

Gathering Scholars to Defend the Country: The Institute of International Relations before 1975*

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Throughout much of history, the Institute of International Relations (IIR) has been perceived as a Kuomintang think tank. Based on the perspective generated by personal contributions before its formal establishment in 1975 as part of National Chengchi University, the author traces the IIR's foundation and key staff as far back as 1937 to argue that it was constructed during a national crisis because the state leader needed professional opinions that could be used strategically. Thus, rather than considering the IIR as an organization subject to a political party, it should be regarded as an institution charged with gathering scholars to defend the country.

KEYWORDS: think tank; Institute of International Relations; Chiang Kai-shek; Chiang Ching-Kuo; Wang Pengsheng.

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R. Kent Weaver, a political scientist and think-tank specialist, argues that the increase in the number of think tanks does not indicate an increase in their influence. Indeed, precisely the opposite may be true. Policy makers can easily find a think tank study to support their views, no matter what they may be.¹ Weaver's study has been reinforced by many other scholars. For example, Donald E. Abelson contends that individual think tanks have sometimes played an important role in shaping the policy preferences of decision makers, but often in different ways and at different stages in the policy cycle.²

Because statistical data do not reveal how the government takes advice from think tanks, Andrew Rich argues that many think tanks simply mimic interest groups rather than researching units, thus for policy makers the known ideological proclivities of many think tanks have undermined the credibility of their expertise.³ James G. McGann concludes that voices from partisan politics, donors, and media have affected the ability of think tanks to provide independent analysis and advice to the extent that "rarely does an idea leap from a think tank to become public policy." The influence of think tanks on policy makers is thus "indirect."⁴

The aforementioned studies on think tanks may not entirely apply to the Institute of International Relations (IIR), which is currently located at National Chengchi University in Taipei. The IIR is categorized by London's Overseas Development Institute as a "geopolitical and security-focused think tank."⁵ Its opinions seem to "directly" shape public policies

¹See R. Kent Weaver, "The Changing World of Think Tanks," *Political Science and Politics* 22, no. 3 (September 1989): 577.

²Donald E. Abelson, *Do Think Tanks Matter? Assessing the Impact of Public Policy Institutes* (Quebec City: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009), 4.

³See Andrew Rich, *Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

⁴James G. McGann, *Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates* (London: Routledge, 2007), 3-4.

⁵Karthik Nachiappan, Enrique Mendizabal, and Ajoy Datta, *Think Tanks in East and South-east Asia* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2010), 16-17.

as Japan's National Institute for Research Advancement labeled the IIR a think tank that "submit[s] reports and suggestions to the government concerning major events in mainland China and overseas, and promote[s] understanding of and support for the Republic of China (ROC) in the international community."⁶ Because the IIR provides such a nationally important service to policy makers, Australian scholar Gerald Chan calls it "the leading institution in the country with a research focus on international relations and Chinese affairs."⁷

The IIR was established in Taipei 60 years ago, but there are currently many other think tanks in Taiwan. Why does the IIR continue to enjoy the reputation of being a "leading institution"? As previously mentioned, the factors that most affect the influence of think tanks are funding, interactions with the government, and ideology. Within this framework, the IIR has been described as a Kuomintang (國民黨) think tank. Dr. Cheng Tuanyao (鄭端耀), IIR Director from 2005 to 2010, briefly explains the history of this think tank:⁸

[The] IIR was probably Taiwan's first research institute. The purpose of its establishment was very simple: to become a think tank for the government. . . . The government needed a research institute to provide ideas on mainland China and international affairs. . . . As the Kuomintang ran the government for so long, as a government think tank, we were of course working for the Kuomintang.

In other words, serving the Kuomintang was the foundation of the IIR's status. Although academics have rarely examined the political inclination of the IIR, non-academic articles have labeled it the Kuomintang's talent pool.⁹ However, there have also been arguments against this

⁶See <http://www.nira.or.jp/past/ice/nwdtt/2005/DAT/1302.html> (accessed January 20, 2014).

⁷See Gerald Chan, "International Studies in Taiwan Today: A Preliminary Survey of the Problems and Prospects" (Asian Studies Institute Working Paper 16, Victoria University of Wellington, 2000), <http://www.victoria.ac.nz/slc/asi/publications/13-international-studies-in-taiwan-today.pdf> (accessed January 20, 2014).

⁸Chung-han Wu, "Taiwan zhiku jigou zhi fenlei ji fazhan xiankuang yanjiu" (Categorization and development of Taiwan think tanks) (master thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 2010), 315-20.

⁹See, for example, Zeng Yanqin, "Shi 'shengguan leyuan' yeshi 'zhao'an zongbu': qian-

impression that contend that the IIR was working for the state, rather than for any specific party.¹⁰

Given Taiwan's political history, it is difficult to separate the Kuomintang and the state from the IIR's development. Taiwan today is no longer a party state, yet there have been few discussions on why the IIR is still thriving without assistance from either the government or any political party.

Writing on think tanks in the Qing dynasty, Dr. Chen Xiaojun (成曉軍) argues that it is not political power but a leader's temperament and ability to appreciate the characteristics of think tank members that determines such an operation's success.¹¹ This perspective can be used to reanalyze the IIR's history. A think tank is an organization of researchers. By recruiting intellectuals and effectively applying their talents, a think tank can improve its value. As notable think-tank researcher Diane Stone indicates, "the human capital of a think tank is its primary asset in producing policy analysis and sustaining reputation."¹²

By focusing on the early leaders of the IIR, this paper reviews how they established the IIR's reputation. The author connects the IIR's history to that of its predecessor on the Chinese mainland, rebuilding the historical meaning of the IIR by studying the management and challenges of its forerunner. In studying their respective efforts, the author intends not only to demonstrate the importance of human capital and personal leadership in the history of a think tank, but also provide an explanation for the persistence of the IIR's influence and reputation.

qibaiguai de guoguan zhongxin" (The headquarters of cadet politicians and political dissidents: the strange IIR), *Caixun* (Wealth Magazine) (Taipei), April 1994, 108-10.

¹⁰See, for example, Anonymous, "Taiwan zhengyao yangchengsuo: jiekai guoguan zhongxin de shenmi miansha (xia)" (A training ground for government dignitaries in Taiwan: lifting the mysterious veil of the Institute of International Relations[II]), *Zhongwai zazhi* (Kaleidoscope Monthly) (Taipei) 52, no. 5 (November): 133. After reviewing the IIR's retirement and archival files, I confirm that the author of the paper is retired IIR research fellow, Fang Xuechun (方雪純).

¹¹Chen Xiaojun, *Wanqing diyi zhiku: Zeng Guofan de muliaomen* (The first think tank in the late Qing dynasty: Zeng Guofan's staff) (Taipei: Jieyou, 2002), v.

¹²Diane Stone, *Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the Policy Process* (London: Routledge, 1996), 153.

Establishing the Institute of International Affairs during the Japanese Invasion

Although the ROC had several units that specialized in foreign policy and intelligence affairs during the 1930s, the official institute tasked with studying the enemy was not established until 1937, when Japan invaded China. It was originally named the “The Supreme Investigation Committee” (*zuigao diaocha weiyuanhui*, 最高調查委員會) and brought together numerous intelligence units, including both of the Bureaus of Investigation and Statistics (hereafter the BIS) of the Kuomintang and the National Military Council (*zhongtong*, 中統, or 中國國民黨中央執行委員會調查統計局; *juntong*, 軍統, or 國民政府軍事委員會調查統計局). The director of this Committee was Wang Pengsheng (王芃生), but his position was untenable because there was much factional competition within the committee. The committee was disbanded after Wuhan was lost to the Japanese in 1938. Chiang Kai-shek (蔣介石) then established a new unit under the National Military Council called the Institute of International Affairs (IIA, or *guojiwenti yanjiusuo*, 國際問題研究所), again directed by Wang Pengsheng.

In terms of the IIA’s importance, He Fengshan (何鳳山), Chair of the Intelligence Department of the ROC Foreign Ministry in the early 1940s, stated that there were three famous intelligence units in Chongqing during the Sino-Japanese War: the BIS of the Kuomintang, the BIS of the National Military Council, and the IIA. He also stated that “although the IIA had ‘international affairs’ in its title, it actually targeted Japanese intelligence and research only,” “No one knew Japan better than Wang Pengsheng,” and “the highest authority paid very much attention to Wang’s opinions.”¹³ In terms of the IIA’s position in the government, Mr. Xin Xianhui (辛先惠), Wang’s secretary during the war, noted that although the IIA was under the National Military Council, it was funded by

¹³He Fengshan, *Waijiao shengya sishinian* (Forty years of foreign service) (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1990), 155.

Chiang Kai-shek's Office of Attendants (*shicongshi*, 侍從室). However, the Office of Attendants was not able to command Wang; only Chiang could give orders.¹⁴

Although many scholars argue that Chiang Kai-shek tended to assign important posts to those with whom he had personal links, this theory does not apply to Wang Pengsheng. Wang was from Hunan, but his career was forged in northern China. He studied in Japan, spoke fluent Japanese, and had written several books about Japanese history. He was also a noted observer, and published comments in influential newspapers and journals. Moreover, he had been involved in Sino-Japanese diplomatic affairs since 1918.

Wang attracted Chiang Kai-shek's attention probably because of his knowledge of Japan. Gong Debo (龔德柏) was a Delegate of the National Assembly and a Japanese specialist, knew Wang very early on, and had several personal conflicts with him. Gong pointed out that Chiang knew Wang through Zhang Xueliang (張學良), who arranged the first meeting between them. Chiang was impressed by Wang's extensive understanding of Japan and then helped him to become involved in the ROC's diplomatic affairs with Japan.¹⁵ However, others have argued that it was Wang's intelligence capability that won Chiang's attention. For example, by collecting information from Japan, he accurately predicted the Xian Incident and the Japanese invasion in 1936 and 1937, respectively, and reported them to Chiang in advance.¹⁶

Wang was an intellectual with both academic and diplomatic experience. He was not only a distinguished Japanese data analyst, but also a

¹⁴Xin Xianhui, "Yi Wang Pengsheng xiansheng zai kangzhan shiqi de guojiqingbao gong-zuo" (Recollection of Wang Pengsheng's work on international intelligence during the Sino-Japanese War), *Jinri Zhongguo* (China Today) (Beijing), 1988, no. 12:58.

¹⁵Gong Debo, *Youshi yuhua* (Nonsense again) (Taipei: Wenshin, 1965), 10-12.

¹⁶Pan Shixian, "Huiyi Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo" (Recollection of Wang Pengsheng and the Institute of International Affairs), in *Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo* (Wang Pengsheng and the Institute of International Affairs), ed. Cultural Research Committee, Zhuzhou City, Hunan Province, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (Zhuzhou City: Cultural Research Committee, Zhuzhou City, Hunan Province, National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference), 56-57; Xin, "Yi Wang Pengsheng xiansheng," 56-57.

noted writer of government publicity during the war. All of these factors explain why Chiang appointed him to lead an organization to rationalize the existing intelligence units as soon as the war began.

People in the IIA

The IIA had about 500 employees. Among them, 200 were stationed in Chongqing and 300 were posted behind enemy lines. Although the number of staff was much smaller than that of both BISs, almost all articles about Wang have indicated that the IIA generated very precise intelligence, such as accurately predicting the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor. According to a member who served in the Office of Attendants during the war, the information on the Japanese bombing was passed to a young diplomat in Shanghai named Everett F. Drumright, who later became the US Ambassador to Taiwan during the 1960s. Drumright was jailed by the Japanese as soon as the Pacific War began, and praised the ROC's intelligence accuracy after being released.¹⁷

The ROC enthusiastically hoped that the United States would join the Sino-Japanese War, and thus warnings of Japanese attacks on the United States at that time were easily considered by the Americans to be forged. However, some US scholars have noted that Chongqing sent Japanese bombing information to the United States in advance through the BIS of the National Military Council.¹⁸ An IIA employee argued that this was credited to the BIS because the BIS used its influence in the National Military Council to intercept the IIA's files when the IIA submitted

¹⁷Shao Yulin, "Zhuinian Wang Pengsheng xiansheng" (Missing Mr. Wang Pengsheng), *Zhuanji wenxue* (Biographical Literature) (Taipei) 8, no. 5 (May 1966): 28.

¹⁸Frederic Wakeman Jr., *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2003), 283; Kathryn Meyer and Terry Parssinen, *Webs of Smoke: Smugglers, Warlords, Spies, and the History of the International Drug Trade* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 208; Hua-Lun Huang, *The Missing Girls and Women of China, Hong Kong and Taiwan: A Sociological Study of Infanticide, Forced Prostitution, Political Imprisonment, "Ghost Brides," Runaways and Thrownaways, 1900-2000s* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2012), 38-39.

this information to Chiang Kai-shek.¹⁹

The IIA's valuable intelligence attracted the attention of the ROC's allies. For example, the British government set up an intelligence office within the institute. An important factor in the IIA's value was that it recruited "enemies." First of all, there was an independent office organized by Japanese who could not even speak Chinese. Secondly, to enlarge intelligence sources behind the enemy line, Wang Pengsheng seemed to accept communists as employees. Accusing Wang's closeness with Zhou Enlai (周恩來), Gong Debo even argued that Wang himself was a communist.²⁰

There were also Chinese-speaking "Japanese" in the institute. One of Chiang's important intelligence staff, Tang Zong (唐縱), described the IIA as being mostly organized by "Taiwanese, Koreans, and students who studied in Japan."²¹ For example, Wang Pengsheng himself had studied in Japan as a student, and his chief of staff, Xie Nanguang (謝南光), later a renowned Taiwanese communist, represented the IIA to maintain constant exchanges with the Soviet Embassy in Chongqing.²²

Taiwan was a part of Japan. Many Taiwanese not only studied in Japan but were also very familiar with Japanese politics and culture. Thus, Taiwanese staff played an important role in the IIA. The intelligence passed to Chiang Kai-shek about the Japanese invasion of 1937 resulted from the cooperation of Wang Pengsheng and four Taiwanese: Xie Nanguang, Li Wanju (李萬居), Zhang Xichi (張錫祺), and Zhang Xijun (張錫鈞).²³ Other famous Taiwanese working in this institution included

¹⁹Pan, "Huiyi Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo," 53.

²⁰Gong, *Youshi yuhua*, 1-41.

²¹Tang Zong, "Wo dui Pengsheng xiansheng zhi huainian" (My memory of Mr. Pengsheng), in *Wang Pengsheng xiansheng jinianji* (Wang Pengsheng memorial set), editor unknown (n.p.: publisher unknown, 1966), 4. The book's publisher and editor are both unknown. The volume is a composition of many articles on Wang Pengsheng and the IIA by famous officials and scholars in Taiwan during the 1960s. The National Central Library in Taipei has a copy of this book.

²²Ibid., 54.

²³Pan, "Huiyi Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo," 44.

Lian Zhengdong (連震東), Huang Guoshu (黃國書), You Mijian (游彌堅), Huang Chaoqin (黃朝琴), and Cai Peihuo (蔡培火).²⁴

As there were enemies and enemy-trained specialists working in this institution, the IIA was able to analyze Japan from common information. For example, before the Pacific War, the IIA intensively studied the Japanese stock market. IIA experts were familiar with the Japanese plutocracy, and by studying the changes in the stock index could examine the intercourse among politicians, the armed forces, and tycoons, and further analyze possible Japanese diplomatic and military movements.²⁵

Thus, with help from the “enemies,” the IIA concentrated on collecting and analyzing information, and submitted *Intelligence Summaries* (*qingbao zhaiyao*, 情報摘要) and *Research Reports* (*yanjiu baogao*, 研究報告) to the government and foreign embassies in Chongqing. To enhance the quality of these papers, Wang paid much attention to nurturing young people. Newcomers received extra pay if they had translation abilities. As long as they were willing to study foreign languages and international relations, he tolerated their working hours and the late submission of analytical papers. He also asked senior researchers with distinguished foreign language capability to hold classes for junior researchers.²⁶

Failed Reconstruction

Wang Pengsheng wrote intensively in newspapers and other influential journals during the war. The famous litterateur Zhang Zhigan (張之淦) praised him for his deployment of the IIA’s resources to influence the public, such as Wang’s work in September 1941 in *Dagong bao* (大公報)

²⁴Chen Dunzheng, “Shijie de ‘ribentong’: Wang Pengsheng” (A world class Japanese expert: Wang Pengsheng), *Zhongwai zazhi* (Kaleidoscope Monthly) (Taipei) 32, no. 5 (November 1982): 102.

²⁵Pan, “Huiyi Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo,” 47-49.

²⁶Hu Youshen, “Wo zai guojiwenti yanjiusuo de gongzuo jingli” (My working experiences in the Institute of International Affairs), in *Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo*, 141-42.

that forecasted the Japanese attack on the United States. His papers boosted Chinese morale, and could even “make a coward find his courage.” Nevertheless, Zhang also commented that Wang’s position was a combination of diplomacy, intelligence, and propaganda, and that the IIA was designed to be “an institute of academics and strategy.” Wang’s writings were thus short of academic value.²⁷

Finding the right position between the academic and political poles became the IIA’s principal problem. IIA was an organization constructed during a national crisis to instantly provide professional opinions in response to Japanese attacks, but once the enemy was losing the war, its existence was challenged. Both for the “Supreme Investigation Committee” and the IIA, Wang was always Chiang Kai-shek’s ideal director. However, Wang belonged to neither the existing BIS intelligence systems nor any of the powerful cliques in the Kuomintang. “The Supreme Investigation Committee” failed because of factional competition, but the IIA’s successful establishment and functioning after Wuhan was lost implied that all of the factions sensed the Japanese threat and were willing to confront their common enemy.

In the closing period of the war, the IIA’s structural problems became obvious. Its intelligence capability was a threat to the credibility of both BISs, and its relationship with the communists became a debt in political wrestling. Moreover, the fact that Wang Pengsheng was not connected to any powerful Kuomintang faction proved fatal. He failed to convince any government bodies to take over the IIA after the war. He tried to convince Academia Sinica to take over the research institute, but Fu Sinian’s (傅斯年) response was that the IIA was too big for Academia Sinica to accept.²⁸

Without support from either the Kuomintang or academia, Wang was neither able to secure an appropriate position in the post-war government

²⁷Zhang Zhigan, “Luetan Wang Pengsheng” (To talk about Wang Pengsheng), in *Wang Pengsheng xiansheng jinianji*, 105-10.

²⁸Wan Fazhen, “Kangzhan shiqi de Wang Pengsheng yu guojiwenti yanjiusuo” (Wang Pengsheng and the Institute of International Affairs during the Sino-Japanese War), *Shandong ligong daxue xuebao, shehui kexueban* (Journal of Shandong University of Technology, social science edition) 24, no. 1 (January 2008): 53.

nor find a way out for the IIA. Wang died soon after the war ended of heart disease at the age of fifty-four. When he passed away, a piece of paper was found in his hand that expressed his great frustration: “What is the future of the IIA?”²⁹

Before he passed away, Wang recommended that Shao Yulin (邵毓麟), another Japanese expert, take over his position. Shao took over as soon as Wang died. His first job was to arrange a funeral service for Wang as splendid as that of Dai Li (戴笠), the director of the BIS, National Military Council, who died two months before Wang. Chiang Kai-shek wrote the funeral oration. However, Shao was unable to solve the problems of the think tank, and his main task consisted of paying gratuities to employees and disbanding the IIA.

The IIA did amass some achievements in its short life. First, although Wang Pengsheng was not connected to Chiang Kai-shek and thus found himself shut out by Chiang’s official intelligence units, Chiang did select him as the director of the IIA in recognition of his professional training. Second, the IIA used enemies and enemy-trained employers to analyze intelligence, providing Chiang Kai-shek and his allies with valuable information. Third, many of the Taiwanese who worked for the IIA later became leaders in Taiwan, demonstrating its function as a forum for training intellectuals. Finally, the IIA was an instant construction from existing intelligence units for the purpose of making professional policy recommendations regarding the enemy. Its appearance and disappearance were thus linked to the ebb and flow of military requirements.

Reborn: The Policy Analysis Office of the Information Division, Presidential Office

The Information Division of the Presidential Office took charge of intelligence affairs after both BIS intelligence systems collapsed in main-

²⁹Hsiung Chen, “Wang Pengsheng zhuan” (A biography of Wang Pengsheng), *Guoshiguan guankan* (Bulletin of Academia Historica) (Taipei) 7, no. 12 (December 1989): 132.

land China in 1949. The collapse of the old systems meant that Chiang Kai-shek could launch a new system in Taiwan and establish better control. His son Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) gradually became involved in intelligence affairs. With his father's help, Chiang Ching-kuo spent three years (1950-1953) reorganizing the secret services and strengthening his power, and then finally became the new head of all of the intelligence units.³⁰

In terms of timing, the establishment of the Policy Analysis Office (hereafter the PAO) was very similar to that of the IIA. On February 17, 1953, Chiang Kai-shek gave handwritten orders to Chiang Ching-kuo, Chief of the Information Division, to engage in psychological warfare, intelligence, and propaganda by assembling experts to establish a new unit that would clarify international politics and analyze Communist affairs. The regions of research were to include the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Japan, the Middle East, South East Asia, and Taiwan's local political factions.³¹

Scholars have confirmed that Chiang Kai-shek's handwritten orders were largely the result of military need.³² In early 1953, there were intensive military conflicts in the Taiwan Strait, the Korean War was ongoing, and the United States had not yet signed the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taipei. Once again, a national crisis in the ROC led to the birth of a think tank. By conducting professional research on the enemy, a think tank would provide policy recommendations for the state leader. The PAO was thus born.

³⁰Tu Chen-ji, *Kelai'en yu Taiwan: fangong lixiang yu lixing zhi chongtu he tuoxie* (Ray S. Cline and Taiwan: the conflict and compromise of his passion and reason on anti-communism) (Taipei: Showwe Information, 2007), 99-101.

³¹"Zongtong shouling" (Handwritten orders from the President), February 17, 1953, in "Ben-shi yewu hui bao, minguo 46 nian zhi 55 nian" (Reports of the Policy Analysis Office, 1957-1966), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

³²See, for example, Zhang Ruide, "Yaozhi: Jiang Jieshi shouling yanjiu" (Remote control: a study of Chiang Kai-shek's use of handwritten personal orders), *Jindaishi yanjiu* (Modern Chinese History Studies) (Beijing), 2005, no. 5:27-49.

According to Chiang Kai-shek's original instructions, the PAO's research areas were comprehensive, and even involved the study of Taiwan's local politics. As this new unit targeted foreign and enemy affairs, it would appear that Chiang Kai-shek considered Taiwan's political cliques to be "foreign" and inimical.

However, it was Chiang Ching-kuo who interpreted his father's orders. On April 1, 1953, the PAO was established to target the affairs of the Soviets, the Communists, the United States (including the United Nations), Japan/Korea, and Europe. Southeast Asian affairs belonged to the "Europe" group, and were important to Taipei due to the geographical closeness and rising anti-colonial and communist forces in the region. Taiwanese issues were not included. Chiang Ching-kuo made the focus of the PAO "international" only. All of the research fields were urgently demanded by the ROC's military and diplomatic policies, so in fact the PAO mainly targeted international issues related to the ROC's mission of counter-attack against the Chinese mainland and the Communists.

The linkage between the IIA and PAO was evident not only in the timing of establishment, its founding purpose, and its tie with the national leader, but also in personal connection and Chiang Kai-shek's authorization. The first director of the PAO was the IIA's last director, Shao Yulin. He did not like the title of the PAO, so with the approval of Chiang Kai-shek, Shao, for "yearning for Wang Pengsheng's contribution to international studies," gave the PAO a new name "Council of International Relations" (*guojiguanxi yanjiuhui*, 國際關係研究會, hereafter CIR).³³

In terms of Chinese pronunciation, Shao and Chiang Kai-shek made the CIR sound so similar to the IIA that those who experienced the era of Wang Pengsheng might keep using the old name. Kuo Ting-yee (郭廷以) was a renowned scholar who served as the director of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica. He had regular contacts with Chiang Ching-kuo and people in the CIR/IIR. In his diary, however, he usually

³³Shao Yulin, "Zhuinian yige da bu pingfan de Guomindangyuan" (Missing an extraordinary Kuomintang member), in *Wang Pengsheng xiansheng jinianji*, 28.

referred to this Taiwan-born institute as “*guojiwenti yanjiusuo*” (國際問題研究所, the IIA’s Chinese name).³⁴

Position of the “Council of International Relations” in the Government

According to the IIR’s website and published academic journal, the history of the IIR began with the establishment of the CIR in 1953, which was renamed the IIR in 1961.³⁵ It is important to note that the CIR did not come out into the open until 1958, and as soon as the CIR was registered as a civilian organization and engaged in more public interaction, it was extended to the IIR, nominally a private research institution registered under the Ministry of Interior Affairs, in 1961.³⁶

The Information Division of the Presidential Office became the National Security Bureau on March 1, 1955, and thus the research unit became part of the Bureau. Although the unit was known as the CIR or IIR in public, within the National Security Bureau it was called the PAO. This PAO/CIR/IIR usually sent official reports directly to a strange receiver called “Mr. Chiang.”

This “Mr. Chiang” was Chiang Ching-kuo. Chiang Ching-kuo was so close to PAO researchers that he usually took as many as twelve of them to work in his car.³⁷ Regardless of who was the director of the PAO/

³⁴Kuo Ting-yee, *Guo Liangyu xiansheng riji cangao* (Diary fragments of Guo Liang-yu) (Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2012), 169, 265.

³⁵See the IIR’s website, <http://iir.nccu.edu.tw/intro/pages.php?ID=intro2&submenu=intro2&menu=mastermenu2> (accessed January 6, 2014); and “Guojiguanxi yanjiuzhongxin zhi lishi yange, yewu gaikuang, yu weilai fazhan” (The history, function, and future of the IIR), *Wenti yu yanjiu* (Issues and Studies) (Taipei) 22, no. 7 (1983): 5-8.

³⁶“Guojiguanxi yanjiusuo yewu jianbao ziliao” (Briefing for the Institute of International Relations), September 18, 1964, in “Zhangguan xunci, minguo 47 nian zhi 53 nian” (Speeches of superior officers, 1958-1964), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

³⁷“Wushisi nian si yue yi ri zai shi’er zhounian jinianri yu Zhongyang ribao dalou qi lou huiyishi jiangci” (Chiang Ching-kuo’s speech on the 12th anniversary at the 7th floor conference room of the Central Daily News Building, April 1, 1965), in “Yandu Jiang

CIR/IIR, the overall leader was Chiang Ching-kuo, whose involvement in the establishment of the unit was the major difference between the IIA and the PAO/CIR: the latter was no longer troubled by serious factional conflicts because there was only a “Chiang clique.”

In addition to receiving direct reports from the PAO/CIR, Chiang Ching-kuo usually visited the unit in person and gave instructions. Direct communication between Chiang Ching-kuo and the PAO/CIR meant that although the research unit was subject to the National Security Bureau, it was relatively independent and belonged to the Bureau in name only, as it was under the direct command of Chiang Ching-kuo. In terms of structure, the PAO/CIR was also very similar to the IIA, being a research unit built instantly from the existing intelligence system but under the direct command of the state leader.

Why did this intelligence office adopt a public name and disclose itself to the world in the late 1950s? In Chiang Kai-shek’s first address to research fellows on September 19, 1953, he stated only that the research unit was to assist him in his personal decision making. However, in the same speech, he told research fellows to publish a distinguished journal on a par with *Foreign Affairs*,³⁸ despite the fact that the written order of February 1953 did not contain a word regarding this publication.

It was unusual for a national leader to require that his advisors publish their thoughts, particularly with the added demand that the publication be academically competitive. However, Chiang’s written order did mention propaganda, which made the mission of the PAO/CIR clearer. In addition to enemy analysis, it had to dedicate itself to academic propaganda.

xiansheng jiangci, minguo 42 nian zhi 63 nian” (Studying Mr. Chiang’s speeches, 1953-1974), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

³⁸“Fan fujuzhang zhuchi bensuo jianbao jilu” (Briefing for General Fan, Deputy Chief of National Security Bureau), March 4, 1966, in “Zhangguan xunci, minguo 47 nian zhi 53 nian” (Speeches of superior officers, 1958-1964), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

During the 1950s, Chiang Ching-kuo spoke to members of the PAO every couple of months. He pushed for theoretical research, exchanges with foreign universities, and the employment of young researchers. He disliked what he referred to as useless, anti-communist rubbish, and asked researchers to look for the advantages of Chinese Communist rule on the mainland. His most important mission seemed to be to fulfill his father's request for a "distinguished publication," and he mentioned it in almost every speech to researchers. After the CIR's first Chinese publication *Wenti yu Yanjiu* (問題與研究) went public in 1957, he kept pushing for an English version of the journal. Probably because Chiang Ching-kuo was particular about the English, this was delayed for another four years.³⁹

Although it took the IIR years to prepare its publications, Chiang Ching-kuo's endeavor was rewarded by superiority over its People's Republic of China (PRC) counterpart. The China Institute of International Studies was established by the PRC Foreign Ministry in 1957 and released its first publication in 1959, but that was soon terminated due to political concerns. By 2006, only 154 issues had been published, with the first English version appearing in 2005.

Using the "Enemy"

During World War II, the IIA hired many Japanese, Koreans and Taiwanese employees for their understanding of Japan. In post-1949 Taiwan, the best people to analyze communist affairs still seemed to be the communists themselves. Chiang Ching-kuo was familiar with the talent that often sprang from communist training due to his Soviet experiences. The first PAO director Shao Yulin, a Japanese/Korean specialist, left his

³⁹For Chiang Ching-kuo's instructions, see "Jiang xiansheng dui benshi gongzuo zhishi zhaiyao" (Summary of Mr. Chiang's Instructions), 1953-1967, in "Yandu Jiang xiansheng jiangci, minguo 42 nian zhi 63 nian" (Studying Mr. Chiang's speeches, 1953-1974), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

post in November 1954, and a Soviet specialist Bu Daomin (卜道明) took over the directorship.

Bu Daomin's communist experience can be traced as far back as Chen Duxiu's (陳獨秀) era. He was secretary to both Chiang Kai-shek and Mikhail Markovich Borodin in the 1920s. Bu was not a scholar but a professional diplomat who led the Department of West Asia of the ROC Foreign Ministry and was in charge of Sino-Russian relations before 1949.

He was also Chiang Ching-kuo's classmate in Moscow. In Taipei, Chiang and Bu lived near each other on Zhongshan North Road, and often visited each other after work in slippers.⁴⁰ His close connections to the Chiangs, his expertise in the Russian language, and his practical experience of foreign affairs made him a perfect leader for the PAO/CIR.

Many of Chiang Ching-kuo's instructions were carried out by Bu. One of the IIR's major publications, *Wenti yu Yanjiu*, was initiated in 1956 and went public in 1961. Another journal that continues to enjoy a good reputation today is *Mainland China Studies* which used to be called *Feiqing yuebao* (匪情月報, Chinese Communist Affairs Monthly) and was first published in 1958. Led by the National Security Bureau, *Feiqing yuebao* was the result of cooperation among the most important intelligence units in Taiwan: the Kuomintang's Division of Mainland Chinese Intelligence, the Investigation Bureau of the Justice Ministry, and the Intelligence Bureau of the National Defense Ministry.⁴¹

During Bu's term, the PAO opened up further and changed its public title from the CIR to the IIR, which sounded more professional and carried more academic weight. In addition, the IIR's headquarters moved

⁴⁰Anonymous, "Taiwan zhengyao yangchengsuo: jiekai guoguan zhongxin de shenmi miansha (shang)" (A training ground for government dignitaries in Taiwan: lifting the mysterious veil of the Institute of International Relations[I]), *Zhongwai zazhi* (Kaleidoscope Monthly) (Taipei) 52, no. 4 (October 1992): 113.

⁴¹Ibid. In the mid-1960s, due to the Cultural Revolution and Chiang Kai-shek's order to extend research on Chinese communists, these units gradually generated their own academic output in mainland China studies: *Studies on Chinese Communism* by the Intelligence Bureau of the National Defense Ministry, *Studies in Communism* by the Investigation Bureau of the Justice Ministry, and the Kuomintang's *Mainland China*.

from an old building beside Yuanshan Zoo and the Keelung River to a modern downtown building that would not suffer the interruptions of animals, rain, and floods. The IIR was now ready for more external exchanges.

Under Bu, many IIR staff members were ex-communists, convicted communists, and inside men who had served the Chinese communists.⁴² Public and secret information collected by spies and armed forces, or from communist publications all over the world (especially from Hong Kong), were sent to these “professionals”, who could analyze the changes in Chinese politics through the details and clues.

The ex-Secretary General of the ROC’s National Security Council Su Chi (蘇起) used to work in the IIR in the early 1980s and later became its deputy director. He stated that he had heard from some senior researchers that spies from Taiwan would collect obituary notices from mainland China. By studying how officials’ names were arranged on the notices, the IIR’s ex-communists could apply their practical experience and understanding of political culture to analyze changes of power in mainland China.

One of the achievements of these communist specialists was the publication by the IIR of the *Chinese Communist Who’s Who* in 1967. At a time when China was isolated from most of the world, this volume provided the biographies of officials in local and central government and was an important contribution to China studies.

The most famous communist researcher for the IIR was Warren Kuo (郭華倫). Arrested by the Kuomintang in the 1930s, he was once a high-ranking officer in the Chinese Communist Party but soon switched his loyalty to Chiang Kai-shek and served him by arresting his old comrades. After Japan surrendered, he was sent to Taiwan in 1946 to keep hunting communists. In 1955, he wrote a book on the history of Taiwanese communists. He was assigned to the IIR in 1963 and wrote a book called

⁴²The IIR’s archives still hold many of the personal files of these researchers. For public information, see the IIR’s website: <http://iir.nccu.edu.tw/dept3/writing.a.php?class2=L03&deptcl=depta3> (accessed January 7, 2014).

Analytical History of the Chinese Communist Party that was academically unique because it was produced at a time when even Communist China had no similar publication to analyze its own history.

**Assembling Scholars Domestically and Internationally:
Wu Chen-tsai**

Wu Chen-tsai (吳俊才) was the youngest founding member of the PAO, despite having joined as a part-time research fellow. He had studied in the United Kingdom and in India, was a professional correspondent, had taught at National Taiwan University and National Taiwan Normal University, and published a book on modern Indian history in 1954. In contrast to other staff, Wu Chen-tsai did not have significant military, government, or communist experience, but he was equipped with distinguished academic and writing capabilities that were reminiscent of Wang Pengsheng, which may have been why Chiang Ching-kuo and Chiang Kai-shek recruited him.

Bu Daomin deliberately raised Wu's status in the IIR, but his replacement of Bu Daomin was not smooth when the latter passed away in 1964. As mentioned, the IIR was a combination of soldiers, ex-spies, secret services, diplomats, and ex-communists, some of whom could not accept the leadership of a scholar/journalist. However, unlike the IIA, there was no longer intensive factional conflict because only Chiang Ching-kuo's clique was allowed in the institution. With strong support from the top, senior IIR researchers who stood against the young director were forced to leave.⁴³

Kuo Ting-yee used to believe that the IIR was just a unit of "newspaper clipping."⁴⁴ However, Wu Chen-tsai's academic prowess soon resulted in the further enhancement of the IIR's reputation in the govern-

⁴³Anonymous, "Taiwan zhengyao yangchengsuo (shang)," 113.

⁴⁴Kuo, *Guo Liangyu xiansheng riji cangao*, 174.

ment. Although there were always different units in the government to collect intelligence, no later than 1966, the IIR became the analytical center of intelligence for the ROC's international status.

Competition among different divisions was a major cause for the IIA's fall, but this was not the case with the IIR. After years of efforts, as stated above, in 1966 both Ye Xiangzhi (葉翔之, the head of Military Intelligence), and Chen Jianzhong (陳建中, the head of the Kuomintang's Division of Mainland Chinese Intelligence) recognized the leading status of the IIR in the fields of communist research, foreign intelligence exchanges, and international academic connections. These two intelligence units, similar to the BIS of the National Military Council and the BIS of the Kuomintang, keenly provided data for the IIR to strengthen the ROC's fading Chinese legitimacy in the world.⁴⁵

Wu's major contributions were as follows:

1. *Issues & Studies*

Wu realized Chiang Ching-kuo's continuous push to publish an English journal. The IIR's current major English periodical, *Issues & Studies*, was initiated soon after Wu became director. In a way, this publication realized Chiang Kai-shek's expectation of a "distinguished journal." Although it is still not as influential as *Foreign Affairs*, it has been a critical academic source for China Studies, and remains an influential publication in East Asia.

2. Service

With Chiang Kai-shek's support, Wu dedicated himself to providing more hospitality and convenience for foreign scholars who came to

⁴⁵See the letter of Chen Yuching (陳裕清, Director of Section Four, Central Committee of the Kuomintang) to Wu Chen-tsai, February 18, 1971, in "Files of Central Committee of Kuomintang," Social Science Information Center, National Chengchi University; Memo, Wu Chen-tsai's letter to Chiang Ching-kuo and National Security Bureau, January 25, 1967, in "Wu zhuren sihan" (Director Wu's personal letters), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

the IIR to conduct research. Wu hoped that if the IIR could satisfy their academic needs, then “they will publicize for us after they return to their country.”⁴⁶ His endeavor was recognized by the journal *The China Quarterly* in 1968.⁴⁷

The prospects for visitors wishing to engage in research on mainland affairs in Taiwan have taken a sharp upward turn since mid-1966. A change which has corresponded with a great improvement in the quality of analyses being published by the Nationalists themselves. To facilitate outside scholarly work, a “foreign guests reading room” has been set up in the offices of the “Institute of International Relations.” Here one can find secondary materials produced by several organizations on Taiwan, indexes of the holdings of a number of official libraries, and a small staff which tries very hard to help the visiting researcher obtain data he is interested in seeing and which provides introductions to other organizations which might have relevant materials. The reading room, the only one in the Institute with air-conditioning, has a high quality Ricoh copying machine, a microfilm reader-printer and desk space for five or six scholars.

3. Exchanges

When mainland China was relatively isolated from the world and information about it was difficult to access, the IIR was able to continually renew data for study by international scholars based on information from Taiwan’s intelligence units. The IIR was undoubtedly an important base for China Studies across the world. To further enhance the IIR’s reputation, Wu regularly exchanged documents and research fellows with reputable institutions such as the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, the Yenching Library at Harvard University, Kyoto University, the Cabinet Intelligence and Investigation Office in Japan, Freie Universität Berlin, and Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München.⁴⁸

In the early 1970s, such links gradually developed into large annual international conferences on mainland China affairs. The first meeting in December 1970 targeted exchanges with American scholars, with invitees

⁴⁶See note 38 above.

⁴⁷Gordon A. Bennett, “Hong Kong and Taiwan Sources for Research into the Cultural Revolution Period,” *China Quarterly*, no. 36 (December 1968): 137.

⁴⁸Anonymous, “Zhengyao yangchengsuo (shang),” 114.

including renowned scholars such as Allen S. Whiting, Michel Oksenberg, Robert A. Scalapino, C. Martin Wilbur, David N. Rowe, and Richard Walker. Taipei paid so much attention to this meeting that Chiang Kai-shek and his wife greeted the delegates with a tea party on Yangming Mountain. Such exchanges were later extended to Japanese scholars, and, later still, to European academics.

4. Policy Recommendations

Academic exchanges allowed Chiang Kai-shek to enlarge his information sources. For example, he paid particular attention to Robert A. Scalapino, who suggested Taiwan's separation from China in the Conlon Report of 1959. Chiang Kai-shek was not supposed to welcome this kind of scholar. However, the presidential office gave Dr. Scalapino special permission to visit Taiwan in 1968, and during his trip he visited the IIR, Chiang Ching-kuo's second-self General Wang Sheng (王昇), and Chiang Ching-kuo.⁴⁹

Wu Chen-tsai visited over 200 American scholars in December 1969, but when he reported on his tour to Chiang Kai-shek in February 1970, Chiang only asked about Scalapino's opinion, which was another sign of Taiwan's separation from China: "With economic advancement, Taiwanese will seek more political rights . . . we should recognize the fact that both Chinas exist at the same time."⁵⁰

At the same time, Chiang Ching-kuo told the National Security Bureau that "we used to say that to confront changing situations, we should

⁴⁹About Robert A. Scalapino's visit to Taiwan in 1968, see "Meiguo Shikalabinnuo jiaoshou fanghua, minguo 57 nian zhi 58 nian" (American Professor Scalapino's visit to the ROC, 1968-1969), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable. It is important to note that Scalapino's visit to Chiang Ching-kuo is not listed on this file. Dr. Scalapino released this information in his dialogue with Wu Chen-tsai in December 1969.

⁵⁰"Wushijiu nian er yue shiqi ri guojiguanxi yanjiusuo cheng guojia anquanju" (Memo, Policy Analysis Office to National Security Bureau on February 17, 1970), in "Qiancheng Jiang xiansheng, minguo 58 nian zhi 61 nian" (Reports to Mr. Chiang, 1969-1972), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

respond with no change of policy. Now, we are no longer like that.”⁵¹ Dr. Scalapino’s opinion may have helped Chiang Kai-shek and his son not to be so stubborn in their insistence on sole Chinese legitimacy, and explains the ROC’s cautious acceptance of the “Dual Representation” strategy in the 1971 UN Chinese Representation campaign.⁵²

5. Young Scholars

Wu Chen-tsai understood that the IIR would not always be able to rely on research fellows from mainland China because they would either retire or were short of training in contemporary social sciences. Therefore, he needed to generate new forces for the IIR’s future development. He usually targeted newly graduated PhDs from the United States and Europe, such as Chiu Hungdah (丘宏達), a Harvard PhD who later became a renowned law professor at the University of Maryland, and Hsu Cho-yun (許倬雲), a University of Chicago PhD who later became a renowned history professor at the University of Pittsburgh.

Another method of recruitment was through examinations. University graduates were allowed to take a test. Those who passed could serve as assistant research fellows. Retired researcher Chang Hu (張虎) related that although he passed the exam, he did not know the importance of the job until Wu Chen-tsai brought the new employees to meet Chiang Ching-kuo. Some staff members later became renowned scholars in Taiwan, such as Lee Benjing (李本京), who later earned his PhD at St. John’s University and became the Dean of the College of International Studies at Tamkang University.

In his meeting with Wu Chen-tsai, Chiang Kai-shek particularly

⁵¹“Jiang xiansheng dui dangqian shiju zhishi yaodian” (Mr. Chiang’s instructions for world situations), February 3, 1970, in “Jiang xiansheng dui benshi gongzuo zhishi, minguo 42 nian zhi 57 nian” (Mr. Chiang’s instructions to the Policy Analysis Office, 1953-1968), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable.

⁵²For Chiang’s Dual Representation strategy, please see Philip Hsiaopong Liu, “Dual Representation: Reviewing the Republic of China’s Last Battle in the UN,” *Issues & Studies* 47, no. 2 (June 2011): 87-118.

asked if there were Taiwanese working in the IIR.⁵³ Chiang Kai-shek may have had similar concerns to Dr. Scalapino: the Taiwanese might start calling for greater political rights, and it was thus imperative to nurture the Taiwanese political elite. Wu Chen-tsai paid specific attention to hiring Taiwanese-born scholars, such as Shi Chiyang (施啓揚), who later became a professor at the National Taiwan University and President of the Judicial Yuan. Among the IIR's Taiwanese scholars, the most famous was Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), who was President of the ROC between 1988 and 2000.

6. Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, Chengchi University

Young scholars recruited by the IIR were usually very popular with academics, and thus many did not serve in the IIR for long. To maintain a sustainable supply of research manpower, Wu decided to build a graduate school specifically for the IIR to produce talent in mainland China studies. The Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies of National Chengchi University was duly established, but its links with National Chengchi University were essentially a cover-up, because students in the institute were managed by the IIR and the National Security Bureau and had to pass a security check conducted by the Investigation Bureau of the Justice Ministry before they were admitted.

According to the National Security Bureau, the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies was to produce a talent pool not only for academics, but also for the use of the "state" and the "revolution."⁵⁴ Guo Guanying (郭冠英) was an alumnus of this institute and used to be a ranking official in the ROC Government Information Office. He remembered that students in the graduate institute enjoyed better financial support than those in other graduate institutes at National Chengchi University. Students

⁵³See note 50 above.

⁵⁴Memo, Office of Zhao Anguo to Wu Chen-tsai, on November 5, 1969, in "Xingzheng Zajian, Minguo 53-61" (Administrative Documents, 1964-1972), Institute of International Relations Archives, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, file number unavailable. The "Office of Zhao Anguo," according to a retired researcher Chang Hu, was a Kuomintang branch in the National Security Bureau.

were led by Wu Chen-tsai, who was very close to Chiang Ching-kuo, and studied among the secret service and ex-communists. He remembered.⁵⁵

There was a professor teaching agricultural economy. We paid no attention to him, and always fell asleep in his lectures. Was there any relationship between corn, wheat, and communism? We did not even understand his Mandarin-Taiwanese accent. We thought that this Executive Yuan's Minister without Portfolio might be one of Chiang Ching-kuo's talents nurtured by Wu Chen-tsai. . . . This professor was close to us. When the class was over, he drove all of the students in shifts to the Chih Nan Temple in his old Yue Loong vehicle and bought us rice noodles. He even told us to chase his daughter. He looked like a Japanese teacher cherishing his students. Too bad we were all too snobbish. We only cared about Wu Chen-tsai and looked down on this teacher.

This teacher was Lee Teng-hui, who had just earned his PhD from Cornell University. Retired researcher Chang Hu's wife was Wu Chen-tsai's assistant. She remembered that Lee was not very well off at that time, and often had to borrow 200 TWD in advance to be able to buy his students rice noodles.

In the early 1970s, a student developed by the PAO/IIR looking down on a caring professor such as Lee probably meant that students paid more attention to the political functions of the institution rather than its academic achievement. This kind of "academic institution" can only exist in a specific political environment. If the political environment changes, then the institution must make adjustments.

Reorganization

Although the Cold War did not end until the late 1980s, the IIR had been losing its advantage since the 1970s. First, Nixon's visit to Shanghai implied the inevitability of a full Sino-US exchange, and thus the IIR would no longer enjoy the monopoly on Chinese information. Second,

⁵⁵Guo Guanying, "Naxienian yanjiu Zhonggong de ren" (Chinese Communism researchers in those Years), *Want Daily*, May 21, 2012, <http://www.want-daily.com/portal.php?mod=view&aid=23874> (accessed on January 7, 2013).

because Taiwan had lost its UN seat and the United States was courting the Chinese Communists, it was meaningless for Taiwan to plan a counterattack against mainland China. Third, because Taiwan would soon lose official recognition, to keep international exchanges active the IIR had to dilute its relationship with the National Security Bureau.

In 1975, National Chengchi University again performed a cover-up. Theoretically, the transformation of the IIR meant that it became a division of the University so that “National Chengchi University” was included in the IIR’s Chinese title. However, due to its international reputation, the IIR retained its English title. Its relationship with the university was very weak, and it only participated in a very limited number of school meetings. In fact, it was still an independent institution.⁵⁶

Although the IIR was still very active in the diplomatic front, its relationship with Chiang Ching-kuo and the National Security Bureau was no longer the same. Since Chiang Ching-kuo took over his father’s political position, he became much less involved in managing IIR affairs personally. Moreover, the PAO ceased to exist and the chief of the Bureau Wang Yunshu (王永樹) stated that the IIR had “totally disconnected” from the Bureau.⁵⁷ Many IIR staff members who had no research capabilities returned to the Bureau. The IIR’s direct connection with top national security leaders began to decline; the prequel to the IIR was wound up in 1975.

The IIR continued as a government think tank, which was still a valuable national security asset as its scholars defended Taipei in international academic circles. Therefore, the Bureau continued to sponsor a large part of the IIR’s funding to speak for the ROC. Speaking for the ROC required outstanding language and theoretical skills. For this pur-

⁵⁶Interview with Jui Ho-cheng (芮和蒸), ex-director of the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies, National Chengchi University, see “Rui He-zheng Zhongguo yanjiu jingyan koushu lishi fangtan jilu” (Minutes from an interview with Jui Ho-cheng on his China studies experiences), interview, by the Research and Educational Center for China Studies and Cross Taiwan Strait Relations, Department of Political Sciences, National Taiwan University, <http://politics.ntu.edu.tw/RAEC/act02.php> (accessed June 21, 2013).

⁵⁷Anonymous, “Zhengyao yangchengsuo (xia),” 132.

pose, when researchers with communist/intelligence backgrounds either left or retired, more scholars with PhDs from European and American universities were recruited and gradually came to dominate the IIR. They cared much less about “state” and “revolution,” and more about the theoretical application of the social sciences. The IIR gradually came to rely more on its academic performance, instead of intelligence, to speak for the ROC. Academics therefore foretold the next stage of the IIR.

When Taiwan began to democratize in the 1990s, the definition of national security became debatable. In addition to civilian think tanks, the government had multiple channels through which to formulate its policies, so the IIR lost its unique position in the government. Without support from the government, the IIR required further reorganization and officially became part of National Chengchi University in 1996. Losing its status as an exclusive government think tank also implied that the IIR had to further rely on its academic competitiveness. Currently, the IIR is more of an academic institution because the University has strong research requirements and weak political needs. Dr. Cheng Tuanyao in 2010 briefly reviewed the evolution of the think tank over the past twenty years.⁵⁸

When I joined the IIR twenty years ago, there were about 80, 90, or even 100 professional researchers. If administrative staff are included, then there were about 140-150 people working in the IIR . . . the ex-president of the university then gave us shock therapy, cutting it down to about 80 people in the institution. Total staff numbers have now dropped to half of this number . . . politics has changed, so the institution must change too. As a research institution, our survival depends on our professional performance . . . we will be more and more academic . . . more and more like Academia Sinica.

Being an “Academia Sinica” of international/China studies was not the founding purpose of the IIR. Academics served as a tool to make the IIR’s tasks of propaganda and intelligence more professional. However, with the change of politics, this professional expertise proved to be the

⁵⁸Chung-han Wu, “Taiwan zhiku jigou zhi fenlei ji fazhan xiankuang yanjiu” (Categorization and development of Taiwan think tanks) (master’s thesis, Department of Political Science, National Taiwan University, 2010), 315-29.

most crucial feature in the IIR's existence, and will continue to direct the development strategy of this institution.

Conclusion

Today's IIR has far fewer employees than it once did, but its major English journal *Issues & Studies* has significantly more readers. In publication for half a century, *Issues & Studies* continues to extend its international academic influence. The Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Current Contents, Research Alert (Institute for Scientific Information, Philadelphia), ABC POL SCI (ABC-Clio, Inc., Santa Barbara, California), the International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBZ), the International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences (IBR) (Osnabrueck, Germany), the International Political Science Abstracts (Documentation Politique Internationale, Paris), International Development Abstracts (Oxford, England), the International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (London), and Sociological Abstracts (San Diego, California) have all included articles from *Issues & Studies* in their indices and/or abstracts.

To some extent, *Issues & Studies* is a summary of the IIR's history. The IIR and the Institute of International Affairs (IIA) were both formed at a time when the nation was confronting a formidable enemy. Although the IIA showed strong performance and had an ample number of intellectuals, it failed to build its academic value and, even worse, was thwarted by factional competition from formulating any permanent development strategy. As soon as the war was over, the IIA was no longer needed. This institute was disbanded and the only thing left was Wang Pengsheng's words of regret.

Compared with the destiny of the IIA, the IIR, although reduced in size, has been transformed into an academic institution and continues to have powerful publishing capabilities and plenty of excellent scholars. Why was the fate of the IIR so different from that of the IIA? First,

Chiang Kai-shek consolidated his power in Taiwan, which led to much less factional competition in the intelligence units. Second, Chiang Ching-kuo dominated the development strategy for the IIR, pushing hard for it to generate distinguished publications, leaving it free to select the best candidates for that specific mission. Third, based on extensive publication, the IIR not only used communist specialists to exploit information from mainland China, but also disseminated their work to international academics through Wu Chen-tsai, who dedicated himself to recruiting young scholars for the IIR's future growth. Thus, the IIR has always had a more solid base than the IIA, enjoying an ever-growing journalistic presence through *Issues & Studies*.

The history of the IIR before 1975 shows the importance of leadership and human capital in think-tank development. Scholars were assembled during a national crisis not only to fight the enemy through policy recommendations and propaganda, but also to nurture talent for the state. Summarizing the early years of the IIR through the concept of political party interests does not provide the whole picture. The early years of the IIR were spent establishing its professional image and academic features, which not only enhanced its value, but also ensured that, once political support ceased, rather than following the IIA into obscurity, the IIR would continue to shine in the academic arena.

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