

Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia's Two "Third-Wave" Democracies

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Asia has two "third-wave" democracies, Taiwan and South Korea. Historically and in their democratizations both countries share several features. Both had a Japanese colonial experience. The economies of both grew rapidly under authoritarian governments and both democratized at similar times. Both democratic regimes have faced issues of legitimacy, media that derive from the old authoritarian regimes, and judicial authorities that have been slow to democratize. However, Taiwan and South Korea also differ in several important respects. For example, Taiwan has some continuity of political parties, while in South Korea parties have become the electoral machines of leading politicians. Taiwan and South Korea today both have divided politics, but democratization has achieved widespread acceptance in both countries and very few people wish to return to an authoritarian past.

KEYWORDS: democratization; Taiwan; South Korea; Japanese colonialism; political parties.

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Around 1990, with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the downfall of several communist regimes in Eastern Europe, many people became enthusiastic about a "third wave" of "democratization in the late twentieth century."¹ Over fifteen years later, this wave of democratization has proven disappointing. At present, Asia has only four stable democracies: India, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.

India became democratic through the participation of the Indian National Congress in British colonial rule during the 1930s and through having many great leaders such as Gandhi and Nehru. Japan had Taisho (大正) democracy during the 1920s, yet its democratic regime was built by the allied occupation forces following Japan's surrender on August 15, 1945. British colonial experience did not produce democracy in Pakistan, Burma (Myanmar), Singapore, or Malaysia, while strong American influence did not create a stable democracy in the Philippines. Thailand once again has fallen to a military coup. Indonesia has moved toward democratization in recent years, but the military—the core of the Suharto dictatorship—still retains substantial power.

This leaves just two "third-wave" democracies in Asia: South Korea and Taiwan. Some writers have stressed economic factors behind the democratization of South Korea and Taiwan, the two principal Asian "tigers" or "little dragons." The political economy approach of Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman,² for example, suggests key links between the economy and democratization that this writer finds unconvincing. Rather, as Laurence Whitehead notes, any argument that the "Democratic Developmental States" of Taiwan and South Korea required a strong au-

¹The quotes come from the title of Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991). According to Huntington (pp. 13-26), the first wave started with the American and French revolutions and ended around 1926, the second wave began during World War II and ended in 1962, while the third wave began in 1974.

²Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).



thoritarian regime for economic development remains undemonstrated.³ Economic prosperity and development are clearly helpful for democracies, especially if the citizens are educated, but India proves that democracies do not have to be wealthy or highly educated. In Taiwan and South Korea political factors, including historical political factors, appear much more important than economic factors.

Before progressing further, it is necessary to define "democracy." In the simplest definition, a democracy is a political system in which the people regularly and freely choose their own leaders. In choosing their leaders, the people have the right and the ability to make the opposition the new government. In a democracy, people also have such civil liberties as freedom of speech and press and all citizens have relative equality before the law. Democracies appear in various shapes and forms. Some are presidential such as the United States, while others are parliamentary such as the United Kingdom and many Commonwealth countries. Some are unitary such as the United Kingdom and France while others are federal such as the United States, Canada, Australia, Germany, and India. However, in all of these cases the people have and do use their ability to change their rulers freely and peacefully.

It is important to distinguish between democracy and "liberalization." Sometimes authoritarian regimes engage in "liberalization" allowing some increase in freedom of speech and the press. They may allow opposition politicians to win office in elections, though they do not relinquish ultimate control.⁴ In Taiwan, no one was allowed to establish an opposition political party of any kind until September 1986, and those who attempted to do so were imprisoned.⁵ Under their authoritarian governments, both Taiwan and

³Laurence Whitehead, *Democratization: Theory and Experience* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 260-62.

⁴The present writer began to draw this distinction in 1981. See J. Bruce Jacobs, "Political Opposition and Taiwan's Political Future," *The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, no. 6 (July 1981): 21.

⁵Before 1986, Taiwan did allow two minority parties, the Youth Party (青年黨) and the Democratic Socialist Party (民主黨), both of which came to Taiwan from the mainland. The KMT heavily infiltrated both parties and neither attempted to overthrow the KMT. For these two minority parties, see *ibid.*, 22-23.

South Korea had periods of liberalization. From about 1969, when Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) was being prepared as successor to his father, until after his appointment as premier in May 1972, Taiwan had one such period of liberalization. A second important liberalization period took place after the Kuomintang's (KMT 國民黨) "defeat" in the November 19, 1977, election until the Kaohsiung (高雄) Incident of December 10, 1979. A third period of liberalization occurred after the conservative General Wang Sheng (王昇) was in effect exiled as ambassador to Paraguay on September 20, 1983. The ruling KMT, under the direction of its chairman Chiang Ching-kuo, nominated Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), a Taiwanese, to be vice-president on February 15, 1984. However, in taking this action Chiang Ching-kuo did not appoint Lee Teng-hui his successor,⁶ and it seems that Lee, for example, could not see Chiang Ching-kuo when the latter was hospitalized near the end of his life and only fellow mainlanders had access.⁷ At other periods, hard-line authoritarianism prevailed. Similar cycles also occurred in South Korea.

Taiwan and South Korea have some important historical parallels. Under the Manchu Qing (滿清) Dynasty (1683-1895 in Taiwan), Taiwan was a frontier area of the Manchu empire with the substantial territory controlled by Taiwan's aborigines outside of Qing control. The frontier nature of Taiwan enhanced the relatively high social mobility rates of the Ming (明) and Qing dynasties.⁸ Koreans under the Choson (朝鮮) Dynasty (1392-1910) had long settled the Korean peninsula. The societal structure was considerably more rigid with much less social mobility than in Taiwan. Both societies had an overlay of Confucianism. Both later became important Japanese colonies. After World War II, both had four decades of authoritarian government. And both, in the late 1980s, democratized.

⁶Lee Teng-hui has stated this many times. For printed versions, see, inter alia, Lee Teng-hui, *Jianzheng Taiwan: Jiang Jingguo zongtong yu wo* (Witness for Taiwan: President Chiang Ching-kuo and me) (Taipei: Yunchen wenhua, 2004), passim.

⁷Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 2000), 398.

⁸Ping-ti Ho, *The Ladder of Success in Imperial China: Aspects of Social Mobility, 1368-1911* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962).



While these broad similarities facilitate comparison, the following analysis also shows that the two countries had important differences.

The Japanese Colonial Period

Taiwan and Korea both became important Japanese colonies. The Qing Dynasty ceded Taiwan to Japan in 1895 following the Qing-Japanese War of 1894-95, while Korea became a Japanese colony informally in 1905 and formally in 1910. Both countries gained independence from Japanese colonization after Japan's defeat in 1945.

Although both nations gained economically under Japanese rule, both also resisted Japan and both suffered grievously. Davidson estimates that close to 8,000 Taiwanese died resisting the Japanese in 1895.⁹ Lamley suggests that the Japanese killed 12,000 Taiwanese "bandit-rebels" during 1898-1902,¹⁰ while a Japanese source states that the Japanese colonial regime executed over 32,000 "bandits," more than one percent of Taiwan's population, in the same period.¹¹

The Japanese also slaughtered many Koreans during their colonial rule. From 1905 to 1914, the Japanese killed some 150,000 Korean militiamen.¹² In the three months of the March First 1919 Movement (March to May), the Japanese killed 7,509 Koreans, wounded 15,961, and arrested a further 47,948.¹³ After the March First Movement, many Koreans went north to Manchuria and in the Kando (Chinese: Jiandao 間島) Incident

⁹James W. Davidson, *The Island of Formosa: Past and Present* (London: Macmillan, 1903), 365-66.

¹⁰Harry J. Lamley, "Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism," in *Taiwan: A New History*, ed. Murray A. Rubinstein (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999), 207.

¹¹Kiyoshi Ito, *History of Taiwan*, trans. Walter Chen (Taipei: Qianwei, 2004), 138-39.

¹²Kim Sam-ung, *Ilche nun Choson ul olmana nangchyoossulkka* (How much Japan destroyed Korea) (Seoul: Saram kwa Saram, 1998), 36.

¹³*Ibid.*, 73. Kim Chin-bong, *Sanil undongsa yongu* (Research into the history of the March First Movement) (Seoul: Kukhak Charyowon, 2000), 39, gives the same figures except for one thousand fewer arrested.

of October-November 1920, the Japanese crossed the border and killed 3,664 Koreans in Manchuria.¹⁴

Japanese colonial rule in the two countries had some differences. In Korea, the Japanese maintained military men as governors while Taiwan had civilian governors from 1919 to 1936. Yet, Korea "gained some semblance of self-rule while in Formosa it was strongly bureaucratic."¹⁵ Koreans held many senior positions in the Japanese colonial government, while Taiwanese held very few.¹⁶ This was in part because Japanese formed only 2.8 percent of the population in Korea compared to 6.0 percent in Taiwan.¹⁷ Edward I-te Chen argues the Japanese used force in the two places for different reasons. In Taiwan, force was used to "eliminate active resistance," a goal achieved by 1919. In Korea, which revolted in the very substantial March First (1919) Movement, Japan "decided to relax control somewhat in the hope that the Koreans might be reconciled to 'autonomy' and abandon their demand for independence."¹⁸

In terms of future democratization, the Japanese colonial experience made three contributions to both countries. First, the strong Japanese bureaucratic rule established patterns of administration that the postwar governments were able to use, thus enhancing their efficacy. Second, the Japanese colonial experience increased national consciousness among all sectors of both societies. Finally, the Japanese colonial experience advanced both countries economically, socially, and educationally.

The Postwar Authoritarian Period

In the postwar period, the authoritarian governments in both Taiwan and South Korea implemented some similar strategies of economic de-

¹⁴Kim, *Ilche mun*, 100-101.

¹⁵Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 30 (1970): 157.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 144 n. 35.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 158.



velopment and achieved some similar goals. Both, for example, started with import substitution industrialization and then shifted to export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s. Thus, from 1976 until at least 1991, Taiwan's exports always exceeded 40 percent of gross national product (GNP) and in 1984, 1986, and 1987 exports exceeded 50 percent of GNP.¹⁹ South Korean exports from 1976 to 1981 ranged from 24 to 31 percent of GNP.²⁰

Both countries also achieved considerable social mobility. Many people migrated from the farm to the city and moved from agriculture to industry. In Taiwan, many farm girls went to work in factories to earn their dowries and to put their brothers through university, a pattern also familiar in South Korea. Both countries moved in the direction of greater equality in income, though Taiwan moved faster (see table 1). Both also emphasized the importance of education and greatly facilitated the education of the two populations.

Both regimes promoted high levels of education in part owing to the official Confucianism that authoritarian leaders in both Taiwan and South Korea promulgated in order to maintain discipline in their societies. However, Confucianism has mixed implications for authoritarian rule. While encouraging education, Confucian ideas are also proto-democratic.²¹

In addition, study in democratic countries can result in more liberal perspectives. Of the twenty persons in Premier Chiang Ching-kuo's first cabinet announced on May 29, 1972, fourteen had studied or trained abroad—eight in the United States, four in the United Kingdom, and six in Japan including four who had studied in two of these countries. At most two had primarily military educations.²² Certainly, it has become clear

¹⁹Calculated from *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992* (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 1992), 43 (GNP), 190 (Exports).

²⁰Calculated from *Major Statistics of Korean Economy* (Seoul: Korean Statistical Association, 1992), 3 (GNP), 203 (Exports).

²¹Jia Bo (J. Bruce Jacobs), "Minzhu yu Zhongguo zhishi fenzi" (Democracy and China's intellectuals), *Zhongguo luntan* (China Tribune) (Taipei), no. 373 (October 1991): 10-13. For a heavily edited English version, see J. Bruce Jacobs, "Democracy and China," *Economic and Political Weekly* (Bombay) 26, no. 33 (August 17, 1991): 1905-6.

²²Names given in *Zhongguo ribao* (Central Daily News), May 30, 1972, 1-3. Biographical

Table 1
Ratio of Income of Richest 20% over Poorest 20%

Year	Taiwan	South Korea
1953	20.47	
1970	4.61	
1980	4.17	
1985	4.50	6.14
1988	4.85	5.72
1990	5.18	
1993	5.42	5.26
1996	5.38	4.96
2000	5.55	6.84

Sources: Taiwan (1953-90): *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992*, 62-63; and Shirley W.Y. Kuo, *The Taiwan Economy in Transition* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1983), 96-97 (table 6.1). South Korea (1985-88): calculated from *Social Indicators in Korea* (Seoul: The Korean Statistical Association, 1992), 84. Taiwan and South Korea (1993-2000): ROC (Taiwan) National Statistics, "Table 13: Zhuyao guojia [diqiu] jiating suode fenpei zhuangkuang" (The distribution of family income in important countries [regions]), 2007. <http://www.stat.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=17881&ctNode=497>. This last source states that these South Korean figures do not include single-person households or the families of farmers and fishermen, thus lowering the South Korean ratios.

that several of these persons did hold more liberal views that may have ameliorated the actions of Taiwan's government and which seem to have contributed to Taiwan's democratization after Chiang Ching-kuo's death. In South Korea, nine of the seventeen members of the first Yushin Cabinet, which was announced on January 15, 1973, had studied overseas; five had studied in Japan and six in the United States with two of these studying in both countries. However, at least six persons, including three of those who had studied overseas, had studied primarily in military institutions.²³

The nature of the economic development in Taiwan and South Korea also had important differences. Taiwan's large-scale industries remained in

information in *ibid.*, p. 3 and *China Yearbook 1972-1973* (Taipei: China Publishing Co., 1973), 544-726.

²³The educational backgrounds of cabinet ministers have been obtained from *Hanguk in-myong sajon: Haptong yongam 1976-yonpan pyolchaek* (Dictionary of Korean personages: Haptong yearbook 1976 supplement) (Seoul: Haptong Tonginsina, 1976).

government hands, while most industrialization in Taiwan took place in small and medium-sized firms. In South Korea the great private chaebols dominated the economy, though these had important government connections. Both regimes repressed labor, but in Taiwan labor activists could more easily gain employment in a small firm, while in South Korea black-listing proved more effective.²⁴

These different economic developments reflected key differences in the political regimes. The various South Korean postwar authoritarian regimes were Korean. The Taiwan postwar authoritarian regime can best be described as "Chinese" and "colonial" rather than Taiwanese. Just as the Japanese colonial regime discriminated against Taiwanese, so did the Chinese colonial regimes of Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) and Chiang Ching-kuo. During the leadership of the Chiangs in Taiwan (1950-88), Chinese mainlanders, who accounted for less than 14 percent of the population, always held large majorities in the government's cabinet and the KMT's Central Standing Committee.²⁵ Taiwanese never held the positions of president, premier, or minister of foreign affairs, national defense, economics, education, finance, or justice.²⁶ Taiwanese also never held senior positions in the KMT or in the military and the security agencies. Chinese mainlanders controlled the large state industries, leaving Taiwanese to organize their small and medium-sized industries.

From Park Chung-hee's takeover in 1961, South Korean authoritarian governments were military in nature and came to power through coups d'état. Although Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo both had considerable military experience, Taiwan's government remained essentially civilian and the military and security agencies never seriously threatened the rule of the Chiangs.

²⁴This factor helps explain the post-democratic differences in Taiwan and South Korea analyzed in Yoonkyung Lee, "Varieties of Labor Politics in Northeast Asian Democracies: Political Institutions and Union Activism in Korea and Taiwan," *Asian Survey* 46, no. 5 (September-October 2006): 721-40.

²⁵Jausheh Joseph Wu, *Taiwan's Democratization: Forces Behind the New Momentum* (Hong Kong, Oxford, and New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 44, 103.

²⁶*Taiwan lishi nianbiao (suoyin)* (Chronology of Taiwan history [index]), vol. 4 (Taipei: Guoce yanjiuyuan ziliao zhongxin, 1994), 231-33.

In addition, from the retaking of Taiwan from the Japanese in 1945 until the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in early 1988, Taiwan had only one regime. South Korea, in contrast, had five different republics, each with its own constitution: the First Republic under Syngman Rhee (1948-60), the short-lived Second Republic (1960-61), the Third and Fourth republics under Park Chung-hee (1961-72 and 1972-79), and the Fifth Republic under Chun Doo-hwan (1980-87).

The voting systems of the two regimes also varied. In South Korea, the Park Chung-hee government abolished local elections in 1961, but the central government continued to have elections, even if they were controlled. Local elections were only reinstated in 1994 after democratization. In Taiwan, local elections were implemented in the 1950s, but the island had virtually no central elections—other than partial "supplementary" elections after 1969—until after democratization in the 1990s.

Finally, even though the figures may not be complete, the authoritarian governments in both Taiwan and South Korea were violent. In Taiwan, the government killed as many as 28,000 Taiwanese after the so-called "February 28 (1947) Incident." Then, in the White Terror of the 1950s, the regime executed 1,017 persons of whom two-thirds were Taiwanese and one-third were Chinese. Over the whole of the martial law period under both Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo, some 140,000 people suffered imprisonment in some 29,000 political cases. The number executed in political cases totaled three to four thousand.²⁷

According to official statistics, South Korea arrested and executed fewer persons for political crimes than did the Taiwan government. From 1948 until 1993, 336 persons were executed for political crimes and in 1954 alone the government executed 38 people for political crimes.²⁸ From

²⁷Preface of Qiu Rongju (邱榮舉) in Chen Yingtai, *Huiyi, jianzheng baise kongbu* (Recollections, witness to the white terror), 2 vols. (Taipei: Tangshan, 2005), 1:xiii.

²⁸Chong Ho-won, "'Sahyong songo' konguk ihu yonpyonggyun 21-myong/Pommubu kukkam charyo" (Since the foundation of the government, an average of 21 persons annually receive the "death sentence"/Ministry of Justice audit report) (October 5, 1993), <http://www.segye.com/Service5/ShellView.asp?TreeID=1510&PCode=0007&DataID=199310051144000075> (accessed October 23, 2006).

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1962 to 1989, 116 persons were executed for political crimes.²⁹ After the National Security Law was passed in 1948, some 100,000 to 110,000 persons were arrested. During the Korean War, 550,000 were arrested as traitors, but no records remain to reveal their sentences. Under the rules of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, a total of some twenty-five years, about nine thousand persons, an average of three to four hundred per year, were arrested under the National Security Law.³⁰

On the streets, however, the South Korean authoritarian governments proved much more deadly. In the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979, the Taiwan government claimed that 183 police (and no demonstrators) were injured. These figures clearly had problems, but the key point in this context is that no one was killed and relatively few injured in the most important political demonstration during the postwar authoritarian period in Taiwan. By contrast, the suppression in South Korea of the Kwangju Uprising of May 18-27, 1980, officially left 191 people killed and a further several thousand injured, though other estimates go considerably higher.³¹ During the December 1987 presidential campaign, Kim Dae-jung, basing himself on statements by Ambassador William H. Gleysteen of the United States, said that one thousand had been killed in the suppression of Kwangju.³² In June 1987, during the seventeen days of intensive demonstrations that led to the first major steps toward democratization in South Korea, the authorities fired over 300,000 tear-gas canisters at the demon-

²⁹Im Sog-hun, "Chongbu surip hu 998-myong sahyong chiphaeng" (Since the foundation of the government, 998 people have been executed) (January 13, 2006), <http://economy.hankooki.com/lpage/news/200601/e2006011317034170300.htm> (accessed October 23, 2006).

³⁰Park Hong-gyu, "Uri ege sasang ui chayun nun inunga?" (Do we have freedom of thought?), *Minju pophak* (Democratic Legal Studies) 15 (February 1992): 269. For similar figures, see also Kim Min-bae, "Kukka poanpop pangongpop kwa Hanguk inkwon 50-yon" (The national security law, the anti-communist law, and Korean human rights over the past fifty years), *Yaksa pipyeong* (Critical Review of History), no. 46 (Spring 1999): 55 n. 2.

³¹Young Whan Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics: Democracy, Reform, and Culture* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), 78.

³²Kim Yong-taek, *5.18 Kwangju minjung hangjaeng* (The May 18 Kwangju uprising) (Seoul: Tonga Ilbosa, 1990), 307. Later, Gleysteen estimated that around two hundred had been killed. See William H. Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), 131.

strators.³³ This tear-gas alone cost about six billion won³⁴ or US\$7.3 million. By comparison, Taiwan's demonstrations during the authoritarian period (and afterwards) remained quite peaceful.

The Transition to Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea

The processes of democratization occurred at similar times in both Taiwan and South Korea and they share some similarities. Both places received substantial shocks from the fall of Ferdinand Marcos to "people power" in early 1986 and both authoritarian regimes felt less secure as a result. Key people in the authoritarian regimes of both countries helped initiate the process of democratization. However, there were also differences. South Korea, for example, was worried about the Seoul Olympics in 1988, a problem that Taiwan did not face. Demonstrations by the people also played a much larger role in South Korea.

Chiang Ching-kuo had never had difficulty talking to the opposition. However, a more systematic process, the so-called "dialogues" (*goutong* 溝通), began in May 1986.³⁵ This led to four important reforms before Chiang Ching-kuo died on January 13, 1988. First, on September 28, 1986, the opposition organized as the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP 民進黨). While members of the new party had expected to be arrested, Chiang Ching-kuo left them alone and the DPP actually contested the December 6, 1986, elections under its new name.

³³Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, "Introduction: Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea," in *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea*, ed. Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999), 5.

³⁴Calculated from Chung Chulhee, "Social Movement Organizations and the June Uprising," in *Korean Politics: Striving for Democracy and Unification*, ed. Korean National Commission for UNESCO (Elizabeth, N.J. and Seoul: Hollym, 2002), 236-37.

³⁵In English, see C. L. Chiou, *Democratizing Oriental Despotism: China from 4 May 1919 to 4 June 1989 and Taiwan from 28 February 1947 to 28 June 1990* (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 96-102. In Chinese, see Liang Su-jung, *Dashi dafei: Liang Su-jung huiyilu* (Right and wrong: The memoirs of Liang Su-jung) (Taipei: Tianxia wenhua, 1995), 209-17.

Second, less than three weeks after the founding of the DPP, on October 15, 1986, Chiang Ching-kuo announced the end of martial law, effective in July 1987. Although martial law did not affect many people in Taiwan, its abolition was symbolically very important. Third, in October 1987, Chiang Ching-kuo allowed Taiwan residents to visit the Chinese mainland. The surprise of these Taiwan visitors, who discovered that things in China were much worse than the KMT propaganda had stated, did much to remove pressure for reunification between Taiwan and the mainland. Finally, on January 1, 1988, the controls on newspapers were lifted.

President Lee Teng-hui, as a Taiwanese in a mainlander-dominated political system, faced many difficulties. Many mainlanders believed he should be a figurehead like President Yen Chia-kan (嚴家淦), who succeeded the deceased Chiang Kai-shek in April 1975 and quietly served out his term as president until 1978, when Premier Chiang Ching-kuo became president. Significantly, Chiang Ching-kuo became chairman of the ruling KMT upon the death of his father in 1975.

After Chiang Ching-kuo died, debate raged about the party leadership. Only two weeks later, on January 27, 1988, did the KMT's Central Standing Committee agree to make Lee Teng-hui *acting* party chairman. Lee only became the formal chairman of the party on July 8, 1988, at the KMT's Thirteenth Congress.

Lee, however, proved politically adept. He allied with various factions of mainlanders, defeating each group in turn. He brought Taiwanese into key parts of the political system for the first time. He worked tacitly and explicitly with the opposition including people whom he had just released from prison. This led to a variety of democratization measures including an opinion of the Council of Grand Justices (Taiwan's Supreme Court) on June 21, 1990 that forced the parliamentarians elected on the Chinese mainland in the late 1940s to retire. This meant that for the first time Taiwan's voters elected the entire memberships of the National Assembly (國民大會) and Legislative Yuan (立法院) in the elections of 1991 and 1992. In 1992 the Legislative Yuan amended Article 100 of the Criminal Law and significantly enhanced freedom of speech in Taiwan. As a result, nonviolent advocacy of Taiwan independence was no longer

illegal. In addition, Lee Teng-hui put through seven sets of constitutional amendments during his terms of office. These included the popular election of the president, which began in March 1996.

This transition in Taiwan took place very peacefully. While demonstrations played their role, by and large they were very peaceful and, compared to South Korea, quite limited. A very important environmental movement began in 1986, though its main focus was in central Taiwan.³⁶ According to a survey of eighteen social movements, most became especially active after 1986 and all remained relatively peaceful,³⁷ including the student movement of March 1990, which modeled itself to some extent on the Chinese demonstrators of early 1989.³⁸

The situation in South Korea was very different. After Kim Chaegyu, the director of the KCIA, assassinated Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979, Generals Chun Doo-hwan and Roh Tae-woo seized power in a coup of December 12 that year and established the Fifth Republic. Within a few months they had suppressed the protests in Kwangju with deadly violence. In the National Assembly election of March 1981, the military's Democratic Justice Party (DJP) won 151 of the 276 seats. In the February 12, 1985, National Assembly election, the DJP did much worse, winning only 35.3 percent of the vote and 87 of the 276 seats, while the opposition won 30 percent of the vote and the five largest cities in South Korea as well as 67 seats. At this time the two major opposition leaders, Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, remained barred from political activity. On March 6, 1985, the government removed the ban on several opposition politicians, though Kim Dae-jung was still prohibited from political activity. Roh Tae-woo became party chairman.

³⁶See the excellent book by James Reardon-Anderson, *Pollution, Politics, and Foreign Investment in Taiwan: The Lukang Rebellion* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1992).

³⁷Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, "The Rise of Social Movements and Civil Protests," in *Political Change in Taiwan*, ed. Tun-jen Cheng and Stephan Haggard (Boulder, Colo. and London: Lynne Rienner, 1992), 57-72.

³⁸Teresa Wright, *The Perils of Protest: State Repression and Student Activism in China and Taiwan* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 95-128.



From 1984, the number of student protests and their participants rose substantially over the previous years. In 1987 the number of student protesters increased to more than 930,000.³⁹ The 1987 protests were not limited to students and they occurred nationwide. In June 1987, 3,362 protests were held in South Korea, with one million participants in thirty-seven cities.⁴⁰

While President Chun Doo-hwan refused to compromise with the opposition, his designated successor, party leader Roh Tae-woo, gave his famous eight-point speech of June 29, 1987, which made many concessions to the demonstrators including constitutional amendments approved by government and opposition, direct presidential elections, revision of the Presidential Election Law, an amnesty for and restoration of the civil rights of Kim Dae-jung, the freeing of all political prisoners except those charged with treason or violence, a free press, freedom for political parties, local autonomy, self-governance by universities, and a campaign against crime and corruption.⁴¹ Roh Tae-woo implemented these promises and by late October, the South Korean people approved the new constitution of the Sixth Republic.

Although Roh Tae-woo was one of the generals who had carried out the coup of December 12, 1979, and was involved in the suppression of the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980, he seemed to have become much more democratic by mid-1987. In the presidential election of December 17, 1987, Roh won with only 37 percent of the vote against Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung, who split 55 percent of the vote between them. In the National Assembly election of April 26, 1988, held four months after the presidential election, Roh's party obtained only 125 of the 299 seats, though in the March 24, 1992, National Assembly election, near the end of Roh's term as president, his party obtained 149 of the 299 seats.

³⁹Chung, "Social Movement Organizations," 246.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 248-49.

⁴¹A somewhat abbreviated text of Roh's statement appears in Robert E. Bedeski, *The Transformation of South Korea: Reform and Reconstitution in the Sixth Republic under Roh Tae Woo, 1987-1992* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994), 169-70.

In some ways Roh Tae-woo in South Korea combines elements of both Chiang Ching-kuo and the early presidency of Lee Teng-hui. Chiang Ching-kuo, though he began the process of democratization with very significant liberalization, remained the clear and unchallengeable leader. Roh Tae-woo, as a colleague of Chun Doo-hwan, was able to overrule the president, especially as the demonstrations in South Korea became huge and the opening of the Seoul Olympics approached. Like Lee Teng-hui in Taiwan, Roh Tae-woo worked closely with the opposition. In fact, Roh's ruling Democratic Justice Party merged with Kim Young-sam's Reunification and Democracy Party in 1990 to form the Democratic Liberal Party. After overcoming many obstacles, Kim Young-sam came to lead this new party and win the presidency on December 18, 1992.⁴² This ability to compromise partly accounts for the smooth and relatively peaceful transitions in both countries.

Seven Factors Facilitating Democratization in Taiwan and South Korea

In another context, the writer has drawn up ten interrelated factors that assisted Taiwan's process of democratization. Seven of these factors also apply to South Korea and help explain—once the process began—the relative ease with which both countries became democratic.

1. *Administrative, economic, social, and educational development under the Japanese:* The Japanese attempted to make both Taiwan and Korea model colonies in order to demonstrate their "modernization" to the Western powers. Thus, they built penetrating administrative systems backed by strong police forces. In both countries they eliminated diseases and substantially improved public health, reducing the death rate from 33 deaths per thousand to 19 deaths per thousand in Taiwan from 1906 to 1940

⁴²Hong Yung Lee, "South Korea in 1992: A Turning Point in Democratization," *Asian Survey* 33, no. 1 (January 1993): 33.

and from 35 to 23 deaths per thousand in Korea from 1910 to 1940.⁴³ They broadened the scope of education (see below). They built an important infrastructure of roads, railroads, and harbors as well as telegraph, telephone, and postal systems. They improved agriculture with new seeds and built irrigation works. Thus, by the end of the Japanese colonial period, Taiwan and Korea had much higher standards of living.

2. *Relatively high educational levels under Japan and the postwar authoritarian governments:* The Japanese colonial regime educated large numbers of Taiwanese and Koreans. Japanese statistics from 1917 to 1943 show an increasing proportion of Taiwan's school age population undertaking education throughout the period. In 1917, only 13.1 percent of the school age children went to school (21.4 percent of the boys and only 3.7 percent of the girls), but by 1932 this had increased to 35.9 percent (51.0 percent of the boys and 19.7 percent of the girls). In 1943 the figures had risen to 71.3 percent (80.9 percent of the boys and 60.9 percent of the girls).⁴⁴ Very few of these students obtained secondary or higher education, but this reasonably widespread primary education did much toward making Taiwan a literate society. In addition, Kerr argues that under the Japanese "common schooling gradually created a sense of *Formosan* [Taiwanese] identity" among people who spoke different languages at home and lived in "separate community groups."⁴⁵ Tsurumi, who has written the key work on Japanese colonial education in Taiwan, states, "The Taiwanese opposition to Japanese rule which emerged after 1920 was also a product of Japanese education."⁴⁶ Despite an "affinity with China [that] was part of

⁴³Samuel Pao-san Ho, "Colonialism and Development: Korean, Taiwan, and Kwangtung," in *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945*, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 352.

⁴⁴See *Taiwan sheng wushihyi nian lai tongji tiyao* (Statistical abstract of Taiwan Province for the past fifty-one years) (Taipei: Statistical Office of the Taiwan Provincial Administration Agency, 1946; reprint, Taipei: Guting shuwu, 1969), 1241.

⁴⁵George H. Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution and the Home Rule Movement 1895-1945* (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1974), 85. Original emphasis in quote.

⁴⁶E. Patricia Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan, 1895-1945* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1977), 219.

the anti-colonial movement ... the movement contained a local, Taiwanese content too."⁴⁷

At least in part because of the shorter colonial period, progress in education in Korea was slower. From a few thousand students in school at the beginning of the Japanese period, the numbers rose to about 20 percent in 1933, though these were mainly concentrated in urban areas where about 73 percent of the males and about 40 percent of the females attended school. Conversely, in rural areas, only about 31 percent of the males and 7.5 percent of the girls attended school in 1933. By 1940, about half of the school age population attended school.⁴⁸ In Korea, even more than in Taiwan, education "played a central role in the formation of a modern Korean nationalist consciousness which was bitterly anti-Japanese."⁴⁹

Both the Taiwan and the South Korean postwar authoritarian governments promoted education. By 1966, in both countries, over 97 percent of school age children attended primary school, but the numbers of junior secondary students was 59 percent in Taiwan and only 41 percent in Korea, while only 47 percent of children attended senior high school in Taiwan and only 28 percent in Korea. By 1977 in Taiwan and 1980 in South Korea, over 95 percent of children attended junior secondary school.⁵⁰ At the beginning of democratization in 1990, both countries had senior secondary enrolment rates of about 85 percent, while 48 percent of Taiwan's senior secondary graduates and 38 percent of South Korean senior secondary graduates continued to higher education.⁵¹ By 2006, with senior secondary graduate rates well above 90 percent, 84 percent of Taiwan's and 82 per-

⁴⁷Ibid., 218.

⁴⁸E. Patricia Tsurumi, "Colonial Education in Korea and Japan," in Myers and Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, 305.

⁴⁹Ibid., 302.

⁵⁰*Zhonghua minguo liushiliu nian tongji niyao* (Statistical abstract of the Republic of China 1977) (Taipei: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, 1978), 724-25; and *Educational Indicators in Korea* (Seoul: Korean Educational Development Institute, 1993), 42.

⁵¹Calculated from *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1992*, 268; and *Educational Indicators in Korea*, 42.



cent of South Korea's senior secondary graduates went on to some form of higher education.⁵²

In their important, though flawed, cross-cultural study of democracy, Almond and Verba found that education gives people important skills related to political participation and belief in their ability to influence government.⁵³ Clearly, the relatively high educational standards of the citizenry in both Taiwan and South Korea have contributed to their smooth democratic transitions.

3. *Electoral experience under the Japanese and postwar authoritarian regimes*: The Japanese colonial regimes and the postwar authoritarian regimes in both South Korea and Taiwan gave citizens of those two countries limited experience with voting, though in no case did elections ever threaten the ruling regime. After 1930 in Korea and 1935 in Taiwan, small numbers of Taiwanese and Koreans who paid sufficient tax could vote in limited elections under Japanese colonial rule,⁵⁴ while the postwar authoritarian governments in both countries instituted limited elections with universal suffrage. As noted earlier, Taiwan had many local elections, but only very limited central elections, and in Korea local elections were abolished in 1961 while the regime continued controlled central elections. Thus, citizens of both countries were familiar with electoral processes and many people in both countries demanded extensive electoral reform well before democratization ensued.

⁵²Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2007 (Taipei: Council for Economic Planning and Development, Republic of China, 2007), 285; and *Kanchurin kyoyuk tonggye* (Brief statistics on Korean education) (Seoul: Ministry of Education and Human Resources Development, Korean Educational Development Institute, 2006), 29; obtained from <http://cesi.vedi.re.kr/index.jsp> (accessed August 7, 2007).

⁵³Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), 379-87. For the flaws, see the chapters in Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, eds., *The Civic Culture Revisited* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980).

⁵⁴Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa," 149-53; Kerr, *Formosa: Licensed Revolution*, 162, 169-71; and Jong Hae Yoo, "The System of Korean Local Government," in *Korea Under Japanese Colonial Rule: Studies of the Policy and Techniques of Japanese Colonialism*, ed. Andrew C. Nahm ([Kalamazoo]: The Center for Korean Studies, Western Michigan University, 1973), 58.

4. *Increasing economic prosperity with increasing equality:* Many theorists have pointed to the importance of a "strong middle class" for democratization. I would argue that economic growth with good future prospects and equality of opportunity is more important. As noted earlier, the authoritarian regimes in both countries promoted growth with at least some decrease in the disparities between the very rich and the very poor and both countries also had high rates of social mobility and economic opportunity.

5. *Links between government and opposition:* In a useful discussion in perhaps his best book, Samuel Huntington draws distinctions between "reformers" and "standpatters" in authoritarian governments and between "moderates" and "radicals" among the opposition. He notes that if the "reformers" and the "moderates" have relatively more power among the government and the opposition respectively, the possibilities for democratic transition are greater.⁵⁵

This situation existed in both Taiwan and South Korea. With the exceptions listed above, Chiang Ching-kuo basically proved a "reformer" and supported "liberals." The opposition too had many "moderates" and few "radicals" as can be seen by their nonviolent approach. In addition, even in the 1970s, Chiang Ching-kuo either personally or through his key subordinates often developed links with moderate opposition leaders such as Kang Ning-hsiang (康寧祥). Toward the end of Chiang Ching-kuo's life, the KMT established more formal consultation procedures like the "dialogues" mentioned earlier.

In South Korea, these links are less obvious. However, clearly some communication between the dictators and their opponents did occur. For example, despite the electoral controls, opposition political parties did obtain reasonably large numbers of seats in the National Assembly, the national legislature, during the authoritarian periods.⁵⁶ As a result of the February 12, 1985, National Assembly election, the last before democra-

⁵⁵Huntington, *Third Wave*, 121-24.

⁵⁶See tables in Sung Chul Yang, *The North and South Korean Political Systems: A Comparative Analysis*, revised edition (Elizabeth, N.J. and Seoul: Hollym, 1999), 499-505.



tization, the ruling party failed to retain a two-thirds majority, thus forcing the dictatorship "to adopt a new strategy of cultivating a working relationship with the opposition in parliament."⁵⁷

6. *American political pressure*: Clearly, the United States pressured the authoritarian regimes of both South Korea and Taiwan for human rights improvements. This varied over time, but U.S. pressure on the leaders of both countries clearly gave some heart to those in opposition. This became especially important for Taiwan after the Kaohsiung Incident of December 10, 1979, when many Taiwanese were arrested, and after the October 14, 1984, murder in the United States of Chiang Nan (江南) (Henry Liu, Liu Yiliang 劉宜良), a journalist who had written a biography of Chiang Ching-kuo.⁵⁸ Similarly, the Americans put considerable pressure on both President Park Chung-hee and later on President Chun Doo-hwan following the Kwangju Uprising in May 1980.⁵⁹

7. *The fall of President Marcos*: The relatively sudden fall of President Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines to "people power" in February 1986 frightened authoritarian leaders in much of Asia including Taiwan and South Korea. As noted above, the fall of Marcos help spark the democratization in both countries.

Three Additional Factors Facilitating Democratization in Taiwan, But Not in South Korea

Three additional factors assisted the democratization process in Taiwan, but had much smaller roles in South Korea.

⁵⁷Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics*, 78. For more details on this election, see C. I. Eugene Kim, "South Korea in 1985: An Eventful Year Amidst Uncertainty," *Asian Survey* 26, no. 1 (January 1986): 66-77.

⁵⁸Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942* (Armonk, N.Y. and London: M.E. Sharpe, 2004), 179-218. Bush was chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, the United States organ for dealing with Taiwan, from 1997 to 2002.

⁵⁹Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement*. Gleysteen was the American ambassador to South Korea from 1978 to 1981.

I. *Some "liberals" among the top leadership:* In significant ways, Chiang Ching-kuo had "liberal" or reformist elements in his leadership. Beginning in 1972, when he became premier and the clear successor to his father, Chiang pushed hard for more Taiwanese as well as for younger, more educated persons to enter the top leadership, though these persons did not and could not threaten his ultimate control.⁶⁰ Many of these liberals, who included such people as Lee Teng-hui, George K. C. Yeh (Yeh Kung-ch'ao 葉公超), Sun Yun-suan (孫運璿), and Tsiang Yien-si (Chiang Yen-shih 蔣彥士) among many others, had foreign doctorates. Of course, Chiang Ching-kuo also sanctioned the arrest of the Kaohsiung Incident demonstrators in December 1979, gave the conservative Wang Sheng considerable power from 1979 until 1983, and may have approved the assassination of Chiang Nan on October 14, 1984; thus during more conservative times the influence of the liberals was limited.

The Park Chung-hee regime did have a small number of liberal advisors including Hahn Pyong-choon, a Harvard Ph.D. in law, who left academia to work for President Park in 1970, serving as ambassador to the United States during 1973-77. When he was killed by a North Korean bomb in the Rangoon incident of October 9, 1983, Hahn was Chun Doo-hwan's presidential secretary-general.⁶¹ Kim Ok-gil, for many years the president of Ewha Women's University, briefly served as minister of education in the interregnum between Park Chung-hee's assassination and Chun Doo-hwan's accession after the Kwangju Uprising.⁶² As minister, she "successfully prodded the government to reinstate faculty and students expelled in the Park era, to modify the highly unpopular student self-defense corps, and to allow nonviolent protests so long as they did not spill off the campuses."⁶³ Park Tong-jin, a career diplomat who had served as

⁶⁰See, for example, J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan 1972: Political Season," *Asian Survey* 13, no. 1 (January 1973): 102-12.

⁶¹Details from http://people.aks.ac.kr/view.jsp?id=PPL_7KOR_A1932_1_0014385. For the Rangoon incident, see Chae-Jin Lee, "South Korea in 1983: Crisis Management and Political Legitimacy," *Asian Survey* 24, no. 1 (January 1984): 116.

⁶²For details see http://people.aks.ac.kr/view.jsp?id=PPL_7KOR_A1921_2_0002236.

⁶³Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement*, 101.

ambassador to many countries, was foreign minister from 1975 to 1980.⁶⁴ Gleysteen clearly saw Park as a liberal,⁶⁵ who following the Kwangju Uprising "lamented the lack of anyone with stature to talk to the generals."⁶⁶ However, such people were rare under the military regimes of Park and Chun.

2. *A nonviolent, democratic opposition:* Taiwan has been blessed with an opposition that has used nonviolent methods to support its calls for democratization. This began during the February 28 Incident of 1947 and continued right through to Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The armed uprisings in response to the government killings during the February 28 movement, which coexisted with the non-violent action, the attempted assassination of Chiang Ching-kuo in New York on April 24, 1970, and the sending of a letter bomb to Provincial Governor Shieh Tung-min (Hsieh Tung-min 謝東閔) on October 10, 1976, were sharp, relatively rare, and politically insignificant exceptions to this general rule of nonviolence among Taiwan's political opposition.

South Korea, on the other hand, has had more violence both from the government and from the opposition. The authoritarian governments were very quick to imprison opponents and fired on demonstrators with live ammunition. As noted above, two hundred were killed in the Kwangju Uprising of May 1980 and the director of the KCIA assassinated President Park Chung-hee on October 26, 1979. Student demonstrators also used such weapons as Molotov cocktails during protests.

3. *Popular associations and interest group activity:* In an important discussion, Almond and Verba draw links between interest group membership and increased political competence: "Membership in an organization, political or not, appears therefore to be related to an increase in the political competence and activity of the individual."⁶⁷ In Taiwan, under the KMT authoritarian regime, the government set up numerous "popular associa-

⁶⁴For details, see http://people.naver.com/search/people_detail.nhn?id=40731.

⁶⁵Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement*, 35-36, 99, 154.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 139.

⁶⁷Almond and Verba, *The Civic Culture*, 310.

tions," which, though technically independent, in fact operated under government and party control and supervision. In 1978, I wrote: "The paradox of Taiwan's interest groups lies in the fact that government and party organization and control of popular associations has at the same time strengthened and even created groups which may be capable of independent interest articulation."⁶⁸ We know, for example, that the Farmers' Associations led the battle against the government's rice-for-fertilizer barter policy, which meant that to get chemical fertilizer farmers had to supply the government with rice at very low prices. The Provincial Grain Bureau (糧食局) announced the end of this policy on January 9, 1973.⁶⁹ The change came because Lee Teng-hui, appointed to the cabinet as a minister without portfolio in May 1972, worked with the Farmers' Associations.⁷⁰

The broad and encompassing nature of the "popular associations" is clear.⁷¹ Furthermore, some of these associations have long histories. The Farmers' Associations, for example, were founded during the Japanese colonial period. The "popular associations" clearly involved a large variety of Taiwan's citizens during the KMT authoritarian period and it appears that this widespread membership did ease Taiwan's transformation into a democracy.

South Korea did not have such numerous formal popular associations. One scholar found "viable farmer associations" in Taiwan, while South Korea was "seriously deficient in this area."⁷² When South Korea did allow such associations, the one notable feature was that "strict control existed from the highest levels of government down to the rural associa-

⁶⁸J. Bruce Jacobs, "Paradoxes in the Politics of Taiwan: Lessons for Comparative Politics," *Politics* 13, no. 2 (November 1978): 244.

⁶⁹*Taiwan lishi nianbiao (1966-1978)* (Chronology of Taiwan history), vol. 2 (Taipei: Guoce yanjiuyuan ziliao zhongxin, 1990), 144.

⁷⁰For the role of Lee Teng-hui, see Zhang Yanxian et al., *Li Denghui xiansheng yu Taiwan minzhuhua* (Mr. Lee Teng-hui and Taiwan's democratization) (Taipei: Yushanshe, 2004), 44-45, 101.

⁷¹Jacobs, "Paradoxes," 243-44.

⁷²Theodore Reynolds Smith, "Community Development and Agrarian Reform in the East Asian Setting," *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 32, no. 1 (January 1973): 76.

tions. There has been very little feed-back nor is there any sensitivity to rural needs.⁷³

One partial exception to this is the role of Christian churches. South Korea has large numbers of Christians (including Catholics) and the many Christian churches did effectively support democratization in South Korea over the years. Taiwan has many fewer Christians and most of its churches were politically conservative and supportive of the Chiang regime. Only the Taiwan Presbyterian Church took a leadership position in the struggle for Taiwan's democratization.

Democracy in Taiwan and South Korea

Taiwan and South Korea share some institutional similarities. Each has a president and a premier, a dual leadership structure reminiscent of France. In each country there are debates about the relative power of each office, an issue that has become more poignant as the president is now popularly elected in both countries. Both states have unicameral legislatures with terms that differ in length and timing from the presidential terms, so that elections for the presidents and for the legislatures do not occur simultaneously. This leads to division between the executive and the legislature.

Of course, there are also important differences. Party structure, for example, appears much more stable in Taiwan, and the KMT and the DPP remain the two key political parties in Taiwan. Several questions do arise, however, about party structure in Taiwan. First, it remains unclear how many citizens in Taiwan vote for a party as opposed to individual candidates. Second, within the context of the two main parties, there have been a variety of splinter parties such as the New Party (新黨), the People First Party (PFP 親民黨), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU 台灣團結聯盟). Third, some politicians have moved in and out of the parties. In the

⁷³Ibid., 83.

December 2001 election for county executive and legislature in Chiayi County (嘉義縣), for example, fully two-thirds of the fifteen candidates had changed party within the previous few years. In Korea, the issue is much simpler. Political parties are primarily campaign vehicles for leading politicians. The names of the parties regularly change as do the parties themselves as they engage in a seemingly constant ballet of amalgamations and divisions.

Another important difference between South Korea and Taiwan is the differing fault-lines in the electorate. In South Korea geographical origin is extremely important and a significant proportion of the votes for a Korean candidate come from his or her home region. In Taiwan, "ethnicity," rather than geographical origins, is more important. Ethnic differences in Taiwan create some geographical divisions in voting tendencies (the "Green" south vs. the "Blue" north), but these divisions are ethnic in origin rather than geographical.

In both countries, deep division between the president and the legislative majority has led to attempted impeachments. Both President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) of Taiwan, who was first elected in March 2000 and won re-election four years later, and President Roh Moo-hyun of South Korea, who won his term in December 2002, are lawyers from poor backgrounds who did not belong to the previous "establishment."

In 2001, the year after Chen was elected, the KMT-dominated legislature that had been elected in 1998 decided to impeach the president. However, when these legislators returned to their constituencies, they discovered that the voters still supported Chen. This led some KMT legislators to switch to the DPP and the impeachment movement petered out. Again, in 2006, following allegations of presidential corruption, the KMT and their allies tried to impeach President Chen twice, but again they failed.

In South Korea, the opposition in the National Assembly, which had been elected on April 13, 2000, impeached President Roh Moo-hyun on March 12, 2004.⁷⁴ As a result, President Roh had to stand down for two

⁷⁴In this discussion of President Roh Moo-hyun's impeachment, I have drawn on two very



months. The subsequent National Assembly electoral campaign of April 15, 2004, focused on Roh Moo-hyun's impeachment and Roh's new Uri ("Our") Party won with 152 of the 299 seats, an increase from only 49 seats in the previous legislature. The opposition, now led by Park Chung-hee's daughter, Park Geun-hye, followed with only 121 seats, many fewer than the almost two hundred seats that the two key opposition parties had won in the previous election. This made clear that the South Korean people saw Roh Moo-hyun's impeachment as illegitimate.

On May 14, 2004, South Korea's Constitutional Court rejected the National Assembly's impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun, apparently by a divided vote.⁷⁵ The Constitutional Court did not uphold the National Assembly's accusations of incompetence and corruption, but did accept that Roh had violated the Election Law in that he had given public support to his Uri Party candidates even though he was supposed to stay neutral as a public official. The Court ruled, however, that his violations of the electoral law did not constitute the "grave violations of duty" necessary for impeachment.

In both countries the courts have played an important role. Thus, in both countries the highest court has been asked to rule on politically contentious issues. However, the judicial systems in government often lag behind other institutions in the process of democratization. In Taiwan, prosecutors have indicted numerous political figures for what appear to be political reasons. Such seemingly political interventions should decline in number and importance as the courts become less political and more mature.

In both Taiwan and South Korea, those who benefited from the old authoritarian governments have continued to fight strongly for their old privileges. Although Lee Teng-hui, as president, Taiwanized both the KMT and the political system, the conservative mainlanders made con-

different interpretations: Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics*, 343-51 and Chaihak Hahm and Sung Ho Kim, "Constitutionalism on Trial in South Korea," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 35-37.

⁷⁵Kihl, *Transforming Korean Politics*, 351 n. 1.

siderable progress in the KMT under Lien Chan's (連戰) chairmanship after 2000 and in the PFP under James Soong (宋楚瑜). Similarly, the impetus for the impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea came from the old conservative forces, which had done well under the military dictatorships.

The extremely partisan media in both countries appear to exaggerate the political divisions. Both sets of media often bring opinion into news reports and report politically scurrilous rumors as "news." Many of the conservative newspapers and broadcast media in both countries had their origins under the old authoritarian regime, and in response the more liberal media too have become extremely partisan. To some extent, this reflects the transition from authoritarian rule, but it may also reflect the growing partisanship that appears in the media of many Western countries including the United States and the United Kingdom.

Hard-nosed politics, especially among conservatives, is not unique to Taiwan and South Korea. In the United States and Australia conservative politicians also play "hard-ball." Forthcoming elections in Taiwan and South Korea as well as in Australia and the United States will reveal whether voters appreciate such tactics or not.⁷⁶ However, more importantly, virtually no one in either South Korea or Taiwan has called for a return to authoritarian rule.

Conclusions

Democracy still remains rare in Asia despite the optimism of 1990. Thus, the experiences of Taiwan and South Korea, the only two Asian

⁷⁶In the Australian federal election of October 24, 2007, the conservative government, which had been in power for over eleven years, was comprehensively defeated and Prime Minister John Howard lost his own seat in parliament, the first time a sitting prime minister had lost his seat since 1929. The new leader of the opposition, Brendan Nelson, joined new Labor Prime Minister Kevin Rudd in supporting Australia's approval of the Kyoto Protocol and the withdrawal of Australian troops from Iraq, thus changing two die-hard policies of the former government.



"third-wave" democracies, have much to teach us. Before the twentieth century, both countries had an overlay of Confucianism. Both had important Japanese colonial periods during the first half of the twentieth century that led to some economic development and higher educational standards among the populations, though both suffered considerable violence from the Japanese colonial authorities.

Both countries then suffered under strong authoritarian regimes that further stimulated economic growth. However, these authoritarian regimes differed in many respects as Taiwan was under a single Chinese, colonial regime while military governments dominated South Korea under several "republics."

The actual democratization processes differed in the two countries, but both shared at least seven factors that facilitated their democratic transitions including development under Japanese colonial rule, educational development, experience with authoritarian elections, increasing prosperity, important links between "reformers" in government and "moderates" in opposition, U.S. government pressure, and uncertainty following the fall of President Marcos. However, the democratic transitions of Taiwan and South Korea also differed in at least three respects. Taiwan had numerous "liberals" in its authoritarian government, a nonviolent opposition, and substantial popular association activity, factors not apparent in South Korea.

Since democratization, both Taiwan and South Korea have had very divided polities. Both also have highly politicized media that convey an even greater image of division. Yet, and this is the crucial point, virtually no one in either society wants to return to authoritarian rule. To quote Shin and Wells, "We conclude that it is only in these latter three countries [Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan] that democracy is indeed the only game in town, and that political culture has completed its transformation from authoritarian to democratic."⁷⁷ Thus, the prospects for these two East Asian "third-wave" democracies to continue to mature remain great.

⁷⁷Doh Chull Shin and Jason Wells, "Challenge and Change in East Asia: Is Democracy the Only Game in Town?" *Journal of Democracy*, 16, no. 2 (April 2005): 99.

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