

Change and Continuity in the Personal Vote after Electoral Reform in Taiwan

NATHAN F. BATTO

Taiwan's new mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system should promote far lower levels of personal voting than its old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) system. Since personal votes are conventionally contrasted with party votes, this should lead to more partisan politics. However, I argue that personal votes must be disaggregated into two distinct types. Intra-party personal voters favor a particular party and simply pick one candidate over other party nominees. Extra-party personal voters do not like the party, and pick the candidate despite his or her party affiliation. In this paper, I argue that Taiwan's electoral reform has reduced overall personal voting by eliminating intra-party personal votes. However, there are clear continuities in extra-party personal votes. One implication of this is that Taiwan should expect less, not more, partisan politics in its future.

KEYWORDS: Taiwan; single nontransferable vote (SNTV); mixed-member; personal vote; electoral reform.

* * *



When Taiwan scrapped its old single nontransferable vote (SNTV) for a new mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system, it was reasonable to expect that one of the changes that Taiwan

NATHAN F. BATTO is an assistant professor of political science at the School of International Studies, University of the Pacific, Stockton, California. Dr. Batto can be reached at <nbatto@pacific.edu>.

©Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).

would experience under the new system was a change in the nature of personal votes. The new MMM electoral system creates much weaker incentives for politicians to cultivate a personal vote than the old SNTV system did. Strong personal votes are associated with numerous types of behavior that are generally considered undesirable, such as factionalism,¹ voting against the party line in the legislature,² seeking pork for local constituencies,³ spending more time back home in the district than in the capital,⁴ more campaign spending,⁵ corruption,⁶ and other forms of localism.⁷ Therefore, changing the incentives to cultivate a personal vote could potentially alter the nature of Taiwanese politics.

The literature on the personal votes has heretofore been preoccupied with the question of "how much?" Electoral systems have been classified according to whether they engendered larger or smaller incentives to cultivate a personal vote. What the literature has overlooked is the question of "what kind?" In this paper, I argue that we must differentiate between two different types of personal votes. One type, intra-party personal votes, consists of voters who prefer the candidate's party, but choose that particular candidate over other nominees from the same party because of his or her special qualities. Another type, extra-party personal votes, consists of

¹Nathaniel B. Thayer, *How the Conservatives Rule Japan* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1969); Gerald L. Curtis, *Election Campaigning Japanese Style* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971); and J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances M. Rosenbluth, *Japan's Political Marketplace* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).

²Barry Ames, *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002), 187-223.

³Barry Ames, "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress," *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (May 1995): 324-43.

⁴Richard Fenno, *Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts* (New York: Harper Collins, 1978).

⁵Gary W. Cox and Michael F. Thies, "The Cost of Intraparty Competition: The Single, Non-transferable Vote and Money Politics in Japan," *Comparative Political Studies* 31, no. 3 (June 1998): 267-91.

⁶Miriam Golden and Eric C.C. Chang, "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy," *World Politics* 53 no. 4 (July 2001): 588-622.

⁷V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Knopf, 1949); and Paul M. Sacks, *The Donegal Mafia: An Irish Political Machine* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1976).

voters who do not prefer the candidate's party. These voters cross party lines in order to vote for the candidate.

Different electoral systems encourage candidates to place differing emphases on appealing to these different types of personal voters. In Taiwan's case, both the SNTV and the single-member district (SMD) portion of the MMM system encourages candidates to cultivate extra-party personal votes, but only the SNTV system encourages them also to cultivate intra-party personal votes.

In this paper, I argue that there has been both change and continuity in the nature of personal votes in Taiwan following the electoral reform. Theoretically, I argue that there is no longer a need to cultivate intra-party votes. As such, a far smaller percentage of total votes should be thought of as personal votes. This marks a significant change in Taiwan's electoral politics. However, I also argue that there has been remarkable continuity in the number of extra-party personal votes. Empirically, I will demonstrate geographical continuity in the personal vote from the last SNTV election in 2004 to the first MMM election in 2008. I interpret this as evidence that candidates cultivated similar extra-party personal votes both before and after the electoral reform.

The paper will proceed as follows. The first section will review the literature on the personal vote, conceptualize the intra- and extra-party personal vote, and discuss the impact of different electoral systems on the personal vote. The second section will discuss Taiwan's electoral reform, operationalize key variables, and draw testable hypotheses. The third section will provide details on the data set. The fourth section will present a statistical test of the hypotheses. The final section will sum up the argument and speculate on what this change in intra-party personal votes and continuity in extra-party personal votes might mean for partisan politics in Taiwan.

The Personal Vote

The personal vote is typically defined by what it is not. Specifically, the personal vote is not a party vote. In other words, if a voter is not voting

for a candidate on the basis of the collective party reputation, then the voter must be attracted by some individual attribute of that candidate. Shugart, in an article reviewing the state of the literature on electoral systems, writes that the personal vote is "typically defined as that part of a candidate's vote that results from his or her own individual characteristics or actions, rather than from his or her party label."⁸ In an even stronger statement, Carey and Shugart suggest that there is sometimes a zero-sum relationship between personal reputation and party reputation: "if electoral prospects depend on winning votes cast for the individual politician instead of, or in addition to, votes cast for the party, then politicians need to evaluate the trade-off between the value of personal and party reputations."⁹

Carey and Shugart realize, of course, that electoral prospects for individual candidates vary according to the electoral system, and they lay out four factors—whether party leaders control access to the ballot, whether or how votes are pooled, the type of ballot presented to the voter, and district magnitude—that affect incentives to cultivate the personal vote. Since this article is widely considered the definitive statement on the relationship between the personal vote and the electoral system, I will review their argument in some detail.

Ballot access refers to the degree to which party leaders are able to present a fixed, ranked slate of candidates to the voters. Typically, a closed

⁸Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead," in *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 25-55, quote on 46. Shugart instructs readers to see Cain, Ferejohn, and Fioriana's oft-cited book on the personal vote as one of the first clear expressions of this typical definition. However, Cain, Ferejohn, and Fioriana have a somewhat more complex notion of the personal vote. They argue that in addition to partisan affiliation, there are other things, such as class, religion, and ethnicity that do not belong in the realm of the personal vote. See Bruce Cain, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina, *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), 9. Most subsequent treatments have implicitly disagreed with this. For example, Ames gives examples of Brazilian candidates whose appeals are based on their working class backgrounds, Japanese ancestry, and evangelical religious beliefs, respectively. See Ames, *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*, 47-49.

⁹John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas," *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 4 (December 1995): 417-39, quote on 419.

list proportional representation (PR) system maximizes party leaders' control. This control is weaker in an open list PR system, since voters can reorder the candidates, and it is weakest in a system in which party leaders do not control who runs and who does not. To the extent that party leaders control access to the ballot, individual candidates have less control over their fate and benefit less by cultivating a personal vote.

When there are several party nominees in a district, votes may be pooled so that they count for the party first and only secondarily for the individual candidate. For example, in an open list PR system, all the votes of a party are typically pooled together to determine how many overall seats the party will win. Only after this are the votes then used to determine which individuals will win those seats. In contrast, in an SNTV system, votes are not pooled at all. It does not matter how many votes a party wins; it only matters how many votes each individual candidate wins. Systems in which votes are pooled at the factional level constitute an intermediate case. Pooling increases the degree to which a candidate's fate is tied to the fate of the overall party. As such, pooling decreases the incentive to cultivate a personal vote.

The way the ballot can be marked defines the choice that voters can make, and this has important repercussions for personal votes. In some systems, such as closed list PR, the voter can only indicate a single preference for a political party. There is no way for the voter to indicate a preference for any individual candidate within the party. Obviously, this makes it much less valuable to cultivate a personal vote. In other systems, voters can vote for multiple candidates, either within or across parties. For example, in a single transferable vote (STV) system, a voter indicates preference rankings for each candidate. This gives the voter the freedom to indicate wholehearted support for a party by ranking all of its nominees above those from all other parties or to ignore party labels and jump across party lines. Finally, a system such as SNTV, in which voters cast a single vote below the party level, maximizes the importance of a personal vote. In such a system, voters have no way of indicating support for the entire party; they are forced to choose a single candidate within the party.

Finally, district magnitude, the number of seats elected from a district, interacts with the other three factors to affect incentives to cultivate a personal vote. In general, a larger district magnitude magnifies the trends established by the other factors.

Carey and Shugart go on to rank each electoral system. Closed list PR provides the smallest incentives to cultivate a personal vote, while SNTV is at the other extreme. SMD systems fall between these two extremes.

What is missing from this discussion is the recognition that not all personal votes are alike. Some personal votes are strong statements of support for an individual candidate in spite of his or her party label, while others result more from the requirements of the electoral system to choose a particular candidate within the preferred party than from any strong preference for that candidate. Conceptually, the critical question is whether a candidate's personal qualities are compelling enough to convince a voter to cross party lines. In other words, some voters select a candidate because they like the party and they like that particular candidate more than any other nominee from the party. Other voters select a candidate in spite of the party. Cultivating the former group, which I call intra-party personal votes, can be a very different task from cultivating the latter group, extra-party personal votes. Intra-party personal voters are generally attracted by appeals that are compatible with the party platform. To win extra-party personal votes, a candidate must convince voters that his or her position is somehow different from the overall party platform.

Different electoral systems not only incentivize more or fewer personal votes; they also encourage different combinations of intra-party and extra-party personal votes.

For intra-party personal votes, the critical question is whether party supporters must simply accept whichever candidates party leaders nominate, can opt to support either the party or one of several party nominees, or must choose among party nominees. I distinguish among four different levels (see table 1). Intra-party personal votes should be minimized when voters cannot make any choice below the party level, as in closed list PR. Party leaders nominate a slate of candidates, and party supporters have to

Table 1
Incentives to Cultivate Intra and Extra-Party Personal Votes

Incentives to cultivate intra-party personal votes		
<i>Level</i>	<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Example</i>
High	Voter must indicate preference for one and only one candidate among multiple nominees from the same party	SNTV SMD (with multiple nominees from a party) Open list PR (without option to vote for party)
Medium-high	Voter must indicate preference for candidates, but may choose multiple candidates	STV
Medium-low	Voter may choose to vote for entire party or individual candidates	Open list PR (with option to vote for party)
Low	Voter must vote for entire party; no preference for individual candidate is allowed	Closed list PR SMD (with only one nominee from a party)
Incentives to cultivate extra-party personal votes		
<i>Level</i>	<i>Criterion</i>	<i>Example</i>
High	Voter can vote for individual candidate without supporting other nominees from party	SNV STV SMD
Medium	Voter can vote for individual candidate, but this also supports other nominees from party	Open list PR
Low	Voter cannot vote for individual candidate; must support all party nominees equally	Closed list PR

simply accept that slate or go against their party preferences altogether. SMD elections in which there is only one nominee per party are also in this category. A party supporter has little choice but to accept the party's nominee, even if the voter does not particularly like that candidate. The second level, with more intra-party personal voting, features electoral systems

that give the voter an option of either voting for the party slate or an individual candidate within that slate. In Brazil's open list PR system, for example, voters can either vote for a candidate or they can simply vote for the whole party. Here, the voter does not have to differentiate among the various candidates of the party if he or she does not want to. In the third and fourth levels, party supporters are forced to differentiate among their party's nominees. In the third level, voters may not simply vote for the party; they must vote for individual candidates. However, in these electoral systems, voters cast multiple votes. This allows voters who wish simply to support the party as a whole to vote for all party nominees and no other candidates. For example, in Ireland's STV system, a Fianna Fail supporter might cast his or her first three votes for the three Fianna Fail candidates in the district and then refrain from marking any fourth or fifth preference. Even here, however, the voter must decide which of the three Fianna Fail candidates should receive the first preference, and which should only receive the third, and far less valuable, preference. In the fourth level, there is no way for a party supporter to support the party as a whole. Here, a voter must support one and only one candidate, so voters must actively weigh the strengths and weaknesses of each candidate rather than simply seeing them as all the same. Electoral systems in this level include SNTV, open list PR with no option to vote for the party, and SMD with multiple nominees from the political party.

For extra-party personal votes, the critical question is slightly different. By definition, extra-party personal voters like the candidate but dislike the party. Therefore, extra-party personal votes should be more common when voters have the opportunity to vote for a particular candidate without having to also support the other nominees from that party. There are three distinct levels. Extra-party personal voting should be lowest when there is no opportunity to express a preference for an individual candidate, such as in closed list PR. An intermediate level features systems in which voters can express preference for a certain individual, but that vote also helps other candidates from the same party. For example, in open list PR, a vote for a candidate helps that candidate more than any other candidate, but, since the votes are pooled, it also helps the other party nominees by in-

creasing the chance that the party list will win an additional seat. Extra-party personal voting should be highest when a voter can support a particular candidate without supporting any other party nominees at all. Many electoral systems fall within this level, including SMD, STV, and SNTV.

With one major exception, this division of personal votes into intra- and extra-party personal votes yields only moderate differences from Carey and Shugart's taxonomy. Closed list PR is still the least likely system to see personal voting, regardless of whether it is of the intra- or extra-party variety. Likewise, personal voting is still the highest in SNTV. The big difference is in how SMD systems with party endorsement are viewed. Carey and Shugart consider this system to feature fairly high levels of personal voting—less than SNTV but more than either STV or open list PR.¹⁰ However, it is only the incentive to cultivate an extra-party personal vote that is strong in SMD systems. There is no opportunity for intra-party personal voting in partisan SMD elections. In other words, while a system such as SNTV or STV should see a mixture of both intra- and extra-party personal votes, all the personal votes in an SMD system with only one candidate per party are of the extra-party variety.

This discussion presumes that voters have at least weak party preferences. The higher the proportion of voters who satisfy this assumption, the more the division of personal votes into intra- and extra-party personal votes makes sense. Some may object that, in many countries, a large proportion of voters do not have any party preferences. For example, a common argument about Japanese politics is that most voters do not identify with political parties the way that voters in Western democracies do. Standard survey items on party identification show that the percentage of party identifiers in Japan is, indeed, comparatively low. However, Japanese voters do "habitually" vote for the same party over and over.¹¹ I argue that

¹⁰To use their terminology, Carey and Shugart claim that incentives to cultivate a personal vote are greater under a plurality formula with party endorsement and candidate voting than either STV with party endorsements or open list PR with a single vote. See Carey and Shugart, "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote," 426-27.

¹¹Bradley M. Richardson, "Constituency Candidates versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior," *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September 1988): 696-718.

Table 2
Expectations for Personal Votes in SNTV, SMD, and Closed List PR Systems

System	Intra-party personal votes	Extra-party personal votes
SNTV	High	High
SMD	Low	High
Closed list PR	Low	Low

this indicates at least a weak party preference. Moreover, in Japan's new MMM electoral system, voters have to cast one vote for an individual candidate in the SMD tier and one vote for a party in the list tier. If large numbers of Japanese voters have no party preferences, we might expect that turnout in the list tier would be markedly lower, as many voters without opinions about the parties would simply decline to vote in the list tier. However, in both the 2003 and 2005 national elections, the number of votes in the two tiers differed by fewer than 100,000 votes nationally. Either large numbers of Japanese voters selected parties randomly, or, more likely, the overwhelming majority had at least weak preferences.

Taiwan's Electoral Reform and the Personal Vote

Electoral reforms provide us with a unique opportunity to observe the division of personal votes into intra- and extra-party personal votes. Taiwan's recent reform presents us with a particularly good vantage point. After decades of using SNTV, Taiwan adopted an MMM system for the 2008 legislative elections. The MMM system is a combination of SMD and closed list PR tiers. This effectively gives us observations from three electoral systems that reward very different quantities and types of personal votes. As summarized in table 2, only SNTV should see high levels of intra-party personal votes, while both SNTV and SMD should see high levels of extra-party personal votes. Both SMD and closed list PR should see very low levels of intra-party personal votes. In fact, since it is impossible to register a preference for one party candidate over another in either

of these systems, in SMD because there is only one candidate and in closed list PR because a voter can only express preference for a party label, we will assume that there are zero intra-party personal votes in these two systems. Closed list PR should also see very low levels of extra-party personal voting. Extra-party personal voting is at least plausible in closed list PR; one might think of a voter who votes for a party he dislikes because a friend or relative is a candidate on that party's list. However, in this paper, given the fairly large district magnitude, which diminishes the already small incentives to cultivate a personal vote in a closed list system, I will assume that the level of extra-party personal voting in Taiwan's closed list tier is also effectively zero.

Many of the serious candidates in the SMD tier of the 2008 election had previously run and won in the 2004 elections held under SNTV. We should not expect any major changes in the ability of these candidates to attract a personal vote. While they no longer needed to cultivate an intra-party personal vote in 2008, they still had a strong incentive to cultivate an extra-party personal vote. It follows that they should have followed the same types of strategies in both elections, and they should have mobilized roughly the same extra-party personal votes in both elections. Since personal votes tend to be geographically identifiable—most candidates have disproportionate numbers of friends, family, associates, and other extra-party personal votes in some areas and far fewer in others—we should see continuing strength in 2008 in areas that were strong in 2004 and continuing weakness in the weaker areas.

Operationalizing extra-party personal votes is a challenge in both the 2004 and 2008 elections. For the 2008 SMD elections, given the assumption that there are no intra-party personal votes, the number of extra-party personal votes a candidate garnered in a particular area is simply the total number of votes he or she won minus the number of votes the party could be expected to win. This, in turn, requires an estimate of party support. Fortunately, we have such an estimate from the closed list PR tier. As noted above, incentives for personal votes are extremely low in closed list PR, so we can safely assume that the list vote is an accurate barometer of the partisan balance in any district. To the extent that the SMD tier results

deviate from the list tier results, this must reflect the extra-party personal votes of the SMD tier candidates.

In fact, the 2008 list tier vote is perhaps the best precinct level estimate of party support ever collected in Taiwan. Survey sample sizes are too small to yield useful estimates at the precinct level, and the results from other elections are skewed by the personal votes of the candidates running. Because of this, I will use the 2008 list tier vote to estimate party support in both 2004 and 2008.

There are methodological concerns with using the list tier vote as an indicator of the party vote, although I argue none is serious enough to warrant abandoning its use. Several scholars have noted that there are contamination effects between the vote totals in the two tiers.¹² In particular, there is evidence that a party's list vote is higher when it runs a candidate in the district tier. As a result, many small parties are tempted to run candidates in districts even when there is little chance that they might win the seat. To deal with this problem, I do not investigate individual parties. Rather, I look at the two big camps. The Green camp includes the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP, 民主進步黨) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU, 台灣團結聯盟), while the Blue camp includes the Kuomintang (KMT, 國民黨), People First Party (PFP, 親民黨), and New Party (NP, 新黨). There was almost always one (and usually only one) candidate from each camp running in the district tier. So while the DPP list vote might have been higher if it were a DPP nominee, and the TSU list vote might have been higher if it were a TSU nominee, the overall Green camp list vote was probably relatively unaffected. In addition to dealing with the contamination effect, combining the KMT, PFP, and NP into one Blue camp resolves problems arising from the various alliances and mergers of these parties. In 2004, the NP ran its candidates under the KMT label,

¹²Karen E. Cox and Leonard J. Schoppa, "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy," *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 9 (November 2002): 1027-53; and Federico Ferrara, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa, *Mixed Electoral Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

while the PFP ran its candidates under its own name. By 2008, the KMT and PFP had merged, so there were no PFP candidates. The NP had no district candidates, but it did have a separate identity in the list tier. It is impossible to sort out each party's relative strength in the two elections, but it is fairly easy to figure out the Blue camp's overall vote share. A final assumption that must be acknowledged is that the structure of each camp's support did not significantly change between 2004 and 2008. In the following analysis, I will examine the two camps separately, so if the Green camp's vote share declined from 2004 to 2008 but this simply reflected a lower percentage of the same groups and regions, there should be no significant bias in the results. I have no reason to believe that the Blue camp suddenly became much more popular in 2008 than in 2004 with the highly educated, the military, or voters in southern Taiwan, or any other major voting constituency.

One implication of this definition is that a candidate's personal vote is affected by his or her opponents' personal votes. This can result in unexpected findings, such as having a negative measure for a personal vote. Negative personal votes do not make sense when considering a single candidate, but they are readily understandable in a multi-candidate context. Suppose there are only two candidates, and one is very strong in a particular area. The other candidate will garner fewer votes than his or her party list wins, yielding a negative estimate of his or her personal votes. However, this does not mean that he or she actually had a negative personal vote; it simply means that the opponent stole away a larger number of his or her party supporters than he or she could replace with extra-party personal voters. Because of this, the following analysis will keep opponents in mind when analyzing data.

Operationalizing extra-party personal votes in 2004 is even more challenging than in 2008. In fact, the equation is under-identified. If a candidate's total vote is the sum of party votes, intra-party personal votes, and extra-party personal votes, we have to estimate the latter two numbers with only the former two numbers, an impossible task. Instead, I will estimate total personal votes and employ an assumption about their geographical distribution. First, the assumption is that, for any candidate, the geograph-

ical distribution of intra-party personal votes is nearly the same as the geographical distribution of extra-party personal votes. That is, in areas where the candidate has many friends, relatives, and other people in his or her social network, he or she will be able to attract large numbers of both intra- and extra-party votes. Voters who already support the party will choose the candidate over other party nominees because they are more likely than similar voters in other areas to have some sort of social tie with the candidate, and, likewise, voters who do not support the party will be more likely to cross party lines than similar voters in other areas for exactly the same reason. Given this assumption, the next step is to calculate the expected non-personal vote, in this case the share of the candidate's camp vote. As argued above, the best estimate of a camp's vote share is the 2008 list tier vote, and, all things being equal, each of the k party nominees in a district might expect to receive $1/k$ of these votes in each precinct. Thus, the estimate of the candidate's personal vote in 2004 is the actual number of votes he or she garnered minus the expected share of the party vote. More formally, personal votes in 2004 and 2008 are estimated as:

$$PersonalVote_{2004} = Candidate'sDistrictVoteShare_{2004} - \frac{CampListShare_{2008}}{NumberOfCampCandidates_{2004}}$$

$$PersonalVote_{2008} = Candidate'sDistrictVoteShare_{2008} - CampListShare_{2008}$$

In 2004 as in 2008, it is possible to get a negative estimate of a candidate's personal vote. Again, this is a reflection of the personal votes of the other candidates in the district rather than an indication that there are voters actually subtracting from the candidate's vote total by casting negative personal votes. Since there are so many other candidates in each district, it is not feasible to try to control for all the opponents' personal votes in 2004 the same way that it is possible to control for the main opponent's personal vote in 2008. However, it might be less important to do so. In the large multimember districts under SNTV, there were often so many candidates that every precinct was in some candidate's strongest areas. In other words, for any particular candidate, the fraction of votes stolen away

by the personal appeals of all the other candidates was arguably close to a constant. Different candidates might have been stealing those votes in different areas, but everywhere there was a voter susceptible to a personal appeal, some candidate was busy cultivating that vote. If this assumption is generally accurate, then our estimate of each candidate's personal vote in 2004 is largely a reflection of his or her efforts, minus some constant.

This leads us to a pair of testable hypotheses about the continuity of personal votes across the two electoral systems. Theoretically, the expectation is that there should be minimal differences in a given candidate's extra-party personal vote from 2004 to 2008. However, given the difficulties in operationalizing the extra-party personal vote, we must retreat to a cruder hypothesis, that there are minimal differences in the candidate's total personal vote from 2004 to 2008. Theoretically, since the intra-party personal vote under SMD is effectively zero, the total personal vote in 2008 is the extra-party personal vote. The total personal vote from 2004 is not equivalent to the extra-party personal vote. However, we assume that the total personal vote and the extra-party personal vote are highly correlated from precinct to precinct. If these assumptions are reasonably accurate, then we should be able to find a statistical relationship. Precisely, the hypotheses to be tested are:

- H1:** Controlling for his or her camp's vote share, a candidate's 2008 district tier vote will be higher where his or her 2004 personal vote is stronger.
- H2:** Controlling for his or her camp's vote share, a candidate's 2008 district tier vote will be lower where his or her opponent's 2004 personal vote is stronger.

To illustrate these hypotheses, we look at Longshou Village, Guishan Township, Taoyuan County (桃園縣龜山鄉龍壽村) (see table 3). This village was part of Taoyuan County First District. In 2008, the two main candidates, Chen Gende (陳根德) of the KMT and Li Zhennan (李鎮楠) of the DPP were both incumbents. The 2008 list vote indicates that this village leans to the Green camp, with the Green camp winning 55.8 percent

Table 3
Results from Longshou Village, Guishan Township, Taoyuan County

	Chen (KMT, Blue)	Li (DPP, Green)
2008 camp list share	42.3%	55.8%
2004 number of camp candidates	10	9
Candidate's expected 2004 vote share	4.2%	6.2%
Candidate's actual 2004 vote share	2.3%	46.0%
2008 district vote share	38.2%	60.0%

of list votes compared to the Blue camp's 42.3 percent. In 2004, Li had been very strong in this village, gaining 46.0 percent of the overall vote. This was a stunning achievement, since there were eight other Green camp candidates vying for the same pool of votes. In the absence of any personal votes, Li might have been expected to gain only 6.2 percent. In short, Li's personal vote is estimated at about 39.8% of the voters, a very high figure. Our assumption is that Li had a high number of both intra- and extra-party personal votes, though it is mathematically possible that all of Li's personal votes were intra-party personal votes, since his 46.0 percent was still below the party's 55.8 percent list share. If the assumption is incorrect, and Li was unable to win any extra-party personal votes in 2004, then there is no reason to expect him to be able to win any extra-party personal votes in 2008. As such, his 2008 vote share should not have been much different from the party list total. If, however, the assumption that large personal votes imply high levels of both intra- and extra-party personal votes is correct, then it is reasonable that Li's extra-party personal voters would continue to support him in 2008, and his vote total in 2008 should be markedly higher than the party list total.

Li's opponent in 2008, Chen, did worse than might be expected in 2004. He only won 2.3 percent of votes in this village where he might have expected to win about 4.2 percent. This yields an estimated personal vote of -1.9 percent. As noted above, this negative number is a reflection of Chen's opponents' strong personal votes rather than any actual negative personal vote. It is, however, evidence of a very weak personal vote, both intra- and extra-party, in this village.

If our hypotheses are correct, we might expect Li to win more than 55.8 percent in the district and Chen to win fewer than 42.3 percent in 2008. In fact, Li won 60.0 percent of district votes in 2008, while Chen only won 38.2 percent. This outcome is readily explainable in light of our expectations of continuity in extra-party personal votes. Of course, while a single anecdote is consistent with our hypotheses, a more conclusive test requires a larger data set.

Data

I collected precinct-level election returns for the 2004 and 2008 elections. Unfortunately, precincts are not stable from year to year, so I was forced to aggregate the data up to the next-level, village (村里, *cun or li*). Each village typically produces between 400 and 4000 valid votes. Villages are formal administrative districts, so most villages do not change from year to year. However, in each election cycle, a small number of village boundaries are redrawn. Between these two elections, three townships completely revamped all village boundaries. I obtained the redistricting plans from each of these township governments and combined villages so that each case contained the same areas in 2004 and 2008. This gave me 7,737 cases in 2004 and 7,758 cases in 2008. There were also some townships that changed the boundaries of one or two villages. Usually, after a period of population growth, they found it necessary to split a large village in half. One half typically retained the old name, while the other half was given a new name. It is quite easy to eliminate the village with the new name, as it has no data for 2004. However, I also wanted to eliminate villages with significantly larger or smaller populations in the two elections. As such I eliminated all villages whose valid district votes were either 50 percent higher or 50 percent lower in 2008 than in 2004. This has the added benefit of eliminating villages in which extremely high population growth meant that the voters in 2008 were quite unlike the voters in 2004.

Another problem that I faced was dealing with primarily aboriginal villages. Voters with aboriginal status vote in special districts, but they

cast their list tier vote along with all other voters. As such the list tier vote share might reflect the preferences of several hundred voters, while the district tier might only have a few dozen valid votes. To avoid this problem, I eliminated all villages that had more than twice as many valid list votes as district votes in 2008.

I also worried that extremely small villages might affect my results. Since I am using percentages, and percentages can swing wildly when there are only a few voters, I eliminated all villages with fewer than 200 valid district votes in 2008.

This gave me 7,214 cases that were comparable in 2004 and 2008. However, many of these cases were problematic politically, and I had to throw away several districts. I do not believe that these districts were fundamentally different from those I ended up analyzing. It is simply that, because of various circumstances, these districts did not provide for a clean test. I discarded eleven (of 73 total) districts as follows.

I discarded three districts due to Green camp complications. The Green camp did not run a candidate in Taitung County (台東縣). In Taipei County (台北縣) First District, the DPP nominated a candidate who had won his race in 2004 as a KMT candidate. In Taoyuan County Sixth District, the DPP nominated a candidate who had run as an independent in 2004 and won as a PFP candidate in 2001. Since neither of these two had drawn on Green camp support in 2004, it is hard to determine their expected party vote in that election.

There were four districts in which the Blue camp did not nominate a candidate in 2008. While they were clearly allied with an independent, I decided not to assume that independents allied with the Blue camp were equivalent to actual Blue camp candidates. These four districts are Taichung County (台中縣) Second District, Tainan County (台南縣) Second District, Pingtung County (屏東縣) First District, and Penghu County (澎湖縣).

There were also four districts in which I determined that it was impossible to get a clear picture of Blue camp vote share or personal vote. Jinmen (金門) and Lianjiang (連江) counties are dominated by the Blue camp, and the real competition is usually between a Blue camp nominee

and an independent affiliated with the Blue camp. As such, the Blue camp nominee's vote is not a reflection of party support plus a personal vote in the same way that we find in most other districts. Similarly, in Miaoli County (苗栗縣) Second District, the KMT nominated two candidates in 2008. Since the Green camp is extremely weak in this district, the two finished first and second. However, it is difficult to compare their personal votes to those found in other districts with only one Blue camp candidate. Finally, in Hualien County (花蓮縣) the KMT declined to nominate a candidate in 2004. There were several independents, and the KMT was hoping for one of them to emerge. However, if one assumes that there was only one Blue camp nominee, the PFP candidate, expected vote shares are extremely skewed. Instead of arbitrarily deciding that one, two, or three of the independents were actually Blue camp candidates, I discard the district.

This leaves 6,191 villages that are highly comparable from 2004 to 2008.

Results

In this section, hypotheses one and two are tested. I use a simple OLS regression model in which the dependent variable is the 2008 camp's district vote share. There are three independent variables, including the camp's list vote share, the candidate's 2004 personal vote, and the opponent's 2004 personal vote. I expect the coefficient for the camp list vote share to be close to one. Based on Hypothesis One, I expect the coefficient for the candidate's 2004 personal vote to be positive, and, based on Hypothesis Two, I expect the coefficient for the opponent's 2004 personal vote to be negative. As noted above, I test the Blue and Green camps separately.

For candidates who did not run in 2004, I adopt two different strategies. First, I run a model with new candidates' personal votes coded as missing. This model includes only cases in which both of the main candidates have track records. Second, because in almost all of the cases excluded in the first model one of the candidates has a track record from 2004, I run a second model in which new candidates' personal votes are coded as zero.

Table 4
OLS Regression of the 2004 Personal Vote on the 2008 District Vote

	Blue camp				Green camp			
	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4	
	b (se)	sig	b (se)	sig	b (se)	sig	b (se)	sig
Camp vote share	.857 (.009)	*	.869 (.007)	*	.910 (.010)	*	1.008 (.008)	*
Candidate's 2004 personal	.245 (.010)	*	.257 (.010)	*	.188 (.013)	*	.267 (.013)	*
Opponent's 2004 personal vote	-.132 (.012)	*	-.159 (.011)	*	-.167 (.010)	*	-.150 (.011)	*
Constant	.088 (.005)	*	.079 (.004)	*	.032 (.004)	*	-.022 (.003)	*
N	2812		6191		2812		6191	
R ²	.78		.75		.77		.75	

Note: The dependent variable is the camp's 2008 district vote. In Models 1 and 3, the personal votes of candidates who did not run in 2004 are coded as missing. In Models 2 and 4, they are coded as zero.

* $p < .001$.

Table 4 shows that in all four models, all of the coefficients are significant and in the expected direction. The list vote is far and away the strongest predictor of the district vote. However, after controlling for the list vote, personal votes from the 2004 election are useful predictors for the 2008 district vote. In areas in which the candidate has a strong 2004 personal vote, his or her 2008 district vote is significantly higher. In areas in which the opponent has a strong 2004 personal vote, the candidate's 2008 district vote is significantly weaker.

Note that the coefficients for a candidate's 2004 personal vote are far smaller than one, ranging from .188 to .267 in the four models. In other words, candidates' personal votes in 2008 were only about one-fourth or one-fifth the size of the 2004 personal votes. This large decline is not surprising, given the assumption that intra-party personal votes were far more numerous than extra-party personal votes in 2004 and the theoretical argu-

ment that the electoral reform eliminated all the intra-party personal votes.

How big are the effects? At first glance they seem quite modest. Using Model 2, an increase of ten percent in the candidate's personal vote and a decrease of five percent¹³ in the opponent's personal vote increases the predicted 2008 district vote share by 3.4 percent. While three or four percentage points do not seem like much, one must remember that many races have been decided by far smaller margins. Moreover, this model has already controlled for partisan preferences. These 2008 personal votes are almost certainly what we have conceptualized as extra-party personal votes. These are the hard votes to win, since these voters likely disagree with the candidate's party on important points. Even in districts that are not ultimately decided by these small margins, a swing of a few percentage points is very valuable.¹⁴

Discussion

Empirically, this paper has identified two main trends. First, the overall incidence of personal voting has declined substantially from 2004 to

¹³Large positive deviations from the mean tend to be more common than large negative deviations from the mean, especially as the district magnitude increases.

¹⁴In the literature on American congressional elections, a generation of scholars worried about concerns, first raised by Mayhew, that the large margins between winners and losers and high incumbency rates meant that elections did not exert pressure on representatives to be responsive to their constituents. Jacobson refuted this thesis with two main points. First, he argued that partisan swings were larger than in the past, so that large margins of victory did not make representatives as safe as it might appear. Second, he noted that representatives fought hard for every vote even in years in which they expected to win easily because they took a careerist approach to Congress. One election loss would derail a career, so they could not afford any vulnerability that might attract a strong competitor in the future. See David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals," *Polity* 6, no. 3 (Spring 1974): 295-317; Gary C. Jacobson, "Running Scared: Elections and Congressional Politics in the 1980s," in *Congress: Structure and Policy*, ed. Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 39-81; and Gary C. Jacobson, "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-1982," *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 1 (February 1987): 126-41. While conditions in Taiwan do not exactly mirror those in the United States, it is reasonable to expect that successful politicians do not take victory for granted.

2008. Second, there is geographic continuity in personal votes from 2004 to 2008. If a candidate won a disproportionately large number of votes in a particular village in 2004, he or she was likely to win a disproportionately large number of votes in that village again in 2008.

How are we to understand these findings? According to the traditional literature on personal voting, which assumes a dichotomy between personal votes and party votes, this reduction in personal voting implies an increase in party voting. Since the type of politics necessary to cultivate a personal vote is vastly different from the type of politics amenable to building a strong party vote, this change might potentially transform the nature of Taiwanese politics.

In this paper, I have argued that it is not sufficient to simply consider the quantity of personal votes because not all personal votes are alike. Some, intra-party personal votes, come from within the ranks of party supporters, while others, extra-party personal votes, come from voters who would not otherwise support the candidate's party. Under SNTV, both types are common. Under the SMD tier of MMM, since there is typically only one nominee per party, there is no way for a voter to express preferences below the party level. The only type of personal vote feasible is the extra-party personal vote.

Since we expect to see extra-party personal votes both before and after the electoral reform, it is fair to ask whether we actually do see much continuity. While I was unable to directly operationalize extra-party personal votes under the SNTV system, there is a clear geographical continuity between personal votes in 2004 and in 2008. The most reasonable interpretation of this empirical finding is that, in 2004, candidates amassed more extra-party personal votes in the same places they won more intra-party personal votes, and, in 2008, they returned to these same places and continued to win disproportionate numbers of extra-party personal votes. In other words, there is a strong degree of continuity in extra-party personal votes from 2004 to 2008.

Suppose, according to the traditional personal vote literature, that all personal votes are equivalent and that the incidence of personal voting simply dropped by 75-80 percent. Would we expect to see the same pattern of

geographical continuity? I argue that it would be far less clear. A candidate would only retain the support of those voters with the closest ties to him or her, and these people have a distinct geographic pattern. People with whom the candidate has had the longest and most intense relationships tend to be concentrated in the candidate's hometown. So while the candidate might lose 90 percent of personal votes elsewhere, he or she might only lose 60 percent in his or her hometown. Since we would expect the candidate's hometown to be strong in both scenarios, this might still produce a marginally significant geographical pattern. However, since there would be different rates of losses in different areas, the standard areas of any coefficients would likely be relatively large. If, on the other hand, there is a distinction between intra- and extra-party personal votes, and candidates cultivated almost exactly the same extra-party personal votes in both elections, the standard errors might be much smaller. In fact, the standard errors found in our models are extremely small; all coefficients are significant at $p < .001$. This suggests that the latter story, with continuity in extra-party personal votes, is more reasonable.

If the effect of the electoral reform is indeed that intra-party personal votes have been eliminated but extra-party personal votes continue to be important, what significance does this have for party politics in Taiwan? One interesting implication is that candidates should pay less attention to the demands of their party supporters and more attention to the demands of voters who do not support their party. Since there are no other nominees from the same party to compete with, candidates do not have to worry nearly as much about losing the votes of party loyalists. They can afford to take positions that appeal to other voters. This conclusion is surprising from the traditional view of the personal vote.¹⁵ Since personal votes are defined in contrast to party votes, fewer total personal votes are usually

¹⁵Interestingly, this conclusion is not at all surprising from the perspective of the spatial voting literature. Less partisanship following a move from SNTV to SMD is exactly what that literature would predict. See Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1957) and Gary W. Cox, "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems," *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 3 (November 1990): 903-35. I thank the anonymous referee for pointing this out.

considered to imply more partisan politics. However, once we disaggregate personal votes into intra- and extra-party personal votes, reducing total personal votes by eliminating intra-party personal votes implies less, not more, partisan politics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in the Brazilian Congress." *Journal of Politics* 57, no. 2 (May): 324-43.
- _____. 2002. *The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn, and Morris Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14, no. 4 (December): 417-39.
- Cox, Gary W. 1990. "Centripetal and Centrifugal Incentives in Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 34, no. 3 (November): 903-35
- _____, and Michael F. Thies. 1998. "The Cost of Intraparty Competition: The Single, Nontransferable Vote and Money Politics in Japan." *Comparative Political Studies* 31, no. 3 (June): 267-91.
- Cox, Karen E., and Leonard J. Schoppa. 2002. "Interaction Effects in Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: Theory and Evidence from Germany, Japan, and Italy." *Comparative Political Studies* 35, no. 9 (November): 1027-53.
- Curtis, Gerald L. 1971. *Election Campaigning Japanese Style*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Fenno, Richard. 1978. *Homestyle: House Members in Their Districts*. New York: Harper Collins.
- Ferrara, Federico, Erik S. Herron, and Misa Nishikawa. 2005. *Mixed Electoral*

Systems: Contamination and Its Consequences. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Golden, Miriam, and Eric C.C. Chang. 2001. "Competitive Corruption: Factional Conflict and Political Malfeasance in Postwar Italian Christian Democracy." *World Politics* 53, no. 4 (July): 588-622.
- Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "Running Scared: Elections and Congressional Politics in the 1980s." In *Congress: Structure and Policy*, edited by Mathew D. McCubbins and Terry Sullivan, 39-81. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- _____. 1987. "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives, 1952-1982." *American Journal of Political Science* 31, no. 1 (February): 126-41
- Key, V. O., Jr. 1949. *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. New York: Knopf.
- Mayhew, David R. 1974. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity* 6, no. 3 (Spring): 295-317.
- Ramseyer, J. Mark, and Frances McCall Rosenbluth. 1993. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
- Richardson, Bradley M. 1988. "Constituency Candidates versus Parties in Japanese Voting Behavior." *American Political Science Review* 82, no. 3 (September): 696-718.
- Sacks, Paul M. 1976. *The Donegal Mafia: An Irish Political Machine*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press.
- Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 2008. "Comparative Electoral Systems Research: The Maturation of a Field and New Challenges Ahead." In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, edited by Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell, 22-55. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Thayer, Nathaniel B. 1969. *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.