to influence legislation. It was only in June 2001, when FAPA established the Formosan Association for Public Relations (FAPR) under U.S. tax code 501 (c) (4) that the organization had a full-fledged legal wing through which it could

²⁵Chen Chong-sin, "Taiwanmen: heimingdan zhengce yu renquan" (Taiwangate: blacklist policy and human rights), in *Zijue yu rentong: 1950-1990 nian haiwai Taiwanren yundong zhuanji* (Self-awakening and identity: overseas Taiwanese movements, 1950-90), ed. Chang Yen-hsien, Tseng Chiu-mei, and Chen Chao-hai (Taipei: Wu Sanlien Taiwan shiliao jijinhui, 2005), 555-71.

²⁶Taiwan Human Rights InfoNet, <http://www.2003hr.net>.

conduct political lobbying.²⁷ According to my interview with FAPA's lobbyist Coen Blaauw,²⁸ FAPA staff were careful not to exceed their legal remit prior to the formal establishment of FAPR. Lin, in her 2006 study, also interviewed another FAPA staff member, Mark J. Cohen, who similarly stressed that what FAPA focused on in its early days was "educational lobbying."²⁹ Based on his past experience of dealing with FAPA staff in Congress, Richard Bush (卜睿哲) comments that "it is fair to say that FAPA exceeded its legal authority prior to the founding of FAPR.... To be fair, however, I would also say that 501 (c) (3) is probably one of the more poorly enforced sections of the U.S. tax code. Moreover, the KMT-controlled government exceeded diplomatic propriety itself and played its own role in influencing American foreign policy."³⁰

FAPA started its blacklist campaign, as it did other campaigns, by using what Keck and Sikkink call information politics. This was a way in which it could build up its influence while at the same time fulfilling its then purely educational role. A large part of FAPA's daily work entailed exchanging information with congressional staff through telephone calls, fax communications, and the circulation of newsletters and pamphlets.³¹ FAPA also encouraged members to flex their muscles as constituents by means of a congressional handbook telling them how to approach their congressional offices and local representatives.

²⁷For more information see Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 143-44.

²⁸I conducted phone interviews and exchanged correspondence with FAPA's lobbyist Coen Blaauw from May 2005 to March 2006. To avoid excessive notation, I will not repeat this elsewhere in this paper.

²⁹Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 148.

³⁰The author's email correspondence with Richard Bush, January 9, 2007. For detailed information on the difference between the 501 (c) (3) and 501 (c) (4) tax codes, see B. Holly Schadler, *The Connection: Strategies for Creating and Operating 501 (c) (3)s, 501 (c) (4)s, and PACs* (The Alliance for Justice, 1998), 2-3.

³¹Chi Tsung, "From the China Lobby to the Taiwan Lobby: Movers and Shakers of the U.S.-China-Taiwan Triangular Relationship," in *The Expanding Roles of Chinese Americans in U.S.-China Relations: Transnational Networks and Trans-Pacific Interactions*, ed. Peter H. Koehn and Xiao-huang Yin (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 108-24; and Robert G. Sutter, *U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), 76.

Meanwhile, FAPA exercised symbolic politics to help advance its cause. For instance, on the thirty-third anniversary of the ROC government's imposition of martial law on May 20, 1982, FAPA persuaded four members of Congress—Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-MA), chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs Claiborne Pell (D-RJ), chairman of the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Stephen J. Solarz (D-NJ), and Representative Jim Leach (R-Iowa)—to hold a press conference on the subject.

These four members were known in some quarters as the "four horsemen" or the "gang of four" on account of their willingness to speak out in Congress on behalf of democracy in Taiwan.³² Their support did not come by accident. Contacts between overseas Taiwanese activists and Representative Solarz and Senator Kennedy, for instance, predate the birth of FAPA.³³ The Taiwanese diaspora in the United States promised them election contributions in exchange for their support in Congress.³⁴ Lin also mentions that Senator Pell had been trained in Taiwanese history as a diplomat before he entered Congress, which gave him a deep "interest and commitment to the people of Taiwan unmatched by any other member of Congress."³⁵

³²Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 197; and Chai Trong-rong, *Minshi yu wo* (FTV and I) (Taipei: Formosa Television Company, 2003), 24-25.

³³The activists' contacts with Solarz and Kennedy date back to the issue of the quota of Chinese immigrants to the United States, which in 1979, when Washington established diplomatic ties with Beijing, was shared out between the ROC and the PRC, giving the much more populous PRC an advantage over Taiwan. As a result, Dr. Chai Trong-rong (蔡同榮, later a founder of FAPA) and his friends began to knock on the doors of Representative Solarz and Senator Kennedy. Richard Bush, a member of Solarz's staff, recalls that it was Dr. Chai who awakened the legislator's interest in Taiwan affairs and turned him into a Taiwan expert, constantly informing him about Taiwanese issues and assisting him with fundraising. Similarly, the Taiwanese community in the United States also offered financial support to Senator Kennedy in return for his support on the immigration quota issue. For more information, see Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 193-94; Chai, *Minshi yu wo*, 22-25; the author's interview with Yang Maysing (楊美幸) in Taipei, July 15, 2005.

³⁴Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 193-94; Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 147-49; Chai, *Minshi yu wo*, 22-25; and interview with Yang Maysing in 2005.

³⁵Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 157-58.

In addition, FAPA pointed out that the blacklist policy denied individuals legal equality, in that they could not freely leave or return to their homeland. For instance, in a letter to President George H. W. Bush on May 7, 1991, Coen Blaauw reported the number of Taiwan-born citizens in the United States who had been banned from entering Taiwan, and referred to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to argue that everyone should have the right to freely leave or return to his or her own country.³⁶

Several responses from the White House were positive, which leads me to assume that the administration was supportive of FAPA's campaign. For instance, the White House organized a briefing for Taiwanese Americans on March 5, 1992, the first time White House staff had public and formal contact with Taiwanese Americans. With about ninety representatives of Taiwanese American communities from around the country in attendance, the briefing was mainly about the KMT government's blacklist policy, human rights issues, and national security in Taiwan.³⁷

Outcome in Congress: Representative Solarz helped introduce a non-binding resolution (otherwise referred to as a concurrent resolution)—HCON RES 248—in the House. Concurrent resolutions, being non-binding, are easier to get approved, and they proved useful to FAPA during its campaigns. The downside, however, was that since the bill was non-binding, the president could choose not to approve it if he did not agree with it.³⁸ Senators Pell, Kennedy, and Joe Lieberman (D-CT) submitted a similar bill, SCON RES 99, in the Senate. Both bills stated that the Taiwan authorities should permit Taiwan-born residents of the United States who were excluded from Taiwan to return to their homeland. The Senate passed the bill on March 10, 1992, and the House followed suit on May 14.³⁹

³⁶Coen Blaauw's letter can be found at http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/china/1999_0182_F/c0034_01/c0034_01_238921/c0034_01_238921.pdf.

³⁷John Chen, *FAPA yu guohui waijiao* (FAPA and congressional diplomacy) (Taipei: Vanguard, 2004), 114.

³⁸The author's conversation with Richard Bush in Taipei, July 18, 2005.

³⁹The Library of Congress, <http://thomas.loc.gov>. The congressional resolutions mentioned in this paper are all taken directly from this website. To avoid excessive notation, I will not repeat this elsewhere in the paper.

Although this research focuses mainly on the outcome in Congress, I shall note that, bowing to rising pressure at home and abroad, the KMT government gradually phased out the blacklist system and ended its suppression of political dissidents. As a sign of the KMT's reform, on May 15, 1992, the Legislative Yuan (立法院) passed an amendment to Article 100 of the ROC's criminal law which meant that political dissidence was no longer tantamount to sedition.⁴⁰

The Birthplace Campaign

Background: The birthplace campaign arose from the complaints of some Taiwanese Americans who wanted to have "Taiwan" recorded as their birthplace on their American passports. Until 1995, they did not have such an option. When they indicated on their passport applications that "Taiwan" was their place of birth, "China" was printed in the relevant place on the inside front cover of the passport. As a result, they expressed their frustration of this practice to FAPA.

Campaign activities: Allowing Taiwanese Americans to put "Taiwan" as their birthplace on their passports could imply that the United States recognized Taiwan's statehood, thus violating the "one China" policy. FAPA's strategy was to alleviate policymakers' concerns about this and assure them that a policy change in this regard would not have a fundamental impact on U.S. China policy.

The birthplace campaign began around 1992. As in the blacklist campaign, FAPA made use of information politics. FAPA used Representative Solarz again and also Representative Dennis M. Hertel (D-MI) to help promote its agenda.

During the birthplace campaign, FAPA encountered two major setbacks. The first came at the end of 1992, when Representatives Hertel and Solarz failed in their re-election bids.⁴¹ FAPA had lost two champions

⁴⁰Taiwan Human Rights InfoNet, <http://www.2003hr.net>.

⁴¹Chen, *FAPA yu guohui waijiao*, 124.

and had to seek new allies. One vital person FAPA contacted was Representative Howard Berman (D-CA) and his staff member Amit Pandya. Representative Berman's chairmanship of the International Operations Subcommittee was the key reason why he attracted FAPA's attention. FAPA came to the conclusion that in order to bypass the sensitive issue of the "one China" policy, the birthplace issue should be attached to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of the annual State Department Authorization Bill (SDAB) (Fiscal Years 1994 and 1995). The reason for this, according to Blaauw, was that there was a better chance of getting it passed as part of an annual vehicle like the SDAB than as a free-standing bill.

The plan worked. Both houses passed the SDAB, including the birthplace bill, in April. Specifically, Section 132 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (HR 2333) contained a short regulation, saying, "For purposes of the registration of birth or certification of nationality of a United States citizen born in Taiwan, the Secretary of State shall permit the place of birth to be recorded as Taiwan."

However, Section 132 did not refer to "passports," and in an abrupt about-face in May 1994, the State Department announced that it would therefore not allow Taiwanese Americans to use "Taiwan" as their place of birth on passports. I cannot find any solid evidence of the administration's position on this issue, but this decision by the State Department implies that the administration's attitude was unsupportive. Blaauw states that he cannot remember the exact situation at the time, only explaining that there is always a loophole for the president to state that part of a bill is unacceptable as it is inconsistent with his obligations under the U.S. Constitution.

After repeated consultations between FAPA staff and Berman's aide Amit Pandya, it was decided that another attempt would be made with a more specifically-worded bill attached to the annual State Department Technical Corrections Bill (SDTCB) which like the SDAB, offered legislators the opportunity to pass a package of bills at the same time.

Outcome in Congress: The second try worked. On September 12, 1994, Representatives Howard Berman and Olympia Snowe (R-ME) submitted HR 5034 with the birthplace bill attached. The birthplace ruling was contained in Section 132 of HR 5034 of the SDTCB. This amended

Section 132 of HR 2333 by inserting a few words to specify the passport issue. President Bill Clinton signed it into Public Law 103-415 on October 25, 1994. In December, the State Department formally announced procedures to implement this law. It is unclear why the Clinton administration agreed to let the birthplace bill be implemented the second time around. Blaauw comments that the president may have felt that he had to sign it as Congress was so persistent on this issue.

The U.N. Campaign

Background: The U.N. issue stemmed from the old rivalry between the ROC and the PRC over which was the legitimate representative of China. The ROC was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945, and a permanent member of the Security Council. After its relocation to Taiwan and the establishment of the PRC on mainland China, diplomatic competition over legitimate recognition began. After many years of striving, the PRC obtained U.N. membership in 1971 when the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2758 (XXVI) replacing the ROC with the PRC as a permanent member of the Security Council. Since then, many states have switched diplomatic relations to the PRC.

FAPA started its campaign in Congress for Taiwan's U.N. membership in 1992, and it is still going on today. Interestingly, the Taiwan government also decided to bid for U.N. membership in 1993. This decision, according to Munro, was a result of the Taiwan public's growing aspiration for U.N. membership, regardless of their political allegiance.⁴²

Despite the fact that both FAPA and the Taiwan government want Taiwan to join the United Nations, the prospects of success are bleak in the face of PRC opposition. According to Chapter II, Article 4 of the U.N. Charter, the admission of new members requires a decision of the General

⁴²Ross H. Munro, "Giving Taipei a Place at the Table," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 110-11.

Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council. In reality, Taiwan's application has only ever reached the General Committee of the General Assembly where the U.N. General Assembly's annual agenda is set. The Committee has never been able to put the issue on the annual agenda due to a lack of consensus.⁴³

The ROC has tried different strategies to achieve a breakthrough on this issue. It has, for example, promised economic assistance to its Latin American allies (who held U.N. seats) in exchange for their speaking up for the ROC in the United Nations. From 1993 to 1996, they attempted to get the General Assembly to set up a "special council" to investigate Taiwan's case. Then from 1997 to 1998, the strategy was changed to one of asking allies to propose a review of Resolution 2758 to amend the part that drove out the ROC representatives and to reestablish Taiwan's right to participate in the United Nations.⁴⁴

At first glance, the ROC government's position was in line with that of FAPA. However, there was one big difference: FAPA did not support the amendment of U.N. Resolution 2758, as that would have brought the ROC back into the United Nations. Rather, FAPA, which had always been antagonistic to the KMT authorities, wanted U.N. membership for Taiwan, not the ROC. FAPA's goal was much more radical than that of the Taipei government because it would have pushed Taiwan further toward *de jure* independence. This schism, as will be shown below, created tension and competition between the ROC government (particularly under KMT rule) and FAPA.

Campaign activities: FAPA used what Keck and Sikkink term leverage politics. Whether Taiwan could enter the United Nations or not was up to the United Nations to decide. However, instead of directly lobbying the United Nations, FAPA strived to persuade the U.S. Congress to support Taiwan's bid. The goal was to make Congress pass resolutions to support Taiwan, and then use this legal basis to pressure the U.S. government to

⁴³Ibid., 110.

⁴⁴Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA), <http://www.fapa.org>.

help Taiwan. One may ask why FAPA chose the United States as the key battlefield to fight for this cause. The main reason, according to FAPA's website, was that the United States was the only country in the world that could stand up to the PRC and support the ROC. FAPA hoped that the action of the United States would increase international pressure on the United Nations to accept Taiwan's bid.

The discourse of FAPA's campaign focused on legal equality of opportunity in terms of U.N. participation. By stressing that the United Nations, though founded to uphold universal representation of all peoples, still excluded the Taiwanese, FAPA sought to expose a discrepancy between commitment and practice, thus winning public sympathy for Taiwan.

FAPA made 1993 its "year of the U.N." FAPA mobilized fourteen Taiwanese groups to post a joint statement in the *Washington Times* in support of Taiwan's bid on June 26 that year, the forty-eighth anniversary of the founding of the United Nations.⁴⁵ The following year, FAPA president John Chen (陳榮儒) visited Taiwanese communities in Australia and New Zealand, seeking their support for the U.N. bid. He also took the opportunity to promote the campaign to an Australian Senator William O'Chee.⁴⁶

Despite these annual efforts, the U.N. campaign has never won positive support from the U.S. administration, as Taiwan's re-entry to the United Nations would run foul of the U.S. "one China" policy.⁴⁷ This,

⁴⁵Chen, *FAPA yu guohui waijiao*, 355. The fourteen Taiwanese groups were: (1) Formosan Association for Public Affairs (FAPA); (2) World Federation of Taiwanese Associations (WFTA); (3) Taiwanese Association of America (TAA); (4) World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI), USA; (5) Association for a Plebiscite in Taiwan (APT); (6) North American Taiwanese Medical Association (NATMA); (7) North American Taiwanese Professors Association (NATPA); (8) Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) America-East Chapter; (9) North American Taiwanese Women's Association (NATWA); (10) Formosan Association for Human Rights (FAHR); (11) Committee for Taiwan's New Constitution (CTNC); (12) Taiwanese Christian Church Council of North America (TCCCNA); (13) Center for Taiwan International Relations (CTIR); and (14) UN for Taiwan Alliance (UNTA).

⁴⁶Chen, *FAPA yu guohui waijiao*, 151, 190-92.

⁴⁷This is exemplified by President Bill Clinton's announcement during his 1998 trip to China that he would not support Taiwan's membership of any organization that would require recognition of statehood. See also Dennis V. Hickey, "U.S. Policy and Taiwan's Bid to Rejoin the United Nations," *Asian Survey* 37, no. 11 (November 1997): 1031-43.

however, does not necessarily imply that the United States would oppose or block Taiwan's admission. As Kent Wiedemann, deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, explained before the House International Relations Committee in August 1995, "the U.S. could accept any solution to this issue which is consistent with the U.N. Charter and is agreed upon by the people on both sides of the Strait. Until Taiwan and the PRC reach such an agreement, however, we believe that no good, and considerable harm, would come from U.S. support of Taiwan's participation in the U.N."⁴⁸

What is more interesting is that the ROC government's *de facto* representative in the United States—the Coordination Council for North American Affairs (CCNAA, 北美事務協調委員會, later renamed the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, TECRO, 台北經濟文化代表處), sometimes acted to sabotage FAPA's U.N. campaign. For example, Chen recalls that ROC officials lobbied Representative Robert K. Dornan (R-CA) to withdraw a bill in support of FAPA's agenda that he was about to submit to Congress.⁴⁹ One former ROC diplomat in the United States has confirmed that they were all instructed to treat FAPA as the enemy and to work against it.⁵⁰ The main reason for this, as mentioned above, was that FAPA's ultimate goal of *de jure* statehood for Taiwan ran counter to the KMT's policy of one day returning to mainland China and becoming the legitimate government again.

Outcome in Congress: FAPA was able to find a number of U.S. legislators willing to introduce bills in support of Taiwan's U.N. bid. For example, FAPA worked with Representative Robert G. Torricelli (D-NJ) to introduce a concurrent resolution, HCON RES 166, on October 14, 1993, in favor of Taiwan's U.N. membership, with 110 other representatives co-sponsoring the bill. The KMT government, interestingly enough,

⁴⁸Testimony of Kent Wiedemann on the concurrent resolution HCON RES 63:33-34.

⁴⁹Chen, *FAPA yu guohui waijiao*, 173-74.

⁵⁰From the author's conversation with this anonymous contact in Taipei, July 7, 2005. For additional information on the KMT's moves to obstruct FAPA, see Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 153-54.

persuaded Representative Gerald Solomon (R-NY) to propose a similar bill, HCON RES 148, on September 21 that year, with 142 co-sponsors. The differences in the bills' wording reflected the aforementioned cleavage between FAPA and the ROC government on this issue. HCON RES 166 emphasized that it was "Taiwan" that was contending for a U.N. seat, while HCON RES 148 advocated U.N. membership for the "Republic of China on Taiwan." As Representative Torricelli explicitly stated, "the language of this resolution (HCON RES 148) was unacceptable to both the leadership of FAPA and myself."⁵¹ He was also worried that Congress would not take substantial action in support of Taiwan's U.N. bid as long as there were two different versions of the resolution.⁵²

This problem persuaded Representative Torricelli and FAPA of the need to enter discussions with Representative Solomon, the ROC Foreign Ministry, the ROC representative in the United States, and other relevant American legislators in order to generate a single, coherent resolution.⁵³ After several months of negotiation, on April 7, 1995, Representatives Solomon, Torricelli, and others introduced another concurrent resolution, HCR 63. In Representative Torricelli's correspondence with FAPA, he highlighted a few of the differences between Representative Solomon's 1993 HCON RES 148 and the 1995 HCON RES 63, which I briefly list below so readers can understand what was negotiated between the aforementioned players:⁵⁴

- HCON RES 148 mentioned the Republic of China twelve times and Taiwan only once. HCON RES 63 listed the Republic of China only three times, but Taiwan twenty times
- HCON RES 148 mentioned that "China has been a divided nation since 1949," a phrase which Representative Torricelli recalled as

⁵¹This is taken from Representative Torricelli's correspondence with FAPA on April 20, 1995, which is included in Chen, *FAPA yu guohui wajiao*, 385-86.

⁵²Ibid.

⁵³Ibid.

⁵⁴Ibid.

"troublesome to many Taiwanese," and which therefore did not appear in HCON RES 63

- HCON RES 148 concluded that "the Republic of China on Taiwan" deserved a U.N. seat. HCON RES 63 replaced the term "Republic of China on Taiwan" with "Taiwan"

These changes show that Representative Torricelli was able to negotiate a resolution that was more favorable to FAPA's position. Sixty-six representatives co-sponsored HCON RES 63 in 1995. The bill was first referred to the House Committee on International Relations and later to the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. It was the subject of a committee hearing in August 1995. During subsequent years, FAPA continuously worked with U.S. legislators to promote several bills in support of Taiwan's U.N. bid, including HCON RES 212 and SCON RES 3 in 1996, HCON RES 132 in 1997, and HCON RES 390 in 2000.

The WHO Campaign

Background: The WHO campaign was launched around 1997, when FAPA was still making little progress with its annual U.N. effort. Blaauw says that FAPA staff felt that the political agenda of the U.N. campaign was too obvious. It was hard to persuade U.S. legislators and the administration to support Taiwan on this because it would violate the U.S. "one China" principle. There was a need to seek alternative strategies, channels, or targets. Soon FAPA came up with the idea that it should promote Taiwan's membership of the WHO. FAPA sought to persuade Congress that Taiwan needed to participate in the world's health system. Its strategy was to link the issue to human rights concerns in the hope of winning sympathy and support from the public, opinion leaders, the media, legislators, and officials. Beneath this health agenda was a political aspiration to promote Taiwan's international recognition. However, FAPA strove to convince people that the health issue was not linked to political concerns.

Campaign activities: As in the U.N. campaign, FAPA used leverage politics. Instead of directly knocking on the door of the WHO, FAPA sought congressional support to press the U.S. government to help Taiwan. As in the U.N. campaign, FAPA perceived U.S. help as decisive. The reason, according to Blaauw, was that the United States had a strong voice inside the WHO, and could also effectively lobby small member states. FAPA hoped that by doing this the United States would increase international pressure on the WHO to accept Taiwan's bid.

The WHO campaign began in 1997 when the president of the Cleveland chapter of FAPA approached his congressman, Sherrod Brown (D-OH), concerning Taiwan's exclusion from the WHO.⁵⁵ Sherrod Brown first helped introduce concurrent resolutions, such as HCON RES 219 of February 12, 1998, in support of Taiwan's bid. In Blaauw's words, the introduction of non-binding resolutions was designed to help raise awareness of the issue. In other words, this period of FAPA's work was mainly concerned with setting the agenda for later action. As more and more members of Congress became aware of the issue, FAPA supporters began to introduce binding resolutions with specific instructions to the State Department about what they should do to help Taiwan. This occurred in 2001 when Sherrod Brown introduced a binding bill, HR 428, under which the United States would have to come up with plans to help Taiwan gain observer status at the WHA.

FAPA faced obstruction from the PRC, which made a formidable lobbying effort to dissuade Congress from supporting Taiwan. Meanwhile, FAPA won support from some Taiwanese American communities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). According to Blaauw, the North America Taiwanese Women's Association (NATWA) and the North American Taiwanese Medical Association (NATMA), for instance, had informal contacts with FAPA through phone calls or irregular meetings on the progress of Taiwan's WHO bid. NATMA is a kind of epistemic community, a term coined by Haas to describe knowledge-based interest groups

⁵⁵Rawnsley, *Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda*, 140.

set up by scientists or other professionals.⁵⁶ For years NATMA has sent delegations of physicians to Geneva to lobby the WHO. FAPA did not follow suit, but some members lobbied in an individual capacity.

From 1997 to 2000, the KMT was still in power, so FAPA did not cooperate with the Taiwan government in this period. When the KMT lost the 2000 presidential election and the DPP came to power, FAPA began to have informal contacts with the new administration,⁵⁷ although it did not establish formal cooperation with Taipei to further the WHO campaign. Using information politics, FAPA provided policymakers, the media, and the general public with information on issues related to Taiwan's WHO application. Updates on FAPA's campaign could be found on its website. FAPA's staff and members constantly wrote letters to the press and op-ed pieces in major newspapers and magazines in the United States such as the *New York Times*, *Washington Post*, and *Foreign Affairs*.⁵⁸ In these, FAPA stressed the bodily harm that Taiwan's exclusion from the WHO threatened to do to vulnerable individuals. For instance, FAPA helped Sherrod Brown publish an article "Don't Taiwanese Children Count?" in the *Washington Post* on July 8, 1998. The article reported that international cooperation was needed to fight various childhood diseases.⁵⁹ FAPA also highlighted the denial of legal equality of opportunity, asserting that everyone has the right to access health assistance when needed. Furthermore, FAPA warned on its website that "diseases do not respect borders" and invited people to separate politics from health.

Ironically, as Blaauw comments, the 1999 earthquake and the 2003 outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) gave FAPA a

⁵⁶Peter M. Hass, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," *International Organization* 46, no. 1 (1992): 1-35.

⁵⁷For instance, Lin mentions that the head of Taiwan's Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission (OCAC, 中華民國僑務委員會, formerly known as the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission) Fu-mei Chang (張富美) has supported FAPA's WHO campaign. For more information, see Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 154-55.

⁵⁸Chi, "From the China Lobby to the Taiwan Lobby," 115.

⁵⁹FAPA's website, <http://www.fapa.org/who/106thcongresscampaign/WASHPOSTBrown.htm>.

chance to use symbolic politics, and these disasters served as catalysts developing awareness and expanding FAPA's networks. On SARS, FAPA depicted Taiwan as being in a helpless predicament, and the rest of the world as either unaware of or indifferent to Taiwan's plight. Moreover, at a time when SARS was raging in both Taiwan and the PRC, the PRC actually expressed its disapproval of Taiwan's WHO bid. This gave FAPA more impetus to call for the separation of politics from health.⁶⁰

Outcome in Congress: On April 24, 2001, HR 428 was passed by the House with 407 votes in favor and none against, and on May 9, it was unanimously passed by the Senate. On May 15, the House adopted the Senate version of HR 428, and on May 28, the president signed it into Public Law (No. 107-10). By signing this bill into law the U.S. government openly declared its support for Taiwan's bid to join the WHO. This is still an ongoing process, however, because the United States has not actually been able to obtain observer status for Taiwan. The reason, according to Blaauw, is that the legal commitment to help has not been transformed into action. The United States is cautious because it does not want to jeopardize its relationship with the PRC.

The TSEA Campaign

Background: The TSEA (HR 1838) was initiated by a group of neo-conservative legislators in the United States in 1999. Drafted by the House whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), the TSEA had three primary objectives: (1) to foster military coordination between Taiwan and the United States; (2) to establish a secure communication link between the two nations' militaries; and (3) to require the U.S. administration to report on both

⁶⁰The Taiwan government has similarly made use of the "softer" nature of the WHO issue to win sympathy and support. Readers can find ample evidence on the website of the ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA, 中華民國外交部), <http://who.mofa.gov.tw/index.asp>. Although FAPA does not formally work with the ROC government on the WHO issue, their rather like-minded positions and parallel efforts were crucial to the outcome of the campaign in Congress. This has been particularly evident during the DPP administration.

Taiwan's security needs and the U.S. ability to react to an attack against Taiwan.

According to Blaauw, FAPA's position was to support the TSEA. Senior FAPA member and DPP legislator, Chai Trong-rong, has commented that neither the KMT administration nor its DPP successor explicitly expressed a stance on the TSEA, although in private both were supportive. The ROC government was reticent due to concerns about provoking the PRC. Chai states that he and other like-minded Taiwanese legislators actually flew to the United States six times to lobby Congress on this bill.⁶¹ However, this was done in a personal capacity, not as representatives of the ROC government.

Campaign activities: As in previous campaigns, FAPA used information politics, such as organizing workshops to inform participants of pending legislation concerning Taiwan's security as well as to instruct them on how to approach their local representatives to influence congressional decisions.⁶² FAPA sent out two important messages. One was that the PRC had become more aggressive toward Taiwan, and that Taiwan was not well-equipped to confront challenges from the PRC. For example, making use of reports published by the Pentagon about China's military build-up, FAPA asked its members to petition senators to address this issue. FAPA also posted a paper written by Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) on its website. Entitled "Defending Taiwan" and published in the *Washington Times* on January 9, 2001, this article stated that "the preparedness of Taiwan's defense forces is also in doubt. Successive [U.S.] administrations have denied several badly-needed defense requests from Taiwan, solely to appease China. Moreover, it has now been more than twenty years since Taiwan has engaged in a joint military exercise with another country. Operating in such isolation, Taiwan's military cannot avoid being behind the curve when it comes to modern military methods."⁶³ This message em-

⁶¹The author's interview with Chai Trong-rong in Taipei, July 20, 2005.

⁶²Chi, "From the China Lobby to the Taiwan Lobby," 116-17.

⁶³FAPA's website, <http://www.fapa.org/tsea/helms010901.html>.

phasized the hard facts of Taiwan's defense needs. It could be argued that U.S. legislators would have been more receptive to FAPA's message if it had been couched in terms of bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or legal inequality of opportunities. Nevertheless, the nature of the TSEA was highly political. There was no evidence of bodily harm to individuals (e.g., casualties resulting from a PRC attack) or any deprivation of legal equality in this regard for FAPA to exemplify at that time.

FAPA did not use symbolic politics in this campaign simply because there was no chance for it to do so. Regarding enemies and friends, FAPA faced obstruction from the PRC government. According to Blaauw, FAPA did not work with the ROC government because the KMT was still in power. Parris Chang (張旭成) has indicated that TECRO did not put any significant effort into lobbying for the passage of the TSEA, nor did it make use of any of the public relations firms that it usually worked with to push forward this bill.⁶⁴

It was Taiwanese American organizations who worked with FAPA on this campaign. Interestingly, the "blue team" of think tanks and opinion leaders, plus military equipment manufacturers who had commercial interests, also put in lobbying efforts to promote the bill. They did not work with FAPA, but their efforts were beneficial to its cause.

FAPA was also able to find a champion—Senator Jesse Helms—to back the bill. Senator Helms was a staunch conservative whose anti-PRC position inspired him to tirelessly promote the TSEA. Also, Blaauw recalls, of the twenty sponsors in the Senate that FAPA mobilized to support the bill, only one, Senator Robert Torricelli (D-NJ), was a Democrat. Democrats were not keen on supporting the bill, because they were suspicious of its Republican supporters' motives.⁶⁵ Democrats were afraid that this was a scheme by Republicans to ruin President Clinton's many achievements in U.S.-China relations.

⁶⁴Parris Chang, "Lobbying for Taiwan's Security," *Taipei Times*, October 23, 1999, <http://taiwansecurity.org/TT/TT-991023-Lobbying-for-Taiwan's-Security.htm>.

⁶⁵Robert Torricelli served in the House of Representatives from 1983 to 1996, and then in the Senate from 1997 to 2003.

The administration was against this bill. President Clinton took a more accommodating approach toward China, hoping to precipitate internal change by helping it integrate into the world system. Supporting the TSEA would have clouded the U.S.-China relationship. Also, the administration opposed the TSEA because it would have interfered with the president's constitutional powers as commander-in-chief and chief arbiter of foreign affairs. Hence, even though the TSEA passed the House, the Clinton administration did not support the bill. President Clinton even threatened to use his veto on it. With a presidential election just around the corner, the administration did not welcome any fundamental policy change.⁶⁶

Outcome in Congress: On October 26, 1999, the House International Relations Committee passed the TSEA by a vote of 32-6 and sent it to the floor of the House. On February 1, 2000, the TSEA was approved by a bipartisan vote of 341 to 70.

When the TSEA went to the Senate, however, it was put on hold, and failed to pass the Senate before Congress adjourned for the year. There are several reasons why the Senate put a hold on the bill. Apart from those mentioned above, Goldstein and Schriver indicate that senators were concerned with the coherence of U.S. policy at this juncture. Congress was about to grant permanent normal trade relations status (PNTR, previously known as most-favored-nation [MFN] status) to Beijing. In the opinion of Goldstein and Schriver, the TSEA complicated the final passage of PNTR. The Senate decided to balance positive engagement with China by putting the TSEA on hold.⁶⁷

⁶⁶For detailed information, see Eric Schmitt, "Clinton Threatens Veto of Closer Military Ties to Taiwan," *New York Times*, February 2, 2000, <http://taiwansecurity.org/NYT/NYT-02022000-Clinton-Threatens-Veto.htm>; and Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 235.

⁶⁷Steven M Goldstein and Randall Schriver, "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan and the Taiwan Relations Act," *The China Quarterly*, no. 165 (March 2001): 147-65.

Table 1
Factors that Affect the Outcome of FAPA's Campaigns

		Blacklist Campaign	Birthplace Campaign	UN Campaign	WHO Campaign	TSEA Campaign
Domestic Structure	Championship in Congress	+	+	+	+	+
	Support from the administration	+	Ambiguous*	-	+	-
Nature of Issues	Issues that stress "bodily harm"	-	-	-	+	-
	Issues that stress "equality"	+	+	+	+	-
Outcome	Bi-cameral passage of legislation	+	+	+	+	-
		+		-		-

Note: *implies that the administration does not explicitly support or oppose the initiation.

Research Results

On the Hypothesis of Championship

I find that championship played a key role in the bi-cameral passage of bills in the blacklist, birthplace, U.N., and WHO campaigns. However, the TSEA campaign shows that championship alone was not enough to ensure success (see table 1). FAPA was not supported by the administration. The TSEA had a too obviously political agenda, and it was an issue that was difficult to portray as involving bodily harm to vulnerable individuals or legal equality of opportunity. Furthermore, as previously mentioned, a configuration of concerns in relation to U.S. national interests made the Senate put a hold on the bill. This comparison leads me to conclude that FAPA's ability to find champions in the U.S. Congress is an

important but insufficient factor to explain the bi-cameral passage of the bills that FAPA supports.

Before I proceed to the next section, I would like to explore why some legislators are willing to support FAPA's agenda. As noted earlier, there are generally four factors that could prompt a legislator to become a champion of a particular interest group's cause: concerns about constituents' preferences, constituents' financial contributions to the legislator's campaign, pressure from one's political party, and personal preferences. During the blacklist campaign, support from Representative Solarz was crucial. Representative Solarz was initially not particularly concerned about the Taiwan issue. It was only through Chai Trong-rong's efforts in raising campaign funds on his behalf and informing him about Taiwanese issues that he gradually turned into an outspoken proponent of Taiwan's democratic transformation.⁶⁸ In the same campaign, financial support was also pivotal in winning Senator Kennedy's endorsement.

In the birthplace campaign, Representative Howard Berman's role was notable. According to Blaauw, it was the legislator's personal ideology and belief in human rights and democracy that led him to support the birthplace bill. It was the same with Representative Robert G. Torricelli in the U.N. campaign.

In the WHO campaign, Representative Sherrod Brown was befriended by FAPA members in his Ohio district first. Blaauw recalls that Brown did not know much about Taiwan at the outset, but gradually became one of the most knowledgeable legislators in the Taiwan field.

The last person to note is Senator Jesse Helms in the TSEA campaign. As noted earlier, Senator Helms is a far-right anti-communist. Blaauw notes that although Senator Helms' "motivation to help Taiwan stemmed more from a Cold War 'Free China' sort of belief, through ... befriending his staff we managed to turn that more and more into 'self-determination for the people of Taiwan' kind of support."

⁶⁸Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 194.

On the Hypothesis of the U.S. Administration's Support

I cannot find solid evidence to prove that the administration's support was pivotal to the bi-cameral passage of bills. First, the U.S. administration was not supportive of either the U.N. or the TSEA campaigns. Yet the TSEA did not pass in the Senate, while both chambers have passed several bills in support of Taiwan's U.N. bid. It is unclear from this comparison whether the administration's support really matters (see table 1). Secondly, if we compare the blacklist, birthplace, U.N., and WHO campaigns, the administration was positive toward the blacklist and WHO campaigns, ambiguous toward the birthplace campaign, and negative toward the U.N. campaign. Despite these different stances adopted by the administration, all of these campaigns resulted in bills being passed in Congress (see table 1). This leads me to conclude that the factor of the administration's support is not sufficient to explain FAPA's campaign outcomes.

On the Hypothesis of Norms

The theory that norms about equality and protecting vulnerable groups from bodily harm have more resonance than other norms might explain why the blacklist, birthplace, U.N., and WHO campaigns succeeded while a similar, powerful campaign like that for the TSEA, organized by many of the same people, failed to win congressional support.

It is interesting to compare the WHO and TSEA campaigns, in that the former stressed both equality and bodily harm, while the latter did not touch upon these issues at all (see table 1). The health angle brought up by the WHO campaign was an attractive and practical issue. The questions involved were relatively simple and straightforward. FAPA used evocative symbols and messages that were conveniently adapted to the media, and built a climate of public opinion that made policy change possible. The catalytic function of the 1999 earthquake and 2003 SARS crisis also stood out in the WHO campaign. However, the TSEA was a highly political issue. There was no catalyst for accelerated action in the TSEA campaign. U.S. officials believed that existing bilateral interaction was sufficient to maintain peace and security across the Taiwan Strait.

Discussion and Conclusions

In this concluding section, I will first discuss the relationship between the ROC government and FAPA, since this has been a recurring theme in my analysis. After this, I will proceed to summarize my findings on FAPA's influence.

The relationship between FAPA and the ROC government is divided into two periods: before and after the DPP came to power in Taiwan. From its inception in 1982, FAPA worked against the interests and tenets of the KMT regime. On the blacklist issue, FAPA and the KMT were clearly at loggerheads. On the U.N., WHO, and TSEA issues, although their interests overlapped to a certain degree, their longstanding antagonism largely prevented them from cooperating directly.⁶⁹ This is confirmed by Blaauw, who explains that there was never a debate within FAPA about working with the KMT, "The situation was clear: the KMT had always been and still was the enemy."

Since the DPP replaced the KMT as the ruling party in 2000, relations between FAPA and the ROC government have improved. This is because the DPP and FAPA share the view that the people of Taiwan have the right to determine their own statehood and future. However, despite this improvement in relations, FAPA has not really worked with the DPP administration on the WHO, U.N., and TSEA issues. Instead, they have had irregular informal contacts. The fundamental reason for this is a lack of mutual trust.⁷⁰

⁶⁹This does not rule out the existence of communication among FAPA, the KMT government's representatives in the United States, and relevant American lawmakers.

⁷⁰I do not have direct evidence to prove that FAPA has acted (or not acted) as a surrogate for the DPP government since 2000. My observation is that FAPA is willing to work with the government if the government allows it to. However, the DPP government is not that willing to work with FAPA for the following reasons. First, the government has more interests to take into account in policymaking and it does not want to incite the PRC. FAPA members, on the contrary, are strongly pro-Taiwan independence, and they do not take into account as many other interests as the government does. Secondly, like-minded people or institutions do not work with each other all the time. Certain officials in the government see fighting for Taiwan's rights as their exclusive turf, and they do not want to share it with other organizations. This to a certain degree echoes Yang Maysing's view. In the past,

Turning to the findings of this comparative analysis, in all of the five cases outlined above, I find that FAPA was able to persuade champions in the U.S. Congress to advance its cause, but only four out of the five campaigns won bi-cameral passage of bills. FAPA's ability to find champions is therefore a vital but insufficient factor. A closer examination of the motives of these congressional "champions" provides further evidence of the strengths and weaknesses of the group's operations. Although American politics provide a relatively large number of entry points for interest groups to stake their claims, FAPA's case shows that groups that are more able to marshal financial contributions to election campaigns have a higher chance of capturing the attention of legislators. The strength of FAPA lies in its ability to mobilize its politically savvy, wealthy, and generous Taiwanese American constituencies to lavish funds on their respective members of Congress in exchange for their legislative support on Capitol Hill.

Although the provision of electoral campaign funds matters, the amount of money donated by FAPA constituencies has limits. In some cases, the ideological stances of legislators are more important than material incentives. Lin, in her analysis of FAPA, indicates that it often works with Democrats, as they tend to be more concerned about human rights and democracy issues.⁷¹ Additionally, my research suggests that FAPA (or even the ROC government) has from time to time allied with conservative members of Congress and politicians to further its goals. These particular politicians are noted for their anachronistic anti-communist ideology, and this is why they back FAPA, not because of their support for Taiwan's *de jure* independence. However, as there is a convergence of interests between FAPA and these conservative politicians, there is room for cooperation. It is hard to generalize about FAPA allies, as who

Yang was actively involved with FAPA, but now that she holds a high position in the DPP administration, she is of the opinion that there is not enough trust between the DPP government and FAPA for them to work together. While FAPA people are used to working at the grassroots, the ROC Foreign Ministry prefers mild action to avoid agitating the PRC.

⁷¹Lin, "Taiwan's Overseas Opposition Movement and Grassroots Diplomacy," 158.

they are hinges on "the power relations between the White House and Congress and within Congress itself," as Lin has pointed out.⁷² An ability to grasp the power relations between all of these relevant actors is the secret of a successful lobbying effort.

My findings also indicate that campaigns that involve issues to do with bodily harm to the innocent or the denial of equality of opportunity are more effective in winning congressional support. What constitutes bodily harm or inequality is subjective and vague, yet it is precisely this ambiguity that gives FAPA the opportunity to create causal links to make their campaigns compelling and convincing, such as attributing the deaths of innocent people during the SARS outbreak to the fact that Taiwan is excluded from the WHO and did not receive assistance from the organization in curbing the disease.

Even though I do not find sufficient evidence to prove that the support of the administration determined the bi-cameral passage of bills favoring FAPA's interests, I do note that FAPA lobbyists and members of Congress have all been highly sensitive to the U.S. administration's concerns of national interest. This was why FAPA and its congressional allies often chose to propose non-binding resolutions that would not be obstructed by the administration, thus increasing the chances of their passage.

I should note that this paper is not without flaws. First, it defines FAPA's success as the ability to achieve the bi-cameral passage of bills in Congress. As table 1 reveals, however, even though Congress passed bills in support of four of the campaigns in question, the ultimate objectives of these campaigns were not all realized. The blacklist and birthplace campaigns were successful, but Taiwan has yet to be admitted to the United Nations or the WHO. FAPA is continuing to campaign on these issues. Future research should focus on the discrepancy between congressional support and the realization of the ultimate objective.

Moreover, I have only touched upon competition with the pro-PRC lobby on the Hill, having focused mainly on interaction between FAPA, the

⁷²Ibid.

ROC government, and the United States. The former is an aspect of this subject that deserves further investigation.

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