

# Deep-Green Supporters and Political Tolerance in Taiwan: An Analysis of Kennedy's Hypothesis

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*Extremism is a common phenomenon in the political world. Although it is not new, extremism has different sources, emerges in different forms, and on occasion can exercise a disproportional political influence. Among the many concerns about extremists is their lack of tolerance. As Robert Kennedy bluntly stated, the danger from extremists "is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant." Treating Kennedy's statement as a hypothesis, this study examines the political tolerance exhibited by Taiwan's extreme nationalists—dubbed "deep-Green supporters." Utilizing survey data recently collected in Taiwan, this research shows that deep-Green supporters do indeed have lower levels of political tolerance toward groups that are perceived as threatening the values vital to them. The findings not only reveal the underlying dynamics of the extremists' political*

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*tolerance, they also have important policy implications for the future development of Taiwanese democracy.*

**KEYWORDS:** political tolerance; extremism; Democratic Progressive Party (DPP); Taiwan; logit model.

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What is objectionable, what is dangerous about extremists is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant.<sup>1</sup>



Extremism is a common phenomenon in the political world. It has different sources and can emerge in different forms. Some forms come out of religious belief while others are based on strong nationalist stands. Political extremism appears to be on the rise in contemporary politics and it may sometimes exercise disproportional political influence as demonstrated by the ascent of Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. President George W. Bush's appeal to evangelical conservatives some of whom espouse extreme religious views, and former Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) repeated pleas for help from the core supporters of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨), the "deep-Green supporters."<sup>2</sup>

Concern over the behavior and attitudes of extremists is hardly of recent origin. Confucius praised the way of the Mean and characterized it as one of the most important human virtues as early as the fourth century B.C. For this East Asian philosopher, moderation was clearly the norm for a "gentleman" while extremism was both a vice and a characteristic of lesser men who recklessly follow their every whim.<sup>3</sup> At about the same

<sup>1</sup>Robert F. Kennedy, *The Pursuit of Justice*, ed. Theodore Lowi (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 68.

<sup>2</sup>As will be discussed below, Taiwan's political landscape is divided into two political camps: the pan-Blue (泛藍) and the pan-Green (泛綠) alliances. Like their deep-Green counterparts, deep-Blue supporters are generally considered to be the political extremists of the pan-Blue alliance. That the current study focuses primarily on political tolerance among the deep-Green supporters is due to the disproportional political importance of deep-Green supporters and the relatively low number and political insignificance of deep-Blue supporters. In addition, there is a lack of consensus in academia regarding the proper characteristics of deep-Blue supporters.

<sup>3</sup>Confucius said, "Gentlemen embody the way of the Mean while lesser men act contrary

time in Greece, Aristotle praised temperance and noted that human virtue is likely "to be destroyed by excess and by deficiency."<sup>4</sup> Working from a table of virtues and vices, he identified key characteristics of the excesses, deficiencies, and the mean of human action. For Aristotle, extremists misrepresent the truth by distorting the facts and "pushing the middle character toward the other extreme."<sup>5</sup> While these early philosophers of the East and the West sat in moral judgment over the characteristics of extreme personal behavior and its effects on the individual, modern political thought has expanded scholarly interest to groups of extremists and their influence on the continued functioning of democratic systems. Robert Kennedy, for instance, has bluntly stated that the danger from extremists "is not that they are extreme, but that they are intolerant."<sup>6</sup> In his eyes, extremism is harmful to one of the key principles underlying democratic societies, political tolerance. Or, is it? Treating Kennedy's statement as a hypothesis, this study aims to examine the degree of tolerance exhibited by deep-Green supporters in Taiwan.

Taiwan's future relationship with China is usually framed as "unification vs. independence" and it is *the* most important political issue on the island. The deep-Green supporters' determination to pursue Taiwan's separation from China at almost any cost places them at one end of the political spectrum. Very much as evangelical conservatives did for George W. Bush in the United States, deep-Green supporters have provided unwavering electoral support for the DPP, the only major political party on the island whose policy is to pursue Taiwan's *de jure* independence.<sup>7</sup> They also

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to the way of the Mean ...[because] lesser men pay no heed to the consequences [of their actions]" (子曰:君子中庸,小人反中庸。君子之中庸也,君子而時中,小人之反中庸也,小人而無忌憚也). See *Zhongyong jinghua xuancui* (《中庸》菁華選粹, Selected reading of *Zhongyong*), <http://www.dfg.cn/gb/chtwh/ssjz/2-zhongyongjinghua.htm>.

<sup>4</sup>Aristotle, *The Nicomachean Ethics*, ed. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), 77.

<sup>5</sup>*Ibid.*, 107.

<sup>6</sup>Kennedy, *The Pursuit of Justice*, 68-69.

<sup>7</sup>Article One of the DPP Party Platform states that "Taiwan is sovereign and independent, that it does not belong to the People's Republic of China. ... According to this reality of sovereignty and independence, Taiwan should draw up a constitution and establish a nation." <http://www.dpp.org.tw/>.

offered loyal support to President Chen during the many political crises that occurred throughout his eight-year rule of Taiwan. In return, members of the DPP elite have repeatedly made statements and pursued policies that appealed to deep-Green supporters, particularly concerning the issue of Taiwan's relations with China. DPP officials have accused those who proposed a compromising or conciliatory stand toward cross-Strait relations of "betraying Taiwan," "selling out Taiwan," and/or being proxies of the Beijing government, thus labeling these citizens as enemies of the state.<sup>8</sup> Observers and political pundits have interpreted these actions as signs of the DPP elite having been "hijacked" by deep-Green supporters.<sup>9</sup>

Precisely due to the deep-Green supporters' substantial political weight, their tolerance has become an important issue for the young East Asian democracy. As William Ebenstein succinctly pointed out four decades ago, democracy is a way of life and it cannot exist in a vacuum devoid of democratic values.<sup>10</sup> Given that political tolerance is one of the major democratic tenets, it is crucial to know whether Taiwanese citizens enjoying disproportional political influence embrace values that are fundamentally beneficial to the successful operation of a democratic state. Utilizing survey data recently collected through telephone interviews (hereafter

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<sup>8</sup>When Robert Tsao (曹興誠), chairman of the United Microelectronics Corporation (聯華電子), proposed "peaceful coexistence legislation" to resolve cross-Strait conflicts, Chen Shui-bian immediately labeled it as a "Taiwan surrendering act" and another version of China's "anti-secession law." See Ko Shu-ling, "Chen Slams Tsao Proposal," *Taipei Times*, November 21, 2007, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2007/11/21/2003388844>. Similarly, when Lien Chan (連戰) visited China in his capacity as chairman of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), Chen ridiculed Lien as "having China and forgetting Taiwan (in his heart)." See "Bian yu Lian: mou youle Zhonguo meile Taiwan" (扁籲連: 莫有了中國沒了台灣, Bian called on Lian: Don't just have China in your heart and forget Taiwan), *Ziyou shibao* (自由時報, Liberty Times), April 10, 2005, <http://www.libertytimes.com.tw/>. Pro-independence supporters and their media organizations also accused Lien of "selling out Taiwan" and called for less tolerance of Lien and his conciliatory policies toward China. See "Don't Let the Opposition Sell Us out," *Taipei Times*, April 24, 2005, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2005/04/24/2003251788>; and "Be Less Tolerant of Lien and Soong," *ibid.*, April 24, 2005, <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/edit/archives/2005/04/24/2003251786>.

<sup>9</sup>See, for example, Chen Xiaoping, "Hai zai 'xiaokan' shenlu liliang" (Still "despise" the strength of deep-Green supporters), *Lianhe bao* (United Daily News), March 7, 2007.

<sup>10</sup>William Ebenstein, *Today's Isms: Communism, Fascism, Capitalism, Socialism* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

referred to as the 2007 Political Tolerance Survey), this study examines the level of political tolerance of deep-Green supporters in Taiwan. The survey was conducted on September 15-20, 2007, when the DPP was the country's ruling party. Treating Taiwanese citizens aged 20 and above as the population, the sample was identified through the equiprobability sampling method. Telephone numbers were first selected through systematic sampling of the telephone directory weighted by county and city population. The last two or four digits of the telephone numbers were then modified randomly to avoid selection biases. A further enumeration and random selection process was used to identify the desired respondent from among members of the household. Only one eligible respondent from each household was selected to be interviewed. The total sample size of this survey is 1,069. Data were weighted to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the sample resemble those of the population.

### **Extremism and Tolerance**

Despite the concern expressed by political thinkers from earliest times, very few empirical studies have been conducted to examine the relationship between extremism and political tolerance. In the few studies that have been carried out, extremists are generally considered as part of the "unpopular target groups" to be tolerated. Including such groups as socialists on the left and fascists and Ku Klux Klan on the right, extremism has been implicitly considered a dependent variable in the previous research.<sup>11</sup> There is no published study in English examining the political tolerance of extremists even though there is a voluminous literature on the causes,

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<sup>11</sup>See, for example: John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance: Illusory Increases 1950s-1970s," *American Political Science Review* 73, no. 3 (September 1979): 781-94; James L. Gibson, "Homosexuals and the Ku Klux Klan: A Contextual Analysis of Political Tolerance," *The Western Political Quarterly* 40, no. 3 (September 1987): 427-48; and Mark Peffley, Pia Knigge, and Jon Hurwitz, "A Multiple Values Model of Political Tolerance," *Political Research Quarterly* 54, no. 2 (June 2001): 379-406.

formation, and grievances of extremist movements and policies toward extremism.<sup>12</sup>

Studying the political tolerance of extremists is not a simple task. One problem stems from the fact that the term "extremism" contains strong normative connotations. Indeed, extremism in democracies is frequently treated as a nuisance at best or a destabilizing force at worst. It has been frequently celebrated, however, if it occurs in non-democratic countries.<sup>13</sup> Such a normative judgment often obscures the nature and the causes of extremism. The complexity of studying extremism increases as there is little consensus on the definition of extremism. Some scholars reserve the term only for political actors at the ends of a left-right scale,<sup>14</sup> while others make reference to social identity and conceptualize the phenomenon as a type among ethnicities or religions.<sup>15</sup> What these definitions share is the view that extremism represents a location at one end or the other, rather than in the interior, of some dimension of an issue, belief, or ideology. As such, extremism is a relative term depending on where one stands at a particular point in time, and it can happen that the beliefs of present-day extremists become the mainstream of tomorrow.

<sup>12</sup>See, for example: Uwe Backes and Cas Mudde, "Germany: Extremism without Successful Parties," *Parliamentary Affairs* 53, no. 3 (July 2000): 457-68; Elisabeth L. Carter, "Proportional Representation and the Fortunes of Right-Wing Extremist Parties," *West European Politics* 25, no. 3 (July 2002): 125-46; John Hagan, Susanne Rippl, Klaus Boehnke, and Hans Merkmens, "The Interest in Evil: Hierarchic Self-Interest and Right-Wing Extremism among East and West German Youth," *Social Science Research* 28, no. 2 (June 1999): 162-83; Bernt Hagtvet, "Right-Wing Extremism in Europe," *Journal of Peace Research* 31, no. 3 (August 1994): 241-46; Koksidis Pavlos-Ioannis and Caspar Ten Dam, "A Success Story? Analyzing Albanian Ethno-Nationalist Extremism in the Balkans," *East European Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 161-90; Shomit Saggat, "The One Per Cent World: Managing the Myth of Muslim Religious Extremism," *The Political Quarterly* 77, no. 3 (July-September 2006): 314-27; Jonathan R. White, "Political Eschatology: A Theology of Antigovernment Extremism," *American Behavioral Scientist* 44, no. 6 (February 2001): 937-56; and Raphael Zariski, "Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe: Dimensions, Causes, and Institutional Responses," *Comparative Politics* 21, no. 3 (April 1989): 253-72.

<sup>13</sup>Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, and Ronald Wintrobe, eds., *Political Extremism and Rationality* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

<sup>14</sup>Carter, "Proportional Representation," 125-46; Hagan, Rippl, Boehnke, and Merkmens, "The Interest in Evil," 162-83; and Hagtvet, "Right-Wing Extremism in Europe," 241-46.

<sup>15</sup>Saggat, "The One Per Cent World," 314-27; White, "Political Eschatology," 937-56; and Zariski, "Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe," 253-72.

Many issues are raised in the study of extremism, and one of the key concerns is the level of tolerance exhibited by extremists in democratic societies. Tolerance is generally conceptualized as a willingness to "put up with" those things that one objects to.<sup>16</sup> A tolerant individual is one who is willing to extend the rights of citizenship to all members of the polity, including those who hold opinions and ideas the individual personally opposes. As political tolerance presumes disagreement, questions of tolerance do not exist unless one seriously objects to a target group's beliefs. Why did Robert Kennedy voice special concern over extremists' intolerance? Several perspectives provide the theoretical underpinning for Kennedy's concern.

Breton and Dalmazzone argue that individuals form their beliefs about the world through a process of socialization.<sup>17</sup> Once acquired, these beliefs become part of an individual's identity and therefore change is both very difficult and very costly. These beliefs serve as filters of available information and become the basis of decision-making. As individuals increasingly become "true believers" of a particular point of view, their ability to think critically about their beliefs progressively fades. As a result, the more extreme a person is in their beliefs, the further away his/her views are from the mainstream, the less willing that person is to compromise about these beliefs, and he/she then becomes more rigid and intolerant of viewpoints that contradict these beliefs. Thus, being an extremist itself contributes to political intolerance.

An alternative explanation links the theory of threat to the social psychology perspective. Previous studies have demonstrated that the perception of threat is one of the main determinants of political intolerance.

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<sup>16</sup> John L. Sullivan, James E. Piereson, and George E. Marcus, *Political Tolerance and American Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 2; Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance," 784; James L. Gibson and Richard D. Bingham, "On the Conceptualization and Measurement of Political Tolerance," *American Political Science Review* 76, no. 3 (September 1982): 604.

<sup>17</sup> Albert Breton and Silvana Dalmazzone, "Information Control, Loss of Autonomy, and the Emergence of Political Extremism," in Breton, Galeotti, Salmon, and Wintrobe, *Political Extremism and Rationality*, 44-66.

The belief that a target group poses a threat to one's vital values may give rise to considerable anxiety. As intolerance toward the perceived source of danger is a way of relieving that anxiety, political tolerance toward the target group tends to be lower.<sup>18</sup> Following this logic, the causal linkage between threat perception and political intolerance is expected to be strong for extremists because they tend to stress differences more than moderates. Haslam and Turner showed that extremists have a propensity to perceive the world in "accentuated 'black and white' terms rather than in shades of grey."<sup>19</sup> Extremists are more inclined to perceive ideas that are similar to their own as closer than they really are while differing views suffer from the opposite problem in that they are seen as more different from those of the subject than they truly are. People holding similar ideas to an extremist are frequently considered members of the in-group while those with different views are relegated to out-group status. Extremists tend to evaluate in-group members positively and out-group members negatively. Linking these arguments to the theory of threat, one would expect political extremists to be more likely to consider groups holding different ideas from their own as both foreign and threatening and to be less likely to tolerate these groups and their beliefs.

### Political Extremism in Taiwan

The aforementioned theories of extremism are relevant to the analysis of political tolerance in Taiwan. Since the island country started its democratization process in the late 1980s, the political landscape has been roughly divided into two political camps: the pan-Green alliance and pan-Blue alliance. The former consists of the DPP and the Taiwan Solidarity Union

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<sup>18</sup>Michal Shamir and John L. Sullivan, "The Political Context of Tolerance: The United States and Israel," *American Political Science Review* 77, no. 4 (December 1983): 911-28; and T. Y. Wang and G. Andy Chang, "External Threats and Political Tolerance in Taiwan," *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 3 (September 2006): 377-88.

<sup>19</sup>S. Alexander Haslam and John C. Turner, "Extremism and Deviance: Beyond Taxonomy and Bias," *Social Research* 65, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 436.



(TSU, 台灣團結聯盟), while the latter includes the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), the People First Party (PFP, 親民黨), and the New Party (NP, 新黨). The political division has its historical roots in Chiang Kai-shek's (蔣介石) authoritarian rule after the island's sovereignty was returned to the KMT government by the Japanese at the end of World War II. During the ensuing half-century, the KMT leaders held that Taiwan was a part of China. They imposed harsh authoritarian rule coupled with intense propaganda efforts to "re-Sinicize" local residents. A variety of measures were adopted to foster the "greater China identity" and make local residents accept the view that both Taiwan and the Chinese mainland were parts of China and that China was their motherland. Activities that might encourage the development of a separate Taiwanese identity were censored and suppressed. Those who advocated Taiwan independence and/or democratization were considered threats to national security and were arrested or forced into exile. Since political tolerance on the part of the regime was virtually nonexistent, the authoritarian rule of Taiwan solidified the local perception of the KMT as a mainlander-dominated occupying force and a new foreign regime. The ethnic cleavage between "mainlanders" and "Taiwanese" has become the major political division within society.<sup>20</sup>

The pace of democratic reform quickened after the formation in 1986 of the DPP, the island's first major opposition party. The rapid democratization brought the lifting of restrictions on research into Taiwanese literature, languages, and history, as well as a shift in school curricula from the old China-centered programs to a new emphasis on Taiwan's own history

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<sup>20</sup>The ethnic line in Taiwan is drawn between "mainlanders" and "Taiwanese" even though there are four major ethnic groups on the island: the Minnanren (閩南人), Hakka (客家人), aborigines, and mainlanders. With approximately 12 percent of the total population, "mainlanders" are those Chinese migrants who fled to the island at the end of the Chinese civil war. The Minnanren, Hakka, and aborigines are generally grouped together as "Taiwanese" even though they have different customs and habits and speak different dialects. The term "Minnanren" refers to island residents whose ancestors migrated to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland several hundred years ago and they constitute the largest ethnic group at 77 percent of the island's 23 million people. About 10 percent of Taiwan's total population is Hakka, descendants of immigrants who came to the island at roughly the same time as the Minnanren from areas in central China. Aborigines constitute less than 2 percent of the total population in Taiwan.

and culture. An atmosphere of political tolerance appeared to be emerging on the island as opinions different from the "one-China" principle were permitted to be heard. However, rapid democratization on the island also allowed the emerging indigenous majority to enter the political arena which subsequently created tense divisions within Taiwanese society. The democratization movement that had initially focused on protesting against the monopoly of power enjoyed by a mainlander-dominated regime now turned toward a call for de jure Taiwan independence.<sup>21</sup> Further complicating the picture and dramatically raising the stakes for taking any action toward independence is the Beijing government's forceful claim to sovereignty over Taiwan. Arguing that Taiwan is a part of China, Beijing leaders insist that the island must be returned to the "motherland" under the "one country, two systems" unification plan. In an attempt to force Taipei to accept its unification proposal, the Chinese government has isolated Taiwan internationally and backed up its claim to the island with the constant threat of military force. As Taiwan's future relationship with the Chinese mainland has now become the most important political issue facing society, its political landscape has become sharply divided between the pan-Green and the pan-Blue alliances. In general, pan-Green identifiers are more supportive of Taiwan's separation from China, while pan-Blue supporters either prefer or do not exclude the unification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup>Wang Fu-chang, "Taiwan zuqun zhengzhi de xingcheng yu biaoqian: 1994 nian Taibei shizhang xuanju jieguo zhi fenxi" (The formation and depiction of Taiwan's ethnic politics: an analysis of the 1994 Taipei mayoral election), in *Minzhu, zhuangxing? Taiwan xianxiang* (Democracy, transition? The case of Taiwan) (Taipei: Guiguan chubanshe, 1998), 143-232; Wang Fu-chang, *Dangdai Taiwan shehui de zuqun xiangxiang* (Ethnic imagination in contemporary Taiwan) (Taipei: Socio Publishing Co., 2003); Shyu Huo-yan, "Taiwan Electorate's State Identity and Partisan Voting Behavior: The Results of Empirical Studies from 1991 to 1993," *Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan* (Taiwanese Political Science Review), no. 1 (1996): 85-127; Shi Zheng-feng, *Taiwanren de minzu rentong* (Taiwanese national identity) (Taipei: Vanguard Publishing Company, 2000); and Chang Mao-kuei, "Shengji wenti yu minzu zhuyi" (Provincial origin and nationalism), in *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong* (Ethnic relationships and state identity), ed. Chang Mao-kuei et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang chubanshe, 1993), 233-78.

<sup>22</sup>Although some pan-Blue supporters do not reject the unification of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in principle, it is important to note that very few Taiwanese citizens want

The election to the presidency of the pro-independence DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian in 2000 further inflamed the controversy over Taiwan's future status. During its eight-year rule of the island, the Chen administration implemented a series of major policies fostering Taiwanese consciousness and it characterized the previous KMT-run government as a foreign regime (外來政權, *wailai zhengquan*) while accusing its current leaders of being proxies of the Beijing government. Chen's efforts to strengthen Taiwanese identity and promote the island's separate status in the international community reached a climax when, in 2007, the campaign for a referendum on whether Taiwan should be a member of the United Nations was launched and the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial Hall (中正紀念堂) in Taipei was renamed.<sup>23</sup> While these efforts inevitably irritated pan-Blue identifiers, they were actually aimed to appeal to the DPP's core base—deep-Green supporters.

Deep-Green supporters are a group of Taiwanese citizens whose political beliefs occupy one end of the political spectrum on the issue of Taiwan's future relations with China. Specifically, they are extreme Taiwanese nationalists who hold an uncompromising view that Taiwan is a separate political entity from China and they are firmly convinced that the island country should pursue *de jure* independence. Fearing that the pan-Blue alliance's conciliatory position on cross-strait relations would "betray" or "sell out" Taiwan, deep-Green supporters view any KMT-run government as a foreign regime and thus steadfastly support "a government of members of the Taiwanese ethnic group" (本土政權, *bentu zhengquan*).<sup>24</sup> To identify "deep-Green supporters," the 2007 Political Tolerance

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immediate unification. More than 80 percent of the islanders prefer maintaining the status quo for the time being, even though they may differ in their views on Taiwan's future relations with China. See T. Y. Wang and I-chou Liu, "Contending Identities in Taiwan: Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," *Asian Survey* 44, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 568-90.

<sup>23</sup>Peter Enav, "Taiwan Leader Riles China, U.S.," *The Washington Post*, September 9, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/09/AR2007090900579.html>; and Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, "Inscription Goes up at Democracy Hall," *Taipei Times*, December 9, 2007, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/12/09/2003391782>.

<sup>24</sup>Cheng Su-feng, "Shenlu xuanmin zhi tansuo" (A preliminary study of deep-Green voters), *Wenti yu yanjiu* (Issues and Studies) 46, no. 1 (January/March 2007): 33-61.

**Table 1**  
**Deep-Green Supporters in Taiwan**  
**(N = 863)**

		To love Taiwan we must only support regimes governed by members of the Taiwanese ethnic group.	
		Strongly agree	Otherwise
China and Taiwan are separate and different political entities. Taiwan should take its own path.	Strongly agree	129 (15.0%)	186 (21.6%)
	Otherwise	35 (4.0%)	513 (59.4%)

Survey solicited responses from respondents on the following two questions:

Some people say that "China and Taiwan are separate and different political entities and Taiwan should take its own path." Do you agree or disagree with the statement? (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Some people say that "to love Taiwan we must only support regimes governed by members of the Taiwanese ethnic group." Do you agree or disagree with the statement? (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

Together, tables 1 and 2 provide a profile of the core base of the pan-Green alliance. Because extremists are located at an end of a political spectrum, those who strongly agree with both statements meet the definition of deep-Green supporters. About 15 percent of those who responded to both questions can be characterized as deep-Green supporters. They are overwhelmingly Minnanren by ethnicity. Deep-Green supporters are generally older than their fellow citizens as 46 percent of them are age 50 or older and only 30 percent of them are between the ages of 20 and 39. Not surprisingly, the majority of them identify with pan-Green parties. Compared with other respondents, deep-Green supporters have a lower education level as more than half of them have only a high school education and close to 30 percent of them an elementary school education or below. In terms of geographical distribution, about 40 percent of deep-Green supporters reside in the more industrialized north of Taiwan while about 37 percent of

**Table 2**  
**Characteristics of Deep-Green Supporters**

	Deep-Green supporters	Other
Ethnic background*	<i>N</i> = 124	<i>N</i> = 176
Hakka	10.5%	12.0%
Minnanren	82.6%	74.8%
Mainlander	6.9%	13.2%
Age groups	<i>N</i> = 128	<i>N</i> = 726
20-29	18.8%	25.8%
30-39	12.4%	24.4%
40-49	22.7%	21.9%
50-59	26.9%	16.2%
60 and above	19.3%	11.6%
Party ID	<i>N</i> = 125	<i>N</i> = 686
Pan-Blue	7.7%	40.5%
Pan-Green	66.2%	19.4%
Independent	26.1%	40.1%
Education	<i>N</i> = 128	<i>N</i> = 734
Elementary education	28.3%	13.5%
High school	54.3%	44.0%
College or above	17.4%	42.5%
Region <sup>†</sup>	<i>N</i> = 129	<i>N</i> = 693
Northern Taiwan	41.1%	47.5%
Central Taiwan	16.7%	18.7%
Southern Taiwan	37.4%	29.7%
Eastern Taiwan	4.9%	4.1%

\*This study excludes aborigines from the analysis because they constitute less than two percent of the total population in Taiwan.

<sup>†</sup>The following counties are included in the respective regions:

**Northern Taiwan:** Taipei City, Taipei County, Keelung City, Taoyuan County, Hsinchu City, Hsinchu County, and Miaoli County; **Central Taiwan:** Taichung City, Taichung County, Changhua County, and Nantou County; **Southern Taiwan:** Yunlin County, Chiayi City, Chiayi County, Tainan City, Tainan County, Kaohsiung City, Kaohsiung County, and Ping-dong County; **Eastern Taiwan:** Yilan County, Hualian County, and Taitung County.

them live in the southern part of the island. This finding initially seems to contradict the conventional wisdom that the DPP's core base is concentrated in southern Taiwan. However, when the population distribution between the two areas is taken into account, i.e., that the northern counties have 43.9 percent of Taiwan's 23 million population while 32.4 percent resides in the south, it is clear that the proportion of deep-Green supporters is in fact higher in southern Taiwan, consistent with the conventional wisdom. Deep-Green supporters also tend to be concentrated in rural areas. As will be explained below, education and knowledge are heavily emphasized in Taiwan's industrialized society, so deep-Green supporters are at a political disadvantage. When their older age and geographical location are considered, they are clearly poised to lose their political influence over time.

Because political tolerance implies a willingness to extend political rights to specific groups which hold opinions and ideas one opposes, the assessment of deep-Green supporters' tolerance requires the identification of their target groups. As indicated earlier, an individual's opposition to a particular political group presumes a perception that the target group poses a threat to values vital to that individual.<sup>25</sup> Such perceived threats are frequently rooted in long-standing social or political cleavages that have significant political implications for society, such as race in the United States or religion in Northern Ireland. Since numerous studies have demonstrated that Taiwan's future relationship with China is the most salient issue that divides the islanders,<sup>26</sup> this study focuses on whether deep-Green supporters are willing to "put up with" groups that have different positions on the issue of "unification vs. independence." To identify target groups that a respondent feels are the most threatening and thus objects to the

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<sup>25</sup>Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance," 781-94.

<sup>26</sup>Chi Huang, "Dimensions of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and National Identity in Taiwan: A Latent Class Analysis," in *Taiwan's National Identity and Democratization*, ed. T. Y. Wang, Special Issue of the *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 40, no. 1-2 (April 2005): 51-70; and John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Ethnicity, National Identity, and Domestic Politics in Taiwan," *ibid.*, 13-28.

**Table 3**  
**Deep-Green Supporters' Perception of Threats from Target Groups**

Groups perceived as threatening	Deep-Green supporters	Other
Those who support the establishment of the Republic of Taiwan	5.8% (7)	20.5% (150)
Those who support communism	29.8% (38)	31.7% (233)
Those who propose to accept Beijing's "one country, two systems" unification plan	38.5% (50)	14.1% (103)
Other threats	9.8% (13)	14.9% (110)
No response	16.1% (21)	18.8% (138)
Total cases	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 129)	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 734)

most, the following question was asked:

Who of the followings are most likely to harm our society: "those who support the establishment of the Republic of Taiwan," "those who support communism," "those who propose to accept Beijing's 'one country, two systems' unification plan," or "others"?

From table 3, one can see that close to 40 percent of deep-Green supporters feel that those favoring Beijing's unification plan are most likely to inflict harm on the island's society, while about 30 percent of them view supporters of communism as the most threatening group. As the Beijing leadership is constantly displaying its military might, it is not surprising that close to 70 percent of deep-Green supporters consider citizens espousing these views to pose the greatest threat to their vital interests. Very few deep-Green supporters, however, perceive advocates of Taiwan independence as harmful to society. In contrast, about 30 percent of non-deep-Green respondents express concern about the threat from those who support communism while advocates of Taiwan independence are considered the second most threatening group for society. Only 14 percent

of non-deep-Green respondents see supporters of the mainland's unification plan as a threat to Taiwan. These findings may reflect their understandable concern over both Beijing's military threat and the possibility that the Taiwan independence movement might directly challenge China, a very real possibility under the Chen administration. Such a confrontation would likely invoke a violent response from the Chinese government with little or no support from Washington and the international community.

As China is considered an icon of communism and constantly backs up its unification plan with military threats, deep-Green supporters naturally express strong concerns regarding supporters of communism and Beijing's unification plan and find them both to be objectionable. These findings indirectly validate the general belief that deep-Green supporters hold strong views on Taiwan being a separate and independent country.

Are there differences between deep-Green and non-deep-Green citizens in their tolerance toward groups they find objectionable? To answer this question, the 2007 Political Tolerance Survey asks Taiwanese citizens whether those with objectionable ideas should be allowed to (1) express their views on TV freely, (2) teach in schools, and (3) hold public office in the government. Table 4 shows that deep-Green supporters are less willing to extend democratic rights to groups that they perceive as constituting a threat to the island's society. The overall tolerance levels of deep-Green supporters are 16 to 22 percentage points lower than other respondents when it comes to allowing objectionable groups to exercise their rights of citizenship. A clear majority, 60 percent, of deep-Green supporters are not willing either to allow objectionable groups to express their views on TV or to teach in school, while about 45 percent of non-deep-Green citizens prefer restricting such rights. Close to two-thirds of deep-Green supporters want to limit objectionable groups' rights to run for and hold political office but less than half of their non-deep-Green counterparts would do so. In addition, as table 5 shows, deep-Green supporters' political intolerance seems to be uniform for all objectionable groups except with respect to freedom of expression. The majority of them, ranging from 50 percent to 79 percent, are not willing to allow objectionable groups to teach in school or to run for government office. While deep-Green supporters are also



**Table 4**  
**Deep-Green Supporters' Political Tolerance**

For those who are most likely to harm our society, do you agree or disagree that they should be allowed to:

	Deep-Green supporters	Others
Express views on TV freely		
Agree	35.4% (40)	51.5% (321)
Disagree	61.8% (70)	42.9% (267)
No opinion	2.8% (3)	5.7% (36)
	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 113)	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 624)
Teach in schools		
Agree	24.7% (28)	46.6% (291)
Disagree	58.2% (66)	45.9% (286)
No opinion	17.1% (19)	7.5% (47)
	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 113)	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 624)
Hold government office		
Agree	20.4% (23)	42.7% (267)
Disagree	71.6% (81)	49.1% (306)
No opinion	8.0% (9)	8.2% (51)
	100.0% ( <i>N</i> = 103)	100% ( <i>N</i> = 624)

adamant about restricting the freedom of expression of those who support communism and Beijing's unification plan, they are much more willing to allow Taiwan independence advocates freedom of expression on TV even when they consider them to be a threat to society. Such selective discrepancy further demonstrates their political intolerance.

In summary, consistent with the theoretical expectations, deep-Green supporters in Taiwan show a lower level of political tolerance than do non-deep-Green citizens. Such intolerance appears to be across-the-board as long as the target groups are deemed objectionable. To ascertain if these findings are spurious, multivariate analyses are conducted in the following section.

**Table 5**  
**Threat Perception and Political Rights: Comparisons between Deep-Green Supporters and Others**

	Deep-Green supporters ( <i>N</i> = 92)			Other ( <i>N</i> = 620)		
Group perceived as threatening	Express views on TV freely					
	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)
Supporters of Independence	20.0	80.0	(5)	33.7	60.3	(172)
Supporters of communism	70.6	29.4	(34)	48.6	51.4	(245)
Supporters of Beijing's plan	51.2	48.8	(43)	45.2	54.8	(93)
Other	60.0	40.0	(10)	50.0	50.0	(110)
	Deep-Green supporters ( <i>N</i> = 80)			Other ( <i>N</i> = 604)		
Group perceived as threatening	Teach in schools					
	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)
Supporters of independence	50.0	50.0	(4)	35.1	64.9	(168)
Supporters of communism	75.9	24.1	(29)	60.0	39.4	(241)
Supporters of Beijing's plan	60.5	39.5	(38)	44.5	55.4	(92)
Other	66.7	33.3	(9)	60.2	39.8	(103)
	Deep-Green supporters ( <i>N</i> = 88)			Others ( <i>N</i> = 600)		
Group perceived as threatening	Hold government office					
	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)	Disagree (%)	Agree (%)	(N)
Supporters of independence	60.0	40.0	(5)	40.7	59.3	(167)
Supporters of communism	78.8	21.2	(33)	62.0	38.0	(242)
Supporters of Beijing's plan	73.2	26.8	(41)	47.8	52.2	(90)
Other	66.7	33.3	(9)	65.4	34.7	(101)

### Multivariate Analysis of Deep-Green Supporters' Political Tolerance

To conduct the multivariate analyses, responses to the three tolerance-related questions listed in table 4 are employed as dependent variables. These responses are coded dichotomously, with 1 indicating support for extending the specific right to all members of society and 0 otherwise.

Because political tolerance presumes a disagreement or objection, respondents with a "no opinion" response are deemed indifferent on these matters and are thus excluded from the subsequent analyses.

Several key independent variables are included in the analysis. As indicated, the more extreme a person is in their beliefs, the less willing that person is to compromise on them, and the more intolerant they are of viewpoints that contradict those beliefs. Thus, an extreme Taiwanese nationalist would be expected to exhibit lower political tolerance on this issue. To assess this hypothesis, a dummy variable, *deep-Green supporter*, is created based on the responses presented in table 1. Those who strongly agree with both statements and therefore meet the definition of deep-Green supporter are coded 1 while all others are coded 0. Extremists also tend to accentuate the differences between their beliefs and those of others and are less open-minded about different ideas. They are more likely to consider "out-groups" as threatening and will exhibit lower tolerance toward them. The testing of this hypothesis requires assessing the interaction effects of respondents' deep-Green membership and their perceptions of target groups as threats. Since deep-Green (DG) membership and all threatening target group choices are measured dichotomously, three dummy variables are created by multiplying the former with each of the latter: (1) DG's threat perception of advocates of communism; (2) DG's threat perception of advocates of Beijing's unification plan; and (3) DG's threat perception of other groups. This measurement scheme uses the deep-Green supporters' threat perception of advocates of Taiwan independence as the baseline group for comparison.

Several other factors are included as control variables. Previous research has shown commitment to general democratic principles to have positive effects on applications of these principles.<sup>27</sup> To assess the effects of respondents' belief in abstract democratic principles on their tolerance

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<sup>27</sup>John L. Sullivan, George E. Marcus, Stanley Feldman, and James E. Piereson, "The Sources of Political Tolerance: A Multivariate Analysis," *American Political Science Review* 75, no. 1 (March 1981): 92-106.

levels, a dummy variable, *high democratic value*, is created by the response to the following statement: "The existence of too many different political opinions will harm the solidarity of our society." Negative responses (i.e., disagree or strongly disagree) are coded 1, representing a higher level of commitment to diverse opinions, and 0 otherwise. In his analysis of tolerance toward potentially objectionable groups, Stouffer found that tolerance of unpopular groups increases over time as a result of rising levels of education.<sup>28</sup> Later analyses of Stouffer's hypothesis have confirmed the positive effects of education on level of political tolerance.<sup>29</sup> It is argued that education raises the awareness of different thinking and that in turn increases the willingness to accept diverse ideas and people. To measure respondents' education level, *college degree (and above)* is created, coded 1 for those who are in the relevant category and 0 otherwise. Age is also said to have an inverse effect on tolerance because younger respondents are likely to be more educated, more liberal, and more likely to have been exposed to different ideas.<sup>30</sup> Finally, female respondents were found to be less tolerant than males of objectionable groups.<sup>31</sup> Age is measured by the number of years since birth and a dummy variable, *female*, is coded according to respondents' gender.

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<sup>28</sup>Samuel A. Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties* (New York: Doubleday, 1955).

<sup>29</sup>Lawrence Bobo and Frederick C. Licari, "Education and Political Tolerance: Testing the Effects of Cognitive Sophistication and Target Group Affect," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 53, no. 3 (Autumn 1989): 283-308; Gibson, "Homosexuals and the Ku Klux Klan," 427-48; Ewa A. Golebiowska, "Individual Value Priorities, Education, and Political Tolerance," *Political Behavior* 17, no. 1 (March 1995): 23-48; Lawrence J. R. Herson and C. Richard Hofstetter, "Tolerance, Consensus and the Democratic Creed: A Contextual Exploration," *Journal of Politics* 37, no. 4 (November 1975): 1007-32; David G. Lawrence, "Procedural Norms and Tolerance: A Reassessment," *American Political Science Review* 70, no. 1 (March 1976): 80-100; and Mark Peffley and Lee Sigelman, "Intolerance of Communists during the McCarthy Era: A General Model," *The Western Political Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (March 1990): 93-111.

<sup>30</sup>Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*; Golebiowska, "Individual Value Priorities, Education, and Political Tolerance"; Clyde Z. Nunn, Harry J. Crockett, Jr., and J. Allen Williams, Jr., *Tolerance for Nonconformity* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978); and Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, and Piereson, "The Sources of Political Tolerance."

<sup>31</sup>Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*.

Because all of the three dependent variables in the analysis have two categories, a logit model with binary outcomes is employed.<sup>32</sup> Specifically, the regression model takes the form of

$$\ln \Omega(\mathbf{x}) = \ln \frac{\Pr(y = 1|\mathbf{x})}{\Pr(y = 0|\mathbf{x})} = \mathbf{x}\beta$$

where  $\ln\Omega(\mathbf{x})$  is the natural logarithm of the conditional odds of having a response of extending the specific democratic rights to all members of society relative to having a response denying such rights,  $\mathbf{x}$  is a vector of independent variables, and  $\beta$  is a vector of regression estimates.

Ideally, responses to the three tolerance-related questions should be regressed on all eight independent variables in order to assess deep-Green supporters' level of political tolerance. Unfortunately, the variable "*deep-Green supporter*" is highly correlated with the three variables of threat perceptions, which presents serious problems of multicollinearity.<sup>33</sup> *Deep-Green supporter* and the three perception variables are thus included in the analysis separately. Because all of the theoretical expectations imply directional hypotheses, a one-tailed significance test is employed. Collectively, the six logit models in tables 6 and 7 reveal several major findings.

First of all, two out of the three regression coefficients related to deep-Green membership in table 6 are statistically significant and bear

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<sup>32</sup>An alternative approach to measuring political tolerance is to create summative indices by summing Taiwanese citizens' responses to the survey questions. While the use of summative indices may be parsimonious, it fails to provide a perspective with substantive meaning. The use of three separate tolerance items, i.e., expressing views on TV freely, teaching in school, and holding government positions, allows readers to link political tolerance to specific political behaviors. In addition, political tolerance has multiple dimensions and a respondent agreeing to allow objectionable groups to teach in schools may not consent to allow them to run for office. The use of separate tolerance items is thus theoretically justified.

<sup>33</sup>When *deep-Green supporter* is included in the analysis along with the three variables of threat perceptions, the corresponding Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) is 11 which is above the recommended threshold of 5 and indicates a serious problem of multicollinearity. See John Fox, *Regression Diagnostics* (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 1991). After the above variables are included separately in the analysis, none of the VIFs is above 2. It is thus concluded that there is no significant evidence of multicollinearity after the aforementioned independent variables are included separately in the analysis.

**Table 6**  
**Deep-Green Supporters' Political Tolerance: Logit Analysis**

Variables & Categories	Express views on TV		Teach in schools		Hold government office	
	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)
<i>Deep-Green supporter</i>	-0.49 (0.30)	-38.7 (0.61)	-0.86** (0.33)	-57.7 (0.42)	-1.06** (0.33)	-65.4 (0.35)
<i>High democratic value</i>	0.68** (0.19)	97.1 (1.97)	0.38* (0.19)	46.5 (1.46)	0.39* (0.19)	47.0 (1.47)
<i>College degree (and above)</i>	0.32* (0.19)	37.3 (1.37)	-0.09 (0.20)	-8.6 (0.91)	-0.23 (0.20)	-20.4 (0.80)
<i>Age</i>	-0.02 (0.009)	-1.6 (0.98)	-0.02* (0.009)	-1.7 (0.98)	-0.02** (0.009)	-2.3 (0.98)
<i>Female</i>	-0.46** (0.19)	-36.7 (0.63)	-0.46** (0.19)	-36.9 (0.63)	-0.15 (0.19)	-13.8 (0.86)
<i>N</i>	693		669		671	

**Key:** Coef. = regression coefficient; % ch. = percentage change in odds; s.e. = robust standard error; O.R. = odds ratio; \*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , one-tailed test.

negative signs. Compared with other citizens on the island, deep-Green supporters are less willing to allow objectionable groups to teach in schools and to hold government office. The odds of them being willing to extend democratic rights to these objectionable groups are 57.7 percent and 65.4 percent lower than other citizens on the island. Although deep-Green supporters seem to be indifferent to objectionable groups' freedom of expression, they are in fact particularly sensitive to their differences with advocates of communism. Indeed, as table 7 shows, all regression coefficients associated with deep-Green supporters' threat perception of communism advocates are statistically significant with negative signs. Because the threat perception of Taiwan independence advocates is used as the baseline for comparison, these negative coefficients suggest that deep-Green supporters are more tolerant of citizens supporting the island's independence. They are much less likely, by 60 percent to 70 percent in odds, to

**Table 7**  
**Deep-Green Supporters' Political Tolerance: Logit Analysis**

Variables & Categories	Express views on TV		Teach in schools		Hold government office	
	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)	Coef. (s.e.)	% ch. (O.R.)
DG's threat perception of advocates of communism	-1.26** (0.45)	-71.7 (0.28)	-1.07* (0.54)	-65.7 (0.34)	-0.94* (0.55)	-61.0 (0.39)
DG's threat perception of advocates of Beijing's unification plan	-0.22 (0.42)	-19.4 (0.81)	-0.62 (0.41)	-46.2 (0.54)	-1.26** (0.45)	-71.7 (0.28)
DG's threat perception of all of the above	-1.20 (1.04)	-69.8 (0.30)	-1.29 (1.15)	-72.3 (0.28)	-0.55 (0.91)	-42.2 (0.58)
High democratic value	0.62** (0.19)	86.5 (1.87)	-0.40* (0.19)	49.6 (1.50)	0.36* (0.19)	42.9 (1.43)
College degree (and above)	0.32* (0.19)	37.6 (1.38)	-0.10 (0.20)	-9.2 (0.91)	-0.20 (0.19)	-18.3 (0.82)
Age	-0.01 (0.009)	-1.3 (0.99)	-0.02* (0.009)	-1.6 (0.98)	-0.02* (0.009)	-2.1 (0.98)
Female	-0.48** (0.19)	-38.2 (0.62)	-0.47** (0.19)	-37.5 (0.62)	-0.18 (0.19)	-16.5 (0.84)
N	709		682		683	

**Key:** Same as table 6.

agree with extending democratic rights to communist supporters. Deep-Green supporters are also less likely to agree that advocates of Beijing's unification plan should be allowed to hold government office as the associated regression coefficient is statistically significant and bears a negative sign.

As hypothesized, all coefficients related to *high democratic value* are statistically significant and bear positive signs. This indicates that the higher the democratic commitment of Taiwan residents, the more willing they are to put up with the activities of objectionable groups. Contrary to some of the previous findings that education is not significantly related

to tolerance,<sup>34</sup> our findings have mixed results because the coefficients for *college degree (and above)* are only statistically significant regarding freedom of expression in both tables 6 and 7. People with higher levels of education appear to be indifferent to objectionable groups teaching in school or holding government office. Finally, age and gender play important roles in Taiwan residents' political tolerance because senior citizens are less willing to extend the rights of teaching in school and holding government office to objectionable groups than are younger citizens. Female respondents are also less tolerant than males toward expressing views on TV and teaching in school.

In general, after controlling all other relevant variables, the empirical findings show that deep-Green supporters are less tolerant of groups deemed threatening to their vital values. Consistent with the general profile that extreme Taiwanese nationalists are in favor of Taiwan independence, they also show different degrees of intolerance toward target groups even if they are all perceived as endangering society. They are less willing to extend democratic rights to advocates of communism and of Beijing's unification plan than to supporters of Taiwan independence, presumably because they agree with the latter.

### Conclusions

Treating Robert Kennedy's statement as a hypothesis, this study employs survey data collected in Taiwan to assess the political tolerance of extremists in the island's society. Generally considered as extreme Taiwanese nationalists who strongly advocate the island's de jure independence and Taiwanese governance, deep-Green supporters show lower levels of political tolerance toward communist supporters and advocates of Beijing's unification plan and are less willing to extend citizen rights to members of

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<sup>34</sup>Sullivan, Piereson, and Marcus, "An Alternative Conceptualization of Political Tolerance"; Sullivan, Marcus, Feldman, and Piereson, "The Sources of Political Tolerance"; and Shamir and Sullivan, "The Political Context of Tolerance."



these groups. As the findings confirm Kennedy's hypothesis, they further reveal the dynamics underlying extremists' political intolerance. Indeed, being an extremist itself contributes to political intolerance because when individuals become "true believers" of certain viewpoints, they are less willing to compromise on these beliefs and become less open-minded. Furthermore, because extremists tend to accentuate the differences between their viewpoints and those of others, they are more likely to see those with dissimilar stands on issues they are concerned about as threatening. Compared with other citizens, extremists are thus less willing to put up with groups they deem objectionable and demonstrate lower commitment to one of the most important democratic principles—political tolerance.

The above findings also have an important policy implication for the future of Taiwan's ruling-turned-opposition party, the DPP. The DPP suffered humiliating defeats in the legislative and presidential elections in 2008. They won only one-fourth of the legislative seats, while the opposition KMT enjoyed a landslide victory with nearly three-fourths of the seats; their presidential candidate, Frank Hsieh (謝長廷), was also roundly defeated by the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), by a 17 percent margin. In the aftermath of the elections, critics identified former President Chen Shui-bian's approach of appealing to the political values of deep-Green supporters as the leading cause of the party's electoral defeats, in addition to poor government performance, various corruption scandals, and changes of electoral rules. Indeed, during Chen's eight-year rule of Taiwan, his administration and the ruling DPP under his leadership adopted a series of policies deemed consistent with the "core values" of the pan-Green alliance. In response to deep-Green supporters' demands for "de-Sinification" and the pursuit of de jure independence, the DPP government launched a "rectification movement" (正名運動, *zhengming yundong*), replacing "China" in the names of all relevant government and state-run agencies with "Taiwan."<sup>35</sup> It also renamed the Chiang Kai-shek Memorial

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<sup>35</sup>For instance, the Chen administration renamed the state-run China Petroleum Corp. "CPC Corp, Taiwan" and the postal system "Taiwan Post." Other renamed agencies included Taiwan's shipbuilding corporation and its central bank. See Mac William Bishop and

Hall and proposed a referendum on UN membership to be held during the 2008 presidential election. Because deep-Green supporters are so adamant in their views, the DPP changed its rules concerning party primaries before the 2008 legislative election so that candidates deviating from the "core values" would not be nominated. While such policies may have pleased deep-Green supporters, they seriously alienated the island's centrist voters and damaged the party's prospects of holding on to political power. Taiwan has recently changed its electoral rules and the majority of legislative seats are now elected from single-member districts. This new system requires political parties to move to the center on various issues in order to gain the support of the majority of voters. Even though the DPP's 2008 presidential candidate Frank Hsieh attempted to separate himself from Chen by proposing moderate policies in the aftermath of the legislative election, it was a case of too little too late. The DPP's humiliating defeats in the 2008 elections thus clearly demonstrate that deep-Green supporters have lost political appeal by advancing the cause of Taiwan's de jure independence and have become less relevant to contemporary Taiwanese politics. They have not only caused both themselves and the DPP as a whole to become marginalized but they have also restored Taiwan to the status of a de facto one-party state without a credible opposition to the pan-Blue alliance. The lesson for the DPP and for other political parties on the island is that policies and actions designed to appeal to a small section of the electorate whose beliefs are outside of the political mainstream will only hurt their chances of winning political power. If the DPP wants to continue to play a major role in Taiwanese politics, the party's extremist stand of pandering to deep-Green supporters will have to change.

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Mure Dickie, "Taiwan Drops 'China' in Identity Move," *Financial Times*, February 12, 2007, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/581a6f9a-ba96-11db-bbf3-0000779e2340.html>.

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