

Managing Cross-Strait Relations: A Value Analysis of Taiwan's Leadership Messages, 2004-2011*

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The relationship between Taiwan and China has swung between periods of conflict escalation and de-escalation during the past two decades. In recent years, a notable trend of reconciliation has been observed amidst rising Taiwanese identity/attachment and public apprehension in dealing with China. This paper examines how the leadership in Taiwan frames public discourse and manages the tenor of cooperation and competition in public communication. Examining public speeches and interviews from 2004 to 2011 through the lens of value analysis reveals not only the substantive differences, but also the commonalities in rhetoric styles shown by Chen and Ma and their respective administrations. When facing different audiences, both administrations calibrate and adjust their messages. Sharp attacks against China are usually reserved for domestic audiences, while Taiwan's aspirations and accomplishments are showcased for foreign audiences. Furthermore, while their language toward China may be different in tenor of denunciation and accusation, the Chen and Ma administrations exhibit a similar tendency to appeal to the sense of Taiwan identity derived from in-group bias.

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*An earlier version of the paper was presented at the 2012 Taiwan Studies Conference at University of South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, U.S.A.

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KEYWORDS: Value analysis; cross-Strait relations; China; Taiwan; content analysis.

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The relationship between Taiwan and China has swung between periods of conflict escalation and de-escalation during the past two decades. In recent years, a notable trend of cross-Strait reconciliation has been observed. Since May 2008, when Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) succeeded Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) as President in Taiwan, both sides of the Taiwan Strait have resumed the dialogues and consultations terminated 10 years prior. Through the negotiation platform of the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in Taipei and the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) in Beijing, the two sides concluded 7 rounds of consultations and signed 18 agreements between June 2008 and August 2012.

The types of issues negotiated during this period reveal an interesting progression from functional (customs cooperation, cross-Strait charter flights, air transport, sea transport, postal services, Chinese tourists, fishing crews) and technical (medical and health, nuclear power, food safety regulations, quarantine of agricultural products, standards, metrology, inspection, and accreditation) to judicial and financial (combating crime, providing mutual judicial assistance, minimizing double taxation, reducing tariffs, protecting investments and intellectual property rights). The ambitious agenda reflects an unprecedented level of cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in areas that not only require broader and deeper coordination between government authorities, but also touch on sovereign, political issues. The development is quite remarkable in light of the intense diplomatic competition and military confrontation from a few years ago. If the momentum is sustained, it could signal a new chapter in history and have profound implications for peace and stability in East Asia.

However, according to recent polls, beneath the surface of this new rapprochement are harsh political realities: both governments remain disinclined to recognize each other's political status; more than 1,000

Chinese missiles are deployed to target Taiwan; significant percentages of people in Taiwan continue to prefer maintaining the political status quo as opposed to unification with China (83.7% vs. 3%) and see the Chinese government as “unfriendly” toward the Taiwanese government (52.2%) or Taiwanese people (44.4%).¹ Even though President Ma was re-elected to a second term in the January 2012 election, the closeness of the race between Ma and his contender, Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) of the Democratic Progressive Party (民進黨), in the final days of the campaign, further attests to the fluidity of the situation.

A series of surveys conducted since 1992 show a clear trend toward a growing percentage of the population in Taiwan claiming to be “Taiwanese,” while the percentage of self-identified “Chinese” is in constant decline.² In the most recent survey of December 2012, 54.3% of the population in Taiwan view themselves as “Taiwanese” and only 3.6% identify themselves as “Chinese.” Nevertheless, there is a sizable group who consider themselves “both Taiwanese and Chinese.” Before 2007, this group had the greatest degree of support and, in 2007, accounted for 44.7% of the population, edging out the “Taiwanese” group (43.7%). Nevertheless, the Taiwanese-Chinese group has lost ground since 2008, standing at 38.5% in the latest survey. The prevalence of this emotional attachment toward Taiwanese identity and its potential effect on cross-strait relations is a factor that all politicians in Taiwan must consider.

In light of the rising Taiwanese identity/attachment, and with a sizable general public showing apprehension and ambivalence in dealing with China, how do political leaders in Taiwan engage in public discourse on cross-strait relations? How do they manage the tenor of cooperation and competition with China in public communication? What do they emphasize and de-emphasize in their public statements? From a broader per-

¹The latest polls, commissioned by Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, were conducted by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University from November 30 to December 3, 2012. See <http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Data/2122614253971.pdf>.

²Data are available from the website of the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm>.

spective, answers to these questions will inform us how the political elite in Taiwan attempt to shape public opinion and public policy—an essential element in the democratic process. More specifically, these questions will draw our attention to the process of agenda setting and issue framing on important policy matters.

Research on agenda setting examines the ability and power of information entrepreneurs in telling people “what to think about” and “how to think about it.”³ Beginning with the study of the role of the media in influencing public agendas,⁴ it subsequently expands to include analyses of communication by other actors, such as presidents, in influencing public opinion on specific policies.⁵ Hypothesis formulation has also changed from the original focus of how policy issues become salient and prominent, to second-level agenda setting (i.e., framing) that examines how certain aspects of issue attributes are selected and highlighted so as to “promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation.”⁶

By building on this intellectual tradition, I will investigate how political leaders might frame public discourse on cross-Strait relations as they manage this important policy issue. Specifically, I will analyze public speeches and interviews given by Chen and Ma, as well as by their

³Bernard C. Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas,” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 2 (June 1993): 58-67; Maxwell McCombs, “A Look at Agenda-setting: Past, Present, and Future,” *Journalism Studies* 6, no. 4 (2005): 543-57.

⁴Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, “The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-85.

⁵Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, *News That Matters: Television and American Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987); Jeffrey E. Cohen, “Presidential Rhetoric and the Public Agenda,” *American Journal of Political Science* 39, no. 1 (February 1995): 87-107; Jeffrey E. Cohen, *Presidential Responsiveness and Public Policy-making: The Public and the Policies That Presidents Choose* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1997); Garry Young and William B. Perkins, “Presidential Rhetoric, the Public Agenda, and the End of Presidential Television’s ‘Golden Age’,” *Journal of Politics* 67, no. 4 (November 2005): 1190-1205.

⁶Richard M. Entman, “Framing: Towards Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm,” *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 4 (December 1993): 52.

Ministers of the Mainland Affairs Council, to find out how cross-Strait relations and mainland policies have been presented. I will then explore the implications of these presentations.

It is important to note that this paper makes no claim that public rhetoric drives or causes policy changes; instead, it seeks to explore how public discourse may help set the stage for policy evolution and debate, especially between strategic rivals. The way adversaries are described and portrayed affects the domestic politics of both sides. Discourses about Self and Other, in essence, draw boundaries about what is good and acceptable in practical and ideational terms. As public discourse evolves, policy spaces and options either contract or expand, depending on whether policy orthodoxies are reinforced or challenged (Johnston, 2013).⁷

Prior Research

Values are overarching goals or standards that are not only desirable but also serve as guiding principles in individual lives and actions.⁸ Values help develop and maintain individual attitudes toward objects, situations or other individuals, and organize systems of actions and judgments. The current literature has documented the presence of competing and conflicting values in Taiwan's domestic politics and in cross-Strait relations. For example, Lin, Chu and Hinich identified the competition of "socio-economic justice" (i.e., concerns for money politics) and "national identity" as important dimensions of Taiwan's partisan politics.⁹ Similarly,

⁷Alastair Iain Johnston, "How New and Assertive Is China's New Assertiveness?" *International Security* 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013): 7-48.

⁸Ralph K. White, *Value-Analysis: The Nature and Use of the Method* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Society for Psychological Study of Social Issues, 1951), 13; Milton Rokeach, *Beliefs, Attitudes, and Values* (San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1968), 160; Shalom H. Schwartz, "Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries," in *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 25), ed. M. P. Zanna (New York: Academic Press, 1992), 1-65.

⁹Tse-min Lin, Yun-han Chu, and Melvin J. Hinich, "Conflict Displacement and Regime Transition in Taiwan: A Spatial Analysis," *World Politics* 48, no. 4 (July 1996): 453-81.

Wu observes potential value conflicts along continuums such as identity (unification vs. independence) and interest (economics vs. security) in the formation of Taiwan's mainland policy.¹⁰ In electoral politics, Taiwanese voters are found to be pulled in opposite directions with the rational pursuit of self-interest that drives economic exchanges on one end, and the emotional symbolism that fuels identity politics on the other.¹¹

Most current studies recognize the tension of value conflict in grass roots politics and have sought to investigate different cognitive models at the individual level through survey research (i.e., different modes of decision-making at the individual level regarding the nature of the conflict and its potential solution). At present, very little attention has been given to the role of political elites in reinforcing or reshaping these normative disputes, or the manner through which values converge or diverge in public discourse and communication. Lin's analysis of Chen Shui-bian's cross-Strait messages was a welcome exception that addressed this vacuum.¹² He found that the majority of Chen's pro-independence remarks were delivered in extra-constitutional occasions, such as in meetings with international media, conversations with foreign visitors, and in events held by nongovernmental organizations. The analysis pointed to a deliberate attempt by Chen to tailor his messages in fulfilling three different roles: "the head of state, the de facto head of government, and an election campaigner."¹³

¹⁰Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan de dalu zhengce: jiegou yu lixing" (Taiwan's mainland policy: structure and rationality), in *Zhengbianzong de liang'an guanxi lilun* (Contending approaches to cross-Strait relations), ed. Tzong-Ho Bau and Yu-Shan Wu (Taipei: Wunan, 1999), 155-210.

¹¹Shu Keng, Lu-huei Chen, and Kuan-bo Huang, "Sense, Sensitivity and Sophistication in Shaping the Future of Cross-Strait Relations," *Issues & Studies* 42, no. 4 (December 2006): 23-66; Lu-huei Chen, Shu Keng, and T. Y. Wang, "Liang'an guanxi yu 2008 nian Taiwan zongtong daxuan: rentong, liyi, weixie yu xuanmin toupiao quxiang" (Taiwan's 2008 presidential election and its implications for cross-Strait relations: the effects of Taiwanese identity, trade interests and military threats), *Xuanju yanjiu* (Journal of Electoral Studies) (Taipei) 16, no. 2 (2009): 1-22.

¹²Jih-Wen Lin, "The Institutional Context of President Chen Shui-bian's Cross-Strait Messages," *Issues & Studies* 44, no. 1 (January 2008): 1-31.

¹³*Ibid.*, 29.

Although valuable as an exploratory analysis, Lin's research is somewhat limited in its scope by focusing exclusively on one type of message (i.e., independence-leaning or not) under one president. In this study, I will expand the research by comparing broader value profiles embedded in the content of the public messages under both the Chen and Ma administrations, to ascertain similarities and differences in how political leaders in Taiwan may frame their rhetoric as they manage the relational context for their mainland policies.

The assumption behind this study is that moving beyond a particular policy position in public communication will enable us to unpack the multifaceted nature of cross-Strait policy debates. Analytically, stated positions toward certain policy alternatives or political identities are outward manifestations of value systems, which contain a set of interconnected values. A stance on "independence" versus "unification" may not simply be an individual's choice of this dichotomy *per se*. Rather, the position may reflect the outcome of a series of trade-offs between varying value priorities related to this dichotomous construct. Examining the value profiles of political leaders and the value hierarchies displayed in their rhetoric could offer more insight into the value typology deemed important in cross-Strait relations at the elite level, and the potential direction of value trade-offs suggested by political leadership.

There is a common perception that politicians often say what they want others to believe, rather than voicing their true beliefs. Such manipulation is certainly possible, but unlikely from a value perspective. As pointed out by Suedfeld, Cross and Brcic, "... values are nonobvious characteristics that are not easily recognized and manipulated, and their implications are so subtle that the 'desirable' message is not clearly identifiable."¹⁴ The difficulty in manipulating value profiles is in part due to the fact that value is a higher-order concept that transcends specific policy positions. Suppose one speaker advocates trade expansion with

¹⁴Peter Suedfeld, Ryan W. Cross, and Jelena Brcic, "Two Years of Ups and Downs: Barack Obama's Patterns of Integrative Complexity, Motive Imagery, and Values," *Political Psychology* 32, no. 6 (December 2011): 1011.

Country A for economic gain, whereas another speaker, for purposes of economic diversification, is in favor of trade expansion in markets outside Country A. From a policy perspective, these positions are contradictory, but from a value perspective, both of them underscore the same type of value—the value of the “economy.” As such, it is quite difficult for politicians to identify the right mix of policies to project a desirable value profile. This may partly explain why research on U.S. presidents has shown that the value patterns of their public communication are remarkably consistent and stable, notwithstanding the fluid political environment.¹⁵

The Framework of Value Analysis

The value analysis system employed in this study was originally developed by White and recently modified by Smith and others.¹⁶ Altogether, there are eight value categories: dominance, aggression, autonomy, security, morality, economy, recognition, and unity.¹⁷ Table 1 provides the definition and prototypical example for each value category.

This study chooses to use White’s taxonomy for two major reasons. First, it has been previously used by a number of studies in the field of international relations for both state and non-state actors with confirmed validity and reliability.¹⁸ Second, the applications are especially relevant

¹⁵Ibid., 1007-33.

¹⁶White, *Value-Analysis*; Allison G. Smith, “From Words to Action: Exploring the Relationship between a Group’s Value References and Its Likelihood of Engaging in Terrorism,” *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 27, no. 5 (2004): 409-37; Allison G. Smith et al., “The Language of Violence: Distinguishing Terrorist from Nonterrorist Groups by Thematic Content Analysis,” *Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict* 1, no. 2 (2008): 142-63.

¹⁷The main difference between dominance and aggression lies in the latter’s perceived interest in the use of physical force.

¹⁸William Eckhardt, “War Propaganda, Welfare Values and Political Ideologies,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 9, no. 3 (September 1965): 345-58; William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White, “A Test of the Mirror-Image Hypotheses: Kennedy and Khrushchev,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 11, no. 3 (September 1967): 325-32; William Eckhardt and Rosanne Lipe, “Value-Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict: 1969-1976,” *International Interactions*

Table 1
Value Categories, Definitions and Examples

Value Category	Definitions
Dominance	Valuing power over people, authority, leadership, influence. <u>Example</u> : “Moreover, the other side continues its saber rattling and suppression of Taiwan on all fronts.”
Aggression	Valuing the use of physical violence or victory in war. <u>Example</u> : “This is why I say that, for Taiwan, China is not a normal country. It is hostile toward Taiwan and intends to swallow up or annex Taiwan at any time.”
Autonomy	Valuing freedom, liberty, and/or not being dominated, dictated to or interfered with. <u>Example</u> : “Taiwan is a sovereign independent country.”
Security	Valuing physical security. <u>Example</u> : “Needless to say, Taiwan’s national security is of greater concern to us than to anyone else in the world.”
Morality	Valuing being good or noble in a moral sense, right vs. wrong; justice; truth-speaking and truth-action; not lying; not concealing the truth; keeping promises. <u>Example</u> : “We have triumphed over adversity by cleaning up political corruption and restoring good governance to our nation.”
Economy	Valuing prosperity, a high standard of living, or those things which prosperity makes possible. <u>Example</u> : “For this reason, we call on Taiwanese businesspeople to work with the government on four priorities: Taiwan first, economy first, investment first, and investment in Taiwan first.”
Recognition	Valuing prestige, respect, glory, honor; not being looked down upon or humiliated. <u>Example</u> : “A free and democratic country like Taiwan deserves to be treated properly and with respect by the international community.”
Unity	Valuing working with others, active good will, readiness to cooperate with and/or support others inside one’s own group. <u>Example</u> : “Therefore, let us relinquish our differentiation between native and foreign, and between minority and majority, for the most complimentary and accurate depiction of present-day Taiwan is of a people “ethnically diverse, but one as a nation.”

Source: Adapted from White and Smith. See White, *Value-Analysis*; Smith, “From Words to Action.”

to situations involving conflict in dyadic “us vs. them” settings (e.g., the United States and the former Soviet Union during the Cold War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, and terrorists and their targets), which fit the cross-Strait context quite well.

By exploring the relationship between value expressions and war/peace propensities, previous value research has investigated various combinations of the eight value categories and identified three indices—denunciation, strength, lack of concern for other’s welfare—as precursors for war or conflict.

Conflict-mindedness is manifested first and foremost through denunciation of opponents.¹⁹ Accusing others of, or condemning others for, their lack of certain values such as morality, peace, and freedom reflects a disapproving attitude toward opponents, a move usually meant to prepare people for conflict through war propaganda. In the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the two most frequently expressed values by both Arabs and Israelis—peace and national sovereignty—are in fact couched in moral condemnation of the other side’s aggression and dominance.²⁰

“Strength” is the second index, which includes the following values: autonomy, unity, recognition, and security.²¹ This cluster of values also appears to convey an attitude oriented toward war and conflict. Rhetoric emphasizing one’s desire to be safe and secure, to be honored and respected, and to be able to freely pursue these goals with unified support reflects an attempt to rally the public for a common goal in defiance of the opposition from one’s enemy. Self-perceived strength in those areas often indicates that the leader is preparing his country to assert its will against others.

3, no. 3 (1977): 285-303; Smith, “From Words to Action”; Smith et al., “The Language of Violence.”

¹⁹White, *Value-Analysis*, 6; Eckhardt, “War Propaganda,” 348.

²⁰William Eckhardt et al., “A Value-Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict.” *Journal of Contemporary Revolutions* 6, no. 4 (1975): 111; Eckhardt and Lipe, “Value-Analysis of the Arab-Israeli Conflict,” 289.

²¹Eckhardt, “War Propaganda,” 352.

The final index, “peace value,” is manifested through concerns for economic welfare. Promoting economic well-being reflects an interest in production, standard of living, and individual livelihood,²² which is typically achieved through peaceful means in cooperation with others. Thus, references to economic benefits and interests reflect an interest in peace, as opposed to conflict.

Hypotheses

Although the value constructs outlined above have been previously applied to various international conflicts, never before have they been used in the study of conflicts between Taiwan and China. As an exploratory investigation into the field, this study will first examine the validity of value typologies in the cross-Strait context. Along the lines of reasoning as originally proposed by White and subsequently supported by Eckhardt,²³ the following descriptive hypotheses are proposed for validation purposes:

- H1:** The “Conflict” values (China Aggression, China Dominance and China Morality) are expected to correlate significantly with one another, but with China Morality in inverse relationship with the other two.
- H2:** The “Strength” values (Taiwan Autonomy, Taiwan Security, Taiwan Unity, and Taiwan Recognition) are expected to correlate positively with one another.
- H3:** The “Peace” value (Taiwan Economy) is expected to correlate negatively with two of the “Conflict” values (China Aggression, China Dominance), but positively with the third (China Morality).

²²Ibid., 353.

²³Ralph K. White, “Hitler, Roosevelt, and the Nature of War Propaganda,” *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 44, no. 2 (April 1949): 157-74; Eckhardt, “War Propaganda.”

As further explained in the Methods Section, values can be attributed to oneself (Taiwan) or one's opponent (China), and can be accorded a positive score when the subject is described as possessing a particular value, or a negative one if not. As conflict-minded leaders usually portray their opponents in a negative light (i.e., aggressive, dominant, lacking morality), China Morality is expected to have an inverse relationship with China Aggression and China Dominance. In other words, assertions of China's aggressive and dominating behavior are expected to correlate with negative evaluations of China's moral character.

The second set of hypotheses explores factors that may have influenced the way values are expressed in the political elite's public statements, especially as they relate to cross-Strait issues that are in a state of flux and potentially divisive. As indicated earlier, one prominent trend that political leaders in Taiwan must consider is the rise of self-identity in the country. How would political leaders position themselves in managing relations with Mainland China?

Against the backdrop of rising Taiwanese identity, it is difficult to imagine that any political leader in Taiwan, interested in political survival and longevity, would deviate significantly from the mainstream norm centered on Taiwan identity and loyalty. All are likely to support the notion of "Taiwan priority." If there is any difference in their communication, it may lie in how this notion is framed and interpreted.

To examine how these values may be packaged and presented, I advance two hypotheses. The first, H4, deals with the effect of political leadership, whereas H5 deals with the immediate target audience. It is commonly acknowledged that cross-Strait relations have improved under the Ma administration due to its more conciliatory approach toward China. It is quite reasonable to assume, in comparison, that the Chen administration may exhibit a more confrontational attitude toward Mainland China in its public discourse. Negative images attributed to China are likely expressed by Chen and his officials through public rhetoric that accuses China of dominance and aggression. As the Ma administration strives to stabilize cross-Strait relations, less negativity is expected in its public messages. Yet, that may be only half of the story. To survive the fierce political com-

petition in Taiwan politics, it is essential to be sensitive and responsive to mainstream public opinion that emphasizes the Taiwan identity. Consequently, political leaders in Taiwan, regardless of their party affiliations, have to advocate the general public's fundamental interests. As such, even though the Ma administration may display fewer "Conflict" values, it is expected to match closely with the Chen administration in "Strength" values.

Regarding the target audience, I posit that, other things being equal, the use of negative rhetoric about one's opponent is primarily for domestic consumption, irrespective of who is in power. Denunciatory or accusatory language about one's opponent may serve to grab the media spotlight and drum up domestic support, but could be considered belligerent or confrontational by third parties. When the immediate audience of the message includes foreign journalists, scholars, or dignitaries, political leaders may want to tone down the negativity and carefully balance their rhetoric to project a sensible and rational image. Thus, in the presence of a foreign audience, public communication may steer clear of negative tenors and tones toward its opponent. Rather, it is more likely to focus on Taiwan's aspirations and accomplishments so as to put the leaders and the country in a positive light. Hence, values related to "Peace" and "Strength" are more likely to appear when the immediate audience includes foreigners.

Based on these expectations, I suggest the second set of hypotheses as follows:

- H4:** The Chen administration differs significantly from the Ma administration in "Conflict" and "Peace" values, but both show similar support for "Strength" values.
- H5:** When the immediate audience is foreign, "Strength" values are emphasized more than "Conflict" values.

Methods and Results

To test these hypotheses, this study collects all public statements, speeches and interviews made by Presidents Chen and Ma, as well as

their Ministers of the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), that are available in full English text. The time frame of the documents ranges from May 2004 (the beginning of Chen's second term) to November 2011, right before Ma's re-election. Altogether, 89 documents were retrieved from the official websites of Taiwan's Presidential Office or the MAC.

Following the model of thematic content analysis (TCA), which generates quantitative data from texts by identifying themes in theoretically based categories and assessing frequencies of the categories, detailed scoring guidelines are developed to show how each value can be identified and scored from the interviews and speeches. Qualifications of the coders, who are unaware of the hypotheses of the study, are confirmed by achieving a reliability of at least .80 (kappa) with expert-scored training materials. The inter-coder reliability in this study reached .80 across all value categories.

The unit of coding is the paragraph. The division of paragraphs in the original texts is retained without alteration. When a value is explicitly mentioned or implied, it is recorded. Any value category can be scored only once for each paragraph. All values could be attributed to oneself and one's opponent. In this study, each value reference is recorded in the category of "Taiwan" when speakers use it specifically to describe themselves (including the Taiwan government and the society), or in the category of "China" when referring to China, including Chinese leaders, government, or society. Value references attributed to other international actors such as Japan, the U.S. or the European Union, are not coded.

If any subject is described as not possessing or wanting to possess one of the values, a negative score is recorded. After the full document is coded, negative scores are subtracted from positive ones for each value category, to yield final net scores. The relative frequency of reference to a value presumably indicates its importance to the speaker. Final net scores are then converted to value references per 1,000 words to control for the length of the documents.

The eight types of values outlined in Table 1 are the dependent variables in this study. To examine the factors that affect value references in public discourse, two dichotomized independent variables, "Admin-

istration” and “Presence of Foreign Audience” were created. Coding of “administration” (i.e., Chen vs. Ma administration) is straightforward as the speakers are clearly identified. Of the 89 documents collected for analysis, 46 came from the Chen administration and 43 from the Ma administration. For “Presence of Foreign Audience,” the document is coded “Yes” when citizens from another country were explicitly recognized or addressed in the speech, or when statements were made in interviews with foreign media or during an international press conference. The presence of foreign audiences was noted in 38 out of the 89 cases.

Validity of Value Constructs

- H1:** The “Conflict” values (China Aggression, China Dominance and China Morality) are expected to correlate significantly with one another, but with China Morality in inverse relationship with the other two.
- H2:** The “Strength” values (Taiwan Autonomy, Taiwan Security, Taiwan Unity, and Taiwan Recognition) are expected to correlate positively with one another.
- H3:** The “Peace” value (Taiwan Economy) is expected to correlate negatively with two of the “Conflict” values (China Aggression, China Dominance), but positively with the third (China Morality).

To evaluate H1-H3 on the validity of the value constructs, I conducted a principal components analysis with varimax rotation to verify whether these value categories were clustered as suggested. The findings in table 2 generally lend support to the hypotheses. With minimum factor loadings at 0.50 and a minimum eigenvalue of 1.0, the value references yielded three-factor solutions accounting for 64.12% of the variance.

The first factor could be labeled “Conflict/Peace” as it contains all three “Conflict” variables (China Aggression, China Dominance, and China Morality) and the “Peace” variable (Taiwan Economy). As predicted in value analysis, accusing China of being aggressive and domineering parallels the negative assessment of its moral character. Emphasizing Taiwan’s own economic growth and development, seen as signaling peaceful

Table 2
Principal Components Analysis of Values

	Factor 1 (Conflict/Peace)	Factor 2 (Strength-Internal)	Factor 3 (Strength-External)
Values			
China Aggression	.820	.119	-.154
China Dominance	.899	-.034	.132
China Morality	-.708	.068	-.358
Taiwan Security	.159	.797	-.169
Taiwan Unity	-.237	.773	.096
Taiwan Autonomy	.296	-.011	.634
Taiwan Recognition	-.291	-.058	.787
Taiwan Economy	-.618	.116	.121
% of total variance explained	32.72%	15.85%	15.55%

intentions to cooperate with others, has an inverse relationship with the accusatory and denunciatory rhetoric. Thus, these “Conflict” and “Peace” values perform in the direction as prescribed in the current literature.

The four “Strength” variables, however, perform a little differently as suggested by H2. Instead of being grouped along one dimension, they are split into two separate factors, with “Taiwan Security” and “Taiwan Unity” collating in one, and “Taiwan Autonomy” and “Taiwan Recognition” in the other. Upon further analysis, the division and separation of these values make sense, especially in the cross-Strait context. It appears that “Taiwan Security” and “Taiwan Unity” convey characteristics internal to one’s presence and existence (i.e., internal strength), while “Taiwan Autonomy” and “Taiwan Recognition” relate to acceptance and approval by the external community—the external strength. Taiwan’s effort to be recognized by the international community as an independent, sovereign state accentuates the significance of the external aspect of its longstanding struggle. The division of the “Strength” values into two distinct factors augments the literature on value analysis.

Overall, the results of table 2 show that these value typologies perform as expected. The value constructs are in general agreement with

prior research in the expected direction of their interrelations. The consistency of inner logic lends support and credence to the idea of applying these value typologies to a cross-Strait context.

Explanations of Value References

- H4:** The Chen administration differs significantly from the Ma administration in “Conflict” and “Peace” values, but both show similar support for “Strength” values.
- H5:** When the immediate audience is foreign, “Strength” values are emphasized more than “Conflict” values.

To investigate the factors that presumably affect the selection and expression of values, I conducted a two-factor multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA). Two-factor MANOVA is ideal for this kind of analysis because the procedure examines not only the effects that each of the two independent variables may have on the dependent variables, but also the effects of the interaction of the two independent variables on the dependent variables. All three independent variables (i.e., “Administration,” “Presence of Foreign Audience,” and the interaction of the two) are found to have significant main effects in the two-factor MANOVA analysis. The omnibus *f*-test indicates that there is a significant difference between the Ma and Chen administrations in terms of the values manifested in their public communication (Wilks’ $\lambda = .404$, $F(8, 78) = 14.38$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .60$, and the power to detect the effect was at 1). Similarly, the presence of a foreign audience and the interaction of the two independent variables are found to have significant main effects on the values expressed in the messages. (For foreign audiences Wilks’ $\lambda = .825$, $F(8, 78) = 2.07$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .18$, and the power to detect the effect was at 1; for two-variable interaction, Wilks’ $\lambda = .837$, $F(8, 78) = 1.91$, $p < .10$, $\eta^2 = .16$, and the power to detect the effect was at .759.) Given the significance of the overall test, the univariate main effects were further examined. The results are presented in table 3.

As indicated in table 3, there are significant differences between the Chen and Ma administrations in values emphasized. All of the “Conflict/

Table 3
Values in a Two-Factor Multivariate Analysis of Variance

Independent Factors	Values	F (1, 85)	Significance
Administration			
	China Aggression	55.50	.000
	China Dominance	46.90	.000
	China Morality	20.00	.000
	Taiwan Security	3.87	.052
	Taiwan Unity	0.54	.463
	Taiwan Autonomy	3.97	.050
	Taiwan Recognition	11.82	.001
	Taiwan Economy	26.78	.000
Presence of Foreign Audience			
	China Aggression	0.25	.619
	China Dominance	1.42	.237
	China Morality	2.41	.125
	Taiwan Security	1.32	.253
	Taiwan Unity	0.59	.444
	Taiwan Autonomy	4.65	.034
	Taiwan Recognition	3.22	.076
	Taiwan Economy	0.07	.789
Interaction (Administration by Presence of Foreign Audience)			
	China Aggression	0.22	.642
	China Dominance	1.82	.181
	China Morality	6.93	.010
	Taiwan Security	0.17	.679
	Taiwan Unity	0.04	.842
	Taiwan Autonomy	1.85	.178
	Taiwan Recognition	2.12	.150
	Taiwan Economy	2.64	.108

Peace” values and three of the four “Strength” values are statistically significant at the level of 0.1 or better. By examining the mean scores of these values, it is clear that public messages by the Chen administration contain more references to China’s aggression and dominance, along with more negative assessments of China’s morality. On the other hand, the

Ma administration shows greater interest in underscoring the importance of Taiwan's economy.

Yet, contrary to the clear distinction in the distribution of the "Conflict/Peace" values between the two administrations, the pattern in the "Strength" values is more complicated. In the area of Internal Strength, the two administrations are closely matched in terms of "Taiwan Unity," while the Chen administration shows greater concern for Taiwan Security. For External Strength (i.e., "Taiwan Autonomy" and "Taiwan Recognition"), the two are equally divided, with the Chen administration having a higher score on autonomy, and the Ma administration on recognition. In other words, although the Ma administration differs significantly from the Chen administration in "Conflict/Peace" values, it shows roughly the same level of commitment to "Strength" as the Chen administration. The result generally supports H4, which expects major differences in "Conflict/Peace" values.

Varying emphases given to different types of values between the two administrations mark the differences and similarities in their communications. Under the Chen administration, negative attributions to China are consistent with the more rancorous relations it had with Mainland China. In the same vein, less confrontation and hostility toward China in messages from the Ma administration reflect the improved, more cooperative cross-Strait relations since May 2008. Yet, mindful of the need to demonstrate to their constituencies their credibility in safeguarding the fundamental interests of Taiwan, political leaders in both governments are comparable in their eagerness to stake out their positions in support of the "Strength" values, a point that I will discuss further in the next section.

As to the potential audience effect on the value profile, table 3 also shows how the reference to values can be influenced by the presence of a foreign audience, irrespective of the speaker's ideological or political background. Specifically, two of the values are subject to this audience effect: Taiwan Autonomy (at the 0.05 level) and Taiwan Recognition (at the 0.1 level). Examination of their mean scores confirms that messages delivered in the presence of foreign audiences contain significantly more references to the value of autonomy and recognition. As for other types

of values, the difference in means also performs as expected (with the exception of “China Aggression” and “Taiwan Unity”), but not at the level of statistical significance.

Finally, examining the interaction effect of the two independent variables helps to differentiate any disparities between the two administrations in front of different audiences. One value, “China Morality,” is affected significantly by the interaction of the two independent variables. The Chen administration is found to be more negative about China’s moral character when a foreign audience is not immediately present, whereas the Ma administration is more positive about China’s morals when facing a domestic audience. In light of the numerous agreements signed between both sides under the Ma administration, it seems that this administration makes extra efforts to boost China’s credibility and, hence, build stronger domestic support for its *rapprochement* with China.

Discussions

Research on group loyalties and attachments has demonstrated the robustness of ingroup-favoring bias (i.e., the subjective preference for positions and products of one’s own group) even when groups are randomly or arbitrarily formed,²⁴ and especially when national identities are involved. The materialization of ingroup bias thus constrains the latitude of group representatives on collective action.²⁵ Political leaders are expected to show similar tendencies to describe themselves and/or their own groups in positive terms, such as being peaceful (non-aggressive), moral,

²⁴Daniel Druckman, “Nationalism, Patriotism, and Group Loyalty: A Social Psychological Perspective,” *Mershon International Studies Review* 38, no. 1 (April 1994): 43-68; Daniel Druckman, “Group Attachments in Negotiation and Collective Action,” *International Negotiation* 11, no. 2 (2006): 229-52.

²⁵Robert R. Blake and Jane Mouton, “The Intergroup Dynamics of Win-Lose Conflict and Problem-Solving Collaboration in Union-Management Relations,” in *Intergroup Relations and Leadership: Approaches and Research in Industrial, Ethnic, Cultural, and Political Areas*, ed. Muzafer Sherif (New York: Wiley, 1962), 94-140.

and unified. Furthermore, they are expected to attribute positive values to policy objectives such as autonomy, security and economic development.

The key question is whether the ingroup bias will lead to the derogation of outside groups. In other words, while political leaders ascribe positive values to themselves and their groups, will they attribute negative values such as aggression and dominance to their opponents and portray them as immoral?

Of particular interest and relevance to this study is the distinction between nationalism and patriotism, as noted by Feshback and his colleagues.²⁶ Through factor analysis, Feshback and his colleagues uncover two ways in which people relate to their groups. The first factor, called “patriotism,” shows emotional attachment to one’s own group without strong, negative feelings toward other groups or countries. The “patriots” are proud of being members of their own group without feeling superior to, or hostile toward others outside the group. People belonging to the second group, “nationalism,” associate the pride of their own group with a sense of superiority, and denigration of other groups. Nationalism is generally linked with a competitive worldview and a hawkish attitude, whereas patriotism is associated with a cooperative approach and a dovish attitude.

As discussed earlier and as further illustrated in table 4, the Chen administration clearly follows the conventional path of “nationalism” in dealing with China. Strong language used in condemning or denouncing China naturally draws a distinction between the ingroup and outgroup, which serves to solidify political support in alignment with Taiwan nativism or Taiwan-centered identity. The logic behind the strategy is clear and straightforward. In comparison, the absence of derogatory language toward one’s opponent (China) underscores one of the key differences

²⁶Seymour Feshbach, “Individual Aggression, National Attachment, and the Search for Peace: Psychological Perspectives,” *Aggressive Behavior* 13, no. 5 (1987): 315-25; Seymour Feshbach, “Psychology, Human Violence, and the Search for Peace: Issues in Science and Social Values,” *Journal of Social Issues* 46, no. 1 (Spring 1990): 183-98; Rick Kosterman and Seymour Feshbach, “Toward a Measure of Patriotic and Nationalistic Attitudes,” *Political Psychology* 10, no. 2 (June 1989): 257-74.

Table 4
Ranking of the Top Five Values of the Chen and Ma Administrations

<u>Chen Administration</u> (Mean/Std. Deviation)	<u>Ma Administration</u> (Mean/Std. Deviation)
1. China Dominance (2.14/2.06)	1. Taiwan Economy (2.96/1.81)
2. Taiwan Autonomy (1.96/1.78)	2. Taiwan Autonomy (1.22/1.20)
3. Taiwan Economy (1.15/1.28)	3. Taiwan Recognition (1.15/0.83)
4. Taiwan Unity (1.13/1.24)	4. Taiwan Unity (0.98/0.89)
5. China Aggression (0.99/1.31)	5. Taiwan Security (0.48/0.57)

between the Ma and Chen administrations. By steering clear of condemnations of, or accusations toward China, the Ma administration has a more difficult task. Overall, its position is closer to that of a “patriot,” as defined by Feshback and his colleagues.

Yet, how did Ma establish and build his credentials as a true patriot? This brings us to the value of “Taiwan Recognition,” a Strength value on which the Ma administration underscores its messages much more than the Chen administration. To emphasize the value of “recognition” is likely a conscientious and deliberate decision to lend support to his image as a patriot. Additionally, the economic value, traditionally seen as “Peace” value by the value analysis, seems to also serve as a Strength value for the Ma administration.

Closer examination of the speeches and interviews given by Ma Ying-jeou and Lai Shin-yuan (賴幸媛), Minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, shows that the purpose of *rapprochement* with China is justified on grounds that it will bring greater opportunities to sustain Taiwan’s economic growth. In his inaugural address of May 20, 2008, Ma proposes the principle of “*Taiwan youxian; yi renmin weizhu*” (臺灣優先, 以人民為主) or “putting Taiwan first for the benefit of the people.” Subsequently, on April 7, 2009, in a speech delivered at Feng Chia University in Taichung City, Lai claims this to be the “highest guiding principle of the government in promoting cross-Strait relations.” She further explains:

“‘Putting Taiwan first’ refers to President Ma’s insistence on the need to safeguard Taiwan-centric identity; and ‘for the benefit of the people’ means that policy measures must be consistent with the interests of the people of Taiwan. Moreover, those interests must be shared by all of the people. The government will sequentially and steadily promote policy measures conducive to benign cross-Strait interactions and normal contact. And it will pragmatically promote cross-Strait negotiations and exchanges to usher in a new era of ‘mutual benefits, win-win outcomes, coexistence, and co-prosperity’ in the Taiwan Strait.”

The policy position is a careful balance between Taiwan identity and Mainland opportunity. On the one hand, promotion of peaceful cross-Strait relations is justified on the grounds of the positive effect it will have on economic accomplishment and benefit. On the other hand, to safeguard the “Taiwan-centric identity,” Ma and his administration must show their ability to uphold the “Taiwan priority” so as to leave no openings for attacks from political opponents for being “soft” on China. This is where “recognition” enters the picture. Recognition by the international community is an important political achievement, especially for a government recognized by fewer than 30 states. It is an effective way to demonstrate a commitment to the Taiwan identity, while deflecting potential criticism of “selling out” to the economic interests of big business.

The following quote from a statement issued by the Mainland Affairs Council in December 2010 illustrates this point. In reviewing the results of the five rounds of cross-Strait talks since June 2008, the Mainland Affairs Council claims that:

“The sovereignty of the ROC has not been compromised at all; on the contrary, the improvement of cross-Strait relations has broadened Taiwan’s international space.

Over the past more than two years, the number of diplomatic allies with the ROC has held steady. At the same time, Taiwan has successfully participated in the World Health Assembly (WHA) and become a contracting member of the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA). Countries/areas including the United Kingdom, Ireland, New Zealand, Canada, and the European Union have successively granted visa-free treatment to the people of Taiwan, who consequently can now travel to 96 countries/areas without advance visa application (visa-free treatment in 75 countries/areas and landing visas in 21 countries/areas). This is an 81% increase over the 43 countries/areas that granted such treatment before President Ma Ying-jeou came into office in 2008.”

Obviously, it takes a lot more than one's own effort to build a robust economy and achieve recognition in a global society. Close collaboration and partnership with other members of the international community, none less than the state and market of China, is requisite for the success of the formula. This is, in essence, Ma's core message. The pursuit of economic growth and international recognition justifies the cooperative approach adopted by the Ma administration and lends credence to his patriotism.

This argument does not necessarily imply that the statements or speeches made by Chen or Ma were merely for image building or impression management. In fact, in much the same way as value research conducted on U.S. presidents,²⁷ the value hierarchies expressed by Chen and Ma, and their respective MAC Ministers, are remarkably stable. Comparing scores of their top five values with one-way ANOVA in 12-month intervals yields no meaningful differences, except that the value of autonomy was significantly higher in Chen's final year. The consistency of these value hierarchies, without being noticeably influenced by major events such as the passage of the Anti-Succession Law, Chen's corruption scandals or Ma's re-election bid, indicates that they represent something broader and deeper than a communication strategy.

Was Ma successful in convincing people in Taiwan about the importance of stabilizing cross-Strait relations? Did the effort to frame cross-Strait interactions in the context of Taiwan's economic growth and international recognition resonate well with people in Taiwan? In response to the question: "During the three-plus years of the Ma Administration, the SEF and the ARATS have held seven institutionalized talks and signed 16 agreements. Do you believe this has protected Taiwan's interests or not?" 60.9% of those responding answered "Yes." As to whether Taiwan's national sovereignty was protected, 56.3% said "Yes."²⁸ In an earlier survey, over 63.7% of the public believed the improvement

²⁷Suedfeld, Cross and Brcic, "Two Years of Ups and Downs," 1027.

²⁸These polls, commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, were conducted by the China Credit Information Service from October 22 to 24, 2011. See <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=99555&CtNode=7267&mp=3>.

of cross-Strait relations was conducive to expanding Taiwan's international space.²⁹ Although messages from Ma or his administration may not be the only reasons for these positive views, they certainly play a significant role in framing the direction of policy debates and are instrumental in contributing to public support and perception of improved cross-Strait relations.

Taken together, the theoretical distinction between nationalism and patriotism describes quite well the rhetorical styles between Chen and Ma. While both administrations uphold values integral and central to Taiwan's identity, Chen and his officials show greater hostility and antagonism toward China. As the Ma Administration seeks *rapprochement* with China, they seek to highlight the potential benefits to be gained from positive relations affecting Taiwan's economy and international recognition.

Conclusion

Facing the same constraint of rising Taiwanese identity, Chen and Ma and their respective administrations reveal similarities and differences in public rhetoric with regard to cross-Strait relations. Using the broad classification of "confrontation vs. cooperation" to describe relational messages may help identify differences, but will not adequately uncover similarities. When facing different audiences, both administrations calibrate and adjust their messages. Sharp attacks against China are usually reserved for domestic audiences, while Taiwan's aspirations and accomplishments are showcased for foreign audiences. This fact also points to the second similarity in how political leaders respond to public opinion in a young democracy.

While their language toward China may be different in tenor of denunciation and accusation, the Chen and Ma administrations exhibit a

²⁹These polls, commissioned by Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, were conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University from May 27 to 30, 2011, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=99409&ctNode=7173&mp=3>.

similar tendency to appeal to the sense of Taiwan identity derived from ingroup bias. For political leaders such as Ma and his administration who are interested in peace overtures with external opponents, it is important to be keenly aware of outer constraints imposed by electoral politics and to exercise caution in fine tuning relational messages. In this sense, the scheme of “nationalism vs. patriotism” can better capture the nature and dynamics of message framing.

This study demonstrates not only the substantive differences, but also the commonalities in rhetoric styles shown by Chen and Ma and their respective administrations. As a research tool, value analysis appears very helpful in identifying nuances and subtleties in public communication, as political leaders try to manage conflicting expectations and cross-cutting pressures. Emphasis on different types of values provides indications as to how politicians structure value choices and evaluate priorities. In the future, applying the same value constructs to other actors in the cross-Strait context should be instrumental in identifying possible trends and early warning signals for opportunities and challenges in long-term relations between Taiwan and China. It is an undertaking worthy of further exploration.

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